グローバリゼーションの時代における計画の役割についての批判的な理解に向けて：グローバリゼーションとそれに対する都市・地域計画からの対応に関する文献研究

Toward a Critical Understanding of the Roles of Planning in the Age of Globalization:
A Literature Review on Globalization and Planning Responses

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Abstract

'Globalization' was not recognized as a significant concept in academic circles until the early or even mid-1980s. Today, scholars and professionals of various disciplines find it imperative to discuss globalization. For planning scholars and practitioners, globalization is also a critical issue because an increasing number of cities and regions have come to be affected by global forces, actors, and movements ever more directly. This paper examines a wide range of the theoretical discussions on globalization in the first chapter and explores its implications on planning and prospective planning responses in the second chapter. The paper focuses on six perspectives adopted by the major theoretical literature on globalization. They include historical, economic, cultural, flow, ideological, and spatial perspectives. Based on the wide range of theoretical approaches to globalization, the paper examines the literature on planning that considers globalization as a threat and opportunities for urban and regional planning. This review categorizes major theoretical approaches into the world-system approach, the locally oriented approach, and the protection approach, and it examines the limitations and potentials of planning in the face of globalization that can be understood from these six perspectives. The first approach aims to promote the linkage of localities with the global market to enhance economic competitiveness based on a laissez-faire capitalistic scheme. The second aims to strengthen local capacity for increasing employment and quality of life through local and global networks. The third aims to protect local life and economic spaces and resources from global forces. In the face of the complicated and multidimensional nature of globalization issues, it is necessary for planners to develop a theoretical foundation for globalization and to enhance the resilience of civil society when it is challenged by global changes and forces.

グローバライゼーションは、1980年代中ごろまで学界では重要な概念としては認識されていなかった。今日では様々な分野の学者や専門家が、グローバライゼーションについての議論が必須であると考えている。多くの都市や地域がグローバルな力や主体、活動によってより直接的に影響を受けるようになっていることを考慮すると、都市・地域計画分野の学者や実務家にとってもグローバライゼーションは重要な事項である。本論文は、主要な文献に現される、歴史や経済、文化などグローバライゼーションの6つの見方に焦点をあてる。さらにグローバライゼーションを計画にとっての脅威あるいは機会とみなす学術論

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文を調べる。ここではそれを、世界システム、地域試行、保護の3つの理論的アプローチ
に分類し、グローバライゼーションに直面する都市・地域計画の限界と可能性を探る。第
一のアプローチは、自由競争資本主義の枠組みにおける経済競争力を強化するためにグロー
バル市場と積極的に結びつこうとするもの。第2のアプローチは、地域とグローバル・ネッ
トワークを通して、地域での雇用や生活の質の向上を目指して地域の能力を高めようとす
るもの。第3のアプローチは、グローバルな力から地域生活や経済資源を守ろうとするも
の。全体として本論文は、複雑で多面的なグローバライゼーションに直面する計画家にとっ
て、それを知り、その力に対して市民社会の復元力を高めるための理論的基盤を強化しな
くてはならないことを確認する。

Introduction

'Globalization' was not recognized as a significant concept in academic circles until the early or even mid-1980s (Robertson 1992). Today, scholars and professionals of various disciplines find it imperative to discuss globalization. For planning scholars and practitioners, globalization is also a critical issue because an increasing number of cities and regions have come to be affected by global forces, actors, and movements ever more directly. Globalization presents both threats to and opportunities for cities and regions. The costs and benefits are borne by different groups of people disproportionately. Therefore, a sound understanding of the implications of globalization is vital for planners in order to avoid conflicts and to develop effective policy options that can take advantage of opportunities presented by it.

Currently, the global economy, or economic globalization, is among the most intensely discussed dimensions of globalization discussed in literature and the mass media, but there are other equally important aspects. This paper will examine a wide range of the theoretical discussions on globalization and explore its implications on planning and prospective planning responses.

In the first chapter I will review the literature in terms of six sets of perspectives (historical, economic, cultural, flow, ideological, and spatial) which can provide a conceptual framework for understanding the breadth and depth of diverse discussions on globalization. The central questions that frame the literature review are: what is changing globally and what are the forces causing these changes?

In the second chapter I will examine current major planning practices in the face of globalization. I will divide them into three approaches (world-system, locally oriented, and protection) and discuss the theoretical foundations that justify planning intervention and the strengths and weaknesses of each type of practice.

I. Representative perspectives of globalization
1. Historical perspectives

The development of linkages between different parts of the world through a variety of media, in a variety of modes and from a variety of purposes is the most distinctive event of our recent history. In this section I will review some of the literature and focus on historical

questions such as: when globalization began, how it has developed, and how it has continued.[1]

1) Origins

The most influential explanation of the historical processes of globalization is developed in discussions of world-systems. It provides us with a fundamental framework to start examining the origin of globalization. World-system theories have been developed by different scholars, but Immanuel Wallerstein is considered by many to be the most influential world-system theorist.[2] In particular, Wallerstein's (1974, 1980) "The Modern World System" presents extensive and detailed historical processes of the development of the world-system. He defines the world-system[3] as the only single social system which can be the unit of analysis of social change in the modern world. It should be noted that his analysis focuses only on the 'European' world-economy. He considers that only it has survived and come to dominate the world-economy without being transformed into another form of the world-economy, i.e., a world-empire as represented by China. He suggests that the origin of the world-system goes back to the creation of modern capitalism in Europe during a period from 1450 to 1640 and that it was based on two key institutions: namely, a worldwide division of labour and bureaucratic state machinery. The role of new technologies during the Middle Ages also played an important role in the transformation of the world but did not lead automatically to the development of capitalism. This is shown in his argument about the process of empire building in China, which possessed equivalent or even more advanced levels of technologies than Europe in the fifteenth century.

An organizing concept of Wallerstein's world system is the categorization of the world into core, periphery and semiperiphery zones,[4] according to different modes of labour control. He suggests that their relation to product and productivity affected the rise of capitalist elements and he states that a 'capitalist era' emerges in the sixteenth century and that it takes the form of a world-economy. Another constituent element of the modern world-system is that the states were structured differently, with the core states being the most centralized. Wallerstein's discussions are concerned only with the European world and not with whether the world-economy covered the entire world. His analysis of the development of capitalism demonstrates that historical and geopolitical contingencies are the driving forces of the development of the world-system. However, history is seamless and the world is connected by a variety of actors, means and purposes, the identification of an exact date of the birth of the world-system is not an easy task and is subject to the specific considerations of each researcher.

Abu-Lughod (1989) challenges Wallerstein's Eurocentred world-system viewpoint, which she finds is dominant in world system debates.[5] Opposing the Eurocentric approach, which assumes that Europe is a single hegemony dominating the world-system, Abu-Lughod extends her view to non-European worlds in order to examine the world-system more inclusively. She criticizes Wallerstein's view shown in the first two volumes of "the Modern World-System" as tending to treat the European-dominated world system as if it was just born from nothing. She argues that it is necessary to examine the period before European hegemony in order to understand the roots

of Western hegemony in the "modern world-system." She concentrates specifically on numerous pre-existent world-economies between 1250~1350, when an international trade economy was developing from northwestern Europe to China. In her discussion, Abu-Lughod considers Europe as an upstart periphery when it joined the long distance trade system stretching from the Mediterranean through to China.

In fact, Wallerstein reviews events in the world in the three centuries prior to 1450. However, he focuses on the transformation and the crisis of Western European feudalism and the implications for the development of capitalism in Europe. Thus, Wallerstein's theory has a limited capacity to understand the origins of a system which has come to penetrate an increasingly larger part of the world. Although Abu-Lughod's explanation is not completely inclusive either, her emphasis on non-European spheres contributes to raising awareness of the existence of dynamic regional relationships which continued to reorganize capitalism and the division of labour.

2) Global Linkages

The intensification of linkages between distant cities and states via various media is a fundamental feature of globalization. As Robertson (1992: 8) notes, the world is being compressed. Although limited to the European system, the process of the formation of core, semiperipheral and peripheral areas illustrates how the production and accumulation of capital became possible through relative degrees of interaction between the three zones.

Abu-Lughod notes that the pattern of world system development presented by Wallerstein (1974), i.e., different modes of production (capitalist, semifeudal, and precapitalist) and their corresponding three zones (core, periphery, and semiperiphery), is not the only one conceivable for a world system. These elements were found in a number of places around the globe. Her remarks indicate that the interaction of different places of the world cannot simply be categorized and that multiple perspectives are needed to capture the essential nature of global linkages.

An important feature of this categorization is its focus on colonialism as an organizing force. King (1990a, 1990b) articulates the process of the formation of colonial relationships in a single world-economy, based on Wallerstein's theory. King focuses specifically on urbanism,[6] particularly built-up parts of the Imperial city (London) and British colonial cities in order to understand the impact of the world-economic forces on cities. King suggests that the built-up environment was both a product of and a major resource for understanding the process of global integration and interdependency. This approach can provide us with a substantive method of finding both modes of integration and the influence of the formation of the world-economy. Although King adopts a Eurocentric perspective, his approach can be applicable to understanding non-European world-systems. It is important to note that he articulates that colonialism is the origin of today's economic globalization and he understands colonialism as a two-way interaction between colonies and colonizers. In the post-colonial era, their modes of linkage have basically changed but a more complex division of labour is emerging as an unequal linking mechanism.

3) Continuity

Whether and how the world-system has changed or is changing is an important question for planners because planning needs to not only know the past but to predict the future. Therefore, historical patterns of change need to be understood. Knox and Agnew (1989: 87) mention that Wallerstein et al. (1979) draw upon Kondratieff cycles in order to describe the cyclical changes and secular trends of the capitalist world-economy. Although the Kondratieff cycles show the dynamic changes in the world-economy, they cannot show the organizing actors of the system in the world-economy, i.e., the members of and their status in the system. As Wallerstein suggests, the status of the core, the periphery and the semiperiphery is dynamic and thus it is important to ask in which place a city and region can be positioned in order to develop policy options in the face of globalization.

Chase-Dunn (1985), following Wallerstein's theory of a single system of world cities, proposes a way to identify how cities of the capitalist world-economy participate in a single interactive spatial system[7]. He argues that it is important to know which cities are in the capitalist world-economy and which cities are not in order to understand changes in the structure of the world-system. He tries to specify boundaries of the capitalist world-economy by investigating the density of networks of exchange between cities (i.e. the degree of the integration of a city system) through indicators known as the city-size distribution."[8] Using these indicators he examines city-size hierarchies at the world level for the past 1000 years and finds that there have been no fundamental changes to the system. The characteristics of the latest changes can be explained as a variable of trends, cycles, or structural features that have been continuously changing for over 500 years.

Present regional development, though, has been moving from hierarchical development patterns within the state to more policies favouring decentralization. In the face of this shift, the extent this indicator is (or will be) effective is questionable. The fact that the expansion of city regions around the world also contributes to blurring boundaries between neighbouring cities also makes his approach questionable. For example, he considers Tokyo-Yokohama as one unit which determines the city-size but the omission of surrounding cities other than Yokohama, such as Omiya (Saitama prefecture) and Makuhari (Chiba prefecture), does not reflect the reality of the growth of city region in the area. His study presents one method of understanding patterns of growth and the decline of cities in the context of a capitalist world-economy. It does not, however, consider the realities of either current development or growth patterns.

2. Economic perspectives

As Cox (1997: 1) suggests, the globalization of economic relations has become part of the everyday diet of social science and public affairs. In this section, I will review the literature which specifically focuses on the latest development in economic globalization.

1) Forces and factors

The key proposition of the literature on the global economy is that an unprecedented change

in the capitalist system began in the 1980s (Amin and Thrift, 1992: 575; Castells, 1996: 13; Dunning, 1993: 601). The main actors of the dramatic changes are multinational corporations (MNC) or transnational corporations (TNCs). Although the definitions and criteria of the terms vary and are often used interchangeably,[9] the term MNC will be used in this paper.

It should be noted that the MNC is not necessarily a recent capitalist innovation: MNCs have been of significance in the world economy since the colonial era but have been emerging as a dominant force since the 1960s (Hamilton 1986).[10] Changes in their operations and in their organizational and productive structures in the 1980s characterize the new type of MNCs (Castells 1996; Dunning 1993). Castells argues that the fundamental feature of this new economy driven by MNCs is the increasing interpenetration of all economic processes at the international level with the system working as a unit in real time on a planetary scale.[11] He suggests that the driving forces of this change are the dramatic breakthroughs in information technologies known as "the Information Technology Revolution." The new information technologies began to organize the new economy around global networks of capital, management, and information. Observing the worldwide spread of this unique pattern of economic changes, he defines the new economy as both informational and global.

"It is *informational* because the productivity and competitiveness of units or agents in this economy (be it firms, regions, or nations) fundamentally depend upon their capacity to generate, process, and apply efficiently knowledge-based information. It is *global* because the core activities of production, consumption, and circulation, as well as their components (capital, labour, raw materials, management, information, technology, markets) are organized on a global scale, either directly or through a network of linkages between economic agents. It is informational and global because, under the new historical conditions, productivity is generated through and competition is played out in a global network of interaction." (Castells 1996: 67)

Along with the advancements in transportation technologies, the new information technologies resulted in the centralization of corporate decision making into a smaller number of headquarters and the decentralization of more routine tasks across national boundaries (Hamilton, 1986: 16). Hamilton presents this organizational development process as an interlocking spread of MNC business, drawing upon the example of American car manufacturers: when they enter a foreign market, not only vehicle component producers but also non-manufacturing sectors such as financing or marketing subsidiaries, are brought in together.

Amin and Thrift (1992) consider those global actors as becoming increasingly oligopolistic, decentralizing (globalizing) their operational functions and organizations and centralizing (localizing) the functions of the 'head' (i.e. power and control). Castelles (1996: 95) asserts that while all firms do not sell worldwide, their strategic aim is to sell whenever they can throughout the world. Even though he does not expect that the world economy will become fully integrated, he does argue that the quasi-total integration of capital markets will make all economies globally

interdependent.[12]

This notion of global interdependence is an important one in any discussion of globalization. The concept 'interdependency,' though, is misleading because economic actors do interact but do not necessarily depend on one another. In addition, the fact that a significant portion of economic transactions occur between a limited number of MNCs indicates that 'interdependency' is not globally even. As Castells suggests, the process of restructuring the capitalist system at a global scale, which has come to affect the livelihoods of virtually every person (be it directly or indirectly), needs to be examined even more extensively.

2) Globalization and regionalization

Global economic relationships driven by MNCs can be analyzed in terms of: trade, investment, production, financial exchanges, labour migration, international economic cooperation, and organizational practices (Waters 1995: 66). Bhalla (1998) notes that trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) are the most commonly used indicators of global integration. However, the analysis of those indicators does not necessarily identify global integration of economies: it often reveals regional integration. Castells introduces Barbara Stallings' view that economic relationships have developed not globally, but rather regionally. Preston (1998) notes that Hirst and Thompson (1996) argue that globalization does not exist because the current world economy shows more regionalization and that internationalization[13] is a better concept to understand the real-world dynamics of the system.

The discussion about whether we are experiencing globalization or regionalization needs to be developed with great care. For instance, it should be noted that the definition of "region" also varies. More importantly, the current efforts of international economic institution building aiming at regional cooperation, such as APEC and EU, can be understood as a response to the growth of global economies (when the extension of their membership is observed). It is that the growing international coordination in and across a region proves the existence of stronger economic forces which transcend national and regional boundaries too swiftly and selectively for them to control.[14]

Castells identifies three major economic regions in the world: North America, the European Union, and the Asian Pacific region and suggests that regionalization is a fundamental attribute of the informational/global economy. With his two diagrams showing the structure of world trade (and the structure of world direct foreign investment), Castelles argues that economic agents operate in a global network of interactions that transcends national and geographic boundaries and that shows the existence of a global economy.

It is important to note that the concept of economic globalization cannot be compared directly with that of economic regionalization. The former tends to focus on the development of the functional capacity of MNCs to operate across national boundaries on a global scale and the resultant formation and reformation of strategic networks. The latter tends to focus more on reciprocal economic relationships between states, focusing on issues of free trade or the protection of domestic interests. It is useful to understand that "globalization" can result in

inequality among regions and nations within which inequalities occur at various levels such as economic sectors, ethnic groups, gender, etc. Against the statement made by managing directors of major European MNCs that their firms create wealth for society, Hamilton criticizes their lack of social responsibility arguing that the wealth created is distributed very unevenly.

3. Cultural perspectives

Culture is another pillar of discussion topics about globalization. The main thesis of the discussion on cultural issues is that cultural factors shape world economies and politics. The definition of culture varies, but for the sake of the discussion in this section I use the term culture as beliefs, values, images and symbols of a particular group.

1) Homogenization and differentiation

The literature focusing on cultural aspects of globalization examines cultural reasons for socioeconomic and political tensions commonly seen at a global scale. Discussions about the spread of Western (American) culture all over the world and how societies adapt to or resist it account form a significant portion of the literature. Those issues are discussed on the lines of modernization theories as Waters (1995) suggests. Robertson (1992: 12) states that crucial issues are the degree that globalization encourages or involves homogenization (as opposed to heterogenization) and universalization (as opposed to particularization).

In cultural discussions, mass media draw special attention because they convey images which transmit Western culture all over the world. In other words, mass media provide a key mechanism for capitalism associated with consumerism[15] to be spread instantaneously at a global scale. Consequently, the world has come to be conceived as being compressed and the consciousness of the world as a whole has come to be intensified (Robertson 1992: 8). It is not difficult to understand empirically how the whole world has been influenced by Western capitalist culture when we watch television or visit non-Western cities. But as Waters (1995: 139) suggests, responses from different societies or different members of a society are complex and interwoven. The responses represent the uniqueness of each society and its value and belief systems.

Barber (1995) addresses the issues of cultural homogenization and differentiation in his book with a metaphorical title, Jihad vs. McWorld. He argues that civil society is in danger in the face of two opposing processes: one is explained with the concept of 'Jihad' and the other with 'McWorld.' He discusses the opposing nature of the two as follows. The former represents actions against every kind of interdependence, against every kind of artificial social cooperation and mutuality, against technology, against pop culture, and against integrated markets, against modernity itself as well as the future in which modernity rules. McWorld represents actions to nurture economic, technological and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity. It transforms nations into a homogenous global theme park where people are mesmerized by fast music, fast computers, and fast food - MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's.

Barber considers markets, by their very nature, to be unfair while judging (Islamic)

fundamentalism as relatively inhospitable to democracy. His view is that both Western consumer culture, dominant at a global scale, and fundamentalist cultures opposed to it, are indifferent to civil liberties and beyond the control of any national or international entity. He states that they both make war on the sovereign nation-state and thus undermine the nation-state's democratic institutions - therefore nations cannot use either to improve or maintain democracy. It should be noted that Barber argues that while the two opposing cultures are not willing to coexist with the other, they are neither complete without the other; they struggle with each other but are locked together. This suggests that the more Western capitalist culture spreads over the world and increases cultural homogenization, the stronger anti-capitalist forces resist. However, as Barber suggests, the interaction of Jihad and McWorld is complicated and intertwined. The actual process of how societies adapt to and reject the consumption culture is often more complicated.

In his discussion about modernization theory, Robertson refers to Baum's (1974, 1980) claim that societies are converging in some respects (mainly economic and technological), diverging in others (mainly social-relational) and, in a special sense, staying the same in yet others. Robertson finds that Baum contributed significantly to injecting the issue of societal continuity into the debate of globalization. These discussions suggest that both homogenization and differentiation are both seemingly advancing domestically and globally.

2) Transnational connections

Another crucial aspect of the globalization of culture is its ability to transcend spatial boundaries and connect different parts and peoples of the world, either gradually (e.g. TV programs) or instantly (e.g. Internet). Waters (1995) suggests that the globalization of human society is contingent on the extent to which cultural arrangements are effective relative to economic and political arrangements. He argues that material (economic) exchanges localize; political exchanges internationalize; and symbolic exchanges globalize. Following this argument, the degree of globalization would be greater in the cultural arena than either of the two.[16] These symbols themselves need to be universal in order to spread on a global scale. Images, then, become more influential than ideas, which are transmitted via languages that limit the number or classes of members that can understand. Thus, although English has become increasingly dominant (whatever happened to Esperanto?), images, or non-verbal symbols, are often an even more effective means of communication than any one language.

Lash and Urry (1994), who focus on mediated culture, articulate that world-popular TV programs and world-wide events are "the global cultural currency" of the late twentieth century. They consider that global networks of communication and information are critical in the globalization of culture and argue that the most important implication of these networks is that they produce more in the way of images and less in the way of ideas. According to Lash and Urry, images are not homogeneous and represent different values and ideologies and places and thus they form multiple worlds. They argue that there is not a global culture which produces uniformity but a number of processes which are producing the globalization of culture. The

multiplication of worlds could be more accelerated given that individuals are becoming increasingly influential producers and consumers of cultural symbols through the Internet.

3) Culture of consumption

Appadurai (1990) identifies the global network in terms of five dimensions of global cultural flows: ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes. These five factors constitute building blocks for what Appadurai terms 'imagined worlds.'[17] Lash and Urry (1994) first argue that important features of Appadurai's model are that 'de-territorialization' characterizes all of the scapes; and second, that as a consequence mediascapes are of increasing cultural significance and are overtaking ideoscapes in importance. Their argument is that if much of contemporary culture is in some sense postmodern then this means that these mediascapes are global or at least transnational. Drawing upon Bauman (1989), they argue that contemporary culture is not tied to nations and is thus context-less, while modern culture was grounded in the realities of the nation state. This is the reason why they consider that globalization can be represented in mediascapes.

Lash and Urry also discuss diversity in receivers of mediated cultural products; they live in a specific context of their nations but receive context-less images as consumers. Lash and Urry refer to Ohmae's (1990) argument that those consumers living in 'the borderless society' lack allegiance to particular national societies and their particular products and images. The above discussion implies that citizens are increasing defining themselves as consumers at the expense of national identity. Thus, it is important to understand how the primacy of the globalization of culture over those of economy and politics affects notions of citizenship or conditions for citizenship.

4. Flow perspectives

As Cox (1997: 19) notes, the flows of goods and services, information, capital and people characterize the present world: "flow" is a key concept of globalization. Because of its significance, some of the issues of flow are discussed along with other substantive topics elsewhere in this paper. In this section I will discuss the driving forces behind flow and migration.

1) Driving forces

Lash and Urry (1994: 252) suggest that modern society is a society on the move; modern societies have brought about striking changes in the nature and experience of motion or travel. They argue that the modern world is inconceivable without new forms of long-distance transportation and travel. Regarding these new forms, both technologies and the social organization of travel represented by Thomas Cook's voucher system are equally important. In other words, one cannot generate the global movement of people and other things without the other. Dicken (1986: 106 - 115) presents a similar view of the progress of overcoming the distance barrier in his discussion on TNCs. He states that transport and communication are two

important enabling technologies for TNCs in order to operate globally but that the coordination and control of large, geographically dispersed business enterprises also requires an appropriate 'organizational technology.'

Rimmer (1994) argues that improvements in the capacity of external and internal transportation and communication networks are critically significant in the development of macroeconomic corridor regions, or 'new infrastructural arenas,' now being formed, for example, in Europe extending from southeast England through northern France, the industrial belts of northern and southern Germany, to northern Italy and southern France. It shows that the progress of worldwide air links, high speed rail, expressways and telecommunications technologies has brought an expansion of multinational enterprises' activities. These factors have also contributed to the development of corridor regions in which states, firms and supraregional organizations reorganize themselves, seeking opportunities for cooperation. These movements indicate that the increase of movement of people, goods and information are facilitated by both technologies and social, economic and political reorganization. Keeling (1995), though, suggests that their interaction is a two-way process and thus their causality is not so easy to locate.

2) Migration

Migration is not new but has grown dramatically in both volume and significance since 1945 (most particularly since the mid-1980s) and is one of the most important factors in global change (Castles and Miller 1993: 3, 4). Skeldon (1997) suggest that migration cannot be understood isolated from social, cultural, economic and political conditions and changes, and that internal and international migration cannot be separated. As Skeldon suggests, the increasingly complicated nature of migration requires a researcher to examine the phenomenon comprehensively.

Skeldon identifies a migration system that links regions and sectors together. Skeldon's approach is to divide the world into five coherent development regions in order to analyze critically the changing international migration systems.[18] He argues that there are no better criteria than GNP for dividing the world into economic regions. He always for deficiencies in GNP (as a measurement tool) and the existence of other measurements, but considers it to be a relatively coherent measurement. He also refers to the difficulty of identifying regions but claims that the five regions are appropriate for his analysis. Skeldon's argument is that migration is still largely regional rather than global. This is based on his finding that the networks of migration are as highly concentrated as those of capital. Based on the system of five regions, he argues that migration occurs quite intensely between specific regions. For example, as the most notable example, he shows that migration does not occur from the most isolated areas with small economies, which he calls "resource niches," (examples shown by him include the highly urbanized desert kingdoms of the Middle East, the dispersed hunter-gathers of the Amazonian rainforests and the populations of the islands of the Pacific or the Caribbean) to developed areas (i.e. the 'old core' areas of western Europe, North America and Australasia and the 'new core' areas in East Asia). Because he analyzes the flow of population movement

between five regions determined by himself, his conclusion could differ if he changed his methods of grouping the regions. He insists the system can explain migration clearly while other flows such as foreign investment or trade cannot sufficiently demonstrate relationships with population movements. Castles and Miller try to understand international migration by linking immigration to ethnic relations.

Castles and Miller present contrasting views to Skeldon's. They use the concept of globalization quite loosely to express the expansion of migration in the world. They argue that the globalization of migration is the trend as countries affected by migratory movements are increasing, and moreover, areas of origin are becoming increasingly diversified. They do not; however, mention the regionalization of migration at all; they focus on international nature of migration. Interestingly, maps of world migration in both Castles and Miller's and Skeldon's books show very similar migration patterns despite differing conclusions. Maps made by Castles and Miller, which indicate the flows of people with their origins and destination countries connected by arrows indicating peoples' movements, can basically support Skeldon's regionalization theory if the boundaries of the five regions are imposed on them. Castles and Miller do not adopt a regional framework, though.

Castles and Miller focus only on the aspects of the increase and diversification of transnational migration, regardless of any economic gaps (as measured by GNP between origins and destinations). In other words, they do not take into consideration differences between economic conditions in different countries, which often have a close, or even direct, relationship with migration; they focus only on the fact that people move across borders all over the world, including the poorest counties. On the other hand, Skeldon focuses on economic gaps and the concentration of migration in specific areas and identifies the correlation between GNP levels and migration patterns: He uses differences between countries in economic development as a consideration. By doing so, he can conclude that international migration does not largely occur between countries with significant differences in GNP levels and thus it is not thoroughly globalized.

5. Ideological Perspectives

The idea of the unification of the whole world under a single shared political ideology has a long history. Today, liberal democracy has come to be identified by many scholars as the ideology that cannot be replaced by any others. Fukuyama (1992) and Huntington (1991) are amongst the strongest advocates of this idea (Waters, 1995: 118) and Ohmae (1990) advocates it particularly in the economic sphere.

1) Political liberalism

Fukuyama and Huntington assert that the global expansion of liberal democracy, beginning in the 1970s, is an irreversible movement and will eventually become the universal ideology. Both of them acknowledge that while the growth of democracy has not been continuous or unidirectional it has emerged as a global trend society has never experienced before. They

admit authoritarianism still exists or even that its resurgence occurs in some countries but argue that the notion of democracy has a decisive influence on virtually every part of the globe (Fukuyama: 12). Huntington names the trend "the Third Wave of Democratization" and Fukuyama (more radically) "the End of History." While Fukuyama emphasizes that the idea (not necessarily the practice) of liberalism is the only ideology which can be universal, Huntington focuses on the propaganda power of the American image and identifies possible threats to the Third Wave. He argues that the American democratic model could lose ideological credibility among people who are seeking liberal democracy in authoritarian societies or weak democratic societies if it does not appear to bring freedom, strength and success. The symbolic center of this ideology is the United States and thus movements for democracy throughout the world in the 1980s were inspired by, and borrowed from, the American example.

Waters (1995: 121) argues that it is necessary to consider the possibility of cultural variations in liberal democracy from "American" values, referring to Sweden's high level of state intervention and personal taxation as an example. His argument leads to the question of the political meaning of identifying and endorsing a global ideology (i.e. liberal democracy) and defining the world as being unified by the ideology. In short, Fukuyama and Huntington strongly support the homogenizing world called "McWorld" by Barber (1995) and regard events happening outside of it (in Barber's "Jihad" world) as negligible. This approach is quite popular with business communities who are eager for liberalism and democracy for the expansion of their activities on a global scale. Therefore, it is understandable that they were enthused by calls of "the triumph of democracy" made when the former Soviet Union collapsed. Given the continuous and increasingly complicated tensions in civil societies around the world, the announcement of the global victory of liberal democracy is dismissive of legitimate or necessary political and economic processes that do not fall under their umbrella of liberal democracy. As Waters suggests, the concept of "liberal democracy" as explained by Fukuyama falls short of explaining the diversified and conflictual natures of "liberal democracies" in the world.

2) Economic liberalism

Economic liberalism is strongly advocated by Ohmae (1990), a leading business management consultant. He specifically discusses the right of people to conduct free economic activity and economic exchange based on private property and markets, focusing on multinational companies and consumers in an emerging world economy. The central concern of his argument is the efficiency of free-market economies, which are most extensively developed in 'the Inter-linked Economy (ILE)' of the Triad (the United States, Europe, and Japan), joined by aggressive economies such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. He argues that ILE "is becoming so powerful that it has swallowed most consumers and corporations, made traditional national borders almost disappear, and pushed bureaucrats, politicians, and the military toward the status of declining industries." He states that most of the wealth in the world is created, consumed and distributed in the ILE; it is a marketplace which creates value through the free flow of goods and money. In the ILE, consumers and multinational companies are major actors in

creating value across national borders. Ohmae suggests that this leads to the development of a borderless and interlinked economy, and the competition between cities and between regions becomes more intense; economic competition is not only between nation-states anymore.

His focus is exclusively on the market for high value-added products and services, which drive national economies and ignores economic linkages between the Triad and its external areas. He is not concerned about the fact that the former depends on the latter in terms of cheap resources and labour. He also ignores the fact that in the latter democracy is often being undermined by multinational corporations, which he insists are supposed to be true servants of consumers around the world. This explains the reason why those MNCs do not need to pay attention to the citizens of the external areas; that is because those people are not consumers to the same extent as Triad citizens are. Nevertheless, his discussion clearly paints a realistic picture of the growing economic competitions in the free-market composed of those three strong regions.

This above discussion shows increasing challenges to the legitimacy of traditional political ideologies of government, which must serve both the national economic well-being and civil society. His central message about the government is that old-fashioned bureaucrats and politicians who still try to plan and develop the economy should be thrown out. In reality, he strongly advocated the increase of efficiency in governance, including extensive privatization measures, in his speech while running for Governor of Tokyo Metropolitan Government. He suggests a role of the government as: protector of the environment, educator of the work force, and builder of a safe and comfortable social infrastructure. He maintains that the role of government is not to provide options that implement policies, but to free individuals so they can make choices according to their personal tastes. These allow MNCs freedom from major social responsibility. Ohmae's view ignores the reality of a world that does not consist exclusively of consumers and MNCs. His view seems to favour freedom only for those exclusive members.

6. Spatial perspectives

Most of the major cities of the world (integrated into the networks of the world economy) have experienced significant spatial changes. These changes have taken diverse forms and thus different scholars have used different conceptual frameworks in their studies. The most extensively studied cities are those called "world" or "global" cities.[19] Many of the latest studies of world/global cities have been triggered by the World City Hypothesis presented by Friedmann and Wolff (1982). Although some scholars criticize the WCH,[20] it can provide an initial step toward understanding spatial issues occurring in world/global cities.

1) Economic Space and Life Space

Friedmann and Wolff (1982) first proposed the WCH in order to examine the spatial organization of the new international division of labour caused by the growth of transnational capital institutions after World War II. The hypothesis was revised and reformulated with the main theses that link urbanization processes to global economic forces by Friedmann (1986).[21]

In their paper, Friedmann and Wolff suggest possible and ongoing physical restructuring in world/global cities. They are concerned about the emergence and expansion of urbanized regions which are experiencing unequal internal growth, the concentration of activities and wealth and division in internal spatial structures (i.e. the 'citadel' and the 'ghetto'). Friedmann and Wolff consider that those factors would cause conflicts between economic space and life space.

Although Hall (1966, 1977) deals with the similar problems[22] in his analysis of world cities -focusing on population growth, urbanization, and the concentration of urban growth in the great metropolitan areas- the WCH attempts to examine the impact of linking world cities with global forces.[23] The concentration of global business command functions represents the strength of the linkages between cities and the world economy; it forms them into world/global cities.

Sassen (1991) focuses specifically on the process of concentration of "global economic control capability" in her global cities of New York, London and Tokyo, and also addresses changes in sociospatial forms caused by the concentration. Practically, the separation of the impacts of economic globalization on urban spaces is not easy because urban economic systems in global cities are highly complex and are changing rapidly. Sassen concedes that the built-in rigidities of physical structures limit spatial transformations and instead focuses only on distinct sociospatial forms arising out of restructuring processes in global cities. They are high-income residential and commercial gentrification, massive construction projects, and sharp increases in spatially concentrated poverty and physical decay. What these spatial transformation suggest is that segmentation and spatial unevenness has reached dimensions not typical of earlier decades.[24]

2) Spatial polarization

In Friedmann's (1995: 324) account, spatial polarization arises from class polarization in world cities. Three principal facets of class polarization are presented: huge income gaps between transnational elite and low-skilled workers, large-scale immigration from rural areas or from abroad, and structural trends in the evolution of jobs. According to this explanation, popular access to urban resources and services is becoming increasingly uneven, comparing new global actors with those left behind of emerging economic opportunities. This polarization is not unique to global cities in developed countries. Douglass (1998) shows the increase of social and spatial polarization in the process of world city formation on the Asian Pacific rim. He argues that in cities seeking global economic integration, slum and squatter settlements appear almost daily on the urban fringes, while the construction of high-rise commercial centres and luxury neighbourhoods seems to proceed concurrently.

3) Scale

There is no commonly accepted set of criteria and standards for a 'World/global city.' Most of the literature on world/global city indicate that it is a city viewed as distinctive for its global functions. As King (1995: 217) suggests, 'World/global city' might have an infinite number of meanings.[25] Therefore, different spatial scales - which are fundamental to the study of cities and

regions - are adopted by different scholars explicitly and implicitly. For example, the global city 'Tokyo' could be more than one: Hall's (1966, 1977) and Sassen's (1991) Tokyo is the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, but the latter focuses more on central areas than the former, and C hase-Dunn's (1985) includes Tokyo and Yokohama. Others could, and do, include major cities in Saitama and Chiba prefecture as well.

Knox (1995: 3) addresses the issues of scale vis-a-vis world cities. He notes that a world city can be analyzed at several spatial scales: from urban through regional, national, and core-periphery scales to the global. He states that "Scale is an active progenitor of specific social processes." He insists that 'world city-ness', but not the 'world city' itself, can be located at several different scales. He presents the following four pertinent scales for theorizing world cities:

• The global urban system;
• The regional interface between world cities and nation-states or groups of nation-states that constitute core, semi-peripheral, or peripheral regions;
• The placelessness of world cities;
• The metropolitan scale.

His ideas demonstrate that the spatial scale of a world city depends on the identification of 'world-cityness.'

Beauregard (1995: 238) discusses actors and scale. He suggests that once we focus our attention on the agents of power and control who literally make scale, the partitioning of space into global-national-regional-local spheres seems simplistic. He also states that a multitude of actors, each with different geographical interests and influences, create a multitude of spatial scales and he suggests that actors simultaneously have interests on multiple spatial scales. Be auregard's arguments imply that a world/global city can be interpreted as a district, a city, a metropolitan area, etc., according to the method of identification of world city-ness.

It should be noted that Friedmann (1993. quoted by Simmonds 1995) argues that "World cities are large urbanized spaces of intense economic and social interaction" and uses the term "regional cities." Simmonds suggests 'Global City Region' is the right term to represent today's world/global city. Agnew et al (1999) adopt the term 'Global City-Region" in order to extend the meaning of the idea proposed by Hall(1966), Friedmann and Wolff (1982) and Sassen (1991) so as to stress even further the importance of city-regions as fundamental spatial units of the global economy and as political actors on the world stage.

II. Planning responses to globalization

Previous discussions of the six perspectives demonstrate the development of dynamic global changes at an unprecedented level, and their influences on cities and regions. From a planning perspective, the changes can be seen as either threats or opportunities, or both. An imperative task for planners who are empowered by political communities to speak for them is to avoid

problems and make things better through planning (Friedmann and Wolff 1982) in the face of dynamic global changes. In this chapter, I will discuss various types of planning responses to global changes and examine their potential and their limitations.

Much of the literature on planning (dealing with globalization and global cities) explicitly and implicitly frames discussions along the dichotomic notion of global and local. This is simply because planners plan within their localities, i.e., cities, regions and nation states, but do not plan beyond them. However, this simplistic and self-limiting notion of planning is insufficient in considering planning in the age of globalization. Beauregard (1995: 232) suggests that understanding the relationship between global and local has critical implications for planning. Drawing upon Friedmann and Wolff's hypothesis that local actions might have global consequences, he argues that global-local thinking which presupposes the primacy of global forces over the local in terms of power and spatial extension is misleading. Then, he proposes that 'local' planners have to be empowered to be 'global' actors. This means that "planners must be able to react to influences impinging on their 'communities, regardless of where those influences originate and which actors are responsible" (Beauregard 1995: 244). This is a challenging task because it has become increasingly difficult for planners both to understand the mechanisms of global changes and to identify where and when to intervene.

The very nature of planning is of intervention with an intention to alter the existing course of events in the world of the free market (Campbell and Fainstein 1996: 6). Currently, the power of the free market is becoming stronger as the globalization of economies develops. In other words, globalization itself is a representation of the growth of capitalism. This implies that the identification of planning intervention points and arenas becomes even more difficult. The increasing blurring of the once tidy separation between the public and private sectors further contributes to the identification problem. Conceptual modes of planning intervention for ongoing social changes caused by global forces range from open to closed, i.e., from promoting the extensive integration of localities into the global market to delinking them completely. Planning tasks should locate acceptable levels and ways of integration somewhere between these poles in order to enhance the public interest. Planning literature shows various modes of planning responses to globalization and discusses their strengths and weaknesses. I identify the following three representative ideas that underlie the planning responses as follows:

• World-system approach: Promote the linkage of localities with the global market for enhancing economic competitiveness based on a laissez-faire capitalistic scheme.
• Local public life approach: Strengthen local capacity for increasing employment and the quality of life through local and global networks.
• Protection primacy: Protect local life and economic spaces and resources from global forces.

These approaches are not mutually exclusive and it is reasonable to assume that most localities adopt different types of approaches simultaneously or separately depending on the situation.

1. World-system approach

As Friedmann and Wolff (1982) suggest, profit-making is a primary public interest because it is fundamental to supporting people's livelihood. Planners who work for this public interest in localities where the economic environment is not attractive to extralocal investors develop various measures in order to attract or hold them. The ultimate goal achieved by planning is to increase local economic competitiveness,[26] to create new opportunities for local investors, and to strengthen linkages between local and global economies (Beauregard: 236).

1) Recruitment strategy

A transnational investment flow is an important indicator of global integration as is the presence of international markets (Abu-Lughod 1995: 181). Planners who intend to promote the integration of local economies with the global market try to secure foreign investment whose potential is big enough to generate substantial leverage in the given locality. Typical planning approaches include a wide array of industrial inducements and efforts to enhance the image of an area's 'business climate' (Blakely 1994: 74). Blakely calls this approach 'recruitment planning,' which is characterized as being responsive and pro-active. It is also called 'city marketing' (Ashworth and Voogd 1990). Entrepreneurialism is the underlying concept of the approach. Entrepreneurialism is discussed extensively by Eisinger (1988) in the formation of economic development policy. Eisinger discusses the emergence of the entrepreneurial state that seeks to identify market opportunities not for its own exclusive gain but on behalf of private actors whose pursuit of those opportunities may serve public ends. This indicates a shift from a supply-side approach to more demand-side entrepreneurial activities.[27] The objective of the entrepreneurial state is to stimulate new private-business formation.

Fainstein (1996: 172) explains entrepreneurship in the context of local settings. She argues that it is an underlying principle of city governments to take an active role in promoting economic growth, in addition to building infrastructure and providing services. This approach can be seen in many localities. For example, the City of Yokohama invited a German international school to recruit a German Bank and other German companies in an office park development. In the development of a Free Trade Zone in Subic Bay in the Philippines, luxurious resort facilities and amenities exclusive for foreigners were prepared by the government (personal conversation with Laquian, 1999). In many other localities, various tools (e.g. business tax exemptions, infrastructure provisions, high amenities provisions, environmental deregulation, etc.) have been used in order to attract foreign investors. Success stories from elsewhere give impetus to planners and politicians alike to duplicate the successful strategies in their city or region.

However, Douglass (1991: 26) notes that in the context of Southeast Asian countries such popular tools as export processing zones and industrial growth poles remain ineffective.[28] While the planner's task is to secure foreign investment which is expected to have positive impacts on local economies, they need to confront various challenges caused by their own public actions. Harvey (1985. quoted by Wallace 1990: 174) points out, for example, that creating a favourable business climate often involves shifting public spending priorities away from projects enhancing

equity and social justice toward those promoting efficacy, innovations, and rising real rates of labour exploitation. In addition, there are other issues of equity that planners need to address, for example:

- FDI tends to concentrate in limited areas and thus social and economic polarization grows (Sassen 1991; Timberlake 1985).
- The destinations of the costs and benefits of recruiting FDI are different and thus uneven economic development prevails (Bhalla ed. 1998: 22; Douglass 1998).

While recruitment planning has intrinsic problems, as shown above, it remains an important approach, if not a dominant one, in many parts of the world because of the potential positive effects brought about by FDI. The transfer of technology to local industries and the expectation of the subsequent increase of local competitiveness could be attractive enough to justify the strategy. It is noteworthy that recruitment planning based on the notion of entrepreneurship tends to lack public involvement (Blakely 1994). Thus, it should be integrated into a more comprehensive planning framework in order to provide greater public accountability.

Such views are challenged by liberal democracy theorists who point out the inefficiencies of centrally planned economies. The best scenario that global connection planners pursue is to attract FDI which can meet long-term local development goals, adopted by comprehensive planning. But this scenario is contingent upon both external conditions and private sector decisions, thus, planners in charge of recruitment have to work on a case by case basis. In particular, planners in economically less attractive localities tend to adapt themselves to external forces. In such situations conventional comprehensive planning is not able to identify points of intervention for seeking global connections. This undermines the role of comprehensive planning in local economic development. Nevertheless, it does not mean planning is not necessary. Such economic development theorists as Blakely and Eisinger advocate strategic planning as an appropriate approach,[29] though the application of strategic planning in public planning practice is still being debated (Kaufman and Jacobs 1996:324).

2) Selling the city

A recruitment strategy targeting global capital provides various types of services to foreign investors in order to build global connections. Another important policy target for the strategy is the global flow of individuals: "globetrotters and jetsetters" (Waters 1995: 151). As international tourism has grown rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century (Waters 1995: 154) and become a major industry in the world in terms of employment and share of world trade (Lash and Urry 1994: 270), its promotion is perceived as a major plus in addition to FDI (Fry 1989: 5). Thus, attracting tourists has become an important planning practice in connecting localities to the world. This is another form of city marketing.

Tourism does not only mean pleasure trips, but also various types of movements of people such as: business conventions, the Olympic Games and summits such as APEC. In many cases

peoples' trips include both business (and official) as well as pleasure elements. This means that special attractions are critical, in addition to specific facilities such as: hotels, convention centres, world trade centres, and airports. In particular, culture is the most important element for tourism because culture and tourism are inseparable (Lash and Urry 1994: 265). Therefore, cultural planning plays an important role in tourism, although Harvey (1985. quoted by Wallace, 1990: 174) suggests that strategies for attracting tourists tend to cause equity problems. Ashworth and Voogd suggest place-image promotion should be seen as one planning instrument within the market planning process as a whole, and used in preference to, or in combination with, other non-market-oriented place management techniques. A central planning task is to create, maintain and sell images of the place globally. Lash and Urry argue that visual consumption has become dramatically more widespread and pervasive. This means that tourists often consume simulated reality, not reality (Lash and Urry 1994: 272). Thus, the commodification of built environment and cultural aspects is expected to increase global economic competitiveness.

Since international tourism is a big industry, both foreign and domestic investments have come to be involved in tourism development. As a result, international design and management firms and leisure industries came to expand their businesses with specific skills in producing certain urban images, and homogenized urban landscapes are emerging. In particular, in many global cities almost the same postmodern style of corporate headquarters, convention centres, urban waterfront developments, shopping districts, high-end condominiums, etc., occupy the best precincts. This homogenizing trend is not only an issue of urban aesthetic but also an issue of equity, as suggested by Harvey. Those new urbanscape elements are designed to yield substantial financial returns to investors by maximizing the economic value of life space at the expense of less profitable but more locally worthy uses. In the process of the commodification, the planner is required to act as an image broker. The image of the city is often talked about as a public interest. How planners are involved in issues of city image is a serious topic.

As mentioned before, images of global cities (cities most strongly connected to the global market) are becoming increasingly homogeneous. It cannot be easily answered whether the homogenization of the image of the city is good or bad but planners face a dilemma between selling cities to foreign capital that causes homogenization and selling images which are appealing to "globetrotters and jetsetters." Heritage preservation is a major response from local residents and planners who see the invasion of homogenizing power as a threat to their city image, often understood as local identity. Although heritage preservation seems a residual remedy, it can be a strong tool for cities to connect with the global market as heritage buildings or places are presented as historical products. In heritage preservation, planners should notice that they are still selling the image to particular user groups, as suggested by Ashworth and Voogd 1990: 68), although these groups may differ from those who would favour more homogeneous images.

2. Locally oriented approach

The planning strategies previously reviewed aim to increase economic competitiveness by

integrating localities into global markets where the marketing of local resources to external forces is the core of the strategy. There is an alternative approach to increase local competitiveness, but with broader social considerations. It does not intend to basically depend on extralocal forces but tries to develop local capacity to cope with global economic restructuring based on local initiatives (Alger 1999, Stöhr 1990). This is not necessarily seeking local "self-sufficient development" but rather "self-reliant development."[30]

Local initiatives are grounded in the recognition that central governmental planning is not effective for regional restructuring and innovation (Stöhr 1985; Wadley 1986. quoted by Stöhr 1990: 40). But it does not assume that localities alone can solve all of the problems caused by changes in global economy. Each local initiative is a small scale activity. Stöhr (1990) acknowledges that the scale of local initiatives is generally too small to draw mass media's attention but argues that it cannot be ignored in terms of its role for local employment.

As Stöhr (1990) suggests, local initiatives become realistic when the sovereignty of nation states are being undermined by global forces. This urges localities to take measures to mitigate global forces without waiting for decisions by, and support from, the centre. In their World City Hypothesis, Friedmann and Wolff (1982: 330) propose that local actions may have global consequences. The community initiatives launched by the European Commission for the first time in 1989 support the validity of the Hypothesis if not completely.[31]

In a discussion of local initiatives, the role of actors (initiators) is important. Various types of people, including nonlocal ones, can be initiators, as suggested by Stöhr. He also suggests that local planners can also be initiators and supporters of activities. When they work together with local actors, their interaction as social practice can create an environment for social learning (Friedmann 1987: 183). As Friedmann (1987: 185) suggests, local initiatives are task-oriented action groups and thus the public interest of each task needs to be discussed when planners are involved in their actions.[32] The European Commission made this point clear by setting out an organized procedure (proposals, guideline, programmes and projects) for funding community initiatives. However, such well-organized formal approaches to local initiatives are not necessarily applicable to other localities. Formal approaches could exclude initiatives which cannot satisfy a set of requirements even if they have significant implications for localities.

The contingent nature of local initiatives (Fisher and Kling, 1993: xix) makes planning intervention more difficult. Pluralism in societies makes the identification of "the public interest" served by planning even murkier. Nevertheless, planners have to act for local initiatives in the face of dynamic and intruding global forces and the weakening nation state so that localities can maintain and strengthen their local capacities for innovation and competitiveness.

However, a priority planning target in this regard should not be limited to local economic competency but must include social equity among local actors in order to mitigate social polarization. The Planner's task here is to support local initiators by for example providing information and training. In such a case, planners themselves can be initiators. The primary goal is to try to strengthen the resilience and cohesiveness of their territorial community as a whole. Although planners are concerned about local collaboration or partnership arrangements,

they should not be involved in conventional local public-private partnerships which connect pow-erful political and economic actors and organize growth coalitions (Logan and Molotch 1987). The planner can be a creator or a mediator of public-private partnerships which pursue shared community goals but questioning whether other public-private partnerships are capable of operat-ing in the public interest is fundamental (Peters 1998: 30).

3. Protection approach

1) Border protection

One of the most radical arguments raised by advocates of globalization is the dissolution of national borders and the resulting emergence of "a borderless society" (Ohmae, 1990). Although many global theorists do not admit the end of the nation-state (Held 1991: 212; Douglass 1998: 136), the increasing porousness of borders, as a result of growing global-local integration, has significant implications for planners.

In particular, massive global immigration has a unique impact on local society compared with other non-human flows: they act (flow) of their own volition. Since national regulation of immigration often falls short of controlling migrant influxes and their activities in host localities, planners of global cities which receive massive numbers of migrants face a variety of social issues (see Sassen 1991). It should be noted that there are various types and groups of migrants (Skeldon 1997: 57) and thus migrant problems are multifaceted. For example, taking jobs away from local workers, pushing up housing prices and overloading social services are all problems that appear (Castles and Miller 1993: 13). Different problems are caused by different types of migrants: legal or illegal, male or female, professional or labourer, etc. and different local people are affected differently too. The "rational" regulatory approach is to expel problem-causing migrants but it is not always feasible because they know many avenues, both legal and illegal, to exploit in order to stay and work.

For example, even Japan, which has a very strict immigration act and is surrounded by the sea, cannot completely control the flow of illegal migrants and their illegal labour. Interestingly, the government knows that some industrial sectors need cheap labour to adapt to ongoing economic restructuring and that the implementation of strict regulations would be costly. As a result migrants become de facto citizens. If planners continue to lack power to control the inflow, they will not be able to solve the emerging problems mentioned above.

The rationale of planning can be found between the poles of "legal requirements" and "social justice" in dealing with migrant workers. It is difficult for governmental planners to work on their behalf directly because they are to serve de jure constituencies but it is possible to support community organizations which work to enhance equity and democracy for these de facto citizens. However, such actions are highly contingent and reactive, and it is not clear whether formal planning is necessary. Furthermore, they need to work in an ideologically conflictive situation in which those who favour immigration and those who wish to raise exclusionist walls coexist (Skeldon 1997: 81). Those special conditions make the planner's position tenuous. When planners are not supported by their political community regarding these

de facto citizens, they are not empowered to act (Friedmann and Wolff 1982). They can merely observe, if not ignore, the development of events.

An alternative response of the planner is to take an advocacy role. This is a response to the need for humanity and openness in the adoption of social goals (Davidoff 1996: 305). However, an advocacy approach is increasingly difficult to take in a pluralistic society. Moreover, its own limitation is that arguments between stakeholders is set up as a competition, a bargaining situation in which outcomes are zero-sum games of the 'I win-you lose' variety (Healey 1997: 224).

It is more meaningful for planners to initiate and develop multicultural planning. It is an imperative issue, particularly in global cities; it is a public adaptation to an irresistible global force. Planners need to put great energy into promoting multiculturalism as a social learning process in order to maintain and strengthen social cohesiveness given the existence of "anti-multi culturalism." Multicultural planning is expected to provide opportunities to civil society with more inclusive and human ways to celebrate different voices, as suggested by various feminist theorists (Sandercock and Forsyth 1996: 473). Although a backlash against multiculturalism may happen to varying degrees in different places, it is an imperative planning project in order to make a society more integrated.

2) Welfare protection

Globalization and its associated forms of economic change help to amplify social and spatial polarization and to widen the gap between the wealthy and the poor (Agnew et al 1999: 14). Douglass (1998) also argues that ongoing globalization processes have widened class and other social divisions and caused contradiction between life versus economic space in the Asia Pacific Rim. Those discussions are based on the notion that the globalization of capitalism is a major cause of social polarization and thus leads to the argument that planning is needed to correct the chaos of the market and to work for equal protection and equal opportunity (Campbell and Fainstein 1996: 6, 10). However, this does not necessarily result in the primacy of planning over market forces.

In light of the current global ideological trend of liberal democracy suggested by such scholars as Ohmae (1990), Fukuyama (1992) and Huntington (1991), the role of planning as an allocator of society's resources has been weakening. It can only correct "market failures," a well recognized role of planning by classical and neoclassical economists.[33] However, the government can find an opportunity to take the initiative in enhancing social equity. Douglass presents a notable example of the improvement of citizen welfare in the process of world city formation in South Korea by its government. It was in the "Two-Million Unit Housing Construction Plan" for Seoul in 1989. Douglass states that, as in Hong Kong and Singapore, the government of Korea has realized that housing and community space are fundamental to securing social as well as economic stability. This program indicates the important role and capacity of the national government in the redistribution of economic wealth produced by the integration of national economy into the global market. In the global-local discussion the role

of the nation state tends to be neglected, but its role and capacity need to be discussed further. However, as Klosterman (1996: 155) suggests, the provision of public goods can be made in a number of ways other than planning. Redefining opportunities for planning intervention in the promotion of global linkages and the protection of citizen welfare is imperative.

3) Environmental protection

Environmental degradation is an increasingly serious issue both in developed and developing countries. Keil (1995) argues that ecological problems have been hardly dealt with by researchers after the "world city hypothesis" was presented by Friedmann (1986), despite the fact that pollution and land use (growth) are two fundamental realities in the world city. Douglass also argues that in world cities of the Third World where environmental infrastructure is not sufficiently built, poorer people are forced to live in environmentally unsafe areas while city governments lack the means to confront environmental crises. In particular, for cities which rely on a recruitment approach as a major economic development scheme, it would be difficult for the planner to impose stricter environmental regulations on foreign investors or to require them to pay substantial development impact fees. However, locally applicable regulations are the only measure against environmental problems.

There are problems that cannot be solved locally (Barrow 1995: 381). Environmental problems cannot be contained within administrative boundaries: they flow across national boundaries. While Keil suggests that activating the "local" is considered a necessary condition for environmental policy-making and implementation, he acknowledges that local needs to be supplemented by regional initiatives for environmental action. Although he does not discuss issues of regional cooperation, it is important to note that he implies that a planning challenge is to transcend national borders and establish an environmental region of cooperation. Waters (1995: 100) argues that the individual state can no longer offer protection against environmental risks, including the loss of biodiversity, the depletion of the ozone layer, acid rain, green house gases, AIDS and chemical and nuclear weapons, and calls for management of such risks on an international scale.

These discussions show the imperative of considering the view "think locally and act glo bally" (Beauregard 1995: 243) for environmental problems. Although there can be no precise universal definition of "sustainable development" (Barrow 1995: 371), i.e., its emphasis on the integrated nature of ecological, economic and social challenges (Robinson and Tinker 1996) indicates a necessity for integrated and comprehensive regional development planning (Barrow 1995: 380) across political boundaries. This is a formidable task for the planner given the fragmented mode of public policy making.[34] For planners who are concerned about seeking sustainable development, the limitations of current analytical tools for examining interactions between ecological, economic and social agents are problematic and thus better tools are needed (Robinson and Tinker 1996).

Planners, though, cannot carry out their tasks only with analytical tools. They need specific policy instruments, institutional innovations, or methods of social mobilization in order to

intervene with existing problems (Friedmann 1987:37). In such a complex situation - where global forces are intertwined directly and indirectly with local ecological, economic and social conditions, and society is becoming increasingly pluralistic - either 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' approaches are not acceptable to local constituencies or stakeholders. What planners need to focus on are the diverse perceptions of environmental sustainability in their communities because different people hold different priorities. Although its application to the real situation seems to have limitations, Healey's (1997: 195) proposal for collaborative agenda-setting and policy development in order to build policy approaches for environmental issues could be an alternative strategy.

4. Levels, scales and scopes of planning responses

1) Different responses in the same jurisdiction

Planning takes place at different levels of jurisdictions and spatial scales with various scopes, while specifically aiming to serve the public interest. Multi-level and segmented political and institutional organisms can formulate diverse types of policies and planning around the same policy agenda. It should also be noted that even within the same jurisdiction, different, even contradictory, planning responses can be formed.

For example, as in Sassen's (1991) discussions of global cities (New York, London and Tokyo) planning aims to accommodate global controlling powers. An example is the development of large-scale, high-cost luxury office and residential complexes (i.e. gentrification), while at the same time trying to alleviate the continuation and consolidation of concentrated poverty, extreme physical decay in inner cities and a sharp increase in homelessness. In other words, those planners working for global cities must seek two different but deeply intertwined scopes: economic competitiveness and social and economic equity. Those planning tasks are not new but have become more challenging because the extent of gentrification and the segmentation and spatial unevenness has reached dimensions not typical of earlier decades (Sassen 1991).

Goldberg (1995) points out that "NIMBY" actions at the neighbourhood level conflict with the necessity of promoting economic competitiveness in an urban region (his focus is on the Greater Toronto Area) in a global context and criticizes neighbourhood level politics which are in opposition to higher density housing and commercial development at the expense of opportunities for improving economic competitiveness.

Faced with such local level conflicts, the role of local planners as mediators and negotiators is becoming increasingly important (Forester 1989). Focusing on local land-use conflicts, Forester states that "local planners can use a range of mediated negotiation strategies practically to address power imbalances of access, information, class, and expertise which perpetually threaten the quality of local planning outcomes," though "Mediated negotiations in local land-use processes are no panacea for the structural problems of our society." On the other hand, Goldberg (1995) points to the involvement of a higher level of government (i.e. provincial government) to cope with the conflicts. He contends that "Only senior governments have the necessary systemic overview and policy tools to challenge and overcome the negative aggregate

effects of NIMBYism." It is not reasonable to discuss advantages and disadvantages of the two apart from local place-based contingencies. Either one of the two different planning approaches may work better in one locality and worse in other localities.

2) Planning coordination between different levels
The local and the national

As dynamic global forces alter conventional socioeconomic spatial organizations, such as division of labour and the location of primary economic activities across administrative boundaries, efforts of solving conflicts within only one administrative unit cannot be effective or comprehensive. In their World City Hypothesis, Friedmann and Wolff (1982) state that the urbanized regions of a given world city extend far beyond the boundaries of particular communities, therefore, planners must work to enlarge the scope of political action by building coalitions and networks among both organized communities and interest groups.

Their remarks indicate that political and institutional settings with respect to the authority of planning are critical factors for planners to make effective responses against conflicts caused by globalization. It should be noted that the settings are not stable, and as a result local autonomy vis-a-vis the nation state is constantly changing (Goldsmith 1995). Much of the literature on the nation state and global economy presents that the sovereignty of the former is deteriorating as the latter gains impetus. The changing relationship between local government and national government makes planners' working environment increasingly uncertain.

In the context of Southeast Asian industrialization (in which both national and local planning bodies commit themselves to the creation of social conditions for constructing and sustaining comparative advantage in order to attract Direct Foreign Investment (DFI)), Douglass (1991) discusses different roles and capacities of state and local governments. He considers that externally-driven national development processes of industrialization will heighten social and political tensions, thus leading to an undermining of the comparative advantage of host societies in attracting and keeping transnational investment.

Concerning the role of the state, he asserts that laissez-faire ideologies and policies will not guarantee passages to higher levels of welfare and argues that the state should provide essential institutional structures in order to pursue a more democratized path toward industrialization. In other words, building a democratic institutional framework, which can create national comparative advantages in attracting DFI and ameliorate social inequalities, is a critical task for planners in the national government in the face of the dynamism of the rapid transnationalization of capital. Concerning the role of subnational regional policy, he points out that regional policy should aim to balance economic development between core (metropolitan) regions and peripheral regions by rethinking local particularities and complexities. This is a field in which local planners familiar with place-based opportunities and constraints can play greater role than their national counterparts in the development and implementation of policies. Douglass's discussions present that national and regional development policies have to be revised and rearranged systematically in order to guide a more balanced and even development planning, either in a period of rapid

or a period of slow world economic expansion.

In the discussion on European Local Employment Initiatives (ILE), Novy (1995) also discusses the roles and the capacities of local government and central government. As Douglass (1991) contends, policy coordination between the local government and the state government is also a central issue in Novy's discussion. While the former focuses on democratization as a policy imperative (in the context of Southeast Asian political environment), the latter is more concerned about local innovation and entrepreneurship in the context of a Europe-wide economic problem, i.e. unemployment.

Novy focuses on the local government and other local partners such as universities and research institutes as major actors of local economic development because of the inability of central agencies in dealing with unemployment based on a 'trickle down' policy. According to Novy, interactions between individuals, groups and institutions are of crucial importance in order to mobilize community resources. He argues that local government should try to cooperate with central authorities but that a local consensus is enough to forward their initiatives when there is no national consensus.

His argument indicates the growing importance of the political role of local planners as an intermediary between diverse local actors. For them, as Bryson and Crosby (1996) suggest, to rely on forums for discussion and on arenas for policy making and implementation - i.e., to pay more attention on the various institutional contexts and settings within which procedural aspects of planning occur - will have a significant implication for the achievement of their goals.[35]

These discussions show the critical role of intergovernmental coordination in order to cope with urban and regional issues of globalization. As Christensen (1999) suggests, the intergovernmental system shapes planning, whereas planning works on and through the intergovernmental system. In other words, planners cannot complete many important tasks within one level of government. However, as Chirstensen contends, the system takes the form of either cooperation or conflict. Thus, deliberative cooperative intergovernmental coordination is an important task for the planner who has to deal with growing conflicts across territorial and jurisdictional boundaries.

In addition to intergovernmental coordination between different level of governmental bodies shown above, coordination between geographically adjacent jurisdictions would be also necessary in some cases because local impacts of globalization could spread over more than one jurisdiction or a single jurisdiction is too small to "hold down the global" effectively (Amin and Thrift 1995). The establishment of a new regional government or governing bodies such as Metro Toronto and GVRD are the examples of such efforts, although they do not necessarily focus only on the urban and regional problems of globalization. Such regional level planning entities could mobilize local resources better than individual local governments, as suggested by Goldberg (1995) previously.

The local and the global

Alger (1999) and Kirby, Marston and Seasholes (1995) put stronger emphasis on the

potential of municipal and civic actions over coordination between the local government and the nation state in coping with global issues. They discuss municipal foreign policies that try to link municipalities to the world against the monopoly of legitimacy held by nation-states in the international arena. Both of them discuss the capacity and potential of local government to participate in the world economy directly, pursuing their economic interests. In their discussions, the role and capacity of civil society and citizen actions is also highlighted in their dynamic expansion of various networks around various issues ranging from peace and security to economic development and co-operation, as well as moral issues such as the sanctuary movement (Kirby, Marston and Seasholes 1995. See table 15.1: 273).

Alger states that solutions to an array of global problems require coordinated contributions from governments that reach from the local to the global. For conventional local and municipal planners under conventional regulatory and constitutional frameworks, seeking direct links with the global (beyond the state) is a challenging task. However, their task is not limited to taking initiatives by themselves. It is also an important task for them to develop an environment in which a variety of local actors can take initiatives of global linkage formation. Democracy that encourages broader local public participation in initiatives is crucial. On the other hand, as suggested by Kirby, Marston and Seasholes, in some municipalities, which are not comfortable with bypassing the state to strengthen global linkages, planners would have difficulties in developing municipal foreign policies.

These discussions assume that planners must serve the public interest not only under the constraints of the capitalist political economy (Campbell and Fainstein 1996) but also under the constructions of political institutions regarding political issues (Forester 1989). As Low (1991) suggests, planning is itself part and parcel of the political process. Therefore, choosing specific types of responses for dealing with global forces and changes requires planners in various institutions to understand political and bureaucratic constraints and conditions on different levels, as well as finding ways for strategic intervention which can enhance democracy as a whole.

III. Conclusion

In their political communities, planners have to work in the face of unprecedented dynamic changes brought about by forces operating on a global scale. As shown in chapter one, those forces are elusive, intertwined and multifaceted. The global forces present much more "wicked" problems (Rittel and Webber 1973) for planning to deal with. Thus, it is no wonder that the identification of planning intervention in social problems caused directly and indirectly by global forces is an increasingly challenging hard task. Planners know that traditional comprehensive planning is not effective but corporate-style strategic planning is also not the answer in this situation. It is obvious that planners urgently need new knowledge in order to understand dynamic global changes and forces, and new theories and methods of practices to manage or guide social changes in order for the members of the communities to maintain and improve their life space.

Discussions grouped into six perspectives in chapter one represent one effective way for

planners to understand the natures and mechanisms of globalization issues comprehensively. Although they do not cover all the issues around globalization (it is not my intention for this paper), they show how globalization is being recognized and problematized by scholars of various philosophies and disciplines. It should be noted that the reality and the recognition of that reality are not necessarily identical. In other words, a specific global change can be interpreted differently by different scholars as represented by the difference between Wallerstei n's and Abu-Lughod's world-systems. However, the method of reviewing the discussions on globalization based on six perspectives helps us to understand a variety of the global changes and forces which are interconnected, and provides a theoretical platform to analyze them critically. The six perspectives are not mutually exclusive but demonstrate what events and agendas planners should focus on. Nevertheless, they can be improved upon by adding other perspectives or by reorganizing them. Better ways to inform planners of globalization need to be pursued continuously.

The second chapter demonstrates a range of planning responses to globalization and their strengths and weaknesses in the face of various global changes and forces discussed in the previous chapter. Those grouped into three approaches (based on differences in planning principles and philosophies) are formed by different combinations of actions against or in favour of global forces. They are: linking the community to the global economic network, adaptation to global forces, control of and resistance to the global forces. Planners following one of these approaches can prescribe a specific type of response such as luring foreign investment or responding to the needs of their political community. It is likely that the same planner develops different types of strategies simultaneously or that different strategies are adopted at different periods of time in a community. In any situation, the purpose of planning is to mediate global forces and changes. In other words, the different combinations of linking, adaptation, control and resistance produce different mediation strategies.

A challenge to planners is whether they can identify the most effective combination to serve the public. Although the legitimacy of planning has been undermined, its role will remain critical because a free market often falls short of serving the public satisfactorily (or least a significant proportion of the public). An imperative for planners is identifying the potentiality of present planning practices in order to cope with globalization and developing theories to improve practices. The three types of approaches shown in the chapter two can facilitate those tasks but there is also plenty of room for improving those approaches.

Another critical agenda for planners is realizing, as discussions in both chapters articulate, that there is no single definition of globalization. In addition, it is important to note that there are two streams of thought about defining globalization. One is to aim to find changes and forces covering all states of the world simultaneously and ubiquitously, and the other covers "major" parts of the world only. Some say the latter is not a genuine globalization theory. For example, there are scholars who consider that Wallerstein's world-system is not a globalization theory (see Waters 1995: 25-6). As shown in the literature on trans-border growth network formation (e.g. Tang and Thant 1998, Rozman 2000), planners need to be concerned about the

implications of ongoing rearrangement of regional functional cooperation across national borders for the development of their own political communities. Such regionalization or regionalism supports Beauregard's (1995) argument that simplistic local-global thinking should be abandoned. However, that is not to say that the identification of various geographical units such as region and sub-regions is sufficient. As the above discussions indicate, functional relations formed across the borders also need to be understood in addition to geographical considerations. In the face of the complicated and multidimensional nature of globalization, it is necessary for planners to develop a theoretical foundation upon which to know globalization and to know how to enhance the resilience of civil society when it is challenged by global changes and forces. This paper demonstrates one approach to building the theoretical foundation and it can facilitate discussions on the roles both of planning and of new planning practices.

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[1] Waters (1995 :3) suggests that the best way to define globalization is to specify where the process of globalization will end, i.e. what a fully globalized world will look like.

[2] For example, King (1990a: 10) notes that the world-systems perspective (Wallerstein 1987) is one of the most influential paradigms within which to consider urban phenomena globally. Knox and Agnew (1989: 82) introduce Wallerstein's (1979a) view in the beginning of the discussion about the historical geography of the world-economy. Timberlake (1985: 10) states that the world-system perspective was

developed and elaborated on by Wallerstein (1979) and others. Waters (1995: 22) states that the most influential sociological argument for considering the world as a single economic system comes from Wallerstein (1974; 1980; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1980; 1982).

[3] A world system has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimization, and coherence (Wallerstein 1974: 347).

[4] Concerning the three different zones, Wallerstein (1979: 87) states that "Why different modes of organizing labour-slavery, 'feudalism,' wage labour, self-employment-at the same point in time within the world-economy? Because each mode of labor control is best suited for particular types of production. And why were these modes concentrated in different zones of the world-economy-slavery and 'feudalism' in the periphery, wage labor and self-employment in the core, and as we shall see sharecropping in the semiperiphery? Because the modes of labor control greatly affect the political system (in particular the strength of the state apparatus) and the possibilities for an indigenous bourgeoisie to thrive. The world-economy was based precisely on the assumption that there were in fact these three zones and that they did in fact have different modes of labor control. Were this not so, it would not have been possible to assure the kind of flow of the surplus which enabled the capitalist system to come into existence."

[5] She acknowledges that Braudel's (1984. *The perspective of the World,* Civilization & Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Vol. III) argument that world-economies existed in various parts of the world long before the thirteenth century seems sensible but criticizes it that it is still Eurocentric (p.11).

[6] In addition to urban forms and the processes of their formation, King (1990: 1) notes that "'Urbanism' also emphasizes the symbiotic relationship between the material and spatial aspects of cities, their built environment, and architectural form, and the social, economic, and cultural systems of which they are a part."

[7] Chase-Dunn (1985:270) also refers to the works of Amin (1980) and Frank (1978, 1979) as contributors to the discussion of the world-system.

[8] This is based on the premise held by most studies of city systems that an unintegrated spatial economy will exhibit relatively unhierarchical size distribution (Rozman 1976. quoted by Chase-Dunn).

[9] Hamilton (1986: 2) states that there is neither a single nor a simple definition of MNC and TNC and suggests that the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) has probably stimulated the interchangeable use of the terms.

[10] Hamilton (1986: 7) notes that in the period of 1875-1914 mainly UK, USA, French and German based MNCs already operated branch production facilities in foreign countries, the type of activities which have become most common since 1960.

[11] It was the world economy which could become truly global (Castells 1996: 93).

[12] The capitalist economy has been, since its beginnings, a world economy (92).

[13] "Hirst and Thompson draw a distinction between globalization and internationalization. The former term they read as essentially rhetorical, a matter of the ideological willing of those committed to the market-liberal political project, and they suggest that the latter notion allows a better access to the real-world dynamics of the system" (Preston 1998: 140).

[14] See Funabashi, 1995: 8.

[15] 'Americanization' 'Western cultural imperialism' and 'Coca-colonization' are other terms for 'global consumer culture.' They imply the spread of US consumer culture to the world through mass media (Waters 1995: 140).

[16] Waters notes this is a radical proposal because it stands opposed to one of the most influential theories of global integration, Wallerstein's theory of the capitalist world-system. (10)

[17] "ethnoscapes - the moving landscape of tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guestworkers and so on; technoscapes - the movements of technologies, high and low, mechanical and informational, across

all kinds of boundaries; finanscapes - via currency markets, national stock exchanges and commodity speculations, there is the movement of vast sums of moneys through national turnstiles at bewildering speed; mediascapes - the distribution of electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate images and the proliferation of images thereby generated; and ideoscapes - concatenations of images often in part linked to the ideologies of states or of movements of opposition, ideas derived in part from the Enlightenment (Appadurai 1990: 296-300. quoted by Lash and Urry 1994: 307).

[18] Skeldon's(53) migration system composes of five 'development tiers. "The first two tiers identify areas that can be considered developed" the 'old core' areas of western Europe, North America and Australasia and the 'new core' areas in East Asia... The third development tier, which I have called the 'actively expanding core' is widely scattered and subdivided into three broad classes of actual and potential expanding cores and restructuring cores: in coastal China and central parts of Southeast Asia; in parts of western India; in southern Africa; around Israel in West Asia; in four parts of Latin America; and in western Russia and eastern Europe. Away from these areas I have designated a fourth tier of a 'labour frontier' and, in the most isolated areas and in small economies, a fifth tier representing a 'resource niche'.

[19] The term world city was christened by Patric Geddes, "Cities in Evolution," as early as in 1915. (Hall 1960, 1977: 1).

[20] See for example, Abu-Lughod (1995: 171); Keil (1995: 281); and King (1990b: 53).

[21] He suggests that world cities are ones that have become the 'basing points' for global capital (i.e. world/global cities) and have formed the hierarchical network together.

[22] For example, Hall mentioned that specialized financial and professional services increased in the 1960s in London's central area.

[23] Absolute size is not a criterion of world city status (Friedmann 1986: 324).

[24] The contrast can be found in redevelopment and gentrification for luxury offices and residential complexes, and fashionable, high-priced shopping districts, on one hand, and in a continuation and consolidation of concentrated poverty and extreme physical decay in the inner cities (Sassen: 254, 255).

[25] "Cities can be distinguished by a large number of criterial attributes (King 1994), only some of which refer to the geographical, economic, political, cultural, climatic, or other kinds of contextual space (such as inland, industrial, socialist, Islamic, or winter) which supposedly help to account for their existence. But cities also exist under scores of quite different metaphors: sin city, holy city, drug city, city of angels, and many more. In this context the number of meanings which 'world city' might have are infinite" (King 1995: 217).

[26] Competitive advantage rather than comparative advantage has become the dominant notion of economic development in the global context. For example, Lipsey (1990. quoted by Dunning, 1993: 611) states that "technology, human capital, market structure, organizational systems and country-specific cultural values, rather than natural factor endowments, determine the level and structure of a nation's competitive advantages."

[27] Fainstein claims that Eisinger's use of the term "demand side" is confusing because it usually refers to a policy that subsidizes consumers rather than investors.

[28] On the contrary, in the US context, Grosfoguel (1995: 167) states that a reason for the relocation of many internationally oriented businesses in Miami was the institutional formation of a free trade zone."

[29] Blakely considers that strategic planning is practiced based on local needs with a long-term view. Eisinger also considers that strategic planning is suitable for economic development because it establishes realistic long-term economic goals, focuses on resources, identifies certain industries likely to benefit local needs, and it specifies timetables (27).

[30] Friedmann (1987: 371-382) discusses self-reliant development with more of a self-sufficiency orientation.

On the other hand, Galtung (1978: 9) does not deny international trading as a means to pursue self-reliant development.

[31] " The Community Initiatives are proposed by the Commission to support operations which help solve problems of particular importance at European level. The Community Initiatives have three features:
* support for the development of trans-national, cross-border and inter-regional cooperation;
* a "bottom-up" method of implementation;
* a high profile on the ground through expanded partnership." (European Communities, 1998: 7)

[32] It should be noted that local initiatives do not necessary need planners. They can be purely private activities.

[33] See Klosterman 1996: 152.

[34] "In virtually all states, and at the international level, public policy is determined in a sectoral way within each prime system, by separate ministries or agencies, in pursuit of relatively narrow and often conflicting goals." (Robinson and Tinker 1996)

[35] In addition to forums and arenas, Bryson and Crosby (1996) discuss court as a place to manage residual disputes and enforce the underlying norms in the system. They argue that the design and use of these settings (forums, arenas and courts) have profound effects on how public issues are raised and resolved.