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de Certeau の仮定する historiography はその他の narrative—例えば小説、あるいは随筆—との近似性を示唆するという点で文学の研究者にとっても興味深い。この論文では彼の *The Writing of History*、特に“The Historiographical Operation”の章に焦点を合わせて Practice, Closed-Discourse, Reality の三者間の関係を明確にすることから始めた。de Certeau は historiography をこの関係のある特定の場所に位置していると定義するのではなく、様々な要因に左右されうる流動的な位置を占めつつ、正に彼の文体が示すように、常に固定化する動きに反発し Practice—Closed-Discourse—Reality の図式に表された関係に束縛された領域を超越する活動だと説く。

On Michel de Certeau

I would like to direct your attention to the following diagram I formulated from Michel de Certeau's *The Writing of History*.

PRACTICE: reality-impacted discourse; Ethics; compilation of history; consisting of techniques	H I S T O R Y	CLOSED DISCOURSE: accessible to the real; Dogmatism; telling stories; revealing a performative nature
REALITY : presumed to be extra-discursive	Y	

It is true that de Certeau does not clearly define the terms I use in this diagram, but I consider the terms and their distribution in the diagram essential to comprehend the type of historiographical operations de Certeau deploys in his works.

De Certeau refers several times to Marx in *The Writing of History* (pp. 13, 57, note 4) by way of explaining what he means by “practice.” For Marx, de Certeau observes, praxis is a “human sensuous activity” . . . and revolutionary praxis . . . the simultaneous changing of circumstances and of human activity itself [T] ruth is determined by praxis and therefore is not a question of theory, [the categories of which] correspond to relationships produced in social praxis (Theses on Feuerbach quoted from *Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory*, ed. Irena R. Makaryk [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993], 614) .

De Certeau is very much conscious of the weight the constructive process of historiography holds in his endeavor, as demonstrated by his statement that “the analysis returns to needs,

to technical organizations, to social places and institutions" (*The Writing of History*, 13). The feature that links de Certeau to Marx is the view the former maintains regarding practice. De Certeau defines historiography as an project to locate the "so-called history of ideas or mentalities" (13) as they appear in their material condition. Louis Althusser sheds more light on the concept of praxis de Certeau shares with Marxists. To Althusser practice is an integral concept in his Marxist ideological framework and he sees practice as "any process of *transformation* of a determinate given raw material into a determinate *product*, a transformation effected by a determinate human labor using determinate means (of 'production')" (Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, tr. Ben Brewster [New York: Random House, 1969], 166). Althusser and others stress the transformational operations involved in producing history. De Certeau entirely concurs with them in this sense as he observes that historians "work on materials in order to transform them into history First transforming the raw material (a primary source) into a standard product (secondary source), the work of the historian carries it from one region of culture ('curiosities,' archives, collections, etc.) to another (history)" (*The Writing of History*, 71).

In contrast to praxis, closed discourse is defined as a type of discourse that makes study of the real appear . . . insofar as it is the *known* (what the historian studies, understands, or "brings to life" from a past society) [This discourse] valorizes the relation the historian keeps with a lived experience, that is, with the possibility of resuscitating or "reviving" a past. It would like to restore the forgotten and to meet again men of the past amidst the traces they have left. It also implies a particular literary genre, narrative . . . (35-6).

Ethics and dogmatism, two constituents in the diagram above, are concepts that appear in de Certeau's *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other*. To show how these concepts are presented I will quote the following excerpt:

Ethics is articulated through effective operations, and it defines a distance between what is and what ought to be. This distance designates a space where we have something to do [D]ogmatism is authorized by a reality that it claims to represent and in the name of this reality, it imposes laws. Historiography functions midway between these two poles [D]uring the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries . . . the religious or metaphysical aim of stating the truth of beings according to God's will was replaced by the ethical task of creating or making history [A] new "dogmatism" has appeared, one that has replaced the historical linkage of ethical obligation and technical ability. The scientific establishment . . . has slowly been losing its foundation in social operativity and transforming its products into representation of a reality in which everyone must believe. I call this dogmatizing tendency "the institution of the real." It consists of the construction of representations into laws imposed by the states of things. Through this process, ethical tasks are replaced by what is supposed to be the expression of reality (199-200) .

Before I go any further I must admit that attempting to explicate de Certeau's complicated historiographical concept by using the diagram may not be the best way to comprehend his system. But since his writing tends to elude readers' organizational grasp in such a subtle and inexplicable manner I deemed it wise to construct a heuristic platform on

which to develop some methodical understanding of de Certeau's concept. Therefore, diagrammatization of his concept is by no means the only way to approach his historiography nor intends to exclude any other attempts to comprehend him. By the way, the diagram shown above is to a significant degree inspired by the passage that appears in *The Writing of History* :

History ... vacillates between two poles. On the one hand, it refers to a practice, hence to a reality; on the other, it is a closed discourse, a text that organizes and concludes a mode of intelligibility (*The Writing of History*, 21) .

De Certeau recognizes some paradoxes as he ventures to develop his historiographical concept. One paradox arises because the terms, which I assigned to different poles, do not function as neatly as they are supposed to. They are merely relational and far from antinomical. De Certeau mentions that "a relation [is] established between two antinomic terms, between the real [understood as historical events] and "discourse [i.e., writing]" (*The Writing of History*, xxvii). However, one version of his historiography is rendered as a mere copy of the linguistic function, as discourse and the real are forcefully combined at a level where their fusion is logically impossible. In addition to the operational paradox, there is a sleight-of-hand type of paradox. A historiographer desires the past as a material he can reconstitute. In this sense the historiographical venture is conceived as a process. But the historiographer does not want the past to present itself as an obstacle to his reconstruction. The past in its corpus, or in a sense as an empty space, exists only as a docile malleable entity that meets the historiographer's needs. To make my point clear I quote the following passage from *The Writing of History*:

On its own account, historiography takes for granted the fact that it has become impossible to believe in this presence of the dead that has organized (or organizes) the experience of entire civilizations; and the fact too that it is nonetheless impossible "to get over it," to accept the loss of a living solidarity with what is gone, or to confirm an irreducible limit. What is perishable is its data; *progress* is its motto. The one is the experience which the other must both compensate for and struggle against. Historiography tends to prove that the site of its production can encompass the past: it is an odd procedure that posits death, a breakage everywhere reiterated in discourse, and that yet denies loss by appropriating to the present the privilege of recapitulating the past as a form of knowledge. A labor of death and a labor against death (5).

Another paradox derives from the unfixability of the position his historiography/history occupies. Historiography/history for de Certeau is both an operational move to constitute what deserves to be called the past and the ingredients out of which the past is reconstituted. In De Certeau's words history is both "the explication which is *stated*, and the reality of *what has taken place* or what takes place" (21) .

It may be that de Certeau postulates two poles because he wants to grant historiography/history some latitude to vacillate between them rather than confine the historiographical operations to a limited space. However, the dichotomy that emerges from the bipolar scheme de Certeau seems to be propounding in his work contains rather unexpected opposites. Rather than contrasting practice to reality de Certeau brings in closed discourse as the former's antithesis. Here de Certeau is obviously resorting to a Barthesian

move in a sense that he allows historiography a pretext to delve into the real but the real it is enabled to access is not the real but the real only fabricated by the power of historiographical discourse. Since discourse assumes the role of practice and constitutes the real, it is not surprising to hear de Certeau remark that "the breadth and extension of the 'real' are forever designated and considered as meaningful solely within the bounds of a discourse" (21). Discourse not only constitutes the real but assigns the meaning the real is supposed have by dint of its discursive operations. That is why historiography is so closely knit with linguistic activities. The reality as it is never exists and the supposed reality is no more than an assumption on which to create a reality. De Certeau asks, rhetorically of course, "doesn't language not so much implicate the status of the reality of which it speaks, as posit it as that which is other than itself?" (21) . To question the authenticity of the real is not even an option. When de Certeau mentions that history refers to "a practice, hence to a reality" de Certeau is simply repeating the same idea. But because of the way practice and reality are aligned the real develops as a more positive concept than it seems to have been defined, i.e. a malleable, amorphous entity. De Certeau in fact does not think that the real is fabricated purely through historiographical discourse. On the contrary, he recognizes possible reciprocity between the real and discourse. The reciprocity that emerges from de Certeau's historiographical contemplation seems to imply that the autonomy he assigns the real does not give it an independent status but the historiographical reference to the real via discursive activities enables the real to impact on history and allows historiography in turn to be empowered to illuminate the real.

A key to understanding the reality-impacted discourse is found in the section entitled "A Practice" in "The Historiographical Operation." It turns out that the practice de Certeau has in mind "makes of scientific discourse the exposition of the conditions of its productions, instead of the 'narrative of past events'" (41) . This historiographical practice confounds the boundary between the factual and fiction. De Certeau makes Barthes wonder

whether "the narration of past events submitted to . . . the sanction of historical 'science,' placed under the imperious guarantee of the 'real,' justified by principles of 'rational' exposition . . . truly differs, through indubitable relevance, or through some specific trait, from imaginary narrative such as one finds in the epic, the novel, and the drama" (quoted in *The Writing of History*, 41) .

Inevitably when de Certeau discusses historiographical operations he does not follow the footsteps of such "classical" historians as Herodotus, Machiavelli, Bossuet and Michelet. What is historical about the works of these writers is "defined by a combination of meanings articulated and advanced only in the name of facts" (*The Writing of History*, 41) . But what de Certeau envisions is the kind of historiography that stresses the practice of research and construction of a text through the continual development of techniques.

A work is "scientific" when it produces a redistribution of space and when it consists, first of all, in *ascribing* a place for itself through the "establishment of sources"—that is to say, through an institutionalizing action and through transformational techniques" (75) .

This is the type of historiography that "ponders what is comprehensible and what are the conditions of understanding" (35). In *Heterologies* historiography is related to an "ethics . . .

[which is] articulated through effective operations [and which] defines a distance between what is and what ought to be. This distance designates a space where we have something to do" (199). De Certeau, however, does not allow historiography to dominate the real by endowing it with the absolute power to produce the real without any reference to it. On the contrary, he admits the full possibility of

the reference to the real This reference has instead been somewhat displaced. It is no longer immediately given by narrated or "reconstituted" objects. It is implied by the creation of models (destined to make objects "thinkable") proportioned to practices through their confrontation with what resists them, and makes appeals to other models (*The Writing of History*, 43) .

Because of the technical issues involved in the historiographical study, de Certeau then engages in some discussion on the development of computers.

The development of the computer has brought about an important change in historical practice. By dint of the new technology statistical differences and deviance are easily incorporated into historiographical studies. De Certeau distinguishes the new procedure utilizing computers from earlier historical practices. Previously, the historian started from a variety of data and incomprehensible remainders of the past, and gradually produced a coherent, comprehensible totality from it. The inductive process the traditional style entailed, moving from the the particular evidence to a general conceptualization, tended to eradicate diversity in favor of a totalizing view. However, the totalizing endeavor was bound to be questioned because more evidence would always come up to damage the credibility of the homogenizing tendency of the old methodology. Recent practices choose a priori historiography's "objects, levels and taxonomies of analysis. The coherence is initial" in the act of producing a model that can be conceptualized in terms of seriality and quantification. The project now concentrates on the "deviations that are revealed through [the] logical combination of series" or evidence (78). Resisting the temptation to totalize history, the new historians do not disdain to focus on the margins and investigate the issues that had escaped the totalizing framework of the old method—"sorcery, madness, festival, popular literature, the world of the peasant" and so on (79). Although the totalizing framework is to a lesser extent still maintained (as can be glimpsed in such expressions as "coherence in space" and "permanence in time"), the historian is now more concerned with those elements that are bound to upset the orderly structure of the old homogenizing view.

De Certeau also conceives of historiography as a deconstructive project that works against the kind of disciplines which limit the representational horizon of human conditions. This historiography has become a "function of falsification" (80). The new historiography challenges sociology, economics and psychology by bringing them outside their so-called proper realms and by forcing them to treat the "marginal" issues head on. Historiography cannot leave facts and models in the background because they are essential for the "internal organization of historical procedures" (80). Facts are no more discarded simply because they violate the normative rule of a totalizing representation but are rather valued precisely because they deviate from it. De Certeau cannot stress enough the importance of evidence/facts: "the fact, such is the difference" (81). Models hold a similar position in the historiographic concept de Certeau develops. However, models "take up the connection of

historical procedures with different scientific fields" (80), whereas evidence is imbricated in the organizational scheme of the disciplines that attempt to grasp true human conditions. Models are utilized to upset the balance on which these disciplines are complacently based. De Certeau explains this relationship to other sciences in the following manner:

A tactic of deviation would specify the intervention of history. From its standpoint, the epistemology of sciences begins with a present theory (in biology, for example) and meets history in the fashion of *what was not* clarified, or thought possible, or even formerly articulated. The past surges up first as "what lacks" (82).

De Certeau adds that the position of this historical practice is on the borderlines. The area this new historiography ascribes to itself is not only circumscribed by the scientific analysis exterior to it but also by its own recognition of the limits of various forms of analyses other disciplines provide.

This historical practice is antithetical to a notion of history that is constituted of a rush of events, and marked by specific, isolatable moments. This concept of history is antithetical to the one obviously held by Dickens and Carlyle. The dichotomy between the public, spectacular realm and the private, eventless realm is eliminated from the new historiography. As such, a retreat of the sort contemplated by Dickens and Carlyle is simply precluded because the duality between the two domains is rejected out of hand. De Certeau criticizes the old writers for artificially and wishfully creating an ahistorical, tranquil realm by assigning it an antithetical role to the public domain. It is in fact exactly in this unremarkable and neglected discourse where de Certeau locates the fragmentary voices of the common people who had been excluded because of their potentially recalcitrant and deconstructive status, "an obstacle to rationality" (*The Practice of Everyday Life*, 202-03). In this spirit de Certeau de-emphasizes the "epochal" events and figures that have been considered the staples of history. De Certeau builds his history on the stuff the others would have rather discarded: the everyday, the ordinary and the unremarkable. De Certeau's move is therefore to drive a wedge into the traditional concept of the historiographic approach. In this regard we can see why de Certeau brings to the reader's attention the need to stress the role of the dominated (here equated with the consumers) in *The Practice of Everyday Life*.

This essay is part of a continuing investigation of the ways in which users ... operate ... [It will be successful] if everyday practices, "ways of operating" or doing things, no longer appear as merely the obscure background of social activity ... The examination of such practices does not imply a return to individuality. ... Analysis shows ... that each individual is a locus in which an incoherent (and often contradictory) plurality of such relational determinations interact ... [T]he question at hand concerns modes of operation or schemata of action, and not directly the subjects (or persons) who are their authous or vehicles ... The purpose of this work is to make explicit the systems of operational combination which also compose a "culture," and to bring to light the models of action characteristic of users whose status as the dominated element in society (a status that does not mean that they are either passive or docile) is concealed by the euphemistic term "consumers." Everyday life invents itself by poaching in countless ways on the property of others (xi-xii).

It is appropriate now to return to the diagram and consider the implications of the

historiographical practice de Certeau sets forth in terms of its impacts on the understanding of the real. The type of practice he advocates does not enable one to gain absolute access to the real. But de Certeau seems to suggest that the self-conscious approach the new practice generates, including the possibility that the new approach imposes on itself the task of formulating models in order to be forewarned of the potential residues which will be left out of those models, helps the practitioners of the new method to resist the temptation to adopt a closed system by foregrounding the need to be constantly on the watch not to fabricate their version of the real. This practice is based on "a social place independent of knowledge," (*The Writing of History*, 44), where what is known is "what the historian studies, or understands, or 'brings to life' from a past society" (35). But the practitioners of the new approach is not necessarily dedicated to what is known. Their attention is rather more focused on what is thinkable. They try to grasp the things that have been considered trivial and work on them to produce something significant. Because of the area of their emphasis, which is necessarily distinguished from that of the traditional historiographic practitioners, the new generation of historiographers adopt an analytical approach that is also heterogeneous to the conventional kind in concept. For that reason these practitioners do not attempt to delve into the real through "analysis" that is "entangled within the scientific operations (the present society, to which the historians' problematics, their procedures, modes of comprehension, and finally a practice of meaning are referable)" (35). The real for them is not located in the past but in the very process to generate meanings in the marginalia, that is, the past. It ultimately becomes a truism for the new practitioners that the real does not proceed from analysis but the real in fact precede analytical operations. The real is a framework and a postulate within and upon which to conduct analytical work. At its most "rigorous," such a practice "symbolizes limits, and this . . . enables us to go beyond these limits" (85). In this context de Certeau' discussion on the "limit" and "difference" seems to shed light on the relationship between practice and real, although the relevance may be quite subtle.

We can speak more appropriately of "limit" or of "difference" than of "discontinuity" (a far too ambiguous term, because it seems to postulate evidence of a rift in reality). From now on we must say with Foucault that the limit becomes "at once the instrument and the object of study." As an operative concept of historiographical practice, it is both the working apparatus and the area of methodological investigation (40).

In this passage de Certeau seems to be reasserting his position he made clear in *The Practice of Everyday Life* quoted above. The tenuous link may be corroborated by his move to place the limit and the difference on the same plane. In fact de Certeau explicitly states that the new practice does not aim to pursue a static, unified representation but to locate a gap, an "interstice" "created within the event of the day through the representation of difference" (86).

Rather than fixing the region in which history can be activated de Certeau resorts to a more flexible view of historiographical practice, as demonstrated by his conception of the new approach. He posits two poles and the pole that is opposed to Practice is what he terms "a closed discourse." The closed discourse is also a practice in that it is made possible

through writing. Because of the descriptive mechanism (an essential feature of this version of practice) closed discourse cannot escape the constraints both place and time and conditions of production impose on it. Unlike the other practice, i.e. its polar opposite, closed discourse tries to hide its origin and at its purest aspires to alienate itself from the process of historiographical creation. Because the closed discourse is so concerned with its own discursive anonymity, it paradoxically presents a stance that is extremely self-conscious. At that stage closed discourse itself becomes its sole preoccupation. In its relation to the real, closed discourse cannot maintain a receptive approach that will allow for unauthoritarian and undogmatic construction of history. The closed discourse hems in the real and dictates the way the real is defined. In this regard, there is no reciprocity between close discourse and the real. Closed discourse virtually contains the real.

Practitioners of closed discourse "valorize the relation the historian keeps with a lived experience, that is, with the possibility of resuscitating or 'reviving' a past." They would like "to meet again men of the past" (35-6). In *Heterologies* de Certeau describes the closed discourse as "dogmatism," which "is authorized by a reality that it claims to represent, and in the name of [which] it imposes laws" (199). It is a discourse which "transforms its products into representations of a reality in which everyone must believe" (*Heterologies*, 200). It replaces the ethical—a realm where our interactions with the real/history are not precluded—with a supposed expression of reality (200). There is a passage in *The Practice of Everyday Life* that sheds more light on closed discourse.

Narrations about what's-going-on constitute our orthodoxy They move forward camouflaged as facts, data, and events. They present themselves as messengers from a "reality." Their uniform takes on the color of the economic and social ground they move into. When they advance, the terrain itself seems to advance. But in fact they fabricate the terrain, simulate it, use it as a mask, accredit themselves by it, and thus create the scene of their law (185).

This is a "representation [that] disguises the praxis that organizes it" (*Heterologies*, 203).

It may be time now to inquire into the implications of the closed discourse and its polar opposite in their relation to the performative nature of language. De Certeau defines what Barthes considered a "fake performative discourse"—because "the apparent declarative element is in fact no more than the signifier of the speech act taken to be an act of authority" (quoted in *The Writing of History*, 96) —as indeed performative. Examining how referential language functions gives us an opportunity to understand the way performative discourse operates.

The discourse that depends on language, especially writing, such as chronicles, archives and documents, is capable of comprehending something other than itself. Inclusion of alien elements is not a sign of openness but an attempt to homogenize the discursive contents and subject them under one control. Citation is utilized to exclude differences from the discourse by creating a "referential language that acts therein as reality This stratification of discourse does not assume the form of a 'dialogue' or a 'collage.' Into the singular it combines knowledge citing the plural of the documents that are quoted" (*The Writing of History*, 94). The referential language, incorporated into the strategy of authentication, transforms what is quoted into a source of reliability. But the referential language in fact does not impart

authenticity to what is quoted (95). Dovetailing external discourse into the master discourse does not valorize the whole discourse but only gives discourse the appearance and facade of authenticity. De Certeau points out that "the role of quoted language is . . . one of accrediting discourse" (94). Citation never ceases to hark back to its source. The other that is implicit in the external discourse never disappears. The seeming credibility it gives does not arise from its assimilation to the master discourse but from the paradoxical presence of the other, heterogeneity, in discourse.

Replacing doctrines that have become unbelievable, citation allows the technocratic mechanisms to make themselves credible for each individual in the name of the others. To cite is thus to give reality to the simulacrum produced by a power, by making people believe that others believe in it, but without providing any believable object (*The Practice of Everyday Life*, 189).

The discourse that relies on referential language "has no openings," for "it is semantically saturated" (*The Writing of History*, 95). It admits no gaps and allows no epistemological escape, although because of the nature of referential language the discourse rich in this kind of language is susceptible to the influences exerted by alien voices within. The discourse impacted by heterogeneous influences however manages to produce a type of audience who inserts themselves into a social space that is formulated not by themselves but by the authoritarian voice implicit in the closed discourse. It functions to produce a certain type of reader, a reader inserted into a social space ordered not by the reader himself but by the closed discourse. The following excerpt (quoted from a section in *Heterologies* where de Certeau discusses what he calls our "general historiography," i.e., a historiography produced by the media industry) illustrates the role closed, performative discourse plays in social life. De Certeau also notes a similarity between the media historian and his academic counterpart.

[The news story] has a pragmatic efficacy. In pretending to recount the real, it manufactures it. It is performative. It renders believable what it says, and it generates an appropriate action. In making believers, it produces an active body of practitioners. The news of the day declares: "Anarchists are in your street; crime is at your door!" The public responds immediately by arming and barricading itself The media historian's narration devaluates certain practices and assigns privilege to others; it blows conflict out of proportion; it inflames nationalism and racism; it organizes or disengages certain forms of behavior; and it manages to produce what it says is happening Thebewitching voices of the narration transform, reorient, and regulate the space of social relations. They exercise an immense power, but a power that eludes control because it presents itself as the only representation of what is happening or of what happened in the past. Professional history operates in an analogous way through the subjects it selects, through the problematics that it privileges, through the documents and the models that it employs. Under the name of science, it too arms and mobilizes a clientele of the faithful. Consequently, the political and economic powers, who often have more foresight than the historians themselves, are always striving to keep historians on their side by flattering them, paying them, directing them, controlling or, if need be, subduing them (207).

Quoting a lengthy excerpt has its disadvantages. One of which obviously would be to bore the reader by disrupting the argument by an alien voice. But allowing an extensive passage of de Certeau's a presence in my essay I meant to avoid the practice of what he terms the closed discourse. However, once his voice is in it will not leave the homogeneous entity to remain undisturbed. After all de Certeau's baffling style is inimical to the stabilizing influence of the authoritarian voice. It is no wonder then that his discourse (which revels in plasticity, ambiguity and subversion of the established real) in the end succeeds in exposing the inappropriateness to conceive his historiographical operations in the manner I diagrammed above. His discourse forecloses the possibility of a fixed point, an absolute perspective from which to construct a model and the model was essentially built to pursue historiographical operations within a fixed framework. Despite the doubt inevitably cast on the usefulness of the diagram, however, the diagram's heuristic value is not totally nullified as we come to the realization that de Certeau's deconstructive approach was made possible only because there was a structure before him to tear down.

De Certeau envisions a historiographical practice that is open and free from dogmatic constraints. As a possible alternative to closed discourse he posits two poles and assigns the real history a position that is to be located between the two poles (or rather it may be more accurate to say that de Certeau constructs history out of the process of incorporating the kind of residues that were deemed irrelevant by the old historiographical practitioners). The result is a deconstruction of the real that constantly vacillates between the two poles represented by two types of discourse. However, as de Certeau's approach becomes more defined, or rather undefined, even the possibility of postulating the bipolar structure is found untenable. In the end the historiography he conceives emerges as an amorphous being/project that resists being fixed within an explicit framework.

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