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Lukacs, Jameson, Foucaultにおけるsubject（主体）の状態について

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On the Status of the Subject in Lukacs, Jameson, and Foucault

Katsuaki Taira

The novel has long been considered as a form of cultural sublimation, as a psychological text which connects one ontological position to another. In fact, the novel's involvement with psychoanalysis has been the subject of numerous studies.¹ Steven Marcus, for example, addresses the complex entanglement of the novel and psychoanalysis by defining psychoanalysis as a "tribute... paid to a culture in which various narrative and fictional forms had exerted for centuries both moral and philosophical authority and that had produced as one of its chief climaxes the great bourgeois novels of the nineteenth century."² Both the novel and psychoanalysis develop a tendency to attain their cultural apotheosis as an authority in shared cultural spaces. Imbricated with each other, however, both psychoanalysis and the novel shape, and are shaped by the empirical, materially manifest subject. This shaping process is dialectical in that the very presentation of an authority induces what Edward Said calls a "molestation," a destabilization of the given authority which entails revision, or the construction of a new authority.³ For example, if the subject envisions a reality, the Real,⁴ with its phantasmagoric undefinability, will invariably challenge the authority of the subject, and forces revision of the reality presented by the subject.

Since all representational authorities are susceptible to deconstruction, the discursive operation to establish authority can never escape from being embroiled in the process of self-contradiction. As a constituent of

the dialectic move, therefore, the subject is ever burdened with a status that is both transitory and paradoxical. Although—despite the threat of post-structural and postmodern approaches—the subject is often posited as continuous and normative, the comprehension of the past should not be premised on such a stabilized and stabilizing view of the subject. The construction of the subject and the impact it has on our belief in the reality of the past should be considered more cautiously, for the very critics whom we entrust to explicate the influence of the novel and the related significance of subject formation, cannot help but be subjects themselves. Consequently, they all too easily discard their search for the real, and end up anthropomorphizing history. As they interpret it, they insert the past into the subjective realm of their own experience. After all, we can never escape from our perspectives, even if, or rather exactly because, our intention is to recover the temporal essence of pastness. That is why Michel Foucault's injunction—that "the traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled"⁵—sounds so salutary, if we want to avoid the contamination of the past by the present. Commenting on the way a continuous subject reconstitutes history, Foucault writes:

If the history of thought could remain the locus of uninterrupted continuities, if it could endlessly forge connexions that no analysis could undo without abstraction, if it could weave, around everything that men say and do, obscure synthesis that anticipate for him, prepare him and lead him endlessly towards his future, it would provide a privileged shelter for the sovereignty of consciousness. Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; the certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the subject—in the form of historical consciousness—will once again be able to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by difference, and find in them what might be called his abode. Making

historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all action are the two sides of the same system of thought.... In various forms, this theme has played a constant role since the nineteenth century: to preserve, against all decentrings, the sovereignty of the subject....⁶

Thus, Foucault challenges the subject's ability to order the past and make it a signifying whole. We must respond to Foucault's challenge in order to gauge the limit of human consciousness, and ultimately human existence.

Georg Lukacs is another critic who seemingly casts doubt on the epistemological certainty of the subject. Lukacs, characterizing *The Theory of the Novel* as a "scarcely articulate rejection of the war," defines it as an attempt "to put [his] emotional attitude into conscious terms" at a time when, "nothing, even at the level of the most abstract intellection, helped to mediate between [his] subjective attitude and objective reality."⁷ However, it is possible to posit some form of mediation between his private reception and what he calls objective reality. Like the novel Lukacs discusses, *The Theory of the Novel* is, after all, an elaborate representation that reflects the response of his own self to the cultural history of the world he is embroiled in. As Lukacs writes, *The Theory of the Novel* is an attempt "to put his emotional attitude into conscious terms" (11). Despite his assertion that the book will not "serve as a guide," Lukacs admits the usefulness of the book if one intends to "become more intimately acquainted with the pre-history of the important ideologies of the 1920s and 1930s" (23). In the book, Lukacs claims that a dialectical evolution of culture brought humanity from an integrated, coherent, epic age, into the fragmented, incoherent age of the present. This evolution took place because "development from the historico-philosophical viewpoint leads to a kind of abolition of those aesthetic principles which had determined development up to that

point in time" (17). According to Lukacs, the dialectical development of the epic genre eventually invalidated the aesthetics necessary to support the genre, and thus, brought about the cessation of the epic. The novel emerged as a replacement for the old genre to oppose the fragmentation and incoherence of the disintegrated modern world. Lukacs considers the novel as a "symptom" of "a world gone out of joint"—a world in which "there is no longer any spontaneous totality of being" (17-8). In this discontinuous world, people are forced to reconstitute their views of reality and self by the invention of different methods of representation.

The process whereby Lukacs implicates the subject in the production of *The Theory of the Novel* can be seen in his addition of the preface to the work. This preface, of a particularly autobiographical nature, problematizes the work as a representation of selves and worlds, whether they are of the present or "pre-historical." Dialectically, Lukacs' prefatory self seeks to replace his older self and deprive it of its authority. From the perspective of the genre, however, *The Theory of the Novel* manifests complications that arise from the difficulty of pinpointing the subject position. As Lukacs notes, "genres now cut across one another, with a complexity that cannot be disentangled" (41). In fact, while *The Theory of the Novel* is a theoretical text, it is also endued with the qualities of a novel, for the work can never secure its existence without its constitutive "objective reality" and Lukacs' subjectivity (with particular emphasis on the latter's transformational capacity). Although *The Theory of the Novel* divides literary history into two distinct cultural periods, the epic and the novelistic, the division can be attributed to the dynamics of Lukacs' own subjectivity. After all, the work was undertaken as a personal response to the disintegrating world caused by the devastating war, at a juncture when a new era was beginning at the demise of an old one.

Frederic Jameson is also concerned with the issue of discontinuity in

history. The first chapter of *The Political Unconscious*, entitled "On Interpretation," illustrates Jameson's move, in Foucault's words, to "preserve, against all decentrings, the sovereignty of the subject," and maintain historical continuity. Although Jameson's project, because of its hermeneutic tendency, can be distinguished from the representational kind associated with the novel, the distinction between interpretation and representation is blurred, for each discourse is comprehended within the other, as demonstrated by his use of psychoanalysis. Jameson claims that criticism seizes objects through their localization. By availing itself of various master codes, criticism attempts to assume authority by establishing a "careful consonance with this or that local law of a fragmented social life, this or that subsystem of a complex and mushrooming cultural superstructure" (10). Criticism projects "the illusion that [its] readings are somehow complete and self-sufficient" by resorting to "strategies of containment" (10). Interestingly enough, Jameson conflates, although seemingly only within the "untranscendable horizon of Marxism," localization/containment strategies with psychoanalysis on a certain level. According to Jameson, the subjectivity with which psychoanalysis deals is a locally constructed concept in a sense that its formation is associated with the historically local psychic fragmentation caused by capitalist development. The psycho-sexual semiotics of psychoanalysis is also localized, for it is related to the banishment of sexual life from the public sphere of bourgeois society. The transhistoricity and organicity of this fragmentation are incorporated in the legitimation and naturalization of psychoanalytic approach. Such strategies fortify the belief in the adequacy of psychoanalytic interpretations, and as a result, exclude other possibilities in the study of subjectivity. This exclusion contributes to the monopolization of the Historical Real by psychoanalysis.

The strategy of containment in the service of psychoanalysis thus

generates the assumption of transhistoricity, or the temporal continuity of psychic fragmentation. This assumption can be derived from a particular historiographical model that is based on such binomial relations as surface-depth, conscious-unconscious, and past-present. The surface-depth relation emerges, for example, from Jameson's concept of sedimentation, as he explains that we "apprehend texts through sedimented layers of previous interpretations" or "through sedimented reading habits and categories developed by those inherited interpretive traditions" (9-10).

Jameson's Marxist orientation provides an important clue to establishing the subject formation as an underlying dynamic that generates binomial manifestations. Jameson claims in *The Political Unconscious* that Marxism is a controlling hermeneutic that accounts for all discourse as being informed by a single, underlying, and teleological master-narrative, i.e., the history of class struggle. The transhistoricity of this master plot allows for a hermeneutic that will undo the very repressions which block our access to the plot itself.

Only Marxism can give us an adequate account of the essential mystery of the cultural past, which... is momentarily returned to life and warmth and allowed once more to speak, and to deliver its long-forgotten message in surroundings utterly alien to it. This mystery can be reenacted only if the human adventure is one.... [Long-dead issues] can recover their original urgency for us only if they are retold within the unity of a single great collective story; only if, in however disguised and symbolic a form, they are seen as sharing a single fundamental theme—for Marxism, the collective struggle to wrest a realm of Freedom from a realm of Necessity; only if they are grasped as vital episodes in a single vast unfinished plot.... It is in detecting the traces of that uninterrupted narrative, in restoring to the surface of the text the repressed and buried reality of this fundamental history, that the doctrine of a political unconscious finds its function and its necessity (19-20).

Since Jameson's master history depends on the verifiability of a single, unified narrative, it functions in an analogous manner as the continuous bourgeois subject. The unified narrative emerges only when the repressive

mechanism is broken down and a continuous thread, or a master plot, is found, just as the psychoanalytic approach obtains its justification when the secure position of the subject is established.

Since Jameson's political unconscious is associated not only with a doctrine but also with a structuring agency that resides in psyches and artifacts, his motive for introducing a stable subject becomes clear. In fact, when Jameson observes that "the conception of the political unconscious outlined in this book is an attempt to cut through this particular dilemma by relocating it within the object," the "object" is identified with the subject, and "it" with the teleological essence of history (34). Furthermore, he writes that "master narratives have inscribed themselves in the texts as well as in our thinking about them," and that the ahistoricizing reader reveals a "resistance to his own political unconscious," and denies "the reading and writing of history within himself" (34). That is why Jameson's postulation of psyches and artifacts as repositories of the past is based on his attempt to create the master narrative—that buried, continuous history which critics are enabled to excavate.

History for Jameson is constituted like the subject, for both are repressed and in need of the analyst, or interpreter. This homology renders History structurally consonant with the subject and discursively complicit in the preservation of the sovereign continuous subject of which Foucault warns us. If we recall his critique of psychoanalysis, i.e., Jameson's consideration of psychoanalysis through the localization/containment strategy, we notice that we have overlooked the locality and fragility of the central critical subject. Jameson's main purpose, however, is to create the illusion that a centered, meta-discursive subject is realizable through the use of his proposed hermeneutic. Apparently, he cannot resist the impulse to defend against the deconstruction of the unifying subject.

Jameson's analyst/interpreter who transcodes—the master critic who mediates between the present and the past—is unquestionably an centered, metadiscursive, continuous subject.

Since Jameson himself assumes this privileged position, his Marxist hermeneutic becomes vulnerable to Foucault's post-structural historiography. In fact, Jameson's work is an attempt to resist the incursions of post-structural approaches represented by Foucault's. Dowling describes Jameson's *The Political Unconscious* as "an original and powerful attempt to subsume within an expanded Marxism the rival programs of such thinkers as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze."⁸ John Frow, on the other hand, emphasizes the opposition between post-structuralism and Marxism. Remarking that "the concept of dialectic is rejected by most post-structuralist writers," he perceives *The Political Unconscious* as a defense of Marxist theory against the deconstructionist threat, for the most threatening aspect of deconstructionist theory is that such theory allows "no point of metadiscursive authority... which is not already caught within the play of discursive codes," thus effectively foreclosing the position for Jameson's analyst or master critic.⁹ In the face of "the rapid installation of deconstruction as a new and depressingly depoliticized orthodoxy [that entails] a pervasive sense of the 'loss of social value and vision of the humanities'" (Frow, 2), Jameson's work becomes an attempt to mend the rift between liberal humanism and post-structuralism, and to preserve the bourgeois humanist concept of the continuity of history and the subject.

As has been suggested, Foucault's view can be opposed to Jameson's. What the comparison of Jameson's "On Interpretation," the first chapter of *The Political Unconscious*, with Foucault's "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" reveals is the peculiarly undoctinaire nature of the latter. Although it presents a serious intellectual and political vision, Foucault's

essay is neither programmatic nor systematically prescriptive. In fact, Foucault is an anti-foundationalist, and as such he rejects fixed determinative origins. In "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" he constantly tries to problematize his Nietzschean origins so that the emergence of the authoritative position is prevented. In contrast to Jameson, who constructs an authority that finds its ultimate form in the figure of the analyst or critic, Foucault eliminates any position that allows for a safe haven for a continuous subject or a single, meta-discursive self. As part of his project to shed light on the relation of power and knowledge, Foucault casts doubt on the continuity of the past and present, and in the process alienates the subject from history and from the traditional role of a historical authority. He attempts to replace continuous histories, such as Jameson's "uninterrupted narrative," with a discourse that is characterized by its haphazard and fragmentary nature. In fact, such a discursive model is equated with a genealogy that develops a tendency to undermine the coherence between histories and the power structures. Nietzschean genealogy, a powerful discursive weapon for Foucault to reconfigure history, entails a strategy of fracturing conventional histories by severing the present from the past. According to Foucault, what the genealogy does is "to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge."¹⁰ To circumvent the unifying move associated with the prescriptive history, the genealogical project must resist the pressure to create order, that relentless demand for synthesis, by complicating the nature of those alleged origins which are the foundation of traditional historical knowledge.

Foucault formulates hypotheses concerning origins that undermine the traditional modes of constructing histories. I will look at these

hypotheses to explicate why Foucault's genealogy clashes with continuous historiographies. One hypothesis states that an original identity is simply constructed from "alien forms." Foucault writes that "if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is 'something altogether different' behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms" ("Nietzsche," 78). This hypothesis subverts the dialectical Marxist historicism of Lukacs and Jameson by rejecting the expressive causality derived from the concept of a structuring essence. Another hypothesis undermines the myth of the origin on which bourgeois historiographies are based on. In the beginning—although the possibility of the originary point is quickly rejected—there is no inviolable identity of the origin of things, Foucault claims, but "the dissension of other things... disparity" (79).

History...teaches how to laugh at the solemnities of the origin. The lofty origin is no more than "a metaphysical extension which arises from the belief that things are most precious and essential at the moment of birth." We tend to think that this is the moment of their greatest perfection, when they emerged dazzling from the hands of a creator or in the shadowless light of a first morning. The origin always precedes the Fall. It comes before the body, before the world and time; it is associated with the gods, and its story is always sung as a theogony. But historical beginnings are lowly: not in the sense of modest or discreet like the steps of a dove, but derisive and ironic, capable of undoing every infatuation. "We wished to awaken the feeling of man's sovereignty by showing his divine birth: this path is now forbidden, since a monkey stands at the entrance." Man originated with a grimace over his future development; and Zarathustra himself is plagued by a monkey who jumps along behind him pulling on his coattails (79).

By this postulate alone, Foucault undermines Jameson's view of the recoverability of the repressed truth from the essential mystery of the cultural past.

Foucault states that history is comprised of "the concrete body of a development, with its moments of intensity, its lapses, its extended

periods of feverish agitation, its fainting spells" (80). As he formulates the genealogy, Foucault conflates two types of origin: descent and emergence. Descent is the equivalent of stock, and is associated with a group that is "sustained by the bonds of blood, tradition, or social class" (80-1). This concept of descent involves a myriad of accidents and deviations, and as a heritage it is filled with "an unstable assemblage of faults, fissures, and heterogeneous layers" (81). As he presents this postulate, Foucault again problematizes Jameson's historical model on account of its teleological master plot. The diametrically opposed position of their views becomes clear, as the "analysis of descent permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events" (81). Genealogy not only involves the record of discontinuous descent but also the investigation of the origin of emergences. Emergences are implicated in adversarial relations that occur in the interstice, i.e., a "non-place" that is deprived of a common space (85). No discontinuous phase of emergences has an identical meaning, for emergences "result from substitutions, displacements, disguised conquests, and systematic reversals" (86). The genealogy, composed of such recalcitrant ingredients, poses an insurmountable barrier to the hermeneutic enterprise typified by Jameson's transcoding. Based on this genealogical concept, Foucault links the method of transcoding to what he terms "interpretation." Through the definition of the term, Foucault essentially debunks Jameson's hermeneutic operation.

If interpretation were the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in an origin, then only metaphysics could interpret the development of humanity. But if interpretation is the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a series of interpretations (86).

Consideration of emergence and descent leads to what Nietzsche calls *wirkliche Historie*, or effective history. Effective history is a move that opposes the historical attempt to reduce heterogeneous time to a unified, homogeneous continuum. Foucault posits effective history as an antidote to a history that is premised on the reconciliation of all the displacements of the past and on the existence of an extra-temporal subjectivity with the assurance of apocalyptic objectivity. Effective history rejects the subject's belief in eternal truth, "the immortality of the soul, and the nature of consciousness as always identical to itself" (87), and forecloses a suprahistorical perspective. Effective history is even associated with "the acuity of a glance that distinguishes, separates, and disperses; that is capable of liberating divergence and marginal elements—the kind of dissociating view that is capable of decomposing itself, capable of shattering the unity of man's being through which it was thought that he could extend his sovereignty to the events of his past" (87). As is implied by its self-deconstructive tendency, effective history is distinguished from traditional history by its lack of constants. Foucault observes that nothing "in man—not even his body—is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men," and he even proposes the dismantlement of the "traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development" (88). In short, Foucault founds effective history on the basic concepts of discontinuity, the instability of life and nature, and the non-teleological accumulation of history, with a concomitant assumption of history's resistance to the interpretative subject and the complicated nature, even the impossibility, of the construction of an integrated, continuous subject.

Genealogy, implicated in the analysis of descent, is also located within the articulation of the body and history. Foucault turns to the body,

rather than to the novel or any other discursive alternative, for a primary text partly to satisfy his desire to eradicate traditional history. By dispelling the illusion of the body as under the unified control of the subject, Foucault separates the subject from the body. In the process, he deindividualizes the subject, and dissociates it from history.

The body... is the domain of the *Herkunft*. The body manifests the stigmata of past experience and also gives rise to desires, failings, and errors.... The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration.... [Genealogy's] task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body (83).

By focusing on the body, Foucault not only fractures the subject but also undermines his own authority as a historian. Thus, in contrast to Marxist historicism upheld by Lukacs and Jameson, who postulate a historical dynamic based on the continuity of the subject, Foucault's genealogy even prevents the analyst/critic/historian, or himself, from assuming a totalizing position that is premised on the absolute status of the subject.

Notes

¹ See Ned Lukacher, *Primal Scenes: Literature, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), and Thomas Ronald, *Dreams of Authority: Freud and the Fictions of the Unconscious* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).

² Steven Marcus, "Freud and Dora: Story, History, Case History," *In Dora's Case: Freud, Hysteria, Feminism*, ed. Charles Bernheimer and Claire Kahane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 72.

³ Edward Said, *Beginnings: Intention and Method* (New York: Basic, 1975), 95.

⁴ In *An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism*, Madan Sarrup defines the Real in post-structural, Lacanian terms:

The reality which we can never know is the Real—it lies beyond language...the reality we must assume although we can never know it. This is the most problematic of the three orders [the Real, the Symbolic, and the Imaginary] or registers since it can never be experienced immediately, but only by way of the mediation of the other two: "the Real, or what is perceived as such, is what resists symbolization absolutely" (26).

Sarrup then adds that Fredric Jameson identifies the Real with History.

⁵ Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Random House, 1984), 89.

⁶ Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, tr. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 12.

⁷ Georg Lukacs, *The Theory of the Novel*, tr. Anna Bostock (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 11-2.

⁸ William C. Dowling, *Jameson, Althusser, Marx: An Introduction to The Political Unconscious* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 10.

⁹ John Frow, *Marxism and Literary History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 31.

¹⁰ Foucault, "Lecture 1:7 January 1976," *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 83.

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Lukacs, Jameson, Foucault における subject
(主体) の状態について

この論文では Lukacs, Jameson, そして Foucault の subject に対する姿勢に関する考察を試みてみた。Lukacs は *The Theory of the Novel* において、その自叙伝的背景もあり、自己とそれを巻き込む文化的歴史の昇華的 (sublimation/making sublime/sublation) 表出の過程で subject の絶対的連続性を確認する。Jameson は弁証法的唯物論の立場から仮定した History と single unified narrative との相似関係から bourgeois subject の連続性を想定し、それに基づいた理論を彼の *The Political Unconscious* で展開する。Foucault はこの両者とは異なり、彼の genealogy により必然的、因果的要素で構築された歴史観を偶発的、断片的要素で構築 (=非構築) された歴史観で覆すと同時に、subject の連続性を否定する姿勢を明らかにする。