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Changing of the US-Japan Alliance: after September 11

Masa'aki GABE
University of the Ryukyus

Abstract

The presence of U. S. military bases on Okinawa has been a political, economic, and social issue in Japan. Japan's national security has depended on U. S. presence, particularly on Okinawa. This article focuses on new trends in the U.S. forward-deployment strategy, and re-evaluates the mission and roles of the armed forces on Okinawa. It also emphasizes the dynamics of domestic politics in dealing with the base issue. If the U.S. and Japanese governments lose political support on Okinawa, the significance of the U.S. presence in East Asia would decline and Japanese security strategy would change.

Keywords: Okinawa, base issue, forward deployment, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and Japan-U. S. relation

The end of the Cold War, which had enveloped the globe for the latter half of the twentieth century, and the onset of globalization have brought to the people of the twenty-first century a mixture of hope, change, and disorder. While the superpower rivalry is a thing of the past, vacuums of power have brought a growing recognition of the importance of avoiding disorder not only in terms of national security, but also from the standpoint of human security that is defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want in the framework of pursuing economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security.¹ At the same time, leaders have come to realize that it will be impossible to create peace so long as sound measures are not adopted to deal with the workings of the various levels of domestic politics, economic, social, and cultural among them. Furthermore, notions of security seem wholly inadequate if they ignore problems that are not contained by borders, such as the environment and human rights.

Even the Japan-U.S. alliance, always an unbalanced structure and perhaps best seen as a holdover of the security arrangements between developed countries during the Cold War era, has increasingly been influenced by the dynamics of each country's economy and social change and, hence, by the framework of its domestic politics. For example, in Okinawa² the regular incidents and accidents as well as the environmental pollution created by the U. S. military and their personnel can no longer be overlooked, as often occurred previously. In January 2001 the Okinawa Prefecture Assembly unanimously passed a resolution, the first of its kind, requesting the prevention of relapses of incidents by U.S. military personnel and a reduction in the number

of U. S. Marines.³ Lt. General Earl B. Hailston (USMC) who was highest ranking officer on Okinawa called Governor and other local conservative politicians as "all nuts and a bunch of wimps," responding to new Okinawan's attitude to U. S. Marines on Okinawa.⁴ This resolution is a symbol that the people of Okinawa have developed increased sensitivities of human rights and the environment and in this respect are perhaps becoming more in tune with international developments at the dawn of the new millennium.

Pressure from the Twenty-first Century

The close of the twentieth century saw the Cold War in Europe come to an end with the collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Perhaps the denouement to this drama is now being played out on the Korean Peninsula. The North South Summit, which even as it was being proposed was fraught with difficulties, has been realized and with it, one hopes, the Cold War structures in Asia that have now spanned fifty years are beginning to be dissolved. The Korean Peninsula is starting to shift from a military standoff to peaceful coexistence. Along with such encouraging developments, however, have come serious conflicts over human rights and ethnic and religious strife in regions where nation-states are fragile. The limits to problem solving through military means become quite clear. Certainly, a large-scale forward deployment strategy of the Cold War variety, such as that found in the U.S. presence on Okinawa, has proven increasingly difficult to legitimize in terms of the national security of any country.

In the United States the beginning of the twenty-first century has also been accompanied by the birth of a new political administration under

President George W. Bush. Signs that this new administration intends to change American foreign policy toward Japan are already visible.

Examples are evident in a non-partisan report on policy vis-à-vis Japan entitled "The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership."⁵ Written under the supervision of Richard L. Armitage, the newly appointed Deputy Secretary of State in the Bush administration (who was, incidentally, also the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security under President Reagan), the report recommends that the prohibition on Japan's right to collective self-defense be removed. Japanese Government has interpreted the meaning of the article nine of Constitution that Japan is not allow to join a collective self-defense but could use self-defense right in case of homeland attack. This interpretation was a reflection that Japanese don't want to be involved in armed conflicts outside Japanese territory. It was a lesson for Japanese from the Asia-Pacific War, 1930-1945. If Japan changes the interpretation to exercise the collective self-defense, Japanese Troops will be sent abroad to join military campaign in order to support U.S. forces. According to the report, such a move would allow for a maturing of the Japan-U.S. security relationship, modeled on the special alliance between the United States and Britain.⁶

Proposed New U.S. Strategy toward Japan

The main points of the report mentioned above are as follows:

1) Criticisms of Japan as irresponsible are exacerbated by the Japanese practice of deferring to the United States in all military matters. This attitude was evident in the negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa in 1972 and in the process for reaching an agreement on the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma Air Station within Okinawa. To the extent that security matters are largely left to the United States, the Japanese people will never willingly accept the existence of U.S. military bases in Japan.

2) The use of collective self-defense and a maturing of the Japan-U.S. alliance using the U.S.-British relationship as a model ought to be promoted. Part of this includes discussions on the allocation of defense responsibilities between Japan and the United States.

3) This "re-redefinition" of the Japan-U.S. security relationship is due to recent developments on the Korean Peninsula and ought to be made part of a long-term Pacific Basin strategy.

4) It would be worthwhile to ease the burden borne by the Okinawans from a political,

though not necessarily a military, perspective. This is designed to win support from the Okinawan people for U.S. military bases and is premised on the argument that the bases continue to be necessary and thus efforts to facilitate coexistence are required.

These points are consistent with those advanced by former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt M. Campbell in his article "Energizing the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership,"¹ which included commentary on the full implementation of the new Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines to be operational in contingency or humanitarian crises, the joint use of facilities with Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF), the re-examination of agreements related to the roles and missions of respective armed forces, and the regulation of training exercises.

The broader context in which these points ought to be considered involves the effort by the United States over the past decade or so to design a new diplomatic and military strategy for the post-Cold War era. After replacing the administration of President George Bush (Sr.), one that had remained locked in a Cold War mindset in many respects, the Clinton Administration took the new framework of the international political economy into careful consideration as it attempted to create its post-Cold War vision. While the Clinton Administration promoted globalization and revived the American economy, its foreign policy lacked consistency and was occasionally even indecisive. It was characterized by the separation of economic and security issues and the tight specification of conditions for action. The former succeeded in creating a framework in which domestic political concerns might be given priority. Unfortunately, it failed to facilitate the integration of American interests. The latter clarified American diplomatic action domestically and internationally at the same time that it made flexible responses difficult.

The New Bush Administration

The shape of the foreign policy from the new Bush Administration has been outlined by newly appointed National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice in an article she wrote entitled "Promoting the National Interest."⁸ It has also been illuminated in statements made by the new Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, before the Senate Armed Service Committee,⁹ and by the new Secretary of State, Colin Powell, before the Senate Foreign Relations.¹⁰ The first characteristic is a return to political realism and a definition of foreign policy goals based on the pursuit of national interests. The second

characteristic is alliance diplomacy marked by a system of divided responsibilities. Bush's Missile defense plan is a new strategy that makes the United States the guarantor of global peace and stability as well as a "world policeman" against international terrorism. In many respects this signifies a return to a "normal" superpower mentality, such as that oriented toward balance of power thinking that dominated American policymaking in the years between World War II and the start of the Cold War. With an eye toward tradition, the foreign policy of the Republican Party emphasizes stability rather than action and caution rather than participation. The new security team will thus be likely to break with Wilsonian thought that were based on moral principles and on the benefits of promoting international accord. Under the Bush Administration the United States is attempting to shift back to using power as the centerpiece of its realist approach. One might, then, expect that top U.S. diplomats would assert national interests in their dealings with allies and that the Administration would face the urgent and bedeviling issue of arriving at a well-defined set of priorities that commands widespread respect, at least within the key foreign policy makers of the Administration. It should also be expected that diplomatic transactions of many varieties would be coordinated within strict calculations of the costs and benefits to the United States.

This approach is likely to bring about controversial and competing responses within Japan. In the case of the negotiation for Okinawa reversion in 1972 the Nixon Administration requested economic contributions from Japan under the Nixon Doctrine. Likewise, the new Bush government will probably request more substantial contributions on security issues (such as the recognition of the right of collective self-defense). The return of a realist foreign policy undoubtedly will bring about changes in the new administration's policy towards Japan. Bilateral rather than multilateral alliances will be stressed, and allies will be asked to bear the costs of preserving American values and sharing the benefits of peace, prosperity, and freedom.

It is difficult to imagine that Japan, which is frequently viewed by American policymakers as an immature ally, will accept these requests docilely. It is also highly unlikely that these requests will promote serious discussions between the countries in which the tradeoffs requested are shown to be clearly in Japan's interests, let alone that such talks will convince the Japanese people of this. This is largely due to the fact that the Cold War provided fertile ground for the development of a Japanese foreign policy

which did not accept military responsibilities. For this reason, the realist diplomacy of the new administration is likely to force Japan to re-examine its diplomacy. In this regard it would be useful if the Japanese government eliminated its de facto restrictions on the debate of security issues and, instead, promoted lively discussions on a variety of levels.

With this in mind, it seems clear that changes in policy for the U.S. military bases in Okinawa, maintained under the name of Japan-U.S. security, hinge on the question of whether or not Japan will be able to overcome the inertia that has spanned fifty years of post-war diplomacy. Stated in a different way, it depends upon how Japan, in the twenty-first century, copes with the negative legacy of the Yoshida Doctrine in 1950s that single-mindedly stressed catching up to the United States economically.

A "Twist" in the Japan-U.S. Security Relations concerning Okinawa¹¹

Douglas MacArthur, who directed the occupation of Japan during its most critical period, once stated that maintaining military bases in Okinawa was an absolutely essential component of efforts to demilitarize Japan. After having brought the Occupation to an end with the condition contained in the San Francisco Peace Treaty that Okinawa would remain under U.S. control, Japan successfully returned to the international community in the post-war period. In the latter half of 1950 the U.S. withdrew ground combat troops from the Japanese mainland. However, the 3rd Marine Division, a part of the ground forces stationed in Japan, was transferred to the newly constructed Camp Schwab in the northern part of Okinawa Island. In 1972 the Japanese and Okinawans' request resulted in the return of certain administrative rights over Okinawa, but also expanded the U.S. military's free use of its bases throughout Japan including Okinawa. Rather than transforming the U.S. military presence, the new arrangement principally simply returned to landowners or transferred to the JSDF fifteen percent of the bases. Between 1996 and 1997, both the Japanese and American governments concluded the "return" of the Futenma Air Station responding to Okinawa's demand, and at the same time, agreed to revise the Defense Guidelines so that Japan approved the use of civilian harbors and airports by the American military. Both governments viewed the Okinawa problem as a part of the reassessment and expansion of the policies of Japan-U.S. Alliance that led to the creation of the new guidelines. The return of the Futenma is conditioned on the building a new alternative

facility that meets the military requirements within Okinawa Island. In this way, the relations between Okinawa and the Japanese mainland were soon "twisted" by the existence of the U.S. military bases, and that problem was exacerbated in the ensuing decades.

Within a sovereign country, even if there are some regional differences due to special characteristics, if placing a specific region under an excessive burden is the only way to achieve an important policy such as national security, then, as a matter of course, that country is likely to have its arrangement with that region constantly questioned. In this regard the people of Okinawa have been calling for a change from the present situation where Okinawa is continuing to get the "negative assets" of the Japan-U.S. relations, to one where it gets "positive assets." At the same time, we must recognize that, taking advantage of the call from Okinawa asking for this change, the U. S. consistently has made demands on the Japanese government throughout the post-war era.

Even in the perception of security issues, there have been decisive differences between Okinawa and the mainland in terms of the details of the formation of the military bases, and the scale and character of U. S. forces. This is linked to either having or not having experienced the actual situation, and has brought about an "intellectual twist" between the mainland and Okinawa over security issues and the Okinawa problem.

The characteristics of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa and the mainland fundamentally differ. With the exception of the U. S. Air Force Fighter Wing at Misawa (Aomori Prefecture) and the Marine Attack Squadrons at Iwakuni (Yamaguchi Prefecture), the mainland bases are used for administration, communications, transportation, logistic support, repairs, and recreation. This is true of Yokota Air Force Base, Tokyo (Headquarters of USFJ), the Yokosuka Naval Base, Kanagawa Prefecture (home port of the Flagship of the 7th Fleet and Aircraft Carrier Group), the Sasebo Naval Base, Nagasaki Prefecture (home port of the Amphibious Ready Group), and Camp Zama, Kanagawa Prefecture (the Army's logistic depot).

In contrast, on the long, narrow island of Okinawa are Kadena Air Force Base, which is the keystone base of the U. S. Pacific Air Force, Camp Butler and six other Marine bases where 15,000 marines are stationed, and an Army station where the Special Forces group is deployed. Because these forces are next to 1.3 million residences, accidents and incidents are bound to occur. In addition, the Americans hold

the perception that the military bases on Okinawa are like having "too many eggs in one basket" (K. M. Campbell).¹² Thus, despite its evident benefits, it is not clear that American military strategists view the Okinawan setup as ideal.

In comparison to the American sense of discomfort with regard to the situation on Okinawa, Japanese politicians and the Japanese government have tended to be most insensitive. For example, the Japanese foreign minister did say his regrets on the 1995 rape incident after President Clinton apologized on his marines' "heinous crime. Perhaps they find it difficult to change their perception that, so long as they follow the decisions of the U.S. Government, they need not have any purpose of their own in terms of diplomatic and national security policies. The consciousness of the Japanese Government and its stance as a "dependent variable" in negotiations with the United States remains unchanged. Japan, which uses the money it provides to the United States in the form of a large Omoiyari-Yosan and uses the considerable resources it provides Okinawa in the form of economic promotion policy as a substitute for an independent security policy, continues to do nothing new in the way of strategic foreign policy formulation.

Along with the increase in U.S. pressure on the Japanese Government to promote the maturation of bilateral relations, it is quite possible that a more flexible force structure in North East Asia including Okinawa, will bring about such measures as reducing the number of Marines, consolidating bases throughout Japan, a reassessment of the training and other fundamental functions of the bases. If negotiations are conducted as a result of U.S. initiatives, it is likely that the Japanese economic and financial burden will simply increase. Such an outcome might produce a "solution" to the Okinawa problem that is devoid of any real substance beyond a few minor cuts in the personnel stationed here. Plainly, such an outcome would not translate into any meaningful changes to a situation in which residents are exposed to injuries inflicted by crimes involving military personnel and to potential accidents associated with the operations and exercises of the U.S. military.

General James L. Jones, Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps, made the comment that "part of the training of the Marines in Okinawa will be transferred to Guam".¹³ But while the rationale is to reduce the burden on Okinawa, it is possible that the travel expenses of the troops will be borne by the Japanese government. In the past in operations involving the transfer of live

ammunition drills from northern Okinawa to numerous practice areas on the mainland, the Japanese Government has paid for the travel costs of the troops. It is also conceivable that the Japanese Government will be asked to bear the cost of moving facilities, bases, and practice areas to places such as Guam. With all this in mind, it seems abundantly clear that Japan might be better served by taking the initiative in bringing demands from Okinawa into negotiations with the United States.

Withdraw the U.S. Marines from Okinawa

The most effective solution to the Okinawa Base Problem would be to withdraw the U.S. Marines from the island, though perhaps not the other troops and personnel. The Marines make up 63% of the troops and utilize 75.5% of the area of the bases. The mission of the Marines on a Okinawa is part of U.S. forward deployment strategy to defeat aggression far from U.S. homeland. They are not trained to play a role in defense of Japan. Because many of the crimes committed by U.S. servicemen and injury from exercises have been linked to the Marines, their withdrawal would be the most effective way to create a feeling among the residents that the situation has significantly improved.

Advances in what has been called revolution in military affairs have included matters ranging from the use of military reconnaissance satellites to the ability to move a unit of troops, lightly equipped, from the continental U.S. to far-flung sites, speedily and effectively. In this regard, strategies have also been developed to hone the ability to develop military operations offshore in any region where conflicts are anticipated so that supplies of missiles, fire power, ammunition, fuel, and water can be readily secured. Thus, even if marines have to be reassigned east of Guam, the use of new strategies for combat troops makes it possible to move military personnel into an area of conflict whenever signs of trouble appear. In this regard, the Japan-U.S. negotiations over the removal of nuclear weapons during the Okinawa Reversion provide a good reference point. The U.S. military insisted to the very end that nuclear weapons had to be stored on the island of Okinawa or U.S. and Japanese national security would be threatened. However, the nuclear weapons stored in Okinawa were becoming outdated and, ultimately, President Nixon made a political decision to remove them in hopes of improving Japan-U.S. relations.

The U.S. Marines Corps, traditionally through lobbying, have strongly influenced the U.S. Senate and Congress, and it can be

anticipated that any proposal to reduce their numbers on Okinawa would be strongly resisted. Certainly, there is also the possibility that even after the unification of the Korean Peninsula, the Marines will remain as the last U.S. ground combat troops in the region in order to compensate for the lack of more imposing military forces elsewhere. However, if the Japanese government made a political argument to the United States that removing the Marines to some site east of Guam would lead to a strengthening of future bilateral relations, that might at least lead to the formation of a plan to reduce the size of the Marine forces in Okinawa on a large scale.

After September 11: Turning Point in the Forward Deployment Strategy

The US bases located in Japan function in terms of launching, staging, logistics, training, communications, family housing, and recreation. The purpose of US forces in Japan, especially the US Marines in Okinawa, is to respond to aggression from the West Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Out of the US service members of the military stationed within this region, the largest force is in Japan (40,000), followed by South Korea (36,000), along with forces in Hawaii (33,000) and Guam (3,000). On top of this, the Seventh Fleet (12,700) patrolling offshore, which has a homeport at both Yokosuka and Sasebo naval bases in Japan, is a part of US Forces in Japan. Out of all US Military Bases overseas, Japan is the second largest host country following the 70,000 US military personnel stationed in Germany.

The role of the US armed forces stationed in Japan in response to the terrorist attack on 11 September has been especially salient. According to recent reports, the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, based in Yokosuka, left on 1 October, 2001 for the Arabian Sea with only 10 of a possible 80 aircraft on board, and was to become a platform for Special Forces making incursions into Afghanistan by helicopter.¹⁴ A squadron of F/A 18 Hornets deployed at the US Marine Iwakuni Air Station also left on the 18 September, 2001 for the Middle East.¹⁵ Furthermore, a US Army Special Force unit, the Green Berets (250 soldiers) based at Tori Station in Yomitan, Okinawa and a US Air Force Special Forces Operation Group based at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa have disappeared. But the remaining bulk of the US Forces stationed in Japan has not been contributing directly to the military actions in Afghanistan, except in terms of logistic support by air using bases such as Kadena and Yokota. This not only highlights the threats and places that the US forces in Japan can respond to, but also

shows the state of the US-Japan security relationship.

The post-war US military strategy has been based on a tripartite pillar of nuclear deterrent through strategic nuclear weapons, participation with allies, and the deployment of military forces on the front line. As both the US and the former Soviet Union have enough strategic nuclear weapons to blow the world up many times over, this acted as a deterrent to nuclear war between these two antagonists. This was referred to as stability due to "mutually assured destruction (MAD)." And to control the spread of communism, the US sought to strength its allies—including, of course, Japan.

To implement the forward deployment strategy, the US located bases in the sovereign territorial space of its allies that were strategically positioned. As part of Soviet policy, the US military bases were set up in Japan, which was positioned as a breakwater against communism. On 8 September, 1951, on the same day as the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which for Japan meant a return to the international community from under the Allied Occupation, the US-Japan Security Treaty was concluded. In this treaty, for the safety of Japan and the Far East, and to prevent the rise of Japanese military imperialism, the US was given the right to station troops in Japan. Compared to being under Occupation, the number of US bases was reduced, but in Japan, which had to bear the burden of providing bases under the treaty, there remained discontent towards the treaty, as the US was placed in a superior position.

The guarantee of bases was not only included in the Security Treaty, but also in the third article of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Crucially, Okinawa was separated from mainland Japan, and placed under long term US control. This is a result of a military claim, placed by the US government, for the maintenance of bases in strategically placed Okinawa, and to use these as the US sees fit. This, in fact, was the basis for the US's control of Okinawa until 1972.

While the US military bases on the Japanese mainland were ascribed the role of surveying the Korean Peninsula and Far East Russia, the bases in Okinawa had the role of covering a wider scope, from the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese coast, Taiwan, through to Southeast Asia as a central pivot in the central Pacific along with Hawaii. But in terms of the deployment and storage of nuclear weapons, due to the strong anti-nuclear feelings of Japanese people on the mainland, which was rooted in the experience of the destructiveness power of nuclear weapons, as witnessed in the atomic

bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons in the Far East were concentrated in Okinawa. Also, during the Vietnam War, the functions of the bases for attack forces, logistics, training, communications and rest and recreation were used to their fullest. After the return of the control of Okinawa, the American bases remain, and even now, Okinawa is being forced to bear an excessive burden as a result of the US-Japan security relationship.

With the ending of confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union, even though the emphasis on nuclear weapons as deterrents has shifted to maintenance of nuclear weapons, per se, the key point to bear in mind is that, in terms of front line forces in allied countries, nothing much has changed: the US seeks to preserve these forces. In short, the US military strategy, ten years after the end of the Cold War, is slowly beginning to show signs of change.

A New Strategy – QDR

The first of President George W. Bush Administration's *Quadrennial Defense Review* was released on 1 October 2001.¹⁶ The Congress had requested that the Defense Department submit the review by the 30 September. *The Quadrennial Defense Review* is a report which, in order to adumbrate the US's military strategy for the twenty-first century, inclusively examines topics such as defense strategy, the structure of the armed forces, plans for modernization, maintenance of military infrastructure, and budgeting plans. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1996¹⁷ provides the legal basis for defense policy; Congress, in turn, is obliged to seek the Defense Department to draw up the report, submit concrete items for inclusion, evaluate threats, and propose the date for submission. In May 1997 the QDR¹⁸ was first drawn up by the Clinton Administration, which at the time was in its second term, and the QDR announced in 2001 was the second, following the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000.

The QDR was due to the necessity to reconstruct the post-Cold War US military strategy. In 1989, Congress had requested Bush senior's Administration to reduce the armed forces in line with the end of the Cold War, and had requested the implementation of this to the Clinton Administration as well. But misgivings over the nuclear weapons potential of North Korea in 1993 meant that cuts in the armed forces stationed in the Asia Pacific region were not taken forward. Instead, the Clinton Administration committed itself to maintain 100,000 US forces in the Asia Pacific region. This commitment of a "100,000" deployment was the starting point and the

framework for dealing with the Okinawa problem from 1995 and beyond. Its continuation can be seen, even now, in the response to calls from Okinawa to reduce US bases, where the governments of Japan and the US sought to placate the Okinawans by moving the US Marine Futenma Air Station, which is situated in the densely populated central part of the main island, to the northern part of Okinawa, Henoko.

At the same time, calls are being made for guidelines for the reorganization of the US's armed forces themselves. Notions of 'Basic Forces', as brought forth by the Bush Administration and the "Bottom Review" as implemented by the Clinton Administration, came forth one after the other. Clinton, a self-acknowledged "post-Cold War President," had advocated a reconsideration of the number of personnel to be maintained in the armed forces and, in addition, had called for the size of the budget to be brought into line with the two-war strategy, adopted until the end of the 1980s, whereby the US would be able to respond simultaneously to large-scale conflicts (i.e. major regional conflicts) in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula. The results of this were published in the 1997 QDR.

The move to establish a post-Cold War military strategy, influenced by the terrorist acts of 11 September, included the vision of using all military means against terrorism and regional conflicts. As is now clear, the biggest problem in the QDR was the total exclusion of budgetary measures. In essence, the possibility for the materialization of this request depends on the level of support and understanding of Congress towards the Bush Administration.

From the first stage of the Bush Administration's reassessment, the jettisoning of the strategy employed by the Clinton Administration was the key element, and this was actually written into the QDR. But in other parts of the QDR, the need to maintain the ability to respond to two regional conflicts simultaneously raises its head. Clearly, however, this does not mean nothing new exists.

The drawing up of the QDR in the Bush (junior) Administration was advanced under the direct control of Donald Rumsfeld, the conservative-leaning Secretary of Defense. The investigations were confined to Rumsfeld and a few trusted advisors, albeit separate from the uniformed military, and the main emphasis was to shift strategy to the Missile Defense System, which would involve large increases in the military budget. Of course, the strong resistance of the military led to there being little mention of the Missile Defense System in the QDR, and instead

emphasis was given to increasing the fighting capability and reaction speed of the regular armed forces.

The basic thinking at the heart of the QDR involved, in essence, a shift from a threat-based strategy reacting to threats, which was employed up until advent of the new Bush Administration, to a capability-based strategy stressing performance. If troops are blessed with suitable equipment, training, and responsiveness, then the US is in a position to deal with any enemy, anywhere, anytime. Heretofore the enemy was assumed to include regular forces. Now, in contrast, an attack from terrorist that are neither a country nor have a military force was regarded as an "asymmetrical threat," and the transformation of military forces that are able to be victorious over terrorist has become a point of contention.

The Anticipated Changes of the Forward Deployment

The attacks on 11 September by terrorist in New York and Washington DC can be seen to have exerted a direct influence on the contents of the QDR. In the QDR, an attack by so-called "invisible forces," terrorists that are neither a country nor boast a military, was defined as an "an asymmetrical threat," and the battle with terrorism was highlighted as a point of utmost concern for the US military. The terrorist attacks on the US mainland, which the American people have no experience of in their two-hundred year history, brought home the fact that what should be protected is the lives and property of Americans. And, quintessentially, the basis of national defense is, literally, the protection of the American homeland. Heretofore the enemy was to emerge from a place far from the American continent, and as such to expel the enemy, a strategy developed to place forces on the front line overseas. Okinawa, which was close to the regional conflicts, was set as the key forward deployment base in the Asia Pacific region. In most cases, Okinawa was never considered a conflict zone.

The basis of the US national defense strategy is the protection of America and the promotion of American interests. In the former strategy, military forces were deployed to the forward bases in places other than the American homeland, and this was based on the co-operation of the US's allies. This was because it was not seen to be possible that the enemy could reach the American homeland. In the terrorist act of 11 September, the American people on mainland became the target of the 'war', and directly felt the damage involved. Because of this, while maintaining a forward-deployment strategy, in the QDR homeland defense is given

the first priority in national security interests. The goal is the improvement of the fighting capability and responsiveness of active, reserve personnel, and state troopers, equipping the nation with a reconnaissance and tracking information technology system and the establishment of arrangements for effective actions based on enhanced alliances. In order to back up this transformation of the military, there is an urgent necessity to reform the way of thinking and the structural organization of the Pentagon itself.

In respect to the maintenance or reduction of current levels of US armed forces, the QDR balks at giving a clear answer. However, in terms of the deployment of US forces on a world scale, some clearly defined points for discussion do emerge. From the point of view of stressing Asia, in addition to the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk based at Yokosuka, calls have been heard for a reinforcement of another aircraft carrier for the West Pacific. Also, there is a recognized need for a training base in the West Pacific for the strengthening of the US's amphibious capabilities, particularly the US Marines, and for the guarantee of bases which are equipped to function as hubs for the rapid deployment of US armed forces. In the future, in respect of the above points, it can be said that, whatever popular perceptions maybe, expectations are surging on behalf of US forces to exert pressure on the Japanese government to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces as far as the Indian Ocean to support US military action.

In the QDR, which seeks to achieve security cooperation with US allies and the restructuring of the US military, US bases in Okinawa appear to be declining in importance. This is because the improved responsiveness of American forces, including those on the homeland, will mean that the front-line forces deployed overseas, whose main advantage heretofore has been their ability to commit quickly to regional conflicts, are less important in the future. If claims over the budget are prioritized, then those forces that did not take part in the response to the terrorist attacks will be the target of cuts. At this point in time, if the Marines in Okinawa, who are involved in training as usual, carry on as usual, then it should be difficult for them to survive at their present level.

Since 11 September the US, which has declared a state of war against terrorism, seems resigned to the fact that the American homeland, as well as military bases and embassies overseas, may become the target of attack. At present, US servicemen and servicewomen are pointing their guns from the inside of the fence to the outside, and they fear an attack from an enemy of which they do not know where and when it will strike.

As the definition of a terrorist is not easy, these guns are also being pointed at the people of Japan, an ally nation. This is because we have entered an era where US bases themselves are being targeted.

In response to terrorism, which is the US's biggest threat, a demand has emerged from the American homeland for a change of roles for American forces stationed in Japan. Essentially, US forces in Japan serve to fly the flag in Northeast Asia, and they can only respond to threats in the region. When military action actually takes place, even if the forces in Japan can act quicker than the forces in the continental US, the reduction in the time difference of the deployment of troops has been shown clearly in the Gulf War and in the military action in Afghanistan. In the near future, there will be a gradual reduction of the reasoning behind stationing US Marines in Okinawa. Looking from the perspective of the new turnaround in US military strategy, no use seems to exist for the planned relocation of the Marine Air Station within Okinawa Island. More than that, it has become time to reconsider the role of the American forces stationed in Japan and the defense of Japan.

The Birth of the Diplomatic Marketplace

In the wake of the "9-11" incident a new world order has begun to emerge, shaped by the liberalisation of diplomacy and the birth of a diplomatic marketplace.

In this world order, polarised at one extreme by the overwhelming military pre-eminence of the United States, diplomacy is being liberalised as well as trade, and each country seeks to maximise its own advantage in the context of a competitive marketplace in which every country has a stake. Rather than a country's interests consisting of a monolithic entity, moreover, in this marketplace a multiplicity of domestic interests are pursued on a case-by-case basis.

The world of the 19th to early 20th centuries, characterised by balance-of-power politics, revolved around military strength. In the post-Cold War world, as the benefits pursued by each country became a two-track process, diplomacy came to require a much more complicated formula, somewhat akin to flying an aeroplane through atmospheric turbulence. In the 21st century, in contrast to the former balance of power era, not only governments but now also non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and transnational organisations linked by the Internet have come to play a part in the process of diplomacy.

The liberalisation of diplomacy began to

develop in response to the competitive interplay between strategies brought by each country to the marketplace, and has been further catalysed by the current Iraq situation. Here, the process of liberalisation was further induced by a dangerous game of military brinkmanship between the Bush Administration and Saddam Hussein's regime.

As regards the United States' intended military campaign against Iraq, not only the neighbouring Middle Eastern nations, but also the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, and even Spain and Turkey are each working for their own diplomatic interests. As the situation approaches the final stage of American military action against Iraq, each country is engaged in diplomacy that seeks to maximise its gains and minimise its losses. The marketplace sanctions no alliances, only competition.

The diplomatic market place, even now, is permeated with a realism in which nobody is to be trusted. Within the previous context of the Cold War, the basis of diplomacy for countries other than the U.S. and Russia was the loyal fulfilment of their roles as members of the respective alliances. Japan, Korea, and the N.A.T.O. states, for example, trading national defence with U.S. involvement, largely followed the U.S. lead in foreign policy. This is not to say that, in line with the times, national security was never prioritised over alliance obligations, as evidenced by West Germany's Eastern Policy and the former Yugoslavia's western diplomacy.

Japan's national security policy is characterised by the name given to its "Self Defence" Forces. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has formed the core of Japanese diplomacy and military posture. This can only be said to be based on utopian realism. This characterisation is evidenced by the Law on a Situation in Areas Surrounding Japan (*Shûhen Jitai Hô*), according to which the object of self-defence consists of the abstract "situation in a neighbouring area posing a threat to Japan's security." However, when and whence such a threat might occur is difficult to predict. The vague spectre of international terrorism, moreover, which is not even known to be targeting Japan, and Japan's commitment to logistical support of a military campaign against Iraq, which poses Japan no immediate threat, are hardly related to self-defence.

At the moment of the outbreak of invasion to Iraq, Japan government showed a firm support U.S. Japan should have done well to determine its interests, investigate the range of available policy options, and take action while allowing for flexible responsive to possible developments. Japan is, of course, providing the American

military with bases and has approved their unconditional use against Iraq. At the same time, Japan depends on Middle Eastern oil. A wide range of policy options exist for Japan *vis-à-vis* the Middle East, including Iraq, where unlike the Korean peninsula, there exists little confusion of domestic and diplomatic interests.

For example, since January this year, the Bush Administration repeatedly delivered its "ultimatum" to Hussein that without the latter's immediate engagement in disarmament an attack on Iraq was only a matter of time. While what was being demanded of Iraq was disarmament, the U.S.'s strategic goal was actually the overthrow of the Hussein regime, one part of the so-called "axis of evil." Furthermore, while the U.N. inspection team seeking the disposal of weapons of mass destruction looks unlikely to garner evidence commensurate with U.S. allegations, the situation reached the brink of war due to the U.S.'s unilateral actions with British coalition forces.

However, military action was not the only option available for achieving Hussein's overthrow. An alternative route existed by which Hussein might be forced to step down of his own accord, and that is by the encouragement of democratic forces within Iraq. This route would accomplish the goal of regime change with minimum cost. Even in the case of a military campaign against Iraq, there was a real possibility that the U.S. would opt for a strategy that sought only Hussein's removal without a subsequent long-term occupation of enormous cost. The military attack on Iraq constituted merely a series of threats woven into a carefully formulated overall strategy with a wide range of options.

True diplomacy is not only a matter of financial expenditure and military commitments; rather, it consists also of the administration of wisdom. Japan is under the scrutiny of not only governmental adherents of realism, but also the people of the world linked by the Internet and seeking peace by means of their very co-operation. This is the restoration of liberalism, supported by the investments of individuals in the diplomatic marketplace in a globalising world.

Trust in wisdom will be heightened by maintenance of the balance between goals and methods, and by demonstration of the will to carry through. If there is anything to be learnt from the U.S. campaign against Iraq, it is that such actions as the dispatch of the Aegis destroyer or those that resulted in international criticism following the Gulf War are inappropriate. Rather, the goals of Japanese diplomacy need to be more clearly defined at the same time as they need to allow for a flexible response to shifting circumstances, and

for this, Japan needs the relevant vocabulary, logic and ethics.

Notes:

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⁴ *Ryukyu Shimpō*, February 6, 2001, and *Stars and Stripes*, February 7, 2001.

⁵ INSS Special Report, *The United State and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership*, Washington, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 11, 2000, pp. 1-7.

⁶ Ibid, p. 2.

⁷ Kurt M. Campbell, "Energizing the U.S.-Japan Security Partnership," *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2000, pp. 125-134.

⁸ Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2000, pp. 45-62.

⁹ American Forces Press Service, "Rumsfeld Details DoD Goals, Objectives in Testimony" January 13, 2001

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¹² *Ryukyu Shimpō* December 14, 2000.

¹³ *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, August 31, 2000.

¹⁴ *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, October 2, 2001.

¹⁵ *Kyodo News*, September 23, 2001.

¹⁶ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, September 30, 2001 (<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf>, accessed on October 2, 2001)

¹⁷ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Subtitle Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996, (http://www.fas.org/man/docs/qdr/quad_leg.html, accessed on October 2, 2001)

¹⁸ US Department of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review May 1997* (<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/>, accessed on October 2 2001)