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Abstract

After reviewing the literature on conceptual metaphors and presenting an analytical model of political discourse, this paper examines some U.S.-Okinawa postwar public discourse that centers on the notion of peace. It first identifies some dominant conceptual metaphors of peace (i.e., PEACE IS JOURNEY; PEACE IS WAR) in American public discourse on postwar Okinawa. Then, along the dimensions of space, time, and modality, it deictically represents the cognitive semantic sphere of conceptual metaphors. The analysis of metaphors reveals how peace justifies war, and how the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor is embodied in the everyday public activities of American political actors.

Keywords: conceptual metaphor, political communication, cognitive semantics, deixis, Okinawa

Metaphors abound in the everyday life of an ordinary person, be it a private conversation with a loved one, a public speech in the workplace, a personal letter to a friend, or a news report. In fact, according to the latest theories of cognitive semantics, they are the "parts and parcels" with which people build concepts and by which they process information cognitively. Should one accept such a theoretical stance, it is anticipated that some abstract but banal concepts such as peace, freedom, and democracy will find a multitude of metaphorical expressions across languages (See Baranov, 1997 for a case study of the Russian language). What follows is my initial attempt to capture some instances of such diversity of linguistic realizations. At the same time, it is an attempt to find in them some facets of varying cultural value orientations. The similarities and differences in the cultural value orientations (in the case at hand between Okinawa and the USA) may in turn explain some of the conflicts experienced by the two parties after World War II and may help envisage a better intercultural relationship.

Conceptual Metaphors

The theoretical position that supports the crucial role of metaphors in human thought was lucidly illustrated by Reddy's (1979/1993) critical assessment of one pervasive metaphor; namely, human communication is transmitting words through a "conduit."[1] He demonstrates, for example, how the "conduit metaphor" of communication trivializes the role of listeners/readers by relegating a listener's role to that of extracting (or decoding) the information being sent. Eventually, the conduit metaphor leads one to think that human communication is a "success without effort" system, when in fact, it is an "energy must be expended" system (p. 186). In the realm of the conduit metaphor, a myriad of contextual cues as well as the interactive and constitutive nature of human communication are wholly lost, leading him to argue that *mass* communication, an archetype of the conduit metaphor, is in this respect *less* communication.

Soon after its conception, the theoretical model of metaphors represented by the conduit metaphor and its impact on human thought processes were fully unpacked

by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) with a rich set of metaphorical expressions from English colloquialism. What have come to be known as conceptual metaphors, they argue, give shape to the way people conceptualize notions such as love, life, health, labor, happiness, and a myriad of other everyday experiences, highlighting certain aspects and hiding others in a totality of a single concept. They went on to argue that "human thought processes are largely metaphorical (p. 6)" in that it is solely due to the fact that a metaphorical concept, ARGUMENT IS WAR,[2] for example, exists in our conceptual system that we are able to describe, explain, and create novel expressions of argument in terms of war.[3] Theoretically speaking, an alternative conceptual system such as ARGUMENT IS DANCE can be operable here. However, to extend Lakoff and Johnson's line of argument, one does not think in this fashion because the metaphor system embedded in English does not avail him/her such alternative conceptions. This is why Lakoff and Johnson argue that metaphors are not simply a matter of language; rather metaphors actively operate in human perception and cognitive processes.

The type of conceptual metaphor discussed above is classified as a structural metaphor because it gives structure to the way we conceptualize arguments. Another type of conceptual metaphor is what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) call orientational metaphors, through which some non-spatial notions such as emotion, mental state, quantity, power and control, value orientation, and so forth are articulated in terms of spatial categories of, for example, up-down, front-back, near-far, on-off, and center-periphery. To cite just a few examples, HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN,[4] HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN,[5] and VIRTUE IS UP; DEPRAVITY IS DOWN[6] are all very commonly exchanged notions in spoken English.

Meanwhile, a third category, ontological metaphors, gives shape to abstract notions such as time, idea, inflation, and emotion, and brings them down to real existence. TIME IS MONEY, for example, with all its pragmatic permutations treats time as a commodity.[7] Perhaps another salient metaphor, the "container metaphor," which is a

subcategory of the aforementioned conduit metaphor, is most illustrative; i.e., LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS. Briefly speaking, in this conceptual system, a speaker puts his/her ideas into words, and a linguistic expression as a container holds the meaning to be transferred to a hearer. The container metaphor presupposes a boundary where one is either inside (interior) or outside of the container (exterior). Similarly, one can go in or go out of the boundary, depicting a motion that centers on the object. It comes as no accident that in the conduit metaphor, ideas are also conceptualized as objects (i.e., IDEAS ARE OBJECTS). A mental schema renders ideas as things that are put inside the container, namely, linguistic expressions. As pervasive as it may be, we should note that the container metaphor also hides a great deal about the conceptual category it maps. It makes us oblivious to the possibly graded structure of categories as well as the fuzziness of category boundaries. Taken together, the kinds of metaphors we use have immense consequence on how we perceive and conceptualize a reality. In the arena of political communication, as we shall see later, the impact is highly consequential.

Before we examine actual political discourse, however, a few more notes on metaphors are due. First, Grady (1997b) proposed decomposing conceptual metaphors further into primary metaphors so as to demonstrate, among other things, that the experiential basis is very conspicuous in the human conceptual system. For example, he decomposed a conceptual metaphor, THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, into two more fundamental cognitive conceptualizations: ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE and PERSISTING IS STANDING ERECT. A primary metaphor is based on the mapping of subjective, sensorimotor experience onto another domain of concept. Some explicit examples of primary metaphors are presented below with a linguistic realization of each.

1.   AFFECTION IS WARMTH ("They greeted me *warmly.*")
2.   MORE IS UP ("Prices are *high.*")
3.   INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS ("We are *close* friends.")
4.   UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING ("He *grasped* our ideas immediately.")
5.   CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS ("Are tomatoes *in* the fruit or vegetable category?")
              (Grady, 1997a; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999)

In sentence 1 above, for instance, a sensorimotor experience of warmth that one experiences when being embraced is mapped onto the concept of affection. What is important here is the fact that human sensorimotor experience functions as a very pervasive source domain from which we metaphorize. To borrow Lakoff and Johnson's (1999) words, "metaphor allows conventional mental imagery from sensorimotor domains to be used for domains of subjective experience" (p. 45). For example,

we may form an image of something going by us or over our heads using a hand gesture (sensorimotor experience) when we fail to understand/grasp something (subjective experience). Turning back to the relationship between conceptual metaphors and primary metaphors, in this theoretical model, a conceptual metaphor becomes a complex combination of primary metaphors, thus grounding the human conceptual system, in large part, in the domain of sensorimotor bodily experience.

In response to this reformulation of their initial idea, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) in part support the conceptual utility of primary metaphors. In fact, they extend the notion even further by arguing that through metaphorizing, human concepts and reasoning become embodied. They are embodied, in one trivial sense, because the rich conceptual structures that human beings form are neural structures in our brain. In other words, the human mind is embodied because any mental construct is realized neurally. At a deeper level, Lakoff and Johnson explain, embodiment has to do with human inference from sensorimotor experience.

> What makes concepts concepts is their inferential capacity, their ability to be bound together in ways that yield inferences. An embodied concept is a neural structure that is actually part of, or makes use of, the sensorimotor system of our brains. Much of conceptual inference is, therefore, sensorimotor inference. (p. 20)

In other words, human sensorimotor experience serves as a foundation not only for our conceptualization (categorization) but also for our reasoning. Clearly this position marks a radical departure from traditional Western thought, which considers reasoning a unique human capacity, a quality that distinguishes humans from animals. In Lakoff and Johnson's model, which is based on neural modeling and other cognitive sciences, a traditional Cartesian body-mind dichotomy thus collapses. However, it is important, they continue, to view embodied (metaphorical) expressions as a gestalt, not as a decomposed fragment of primary metaphors. Such a cursory glance of conceptual metaphors merely scratches the surface of a radically innovative theory. However, be that as it may, one thing is clear: Embodied (metaphorical) expressions promise to inform the analysis of political discourse that follows.

The second and final note on metaphors is about cultural variations and universality of conceptual metaphors (e.g., ANGER IS HOT FLUID IN A CONTAINER). In his practical account of metaphor, Kövecses (2002) reports an interesting study on how anger is articulated in such a diverse range of languages as English, Hungarian, Japanese, Chinese, Zulu, Polish, Wolof, and Tahitian. He found that in all the languages studied, anger is conceptualized using a container metaphor and calls it a near-universal emotion expression. However, he also notes that the location of anger (i.e., where anger is held) varies across cultures (i.e., in the

body as a whole in English, principally in the head in Hungarian, in the stomach/bowels area in Japanese, *qi* (*ki*) in Chinese, in the heart in Zulu, etc.). He then argues that the near-universality of metaphors arises in part from universal aspects of the human body (p. 165) and by implication the sensorimotor (bodily) experience mentioned above. Across cultures, people view their body as some kind of pressurized container that holds anger, and they show similar physiological reactions to anger under certain settings. Needless to say, his findings also resonate with Lakoff and Johnson's thesis of embodied metaphorical concepts and reason.

Also noted was a finding that within a pressurized container where anger is supposed to be located, a category-based metonymic relationship (EVENTS ARE MOVEMENTS, movement being a subcategory of event) is quite pervasive across cultures and thus also contributes to the near-universal employment of the anger metaphor. To illustrate using a Japanese example, "getting angry" (EVENT) is like "anger moving upward to one's head" (MOVEMENT). This is an example of what is also known as Event Structure metaphors, which give shape to the structure of our thought and reason. The "category-based" metonymic relationship, though not a bodily one, structures our thoughts through metaphorizing and as a consequence, becomes a cross-culturally shared aspect of conceptual world. These findings provide the grounds for employing the analytical framework that is described below. Cross-cultural comparison and contrast of peace metaphor is not only feasible but also expected to reveal cultural variations and cross-cultural similarities simultaneously.

The recent accounts of metaphors above by and large emphasize the importance of conceptual metaphors. How then would conceptual metaphors play out in the realm of political communication? Would metaphor analysis of political communication bring about any insights? In what follows, I will attempt to demonstrate some theoretical as well as practical utilities of metaphor analysis vis-à-vis postwar Okinawa political discourse.

An Analytical Framework

The importance of metaphors in human thought processes that we have observed so far figures prominently in Chilton's work on political discourse. He lays out a general outline in the book he edited with his associate (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002) and recently compiled his treatises into a book (Chilton, 2004). Prior to these seminal works, he analyzed some "security metaphors" and some key notions such as truth and fear used in cold-war political discourse (Chilton, 1996). He also explained how political parties try to impose their own concept on others. In his work we find the successful integration of metaphor analysis into the study of political discourse. As such, it is instructive to sketch Chilton's analytical framework and discuss how it informs the issues at hand: namely, the creation of peace metaphors in the U.S.-Okinawa political discourse and the unique

cultural worlds behind them.

Perhaps the most notable of Chilton's work is a splendid blending of several related yet distinctive disciplinary approaches. Pragmatics, cognitive semantics, critical discourse analysis, and rhetorical/philosophical analysis of communication all merge and form one coherent approach toward political discourse. For example, speech act theory is taken up so as to consider political talk as social actions in particular contexts, and ramifications that such an approach would bring about are properly accounted for. Cognitive semantics informs his model of how image schema and the human conceptual system in general are experientially grounded, and how in turn that affects political discourse in its attempt to represent, justify, and coerce one's interpretations onto others. On philosophical grounds, to cite just one example, the model draws on Habermas's theory of rationality to dissect argumentative structures that are typically seen in political discourse. By drawing on such a wide array of scholarly traditions from Aristotle to Habermas, from Hobbes to Lakoff, Chilton offers a well-grounded theoretical and analytical framework.

It is important to take note, at this juncture, of several theoretical assumptions that underlie Chilton's model. One is its epistemological stance. Human knowledge, and for that matter rationality, is not a matter of neutral representation of an objective world 'out there' (Chilton, 2004, p. 42). Rather, it is an intersubjective one being constituted in and through human communicative interaction. Here he draws on Grice's (1979) "cooperative principles of conversation" in order to describe how our everyday interaction is quintessentially built upon mutual cooperation. For example, it is impossible to lie or be devious unless the group makes a collective assumption about communicative cooperation. One cannot lie, he continues, if everyone believes all the time that all communication is mendacious (p. 20). Put simply, human rationality is accomplished through discursive engagement with others.

This epistemological position naturally leads to the perspective that political discourse is a social interaction wherein agent, patient, event and other interactional components are clearly identifiable.[8] This, which one may call the ethnography of communication, perspective then looks at how interaction unfolds in particular contexts. In addition, the model emphasizes, in particular, the *entailments*, *presuppositions*, and *presumptions*[9] that are embedded in political discourse and gauges their *emotive effects* such as "fear of domination" and "loyalty to a group." The emotive effect is especially salient in metaphor usage. Let us witness Adolf Hitler's "parasite metaphor" in his autobiography, *Mein Kampf.* Once the features of microbes are successfully mapped onto Jews, human reaction to microbes almost spontaneously transfers to their reaction to Jews.

The examination of assumptive grounds also helps identify what argumentative strategies are being employed in political discourse. Chilton cites three predominant

strategies: *coercion, legitimization/delegitimization*, and *representation/misrepresentation*. Political actors can enforce their power by issuing commands, laws, and edicts. A less obvious form of coercion is observed in behaviors such as giving answers to questions or responding to requests in situations where the questioners or requesters are perceived as more powerful than the others. At an even less obvious level, political actors can be coercive by setting the agenda, selecting topics, or making assumptions about realities that the hearers are obliged to accept in order to process the text and talk (p. 45). Political actors also convey reasons why their political position must be obeyed by others (i.e., *legitimization*). At the same time, they position their opponents in a negative light by highlighting differences, keeping them outside the boundary, and by explicit speech acts of blaming, accusing, and insulting (i.e., *delegitimization*). Finally, political actors can exert power by controlling the amount of information given to and withheld from the hearers (*representation*). Qualitatively, they can misrepresent the reality by various kinds of omissions, verbal evasion and denial, euphemism, and outright lies (*misrepresentation*).

They may also divert the hearers' attention from troublesome referents (p. 46). These strategies are all discursive ones. The analytical framework employed here attends to such discursive processes so as to uncover assumptions and implicit meanings behind political discourse.

Another analytical move that is most influential in Chilton's work is the positioning of the Self and the Other by a political actor along three axes of space, time, and modality (Figure 1). By placing the Self and the Other in relative positions on the axes, Chilton (2004), for example, successfully portrayed the polar opposite worlds of doctrines represented by U.S. president George Bush and Osama bin Laden as a mirror image of each another (p. 172). The current study takes this general approach of positioning participants, places, and countries, and then applies it to the positioning of key cultural concepts such as peace, freedom, and democracy. By doing so, I take a leap in a theoretical perspective, but if the concrete components of a speech event reveal cultural variability, the key cultural concepts are expected to do so likewise and perhaps more tellingly.


Figure 1: Dimensions of deixis (adopted from Chilton, 2004, p. 58)

The modality axis involves several strands. Most prominently, the Self is not only here and now but also epistemically true and deontically right. In other words, the Self is associated with what is true and how things ought to be. These epistemic and deontic dimensions are often marked by auxiliary (modal) verbs such as may, can, should, and must. As Chilton (2004) states, "the underlying principles seem to be, in crude terms: Self is always right or in the right, the Other always wrong, or in the wrong (p. 60). The three axes of space (s), time (t), and modality (m) are certainly not the only deictic dimensions one can observe, but they prove to be the most salient ones in the realm of political discourse.

What are the cues an analyst can turn to in order to place certain political actions at the relative position on the axes? The model invokes the indexical function of lexical items. At the most fundamental level, lexical items simply

"point to," indicate, or index something else in the context. For example, the pronouns, *we, us, our*, may mean, depending on a given context, military officers, the Marine Corps, the entire military forces, or the government of the United States. Along the temporal dimension, *nowadays, today*, or just *now* could be understood as "after World War II," "after the reversion of Okinawa," or "after the helicopter crash," and so forth. These seemingly mundane facts of discourse, however, become very potent strategies in political discourse because, to cite just a few pragmatic functions, they can set the boundary between the Self and the Other and/or set the anchoring point along the historical development of a political dispute so as to serve one's agenda. Taking such pragmatic functions into account, indexical expressions become linguistic resources that perform deixis (Chilton & Schäffner, 2002, p. 30); that is, they help "position" the speaker, hearer, and event

in question and other components of political discourse along the dimensions of the spatial, temporal, epistemic, and deontic axes. Along the same line of thought, van Dijk (2002) stresses what he calls "cognitive models" that are involved in the interpretation of political talk. He argues that discourse does not index the social context per se but rather the subjective mental models of the context as constructed by speech participants. His view is consistent with the intersubjective epistemological stance that is employed in this analytical model. The positioning of actors, hearers, events, and so forth is therefore accomplished in part by the collaborative process of indexing/communication.

It is my position that the analytical model we have discussed so far becomes useful in the analysis of *metaphors* as well. For one thing, the use of metaphors is a pervasive and salient feature of political discourse. Political actors use metaphors to represent, justify, and coerce their interpretations upon their audience. Such control is not accomplished by political actors alone; it becomes a reality through a collaborative process of communication among the participants. If we can chart the positioning of value concepts along the deictic dimensions by their use of metaphorical expressions, we will better understand how metaphors interface with the political process of coercion and may perhaps be able to come up with a preventive measure for such coercion.

Political Discourse in and about Okinawa

After World War II, the small Okinawan islands in the Ryukyu archipelago were seized by American military forces and until its reversion to Japan in 1972, were occupied by the United States. Much political negotiation took place during the occupation between the U.S. military and the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR), which was founded by the U.S. military at that time. Even after the reversion, the American presence in Okinawa has been very conspicuous because large American military bases still remain in Okinawa under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty that went into effect in 1960. History shows that Okinawa has been an important strategic locale for both the U.S. and Japanese governments.

History also shows that Okinawa has been depicted metaphorically in many ways: "the Rock," "a junk heap," "a stationary aircraft carrier," "Gibraltar of the Pacific," "a showcase of democracy," "Cyprus of the Pacific,' "a pawn," and "the keystone of the Pacific," to cite only some from Miyagi (1982). Likewise, in the unique course of Okinawan history, the notion of peace has been depicted in many ways. From an article of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty ("Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international *peace* and security in the Far East, …") to President Bush's latest State of the Union Address ("And because democracies respect their own people and their neighbors, the advance of freedom will lead to *peace*."), the notion of peace seems one of the core values that sustains U.S.-Japan relations.

The following text presents sporadic citations from the massive amount of documents produced after World War II.[10] The citations all contain some kind of metaphorical reference to peace. The questions pursued in this article can be summed up in the following ways. In these texts, how is peace conceptualized by American political actors? What kinds of image schemas are being activated when they refer to peace? What does the metaphor of peace reveal about the American worldview?

American *Peace*

First let us observe how peace is described by American occupation forces. The following passage is an excerpt from a briefing with General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, who led the occupation forces of Japan:

> (1) The military purpose, which was to insure Japan will *follow the way* of peace, and never again be a menace, has been, I think, accomplished.
> (General MacArthur, March 17, 1947)

Peace is apparently a destination on a path toward which Japan is steadily moving. Peace in this example is embedded in a widely shared American conceptual metaphor of journey. By representing peace as the destination of a journey, a speaker gives it a particular shape (ontological metaphor). Peace is also depicted as something that is in the future and something that should be attained. Therefore, its spatial and deontic position are somewhat removed from the deictic center.

When a journey is mapped onto the domain of politics, the destination of a journey indexes a goal of political activities. When President Eisenhower paid a quick visit to Okinawa in 1960, his address included the following passage:

> (2) Together *we* of the Ryukyus and America present to the world a splendid example of the mutual benefits that result when people of good will *work toward* the common *goal* of peace and friendship in freedom. (President Eisenhower, June 19, 1960)

In this passage, peace is characteristically a goal that one should strive to achieve. In this respect, it is similar to the destination of a journey metaphor that we have just observed. Interestingly, the event structure of achieving peace is similar to that of movement (EVENTS ARE MOVEMNETS); that is, achieving peace is moving from one place to another. Also of interest is the use of the pronoun *we*. As was discussed earlier, pronouns can demarcate the Self and the Other. Because both Americans and Ryukyuans are put in the same *we* category, the simple use of a pronoun can be taken as an attempt to linguistically display solidarity, bringing both parties close to the deictic center. Taken together, the image schema depicts the Ryukyus and America as *moving toward* peace together.

After World War II, high commissioners ruled the Ryukyu Islands with full authority given by the U.S. Department of State. The high commissioner was the highest authority of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) and wielded power over every sector of local administration. Six lieutenant-class officers served as high commissioners between 1957 and 1972. Among the six, Lieutenant Paul W. Caraway was perhaps the most influential and stirred public sentiment the most with his numerous reform plans for local administrations. An extensive literature exists on the high commissioners' reign in Okinawa (Ota, 1984; Hokama, 2000, Miyagi, 1982 to cite just a few). The ensuing analysis of peace metaphors is informed to some extent by this literature.

Paul Caraway made a speech in front of a large group of young, postwar-generation Okinawans and mainland-Japanese leaders (*Kensei-kai*, Jan. 22, 1962) in which he urged the audience to stand firm against the threat from communist countries, which at the time was the "Sino-Soviet bloc" with "a predatory, ambitious power" that was trying to engage in a "conspiracy" of international communities. Peace was a central theme of the address, and it was again depicted as a journey:

(3) I have not been able to define perfectly the peaceful world. I have not been able to pierce the veil hanging between today and the future, to set you unerringly on the *path* to peace or a stabilized world order. Nonetheless America has been *moving toward* the ideal of a peaceful world, by using every means that comes to hand.

Peace is an ideal state of human affairs, a destination that is highly worthy of pursuit. A path is set by America for the less endowed people of Okinawa to take and to be led by America. Deeply paternalistic premises aside, the journey metaphor gives an explicit structure to the conceptual system.

Lest this metaphorical representation miss the point, we may observe Caraway's own attempt to define peace in the same speech. To summarize, it is freedom from war, fear, threat, aggression, and other similar sorts of oppression being imposed on us. At a more personal level, he continues, peace is a state in which one does not have to fear its neighbors and is free from insecurity about the future. Such freedom from oppression and insecurity leads to stability and prosperity, in which mutual respect and order can be fostered.[11] The path-destination cluster of meanings associated with a journey spontaneously provides the means-goal cluster that is necessary to construct Caraway's vision of peace.

The same journey metaphor surfaces again in the same speech, but this time with a slightly different metaphorical structure:

(4) The human *aspiration* for peace is one which is shared by most of the people of the world. Yet, there is a great deal of loose thinking about just what peace is, how it can be *maintained* for the present, and how it may ultimately be

achieved on a more or less permanent basis. This difficulty of definitions is perhaps best exemplified by the number of allusions to peace in terms of *combat*, such as "I will *fight for* peace," etc.

In the same way passages (1) through (3) set peace as a destination/goal, peace in this passage is conceptualized as something to be achieved and then maintained. The JOURNEY metaphor finds support from other sections of the same speech as well. In offering personal opinions on how peace can be made possible, he states, "I am certain that peace cannot be *attained* by acceding to the demands of the aggressors. Second, it is often suggested that peace can be *achieved* by the exertion of moral persuasion and creation of greater moral strength." Invariably, peace is conceptualized as an ultimate goal to be achieved. Peace is also something to be aspired to and thus is fraught with virtues. Here we again see peace as a goal to be sought. However, the path/means to the destination/goal in this instance is quite different from the previous three examples. It is not a path on a journey, nor is it a collaboration with each other. Rather, it is a fight (combat) against the obstacles/obstructers of peace. Although Caraway is satirizing Mao's "protracted war" doctrine here, the fact that his own diction is laden with war metaphor is evident in passages like the following.

(5) For the Ryukyus occupy a critical place in this continuing *struggle*; the reaction of the Ryukyuans to the challenge may determine the fate of Japan and the Western Pacific. In your hands and on your *courage* rest the *hopes* for peace in the Far East.

The struggle in the passage is a struggle against the iron fist of communism, and it is a courageous struggle to reach peace. In this way, the JOURNEY metaphor supported by the WAR metaphor runs deep in his representation of the political state at the time.

War intervenes in the peace metaphor in a more pronounced manner in an address given by the fifth high commissioner, F. T. Unger.

(6) The dream broken, the leaders of the free nations remembered the lessons of an earlier decade, that peace is not *cheap* or *automatic*; that its *price* is *unity, vigilance* and sometimes even *blood*. (Jan. 20, 1969)

The metonymic representation of peace here is mapped by several different source domains, one of which is blood. Blood metonymically indexes victims of struggle and victims of war. Peace, in other words, is so invaluable that it must be protected even at the cost of immense sacrifice. Viewed in this way, George Orwell's (1990) semantic opposite in his "newspeak," "peace is war," can be actually sustained in this context.

Surprisingly, however, as recently as the year 2000, former President Clinton's speech at the Peace Memorial in Okinawa shows some remnant of this JOURNEY-

WAR metaphor of peace.

(7) Asia is largely at peace today because our alliance gives people throughout this continent the confidence that peace will be *preserved*. We have *struggled together* to ensure that no new names will ever be added to this monument, and that no more monuments will ever need to be built. That is what our alliance is for. That is why it must *endure*. (July 22, 2000)

Reflecting on more than 50 years of the postwar history of Okinawa during which "tragedy befell the peace-loving people of Okinawa," Clinton mentions the struggle to rise up from tragedy and the struggle to attain peace in Asia. Several strands of peace metaphor should be noted here. First, the war is depicted as something that befell Okinawa ("But that does not begin to explain the tragedy that *befell* the people of Okinawa itself").[12] A moment after that statement, Clinton says, "By honoring our common sacrifice, it also reminds us of our common responsibility to prevent such tragedy from *befalling* humanity," and "While most monuments remember only those who have *fallen* from one side...." These statements derive from a dominant English conceptual metaphor: VIRTUE IS UP; DEPRAVITY IS DOWN. Hidden behind the conceptual metaphor in this particular context is the existence of an agent that caused the fall. The conceptual metaphor helps obliterate the agent-patient relationship.

Second, tragedy in general has implicit in it the rising up of a fallen figure. In like manner, movement toward peace is an upward movement of struggle ("We have *struggled together* to ensure that no new names will ever be added to this monument...."). The spatial cognition of up and down that is quite conspicuous in the speech

buttresses the metaphorical concepts of tragedy and peace.

Another spatial conceptualization of peace can be seen in the following statement. "The time for wars is ending and the time for peace is not *far away*." Spatial cognition of peace is congruous with the JOURNEY metaphor, with a specific destination (peace) and a path (struggles to rise up again). What is interesting, however, is the loss of temporal cognition that is apparent in the original Okinawan aphorism (*"ikusa-yun sumachi, miruku-yun yagati"*) from which the above quote was translated. In the original, peace is described as something that is coming *soon* rather than something that is far away. In other words, a temporal concept is transformed into a spatial one in the English translation. Furthermore, *miruku-yu*, here transposed as peace, is better described as an ideal society with an abundance of livelihood. It can be safely said that such transposition makes it more conducive for the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor to come alive. We can witness evidence in Clinton's subsequent statement that followed immediately after: "May Sho Tai's words be our *prayer* as well as our *goal* here today."

Furthermore, and most importantly, the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor successfully recreates a reality wherein "fighting for peace" is justified not only during wartime, but also during peacetime. As several critics have observed (e.g., Yakabi, 2002), Clinton's speech was future-oriented. It was so partly because the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor frames his entire speech. In other words, for the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor to be effective, a destination/goal must be set in the future, and the path to the destination is posed as something that is fraught with threats and dangers, which in turn necessitates constant struggle against them, even during peacetime. This line of reasoning is one of the ways in which constant armament continues to be justified in the eyes of a "nurturant provider."[13]

	Space (s)	Time (t)	Modality (m)
Ontological Dimensions	journey (path, obstacle, destination); war (enemy, win-lose)		
Orientational Dimensions	■ working toward the common goal of peace ■ moving toward the ideal of a peaceful world ■ rising up to peace ■ Time for peace is not far away. ■ Asia is at peace.	■ past-tragedy ■ future-peace	**Center:** ■ peace ■ courage to move forward ■ moral persuasion ■ internal tranquility ■ mutual respect ■ (U.S.-Japan) alliance ■ *miruku-yu*
Structural Dimensions	**JOURNEY Clusters:** ■ follow the way of peace ■ move toward the ideal of a peaceful world ■ achieve peace ■ hope for peace ■ pray for peace ■ aspire for peace **WAR Clusters:** ■ fight for peace ■ struggle for peace ■ maintain peace ■ preserve peace ■ the price of peace is blood ■ peace is not cheap or automatic		**Remote:** ■ war ■ menace ■ aggressors ■ communist ■ protracted war ■ tragedy that befell Okinawa ■ (war) monuments ■ *ikusa-yu*

Table 1: A typology of peace metaphors

One feature of the table (i.e., the ontological, orientational, and structural dimensions) shows types of conceptual metaphors explained in Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 1999), and the other dimension derives from Chilton's (2004) model of deixis. Combining the two typologies may be a problematic move to take. However, there are some obvious similarities that will become more illuminating of political discourse if pitted against each other. For example, orientational metaphors, as the name suggests, refer to spatial categories of up-down, front-back, near-far, and so forth, which clearly pertain to space (s) in Chilton's model. Other categories are distinctive enough to rule out such operations. Therefore, the categorical boundaries are redrawn in the table in a way that best suits the purpose at hand. The table includes parts of actual statements or text that were collected. They show in a very cursory form how the concept of peace is treated communicatively. They should not be construed as metaphors themselves; rather, they are linguistic realizations of conceptual metaphors that underlie the speakers' conceptual system.

The overriding conceptual metaphor can be articulated, to follow Lakoff and Johnson (1980), as PEACE IS JOURNEY and PEACE IS WAR. Because this conceptual system is designed to convey the participants' view and their orientation toward peace, it can be taken as an *ontological* basis for their peace concept. It is somewhat difficult to make a distinction between space (s) and time (t) along the dimension of orientational metaphors because, for one thing, temporal concepts are often expressed in terms of space (e.g., "way back in the *remote* past," "a *long way* into the future," "the revolution is getting *closer*"). A case in point from the data is "The time for peace is not *far away*." This statement uses a spatial metaphor ("far away") to index some event that is expected to take place in the future. Such spatial-temporal mapping can be significant, as we have seen in former president Clinton's speech, and should be accounted for accordingly. However, in the table, the distinction is reduced to its minimum because it is reasonable to believe that space and time put together will more aptly build the structure of conceptual metaphors. That is why space and time categories are collapsed into one along the "structural dimension." Similarly, modality seems to encompass both orientational and structural dimensions because it pertains to the speakers' view of what is true (epistemic dimension) and what is right (deontic dimension). In other words, modality covers wide ground and thus resists simple categorization. With these features in mind, the table simply shows, under the heading of "Center," a cluster of words collected from the data that are considered true, right, good, and moral, and under the heading of "Remote," a cluster of words that are considered false, wrong, bad, and immoral.


Figure 2: A JOURNEY-WAR conceptual metaphor of peace

The structural dimension of the peace metaphor consists of two clusters: JOURNEY and WAR. Whereas JOURNEY is an ongoing movement toward the future, WAR may be a lasting but sporadic event that takes place every once in a while. That is why the goals of the two conceptual metaphors are quite different. For JOURNEY, the goal is achievement of the ideal state of peace; for WAR, it is maintaining and preserving peace. Therefore, "aspiration" and "prayer" are coordinates of JOURNEY, not WAR. A person would pray and aspire for something not yet achieved, but not for something that has been acquired already. Figure 2 is a partial representation of the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor.

Another visual presentation may help understand better what has been discussed. Such a visual presentation, by necessity, is an abstraction and risks losing many details of the matter. However, it also helps capture the notion of peace as a whole, showing the relative positions and relations of its constituents.

Peace in this conceptual system is removed both spatially and temporally from the here and now. We (the USA and Japan, the alliance, the people of Okinawa) are moving toward the ideal state of peace. Rising up from the tragedy that befell Okinawa in the past, people hope for,

aspire to, and pray for peace to come closer to them in the future. However, aggressors constantly confront them with immense threats on this journey. Therefore, the achievement of peace is a constant struggle, and occasionally we have to "fight for" peace. However naïve this description may sound, the metaphor analysis of postwar U.S. public discourse on Okinawa suggests such a worldview regarding peace.

Peace represented this way leads to several dire consequences. For one thing, it justifies constant armament because every day is a struggle to counter the threat from external aggressors. It is also a struggle, albeit of a different quality, to achieve peace and then preserve it. This rhetoric in turn justifies the alliance between the two nations and coerces the Okinawan people into accepting U.S. military presence in their land. What is surprising is the close similarity in underlying metaphors between the high commissioners' rhetoric and the rhetoric in present U.S.-Japan foreign relations, as seen in former president Clinton's speech. It is clear that the underlying metaphors make it reasonable to justify the rhetoric for armament. It is questionable whether the same rhetoric makes as cogent an appeal to the public without these conceptual metaphors.


Figure 3: Deictic representation of the JOURNEY-WAR conceptual metaphor

A second aspect that should be noted is that in this conceptual system, aggressors always exist, and their malice towards us is always presupposed. Thus, conflict between the two parties is inescapable. Also, in this

conflict-ridden situation, the relationship is framed in such a way that we are always right (just) and the Other is without exception wrong (unjust). Without an aggressor, there is no need to fight for peace or struggle to achieve

peace. In other words, aggressors and their malice are necessary conditions for the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor to be effective. In this way, the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor necessitates the existence of, and in some cases the creation of, aggressors as its constituent part. Metaphors powerfully influence our thoughts. The JOURNEY-WAR metaphor has been used repeatedly in the history of Okinawa; however, what we have seen here that is unique is the power of metaphor.

This conceptual metaphor continues to dominate the political discourse regarding Okinawa. It is so strongly embodied in the minds of present political actors that comments like those above are likely to be dismissed as merely pacifists' gabble. However, to counter that argument, the latest trends in international relations are evidence of the immense consequences of the metaphor: As long as the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor is adhered to, America will continue to look for an aggressor. In other words, the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor is not simply an artistic expression of U.S.-Okinawa relations; it actually sets our feet on the course to a future war.

In closing

Is the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor a shared view of peace? Can peace be metaphorized by an alternative conceptual framework? To entertain these questions, let us look at some terminology in the global political arena. A recent history of the United Nations has seen "peacekeeping" forces (operations) and "peacemaking" diplomacy. Between these two terms lies a vast semantic gap that may incite an alternative conceptualization of peace. Peacekeeping can mean (military) forces, just as we have seen in the instances of the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor, because force is justified under the name of maintaining, preserving, and protecting the hard-won peace. It is primarily a means to an end. "Peacekeeping," then, is a coordinate of the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor—it is comfortably situated in the domain of the JOURNEY-WAR conceptual network. How can "peacemaking" be aptly placed in the conceptual

network? Will it summon a different conceptual metaphor?

Japanese language data that were collected alongside the English data show some fragments of contrasting conceptualization. "We would hope at the earliest possible day peace will be *built,* and Okinawa will *restore* its original state of being" (Osamu Taira, Nov. 11, 1966) "What we first attempted to do was to *reconstruct* the peaceful island of Okinawa that our predecessors had passed on to us" (a letter of appeal, Oct. 22, 1995), "Let us have it *back*—Okinawa, an island without tragedies" (Sugako Nakamura, Oct. 22, 1995). These expressions of peace do not readily fit the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor. For one thing, they are more past-oriented, for they all refer to something from the past: restoring the "original state of being," our predecessors' gift to the present generation, and the peace that has been taken away. Likewise, in this new conceptual system, peace is described as something that is constructed and restored, not something to be achieved. These first-glance observations lead me to propose, albeit tentatively, another conceptual metaphor, PEACE IS CRAFTING. "Peacemaking" would then find a fitting place in this domain of metaphors because just as one can craft some cultural artifacts, one can craft (make) peace. The new conceptual metaphor brings with it a new set of entailments, presuppositions, and presumptions. To cite just one example in passing, an aggressor, which is always present in the JOURNEY-WAR metaphor, is unmistakably absent.

In what other ways would peace be expressed in the realm of PEACE IS CRAFTING conceptual system? What happens and what kind of relationship is established when the two worlds with varying conceptual metaphors meet? These are questions of tremendous import that will be pursued next. The current essay was meant to initiate such a pursuit.

Notes

[1] Reddy further delineates the concept by offering the following four categories that constitute the "major framework" of the conduit metaphor: (1) language functions like a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one person to another; (2) in writing and speaking, people insert their thoughts or feelings in the words; (3) words accomplish the transfer by containing the thoughts or feelings and conveying them to others; and (4) in listening or reading, people extract the thoughts and feelings once again from the words (p. 170). This metaphor is now known as the "linear model" of communication, which has long been a target of criticism in the field of communication, for its main concern is the efficiency and fidelity of information transfer and thus is inappropriate

for accounting for socio-psychological dimensions of human interaction. One can envision, as Reddy did, a radically different world of communication if a "toolmaker metaphor" is in effect. However inappropriate the conduit metaphor may be, this linear model nonetheless has persisted through the years, which partly shows the power of the pervasive metaphor on human thought processes.

[2] Words in capital letters in this article indicate conceptual metaphors in full or in their parts.

[3] Some expressions that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) cite to illustrate the conceptual metaphor are the following:
1. Your claims are *indefensible.*
2. He *attacked every weak point* in my argument.
3. His criticisms were *right on target.*
4. I *demolished* his argument.

5. I've never *won* an argument with him.
6. You disagree? Okay, *shoot!*
7. He *shot down* all of my arguments. (p. 4)

Interestingly, Takao (2003) demonstrates that parallel constructions of this conceptual metaphor are evident in the Japanese language as well.

[4] The following expressions are manifestation of the orientational metaphor:

1. I'm feeling *up*.
2. My spirits *rose*.
3. I'm feeling *down*.
4. I *fell* into a depression.
5. My spirits *sank*. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 15)

[5] Following expressions from everyday communication are pertinent here:

1. He has a *lofty* position.
2. He's *climbing* the ladder.
3. She *fell* in status. (p. 16)

[6] Again, some colloquial expressions can be observed:

1. He is *high*-minded.
2. She is *upright*.
3. I wouldn't *stoop* to that.
4. That would be *beneath* me.
5. He *fell* into the abyss.

[7] Let us observe the following expressions:

1. You're *wasting* my time.
2. The gadget will *save* you hours.
3. How do you *spend* your time these days?
4. The flat tire *cost* me an hour.
5. I've *invested* a lot of time in her.
6. You need to *budget* your time.

[8] This assumption is quite consistent with the subject-predicate structure of English. It should be kept in mind that the topic-comment structure of the Japanese language may not as readily disclose as English does the agent, patient, and the event that is embedded in a particular political statement. For a further account of the topic-comment structure of the Japanese language, see Maynard (1997).

[9] For the distinction of these three assumptive grounds, readers are reminded of Bertrand Russell's account of a widely cited statement, "The king of France is bald." On a more practical ground, Chilton cites the following examples and examines their political consequences:

(a) An Asian man was beaten up in the street.
(b) A man was beaten up in the street.
(c) Someone was beaten up in the street. (p. 62)

Clearly, (a) entails (b) and (c). Often in political discourse, how much information should be disclosed depends on the speaker's goal as well as social expectations. The social consequences born out of such discursive strategies deserve close analysis.

[10] The data were collected at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD, USA (Records of USCAR, RG260), and the Okinawa Prefectural Archives. Other data are from local Okinawan newspapers.

[11] The speech shows a close similarity to President Bush's recent State of the Union address in which he pronounced that "Our third responsibility to future generations is to leave them an America that is safe from danger, and protected by peace. We will pass along to our children all the freedoms we enjoy--and chief among them is freedom from fear."

[12] The term, befall, originates from "befallen" (Middle English) and "befeallan" (Old English), which principally mean "to fall." Thus, it supports the spatial cognition made available by the conceptual metaphor.

[13] I use the term "nurturant provider" here in part because these manifestations of a JOURNEY-WAR metaphor are reminiscent of the "nurturant parent morality" (Lakoff, 1996) that is described as a dominant moral code among Democrats in the USA.

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