

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

東アジア多国間安全保障枠組創出のための研究—米軍プレゼンスの態様—

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資料

4) SACO Process, October 1996

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USFJ FAX COVER SHEET

Date: 23 Oct 96

Pages 4
(Inclusive)

HQ USFJ
UNIT 5068
APO AP 96328-5068
225-2456
Fax: 225-8200 (U)
225-2470 (CLASS)

TO: (Rank/Name/Unit) MAJ MCCARRON, WING G3 PLATOON






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

Fax Number 645-7578

REMARKS: Dan: Distribute, just info. - S

UNCLASSIFIED

COMPARISON OF FLOATING OFFSHORE FACILITIES

	QIP (Quick Installation Platform)	MEGA-FLOAT			HOB (Mobile Offshore Base)	
		Pontoon-type	Pontoon/Movable Breakwater-type	Semi-submersible type		
Configuration						
Structure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Tow the floating unit with columns on it to the installation location •Mount the floating structure on the columns lowered and fixed on the sea bed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Connect & weld together pontoon type floating units on the sea and behind breakwaters •Use floating units 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Same as in Pontoon-type •Same as in Pontoon-type Breakwaters are Movable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Connect & weld together semi-submersible floating units supported by the buoyancy of the tower hulls below the water surface •Use floating units 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Connect several floating units similar in principle to semi-submersible •May be decoupled •Movable 	
Applications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Base for the recovery work for the Okinawan nuclear reconstruction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Oil storage base (e.g. Uoloh Islands, Japan, etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Same as in Pontoon-type •Movable Breakwaters (e.g. Shiranui, Fukuoka Pref.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Oil (trial) drilling rig (Kash Sea oil field, etc.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •None 	
Technological Consideration Items (e.g.)	Technological maturity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Feasibility study for the required scale necessary (The base mentioned above was approx. 80m x 70m (8 units connected with junks)) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Feasibility study for the required scale necessary (An oil storage base of approx. 400m x 100m exists •300m x 80m scale (10-welded floating units) being tested 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Same as in Pontoon-type (In addition to the test, the long movable breakwaters exist in Fukuoka Pref.) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Feasibility study for the required scale necessary (An oil drilling rig of approx. 110m x 80m exists) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Concept stage need to be investigated
	Installation conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Shallow water (Base columns need to be built) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Shallow water (Breakwaters need to be built) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Shallow water (Movable Breakwaters need to be built) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Deep enough for the draft of the semi-submersible 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Deep enough for the draft of the semi-submersible
	Environmental influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Influence of the base columns are necessary to study 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Influence of the breakwaters and the mooring devices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Same as in Pontoon-type 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Influence of the mooring device 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •To be investigated
Sponsors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Spotify for Study of Marine Space Utilization in Okinawa 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •The Technical Research Association of MEGA-FLOAT •The Floating Structures Association of Japan 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •U.S. Department of Defense 	

		'Con-Deep'	
		Gravity type	Tension type
Configuration			
Structure		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fix the concrete foundation on the sea bed and mount the main structure supported by steel or concrete columns Tow the structure to the installation location 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fix the concrete foundation on the sea bed and connect the foundation and the non-submersible concrete structure with tension cables
Applications		Oil production platform (North sea oil field, etc.)	
Technology		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feasibility study for the required water buoyancy (Oil production platform of 80m x 80m extent) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Feasibility study for the required water buoyancy (Oil production platform of 110m x 110m extent)
Installation conditions		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Shallow water Sea bed surface should not be rock for the concrete foundation installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deep water Sea bed should not be rock for the concrete foundation installation
Environmental influences		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Influence of the concrete foundation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Influence of the concrete foundation
Owner		A Commercial construction company (Obayashi Corporation)	

- Notes: 1 Operation requirements of the military facilities to be installed on the floating platform and necessary related facilities on the ground base need to be examined before the technical discussions mentioned above.
- 2 Other items necessary for technical consideration other than mentioned in the chart would include cost, terms of construction, access to the facilities from the land, influence on safety and noise, the resistance against earthquakes, rough weather in Okinawa, vulnerability to aerial attacks, recoverability from damages, the lifetime of the structure, and the removability of the platform, etc.
- 3 Other items that require examination are possible reaction of other countries, military postures of the both countries including force structure of the U.S. in Japan and influence on the industry especially on the local economy in Okinawa, etc.
- 4 ① The Technical Quorum Association of Hoga-Float : Established in April, 1963, based on law of Honshu Association of Mining and Industrial Technologists
 Chairman of the Board of Directors: Kunitaro Akawa, President, Hitachi Heavy Industries
 Members: 17 companies (Steel and Shipbuilding)
- ② The Floating Structures Association of Japan : Established in July, 1960, as a voluntary group.
 Chairman: Hiroshi Ohno, President, Kawasaki Heavy Industries
 Members: 69 companies (Construction, Marine Civil Engineering, Steel and Ship Building, etc.)
- ③ Society for Study of Marine Space Utilization in Okinawa : Established in November, 1964, as a voluntary group.
 Members: 12 companies (Construction, Marine Civil Engineering, Steel and Heavy Industries, etc.)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. The US-Japan Futenma Relocation Working Group met in Washington D. C. 21 - 23 October 1996. The goal of the meetings were to clarify the operational requirements for the replacement facility for MCAS Futenma. The meeting on the 23rd was not originally scheduled.

2. The 21 October meeting began with a US Side morning meeting chaired by Kurt Campbell. This meeting was aimed at developing a strategy to keep our FOF options alive based on:

- The GOJ is demanding specific operational requirements.
- There appears to be considerable disunity on the GOJ side.
 - JDA originally wanted USMC put on Kadena.
 - JDA is now supporting the "full up" FOF under the assumption that it will not be technically feasible, thus pushing USMC back to a land option.
- SecDef guidance (as per Campbell)
 - Maintain flexibility.
 - No definitive conclusion in November SACO Report.
 - Keep options open.
 - "Continue to explore off-shore options."
- US strategy to back away from specifics. The more specific our requirements, the more GOJ will use them to push us back to a "steel carpet" tied to land. We want to state our requirements in such a manner that will support a deep sea FOF.
- US will seek to ensure that GOJ commits to continue funding Futenma Operations until replacement available.
- Technical reps present feel that if you can build over 1000', you can probably get to 5,000'. Within the given time frame, 5,000' (with the appropriate funding) should be achievable.
- US Embassy, Tokyo representative stated that the public posture has become more positive since Ota agreed to sign the leases. Additionally, Japanese industry now sees opportunity in the FOF concept.
- Campbell stated the USD(P) will support any Japanese proposal that meets the CINC's requirements.

3. The 21 October session continued in the afternoon chaired by Captain Byrd, USN, J-5. The US side was joined by the GOJ side.

- GOJ stated its requirements for US to clarify its operational requirements for the replacement facility. The US provided the COMMARFORJ report (sanitized and edited) and the JCS report delineating our requirements. BGen Murray emphasized that these are only "analyses to date", based on best, current assumptions and therefore may change.
- Col. Wright, USFJ briefed on the review of the 3 options on the replacement facility.
- GOJ stated that their assumptions based on previous meetings were that Strategic operations will be transferred to Kadena. Also, that something less than a 4200' runway may be possible.
- GOJ stated that they may have problems selling a facility sized to the V-22 since they were not aware of it in April.
- In response to Col. Wright's brief, GOJ said we should beware of criticizing Kadena density too much, since some Japanese have pointed out that Atsugi looks worse.
- GOJ was very pleased to receive the two reports, and stated that they would be in a better position to discuss their contents after reviewing them that evening.
- In response to a query about the different capabilities between the 4200' and the 2600' FOF, CAPT Byrd mentioned that the fallback option of 2600' represented the absolute minimum acceptable length. When asked if this length included housing the V-22s aboard the FOF, CAPT Byrd answered yes.
 - USFJ, PACOM and USMC informed CAPT Byrd that it was our understanding that at 2600', the V-22s will be housed ashore.
 - OSD Reps informed us that CMC agreed to a 2600' FOF with V-22s aboard during the 10 October SecDef meeting.
 - USMC informed all that this was not previously the USMC position, but that we would confirm whether CMC had agreed to this option. (Subsequently, there has been no confirmation that CMC agreed to this option. Additionally, other attendees to the 10 October meeting did not recall CMC agreeing to this.
 - USMC reminded all that the 4200' FOF is the USMC's preference, if a FOF is the designated option - however, our first preference has consistently been a facility ashore in accordance with the SACO Interim Report.

4. The 22 October meeting was chaired by Campbell.

- The discussion turned to the runway lengths. Campbell made several points:

- The shorter the runway, the more requirements will have to go to another facility ashore (Kadena already noted in SACO report).
 - Technologically, something requiring ballast may be limited to 1000 x 1000. However, with further study, something larger may be possible.
 - The difference between 1400 ft. (current assumed length) and 2600' is the difference between what is technically possible and the operational necessities.
 - If you go off-shore, you can go with multiple levels. If you go near the shore, you will need facilities ashore.
- The US asked about landfill options and whether the GOJ felt that the Okinawans will accept its technological equivalent -the near-shore "steel carpet."
- GOJ responded that landfills require large amounts of materials where a platform requires less. Also, effect on sea bed and other environmental concerns are less with a platform. (Col. Wright, USFJ pointed out that there are currently several landfill projects ongoing)
- US said we will support any option which meets our requirements, but we must be clear not to mislead the Okinawans.
- US pointed out operational, technical and political considerations must be taken into consideration.
- GOJ responded that operational requirements must come first.
- GOJ solicited advice on how to discuss runway length with Okinawans.
 - Don't mention V-22.
 - Specifically mention V-22.
 - Build for current aircraft, and ask for an extension later when US announces fielding of V-22.
- The US skirted the issue without a concrete answer.
- GOJ inquired about safety and the requirements for runway "overruns," which they heard were 1000' feet on either end. Given these parameters the 4200' FOF would really require a 6200' runway.
- USMC took question for action. (the answer provided later is that V-22 is a Class A aircraft and thus requires only 200' on either end to operate in the STOL mode, and 75' to operate in the VTOL mode).
- GOJ raised the question again about assets which would be housed on a 2600' FOF.

- Campbell's response that it included the V-22s led to a US side-bar at which we again stated that this was not the understood position.
 - BGen. Murray informed Campbell that he had contacted LtGen. Jones and BGen Vercauteren and neither was aware of CMC agreeing to this position. (As noted earlier, PLU spoke to others who attended the meeting and found no one who recalled CMC agreeing to this position)
 - Campbell's concern was that if we acknowledge moving V-22 to Kadena, GOJ will accept that option and agree to the smaller platform. The V-22 are the rationale for building a larger platform.
- With the US side obviously in disagreement over this issue, the meeting ended with Campbell pointing out that difficulties resulted because we were dealing with two new technologies, FOFs and the V-22.

5. The 23 October meeting was originally unscheduled and was called to answer some further technical questions about the FOF requirements. This meeting was chaired by Col. Bedke, USAF, J-5.

- Apparently, at the previous evening's dinner the decision was made to proceed looking at both options - a 4200' and 2600' FOF.
- Col. Bedke unequivocally stated that the US preference is for the 4200' FOF with everything aboard, to include billeting for bachelors. He noted that, obviously, there was no final decision on the V-22 housing with a 2600' FOF. However, for the purposes of studies, they should proceed under the assumption that the 2600' FOF would have the same requirements as the 4200' - with the only exception being the runway length. Again, he emphasized that there is currently no US position on where V-22 will go if the final decision is a 2600' FOF.
- GOJ said the US may want to think in terms of a 4200' FOF being near land, and a 2600' FOF being in deeper water. (One GOJ representative asked why the US was interested in a deep sea FOF if a shallow water, near shore, fixed facility could meet our requirements.)
- One response, voiced by both US and GOJ representatives, was the assumption that going further out to sea may be more politically palatable to the Okinawans. US pointed out that facilities which required more in terms of breakwater, landfills, etc. may be harder to sell.
- GOJ mentioned that US analysis indicates that these requirements are not currently technologically feasible. He inquired if the US expected Japan to assume the technological challenge which we ourselves are not willing to undertake.

- US responded that we were only informing the GOJ that we are not adverse to any solution they may propose which meets our requirements, to include studying the feasibility of semi-submersible technology.
- Col. Wright stated that we are interested in pursuing all options. He asked USMC representative to state our position.
 - Our preferred option is a facility ashore which meets the criteria established in the SACO interim report.
 - If it is determined that a FOF is the solution, we are interested in a facility that provides a runway of at least 4200' and houses all assets required to conduct operations.
 - Our interest in any floating facility is for one that is not a permanent, fixed structure. (Prior discussions directed that we can not, at this time, tell the GOJ that we want a Mobile facility because it is currently politically untenable)
- Asked about the operational requirements for a land facility, we responded that the requirements remained the same whether it is a land facility, or a floating facility.
- US pointed out that the required cubic dimensions will drive the technologically correct answer as much as the runway length.

6. Following the departure of the GOJ representatives, a US side meeting occurred to attempt to formalize a unified position on the 2600'/V-22 housing issue. The meeting was attended by J-5, CINCPAC, USFJ, and USMC. It was agreed that:

- All three options remain open.
- The preferred FOF is the 4200' with all aboard.
- For purpose of studies, the 2600' runway FOF will have the same cubic and square capacity as the 4200' FOF (the assumption being that this will require a deep water, multi-deck, semi-submersible).
- J-5 will send out a tasker requesting identification of onboard assets if the decision is to build a 2600' FOF.
 - V-22 - ashore or aboard.
 - Other assets, i.e. Wing HQ, support facilities, etc.

7. USMC representation at the several meetings were as follows:

- 21 October Maj. H. Torres Jr., PLU
- 22 October Col. D. D. Fulton, PLU
Maj. H. Torres Jr., PLU
- 23 October Maj. H. Torres Jr., PLU
Maj. J.P. Tomczak, APP

- BGen Murray, USMC attended all meetings representing USFJ.

7. Prepared by: Maj. H. Torres Jr., PLU.

24 October, 1996

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Clarification of US Military Position on Futenma Relocation Options

1. Purpose. Confirm consensus. During the bilateral Futenma relocation discussions, the team discovered a disconnect in understanding and agreement of the distribution of assets on the 2600 ft fall-back version of the SBF.

2. Key Points

- The USFJ staff study of 3 Oct 96 examined a "bare-bones" SBF, with most support infrastructure and QOL facilities remaining either at Kadena, on the shore near the SBF, or on another US base on the island. Because of this assumed austerity combined with a short runway, the USFJ report recommended the 2600 ft "fall-back" SBF support only the helicopters. V-22 assets would be stationed at Kadena, in spite of the span-of-control problems the USFJ team noted.
- The Joint Staff assessment of 8 Oct 96 concluded the SBF should be 4200 ft, with both helicopters and V-22 aircraft stationed on the SBF. Additionally, the Joint Staff position was that any SBF--even the 2600 ft minimum "fall-back" version--should not be restricted to "bare-bones" facilities. Any SBF should support direct air operations, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, and base operating support, as well as quality of life (QOL) facilities. The Joint Staff position was that the 2600 ft minimum "fall-back" version would thus include both the helicopter and V-22 assets, maintaining span-of-control and better QOL for the marine unit.
- The Joint Staff position was explained in the Conclusions and Recommendations sections of the 8 Oct 96 assessment, as well as the JS Form 136. Although the Joint Staff recommendation differed from the original USFJ/PACOM position, it assumed a "full-up" SBF rather than the "bare-bones" version, and received concurrence from PACOM and the services.
- This package clarifies the Joint Staff position for OSD and the bilateral team.

Prepared by: Curt Bedke, Col, USAF
APAC, J-5, Ext 695-8134

JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION NUMBER J-5A 04097-96

TO CJCS

THRU DJS

ORIG SUSPENSE 29 Oct 96

SUBJECT Clarification of Joint Staff Position on Futenma Relocation Options

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Purpose. Forward clarification of Joint Staff position on Futenma relocation options to OASD(ISA).

2. Discussion.

a. The bilateral US-Japan Futenma Relocation Working Group met in Washington, DC, on 21-22 Oct 96. This working group exchanged information, examined US operational requirements, and discussed technical, operational, and political issues concerning relocation options available. The bilateral team and OSD asked for clarification of the US military position on a series of issues.

b. Information paper¹ explains the issues in detail.

3. Recommendation. CJCS approve DJS memo (TAB A) for submission to OASD(ISA).

ENDNOTE

¹ Information Paper, "Clarification of US Military Position on Futenma Relocation Options," 24 Oct 96, J-5/APAC.

COORDINATION						
NAME	AGENCY	DATE	NAME	AGENCY	DATE	
	D.L.S			PACOM		
				USMC		
				USN		
	S/S			USAF		
	CCJCSLC			USA		
ACQ/DIV/EXT Col Curt Bedke, USAF, J-5/APAC, 695-8134				Date Prepared 241096		
CLASSIFICATION			CLASSIFICATION/DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS			
UNCLASSIFIED						



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-0300

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Subject: Clarification of Joint Staff Position on Futenma Relocation Options

1. The bilateral US-Japan Futenma Relocation Working Group met in Washington, DC, on 21-22 Oct 96. This working group exchanged information, examined US operational requirements, and discussed technical, operational, and political issues concerning relocation options available. The bilateral team and OSD asked for clarification of the US military position on a series of issues.
2. The Joint Staff position, coordinated with the services and USCENPAC, is:
 - a. Three options—Kadena, Schwab, and sea-based facility (SBF)(formerly the FOF)—as well as hybrid combinations of these—are all being considered. No option is closed at this time.
 - b. Of the SBF options, the 4200 ft runway version meets US operational requirements. Helicopters and V-22s will be stationed on the SBF. This version should include a runway, taxiway, parking ramp, and direct air operations support; and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, and base operating support, as well as quality of life (QOL) facilities.
 - c. Of the SBF options, the minimum fall-back option is a 2600 ft runway version. Helicopters and V-22s will be stationed on the SBF. To meet our minimum requirements, this SBF must include the same full facilities as the 4200 ft runway version.

To: COL LARKIN E CONATSER@CG STAFF@MCB BUTLER, COL JOHN L BRENNAN@COM
ROBERT B NEWLIN@CG@3D MARDIV, COL MICHAEL P BOAK@COMMAND@3D FSSG
DT_JR@COMMAND@1ST MAW, COL THOMAS R KING@HQ@MCAS FUTENMA, MAJGEN W
COMMAND@III MEF, BGEN JAMES M HAYES@CG STAFF@MCB BUTLER, BGEN RAYM
G@3D MARDIV, BGEN BRUCE B KNUTSON JR@COMMAND@1ST MAW, BGEN BRUCE B
D FSSG, BGEN DENNIS T KRUPP@COMMAND@III MEF

Cc: LTCOL TOM BRAY@BASE INSPECTOR@MCB BUTLER, MAJ DAN MCCARRON@G3@1ST
W ZAUTCKE@RPMFHS@MCB BUTLER, COL JAMES P HOPKINS@G3@1ST MAW, LTCOL
NS_JR@G3@1ST MAW, MAJ JOHN N BARCLAY@G5@III MEF, COL RICHARD G BAR
OL EUGENE E SHOULTS JR@G3@1ST MAW, COL RICHARD F HOLIHAN@FACENG@M
OL=JAMES=R=BENSON@G5@MARFORPAC@MFP.USMC.MIL], SMTP[GM14=JON=J=KRA
MFP.USMC.MIL], SMTP[LTCOL=MICHAEL=BULAWKA@G5@MARFORPAC@MFP.USMC.M

Bcc:

From: COL ROBERT G ESSINK@G3@MCB BUTLER

Subject: Fwd: IMPENDING HOT TASKER ON FUTENMA

Date: Friday, October 25, 1996 4:32:34 JST

Attach:

Certify: N

Forwarded by:

Comments:
FORWARDED FOR ADDITIONAL INFO IN PREPARATION FOR THE NEXT TASKER FROM THE
JOINT STAFF.

VERY RESPECTFULLY,
BOB ESSINK

----- Original Message -----

<RCGA45@OKRMCB01@RRSNAD01@OKR.USMC.MIL>,
<DEBB13@OKRMAW01@RRSNAD01@OKR.USMC.MIL>, <"FORCE[COL JAMES
R BENSON@G5@MARFORPAC], <"FORCE[MAJ RICHARD A
SCHAFFER@G5@MARFORPAC]

Cc: <fultond@mqq-smtp3.usmc.mil>,
<COL=JOHN=G=CASTELLAW@APP@HQMC@mqq-smtp3.usmc.mil>,
<COL=HUMBERTO=W=RODRIGUEZ@JSB1@HQMC@mqq-smtp3.usmc.mil>,
<JSB>, <DSN223-2071>, <ACIDGPLJ11>,
<youngsb@mqq-smtp3.usmc.mil>, <MCPLANNER>, <PLJ-3>,
<DSN223-2071>, <ACIDGPLJ03>

From: <MAJ=HERMINIO=TORRES_JR@PLE@HQMC

Date: Thursday, October 24, 1996 at 10:45:02 pm JST

Attached: None

Gents; Having copied the flurry of e-mail messages on the subj, Col Fulton thou
ght it best I restate USMC position on this issue. Hopefully, you've all receiv
ed the MFR I prepared yesterday.

USMC POSITION REMAINS CONSTANT:

1st preference is for a land facility in accordance with SACO report.

If, and only if, a FOF is deemed the answer, we want the 4200' FOF which houses
everything. THIS IS ALSO THE POSITION OF THE JOINT STAFF AND ACCORDING TO THE RE
PRESENT ALSO THE POSITION OF CINCPAC AND USFJ.

2600' FOF has been the ultimate fallback position. In supporting this posit
ion, we accepted the COMMARFORJ recommendation (with CINCPAC endorsement) tha
t this would be a helo only facility with the V-22 somewhere ashore. CINCPAC an

d USFJ reps. concurred with this position. Somehow, OSD interpreted the support for a 2600' fallback position to include housing the V-22 on the platform. As I mentioned in my MFR, this led to a few side-bars during the talks. OSD thinks we should push requirements for a 2600' FOF that houses EVERYTHING. This will either make this particular FOF technologically unfeasible, or require a deep sea multi-decked, semi-submersible FOF (our preference) vice a "steel carpet" rig offshore.

Accordingly, when the GOJ asks for the operational requirements of the 2600' FOF the US side intends to say it has the exact same requirements as the 4200' FOF, but only a shorter runway.

Having said that, we (actually you guys) need to be prepared to answer the question, "if 2600' with everything on it is not doable, what would have to be removed to make this a viable solution? Specifically, the critical item is the V-22.

Will we house them aboard, or request they go ashore? Also, how will this impact the commander's operational capabilities? Keeping in mind that if we say the V-22 goes ashore, the GOJ may jump on this agreeing to build a helo only platform.

Hopefully this clears up any concern over the USMC position. If there remain any questions please contact us.

V/R
Maj. Torres

To: COL LARKIN E CONATSER@CG STAFF@MCB BUTLER, COL JOHN I BRENNAN@COM
ROBERT B NEWLIN@CG@3D MARDIV, COL MICHAEL P BOAK@COMMAND@3D FSSG
DT_JR@COMMAND@1ST MAW, COL THOMAS R KING@HQ@MCAS FUTENMA, MAJGEN W
COMMAND@III MEF, BGEN JAMES M HAYES@CG STAFF@MCB BUTLER, BGEN RAYM
G@3D MARDIV, BGEN BRUCE B KNUTSON_JR@COMMAND@1ST MAW, BGEN BRUCE B
D FSSG, BGEN DENNIS T KRUPP@COMMAND@III MEF
Cc: LTCOL TOM BRAY@BASE INSPECTOR@MCB BUTLER, MAJ DAN MCCARRON@G3@1ST
W ZAUTCKE@RPMFHS@MCB BUTLER, COL JAMES P HOPKINS@G3@1ST MAW, LTCOL
NS_JR@G3@1ST MAW, MAJ JOHN N BARCLAY@G5@III MEF, COL RICHARD G BAR
OL_EUGENE E SHOULTS_JR@G3@1ST MAW, COL RICHARD F HOLIHAN@FACENG@M
Bcc:
From: COL ROBERT G ESSINK@G3@MCB BUTLER
Subject: Fwd: THE HOT TASKER - FUTENMA AND THE SBF
Date: Saturday, October 26, 1996 5:47:11 JST
Attach:
Certify: N
Forwarded by:

Comments:

FORWARDED FOR THE RECORD. I HAVE NOT SEEN THE TASKER YET. MAJ TORRES
DESCRIPTION OF THE SCENARIOS REALLY CONCERNS ME. DR CAMPBELL IS BETTING ON
ONE, WE (USMC) LOOK AT ANOTHER. HOW THE GOJ REACTS IS TOTALLY UNKNOWN. THE
STRATEGY WE TAKE AT THIS POINT IS CRITICAL.

VERY RESPECTFULLY
BOB ESSINK

----- Original Message -----
<RCGA45%OKRMCB01%RRSNAD01@OKR.USMC.MIL>,
<DEBB13%OKRMAW01%RRSNAD01@OKR.USMC.MIL>,
<DEBB01%OKRMAW01%RRSNAD01@OKR.USMC.MIL>, <"FORCE[COL JAMES
R BENSON@G5@MARFORPAC], <"FORCE[MAJ RICHARD A
SCHAFFER@G5@MARFORPAC],
<COL=JOHN=G=CASTELLAW%APP%HQMC@mqq-smtp3.usmc.mil>,
<tomczakj@mqq-smtp3.usmc.mil>, <APP-43>, <DSN224-1794/2189>
Cc: <fultond@mqq-smtp3.usmc.mil>,
<COL=HUMBERTO=W=RODRIGUEZ%JSB1%HQMC@mqq-smtp3.usmc.mil>,
<JSB>, <DSN223-2071>, <ACIDGPLJ11>,
<youngsb@mqq-smtp3.usmc.mil>, <MCPLANNER>, <PLJ-3>,
<DSN223-2071>, <ACIDGPLJ03>,
<vercauterenr@mqq-smtp3.usmc.mil>,
<COL=WALTER=G=FORD%P%HQMC@mqq-smtp3.usmc.mil>,
<DSN224-2502>, <ACIDGP000E>, <wagnerj2@mqq-smtp3.usmc.mil>
From: <MAJ=HERMINIO=TORRES_JR%PLE%HQMC
Date: Friday, October 25, 1996 at 10:41:51 pm JST
Attached: None

Gentlemen;

By now you have probably seen the actual tasker. It
is a draft memorandum from the Joint Staff to OSD providing
clarification on the Joint Staff, CINC and Service
tion. As I mentioned in my last message, the only
posed change deals with the 2600' fall-back option.
Specifically, do we all agree to state that the V-22 will
still be housed aboard this SBF. The lead US negotiator
(Campbell) feels that this position is the only way to keep

the option of a 2600' SBF alive. He feels that if we insist the V-22 go ashore, the GOJ will not entertain spending big money for a helo only platform. They will jump at the opportunity to send the V-22 to Kadena and construct what basically becomes a parking platform for helicopters.

As I mentioned previously, the rationale is that one of two things will occur:

- 1 - The 2600' SBF becomes technologically non-doable;
- 2 - It can only be doable with deep-sea, multi-decked semi-submersible.

If a SBF is deemed the answer, then the type of technology we (the US and USMC) are interested in pursuing is in fact the deep-sea, semi-submersible. Researching this technology can provide valuable information towards the ultimate development of an actual MOB. Obviously, we must be prepared to live with this decision (2600' SBF with V-22 aboard) if the powers that be determine it is doable and the way to go.

Of course, the actual decision on whether to support the tasker's position falls with your commands. As the service AO, I would point out that, unlike paragraph 2.b of the tasker, paragraph 2.c does not identify the requirement for this SBF to meet the "operational" requirements.

To date, we at HQMC have stood firmly. USMC preferences for Futenma replacement:

- 1 - A land facility as per SACO Interim Report
- 2 - 4200' SBF with everything aboard
- 3 - 2600' SBF with V-22 ashore

We stand by prepared to ensure that USMC speaks with one voice. CMC is on the road scheduled to return this weekend. We will brief him prior to signing the service position.

V/R
Maj. Torres

----- Original Message -----

To: LTGEN JAMES L JONES@P@HQMC, GEN RICHARD I
NEAL@ACMC@HQMC, BGEN RICHARD F
VERCAUTEREN@PL@HQMC, COL WALTER G
FORD@P@HQMC, COL JOHN H WAGNER@PL@HQMC,
MAJ HERMINIO TORRES JR@PLE@HQMC, COL
DAVID D FULTON@PLE@HQMC, FORCE[LTGEN
JEFFERSON D HOWELL JR@CFC@MARFORPAC],
SMTP[MAJGEN=WAYNE=E=ROLLINGS&COMMAND&III=
MEF@OKR.USMC.MIL],
SMTP[BGEN=JAMES=M=HAYES&CG=STAFF&MCB=BUTL
ER@OKR.USMC.MIL], FORCE[MAJGEN MARTIN R
STEELE@CINCPAC@MARFORPAC],
SMTP[BGEN=TERRENCE=P=MURRAY&COMMAND&USFJ@
OKR.USMC.MIL]

From: GEN CHARLES C KRULAK@CMC@HQMC
Date: Sunday, October 27, 1996 at 1:29:39 am
UTC
Attached: None

GENTLEMEN,

I JUST HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO READ THE VERY COMPLETE REPORT DRAFTED BY MAJ. TORRES AFTER THE US-JAPAN FUTENMA RELOCATION WORKING GROUP. FIRST OFF, LET ME CONGRATULATE EVERYONE WHO HAS BEEN WORKING SO HARD ON THIS ISSUE---I AM EXTREMELY HAPPY WITH THE WAY YOU ALL ARE OPERATING. IT IS A VERY TOUGH ENVIRONMENT AND

A VERY DIFFICULT ISSUE. WE ARE AT A DISADVANTAGE BECAUSE THE MAJOR US PLAYERS ARE SPREAD FROM THE "BELTWAY" TO HAWAII TO OKINAWA TO JAPAN AND THEY COMPRISE SEVERAL DIFFERENT UNIFORM "COLORS". STILL, WE ARE DOING WELL. THAT IS A TRIBUTE TO EVERYONE IN THE ADDEE COLUMN AS WELL AS THE WORKERS WHO ARE NOT IN THE "SPOTLIGHT". I CANNOT TELL YOU HOW PROUD I AM OF THE WORK YOU ALL ARE DOING FOR OUR CO

AS I READ THE REPORT, THE ONLY PART THAT JUMPED OUT AT ME WAS THE ISSUE OF THE V-22 LOCATION IF THE FOF WERE ONLY 2600 FEET. THERE IS A COMMENT THAT SAYS "R SECDEF MEETING." THIS IS ABSOLUTELY INCORRECT!! ABSOLUTELY "BRAVO SIERRA!" AT NO TIME DID I MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT NOR WOULD I MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT. MY STATEMENT WAS THAT I WOULD AGREE TO A 2600 FOOT FOF IF THE V-22'S WERE PUT AT KADENA! MORE IMPORTANTLY, I STATED THAT I WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A SIGNED AGREEMENT BETWEEN ME AND THE C/S USAF THAT ENCOMPASSES THE AGREEMENT TO HAVE THE V-22'S AND SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT AT KADENA...WITH THE REQUIREMENTS SPELLED OUT IN GREAT DETAIL. THAT IS WHAT THE COMMANDANT SAID IN THE 10 OCTOBER MEETING. THE REASON NO ONE COULD RECALL THE COMMANDANT AGREEING TO THE 2600 FOOT FOF W/V-22'S ABOARD IS THAT THE COMMANDANT DID NOT, I SAY AGAIN, DID NOT, AGREE TO SUCH NONSENSE.

MY LAST POINT TO MAKE IS A VERY IMPORTANT ONE: THERE ARE GOING TO BE TIMES WHEN A MARINE CORPS POSITION NEEDS TO BE MADE---A POSITION THAT IS AT THE CMC LEVEL. THERE WILL BE TIMES WHEN, AS WE JUST EXPERIENCED, THE COMMANDANT'S NAME WILL BE THE QUESTION, "DO NOT PASS GO---DO NOT COLLECT \$200" GET IN TOUCH WITH ME AND ASK THE QUESTION. THE BEAUTY OF OUR SITUATION IS THAT ANYONE CAN CONTACT THE COMMANDANT AND GET THE ANSWER---NO MATTER WHAT TIME-ZONE OR RANK. THESE ARE CRITICAL TIMES AND WE ALL NEED TO BE SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE. IF THERE IS ANY QUESTION OF WHAT THAT VOICE SHOULD BE SAYING, WE CAN ALL GET AN ANSWER VERY QUICKLY. ONCE THE ANSWER IS GIVEN, WE NEED TO ENSURE THAT ALL PARTIES HAVE THE SAME ANSWER SO WE CAN CONTINUE TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE. "BACKBRIEFS" ARE CRITICAL! THERE IS SUCH A THING AS TOO MUCH INFORMATION!

AGAIN, YOU ALL ARE DOING A SUPERB JOB!! I THANK YOU!!!

WARMLY, CCK

28 Oct 96

Subj: CLARIFICATION ON FUTENMA RELOCATION OPTIONS

Purpose: This paper provides further clarification on Futenma Relocation Options

Discussion:

The bilateral US-Japan Futenma Relocation Working Group met in Washington, DC, on 21-23 Oct 96. The working group asked for further clarification/concurrence on the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs memo concerning Futenma Relocation Options.

Concur with the Joint Staff position in paragraph 2a and 2b of the Joint Staff Tasker (Action No. J-5A 04097-96 dtd 24 Oct 96). Selection of any of the SBF options in these paragraphs will provide adequate operational and contingency support.

Non-concur with paragraph 2c, which recommends the minimum fall-back option as a 2600 ft runway version with helicopters and V-22's stationed on the SBF. The SBF would have the same full facilities as the 4200 ft version.

MAG-36 comprises some 2500 personnel and 62 aircraft, an aviation force comparable in size to a USAF Wing. This size facility will not accommodate the required span and depth of operations of a Marine Aircraft Group without a serious degradation in capability and readiness. The total infrastructure requirements to support a "full-up" SBF for all of MAG-36 will significantly add to the size, complexity, and location of the 2600 ft derivative. Resiting of MACG-18 and MWSS 172, currently located on MCAS Futenma, must also be accomplished on a shore facility.

Previous MARFORJ position envisioned a FOF facility that was a working platform, with minimal recreation and QOL facilities, and was connected near the coast by a causeway. The facility envisioned in paragraph 2c of the Joint Staff Study would include a runway, parking ramp and direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, and base operating support, as well as Quality of life facilities.

Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Japan ltr SSIC 4000/4 of 19 Jul 96, Requirements for an MCAS Futenma replacement facility, paragraph 4, provides the minimum projected monthly flight activity. This flight activity is restated below. A 2600 ft SBF with a full complement of aircraft (62) will not be capable of supporting the monthly flight activity.

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Flight Hours	1325
Flights	495
Night Hours at MCAS Futenma	65
Night Hours Away From Futenma	385
Percentage of Hours Flown at Night	42

# ACFT Involve in Ordnance Evolutions	70
Number of Landings and Take-Offs (Day)	1127
Number of Landings and Take-Offs (Night)	285
IFR Activity, Precision	300
IFR Activity, Non Precision	150
IFR Activity, Other	280

Minimum facilities for a full up SBF require approximately 6 million square feet to meet the same "full facilities as the 4200 ft runway version" as envisioned meeting MAG-36 requirements. This breaks down to 2.5 million square feet aircraft parking area, .9 million square feet for operational support (hangers, washracks, etc.), and 2.5 million square feet for troop support, administrative, and quality of life functions. Note: While the SBF is assumed to include QOL support, accommodation of open air recreational facilities normally associated with a shore based facility may not be feasible.

If the top operational deck is assumed to be sized at 2600 ft X 1200 ft, most aircraft parking, some base operations support, and most indirect base operations support must be built as multiple decks below the surface. Current estimates based on "full-up" requirements of 6 million square feet, are that two additional decks below the surface would be required.

For example, the assumed design will only allow a 200 foot deep strip for aircraft parking, at the runway level. All other aircraft parking will be provided on a level below the runway. This means in its current configuration the SBF can only accommodate 20 aircraft at the runway level; 42 aircraft must be parked on the decks below the runway. The operational impact of respotting aircraft from lower decks will be detrimental toward meeting operational commitments.

This multideck deck facility may require a deep draft design, which could drive the location further off-shore, raising questions about the feasibility of shore-based connectivity and protection from typhoons.

It is clear that such a live-and-work facility will significantly reduce the quality of life of assigned personnel, not only for unaccompanied personnel but accompanied. This is particularly significant in the event there is to be over-water transportation to and from work/living accommodations.

Conclusions

In MARFORJ Staff Study of 3 October 1996 a minimal work-only SBF with V-22's ashore was recommended. If Futenma is not entirely relocated to a shore based facility, this remains the only viable SBF option. MARFORJ supports the following options in preference order:

A land facility as per SACO Interim Report.
4200 foot SBF with everything aboard.
2600 foot SBF with V-22 ashore.



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
U. S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, JAPAN
UNIT 35601
FPO AP 96606-5601

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5000
8
28 Oct 96

From: Commander, U. S. Marine Corps Forces, Japan
To: Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan

Subj: MARFORJ COMMENTS ON JOINT STAFF TASKER ON FUTENMA

Ref: (a) Joint Staff Tasker (Subj: Clarification of Joint Staff
Position on Futenma Relocation Options) dated 24 Oct
96 (Action Number J-5A 04097-96)

Encl: (1) MARFORJ Response dtd 28 Oct 96

1. The enclosure is provided as the MARFORJ comments to the
reference.

W E Rollings

W. E. ROLLINGS

OPTIONAL FORM 88 (7-89)		# of pages = 1	
FAX TRANSMITTAL			
To: CDR QUAPMAJ	From: CDR ARNOLD		
Dist/Agency: 7-511	Phone #: 225-8134		
Fax #: 315-477-0327	Fax #: 225-8137		
FORM 7340-01-317-728a		5010-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION	

1300
Memo
29 Oct 1996

From: Director, Strategic Planning and Policy, U. S. Pacific Command
To: Joint Staff (J5)

Subj: CLARIFICATION OF JOINT STAFF POSITION ON FUTENMA RELOCATION OPTIONS

Ref: (a) JS Form 136 dtd 24 OCT 96
(b) JS Study Group Assessment of Futenma Relocation Options dtd 7 OCT 96

Encl: (1) COMMARFORJ Response of 28 OCT 96

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to clarify the USCINCPAC position to the Joint Staff on Futenma Relocation Options as directed in reference (a).
2. Based on our review with Components, we concur with paragraphs 2.a and 2.b. We recommend deletion of paragraph 2.c.
3. The basing of both helos and MV-22's on a 2600 ft Sea-Based Facility (SBF) is a poor option because it cannot support the sustained training and wartime requirements of the MV-22 as well as split MV 22 support structure. The SBF (helo only option), with MV-22's based and operating from a shore facility, provides adequate operational and contingency support to both helicopters and MV-22, while minimizing the size of the SBF. Full MV-22 access to a shore facility for sustained contingency and training operations remains critical.
4. We applaud the recent formation of the U.S.-Japan Bilateral Study on Futenma Relocation and remain convinced that we must continue to emphasize our operational requirements (outlined in reference (b)). Any option that meets our requirements is worthy of further bilateral study. Until these studies are completed, no definitive decisions should be made.

Very respectfully,



M. R. STEELE
Major General, USMC
Director for Strategic
Planning and Policy



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
2 NAVY ANNEX
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO:

PLU-1
MCPDV 014-96
29 Oct 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, J-5A, OF THE JOINT STAFF

Subj: CLARIFICATION OF JOINT STAFF POSITION ON FUTENMA RELOCATION
OPTIONS

1. The Marine Corps nonconcurs in the subject paper as written.
2. Specific Changes:

MC-1 Paragraph 2.c. line 2: change to read:


"...the minimum fallback option is a 2600 ft runway version. Helicopters and ~~V-22s~~ will be stationed on the SBF. V-22s will require facilities ashore. ..."

REASON: As written, the paper incorrectly states the position agreed to between the Marine Corps and the Operating Forces in theater. The original Staff Study conducted by US Forces Japan, and endorsed by USCINCPAC envisioned a minimal work-only SBF as the ultimate fallback position with V-22s ashore. An SBF with a 2600 ft runway which houses both helicopters and V-22s would impose serious degradation on both the span and depth of operations of the Marine Aircraft Group, a force comparable in size to a USAF Wing.

3. The Marine Corps position has remained constant. The Corps' prioritized preferences for the MCAS Futenma replacement facility are:
 - a. A land facility in accordance with the SACO Interim Report.
 - b. A deep-sea, semi-submersible SBF with a minimum runway length of 4200 ft which replaces all the facilities of MCAS Futenma.
 - c. A SBF with a 2600 ft runway which houses only the helicopters. The V-22s are based ashore.

Despite recent statements to the contrary, neither the Commandant nor any Service Action Officer has ever digressed from this position.


B. M. YOUNGS
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps
Marine Corps Service Planner



UNCLASSIFIED

USFJ FAX COVER SHEET

Date: 30 OCT 96

Pages 4
(Inclusive)

HQ USFJ
UNIT 5068
APO AP 96328-5068
225-2456
Fax: 225-8200 (U)
225-2470 (CLASS)

TO: (Rank/Name/Unit) COL ESSINK / MAJ MCCARRA

Voice Number: 645-7221 645-3028

Fax Number 645-3879/3937 645-7578

REMARKS:

- ① What Kadena rep. came up with on matrix (LC Vinograd)
- ② Signed endorsement
- ③ Final matrix.

UNCLASSIFIED

10/24/88 11:11 8225 8200


FILE NO. : 6345165

Oct 24 1988 11:32AM P2

USFJ CMD CTR

002


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY AAF (SAF) Version
USG/GOJ MCAS Futenma Relocation Matrix



Category	0	2.5	5	7.5	10
ENVIRONMENTAL					
1. Potential Conflict w/ Existing Air Traffic (Air Traffic Deconfliction)	0	7.5	10	7.5	
2. Proximity to Population Centers (Risk to Personnel/Property on or Near Airfield)	0	5	10	5	
3. Terrain (Obstacles, High Terrain)	2.5	7.5	7.5	2.5	
OPERATIONS					
1. Contingency Response Capability (Employment)	2.5	2.5	2.5	5	
2. Ramp Loading (Deployment/Re-employment)	0	0	7.5	0	
3. Heavy Aircraft Operations (Capability)	7.5	0	5.0	0	
4. Ability to Meet Training Requirements	2.5	10	10	10	
5. Combat Capabilities Degradation During Construction Period	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	
TECHNICAL					
1. Quality of Life (QOL)	0	5	5	2.5	
2. Cost	0	5	5	2.5	
3. Environmental Impact	0	2.5	2.5	5	
4. Technical (Engineering) Risk	5	2.5	2.5	0	
PUBLIC AFFAIRS					
1. Public Opposition	0	0	0	0	
2. "Lightning Rod" Effect	5	5	5	5	

Legend (Weighted Scale)

- 0 = Most Unfavorable
- 2.5 = Slightly Unfavorable
- 5 = Neutral
- 7.5 = Favorable
- 10 = Most Favorable



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Note: This weighted scale will be used to determine most favorable option of three considered for relocation of MCAS Futenma. For each category / sub area assign a numerical rating between 0-10 for that specific category.



HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES, JAPAN
APO AREA PACIFIC 96328-5068

28 October 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR USCINCPAC/J5

FROM: Headquarters
United States Forces, Japan
Deputy Commander
APO AP 96328-5068

SUBJECT: Clarification of Joint Staff Position on Futenma Relocation Options

1. Recommend addition of the following sentence to the end of paragraph 2.a to proposed Joint Staff memorandum:

Analysis of the options should continue to focus on sustainment of US Forces, Japan, combat capabilities and readiness.

2. Non-concur with paragraph 2.c, which recommends the minimum fall-back option as a 2600 ft runway version with helicopters and V-22s stationed on the sea based facility (SBF). V-22s will require a minimum runway length of 4200 ft or be land based.

3. MAG-36 comprises some 2500 personnel and 62 aircraft, an aviation force compatible in size to a USAF wing. The 2600 ft facility will not accommodate the required span and depth of sustained operations of a Marine Aircraft Group without serious degradation in capability and readiness. The total infrastructure requirements to support a "full-up" SBF for all of MAG-36 will significantly add to the size, complexity, and location of the 2600 ft derivative. Resiting of MACG-18 and MWSS 172, currently located on MCAS Futenma, must also be accomplished on a shore facility. Previous MARFORJ position envisioned an SBF that was a working platform, with minimal recreation and quality of life facilities, and was connected near the coast by a causeway. The facility envisioned in paragraph 2.c of the Joint Staff memorandum would include a runway, parking ramp, direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, and base operating support, as well as quality of life facilities. USFJ and MARFORJ are concerned about long term negative impacts on readiness associated with sustained operations from such a facility.

Handwritten signature of Terrence P. Murray in black ink.

TERRENCE P. MURRAY
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff

MEETING 2000
 LEFT OUT SOME INFO

USG /GOJ MCAS Futenma Relocation Matrix

	Nadeta Collocation	Camp Suburb		Small Sea Based Facility	Large Sea Based Facility
		Shimura Railway	Comma Railway		
Safety					
1. Potential Conflict w/ Existing Air Traffic (Air Traffic Deconfliction)	2.5	10.0	7.5	10.0	10.0
2. Proximity to Population Centers (Risk to Personnel/Property on or Near Airfield)	2.5	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0
3. Terrain (Obstacles, High Terrain)	10.0	5.0	5.0	10.0	10.0
Operations					
1. Contingency Response Capability (Employment)	5.0	5.0	7.5	2.5	5.0
2. Ramp Loading (Deployment/Redeployment)	7.5	7.5	10.0	10.0	10.0
3. Heavy Aircraft Operations (Capability)	10.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	0.0
4. Ability to Meet Training Requirements	5.0	10.0	10.0	2.5	7.5
5. Combat Capabilities Degradation During Construction Period	0.0	10.0	10.0	5.0	5.0
Facilities					
1. Quality of Life (QOL)	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
2. Cost	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
3. Environmental Impact	5.0	5.0	5.0	2.5	2.5
4. Technical (Engineering) Risk	7.5	10.0	7.5	0.0	0.0
Public Affairs					
1. Public Opposition	2.5	5.0	5.0	7.5	5.0
2. "Lightning Rod" Effect	0.0	7.5	7.5	10.0	10.0
Totals	77.5	85.0	95.0	79.0	79.0

Legend (Weighted Scale)



- 0 = Most Unfavorable
- 2.5 = Slightly Unfavorable
- 5 = Neutral
- 7.5 = Favorable
- 10 = Most Favorable

Note: This weighted scale will be used to determine most favorable option of three considered for relocation of MCAS Futenma. For each category / sub area assign a numerical rating between 0-10 for that specific category.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350-2000

N512J
NPM 611-96
30 OCTOBER 1996

**MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J-5), JOINT
STAFF**

**Subj: NAVY PLANNER MEMORANDUM ON CLARIFICATION OF JOINT STAFF
POSITION ON FUTENMA RELOCATION OPTIONS (J-5A 04097-96)**

1. Navy has no equity in the runway length specifications and stationing options associated with the SBF. However, significant differences are noted between the Joint Staff position and those of the affected Service and geographic CINC which should be resolved before the memorandum is forwarded to OSD.



J. A. ROBB
Captain, U.S. Navy
Assistant to the CNO
for JCS Matters

資料

5) SACO Process, November 1996

01411

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES, JAPAN
APO AREA PACIFIC 96328-5068

22 Nov 96

MEMORANDUM FOR MARFORJ/G3
5AF/DO

FROM: HQ US Forces, Japan
Operations Division (J3)
APO AP 96328-5068

SUBJ: Relocation of MCAS Futenma

1. Attached OSD and Joint Staff developed draft "Final Report" on relocation of MCAS Futenma is provided for your review and comment. Request MARFORJ and 5AF provide jointly coordinated comments on attached draft by COB Monday, 25 November 1996.
2. Your comments will be forwarded to USCINCPAC, the Joint Staff and OSD/ISA for further coordination. The "Final Report" will be completed during bilateral meetings in Tokyo on or about 27 November 1996. Current planning calls for approval of the "Final Report" during 2+2 meetings in Tokyo on 2 December 1996.
3. Regret short suspense. Your expertise and comments, however, are critically important to development of the final bilateral agreement on the relocation of MCAS Futenma. We will continue to make every effort to coordinate with you on further revisions to the draft "Final Report".

BRUCE A. WRIGHT, Colonel, USAF
Director, Operations (J3)

DRAFT

**Final Report
Special Working Group on Futenma Air Station
Special Action Committee on Okinawa
Tokyo, Japan
December 2, 1996**

1. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and () reaffirmed their commitment to the SACO Interim Report of 15 April 1996 and the Status Report on the Special Action Committee on Okinawa of 19 September 1996. Both Governments conducted a comprehensive and intensive joint study on three possible alternatives. Based on these studies, the SCC agreed to pursue the following plan to return Futenma Air Station and maintain the military functions of the base.

2. General.

a. Pursue construction of a sea-based facility (SBF) to absorb most of the functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)-capable 1500 meter runway, direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, housing, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. This SBF will be located near the shore, connected to the island by a pier or causeway. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter and MV-22 (Osprey) units.

b. Transfer KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base; transfer C-12 and CT-39 aircraft to Kadena Air Base. Develop additional facilities and equipment at each of these bases to ensure associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.

c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena to support contingency repair and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station.

d. As part of the joint Defense Guidelines review, study the emergency use of alternate facilities which might be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.

e. Return Futenma Air Station after adequate replacement facilities are completed.

3. Proposed Milestones and Timelines. The SCC agreed to implement this plan to return Futenma Air Station and maintain the critical military functions with the following timeline:

DRAFT

as of 22 Nov; 0300 hours

DRAFT

Dec 96: Select and announce proposed location of the new facility

Year 1:

- Establish a bilateral working group to oversee implementation of this plan
- Execute concept development for operational requirements definition for this new facility
- Establish technology performance specifications
- Upon completion of the above activities, both Governments would seek early industry involvement to foster commercial innovation
- Site survey and environmental assessment
- Concept Selection

Year 2: Complete facility design for construction

Year 3-4: Construct and complete installation of the new facility

Year 5: Complete installation of required components of the new facility

Year 6:

- Complete validation tests and suitability demonstrations
- Transfer operations from Futenma to the new facility

Year 7: Return Futenma Air Station

4. Guiding Principles

a. Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained through the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.

b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operations precluded by the shorter runway of the SBF must be accounted for (such as strategic airlift, logistics, and contingency planning). Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational, cost, or quality of life considerations, will be located on shore, on existing US facilities and areas.

c. The SBF will be located near shore, connected by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, air-space and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access.

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as of 22 Nov; 0300 hours

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to other US military facilities and housing.

d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions, corrosion control features, safety, and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations. The SBF will have an operational service life of at least 40 years.

e. The Governments of Japan and the United States will establish a bilateral working group to oversee implementation of this plan. The Joint Committee will implement improvements at Iwakuni and Kadena that are required as part of the transfer of functions from Futenma and report progress to the bilateral working group.

f. In accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Government of Japan will provide funding, acquisition, maintenance, logistics, and additional supporting infrastructure for the SBF and other facilities. Japan will retain ownership of this facility.

g. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of these plans, including concept, location, and schedule of implementation.

DRAFT

as of 22 Nov; 0300 hours

Near-Term Milestone Activities

Bilateral Development Activities (six months)

- Define baseline facilities performance levels (General and Futenma specific)
- Develop concept of operations (what would we do different/same)
- Translate operational requirements into technical performance specifications
- Develop measures of effectiveness
 - Minimum and target levels of performance (ORD)
 - Cost (acquisition, ownership, disposal)
 - Schedule (development, selection, fabrication, demonstration)
 - Immediate and ultimate benefits to Okinawa (economic devel)
 - Immediate and ultimate benefits to Japan
 - Safety (aircraft operators, facilities crew, services personnel, civilian populace)
 - Operability (normal and heavy weather, local topography, high tempo operations, QOL)
 - Sustainability (maintenance, overhaul, resupply, dedicated personnel)
 - Flexibility/Growth Potential
 - Environmental impact (installation, operation, and removal)
- Operational Site Selection

Commercial Development Activities (three to six months)

- Facilities definition
- Concept designs
- Acquisition and life cycle cost estimates
- Detail design and fabrication plan


Concept Selection (one month)

- Compete designs/consortia using measures of effectiveness
- Select technology based on best value (US, Japan, Okinawa)

Technical Working Group (Program Office)

- Japanese program manager
- US Deputy
- Small US technical support team

Concept Selection



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DATE 03-01-2011
BY 60322 UCBAW/STP

Long-Term Milestone Activities

Year 1

- Establish bilateral working group
- Concept Development
- Site Survey
- Environmental Assessment
- Concept Selection Δ

Year 2

- Facility Design Δ

Years 3-4

- Facility fabrication
- Facility installation

Year 5

- Facility outfit - Complete installation of required components

Year 6

- Suitability demonstration/validation Δ
- Futenma operations transfer

Year 7

- Close and return Futenma

Δ Decision Point

To: COL LARKIN E CONATSER@CG STAFF@MCB BUTLER, COL JOHN L BRENNAN@COMMAND@III MEF, COL ROBERT NEWLIN@CG@3D MARDIV, COL MICHAEL P BOAK@COMMAND@3D FSSG, COL ROBERT C DODT_JR@COMMAND@1ST MAW, COL THOMAS R KING@HQ@MCAS FUTENMA, MAJGEN WAYNE E ROLLINGS@COMMAND@III MEF, BGEN JAMES M HAYES@CG STAFF@MCB BUTLER, BGEN RAYMOND P AYRES_JR@CG@3D MARDIV, BGEN BRUCE B KNUTSON_JR@COMMAND@1ST MAW, BGEN BRUCE B BYRUM@COMMAND@3D FSSG, BGEN DENNIS T KRUPP@COMMAND@III MEF

Cc: COL JAMES P HOPKINS@G3@1ST MAW, MAJ DANIEL C MCCARRON@G3@1ST MAW, MAJ JOHN N BARCLAY@G5@III MEF, COL RICHARD G BARR@G5@III MEF, LTCOL WALTER J WIERZBICKI@G5@III MEF, LTCOL TOM BRAY@BASE INSPECTOR@MCB BUTLER

From: COL ROBERT G ESSINK@G3@MCB BUTLER

Certify: Y

Subject: FUTENMA DRAFT INPUT TO FINAL REPORT

Date: Friday, November 22, 1996 at 11:18:27 am JST

Attached: None

GENERALS AND CHIEFS;

COL WRIGHT, USFJ J-3, IS SENDING A FAX OF AN OSD/JOINT STAFF PROPOSAL ON FUTENMA FOR INCLUSION IN THE FINAL SACO REPORT. OUR COMMENTS AND 18TH WING'S WILL BE FORWARDED WITH USFJ'S TO CINCPAC AND THE JOINT STAFF. COL WRIGHT HAS REQUESTED JOINTLY COORDINATED COMMENTS, BUT IF WE FEEL WE SHOULD RESPOND SEPARATELY, WE SHOULD DO SO. OUR DUE DATE IS COB 25 NOV 96. USFJ HAS A SUSPENSE OF MONDAY MORNING EAST COAST TIME.

AS SOON AS I HAVE THE FAXED TASKER AND PROPOSED STATEMENT, I WILL FAX TO III MEF AND PROVIDE A COPY TO THE WING AND COL KING.

REQUEST THE WING TAKE THE LEAD TO DRAFT RESPONSE FOR COMMARFORJ SIGNATURE.

COL WRIGHT INDICATED DR CAMPBELL WILL BE BACK AROUND 27 NOV TO CONTINUE WORK ON THE FINAL REPORT AND PREP FOR THE 2+2. MARFORJ HAS ALSO BEEN INVITED TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO A BILATERAL MEETING WITH MOFA ON 26 NOV (TIME AND PLACE TBD) TO DISCUSS THE USG PROPOSAL AND THE COMPONENT COMMENTS. THIS MAY BE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR COL KING TO MAINTAIN CONSISTENCY IN THE PROCESS. HIS NOMINATION, OR ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL'S, IS SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION AND APPROVAL OF GEN ROLLINGS.

THIS IS A HOT ONE.

VERY RESPECTFULLY,
ESSINK

Happy Mail

To: COL THOMAS R KING@HQ@MCAS FUTENMA, COL ROBERT C
DODT_JR.COMMAND@1ST MAW
From: COL ROBERT G ESSINK@G3@MCB BUTLER
Certify: Y
Subject: COMMENTS ON DRAFT FINAL RPT ON FUTENMA
Date: Sunday, November 24, 1996 at 12:33:41 pm JST
Attached: None

SOME THOUGHTS FOR INCLUSION IN THE COMMENTS SENT BACK TO USFJ.

General comments:

1. I am uncertain if the GOJ will want to put this much into the final report on Futenma. The studies are not all complete to the best of my knowledge; GOJ has not said they can pay what could be the astronomical costs (billions of dollars) to construct the replacement facility. To restrict the report to say a decision has been made and the course laid in is nice for the politicians but not so good for us. I feel they will want a short statement, non-specific as to a decision, and that we will continue to try to find the solution as quickly as possible.

Para 1: The three possible alternatives: The study USFJ had begun had 5 options. Now the number is 3, but they are not specified. Maybe that's good. "Maintain the military functions of the base": I thought we were trying to maintain the capability of our operating forces.

Para 2:

para 2a: "to absorb" What does this mean?

"most of the functions of Futenma Air Station": Does this mean more than 50%? The list of "things" proposed in this paragraph may not fit and some of these may not be desired aboard the SBF. We need to take the last sentence from paragraph 4b and add it right after "...and base operating support." Furthermore, we must emphasize in the general comments paragraph that we do not desire to put "everything" on this SBF.

para 2b and c: Nothing mentioned in the timelines about either of these paragraphs. Recommend these be appropriately included.

para 2e: Change the end of the sentence to read "...completed and operational."

Para 3. Proposed Milestones and Timelines.

Consider this timeline naïve and simplistic. Look how long the Iwakuni runway expansion program has taken; or, look at Naha Military Port. This is not a tinker toy set we are putting out there. If this is a bilateral effort as stated, there are a lot of folks who need to be in the approval

process. I do not know if the acquisition side of the house will be ready to order the equipment needed to make this facility functional before closing down Futenma. We are not going to do dual siting/ operations, just like with the Sobe comm site relocation issue. This part of the plan has not been discussed yet to my knowledge. Do not think the final report needs this timeline. That's what got this whole mess into the quagmire it is in now. Timelines create expectations that they will be met.

Para 4:

para 4b. The first sentence ("To the greatest extent possible, Futenma's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF.") should be deleted. We have not agreed to this. Or, have we?? See the 4 Oct 96 MARFORJ comments about an SBF.

para 4c. The areas addressed here have not been evaluated as yet. If all these must be taken into consideration and evaluated before work can begin, what length of time will these take?

para 4d. Only "adequate measures" to ensure survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions, corrosion control features, safety, and platform security? What scenario is envisioned where this facility will be "fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations?"

para 4f. Wonder if the GOJ is going to buy this? The costs will be immense for us if we owned it. Now we are the tenant and would need a separate agreement on the rules of the road for many things.

para 4g. Good paragraph from a political point. This will probably be acceptable to the GOJ as the second sentence OF TWO in the paragraph on Futenma.

R/
BOB ESSINK

Happy Mail



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
U. S. MARINE CORPS FORCES, JAPAN
Unit 35601
FPO AP 96606-5601

3000
9
25 Nov 96

From: Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Japan
To: Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan

Subj: RELOCATION OF MCAS FUTENMA

Ref: (a) USFJ J-3 Memo of 22 Nov 96
(b) COMMARFORJ ltr T4000 4 dtd 19 Jul 96

1. Reference (a) provided an OSD and Joint Staff developed draft "Final Report" on the relocation of MCAS Futenma for review and comment. This command has several major concerns relative to the OSD draft as outlined below with our recommendations.

2. The format for the Futenma SACO issue differs from that afforded the other 25 issues with a significantly higher level of detail than should be necessary for the Final Report. Recommend a shortened version be prepared.

3. As the SACO Final Report will be widely read and reported, the USG must guard against expectations by GOJ and OPG that everything currently located at MCAS Futenma will be relocated to a Sea Based Facility (SBF). U.S. Marine Corps Forces Japan envisions the SBF as an aviation operations, "work-only" platform with people and significant infrastructure ashore. In addition to aviation operations at Futenma, non-flying units (MACG-18 and MWSS-172) comprise approximately 40 percent of the square footage requirements identified in reference (b). It would be more efficient and less costly to base these units ashore. The SBF cannot replicate the quality of life extant in a shore-based environment. If located near the shore with a bridge, all unaccompanied personnel should live in quarters located near the SBF.

4. I recommend that the appropriate sections be modified as follows:

a. Modify paragraph 2a to read: "Pursue construction of a sea-based facility (SBF) to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations,

Subj: RELOCATION OF MCAS FUTENMA

including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) capable 1500 meter runway, and infrastructure in direct support of these operations. Relocate other functions at Futenma Air Station not suitable for the SBF to other shore-based U.S. facilities on Okinawa, including billeting for personnel assigned to work on the SBF. This SBF will be located near the shore, connected to the island by a pier or causeway. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter and MV-22 Osprey units."

b. Modify paragraph 4d to read: "The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions, corrosion control treatment and prevention, safety, and platform security. Aircraft hangaring facilities must be super-typhoon proof and in sufficient numbers so that evacuating aircraft to other airfields is not required. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations. The SBF will have an operational service life of at least 40 years."

5. The preparation of the technology performance specifications should involve extensive review and participation with GOJ by the U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command to properly develop a technical Request for Proposal. A rush to contract award could inevitably lead to increased risk in the design and possibly an SBF that is unsafe and operationally unsuitable. Milestones should include periodic reviews to ascertain whether the SBF option is/is not feasible and to identify fallback or branch options should the SBF be determined impractical or unable to meet specifications. The Secretary of the Navy's Acquisition Executive should review and propose a strategy leading to final contract award. I recommend the proposed timelines be deleted.

W E Rollings

W. E. ROLLINGS

11/27/96

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES, JAPAN
APO AREA PACIFIC 96328-5068

26 November 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR USCINCPAC/JS

FROM: Headquarters
United States Forces, Japan
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff
APO AP 96328-5068

SUBJECT: Headquarters US Forces, Japan Input to OSD and Joint Staff Draft on Relocation of
Futenma Air Station

1. During the past few days the subject draft provided us on 22 November 1996 has been coordinated with U.S. components and the bilateral Special Working Group on Futenma (SWGf). Our input (Attachment 1), combining comments from US components in theater as well as our Government of Japan (GOJ) counterparts on the SWGF, is provided for your information and inclusion in the final Special Action Committee Okinawa (SACO) agreement on relocation of Futenma Air Station. Attachment 2 includes original inputs from Headquarters, Marine Forces Japan; and Headquarters, Fifth Air Force. Attachment 3 provides our observations and identification of significant issues discussed during SWGF meeting on 26 November 1996. Subject OSD and Joint Staff draft document is provided at Attachment 4.
2. As we refine the wording in the final SACO agreement on relocation of Futenma Air Station, we believe it is important to coordinate a single U.S. input as much as possible. Accordingly, request your assistance in reviewing and forwarding this package to the Joint Staff and DASD/ISA-EAP in time to fully support meetings in Tokyo on 30 November 1996. Additionally, we will continue to update you with any subsequent information received from our counterparts within the GOJ.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Terrence P. Murray".

TERRENCE P. MURRAY
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff

USFJ Comments on *Final Report, Special Working Group on Futenma Air Station, Special Action Committee on Okinawa, Tokyo, Japan*
December 2, 1996

Comment Definitions: **Major** - Significant concerns that may result in nonoccurrence of the document if not satisfactorily resolved. May be used with a general statement of concern with a subject area, thrust of document, etc., followed by detailed comments on specific entries in the document which, taken together, constitute the concern.

Administrative - Comments which correct minor errors, typographical, or grammatical errors.

USFJ-1. Major. Para 2.a. Replace entire paragraph with: "Pursue construction of a sea-based facility (SBF) to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of MCAS Futenma. This facility will support the majority of MCAS Futenma's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) capable 1500 meter runway, and infrastructure in direct support of these operations. Relocate other functions at MCAS Futenma not suitable for the SBF to other shore-based U.S. facilities on Okinawa, including billeting for personnel assigned to work on the SBF. This SBF will be located near the shore, connected to Okinawa by a pier or causeway. The SBF will be designated to support basing of helicopter and MV-22 Osprey units." **Rationale:** Some of MCAS Futenma functions should go on the SBF, some should not. Given the uncertainties associated with the SBF, MARFORJ quality of life (QOL) concerns, and remote location of Camp Schwab, anything which is not absolutely required to be on the SBF should be off the SBF. New paragraph delineates USMC position on SBF operations.

USFJ-2. Major. Para 2.b, first sentence. Change to read: "Transfer KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base; transfer operational support aircraft (OSA), such as C-12 and CT-39, to Kadena Air Base." **Rationale:** Correctness, and conceptual completeness. C-12s and CT-39s are now, OSA is forever.

USFJ-3. Major. Para 2.d. Change to read: "As part of the joint Defense Guidelines review, study the emergency and contingency use of alternate facilities, which might be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available." **Rationale:** Recommend the use of language which has specific meaning for U.S. Military operational planners. Access to other facilities will be necessary to address our contingency concerns.

USFJ-4. Major. Para 3. Replace entire paragraph with: "The SCC agreed to return MCAS Futenma in five to seven years, following the construction of a

Attachment 1

suitable replacement facility. The following should be accomplished in the first year:

- a. Site selection.
- b. Environmental impact studies.
- c. Definition of operational requirements.
- d. Determination of current state of technology, and the capability to meet the specific requirements.
- e. Establishment of a bilateral working group within the existing security framework to oversee implementation of this agreement."

Rationale: Schedule is not possible and has limited credibility with coordinating USG and GOJ organizations. The quickest construction method for an SBF is estimated at more than five years by Japanese industrial consortiums. Given current unknowns, it is impossible to specify a schedule. We know what it will take to get started. Once these items are completed, perhaps within a year, a realistic schedule can be established.

USFJ-5. Major. Para 4.a. Change to read: "Futenma Air Station's ~~The~~ critical military functions and capabilities of MCAS Futenma will be maintained and will continue to operate throughout the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities." **Rationale:** MCAS Futenma remains an important U.S. and U.N. facility, and will remain so until closed, and should be fully supported and maintained until that time.

USFJ-6. Major. Para 4.b, second sentence. Change to read: "Operations Operational capability and contingency planning flexibility precluded by the shortened runway of the SBF must be accounted for, (such as including strategic airlift, and logistics, support and contingency planning)." **Rationale:** Clarity.

USFJ-7. Major. Para 4.d, first sentence. Change to read: "The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions, corrosion control treatment and prevention for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF features, safety, and platform security. Aircraft hanger facilities must be super-typhoon proof and in sufficient numbers so that evacuating aircraft to other airfields is not required. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period emergency or contingency operations." **Rationale:** Corrosion control will be a major problem for SBF and everything on the SBF. Additionally, aircraft hanger facilities are very important, given the frequency of typhoons around Okinawa and the lack of any land based beddown locations, and should be clearly delineated.

USFJ-8. Major. Para 4.e, second sentence. Change to read: "The Governments of Japan and the United States will establish a bilateral working group, supported by a team of technical experts, to oversee the implementation of this agreement plan. The bilateral group, in consultation with the Joint Committee, will create a plan for implementation. Following bilateral approval of

this plan, the Joint Committee, through the Facilities Sub-Committee (FSC), will oversee construction. The Joint Committee will also implement improvements at Iwakuni and Kadena that are required as part of the transfer of functions and facilities from MCAS Futenma and ~~report progress to the bilateral working group.~~ **Rationale:** Makes clear what is required to start plan implementation, and exactly who should do what for governments to move forward.

USFJ-9. Major. Para 4.f, first sentence. Change to read: ~~"In accordance with the U.S. Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,~~ Government of Japan will provide funding for acquisition, operations and maintenance, logistics, and additional supporting infrastructure for the SBF and other facilities." **Rationale:** Mutual Security Treaty specifies that U.S. Government must pay operations and maintenance costs of our facilities. Given the potential very high cost of the SBF, GOJ should be asked to fund this cost in this specific case.

USFJ-10. Administrative. Para 4.d, second sentence. Change to read: "Support will include a reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables." **Rationale:** Clarity on fresh water. Fresh water will be a very important commodity on the SBF, given the amounts that will be needed for corrosion control activities.

USFJ-11. Administrative. Para 4.d, third sentence. Make this sentence a separate paragraph. **Rationale:** The service life requirement is a separate requirement, and has nothing to do with design requirements.

USFJ-12. Administrative. Para 4.f, second sentence. Make this sentence a separate paragraph. **Rationale:** Very important point, not directly related to others in the paragraph.

11/27/96

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES JAPAN
Cite 35601
FPO AF 96606-5601

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25 Nov 96

From: Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Japan
To: Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan

Subj: RELOCATION OF MCAS FUTENMA

Ref: (a) USFJ J-3 Memo of 22 Nov 96
(b) COMMARFORJ Ltr T4000 4 dtd 19 Jul 96

1. Reference (a) provided an OSD and Joint Staff developed draft "Final Report" on the relocation of MCAS Futenma for review and comment. This command has several major concerns relative to the OSD draft as outlined below with our recommendations.

2. The format for the Futenma SACO issue differs from that afforded the other 2S issues with a significantly higher level of detail than should be necessary for the Final Report. Recommend a shortened version be prepared.

3. As the SACO Final Report will be widely read and reported, the USG must guard against expectations by GOC and OPG that everything currently located at MCAS Futenma will be relocated to a Sea Based Facility (SBF). U.S. Marine Corps Forces Japan envisions the SBF as an aviation operations, "work-only" platform with people and significant infrastructure ashore. In addition to aviation operations at Futenma, non-flying units (MAGC-18 and MWSS-172) comprise approximately 40 percent of the square footage requirements identified in reference (b). It would be more efficient and less costly to base these units ashore. The SBF cannot replicate the quality of life extant in a shore-based environment. If located near the shore with a bridge, all unaccompanied personnel should live in quarters located near the SBF.

4. I recommend that the appropriate sections be modified as follows:

a. Modify paragraph 2a to read: "Pursue construction of a sea-based facility (SBF) to absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations."

Subj: RELOCATION OF MCAS FUTENMA

including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) capable 1500 meter runway, and infrastructure in direct support of these operations. Relocate other functions at Futenma Air Station not suitable for the SBF to other shore-based U.S. facilities on Okinawa, including billeting for personnel assigned to work on the SBF. This SBF will be located near the shore, connected to the island by a pier or causeway. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter and MV-22 Osprey units."

b. Modify paragraph 4d to read: "The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions, corrosion control treatment and prevention, safety, and platform security. Aircraft hangaring facilities must be super-typhoon proof and in sufficient numbers so that evacuating aircraft to other airfields is not required. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations. The SBF will have an operational service life of at least 40 years."

5. The preparation of the technology performance specifications should involve extensive review and participation with GOJ by the U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command to properly develop a technical Request for Proposal. A rush to contract award could inevitably lead to increased risk in the design and possibly an SBF that is unsafe and operationally unsuitable. Milestones should include periodic reviews to ascertain whether the SBF option is/is not feasible and to identify fallback or branch options should the SBF be determined impractical or unable to meet specifications. The Secretary of the Navy's Acquisition Executive should review and propose a strategy leading to final contract award. I recommend the proposed timelines be deleted.

W. E. Rollings

W. E. ROLLINGS

11/27/96

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NOV 25 '96

6:00 No. 004 P. 01



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
PACIFIC AIR FORCES

25 Nov 96

MEMORANDUM FOR USFJ/J-3

FROM: 18 OG/CC
UNIT 5157 BOX 10
APO AP 96368-5157

SUBJECT: Draft Comments on Relocation of MCAS Futenma

REFERENCE: US Forces J-3 Memo, Relocation of MCAS Futenma, 22 Nov 96.

The attached 18 OG comments on draft final report Special Working Group on Futenma Air Station Special Action Committee on Okinawa are forwarded for your review.

John E. Vanden Dries, Jr.
JOHN E. VANDEN DRIES, JR., Colonel, USAF
Commander, 18th Operations Group

18th Wing Inputs to Final Report
Special Working Group on MCAS Futenma
SACO

1. Para 2.b: Transfer of some number of MCAS Futenma C-12 and CT-39 aircraft to Kadena is possible but will depend on the number of aircraft transferred. Proposed C-12 and CT-39 operations should be consolidated with existing Navy C-12 operations on the "Navy Ramp." Current facilities may be adequate to support the transfer, but the current proposal to move the Navy P-3s should be reevaluated. Recommend the construction of additional revetments similar to those already on Nancy row be funded and put in place for the P-3s. Also, a new hanger needs to be considered to support the additional C-12s and CT-39s on the "Navy Ramp." Also, planning should continue to straighten taxiway one which was proposed under the current SACO deliberations. If new facilities are deemed necessary for the beddown of these additional aircraft, other aspects of the plan will require reevaluation.
2. Para 2.c: This paragraph implies new facilities will be constructed on Kadena to support Futenma's repair and logistics operations. Any new facility construction on Kadena will require close coordination between Kadena and MARFOR. Additionally, the requirement to straighten Kadena's taxiway one becomes more important with the anticipated increase in airlift supporting the Marine's repair and logistics operations. Again, this proposal demands a reevaluation of the proposed move of the P-3s from their current parking on the "Navy Ramp" to the southeast corner of the Kadena airfield.
3. Para 2.d: With the loss of Futenma's runway, formal US government, GOI, and OPG agreements must be negotiated for the use of Naha International Airport as a divert and contingency use runway.
4. Para 2.e: Add "and operational" at the end of the sentence. US shouldn't move into a site until it is completed and fully operational IAW US standards.
5. Has USEJ or MAREJ addressed the operational concept for typhoon evacuation of USMC aircraft assigned to the SBF? Kadena has no capability to shelter these aircraft during a typhoon.
6. Para 3: The seven year completion schedule is extremely aggressive.
7. Para 3: The milestone schedule needs a decision point on the feasibility of a SBF. Engineering, technological, and design issues may restrict or prohibit the completion of a SBF in seven years.
8. Para 3: The timeline should include Iwakuni, and Kadena and the SBF since all are linked.

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9. Para 4.a: Insert "by USG/GOJ" after "maintained" in the second line. Clarity of each government's responsibilities must be maintained throughout this project.

10. Para 4.a: Add "on Okinawa" to the end of the last line. It must remain clear we are talking of facilities on Okinawa; we do not want to leave the door open for the GOI to offer US facilities on another part of Japan.

10. Para 4.b: This paragraph appears to conflict with paragraph 2a. The phrase "Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational, cost, or quality of life considerations, will be located onshore, on existing US facilities and areas" appears to allow virtually any functions the SBF cannot accommodate to reallocate somewhere on Okinawa. If the issue is contingency support for the SBF, recommend clearly stating the support requirement.

11. Para 4.f: Recommend adding a new sentence stating the SBF will be considered an exclusive use base under the Mutual Security Treaty similar to the way Yokota is today.

John E. Vanden Dries Jr.
JOHN E. VANDEN DRIES JR., Colonel, USAF
Commander, 18th Operations Group

Memo For Record

26 Nov 96

SUBJECT: Summary of Meeting: USFI, MOFA, JDA, and ISO, 26 Nov 96

1. Issues and comments raised by USFI:

- a. GOJ has decided on the sea-based facility (SBF) option, and believes that Camp Schwab is the best location. USFJ believes this proposed location should be specified in the final report; GOJ is against announcement of exact location.
- b. For the SBF option: USFJ has determined that only a close to shore (shallow water) [as opposed to a deep water, offshore] facility is operationally feasible. A bridge or causeway is necessary to handle the large volume of air station support required for normal operations. Only the shallow water option supports the construction of a causeway or bridge.
- c. The stationing of V-22 Osprey aircraft has not yet been announced by GOJ. USFJ desires a release of this information soonest.
- d. C-12/CT-39 aircraft will not be based on the SBF.
- e. 1st MAW HQ will stay at Camp Foster (will not be located on the SBF).
- f. Combat repair (intermediate level maintenance) will be located on the SBF.
- g. Improvements at Kadena AB are required for strategic airlift supported contingency operations and throughput: ramp space for C-5 aircraft and additional hanger space.
- h. Need bilateral agreement that final report will state the minimum operationally feasible SBF length is 1500 meters.
- i. The proposed timeline is not realistic. GOJ agreed, but said some mention of time must be stated for political reasons, and include the "return Futenma in 5-7 years" statement.
- j. Although the US is responsible for O&M of facilities per the SOFA, the substantial maintenance (e.g., anti-corrosion and other engineering support) costs that will be associated with the SBF require a separate Japanese funded O&M support agreement.

2. Issues and comments raised by GOJ:

- a. Desire to address return of MCAS Futenma as a separate document [from the other SACO items], and also have SCC guidance on this issue included in a separate document.
- b. Do not like the heading titles used on the report, especially "General" in para 2. Suggested instead to use [in no particular order]: summary, conclusions, requirements, result of study on technical feasibility, analysis of location (site), comparison of the three alternatives, and guiding principals.

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Page 1 of 2

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to other US military facilities and housing.

d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate measures to ensure survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions, corrosion control features, safety, and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations. The SBF will have an operational service life of at least 40 years.

e. The Governments of Japan and the United States will establish a bilateral working group to oversee implementation of this plan. The Joint Committee will implement improvements at Iwakuni and Kadena that are required as part of the transfer of functions from Futenna and report progress to the bilateral working group.

f. In accordance with the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Government of Japan will provide funding, acquisition, maintenance, logistics, and additional supporting infrastructure for the SBF and other facilities. Japan will retain ownership of this facility.

g. The Government of Japan will continue to keep the people of Okinawa informed of the progress of these plans, including concept, location, and schedule of implementation.

DRAFT

as of 22 Nov, 0300 hours

Note: USFJ/TS asked that GOJ provide a written draft of the report, incorporating their requested changes. USFJ/TS stated that USFJ would then forward their proposal along with our bilaterally coordinated comments.

c. Confirmed that all parties agree a 1500 meter SBF satisfies operational requirements.

d. Requested removal of the service life requirement of the SBF, stated as 40 years.

Note: USFJ/TS stated that if service life is mentioned, it must have wording along the lines of: "operational service life that fully supports the long term commitments of the Mutual Security Treaty.

e. May want to remove any reference to transfer of KC-130's and OSA aircraft, because these are already agreed or minor items (1 T-39, 2 C-12's).

f. JDA and MOFA are still discussing how to best handle the possibility that after further detailed analysis, the SBF option is found, for any reason (technically, cost-benefit, environmentally, politically, etc), not feasible, and another alternative must be explored.

g. Requested the final report include the following items:

- (1) Why the SBF option is the best alternative.
- (2) Why the eastern side of Okinawa is the best location for the SBF.
- (3) A synopsis of the construction methods.

Note: See note following para 2.b above.


ROBERT Y. JALESCHKEFF, MA, USN
Current Operations and Readiness

DRAFT

Final Report
Special Working Group on Futenma Air Station
Special Action Committee on Okinawa
Tokyo, Japan
December 2, 1996

1. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on December 2, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry, and () reaffirmed their commitment to the SACO Interim Report of 15 April 1996 and the Status Report on the Special Action Committee on Okinawa of 19 September 1996. Both Governments conducted a comprehensive and intensive joint study on three possible alternatives. Based on these studies, the SCC agreed to pursue the following plan to return Futenma Air Station and maintain the military functions of the base.

2. General

a. Pursue construction of a sea-based facility (SBF) to absorb most of the functions of Futenma Air Station. This facility will support the majority of Futenma Air Station's flying operations, including an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)-capable 1500 meter runway, direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructure such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, housing, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support. This SBF will be located near the shore, connected to the island by a pier or causeway. The SBF will be designed to support basing of helicopter and MV-22 (Osprey) units.

b. Transfer KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base; transfer C-12 and CT-39 aircraft to Kadena Air Base. Develop additional facilities and equipment at each of these bases to ensure associated infrastructure is available to support these aircraft and their missions.

c. Develop additional facilities at Kadena to support contingency repair and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station.

d. As part of the joint Defense Guidelines review, study the emergency use of alternate facilities which might be needed in the event of a crisis. This is necessary because the transfer of functions from Futenma to the SBF will reduce operational flexibility currently available.

e. Return Futenma Air Station after adequate replacement facilities are completed.

3. Proposed Milestones and Timelines. The SCC agreed to implement this plan to return Futenma Air Station and maintain the critical military functions with the following timeline:

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as of 22 Nov, 0500 hours

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Dec 96: Select and announce proposed location of the new facility

Year 1:

- Establish a bilateral working group to oversee implementation of this plan
- Execute concept development for operational requirements definition for this new facility
- Establish technology performance specifications
- Upon completion of the above activities, both Governments would seek early industry involvement to foster commercial innovation
- Site survey and environmental assessment
- Concept Selection

Year 2: Complete facility design for construction

Year 3-4: Construct and complete installation of the new facility

Year 5: Complete installation of required components of the new facility

Year 6:

- Complete validation tests and suitability demonstrations
- Transfer operations from Futenma to the new facility

Year 7: Return Futenma Air Station

4. Guiding Principles

a. Futenma Air Station's critical military functions and capabilities will be maintained through the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.

b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operations precluded by the shorter runway of the SBF must be accounted for (such as strategic airlift, logistics, and contingency planning). Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational, cost, or quality of life considerations, will be located on shore, on existing US facilities and areas.

c. The SBF will be located near shore, connected by a pier or causeway. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, air-space and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personnel access

DRAFT

as of 22 Nov. 0300 hours

No.

Date Nov 26, 96

1513

- Colonel King Interim Report -

Subject: Bilateral meeting with MOFA, JSO, USFJ
of 26 Nov 96

Purpose: Review ^{and amend} draft SACO Final Report.

Agenda: This is last working-level meeting before OSO/Kirk Campbell arrives Saturday to prepare final draft for 2 Dec & SecDEF.

• Much discussion, questions, gnashing of teeth, & consternation on question of SBF, but with bullets and infrastructure ashore they listened very intently and agreed with operational & QOL rationale, but must convince their bosses, and OPG. USFJ is onboard and will support our view to JCS/OSD. Difficulty with OPG may be overcome by citing operational requirements. A related point -- I had to take position that SBF be connected via bridge/cableway as a QOL operational requirement. They are seeking ways to overcome OPG expectation that "weighting" at Futurus will be on semi-submersible SBF away from shore.

(1)

No.

Date

- Capabilities and functions of Futenna will be maintained until triangle understood that Ops and maint is USMC responsibility, and we would not get anymore JFIP. But, we still have Japanese construction warranties on existing JFIP, Japanese workers, etc -
- Delete direct references to C-12/CT-39, substituting ODA.
- "Emergency" use of NAHA airport. In Japanese "emergency" does not have same meaning as English - it means anything out of the ordinary.
- Also opposed to specific development timeline. Stuck with "5 to 7 years", but willing to obscure when it starts. Favored abstract development plan.
- Accepted all points on super-typhoon proofing and corrosion prevention.
- SBF is only option. Must try very hard to make it work. They thought "Pursue SBF," (versus "construct SBF") has enough ambiguity that if SBF was not feasible technically or cost-wise, alternatives would be pursued. ** Insistent that Final Report show progress by agreeing to pursue a specific option.

(2)

No. _____
Date _____

- Emphasis on early determination in process of site selection.

- Existing SOFA law states that U.S. is responsible for ops + Maint. It would take a special agreement to have GOS maintain / operate SBF.

- Nothing, for now, will be Eastern side of Ordinance.

- JDA wants Final Report to address:
 - ① Why SBF is good
 - ② Site selection
 - ③ Construction methods

- It would be very difficult (impossible) to go back to other land options now.

- Establishment of working group on Future.

- 1500m runway includes overruns (4,900 FT).

- will meet question answered on mv-22 so they can explain to public (when, how many, noise signature, etc)

③

03/27/97

No.

Date

• All agreed that one-year process to achieve contract award is ridiculous (likely obfuscation of language).

• Wanted a simpler report, but also suggested a multi-sectioned format addressing ① Summary ② Conclusions ③ Requirements ④ Results of technical feasibility ⑤ Statement of alternatives ⑥ Guiding principles. (don't think they will be able to rewrite it in time.)

* * We need to be sure that CMC is onboard S&F + infrastructure ashore proposal before Saturday. * *
This concept is on the plate, being pushed hard by me at this meeting and believe these guys will work to convince their bosses. US&F will send to JCS tonight.

B Gen Murray + Col Wright will be with Kirk Campbell this weekend.

Tom King

New Sano ph. OSN 229-8111 Ext 406

(4)

Colonel King Interim Report

MCG 625-3879

1MAW 645-3750

Nov 26, 96

1513

Subject: Bilateral meeting with MOFA, JSD, USFJ of 26 Nov 96

Purpose: Review and amend draft SACO Final Report

Agenda: this is last working-level meeting before OSD/ Kart Campbell arrives Saturday to prepare final draft for 2 Dec & SecDef.

Much discussion, questions, gnashing of teeth, and consternation on questions of SBF, but with billeting and infrastructures ashore. They listened very interestingly and agreed with operational and QOL rationales, but must convince their losses, and OPG, USFJ is onboard and will support our view to JCS/OSD. Difficulty with OPG may be overcome by citing operational requirements.

A related point – I had to take position that SBF be corrected via bridge causeway as a QOL/ operational requirement. They are seeking ways to overcome OPG expectation that “everything” at Futenma will be or semi-submersible SBF away from shore.

Capabilities and functions of Futenma will be mu until transfer (understand that op and maint is USMC responsibility, and we would not get anyraoud JFIP. But, we still have Japanese construction warranties on existing JFIP, Japanese workers, etc.

Delete direct references to C-12/ CT-39, substituting OSA.

“Emergency” use of Naha airport. In Japanese “emergency” does not have same meaning as English. It means anything out of the ordinary.

Also opposed to specific development timeline. Stuck with “5 to 7 years”, but willing to obscure when it straits favored abstract development plan.

Accepted our points on super-typhoon proofing and corrosion prevention.

SBF is only option. Must try very hard to make it work. They though “pursue

SBF," (versus "construct SBF") has enough ambiguity that if SBF was not feasible technically or cost-wise, alternatives would be pursued. That Final Report shall progress by agreeing to pursue a specific option.

Emphasis on early determination in process of site selection.

Existing SOFA law states that U. S. is responsible for OPS + Mant. It would take a special agreement to have GOJ maintain / operate SBF.

Siting, for now, will be Eastern side of Okinawa.

JDA wants Final Report to address

- 1) Why SBF is good.
- 2) Site selection
- 3) Construction methods

It would be very difficult (impossible) to go back to other land options now.

Establishment of working group on Futenma.

1500m (4,900 ft.) runway includes overruns.

Will meet question answered on MV-22 so they can explain to public (when, how many, noise signature, etc.)

All agreed that one-year process to achieve contract award is ridiculous (likely obfuscation of language).

Wanted a simple report, but also suggested a multi-sectional format addressing 1) summary 2) conclusions 3) requirements 4) result of technical feasibility 5) statement of alternation 6) guiding principles (don't think that they will be able to rewrite it in time.

** We need to be sure that CMC is onboard SBF + infrastructures ashore proposal before Saturday.**

This concept is on the plate, being pushed hard by me at this meeting and believe these guys will wolle to convince their bosses. USFJ will send to JCS tonight.

BGen Murray + COL Wright will be Kart Campbell this weekend.

Tom King

New Sanno, ph. DSN 229-8111 ext 406



**HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES, JAPAN
APO AREA PACIFIC 96328-5068**

FACSIMILE

DATE: 27-Nov-96

NO. OF PAGES: 5
(Including this cover sheet)

FROM: LT R.Y. Jelescheff, USN

E-Mail: jeleschr@emh.yokota.af.mil
Voice: DSN: 225-2013
225-2456 (Command Center - 24 HRS)
Fax: DSN: 225-8378 (Unclassified)
225-2470 (Secure)
Comm: (0425) 52-2511
Ext (Operator Assist): Last five digits of DSN - Voice or FAX
(If calling from U.S.: Dial 011-81-(3117)-5 Plus Ext)

TO:	Command	Fax	Voice	POC
	CINCPAC/J5	477-0327	477-6639	LtCol Kearney, USMC
	JCS/J5	225-8137	225-8134	Col Bedke, USAF
	OSD	225-8222	225-7886	LTC Sakoda, USA
	AMEMBASSY	224-5322	224-5337	Mr Uyehara

SUBJ: GOJ INPUT TO RELOCATION OF MCAS FUTENMA

RMKS: Gentlemen,

The following input was provided by Mr Takamizawa of JDA to USFJ/J3.

The first part (pages ~~1 and 2~~ ³) is his input to the SACO Final Report dealing with the relocation of MCAS Futenma. He envisions page 4 as a stand-alone supporting document.

The third document (page 5) is a Q&A for the stationing of MV-22 aircraft on Okinawa.

If you have any questions, please call me.

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Return of Futenma Air Station

1. The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report to include the return of Futenma Air Station. The SCC, agreed in the Status Report on the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) of 19 September 1996, to conduct a comprehensive and intensive joint study on the following three possible alternatives; (a) Incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base, (b) Construct a heliport at Camp Schwab, (c) Develop and construct a Sea Based Facility (SBF) [, in order to determine the most appropriate solution which will minimize the burden on the people in Okinawa and maintain the military functions of the Futenma Air Station].

Both Governments conducted a comprehensive and intensive joint study mainly through Special Working Group on Futenma Air Station (SWGFA), and today the SACO presented the following report to the SCC and the SCC approved the report.

2. The SCC instructed the SSC to establish a special task force on Futenma Air Station to make specific implementation plans for the return of Futenma Air Station in accordance with this report. The SCC agreed that the task force should select an appropriate area (concrete candidate site) for construction as soon as possible and make within one year, a detailed plan [to include operational requirements definition, technology performance specifications and method of construction] while making site survey and environmental assessment as appropriate.

[3. The SCC also reaffirmed the following guiding principles in developing the study.

a. The military functions and capabilities of Futenma Air Station will be maintained and will continue to operate through out the transfer of personnel and equipment and the relocation of facilities.

b. To the greatest extent possible, Futenma's operations and activities will be transferred to the SBF. Operations precluded by the shorter runway of the SBF must be accounted for (such as strategic airlift, logistics, and contingency planning). Those facilities unable to be located on the SBF, due to operational, cost, or quality of life considerations, will be located on shore, on existing US facilities and areas.

c. Selection of the location will take into account operational requirements, air-space and sea-lane deconfliction, fishing, environmental compatibility, economic effects, noise abatement, survivability, security, and convenient, acceptable personal access to other US military facilities and housing.

d. The design of the SBF will incorporate adequate counter measures to ensure survivability against severe weather and ocean conditions, corrosion control features for the SBF and all equipment located on the SBF, safety and platform security. Support will include reliable and secure fuel supply, electrical power, fresh water, and other utilities and consumables. Additionally, the facility will be fully self-supporting for short-period contingency/emergency operations.]

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Report on the return of Futenma Air Station

1. Return of Futenma Air Station

Return Futenma Air Station (approx. 482ha) with the intention to finish the process within the next five to seven years, after the following conditions are met in order to maintain the airfield's critical military functions and capabilities.

(1) Construction of an alternate heliport

Pursue an option of sea-based facility considering water areas off the east side of the main-island of Okinawa as candidate sites. Details of this option [such as specific operational requirements, construction site, size and features of the facility, construction methods and schedule and so forth] will be worked out within one year on the basis of result of the studies of the task force including those on the impact of an alternate heliport on safety, noise, environment etc.

(2) Development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base

Develop additional facilities at Kadena Air Base to support contingency repair and logistics operations which are currently available at Futenma Air Station. Details of this measure will be worked out by the Joint Committee within one year.

(3) Transfer of KC-130 aircraft to Iwakuni Air Base

Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided there as agreed in the SACO Final Report. Details of this measure will be worked out by the Joint Committee and implemented before release of Futenma Air Station.

(4) Conduct of bilateral study on emergency use of facilities in the event of a crisis

Promote joint study on the emergency use of alternate facilities which might be needed in the event of a crisis through the ongoing review of the Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation with the intention to report findings of the study by Autumn of 1997.

2. Summary of studies on the construction of an alternate heliport

(1) Operational requirements as prerequisites for technical study

Operational requirements agreed as prerequisites for studying technical feasibility of SBF are as follows:

a. SBF will be primarily 1,500 meter long structure to enable short-field capable fixed-wing aircraft operate take offs/landings, although permanent deployment of fixed-wing aircraft is not assumed.

b. The SBF will absorb most of the helicopter operational functions of Futenma Air Station and support basing helicopters currently being deployed at Futenma Air Station, a part of which is planned to be replaced by MV-22 (Osprey) tilt-rotor aircraft units around the year of 2003. [The SBF will accommodate this replacement without major change of its specifications.]

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c. SBF will have an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)-capable runway, direct air operations support, and indirect support infrastructures such as headquarters, maintenance, logistics, housing, quality-of-life functions, and base operating support.

d. Operations and their related facilities, which are unable to be relocated to SBF due to operational, cost, or quality-of-life considerations, must be accounted for and will be located on existing US facilities and areas on shore.

(2) Feasibility of the SBF

Based on the above operational requirements, following three options and other options have been studied:

- a. The platform which is supported by a number of steel columns fixed on the sea bed (Pile-supported pier type - QIP),
- b. The platform, which consists of steel pontoon type-units, and is installed in a calm sea protected by breakwaters (Pontoon type),
- c. The platform at a wave free height which is supported by buoyancy of the lower structure submerged under the sea (Semi-submersible type)

The studies conducted thus far suggested that the three options mentioned above have technical feasibility and that their removability conditions will be met. Further detailed studies are required, however, in terms of the geographical conditions during the course of selecting a specific location for installation.

(3) Location for installation of the SBF

Regarding a location for installation of the SBF, the study centering upon the US water areas in Okinawa has been conducted based on the SACO Interim Report stating construction of a heliport on the other US facilities and areas in Okinawa. Water areas off the east side of the main island of Okinawa is considered to be an appropriate area as a location for installation of the SBF because of larger size of water areas and appropriate deconfliction with air-traffic control of Naha Airport and Kadena Air Base. Further and detailed study on such factors as impacts on sea traffic, routes of freighters, ferryboats and others and on environment, and geological features of the bottom of the sea will be required for specific siting.

(4) Comparison among three alternatives

Among Kadena Air Base Collocation option, Camp Schwab Relocation option and the SBF option, subject to further and detailed studies to include costs and environmental impacts, the SBF at water areas off the east side of the main island of Okinawa is considered, at this juncture, to be appropriate for the following reasons:

The SBF will have less significant impacts in terms of safety and noise than the other two options due to the installation on the sea. While the other two options are supposed to impact on operations of the existing facilities through construction work, the SBF will give little impact on operations of the existing facilities. Among other things, the SBF can be removed, different from the other two options.

Q&As for DFAB's explanation to the OPG and the local committees
(MV-22 related issues)

- Q1: The USMC has reportedly a plan to deploy MV-22s. What kind of aircraft MV-22 is? Is it fixed-wing aircraft?
- Q2: What is the current status of MV-22? Has the DoD decided on its production? Has the Congress approved its production? To what extent is it certain for the USMC to deploy MV-22s? When the production and deployment plan of MV-22 will be fixed officially?
- Q3: Which existing Marine aircraft will be replaced by MV-22s? Why is it necessary to replace them by MV-22s? Will replaced aircraft (CH-46 and CH-53D) retire from active duty?
- Q4: What are performance and specifications of MV-22, CH-46 and CH-53D/E?
- Q5: What is the noise level of MV-22? Is it as loud as existing helicopters?
- Q6: Mechanical structures of MV-22 appear more complex than those of existing helicopters. Accidents were reported during its flight tests and the program was once almost cancelled. Is MV-22 as safe as the existing helicopters? What attrition rates does the USMC assume respectively for the existing helicopters and for MV-22 when it develops their acquisition planning?
- Q7: What is the total production/deployment plan of the USMC for MV-22? When will the USMC organize an initial educational squadron to train MV-22 pilots? To what extent does the USMC give priority to its deployment to MARFOR in Okinawa? Does the low-rate production plan of MV-22 contain acquisition of those for MARFOR in Okinawa? How many?
- Q8: What is the USMC's plan to deploy MV-22s to Okinawa? What is the time-line? How many MV-22s will be deployed in each year? Which MARFOR units in Okinawa will receive MV-22s? Are they UDP?
- Q9: Where the MARFOR will deploy MV-22s in Okinawa?
- Q10: Will deployment of MV-22s change organization of the HMs (e.g. name, structure, number of personnel) in Okinawa?
- Q11: What will become of traffic pattern for MV-22 (e.g. altitude, courses, etc.), if compared with that of existing helicopters?
- Q12: Where, when and how many times will MV-22 conduct its flight operation normally?
- Q13: Is an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)-capable 1,500 meter runway/SBF decided with a future and uncertain MV-22 deployment plan in mind? What are the rationale for IFR-capable 1,500 meter runway/SBF? Is this abided by the SACO interim report which described an alternate facility as "a heliport?"

N.B. Preferable answer for the JDA would be along the following lines:

The SBF is a base to operate approximately 60 helicopters. Considerable acreage is required to accommodate the relevant facilities. In addition to that, although there is no plan to deploy fixed-wing aircraft permanently, the SBF, as a military facility, needs to support operations of short-field capable fixed-wing aircraft (C-12s). These factors require the size described above. This is the precondition of the SBF, but, within such a condition, it is considered to be able to accommodate possible replacement of existing helicopters by MV-22s in future, which is not fixed-wing aircraft. The SBF is assumed as a relocation site of the helicopters currently deployed in NCAS Futema. From this perspective, the SBF is a heliport.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

The SACO Final Report December 2, 1996

by

**Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikeda
Minister of State for Defense Kyuma**

**Secretary of Defense Perry
Ambassador Mondale**

The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) was established in November 1995 by the Governments of Japan and the United States. The two Governments launched the SACO process to reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-US alliance.

The mandate and guidelines for the SACO process were set forth by the Governments of Japan and the United States at the outset of the joint endeavor. Both sides decided that the SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative committee (SCC) on ways to realign, consolidate and reduce US facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures of US forces in Okinawa consistent with their respective obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other related agreements. The work of the SACO was scheduled to conclude after one year.

The SCC which was held on April 15, 1996, approved the SACO Interim Report which included several significant measures, and instructed the SACO to complete and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

The SACO, together with the Joint Committee, has conducted a series of intensive and detailed discussions and developed concrete plans and measures to implement the recommendations set forth in the Interim Report.

Today, at the SCC, Minister Ikeda, Minister Kyuma, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale approved this SACO Final Report. The plans and measures included in this Final Report, when implemented, will reduce the impact of the activities of US forces on communities in Okinawa. At the same time, these measures will fully maintain the capabilities and readiness of US forces in Japan while addressing security and force protection requirements. Approximately 21 percent of the total acreage of the US facilities and areas in Okinawa excluding joint use facilities and areas (approx. 5,002ha/12,361 acres) will be returned.

Upon approving the Final Report, the members of the SCC welcomed the successful conclusion of the year-long SACO process and underscored their strong resolve to continue joint efforts to ensure steady and prompt implementation of the plans and measures of the SACO Final Report. With this understanding, the SCC designated the Joint Committee as the primary forum for bilateral coordination in the implementation phase, where specific conditions for the completion of each item will be addressed. Coordination with local communities will take place as necessary.

The SCC also reaffirmed the commitment of the two governments to make every endeavor to deal with various issues related to the presence and status of US forces, and to enhance mutual understanding between US forces and local Japanese communities. In this respect, the SCC agreed that efforts to these ends should continue, primarily through coordination at the Joint Committee.

The members of the SCC agreed that the SCC itself and the Security Sub-Committee (SSC) would monitor such coordination at the Joint Committee as described above and provide guidance as appropriate. The SCC also instructed the

SSC to seriously address the Okinawa-related issues as one of the most important subjects and regularly report back to the SCC on this subject.

In accordance with the April 1996 Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security, the SCC emphasized the importance of close coordination on the international situation, defense policies and military postures, bilateral policy coordination and efforts towards a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. The SCC instructed the SSC to pursue these goals and to address the Okinawa-related issues at the same time.

Return Land:

- Futenma Air Station - See attached.

- Northern Training Area

Return major portion of the Northern Training Area (approx. 3,987ha/9,852 acres) and release US joint use of certain reservoirs (approx. 159ha/393 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2003 under the following conditions:

Provide land area (approx. 38ha/93 acres) and water area (approx. 121 ha/298 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 in order to ensure access from the remaining Northern Training Area to the ocean.

Relocate helicopter landing zones from the areas to be returned to the remaining Northern Training Area.

-Aha Training Area

Release US joint use of Aha Training Area (approx. 480ha/1,185 acres) and release US joint use of the water area (approx. 7,895ha/19,509 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after land and water areas from the Northern Training Area to the ocean are provided.

-Gimbaru Training Area

Return Gimbaru Training Area (approx. 60ha/149 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998 after the helicopter landing zone is relocated to Kin Blue Beach Training Area, and the other facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

-Sobe Communication Site

Return Sobe Communication Site (approx. 53ha/132 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Camp Hansen.

-Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield

Return Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (approx. 191ha/471 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the parachute drop training is relocated to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield and Sobe Communication Site is relocated.

-Camp Kuwae

Return most of Camp Kuwae (approx. 99ha/245 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 after the Naval Hospital is relocated to Camp Zukeran and remaining facilities there are relocated to Camp Zukeran or other US facilities and areas in Okinawa.

-Senaha Communication Station

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html>

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Return Senaha Communication Station (approx. 61ha/151 acres) with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2001 after the antenna facilities and associated support facilities are relocated to Torii Communication Station. However, the microwave tower portion (approx. 0.1ha/0.3 acres) will be retained.

-Makiminato Service Area

Return land adjacent to Route 58 (approx. 3ha/8 acres) in order to widen the Route, after the facilities which will be affected by the return are relocated within the remaining Makiminato Service Area.

-Naha Port

Jointly continue best efforts to accelerate the return of Naha Port (approx. 57ha/140 acres) in connection to its relocation to the Urasoe Pier area (approx. 35ha/87 acres).

-Housing consolidation (Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran)

Consolidate US housing areas in Camp Kuwae and Camp Zukeran and return portions of land in housing areas there with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 2008 (approx. 83ha/206 acres at Camp Zukeran; in addition, approx. 35ha/85 acres at Camp Kuwae will be returned through housing consolidation. That land amount is included in the above entry on Camp Kuwae).

Adjust Training and Operational Procedures:

-Artillery live-fire training over Highway 104

Terminate artillery live-fire training over Highway 104, with the exception of artillery firing required in the event of a conflict after the training is relocated to maneuver areas on the mainland of Japan within Japanese Fiscal Year 1997.

-Parachute drop training

Relocate parachute drop training to Ie Jima Auxiliary Airfield.

-Conditioning hikes on public roads

Conditioning hikes on public roads have been terminated.

Implement Noise Reduction Initiatives:

- Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station

Agreements on aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station announced by the Joint Committee in March 1996 have been implemented.

-Transfer of KC-130 Hercules aircraft and AV-8 Harrier aircraft

Transfer 12 KC-130 aircraft currently based at Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Base after adequate facilities are provided. Transfer of 14 AV-8 aircraft from Iwakuni Air Base to the United States has been completed.

-Relocation of Navy aircraft and MC-130 operations at Kadena Air Base

Relocate Navy aircraft operations and supporting facilities at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the other side of the major runways. The implementation schedules for these measures will be decided along with the implementation schedules for the development of additional facilities at Kadena Air Base necessary for the return of Futenma Air Station.

Move the MC-130s at Kadena Air Base from the Navy ramp to the northwest corner of the major runways by the end of December 1996.

Use reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base

Build new noise reduction baffles at the north side of Kadena Air Base with the intention to finish the process by the end of March 1998.

-Limitation of night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station

Limit night flight training operations at Futenma Air Station to the maximum extent possible, consistent with the operational readiness of US forces.

Improve Status of Forces Agreement Procedures:

-Accident reports

Implement new Joint Committee agreement on procedures to provide investigation reports on US military aircraft accidents announced on December 2, 1996.

In addition, as part of the US forces' good neighbor policy, every effort will be made to insure timely notification of appropriate local officials, as well as the Government of Japan, of all major accidents involving US forces' assets or facilities.

-Public exposure of Joint Committee agreements

Seek greater public exposure of Joint Committee agreements.

-Visits to US facilities and areas

Implement the new procedures for authorizing visits to US facilities and areas announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

-Markings on US forces official vehicles

Implement the agreement on measures concerning markings on US forces official vehicles. Numbered plates will be attached to all non-tactical US forces vehicles by January 1997, and to all other US forces vehicles by October 1997.

-Supplemental automobile insurance

Education programs for automobile insurance have been expanded. Additionally, on its own initiative, the US has further elected to have all personnel under the SOFA obtain supplemental auto insurance beginning in January 1997.

-Payment for claims

Make joint efforts to improve payment procedures concerning claims under paragraph 6, Article XVIII of the SOFA in the following manner:

Requests for advance payments will be expeditiously processed and evaluated by both Governments utilizing their respective procedures. Whenever warranted under US laws and regulatory guidance, advance payment will be accomplished as rapidly as possible.

A new system will be introduced by the end of March 1998, by which Japanese authorities will make available to

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html>

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claimants no-interest loans, as appropriate, in advance of the final adjudication of claims by US authorities.

In the past there have been only a very few cases where payment by the US Government did not satisfy the full amount owed by a final court judgment. Should such a case occur in the future, the Government of Japan will endeavor to make payment to the claimant, as appropriate, in order to address the difference in amount.

-Quarantine procedures

Implement the updated agreement on quarantine procedures announced by the Joint Committee on December 2, 1996.

-Removal of unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen

Continue to use USMC procedures for removing unexploded ordnance in Camp Hansen, which are equivalent to those applied to ranges of the US forces in the United States.

-Continue efforts to improve the SOFA procedures in the Joint Committee

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Dear Mr. [Name],

I am writing to you regarding the [Topic]...

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]

[Address]

[Address]

[Text]

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