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An Analysis of the Coverage of Okinawa by Foreign Media (1995-1996)

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An Analysis of the Coverage of Okinawa by Foreign Media (1995–1996)

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Introduction

This paper attempts to analyze the foreign media's perception of the Okinawa issues between 1995 and 1996. We closely examined reports on the issues such as: the rape case of a 12-year-old girl by three U.S. servicemen, the Okinawan people's demand for the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Governor Ota's refusal to sign legal documents that would force a few recalcitrant local landlords to renew their leases on U.S. installations, the referendum on the base reduction, which was Japan's first prefecture-

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wide plebiscite, held in September 1996, and matters related to the United States Forces Japan (U.S.F.J.)

Following the rape incident in September 1995, there was extensive coverage on Okinawa-related issues by the foreign media between 1995 and 1996. The intense coverage on Okinawa issues was unprecedented except for the coverage of the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. The fact that as many as 103 media in eight countries reported on the Okinawa issues between 1995 and 1996 proves how shocking the rape case was to many people in the world. We can also see the unusual nature of the U.S. military presence on Okinawa when viewed in a global context.

In this paper, we focused on the analysis of print media and excluded broadcast media because of the limitation of the number of pages.

We divided the authorship of chapters. Hiroshi Hosaka composed chapter I and V, and Kiyomi Maedomari wrote chapter II, III, IV, and VI.

II. Data Collection

This article reports on the results obtained by processing a collection of articles, written in English and concerning Okinawa-related matters, that appeared in various news media between September 1995 and September 1996. English-language papers originating in Japan were excluded from consideration because we were interested in analyzing the foreign journalists' perceptions of Okinawa and Okinawa-related issues; moreover, we wished to avoid incidental inclusion of specifically Japanese-influenced interpretation that might be characteristic of Japanese newspapers as that might affect the

results of this study.

The corpus of news samples used for this research comprise 1,667 articles printed or broadcast by 103 media, including newswire services, newspapers, and the Internet, originating from a total of eight countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, Canada, Ireland, and Singapore. Most of the samples were downloaded from the database Lexis/Nexis between November 1995 and September 1996. Additional samples were collected through the database of the Okinawan Government. Because data collection was initiated in November 1995 with Lexis/Nexis, articles that may have appeared in September and October 1995 were possibly not collected. It is to be understood, therefore, that the research and analysis reported here were circumscribed by the scope of the data collected as indicated.

After collection, samples were categorized according to media, subject matter, type of article, and number of words, and assembled in a database. The principal analysis of this paper is based on articles taken from two newswire services, three daily newspapers, four magazines. This section examines aspects of their reporting. A content analysis will be performed in the subsequent sections of this paper.


Based on the database of samples, the following tables and figures were created, and are analyzed as explained below.

A. Analyses of Figures and tables

The number of articles peaked in September 1996 at 417. A secondary peak occurred in March 1996 with 259 articles, followed by a sustained high incidence in April 1996, which provided 178 articles.

The September 1996 peak is associated with news related to a non-

Figure 1: Number of Articles Tabulated by Month of Appearance



binding referendum concerning reduction of the number of U.S. troops in Okinawa. The referendum was the first ever to be held among the municipalities in Japan. Of 909,832 eligible voters, 541,626 participated: 482,538 (89 percent) called for the reduction and realignment of the U.S. military presence; 59,088 (11 percent) accepted the status quo. The voter turnout was 59.53 percent, which was apparently lower than many people had expected. According to the *Okinawa Gendaishi*, because strong support for the referendum came not only from within Okinawa but also from mainland Japan, there was a heated atmosphere in Okinawa before the referendum was held (Arasaki, 228). The amount of articles in September 1996 seems to reflect the intensity of the situation in Okinawa at that time.

The secondary peak was in March when the Naha District Court delivered its verdicts and sentencing for the three U.S. servicemen who raped a 12-year-old girl in September 1995. The sentences were as follows: seven years each for Navy Seaman Marcus Gill, 23, and Marine Private Rodrico Harp, 21, and six and a half years for Marine Private Kendrick Ledet, 20.

Also in March, the Naha Branch of the Fukuoka High Court ordered Governor Ota of Okinawa to "sign the documents necessary for the compulsory acquisition of lands for use by the U.S. military" (Okinawa Prefectural Government 1). In other words, the court ordered the governor to provide his signature on the renewal of land leases for the U.S. bases, thus compelling him to serve as proxy for landlords who were unwilling to provide signatures. However, despite the court ruling, the governor did not follow the court's order. As a consequence, on March 29, Prime Minister Hashimoto himself signed the lease. The trial was described as an

“unprecedented showdown between the central government and Gov. Masahide Ota” (AP) and it was closely followed by the media.

The high number of news articles in April reflect the occurrence of a third peak when the return of Futenma Air Station was announced prior to President Clinton's visit to Japan. Prime Minister Hashimoto announced on April 12 that the governments of the two countries had reached an agreement on the total return of Futenma Air Station. The return of Futenma Air Station, which is located in the middle of Ginowan-city with fifteen schools in close proximity, appeared to present a significant advancement toward the reduction and realignment of the U.S. military.

Also contributing to the April 1996 peak was the sustained battle concerning land leases, in particular the opposition of an anti-war landowner who persisted in his stance against the central government. The pacifist landowner Shoichi Chibana, whose lease expired on April 1, continued to refuse to sign the lease. Although the central government had submitted to the Land Expropriation Committee a request for “emergency use” of the land, the committee rejected the request. As a result, the central government was “illegally occupying” Chibana's land after the lease expiration (Arasaki 219).

These four events mentioned above were the main factors in producing the large number of articles. These three peaks together provide a total of 854 news articles, which is 51 percent of the total number of articles during the twelve-month period. One may therefore conclude that Okinawa-related matters, in particular the ones indicated above, are significant not only within a local framework or perspective but also within a global frame, as reflected in the foreign media. That is, the problems confronting Okinawa were

also matters of concern for the U.S., southeastern Asian countries, and others.

See Table 1 : Number of Articles Tabulated by Type of Media

From the Table 1, one can see that the overwhelming majority of articles were provided by the newswire services, followed by daily newspapers and then television networks (in total 97.8%). Of the total of 1,667 articles, the newswire services issued 1,046 (62.9 percent), the daily newspapers issued 385 articles (23.2 percent), and television contributed 195 articles (11.7) percent.

From the above data, one can recognize the type of media that accounted for a high percentage of Okinawa-related articles were those provided an immediate supply of news to the public. The timeliness and immediacy of news stories counts highly for those kinds of media compared to other media such as weekly or monthly magazines, the majority of whose articles were analysis-oriented. Thus, the data suggest that news on Okinawa-related matters were printed or broadcast almost immediately after each event or incident occurred.

Moreover, the fact that newswire services devoted such a large number of articles to Okinawa-related matters suggests that the reports might well have been translated in many languages and thereby conveyed to many other countries. Based on this assumption, more and more people in increasingly wider area outside Japan were exposed to reports of newswire services about the Okinawa-related matters. Therefore, it can be surmised that a number of readers and viewers throughout the world who were recipients of newswire accounts of Okinawa related-matters quite probably accepted those accounts as "matters of facts" and considered their

Table 1: Number of Articles Tabulated by Type of Media

| Media | Month/Year | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Total | % |
|--------------------|------------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|-------|---|
| | 9/95 | 10/95 | 11/95 | 12/95 | 1/96 | 2/96 | 3/96 | 4/96 | 5/96 | 6/96 | 7/96 | 8/96 | 9/96 | | | |
| Newspaper (daily) | 9 | 13 | 25 | 29 | 33 | 8 | 62 | 42 | 17 | 18 | 14 | 28 | 87 | 385 | 23.2 | |
| Newspaper (weekly) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6E-04 | |
| Magazine (weekly) | 0 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 22 | 1 | |
| Magazine (monthly) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0.1 | |
| TV | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 7 | 4 | 17 | 33 | 13 | 16 | 13 | 23 | 56 | 195 | 11.7 | |
| Radio | 0 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11 | 0.7 | |
| Newswire services | 2 | 0 | 36 | 39 | 73 | 48 | 179 | 101 | 45 | 71 | 84 | 104 | 264 | 1,046 | 62.9 | |
| Internet | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0.3 | |
| Total | 12 | 22 | 67 | 85 | 114 | 60 | 259 | 178 | 75 | 106 | 116 | 156 | 417 | 1667 | 100 | |

(Lexis/Nexis)

*Newswire services include: AP, UPI, Reuters, AFP, Deutsche Press-Agentur, GANNET, TASS, Xinhua, Canada Newswire, Federal News Service, U.S. Newswire, Universal News Services, COMLINE Daily News Telegraph.

*Newspapers: 77 newspapers in the U.S., the U.K., Ireland, Canada, and Singapore.

*Magazines: *Time*, *Newsweek*, *U.S. News and World Report*, *The Economist*, *Forbes*, and *Jane's Defence Weekly*

*TV: BBC (public, U.K.) and CNN (commercial, U.S.A.)

*Radio National Public Radio (public, U.S.A.)

Table 2: Number of Articles Tabulated by Type

| Types of Articles | month/year | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Total | % |
|-------------------|------------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|---|
| | 9/95 | 10/95 | 11/95 | 12/95 | 1/96 | 2/96 | 3/96 | 4/96 | 5/96 | 6/96 | 7/96 | 8/96 | 9/96 | | | |
| News | 12 | 18 | 56 | 73 | 110 | 54 | 243 | 170 | 72 | 106 | 114 | 156 | 419 | 1594 | 95.6 | |
| Feature Story | 0 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 23 | 1.3 | |
| Editorial | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 0.5 | |
| Column | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0.2 | |
| Opinion | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 30 | 1.8 | |
| Other forms | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0.5 | |
| Total | 12 | 22 | 67 | 85 | 114 | 60 | 259 | 178 | 75 | 106 | 116 | 156 | 417 | 1667 | 100 | |

(Lexis/Nexis)

information to be accurate and reliable. However, it is important to note that those accounts were written principally according to foreign journalists' perceptions of Okinawa and Okinawa-related matters.

See Table 2 : Number of Articles Tabulated by Type

From Table 2, one can see that dominant number of articles, 95.6 percent of total, were written in news style. As mentioned above, this shows that news on Okinawa-related matters were quickly disseminated throughout the world. Feature stories with background information on Okinawa account for only 23 articles. These were written constantly from October 1995 through April 1996. However, none appeared during the period of May through August 1996. One possible explanation for this is that with the announcement of the return of Futenma Air Station in April, the foreign journalists may have considered the "Okinawa problem" to be resolved or to have become a moot issue and therefore may have decided that there was nothing controversial to investigate and comment upon.

Another interesting point is that there were 30 opinions and letters sent to the media, mainly to newspapers. This number suggests that readers and viewers who received the information actually considered the matters related to Okinawa, and the media received feedback from them. This shows that communication regarding Okinawa-related issues was not only one way but was also reciprocal.

See Table 3 : Number of Articles Tabulated by Subject Matter

In Table 3, the subject matter which occupied the largest percentage or articles (47 percent) was "Matters related to the United

Table 3. Number of Articles Tabulated by Month of Appearance (AP and AFP)

| | SOFA | Rape of a 12-year-old | Land lease to U.S.F.J. | A referendum | Matters related to U.S.F.J. | Other subject matters | Total | % |
|-------|------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------|------|
| 9/95 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0.7 |
| 10/95 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 1.2 |
| 11/95 | 1 | 46 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 1 | 67 | 3.9 |
| 12/95 | 3 | 57 | 9 | 0 | 11 | 5 | 85 | 5.1 |
| 1/96 | 0 | 45 | 6 | 0 | 61 | 2 | 114 | 6.9 |
| 2/96 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 53 | 7 | 60 | 3.6 |
| 3/96 | 0 | 51 | 135 | 0 | 66 | 7 | 259 | 15.5 |
| 4/96 | 0 | 0 | 54 | 0 | 121 | 3 | 178 | 10.7 |
| 5/96 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 68 | 2 | 75 | 4.5 |
| 6/96 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 81 | 6 | 106 | 6.4 |
| 7/96 | 0 | 7 | 35 | 12 | 59 | 3 | 116 | 7 |
| 8/96 | 1 | 1 | 71 | 14 | 58 | 11 | 156 | 9.3 |
| 9/96 | 1 | 26 | 53 | 122 | 187 | 28 | 417 | 25 |
| Total | 6 | 267 | 363 | 172 | 784 | 75 | 1667 | 99.8 |
| % | 0.3 | 16 | 21.8 | 10.3 | 47 | 4.5 | 100 | |

*SOFA: Status of Forces Agreement

*Matters related to U.S.F.J. on Okinawa include reports of: Talks between the U.S. and Japan, Talks between the Japanese Government and the Okinawan Government, accidents and crimes by U.S. military personnel and their dependents, SACO, etc. . . .

*Land leases to U.S.F.J. means land leases to U.S.F.J. on Okinawa

States Forces Japan (U.S.F.J.) on Okinawa," followed by 21.8 percent concerned with the "Rape of a 12-year-old," and 16 percent related to "Land leases to U.S.F.J. on Okinawa."

As for the rape incident, there are 182 articles published or broadcast between September 1995, when the incident occurred, and January 1996 when the hearing of the trial came to conclusion. The number again increased in March when the Naha District Court on March 9 delivered verdicts for the three servicemen accused of raping a 12-year-old girl.

At the same time, the number of articles on the land leases increased because Governor of Okinawa had refused to sign the leases, thereby refusing to force the unwilling landowners to renew their leases. The Naha branch of Fukuoka High Court ordered him to sign the leases by proxy. (See the analysis of Figure 1.)

The governor again lost a battle with the central government in August when the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal concerning the land leases. Thus, during the hearing and the deliberation of the verdicts, between July and August, the number of articles on land leases again increased.

Interestingly enough, when the matters of land leases seemed to settle down in March, appearing alternately from April to September 1996 were reports on the first referendum ever to be held on the municipal level in Japan. One can track the trend of events, which occurred in Okinawa by closely examining these numbers.

III. Coverage of Okinawa-Related Matters by Foreign Newswire Services

The data collection comprise 14 newswire services: the Associated Press (AP), United Press International (UPI), Reuters, Agence

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France Presse (AFP), GANNET, TASS, Kyodo, Xinhua, Deutsche Press-Agentur (DPA), Canada Newswire, Federal News Services, U.S. Newswire, Universal News Services, and COMLINE Daily News Telegraph.

For this paper, we selected two internationally recognized newswire services, the AP and AFP, and analyzed and compared their reporting.

The AP serves more than 1,700 newspapers and 6,000 broadcast members in the United States. AP services are printed and broadcast abroad by more than 8,500 subscribers in 112 countries (AP stylebook 335).


AFP serves more than 7,000 newspapers, 2,500 broadcast members (2,000 radio stations and 500 TV stations) covering 165 countries (AFP, personal communication).

A. Analysis of Figure

See Figure 2 : Number of Articles Tabulated by Month of Appearance AP and AFP

There were 381 articles provided by the AP and 194 articles provided by AFP between November 1995 and September 1996 according to the data collected for this research. The fact that the number of articles by the AP is almost as double as that of AFP reflects the intrusiveness of the issue to each nation, which is to say, the degree of each nation's involvement in the issue. As mentioned above, the United States was a major player in the news of Okinawa-related matters because of its military deployment in Japan. Therefore, it could be said that the AP, based in the United States, had more "interests" than AFP in the Okinawa issue mainly because of its 7,700

Figure 2: Number of Articles Tabulated by Month of Appearance (AP and AFP)



domestic subscribers' demand for the news.

B. General Tendency of Coverage by Newswire Services

There are three characteristics in the reporting of Okinawa-related matters by both the AP and AFP, though these characteristics more or less overlap with the characteristics of newswire reporting in general and as compared to other media.

First, the reporting was expeditiously produced and implicitly informative of every relevant incident which occurred in Okinawa during that period. The number of articles sent by wire proves that the reporters were attentive to the issues. Although some of the articles shared almost the same text depending on the time of transmission, the number is still valid as a measure of U.S. involvement with the Japanese and the Okinawan governments. Both newswire services provided a combined total of 576 articles, one third of the total number of articles collected for the twelve-month period of this research.

Second, by employing the technique of "objective" reporting, both newswire services attempted to present in the majority of articles only factual information of the events, that is, mainly statements of government officials and clarification of an event, the so-called 5W1H minus "why" information: when, where, who, what, and how. In carrying out the duty of international newswire services, it is evident that, with few exceptions, both newswire services attempted to be "objective" and neutral regarding the issues by presenting only factual information obtainable at the time of the event.

Third, as a consequence of the preceding two points, the majority of the articles lack historical background on Okinawa and are without description of the dangers and inconveniences that derive from

U.S. military presence in Okinawa. The background is crucial to understanding the reasons for the simmering resentment or ambivalent and complicated feelings that the Okinawans bear towards the Japanese government concerning the presence of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa.

In this regard it is also important to note that the newswire services strive for timeliness of the news in order to provide news to their subscribers as fast as possible. As a consequence of such deadline-pressures, it is inevitable that there is a lack of in-depth reporting on the issues. Furthermore, taking into consideration that those newswire services' first and foremost aim is not the deep investigation of an issue but the expeditious dissemination of the news, it is understandable that the majority of newswire scripts lack significant background information.

However at the same time, it remains an unsettled question whether the newswire services which have a large number of subscribers all over the world properly served the journalistic purpose of conveying the real plight of Okinawa and its people.

In the following sections, we provide an assemblage of statements typical of the articles of the AP and AFP.

C. Descriptions of Okinawa

When describing Okinawa, the majority of articles by both newswire agencies focused on the U.S. military presence on Okinawa including Okinawa's purported strategic location. Others focused on the economic disadvantages that Okinawa bears.

a. Descriptions of Okinawa as a Staging Area for the U.S. Forces

Currently, about 75 percent of all installations and areas in the exclusive use of the U.S. forces in Japan are located in Okinawa

Prefecture, covering 11 percent of total prefectural land, and 20 percent of the total land of Okinawa Island, the largest of the prefecture's islands, the island where most of the population and industries are located. There are 40 U.S. military facilities located in Okinawa Prefecture, which comprises only 0.6 percent of the whole of Japanese territory. The bases occupy land in 25 of the 53 municipalities of Okinawa Prefecture (Okinawa Prefectural Government 9). The following quoted paragraphs describe Okinawa by focusing on the U.S. military presence. Okinawa was described as an island in which "about 27,000 of the 45,000 troops" are deployed, and which "bears the brunt of the American deployment" (AP, 76, 11/22/95).

*quotations in their original form were not highlighted.

Though Okinawa accounts for less than one percent of Japan's total area, **75 percent of all Japanese land reserved for exclusive U.S. military use concentrated here. One-fifth of the island is taken up by the bases**, and it is hard to take even a short drive without seeing at least one U.S. military facility (AP, 391, 3/6/96).

However, the majority of those articles of the AP and AFP which explain the distribution of U.S. bases throughout Okinawa are misleading. The figure "75 percent" refers to the percentage of the land area that is in exclusive use of the U.S. forces in Japan. Thus, the statement "75 percent of the U.S. bases are located in Okinawa" could be misleading because it does not specify that the figure represents in terms of the kind of installations and area (exclusive use or joint use, or acreage, or number of installations). For example, the following statement could be wrong if one interprets the statistics

not in terms of acreage, but in terms of the number of installations:

The sub-tropical island, which accounts for only 0.6 percent of Japan's territory, also houses more than three quarters of all US military facilities in the country (AFP, 216, 1/30/96).

In addition to the descriptions of U.S. military presence, other descriptions of Okinawa refer to the strategic location of Okinawa, which is located near China, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asian countries. Given such a geographical location, Okinawa is described as a **"keystone in [Tokyo's] security policy"** (AFP, 112, 12/17/96), **"a crucial U.S. military outpost in the Pacific"** (AP, 777 4/26/96), and **"linchpin of U.S. strategic policy in the Pacific"** (AP, 1315, 9/8/96).

Also, Ambassador Mondale has asserted that Okinawa's bases are **"essential... in the context of the entire region"** (AP, 435, 3/14/96), and the dominant military image of Okinawa apparently lies in its strategic location. The image of Okinawa as a strategic area in the Pacific may also be preponderant over other images that readers may have.

b. Descriptions of Okinawa as an Economically Disadvantaged Area in Japan

Okinawa is also described as **"Japan's poorest prefecture (state),"** one which hugely depends on revenues from U.S. military bases. In many of the AP articles, the phrase **"Japan's poorest prefecture"** is attached to the word **"Okinawa."** The AFP explains more about Okinawa's economic situation:

The \$1.8 billion generated by the bases for Okinawa's frail economy is second only to tourism. **Okinawa is already Japan's poorest state** (AP, 1081, 7/27/96).

Income per capita is the lowest in Japan--three quarters of the national average and only half that for Tokyo. Okinawa also has **the highest unemployment rate and the lowest savings rate**. The level of medical care is the worst for all of Japan and the local people have the country's highest divorce rate (AFP, 1269, 9/4/96).

Although the statements above indicate the economic disadvantages of Okinawa, the living standard of Okinawa may not be as bad as the living standard that one might imagine from those statistics. It could be said that Okinawan people live more affluently than the people in Tokyo do if one takes into account not only the income level but also the condition of the living environment including the surrounding nature. From that point of view, the above statements which describe Okinawa as a poor state may give readers a slightly different image from the true situation in Okinawa. It is important to note, however, that those who live near U.S. bases are nonetheless greatly disturbed by inconveniences, such as noise pollution, which derive from proximity to the bases.

D. Descriptions of the Okinawan People

During W.W. II, U.S. soldiers perceived the Okinawan people to be "docile," "tractable," "passive," and "friendly," according to *The New York Times* (Miyagi, 64). After 50 some years, the Okinawan people's image as reflected in the AP reports is not quite the same. The traits of the Okinawan people as stated above have been

replaced by reference to the emotional states of Okinawans, which are in focus in the descriptions of the Okinawan people. Numerous AP articles describe the Okinawan people as being "angry" or "unhappy" and accusing U.S. military presence of every disadvantage they have. On the other hand, others are said to be anxious about the withdrawal of U.S. troops because of the expected economic slump. (AFP did not have descriptions of the Okinawans.) The following are examples of ambivalent feelings that the Okinawans are said to bear towards the U.S. military presence:

Some islanders have long resented the bases and blamed them for noise, pollution, crime and stunted economic growth (AP, 1202, 8/28/96).

Many Okinawans also fear that losing the bases would mean losing thousands of jobs and a crucial source of income (AP, 1315, 9/8/96).

Other descriptions of the Okinawans deal with public animosity towards the military in any country, and towards the Japanese government. To understand the public animosity in Okinawa not only towards the U.S. military presence but also towards the Japanese government, a knowledge of Okinawan history is essential.

Some Okinawans have hostility towards the Japanese because of what happened in the Battle of Okinawa. Although the Okinawans were on the Japanese side, some Okinawan people were killed, or encouraged to commit suicide, by the Japanese soldiers. The Japanese soldiers are known to have killed the physically and mentally disabled on the pretext that they were spies for the U.S. military; basically, they could not afford having people who are not of any use

(Aniya 349). Many Okinawans were taught by the Japanese soldiers that U.S. soldiers would rape and torture to death their prisoners of war, and the Okinawans were given hand grenades to kill themselves before Americans could capture them.

Furthermore, most Okinawans feel that the government abandoned Okinawa to the control of the U.S. For 27 years, Okinawans were under the jurisdiction of the U.S. government and Okinawa became an "important staging area for the Korean and Vietnam wars" (AP, 703, 4/12/96). The public animosity towards U.S. military is in part attributable to the unfair treatment of the Okinawans during that occupation:

Like many other Okinawans, Chibana comes from a family with a long-standing **distrust of the military - Japanese or American** (AP, 572, 3/28/96).

Many Okinawans still resent Tokyo's decision to use their islands as a buffer against the invading allies, and Washington's refusal to end its occupation of Okinawa until 1972. The occupation of Japan ended in 1952 (AP, 628, 4/1/96).

The AP articles portray the Okinawans as "angry" people who detest both the U.S. and Japanese governments. They also explain that the Okinawans have long been neglected by the Japanese government. Although the statements above reflect the sentiment of many Okinawans, without historical background about Okinawa, a reader may acquire the impression that Okinawans are extremely emotional.

E. Descriptions of the Historical Background of Okinawa

As mentioned above, being familiar with Okinawan history is crucial for understanding the current situation of Okinawa and its people. The more informed a foreigner is of the Okinawan historical background, the better is the person's ability to understand the circumstances of Okinawa. However, because of the implementation of "objective" reporting and writing, there were not many AP and AFP articles that explained Okinawan history in detail. The tendency was to report only the factual information of an event without going into details of background information. The followings are examples of a few articles written on W.W. II :

April 1 also marks the 51st anniversary of the start of the Battle of Okinawa in the final days of World War II. **The Allied onslaught left almost 250,000 Japanese dead, mostly Okinawans who were encouraged by the Japanese military to commit suicide rather than surrender to the Americans** (AFP, 517 3/26/96).

The three-month battle for Japan's southernmost main island was among World War II's bloodiest. **In fighting from April 1 to June 23, 1945, an estimated one-fourth of Okinawa's civilian population was killed. The island's history makes its people especially sensitive to the U.S. military presence** (AP, 961, 6/23/96).

A typical description of the Battle of Okinawa is that it was "one of W.W.II's bloodiest" (AP, 572, 3/28/96 and other articles). Examples above appeared only a couple of times. Considering the large number of articles provided by the two newswire agencies, there is a surprisingly small number of articles that describe Okinawa's situation during and after World War II.

F. SOFA

There were very few articles concerning only the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), yet there were some statements about SOFA, most of which were in reference to the custody of criminal suspects who were U.S. military personnel or their dependents. According to the "Explanation of the Proposed Revision to the Status of Forces Agreement," Article 17 of SOFA states: "The custody of an accused member of the U.S. armed forces or civilian component remains with the U.S. until charged by Japan" (Okinawa Prefectural Government 18). The Okinawan government requested a revision of Article 17. The following article responds well to the request:

Amid the outcry, American officials have taken some steps to try to mollify the Japanese. They have agreed that in some cases they may turn over servicemen accused of crimes more quickly to Japanese authorities (AP, 123, 12/3/96).

In next example, the highlighted part invites misunderstanding. Article 10 of SOFA reads: "official vehicles of U.S. armed forces must carry distinctive number plates or individual markings which shall readily identify them to Okinawan citizens" (Okinawa Prefectural Government 15). However, in reality, they do not. As a result, it becomes problematic in many cases of accidents because the Okinawans cannot identify the specific vehicles involved. Thus the following article does point out a problematic area of the SOFA even though the information itself is misleading.

The cases could become complicated, however, as **American military vehicles do not have to carry number plates in Japan** (AFP, 519, 3/26/96).

Also, another AFP article points out a problematic area concerning Article 18, Renunciation of Claims. It states that when Japan and the United States are responsible for the crime both parties pay equal amount of compensation. It also states: "The authority of Japan shall consider the claim and assess compensation for damages. . . and shall prepare report to deliver to the U.S. authorities, who shall then decide without delay whether they will offer a payment, and if so, of what amount" (Okinawa Prefectural Government 22). It means that the injured party may not receive compensation and even if it does, the amount may not be adequate for the reason that U.S. authorities decide the payment:

It is very rare for Okinawans to file for damages in traffic accidents involving U.S. soldiers, who are generally thought to be incapable of paying (AFP, 669, 4/5/96).

In the two examples above, AFP suggests the existence of problems derived from the enforcement of SOFA, problems which none of the other media point out. However, what the articles do not mention is that the problem originates in the enforcement of SOFA. Thus, even by reading reports such as those cited above, readers may not become aware that SOFA itself is a problematic area of concern.

G. The Rape of a 12-year-old

On September 4, 1995, three U.S. servicemen abducted a 12-year-old girl and raped her. In the majority of articles, the rape case is described as if it were the sole cause of the whole anti-base movement between 1995 and 1996. For example, the rape case has

“caused a furor in Japan,” “galvanized local opposition to U.S. bases in Japan,” “touched off huge anti-military rallies on Okinawa,” “sparked outrage against the U.S. bases on Okinawa,” “heightened local hostility to the U.S. military presence.

One cannot deny that the rape case triggered a series of demonstrations. However, the Okinawans' discontent or resentment towards U.S. bases had existed in Okinawa long before that event and it was that simmering resentment which exploded as a consequence of the rape incident. By repeatedly reading such statements shown above, some readers may misunderstand or they may obtain the false impression that the Okinawans became enraged as a result of a single incident in which only three U.S. servicemen were involved, but that was not the case. To avoid this kind of misunderstanding, statements such as the following would be preferable, statements which indicate that the Okinawan people's resentment was deeply rooted even before the rape incident occurred:

The rape exacerbated the already bitter sentiments against the heavy U.S. military presence on the island (AP, 1067, 7/25/96).

The readers also misunderstand Okinawans by reading the following statements, which claim that the Okinawans used the rape case in order to highlight their sufferings over the past 50 years. The incredible horrendousness of events engendered a train of demonstrations and anti-base movement activities. The Okinawans deplored not only the rape incident but also the accumulated number of incidences of Japanese and U.S. governments' unfair treatment of them over the past 50 years since the end of the W.W.II. Upon self-

examination, many Okinawans discovered that their lack of protest against the U.S. military presence had invited the rape incident, as local university professor Moriteru Arasaki says in *Okinawa Gendaishi* (Arasaki 2). Thus, from a local media researcher's point of view, it is not fair to the Okinawans to imply that they took advantage of the rape incident to insist on evicting the U.S. military by saying: **"Okinawans have seized on the case as an example of their suffering from the heavy U.S. military presence (AP, 133, 12/4/96), and "Okinawa Gov. Masahide Ota has used the case to bolster his campaign to get all U.S. bases removed from the island" (AP, 425, 3/13/96).**

Furthermore, AP and AFP claimed occasionally that the rape case has **"generated waves of anti-American sentiment and demonstrations"** (AP, 85, 11/15/95), **"unleashed an outpouring of anti-American sentiment"**(AFP, 83, 11/16/95), **"sparked widespread anti-U.S. protest"** (AFP, 53, 11/19/95). Such statements may lead readers to misunderstand Okinawans. Those statements should be written as **"anti-U.S. military sentiment"** or **"anti-U.S. base protest."** On a personal level, there are many Okinawans and U.S. personnel who are in good terms with one another. In many cases, the anger of Okinawans is pointed at the military as a whole, not at individual Americans.

In addition, the journalists should also take into consideration that most Americans whom Okinawans have seen and associated with are U.S. military personnel. In many cases, U.S. military personnel are the only Americans that Okinawans have contact with, and they are, to those Okinawans, representatives of the United States. Thus, when they refer to "Americans," what is meant specifically is "U.S. military personnel;" the expression does not

necessarily mean mainland Americans in most cases, nor even non-military Americans living in Okinawa.

H. Land Leases to U.S.F.J. on Okinawa

There are slight differences in the perception of two newswire services in their coverage of the land leases problem on Okinawa. AP captures this problem as a problem between the Japanese government and the Okinawan government. It was indeed a court battle between the central government and the Okinawan government, but to Okinawans it was a problem whose cause was deeply connected with and originated in SOFA, which is a part of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In the following statement, the AP sarcastically insinuates the Japanese government's incapability of handling the lease problem.

...demanding access to his own property, an Okinawan landowner and dozens of supporters marched to the gate of a U.S. military base Monday, only to be turned away by hundreds of Japanese riot police. The showdown is yet **another embarrassment for Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, who was tried unsuccessfully to calm an anti-U.S. military outcry on the southern Japan island** before President Clinton visits Japan later this month (AP, 628, 4/1/96).

In addition, the AP presents the lease problem on the premise that the U.S.- Japan Security Treaty is of absolute necessity. Therefore, there is nothing that the U.S. can do for the lease problem and the Japanese government should appropriately handle the issue:

Citing security needs, officials in Washington and Tokyo have said that troops and bases may be shifted within Japan, but the

overall number will not be reduced. **Under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan is obligated to provide facilities to U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan, where the United States maintains 47,000 of its 100,000 troops in East Asia.** (AP, 570, 3/28/96)

Other examples show the difference in each newswire agency's approach to the issue. The difference is evident in their choices of Gov. Ota's statements in court. While the AP focused on the governor's argument, which is refutable, AFP chose a more emotional one, one with which many people may sympathize. In the AFP article, Gov. Ota was talking about the brutality of the Japanese soldiers during W.W.II., showing the Okinawan people's resentment against military--whether it's Japanese or foreign--and its bases:

Okinawa's governor told a court Monday that his people face an increased risk of crime from U.S. bases on the island, and that forcing them to accept the bases is discrimination. Ota argued that the bases do not enforce adequate discipline. He told the court that thousands of crimes have been committed by Americans on the island since it was occupied at the end of World War II, according to public broadcaster NHK but did not supply Japanese crime figures for comparison (AP, 413, 3/11/96).

"We are taught during the war that it was natural to give up one's life for one's country. But I saw soldiers killing each other and stealing food from the people and have long thought about that," Ota, a former history professor said. "I began to think about the importance of peace for Okinawa. From the old days, Okinawans have been a peace-loving people and I have devoted myself to making a pacifist administration," he said (AFP, 411, 3/11/96).

Similarly, a simple wish of a landowner written in several AFP articles raises a question that many Okinawans have in their mind:

Shoichi Chibana, a 47-year-old shopkeeper who owns a small plot at the communications facility, told reporters... **"I just want my land back"** (AFP, 517, 3/26/96).

The statement above deals with his right to have his own property back, a right which has been ignored by the Japanese Government. But most of the articles on the lease problems describe the significance of the U.S.- Japan Security Treaty and rarely mention the landowners' right to their own land.

I. Referendum

Despite the implementation of "objective" reporting, AP articles seem to exhibit a somewhat negative stance towards the referendum. Most of the AP articles mention without fail the agreement to return 20 percent of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa, providing mention in context with their report of the referendum, as if to suggest that the U.S. has done its part of work in resolving the Okinawa problem:

The referendum is not binding and addresses action that is already being taken. The United States and Japan agreed earlier this year to return 20 percent of the U.S. military base land to Okinawa, and are discussing what else can be done to ease the burden. Governor Masahide Ota wants the bases removed entirely, but that is unlikely (AP, 942, 6/21/96).

"For all these years, no one has paid any attention to what the Okinawan people wanted," said Tsunesada Shimabukuro, a local

government worker. "This is a real chance for us to express our concerns." **In many ways, some of those concerns are already being heard. ... In April, the United States and Japan announced the biggest return of bases land to the Okinawans in decades, and U.S. military officials have tightened restrictions on off-base drinking and repeatedly cracked down on bad behavior (AP, 1315, 9/8/96).**

The AP also perceived the referendum critically saying Gov. Ota is "expected to use the vote as a **bargaining chip** when he meets with Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto" (AP, 1317, 9/8/96). The referendum was non-binding, nevertheless, some Okinawans participated in the referendum because it was "important for them to express their feelings" (AP, 1315, 9/8/96). It meant a lot to Okinawans to have an opportunity to state their opinions because some people remember the time when they had no "say" under the U.S. control during occupation.

As for the result of the referendum, there were articles which focused more on the low voter turnout than on the fact that the majority was in favor of reduction of the bases:

He (Gov. Ota) said **the turnout of 59.5 percent** of the 910,000 eligible voters was "better than I had expected." **The figure was down, however, from the 66 percent in the last Okinawa legislative elections in June, and Okinawan officials had hoped for 70 percent this time (AP, 1315, 9/8/96).**

AFP collected voices that are against the referendum:

The federation feels the media has neglected the majority providing land plots. "People may emotionally support the U.S. troops withdrawal. **However, we don't know how to utilise the**

land even if it is returned," Sunagawa said, adding more than half the federation members are over 60 and largely depend on lease fees (AFP, 1279, 9/6/96).

"The turnout was low, given that such a fuss was made. The federation would be troubled if bases were returned one after another," [Jusei Kinjo, deputy chairman of the Okinawa Prefecture federation of Landowners Associations on Land Used for Military Purposes, which groups 28,000 landlords out of a total of 32,000 in the prefecture] said. Residents' good sense made a fairly severe judgment on the referendum," he said, accusing the prefectural government for "wasting taxpayers' money" on activities to promote the vote (AFP, 1312, 9/8/96).

Both of the arguments above are justified for taking emotional and financial states into consideration. There are people who still have bitter memories of W.W.II, and desire peace more than anything. There are also people who want their land back, which was forcefully expropriated by the U.S. military during occupation. Others want a concrete and definite development plan for constructive use of their land. And there are the elderly who would not be able to find any use for their land if it were suddenly returned.

Generally, in reports on the referendum, both newswire agencies focused more on the lower voter turnout than on the majority's appeal for the reduction and realignment of the U.S. military bases. Also, the newswire agencies succeeded in suggesting the failure of the referendum by effectively presenting opinions of those local people who are against the reduction and realignment of the U.S. military.

J. Matters related to U.S.F.J. on Okinawa

In its reports on matters related to U.S.F.J. on Okinawa, the AP seems to sympathize with the Okinawans and implies that the Japanese were uncooperative with regard to various issues concerning Okinawa:

Since the post-World War II occupation of Okinawa ended in 1972, Okinawans have complained that there is an unfair share of the bilateral security load. But with the concentration of troops off Japan's main islands, most Japanese have ignored them. While many Japanese empathize with the Okinawans' concerns, few are willing to have any of the troops relocated into their own areas. (AP, 674, 4/5/96)

Most Japanese sympathize with the Okinawans for their heavy share of the U.S. military burden. Most Japanese also see the U.S. military presence as an indispensable safeguard against instability in an otherwise volatile region. But few want Marines in their backyards. (AP, 1273, 9/4/96)

The reports above subtly criticize the Japanese for not sharing the heavy burden of the U.S. military bases that Okinawa currently bears. Behind those reports, there seems to be the implication that by contrast the U.S. has done as much as it could to mitigate the Okinawan peoples' sufferings derived from the U.S. military presence on their land. The implication is that because the U.S. promised the return of Futenma Air Station, the U.S. has demonstrated sufficient concession. Especially after April, in a number of AP report on matters related to U.S.F.J. on Okinawa, portions of the two following paragraphs is inserted without fail as if to reinforce the image that the U.S. has done its work and is still committing

itself to reducing the burden on Okinawa:

Responding to the anti-American protests (in the face of the increasing pressure), the United States announced in April it will return 20 percent of the U.S. military base land on Okinawa to local residents. (AP, 1196, 8/28/96, 1197, 8/28/96, 1198, 8/28/96, 1202, 8/28/96, 1285, 9/6/96, etc...)

In contrast to the apparent stance of the AP, we found that AFP outspokenly questions the return of the base and casts doubts in the reader's mind:

The overall relocation and reduction programme is estimated to cost up to one trillion yen (9.3 billion dollars), to be borne by the Japanese government. **It is seen by critics as reinforcing the U.S. military foothold in East Asia** (AFP, 784, 4/26/96).

AFP also reports other transfer of bases or base functions along with the return of Futenma air base:

In line with an agreement reached in April to reduce U.S. bases in Okinawa by about 20 percent, Tokyo and Washington have agreed to move some in-flight refueling planes from Okinawa to a U.S. Marine base in Iwakuni, Yamaguchi prefecture, and some live drills to Ground Self-Defense Force ranges in Hokkaido, Miyagi, Yamanashi, Shizuoka and Oita prefectures. But all of those prefectures have so far expressed reluctance to accept the transfers (AFP, 1279, 9/6/96).

The return of Futenma base, which is in the midst of the city of Ginowan, relieved many Okinawans. But in fact, according to Okinawa University professor Moriteru Arasaki, the U.S. agreed to

return the base only upon fulfillment of certain conditions: to transfer the "in-flight refueling planes from Okinawa to a base in Iwakuni (AFP, 1279, 9/6/96)" to partially transfer the base function to Kadena, to construct a heliport in another part of Okinawa, and to perform a joint research on the military use of Japanese private facility in case of emergency (Arasaki 219).

Arasaki sees such imposition of conditions by the U.S. government as a reinforcement of the U.S. military function on Okinawa and the rise of another type of strategic cooperation (Arasaki 219). No other media besides AFP reported such deals between the U.S. and Japanese Governments.

In addition, the AFP published the following report, which may have had only a slim chance of appearing in U.S. papers because of its harsh criticism of the U.S. Government. The article is about U.S. President Bill Clinton's cancellation of a visit to Japan in November 1995:

U.S. President Bill Clinton canceled a visit to Japan in November partly for fear that he might have to repeatedly apologize for the alleged rape by U.S. servicemen of an Okinawan school-girl, Kyodo News service said Sunday. The sources said the intelligence report noted that repeated expressions of apology by Clinton could have an adverse reaction in the United states and ignite arguments of scrapping the US-Japan security treaty (AFP, 126, 12/3/96).

Compared to other media, AFP is generally outspoken in its articles on Okinawa issues. The AP, however, is vocal about the significance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. After a referendum on the reduction of U.S. bases was held in September 1996, the

following statements appeared and were subsequently published repeatedly by the AP:

[The U.S. State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns] added that the results of the referendum were not unexpected, but noted that Japan is bound by its treaty commitment to provide land and facilities for American forces. "And we have complete confidence in the government of Japan's commitment to fulfilling its own obligations under this treaty," he said. "I can tell you that we're committed to keep American forces in Japan, **that they're there... at the request of the Japanese government**" (AP, 1419, 9/9/96).

To summarize, many AP articles on Okinawa point out the unfair treatment of Okinawans by the mainland Japanese. In a way, the AP seems to be purposefully excluding the U.S. from the news and instead describes the Okinawa issue as if it were only a domestic problem of Japan's. Such a stance of the AP is well reflected in their reports, especially after the announcement of the return of Futenma Air Station in April 1996. One might construe that the AP purposefully excluded the U.S. from most of its articles in order to be "objective" on the issue by attempting to avoid discussion of its own country's diplomatic policy. But many Okinawans perceive the Okinawa problem as something which should be resolved through cooperation of the three parties: the U.S., Japanese, and Okinawan governments. Therefore, when the AP places the U.S. as a bystander, rather than one of the central figures, it proves that there is a discrepancy between the perception of the AP and that of the Okinawans regarding the Okinawa problem.

On the other hand, AFP published some interesting articles which are critical of the U.S. government. Quite possibly those articles

did not appear in U.S. papers or broadcasts because of their critical stance against U.S. diplomacy.

K. Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, I would like to add several suggestions to what I have mentioned in the introduction of this chapter. During the twelve months after the rape incident, both newswire services published a large number of articles, thus demonstrating the readers' and viewers' high interest in Okinawan issues. They closely followed the flow of every event on Okinawa and their news was quickly distributed throughout the world. Their contribution to the dissemination of the news was immense.

However, the images of Okinawa as presented in the coverage of the newswire services were not positive ones. The articles tended to project an image of Okinawans as "furious" people who are anti-American and anti-Japanese Government. Another negative image is that of the Okinawans as "poor." In the absence of detailed explanations of the cultural and historical background of Okinawa, many of the statements that appeared may encourage the development of false images of Okinawa. As a result, foreigners and others unfamiliar with the circumstances may envisage the situation of Okinawa and its people in a way quite different from the real situation.

Thus from a local media researcher's point of view, there were some drawbacks in the reporting which we encountered. However, it must be recognized that it was because of limitations of time and space that many reports were brief and lacked the detailed descriptions of Okinawa, along with historical background, which were needed for transmitting an adequate account of the resentment and

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complicated feelings of Okinawans towards the U.S. military presence.

However, there were also a number of inaccurate descriptions in many articles concerning the presence of U.S. military on Okinawa. (See section III.C., Descriptions of Okinawa). Similarly, some descriptions of the Okinawan people, such as claims of "anti-American sentiment" among Okinawans, were misleading.

Nonetheless, I found some notable differences in the reports of the two newswire services. The Associated Press seemed to steer the U.S. away from responsibility for the Okinawa issues and instead directed criticism towards the Japanese government, especially after the April announcement of the return of Futenma Air Station. Despite the obvious involvement of the U.S. in the Okinawa problem, the AP seemed to maintain that the Okinawa problem was simply a domestic issue, and it leveled criticism at the Japanese Government. In addition, when describing an event, the AP focused only on factual information, and omitted the process and the political background.

In contrast to the AP, AFP criticized any government involved. It portrayed the Okinawa problem as one that involves three governments, namely, the governments of the U.S., Japan, and Okinawa. When describing an event, AFP reported more political background information than the AP did. As a result, the AFP articles' portrait of Okinawa is more detailed, and the perception presented was closer to that of the Okinawans.

Although the two newswire agencies apparently attempted to be "objective," the differences evident in their approach to the Okinawa issues seemed instead to expose their underlying stance towards the issues.

IV. Coverage of Okinawa-Related Matters by Foreign Newspapers

In order to examine the foreign newspapers' coverage of the Okinawa-related matters, we selected three U.S. newspapers: *The New York Times* (NYT), *The Washington Post* (WP), and the *Los Angeles Times* (LAT). In the year from September 1995 to September 1996, 35 articles on Okinawa-related matters were collected from the NYT and analyzed for this research. The articles collected from the LAT amounted to 30, and 16 were collected from the WP. The number of NYT articles peaked in March and September 1996, with each of those two months contributing eight articles. Six articles by the LAT concentrate in March, April, and September 1996. Similarly, the WP has three articles at its peaks in October and November 1995 and September 1996. For the explanation of the events and incidents occurred in those months, please refer to the chapter II and III.

A. General Tendencies of Newspaper Coverage by the Foreign Newspapers

Compared to the coverage of the newswire services, the newspapers' coverage on the Okinawa issues seems to be more in depth. Because they can depend on the reports of the newswire services for timely reporting of foreign news, newspapers have more freedom than newswire services do in terms of allowances of time and space. Thus, a newspaper is capable of producing more in-depth stories with background information essential for understanding the subject matter. In this regard, the reports of newspapers seemed to provide more detail than the reports of the newswire services.

Moreover, the fact that three major newspapers constantly

published articles on Okinawa-related matters proves the high interest of the U.S. media on the issues. Also, it can be assumed that a large amount of information was disseminated throughout the world because these papers are distributed and read worldwide.

Furthermore, it could be said that both the information and the tone of the three "quality" papers, as regards their presentation of Okinawa-related matters, played an important role in the development of foreign peoples' image of Okinawa.

However, from the standpoint of a local media researcher, it can be said that more background information should have been incorporated into the articles to give readers more insight into the real situation of Okinawa. There were indeed some stories in which historical background was added. However, despite the supplementation of historical background, those stories were out of focus and did not seem to contribute to the foreign reader's understanding of the Okinawans.

B. Descriptions of Okinawa

When describing Okinawa, the three papers did not use the word "strategic," quite in contrast to its usage by the newswire services:

On the main island of Okinawa, bases take up 20 percent of the land. That has subjected residents to crime, noise and dangers from accidents like plane crashes (NYT, 1386, 9/9/96).

On Okinawa, an island known for its chrysanthemums, orchids and sugar cane, global security issues seemed less pressing today than solving the rape of a little girl (WP, 3, 9/20/95).

Okinawa accounts for less than 1 percent of the Japanese landmass but hosts more than half of U.S. forces stationed in Japan. The chain of southern islands was devastated during

World War II and occupied by the United States until 1972. It still has the lowest per capita income and the highest unemployment rate in Japan (LAT, 1260, 9/5/96).

The descriptions of Okinawa by the three papers are very similar to the descriptions by the newswire services except that the papers do not stress Okinawa as a "strategic" area. The main focus is on the heavy U.S. military presence and Okinawa's economic disadvantages.

C. Descriptions of Okinawan People

As with the offerings of the newswire services discussed in the previous chapter, most of the newspaper-account descriptions of the Okinawan people reflect the feelings, mainly anger, that Okinawans bear towards the heavy U.S. military presence and towards the unfairness of the Japanese government which placed a disproportionate burden on the Okinawans:

Over the years, the Okinawan people have been angered by rapes and murders committed by U.S. servicemen stationed here, but it has been decades since anything has focused their fury as sharply as what happened on Sept. 4 (WP, 3, 9/20/95).

As for the characteristics of the Okinawans, Nicholas Kristof of the NYT wrote the following:

"In Japanese history, peasants were normally very docile but sometimes they rebelled when they were oppressed and discriminated against too much," said Tokushin Yamauchi, the Mayor of Yomitan, on the southern Japanese island of Okinawa.

... Well, people in Yomitan are normally very patient, but if

the Japanese and American Governments insist on putting a new military facility here, we'll have to rise up in rebellion" (NYT, 862, 5/26/96).

Kristof effectively presented the characteristics of the Okinawans by quoting the mayor's account verbatim instead of writing out a subjective impression of Okinawans based on interviews. Somewhat in support of the above claim, are statements found in other articles:

It is not only the military that has changed since the rape. **The people of Okinawa have become more vocal about complaining** (NYT, 1414, 9/11/96).

Chatan city officials say they did not act earlier on conditions at the sea wall because local residents did not become more vociferous in their complaints until late July (NYT, 1414, 9/11/96).

As shown above, the NYT depicted the Okinawans as "docile" and "patient" but "rebellious" when they are under unreasonable and excessive suppression, and supported the assertion by directly quoting the Mayor.

D. Historical Background of Okinawa

The NYT and the LAT each presented one article, in which Okinawan history was introduced in a condensed and succinct form. The WP did not similarly provide a description of Okinawan history.

The NYT devoted an entire article to the Battle of Okinawa, and exposed how viciously and brutally the Japanese soldiers had treated the Okinawans during the war. The writer of the article, Nicholas

Kristof, had visited several war-sites and museums in Okinawa and he reported some survivors' accounts of the bloody battle.

Kristof states that in the battle, "more than 200,000 people were killed. . . , more than many of the estimates of the death toll in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima." In the same article he explains how **"Dozens of people had committed suicide in the cave, to avoid the rape and mutilation they expected from the American troops who were outside . . ."** and that under such a situation **"parents killed their children, then killed themselves"** (NYT, 220, 1/21/96).

In one paragraph, Kristof reiterates the brutality of the Japanese soldiers:

It is true that [the Okinawan museums] do not fully explain the background that would lead the United States to invade Okinawa, nor do they acknowledge the brutal Japanese military occupation of China, Korea and other countries. Yet the museums do emphasize the viciousness of the Japanese Army, noting that Japanese troops often evicted civilians from caves to face the shelling, or even killed them outright (NYT, 220, 1/21/96).

The article above emphasizes the vicious and heinous acts of the Japanese military during the war, but it does not mention the brutal and heinous crimes committed by the U.S. military during the occupation of Okinawa.

In contrast to the NYT article, the LAT provided two brief and condensed paragraphs of Okinawan history to cover the period from the 17th century until the 1990s:

Okinawa's 160 islands are located roughly halfway between

Kyushu, in southern Japan, and Taiwan. Okinawa historically shared the ancient culture of mainland Japan, and its inhabitants spoke a different version of the Japanese language. But the Ryukyu Kingdom, as Okinawa was known until 1879, was an early pacific trading post and was heavily influenced by China, Korea and Southeast Asia. For a time, the king paid tribute to both Japan and China (LAT, 1329, 9/8/96).

After annexation, a "Japanization" program discouraged Okinawans from using their own language, and when Okinawa reverted from U.S. to Japanese rule in 1972, Tokyo tried to re-establish standard Japanese dialect and customs in its far-flung new prefecture. But in recent years, Japanese have begun to look past their homogeneity to treasure regional differences. Since about 1990, Okinawan culture has become popular in Tokyo, especially lively and rhythmic traditional music and pop music set to a bouncing Okinawan beat (LAT, 1329, 9/8/96).

Although it is better to have some accounts of Okinawan history than no background at all, the descriptions referred to above lack important accounts of the W.W. II and the U.S. occupation of Okinawa, information which is essential for developing a proper understandings of the Okinawans. The LAT article's focus on Okinawan history seems to deviate from the points which are crucial to an understanding of the Okinawan problem. Although in comparison to the articles of the newswire services, the newspapers seemingly used their advantage of having more freedom in time and space to research and report on the subject, as is evident by citations from the above two articles, it should be said also that from a local media researcher's point of view the provision of only two articles on Okinawan history is simply insufficient. Moreover, even in those two lone articles, the focus is on facts which do not

necessarily contribute to an understanding of the Okinawan people's sentiment towards the U.S. military presence.

E. SOFA

The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is from an Okinawan point of view a patently unfair agreement, for which reason Okinawans have urgently requested review and revision of the agreement in addition to the reduction and realignment of the U.S. forces in Japan. Nonetheless, very few articles concerning Okinawa-related issues dealt with SOFA. The reason for such absence may be attributable to the papers' implicit recognition that the revision of SOFA is a matter which should be discussed between both the U.S. and Japanese governments. And it may be that the newspapers did not want to undertake premature judgment or to report on demands for the revision of SOFA. However, the fact that SOFA is an agreement which protects the rights of U.S. military personnel in Japan might have made it somewhat difficult for the U.S. based papers to criticize this problematic area of the SOFA. The following paragraph from the WP does not openly address the problem but implies the difficulty to be found in this area:

Still fresh in local memory is a 1993 case in which an U.S. Army soldier was accused of raping an Okinawan woman. The soldier managed to fly back to the United States before formal charges were brought, and by the time he was returned the woman had decided not to press charges (WP, 3, 9/20/95).

The above problem arose as a consequence of the problematic features of SOFA that enable U.S. military to hold in its own custody any crime suspects who are U.S. military personnel until the

suspects are formally indicted in Japan. However, the readers cannot be expected to understand how such a thing might occur unless the papers explain such aspects of SOFA.

F. The Rape of a 12-year-old

As mentioned in the previous section concerning newswire services, the papers similarly perceived the rape incident to be the event that sparked a series of demonstrations against U.S. military presence:

Okinawans have long complained about the noise, inconvenience and danger attached to the bases. Okinawans' annoyance at the bases turned into outrage last fall after three American servicemen were convicted. . . . (NYT, 1191, 8/29/96).

However, the statement above may not engender among the readers the misunderstanding that the rape incident was the sole cause of the anti-base movement, as appeared possible from analysis of the newswire reportings. Moreover, there were also considerable reports and descriptions of the rape trial, analysis of which will be discussed in a succeeding paper.

G. Land Leases to U.S.F.J. on Okinawa

In the reports of land-lease problems, mainly heard were the voices of the Okinawan people who were against the withdrawal of the U.S. military troops. The NYT described well those voices of the Okinawan people, along with supportive information:

"Currently, society is filled with cries of 'Return the bases!'" said Seizen Hanashiro, the leader of a group of landlords who own the ground under the Futenma air base. "But I think we

should calm down and look at the future more coolly" (NYT, 870, 6/2/96).

The problem is that although sentiment is overwhelmingly against the bases, they contribute about \$1.6 billion to the local economy each year, amounting to 5 percent of the economy and second only to tourism as a money-spinner. Moreover, Okinawa has virtually no manufacturing, and so it is not clear what would replace the economic role of the bases (NYT, 870, 6/2/96).

Unlike the NYT and the LAT, the WP did not discuss the land-lease problems.

H. Referendum

In the coverage of the referendum, the dominant tone of the articles was negative. In line with one another, the three papers reflected notions which apparently abound among government officials of the United States, including the belief that the "bases are a national matter, not a local matter, to be decided by the Governments of the United States and Japan" (NYT, 1386, 9/8/96). Such an argument repeatedly confronts Okinawans who visit government officials in the hope of petitioning for the reduction and realignment of the U.S. military bases. As if to support the above argument, the referendum was seemingly dismissed by both critics and Okinawans as "meaningless (LAT, 1260, 9/5/96)," or the wording was declared to be so ambiguous that the result "cannot be read as an endorsement. . . to eliminate all bases by 2015" (NYT, 1386, 9/8/96). The following examples also spotlight the Okinawans' ambivalent feelings towards the referendum as well as the negative aspects of the referendum:

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Some people apparently did not vote today because of worries about the economic impact of base closings. Even though cities with bases are most subject to the noise and dangers from them, they are also most economically dependent on them (NYT, 1386, 9/9/96).

Others said they had not voted because the question on the ballot was vague and poorly phrased. People were asked whether they agreed with or were opposed to a consolidation and reduction of the American bases and a review of the Status of Forces Agreement, which specifies the rights of American military personnel in Japan (NYT, 1386, 9/9/96).

The wording of the referendum is so vague that few Okinawans are likely to vote against it. Critics say the vote will be meaningless since it does not address key questions now rolling Okinawa: Do islanders want a complete and immediate U.S. pullout or a gradual reduction of forces? What industry would place the lost income from the bases? Would the bases be relocated to mainland Japan, and, if so, who would accept them? (LAT, 1260, 9/5/96)

An earlier article of the LAT similarly indicated problems with the content of the referendum, noting that "the referendum's wording is so general that the Okinawan public is expected to approve it by an overwhelming margin" (LAT, 1190, 8/29/96).

As for the results of the referendum, the NYT reports that although there was an overwhelming ratio of the votes in favor of a reduction, "the message was muted by a low voter turnout of 59.5 percent" (NYT, 1386, 9/8/96).

The only positive report of the referendum was to be found in the LAT:

But the referendum was also seen as a chance to gain cultural recognition and the respect that islanders feel is still being denied them. Most of all, it is the first opportunity in a century for Okinawans to shape their own political fate (LAT, 1329, 9/8/96).

The statement above also shows well the enthusiasm and excitement of the Okinawan people who committed themselves to seeking the reduction and realignment of the U.S. bases on their island.

To conclude, the impressions that readers receive from the majority of articles on the referendum could probably be labeled negative. On the whole, with the exception of the WP, the newspapers effectively presented the position of those opposed to the anti-base movement on Okinawa. In particular, the complicated feelings of those who oppose the withdrawal of the U.S. troops found expression mostly in the context of financial reasons. Some of the reports indeed pointed out the problems of the referendum, and those were valid arguments worthy of presentation. However, one cannot deny that there was an unbalanced allotment of both the facts and the people's opinions. Because the focus of the referendum stories were more on negative aspects than on positive aspects, overwhelmingly the articles projected the image that there were more people who were against the reduction of the bases than those who were in favor of reduction of the bases.

I. Matters Related to U.S.F.J. on Okinawa

There are three major arguments that the three papers share in common in their coverage of matters related to U.S.F.J. on Okinawa. First, they insinuate the inept handling of the Japanese government and its inability to defuse the Okinawa problem. They

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criticize the ambiguous attitude of the Japanese government in their coping with the Okinawa issue, especially the lack of determination and decisiveness in educating the nationals on the importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. In addition, the papers typically support their argument by citing the Okinawans' annoyance towards the Japanese government:

“What is striking, however, is the widespread anger not at the Americans but at the national government in Tokyo” (LAT, 1329, 9/8/96).

Other examples are as follows:

Japanese officials privately say they desperately want to keep the American bases, but in public Japanese political leaders have been silent about explaining the reasons for the American military presence. As a result, the image presented on Japanese television is that Americans are far more enthusiastic about maintaining the bases than Japan is (NYT, 34, 11/2/95).

Ota blamed Tokyo bureaucrats--not U.S. generals--for being unwilling to change conditions so that the bases are less disruptive to Okinawans. The Americans have indicated that they would comply with Japanese requests, he said, but the Japanese government has not asked for concessions (LAT, 1260, 9/5/96).

Second, they repeatedly assert, along with presentation of supportive facts, that the U.S. is making the utmost efforts to lessen the inconvenience or disturbance caused by the U.S. military presence. This can be seen in examples such as the following:

Polls show rising support for the military partnership between

the two counties, and many Japanese seem to have concluded that America made a good-faith effort to resolve the problems on Okinawa and that not much more needs to be done (NYT, 862, 5/25/96).

The efforts [of U.S. military to "control crime and what some Okinawans view as obnoxious behavior"] seem to be paying off in some respects. Arrests of American military personnel for committing serious crimes like murder, rape and theft have dropped by more than half in the last year (NYT, 1414, 9/11/96).

Finally, the most dominant argument that prevails through the articles of the three papers is the importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Reiterated messages that underscore the significance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty clarify those papers' stance towards the Okinawa issues:

"The rape triggered a long overdue debate in Japan about whether the alliance was necessary following the end of the cold war," Mr. Mondale said. "As the debate went on, the answer came in the affirmative, stronger than ever. So I believe there's some greater depth underpinning this alliance as a result of that debate (NYT, 862, 5/25/96)."

While there is feverish discussion about what to do with American troops, there is little public discussion of what Japan would do if they went home. But many military analysts say the inevitable result would be that Japan would bolster its own forces-- and that could trigger a regional arms race (WP, 80, 11/15/95).

The United States and Japan, [Yukihiko Ikeda, Japanese foreign minister] said, will make "the utmost effort to try to prevent

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the Okinawa incident from becoming an obstacle to the vital U.S. role in the region" (WP, 237, 1/21/96).

The above three arguments possibly reflect the underlying principles of the three papers in their coverage of Okinawa-related matters. The following are relevant statements from each paper:

American military behavior in Japan has generally been good since the occupation in 1945. It would be a mistake to let instances of criminal behavior undercut the common Japanese and American objectives of preserving the peace in East Asia (NYT, 33, 10/28/95).

Meanwhile it creates an unhealthy situation in which the United States is sometimes made to look more concerned for Japan's security than the Japanese, and more obliged for the fact and the inevitable frictions of foreign bases (WP, 35, 11/6/95).

Tokyo and Washington agree that their security interests require a continued strong U.S. military presence. They also agree that a reduced reliance on Okinawa bases is desirable. The challenge for Hashimoto or his successor is to shape the political consensus that's needed to shift some U.S. forces from Okinawa to the main islands (LAT, 1413 9/11/96).

To summarize, there is a dominant tone throughout the articles covering matters related to U.S.F.J. on Okinawa that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is indispensable for peace-keeping in East Asia and that a reduction of the current 100,000 U.S. troops in the area is inconceivable. Thus, the Okinawa issue is presented as an issue that should be compensated for or resolved as a domestic matter.

The papers are also inclined to imply that the U.S. has made so much effort and compromise in order to appease the Okinawans that there is not much left for the U.S. to do. This implication may have contributed to the creation of the image among readers that the Japanese government is so dependent on the U.S. that it is incapable of defusing the Okinawa problem on its own.

J. Conclusion

In conclusion of this chapter on the foreign newspaper coverage of Okinawa-related matters, it can be said that as a whole the newspapers appeared to be sympathetic to Okinawans while at the same time they were critical of the poor handling of issues by the Japanese government. They also appeared not to support the reduction and realignment of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa, but instead firmly adhered to the significance and value of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Surprisingly, the papers did not approach the Okinawa issue from the standpoint of human rights, and did not focus on the Okinawan people's right to have a safe and peaceful living environment. On this point, the papers did not reflect the Okinawan people's desire. Improving their living environment is the first priority for the Okinawan people, but that means principally mitigating the dangers and inconveniences that daily threaten their lives. Many Okinawans want to lessen their burden of the U.S. military bases and the problems that derive from the bases, problems which infringe upon their human rights. The revision of SOFA is what the Okinawans really want. Thus, Washington and Tokyo's argument that bases in Okinawa are essential in keeping peace in Asia seems to the Okinawans to be an issue remote from what they are themselves

confronting. They seek first to secure safety in their own lives. Thus, the way the three papers approached the Okinawa problem did not convey Okinawans' pressing desire.

Moreover, despite the descriptions of historical background in a couple of articles, the focus on each story was either one-sided or out of focus. The NYT reported well the brutality of the Japanese military towards Okinawans during W.W.II., but it did not mention unfair treatment by the U.S. military, such as forceful expropriation of land, during the following period of occupation. As in other articles, the NYT's critical stance towards the Japanese Government was obviously a focal point in the article. However, without mentioning both governments' unfair treatment of the Okinawans, it is impossible to convey the Okinawans' point of view accurately. Similarly, focusing on historical events of 300 or 400 years ago does not contribute much to the understanding of the current Okinawa problem. The problems today derive from the U.S. military presence, not from the Japanese invasion of Okinawa in the 17th century.

In *Discovering the News*, Michael Shudson wrote that "content of a news story rests on a set of substantive political assumptions, assumptions whose validity is never questioned" (Shudson, 184). He says that the environment that has surrounded or is surrounding the journalists is the important key to the building of those assumptions because it has a significant influence on the construction of their "news judgment." Shudson further states that "these assumptions are the hidden message of "objectivity." It could be said that the "assumption" that the journalists had in covering the Okinawa issues is the "indispensable role of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty." Having this firm assumption in their mind, they might have

unconsciously missed, or intentionally overlooked, the importance of reporting those aspects of the historical background of Okinawa which could lead their readers to acquire a deeper insight into Okinawa and its justifiable demands.

V. Coverage of Okinawa Related Matters by Magazine

The rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl on September 4, 1995 was a great shock to the Okinawan people. One can say that the incident resulted in a social upheaval to the people of Okinawa in the following year. The rape incident quickly snowballed into a huge anti-base movement; the Okinawan people called for the revision of Article 19, paragraph C, of 1960 Status of Forces Agreement and the reduction and realignment of the U.S. military bases on Okinawa. These two demands were not fulfilled on the national level, however, on the prefectural level, they paved the way for a referendum on the reduction of U.S. bases held on September 8, 1996, which was Japan's first prefecture-wide plebiscite. Also, after the rape case, Governor Masahide Ota of Okinawa refused to sign legal documents that would force a few recalcitrant local landlords to renew their leases on U.S. installations. It also developed into an unprecedented court battle between the central government and the Okinawan government. Furthermore, when a land lease of a local landowner expired in April 1996, it engendered an anomalous situation in which the central government occupied a land without any legal bases. The expiry of the land lease evolved into one of the international (diplomatic) problems between the U.S. and Japan.

One cannot deny that there was an overbearing burden of U.S. military bases on the Okinawan people extended more than 50 years in the background of such a series of political issues. Constant

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occurrence of crime and accidents caused by U.S. military personnel and dependants gave the Okinawan people "indescribable humiliation and terror in their daily lives" (Time, 11/6/95). Also, derived from "huge areas of U.S. bases" which "sprawl across one-fifth of Okinawan's crowded main island," and "restrictions on air spaces and sea lanes" was described as "It feels more like a colony on the verge of rebellion" (Time, 11/6/95).

To those who live in Okinawa and study Okinawa problem, the rape case seems to be both a human rights as well as a constitutional issue (refer to *Okinawa kara mita heiwa kenpo* by Tetsumi Takara Miraisha, 1997 and *Kindai Okinawa no Seishinshi* by Teruo Hiyane by Shakaihyouronsha 1996). On the contrary, foreign magazines seem to view it primarily as a diplomatic concern as related to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and the Japanese defense system. The anti-base sentiment that this incident engendered in the local people did not seem to be reflected in the coverage by foreign magazines, which emphasized the importance of firm security ties between the two nations:

Okinawa's problems cut to the highly sensitive issue of Washington-Tokyo relations. Although strained by the rape incident, continual trade friction and recent charges of CIA spying on Japanese officials, the alliance remains solid in one vital area: an agreement about mutual strategic interests - and the continued presence of U.S. forces in the region (Newsweek, 11/13/95).

Time also refers to the Okinawa issue as follows:

From Washington's standpoint, Okinawa is one of the important bases it has overseas. The 28,000 U.S. sailors, Marines and

airmen stationed on the island are key to the defense of South Korea, where the danger from North Korea is still genuine. They also serve as security for the rest of the region (11/6/95).

There seem to be mainly two perceptions concerning the Okinawa problem in foreign writers' minds, as represented in the above two examples. Firstly, they stress the importance of solidarity in military affairs between the U.S. and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. Secondly, they hold that a military presence on Okinawa is essential to the national security of the United States.

On the other hand, they warn against any future Japanese military expansion in the East Asia region.

This train of thought is also reflected in a stated fear of Japanese nuclear armament in the event of U.S. troop withdrawal from Okinawa. *The Economist* wrote:

From showing Japan's determination to contribute more to the American alliance, the review sees cuts in the numbers of troops, ships and fighter aircraft provided by Japan. This will encourage those Americans who say that only the withdrawal of American troops will make Japan do more for its own defence. The more that argument gathers pace, the closer Asia gets to an alarming arms race. Deprived of American protection, and facing a nuclear China, Japan would go nuclear too. So, in turn, might South Korea, Taiwan and who knows else. Japan's defence planners should try again (12/2/95).

The same fear is stated in the *Newsweek*:

Common security goals lock Japan and the United States into a tight, if sometimes uncomfortable, embrace, which the Pentagon

has no interest in relaxing. Without U.S. forces, Tokyo would rearm, possibly with nuclear weapons. A retrenchment in Asia would also lead to a reduction of the defense budget. Inevitably, the feelings of the Okinawans will count for less than the needs of the two big powers (11/13/95).

Eventually, the Okinawa problem comes down to whether or not the U.S. and other developed nations as well as Asian countries can dispel all the apprehensions about Japan's nuclear armament. Or as J.N. Mak, director of research at the Malaysian Institute of Maritime Affairs, succinctly puts it:

"You (Asian people) want to keep the Japanese military genie in the bottle" (Time, 11/6/95).

This is the so-called "genie in the bottle," argument, which postulates that the U.S. military presence acts as a deterrent to Japanese military expansion in Asia.

Foreign magazine articles also show a pervasive bias against the Okinawan people. From the sociological point of view, one cannot conclude that the expressions are wrong. However, they do reflect a deep-rooted prejudice.

Representative of this is the picture of the "burning Stars and Stripes" on the cover of *Time* on November 6, 1995. The headline read "The Fury Mounts." This gives readers an impression of anti-Americanism, which does not necessarily convey the feelings of the majority of the Okinawans toward Americans after the rape, even if it does represent the feelings of the Japanese toward Americans half a century before. It is no exaggeration to say that this picture is anachronistic and "malicious," and not congruous with the

sentiment of the Okinawan people. No Okinawans would endorse the act of burning a foreign flag.

Moreover, headlines such as "Yankees Get Lost" and "Yankee Go Home" rubbed the Okinawan people's feelings the wrong way. A majority of Japanese know that such remarks and expressions are derogatory to foreign countries. In a sense, Okinawans feel that such expressions should remain unspoken. In fact, no individual uttered these words and no one heard such remarks in rallies and demonstration marches, even in October 1995 when the anti-base movement was at its peak. The usage of such language in a magazine, especially when inaccurate, is discriminatory in itself-against the Okianwan people.

The same argument could apply to a *Newsweek* article of November 13, 1995. The accompanying photograph of the rally of October 21, 1995 was on a double spread title page and bore the title of "Yankee, Go Home." Judging from the testimonies of the people involved and the coverage of the rally, there was no evidence that such slogans were chanted.

Newsweek ran a special feature story with the headline "Battle of Okinawa II" on October 2, 1995. Some Okinawans might be hurt or offended by the headline. The editor might have thought that the headline stands out rhetorically, but to those who attempt to verify the historical aspects of the battle of Okinawa, it is something that causes unjust grief. Even if this were a new "Battle of Okinawa," it does not justify the acts of the three servicemen, who abducted and raped an elementary school child, and that of the United States that allowed it to happen.

Not only headlines and photographs, but also articles contained expressions which can be nothing else but prejudice. For example:

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Okinawa may be a sovereign part of Japan, but it feels more like a colony on the verge of rebellion (Time, 11/6/95).

They are widely viewed as second-class citizens, despite the terrible suffering they endured in the three-month Imperial Japanese forces in 1945 (Time, 11/6/95).

Other examples of problematic expressions are as follows:

In 1879 they were colonized by Japanese invaders from the north. In 1945 American soldiers drove the Japanese out in one of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific war. . . . (Time 11/6/95).

Such descriptions promote a mistaken impressions that Okinawa was a colony of mainland Japan. Furthermore, the article titled "Dreams of Silk, Spices and Self-Respect," in *Newsweek* referring to the "grand design of a cosmopolitan city," is something that could be associated with the never-ending dreams of great voyage days. It is no exaggeration to say that there is a huge discrepancy between the "ideals" of the Okinawan people as presented by foreign writers and the true wish of the Okinawans. Such expressions are representative of discrimination against Asians in general, and Japanese and Okinawans in particular, who are dealt with in one dimensional stereotypical terms.

Then there is the monumental faux-pas of Admiral Richard Macke, Commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific. In a remarkable display of insensitivity, he stated: "I've said several times, for the price they paid to rent the car they could have had a girl" (*Newsweek* 11/27/95).

These remarks are demeaning to women in general not only because of the explicit assignment of a commercial status to women, but also because of the implication that there are prostitutes around U.S. military bases.

In the year after the rape, the representation of the Okinawan people in magazines in the English speaking regions of the world has been rather anachronistic and stereotypical. Such a shallow and superficial analysis of Okinawans cannot adequately convey the "in-describable humiliation and terror in their daily lives" (Time 11/6/95).

I can swear that there are no Okinawans who identify themselves as "the descendants of the Ryukyu Kingdom" (Newsweek, 9/13/96).

VI. Conclusion

The rape of a 12-year-old by three U.S. servicemen in September 1995 aggravated the already difficult situation that had developed between the U.S. and Okinawa as a consequence of half a century of U.S. military presence in Okinawa. News of the rape triggered a train of demonstrations including a rally of 85,000 people that took place in Ginowan City on October 21, 1995. The orderly rally called for tightened discipline over the U.S. military personnel and their dependents and eradication of crimes caused by them, an adequate restitution for the girl, urgent revision of the SOFA, and the reduction and realignment of the U.S. military bases. During the period of one year, September 1995 to September 1996, the Okinawa problem became a focal interest for the world. A preponderant amount of information on Okinawa, unprecedented since the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, was published, broadcast, and made

available through the Internet. Foreign media's contribution to this dissemination of Okinawa-related information was immense. However, from the viewpoint of two local media researchers, the coverage of Okinawa by foreign media, as described here for two newswire services, three U.S. newspapers, and four weekly magazines, did not reflect the real plight of Okinawa and the complicated sentiment of the Okinawan people towards the U.S. military presence.

The coverage by the newswire services initially appears "objective" because they reported only factual information of the events related to Okinawa problem. Yet upon closer investigation, the reports seemed more "superficial" than "objective" because of the absence of deep historical background, specifically failure to provide adequate accounts of the Battle of Okinawa and the U.S. occupation of Okinawa. There was also misleading information, such information concerning the land area occupied by U.S. bases on Okinawa and descriptions of the Okinawan people as "Anti-American." Closer investigation of newswire agencies' reports also revealed that the focus of stories and selection of sentences differentiated the AP articles from AFP articles. Whereas the Associated Press (AP) articles seemed inclined towards the U.S. Government, as evident from subtle and persistent criticism of the Japanese Government, by contrast Agence France Presse (AFP) articles appeared more neutral because issues were presented from many aspects and opinions from various positions were represented.

The newspapers' coverage was critical of the Japanese Government, which was said to have been incompetent in diffusing the Okinawa problem and educating its citizens on the significance and value of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. For all three newspapers,

the fundamental, pervasive theory that was sustained throughout the year's articles was apparently the indispensability of the U.S.-Japan Security and the Okinawa military bases for "maintain[ing] peace" though a stable military-based order in East Asia. As a consequence, Okinawan people's human rights and desire to have a peaceful environment were ignored in the report of all three papers. Although there were a couple of articles which included historical background, those were either insufficient or ineffective for confronting the issues which are relevant for an understanding of the situation in Okinawa.

From the standpoint of the two local media researchers, the coverage by weekly newsmagazines was rather prejudiced. The main stress of the weekly newsmagazines was also on the importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The magazines further underscored the claim that the U.S. military is in Okinawa at the behest of the Japanese Government. When discussing the significance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the magazines suggested that Japan would arm itself again without the treaty. Their pretext is that if Japan moves toward nuclear armament, that would instigate an arms race in East Asia, eventually causing militaristic disorder in the area. Discussion of the already abridged human rights of the Okinawans, who have long suffered from crime and dangers derived from the U.S. military presence, was certainly not robust in those news magazines. Other evidence of prejudice can be found in the descriptions of the Okinawans. Okinawans are depicted as "anti-American" instead of "anti-U.S. bases." Some of the derogatory remarks, allegedly uttered by most Okinawans who participated in a series of demonstrations, are only stereotypical perceptions of Okinawans by foreign journalists rather than the accurate reflection

of the characteristics of the Okinawans.

As a consequence, the image of Okinawa projected in foreign media seems rather negative. Accordingly, the likely image received from the articles is that Okinawans are "poor" people whose government has hugely relied on income from U.S. bases, and that the Okinawans are extremely emotional and prejudiced people who chant derogatory remarks at Americans and or burn an American flag. Some of the articles picked up only a small portion of events caused by a few extreme advocates from mainland Japan who were refrained by the Okinawans. This perceptive gap between the local people and the foreign journalists is a consequence of a lack of understanding of (1) the problems derived from the heavy U.S. military presence, (2) the unfair management of those problems due to SOFA, (3) Okinawan's strong desire to create peaceful environment, and (4) relevant historical background of Okinawa. Without adequate understanding of these areas, in particular, the significance of relevant historical events and conditions, one cannot possibly describe the resentment and antagonism of the Okinawans. The contribution of the foreign media to the dissemination of the Okinawa problem was immense, but the greater and more penetrating reflection of the actual and historical situation of Okinawa and its people is necessary.

Although as local media researchers we have found this investigation of a year's news coverage of Okinawa-related issues to have been valuable and instructive, it is only with regret that we acknowledge that concurrent study and examination of the foreign media's coverage of Okinawa issues was what was most sorely needed. Had such investigation been attempted and accomplished at the time of intense coverage of Okinawa-related issues, it might have been possible to reflect more accurately the local people's perspectives

and their desires might possibly have been better met. In order to lessen the gap in perception and understanding, which exists between the people inside and outside Okinawa, it is necessary not only to report on Okinawa as seen from the outside but also to dispatch from within Okinawa information which is both relevant and timely. This is a task and goal appropriate to the age of global communication. Through researching and writing this paper, we poignantly felt the need to launch truly interactive communications with the outside world, recognizing that such outward-directed self-expression is vital in the context of global communication, and that compositely such communication will eventually lead to mutual understanding among all peoples of the world.

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