

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

在日米軍の削減可能性を探る研究

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REPORT TO CONGRESS

APRIL 1990

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INTRODUCTION

The United States remains a Pacific power with wide-ranging interests in East Asia, a region whose global importance continues to grow each year. We have invested heavily in the region since the Second World War in political, military, and economic terms, assisting in the development of democratic, market-oriented governments. We have active mutual security agreements with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and have established non-treaty security relationships with several other countries. Economically, the region has surpassed Europe as America's largest trading partner, and the margin of difference continues to grow (Fig. 1).

In fact, our success over the years, globally as well as in the Pacific Rim, has been a key contribution to the evolution of the new politico-military conditions that now require us to review our forward-based defense posture.


Within the East Asian and Pacific region, traditional threat perceptions are changing. In Asia, unlike NATO, a region-wide consensus has never existed about the threat posed by the Soviet Union or about other sources of regional instability. However, since our forward deployments have been most commonly justified as a deterrent to Soviet expansionism, our presence in the region is now seen as less relevant in light of domestic changes within the USSR and prospects for U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations. Moreover, nationalist sentiment is on the rise in a number of prosperous Asian nations. Leaders in these countries must contend with influential public opinion that views continued U.S. military presence on their soil as an affront to their sovereignty.

Clearly, important U.S. domestic considerations also must be taken into account. Significant reductions in the defense budget, generated by domestic perceptions of a diminished Soviet threat as well as by fiscal pressures, are probable. At the same time, it is appropriate to expect our prosperous Asian allies—Japan and Korea—to assume greater responsibility for their own defense and, by so doing, to contribute more directly to the stability of the region.

In response to the requirement contained in the FY 1990 Defense Authorization Act, this report discusses specific ways our Asian allies can increase their participation in regional stability and how we can reduce and restructure our military presence in East Asia. Using the specific questions raised in the legislation as a broad framework, this report outlines the rationale for a continued military presence in the Asia-Pacific region over the next decade. Based on our national security objectives and our projections of

regional conditions, we conclude that abrupt and major changes in our security posture would be destabilizing. Nonetheless, adjustments to our forward deployed force structure can and should be made to accommodate changing global, regional and domestic realities. The report lays out the parameters for force restructuring and reductions in the Asia-Pacific region over the next decade. Within these parameters, it will be the responsibility of the principal military commanders involved to organize their forces to accomplish the missions and objectives we identify.

Figure 1
U.S. TRANSATLANTIC AND TRANSPACIFIC TRADE
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)



STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT—PAST AND PRESENT

At the end of World War II, we were the predominant power militarily and economically on the Asia-Pacific rim, a position we held unchallenged for over two decades. Our national security objectives centered on defending American territory as far forward as possible, containing the Soviet Union and protecting strategic allies. Our military strategy to accomplish these objectives, dictated largely by time-distance factors, has been to forward deploy forces to permanent base infrastructures, primarily in Japan, Korea and the Philippines. We have complemented our presence through the development of strategic security relationships (Fig. 2). Recognizing the disparate cultures, political systems, and levels of economic development among our friends in the region, we chose to develop a network of mostly bilateral security relationships rather than a large collective arrangement such as NATO.

Our strategy has been successful. For example, in addition to performing our most highly visible mission of containing the Soviet Union, we have deterred another outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula. In broader terms, our presence has contributed to regional peace, stability, and prosperity by providing the balance necessary to ensure that no single state assumed a hegemonic position. A notable exception to our success was the Vietnam conflict. The Vietnam experience reduced U.S. willingness to commit military force in certain situations, and to some extent, those inhibitions remain. Despite this setback, the combination of American economic power and a regional military

Figure 2
SECURITY TREATY COMMITMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
(By Region of the World)

Europe	Middle East	Africa	Asia*	Americas
NATO			Japan	Rio Pact
			Korea	
			Philippines	
			Thailand	
			ANZUS	

* Asian treaties are bilateral except for ANZUS: however, even under ANZUS, the U.S. has suspended its security obligations to New Zealand.

NOTE 1: The Rio Pact involves 21 countries of Latin America; NATO has 15 members in Europe.

NOTE 2: Besides the above treaties, the United States also has obligations to defend the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia which are Freely Associated States with the United States.

Figure 3
JAPANESE DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)
(Millions of Dollars)

	1986	1987	1988
Asia	2493.54	3415.88	4034.35
Middle East	339.82	526.00	582.52
Central & South America	316.54	417.99	399.29

presence gave us a leading voice in Asian affairs. Under the American aegis, an environment supportive of economic development and democracy has produced increasingly positive results.

Over the past twenty years, the Asia-Pacific rim has undergone remarkable changes, most of them favorable to the United States. The Soviet Union, while still the major threat in Asia, no longer is perceived as the serious menace it was during the 1970's and 1980's. China went through a decade of opening to the West and economic reform which showed tremendous promise, only to retreat to repressive measures to sustain the regime, even at the expense of the entire nation's development. However, China continues to place military modernization at the bottom of its list of four "modernizations" and thus its posture does not currently present a major military threat. The Republic of Korea has been transformed from a war-ravaged nation into an economic powerhouse with the potential to play the lead role in its own defense. Japan is unquestionably an economic superpower—the world's largest creditor and, along with the United States, one of the two largest providers of economic assistance (Fig. 3). Japan's capabilities to provide for its own territorial defense and provide this economic assistance for the development of its regional neighbors have significantly increased and will also be a major factor in enhancing regional stability. Vietnam no longer actively threatens its neighbors, and, except for the Philippines and Cambodia, communist insurgencies have generally disappeared in Southeast Asia.

While virtually all non-Soviet allies in the region today want us to maintain a strong presence, most nations, for reasons of national pride, increasingly desire to be less reliant on the United States. This growing sense of independence, combined with changing threat perceptions and U.S. fiscal constraints, have led to increased scrutiny of the rationale for our continued military presence in Asia.

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC SCENE

The 1990's will be a decade of transition in the Asia-Pacific region. Political volatility and turbulence will characterize key countries—China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, Cambodia and the Philippines to name a few. Political uncertainties are exacerbated by the major changes in generational leadership that will occur, such as in China, North Korea, Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia. Intensified economic competition within the region and with the United States will increasingly complicate security relationships. Moscow will undoubtedly be a more active player in the Asian diplomatic arena as it seeks to further mend ties with Beijing and obtain financial and technological aid from Japan and South Korea. Overall, for the United States, the decade will present opportunities, and important challenges: maintaining our security arrangements; meeting stiff technological and economic competition; containing Soviet influence; and managing, with fewer resources, the process of change.

The Soviet Union is conducting unilateral force reductions that should reduce Moscow's capability to conduct a limited ground offensive against the PRC, thereby mitigating an impediment to better relations. The U.S.S.R. is also clearly reducing its modest force posture in Southeast Asia by withdrawing some aircraft and ships from Cam Ranh Bay. In the Soviet Far East Military District which fronts Japan, however, Soviet capabilities still appear to far exceed those needed for defense (Fig. 4). However, at least in the short term, Soviet modernization programs, particularly air and naval, ensure a continued threat to our interests, and allies, and forces in Northeast Asia.

Soviet preoccupation with events in Eastern Europe has not detracted from Soviet interest in Asia, as demonstrated by Premier Ryzhkov's February 1990 tour of the region. Moscow's attention and initiative will most likely increase as Gorbachev's proposed 1991 visit to Japan approaches. The issue of the Northern Territories remains the single greatest obstacle to an improved Soviet-Japanese relationship.

The U.S.-Japan relationship remains the critical linchpin of our Asian security strategy. The relationship, however, could be further strained during the decade by persistent trade problems and charges of unfair competition. Japan will seek a greater role in international decision making, principally in the economic arena, but also on political issues in which Tokyo has special interests—particularly Asian issues. As Japan extends its regional economic influence, latent regional concerns may resurface. Increases in Japanese military strength undertaken to compensate for declining U.S. capabilities in the region could prove worrisome to regional nations, especially if they perceive Japan is acting independent of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

The Korean Peninsula will remain one of the world's potential military flashpoints. The North has retained its reunification objectives, devoting an extraordinary percentage of its national wealth and maintaining a favorable military balance with over a million men under arms, at the expense of the welfare of its citizens (Fig. 5). It belligerently defies the international trend towards freedom and democracy witnessed elsewhere. North and South Korea will continue to engage in competing military modernization programs, with the Soviet Union remaining the primary source of sophisticated weaponry for Pyongyang. While Seoul is economically capable of matching Pyongyang's military buildup, the defense budget must now compete with other programs in South Korea's fledgling democracy.

Figure 4

TABLE OF SOVIET FORCES IN ASIA

Ground Forces	
Maneuver Divisions	48
Artillery Divisions	3
Tanks	11,500
Artillery	12,500
Helicopters	1,100
Pacific Fleet	
Total Ships, Vessel and Craft	875
SSB/BN	26
Other Subs	94
Carriers	2
Cruisers	11
Destroyers	8
Frigates	56
Minor Combatants	202
Amphibious	21
Support/Misc. Craft	455
Combat Aircraft/Helicopters	345
Naval Infantry Divisions	1
Air Forces	
Bombers	215
Fighters/Attack Aircraft	890
Air Defense Fighters	590

Figure 5

NORTH KOREAN-SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY COMPARISON

January 1990

	North Korea	South Korea
Ground Forces		
Personnel	930,000	550,000
Infantry Divisions	30	21
Independent Infantry Brigades	4	3
Truck Mobile Divisions/Brigades	1/20	2/0
Armored Brigades	15	1
Reserve Infantry Divisions	26	23
Medium and Light Tanks	3,500	1,500
Armored Personnel Carriers	1,940	1,500
Artillery (Tubes)	7,200	4,000
Multiple Rocket Launchers	2,500	37
Surface-to-Surface Missile Launchers	54	12
Antiaircraft Artillery	8,000	600
Surface-to-Air Missile Sites/Missiles	54/800	34/210
Air Force		
Personnel	70,000	40,000
Jet Fighters	750	480
Bombers	80	0
Transports	275	34
Helicopters (including Army)	280	280
Navy:		
Personnel	40,000	60,000
Attack Submarines	23	0
Destroyers	0	11
Frigates	2	17
Corvettes	4	0
Missile Attack Boats	29	11
Torpedo Craft	173	0
Coastal Patrol	157	79
Mine Warfare	40	9
Amphibious Craft	126	52
Total Personnel	1,040,000	650,000

Personnel figures shown here are those published in 1989 by the International Institute of Strategic Studies

A decision by Pyongyang to pursue a nuclear weapons capability would be extremely destabilizing. Uncertainty surrounds the North Korean succession issue, which could increase the prospects for unpredictable behavior—including the use of military force. Despite these compelling reasons for continued concern, progress is possible toward either peaceful reunification or a reduction in tensions by implementing a series of confidence building measures.

Chinese political dynamics will likely be volatile as Deng Xiaoping passes from the scene and various factions contend for control. While specific policies toward Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Vietnam will remain of concern throughout the decade, Beijing's strategy calls for a "peaceful international environment" and trade with market-oriented countries such as Japan and South Korea. However, some older generation leaders, more doctrinaire in outlook, appear willing to return to more isolationist policies of "self-reliance," especially now that orthodox ideology is once again dominant in Chinese decision making circles. Elements of the current leadership are also willing to retreat from reforms achieved over the past ten years to maintain internal control.

In Southeast Asia, the outlook for continued growth and stability is generally good, with some notable exceptions. A lasting resolution to the Cambodian problem continues to be problematic. Vietnam has instituted significant economic reforms, but not political reforms, and is in the midst of major generational leadership changes of uncertain outcome. While it is making active efforts to strengthen its ties to non-communist governments, it is unclear whether Hanoi is abandoning its longstanding goal of enforcing hegemony over Indochina.

Other longstanding regional problems with destabilizing potential persist. Unresolved territorial issues include the Spratly and Paracel Islands. Racial and ethnic tensions in multi-racial nations could warrant extra-regional attention. Historical enmity between various Asian states will remain a factor in the development of intra-regional relations. Growing prominence of new regional powers, such as India, is leading to regional anxiety. Proliferation of modern weaponry and missile technology could turn minor disputes into conflicts of major concern. Destabilizing arms sales and technology transfer, both to and from the region, will continue. Finally, illegal narcotics trafficking will pose a major problem.

U.S. REGIONAL ROLE AND OBJECTIVES

Despite the decade of change that we foresee, our regional interests in Asia will remain similar to those we have pursued in the past: protecting the United States from attack; supporting our global deterrence policy; preserving our political and economic access; maintaining the balance of power to prevent the rise of any regional hegemony; strengthening the Western orientation of the Asian nations; fostering the growth of democracy and human rights; deterring nuclear proliferation; and ensuring freedom of navigation. The principal elements of our Asian strategy—forward deployed forces, overseas bases, and bilateral security arrangements—will remain valid and essential to maintaining regional stability, deterring aggression, and preserving U.S. interests.

We do not bear this role and retain these forward forces only because we are concerned over the vacuum which would be created if we were no longer there, although that is a source of concern. Nor are we merely motivated by altruism. Simply, we must play this role because our military presence sets the stage for our economic involvement in this region. With a total two-way transPacific trade exceeding 300 billion dollars annually, almost 50 percent more than our transAtlantic trade, it is in our own best interest to help preserve peace and stability.

In the changing global and regional environment of the 1990's, superpower confrontation should diminish. In Asia, which has always been an economy of force theater for U.S. military operations (Fig. 6), the size, disposition, and rationale for our forward deployed forces will be increasingly scrutinized. Nevertheless, in spite of a real and/or perceived reduction of the Soviet threat, what has previously been a traditional aspect of our military presence in the region—the role of regional balancer, honest broker, and ultimate security guarantor—will assume greater relative importance to stability. Over the next decade, as a new global order takes shape, our forward presence will continue to be the region's irreplaceable balancing wheel.

No other power is currently able or acceptable to play such a role, and a U.S. reluctance to continue in this role would be inherently destabilizing. A diminution of U.S. commitment to regional stability, whether perceived or real, would create a security vacuum that other major players would be tempted or compelled to fill. Such a scenario would likely produce a regional arms race and a climate of confrontation. Our policies—political, economic, and military—should evolve to avoid such a possibility and to support our unique and central stabilizing role.

Figure 6
FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES

NOTE: Numbers have been rounded for ease of display.

WORLDWIDE			
Command	Total Personnel	Forward Deployed	Forward Deployed as % of Total Force ¹
Europe	341,000	341,000 ²	16.0%
Pacific	362,000	135,000 ³	6.3%
Other Non-CONUS Commands	34,000	34,000 ⁴	1.6%

¹ Total force is 2.13 million.

² This number includes 21,000 personnel afloat.

³ This number includes 25,000 personnel afloat, but does not include 8,000 personnel assigned to Guam.

⁴ This number includes 12,000 deployed to Africa and Near East/South Asia; 21,000 deployed to the Western Hemisphere; and 500 stationed in the USSR, Eastern Europe and Antarctica.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC⁵

Country	Total Personnel	Forward Deployed	Percentage of PACOM FWD Deployments
JAPAN	50,000		37.0%
Army Personnel		2,000	
Navy shore-based		7,000	
Marines		25,000	
Air Force		16,000	
KOREA	44,400		32.9%
Army Personnel		32,000	
Navy shore-based		400	
Marines		500	
Air Force		11,500	
PHILIPPINES	14,800		11.0%
Army Personnel		200	
Navy shore-based		5,000	
Marines		900	
Air Force		8,700	
AFLOAT/OTHERWISE FORWARD DEPLOYED			
(25,000 are afloat)			19.1%

⁵ The 135,000 forward deployed personnel do not include 8,000 stationed on Guam.

Throughout the Pacific, our security presence moderates the actions of second-tier states with expansionist regional aspirations. By concentrating on the stabilizing aspects of our regional presence, we not only legitimize that presence, but also provide a rationale for increased cost sharing contributions to regional security by our friends/allies. This, in turn, helps temper traditional suspicions and friction between regional parties.

While our presence cannot guarantee the absence of conflict in the region, it can work to localize and minimize hostilities while providing us necessary diplomatic leverage for conflict resolution. In the regional milieu of the 1990's, this is a U.S. military role which will be understood, endorsed, and supported by virtually all the major regional players.

A changing regional security environment, however, requires us to fine tune our security objectives, both regionally and bilaterally. We will need to restructure our Asian-based forces to fit more accurately the most likely security contingencies of the 1990's.

Regional Peacetime Objectives:

While remaining flexible and alert to evolving circumstances, our fundamental peacetime objectives in the region will be to:

- continue our strategy of forward presence in Asia for the foreseeable future to deter potential aggressors;
- maintain and broaden access to facilities throughout the region;
- maintain regional stability and reduce tensions where possible;
- limit proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, especially on the Korean Peninsula;
- continue to encourage our Asian allies to assume a greater share of the responsibility for regional security and stability; and,
- encourage security cooperation among countries based upon agreed mutual interests.

Regional Wartime Objectives:

In support of our security objectives and national interests in the region, U.S. forces in the Pacific must be able to deter war, or—if deterrence fails—to fight and win. This will increasingly require the collective capabilities of U.S. forces augmented by our Asian allies. Our wartime objectives for East Asia and the Pacific include, but are not limited to:

- defending Alaska, Hawaii, and the connecting lines of communication (LOCs) to the continental United States;
- assisting our allies in regional defense as appropriate;
- maintaining the security of the LOCs throughout the Pacific—especially to the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and the East and South China Seas; and,
- protecting U.S. territories and freely associated states for which the U.S. retains defense responsibilities.

Operational Mission Capabilities:

The United States and its allies must maintain military forces capable of achieving peacetime and wartime objectives throughout the entire spectrum of warfare. Operational mission capabilities for the U.S. include:

- strategic and non-strategic nuclear warfare,
- global and theater conventional warfare,
- unencumbered access to the LOCs,
- force projection, and
- low intensity conflict.

A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE 1990'S & BEYOND

Given these national interests and security objectives, it is essential to position ourselves now to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Our goals in the next decade must be to deal with the realities of constrained defense budgets and a changing threat environment while maintaining our resolve to meet American commitments. In this context, we believe that our forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region will remain critical to deterring war, supporting our regional and bilateral objectives, and performing our military missions. The volatility and uniqueness of the East Asian environment—where the strategic changes in Europe are not mirrored—combined with existing U.S. economy of force, make major force reductions in the Pacific unwise. The 6.3 percent of our total force forward deployed in the Pacific: ensures a rapid and flexible response capability; enables significant economy of force by reducing the number of U.S. units required and allowing allies to share in defense costs; provides an effective logistics base; and demonstrates to our allies and potential enemies a visible U.S. commitment. Consequently, deployment patterns of our forces should remain much as they are.

However we elect to retain our forward deployed presence, the U.S. nuclear umbrella will remain a critical element. In large measure, it has been our nuclear commitment that has slowed nuclear proliferation in the area. Movement away from this commitment would have disastrous effects and could destabilize the entire region.

The Strategic Plan:

A continued, substantial air and naval presence in East Asia is required, but measured reductions of ground and some air forces in Korea, Japan and the Philippines can take place. In the Republic of Korea, while not acting precipitously, and always taking into account the military balance on the peninsula, we will begin to draw down ground presence and modify command structures so as to transition from a leading to a supporting role for U.S. forces. In addition to ground force restructuring, some reduction in our Air Force presence may also be in order, as ROK Air Force capabilities improve. Regardless of the scope of our force reductions, we will continue to encourage the Koreans to increase their defense spending—not only to compensate for our reductions, but also to increase their contribution to the cost of our remaining in-country presence.

In Japan, beyond some personnel reductions, we envision little change in current deployment patterns—

particularly our forces based at Misawa which serve as a deterrent against the Soviet Union; our key logistics hub at Yokota Air Base which supports global and regional contingencies; and our naval facilities at Yokosuka which possess the best naval repair facilities in the western Pacific and act as a naval force multiplier. However, we will continue to press for Japanese force improvements designed to meet our agreed roles and missions concepts, and increased cost sharing.

In Southeast Asia, our projections are clouded by a variety of uncertainties, including the outcome of the Philippine base negotiations, the unsettled Cambodian situation, and the economic and political growth of the ASEAN countries. We will attempt to retain our basing rights in the Philippines, recognizing that our prospects are uncertain. Prudence requires us to explore alternative arrangements—redeployment to U.S. bases elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific, complemented by expanded access agreements such as those we are currently pursuing with Singapore. While such expanded access arrangements do not offer as much capability as permanent bases, they could advance the objectives of spreading the burden of defense cooperation and ensuring our continued presence in the region.

As we look to the future, it is clear that the best approach will require a combination of caution and innovation in order to adjust to regional changes while preserving the required degree of U.S. presence. We believe that a phased approach, capable of responding to global and regional reactions, is the soundest means of accomplishing our strategy. The plan outlined below is designed to meet rapidly changing strategic circumstances, the concerns of friends and allies, and budget realities. Accordingly, a U.S. national security review process will be conducted at the end of each phase to determine how best to proceed with the following phase. Country-specific objectives and force adjustments are outlined in succeeding sections; but in broad terms, we envision the following:

PHASE I—1-3 YEARS:

Thin out the existing force structure and begin rearranging security relationships

- Over the next three years, the Department of Defense will, in a balanced and measured way, restructure and reduce its forces in the region without jeopardizing its ability to meet its security commitments. Adjustments in our combat forces will be minimal. As an interim goal, our overall force total of 135,000 forward deployed in Asia will be reduced by 14,000 to 15,000 personnel.

PHASE II—3-5 YEARS:

Reduce and reorganize the force structure

- During this phase, proportionally greater reductions in combat forces will be undertaken incrementally to ensure that potential adversaries do not misread our deterrent capability and intentions.

PHASE III—5-10 YEARS:

Further reduce forces and stabilize at a somewhat lower level as circumstances permit

- Continue modest cuts beyond Phase II reductions, as appropriate, given existing circumstances.

This general strategy should remain flexible so that it can be modified according to regional responses, particularly from nations where we presently maintain forward deployed forces. Since the vast bulk of these forces in Asia are located in Northeast Asia where the greatest threat exists (North Korea and the USSR), and our security relationships with Korea and Japan are the most complex, we must pay special attention to the nature and timing of changes that we propose there.

Managing the Cost Sharing Issue:

In the area of cost sharing, we expect increasing assistance from our allies. Increased cost sharing is attainable if we proceed on a steady upward slope with phased goals. The best chance of success in obtaining sizable increases is with proposals made with a definite rationale that can be argued logically in the capitals of those allies, primarily Japan and the Republic of Korea, who are in the best economic position to assume additional responsibilities and increase the share of defense costs they bear.

We must avoid the temptation to "decree" that certain levels of Gross National Product or other specific criteria are a "fair share" of the defense cost sharing. Arithmetic formulas for increases based solely on the premise that there are significant trade imbalances or simply that a specific ally "should do more because it has the money" will likely be met with stiff resistance because such approaches can be viewed as challenges to national sovereignty. It will be more productive to demonstrate a clear need and appeal to our allies' sense of national responsibility. A clear definition of the relative roles and missions assured by the United States and particular allies has proven most productive in the past and has the greatest prospect for success over the next decade.

We will work closely with the allies to identify increased responsibilities that can be assumed from the U.S. A key way for the allies to do more is to accept greater responsibility for combined operations, thereby reducing the requirement for part of the U.S. infrastructure associated with the performance of these responsibilities. The Koreans, for example, have already agreed to increase their responsibility in international bodies associated with maintaining the truce, and the Japanese have agreed to provide the U.S. increased space in selected control centers to increase interoperability of the two nations' forces.

Having identified areas where the allies can participate more fully in their own defense, we must work closely with them to ensure they develop the force structure necessary to support their increased role. Since major changes in military forces and increased acquisition of hardware are not achieved overnight, we must be patient yet continue to encourage them to improve their capabilities.

In the interim, both Japan and South Korea can contribute more financially to ease the U.S. burden for mutual defense. We will continue to work with the Japanese and Koreans to pursue specific areas for increased cost sharing. We are also seeking increased commitments from the Japanese for greater contributions to costs involved in maintaining a U.S. forward presence in Japan. Additional initiatives are outlined in the country-specific discussions to follow.

COUNTRY SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

KOREA

The Korean Peninsula represents special problems for our Asia-Pacific strategy initiative. Our specific bilateral security objectives are to:

- deter North Korean aggression or defeat it if deterrence fails;
- reduce political and military tensions on the peninsula by encouraging North-South talks and the institution of a confidence building measures (CBM) regime; and
- transition U.S. forces on the peninsula from a leading to a supporting role, including some force reductions.

Given our objectives as well as the unique constraints, our preferred near-term approach is to focus on identifying military roles and missions currently performed by the U.S. that the ROK can assume. As ROK military strength develops and broadens, some U.S. units can transfer their responsibilities and be drawn down. During the 1990's, we will seek to restructure our forces to a level that will support U.S. interests over the long term.

Phase I—1 to 3 Years:

The status quo on the peninsula that has existed for 37 years is under the terms of an armistice signed by the United Nations Command (UNC), on one hand, and the North Korean armed forces and Chinese People's Volunteers on the other. The UNC must therefore be retained, essentially in its current form.

During this phase, we will begin streamlining our force presence by reducing administrative overhead and phasing out units whose mission can be assumed by the ROK armed forces. U.S. ground force modernization will permit some streamlining of the 2d Infantry Division while preserving its combat capabilities intact. Overall, by the end of this phase, we envision a force reduction of about 7000 personnel including 2,000 Air Force personnel and approximately 5000 ground force personnel.

These reductions are possible because of steady improvements in ROK defense capabilities. Under its current force improvement program (FIP III), South Korea continues to devote about one-third of its defense budget to investments in force upgrades:

- South Korea's defense industry continued the manufacture of its main battle tank and other hardware.

- New artillery tubes were placed in front-line units, allowing older tubes to be rotated into reserve units.
- Two new infantry divisions were formed, and a new artillery brigade was fielded.
- Six Chinook helicopters were acquired, providing the South Korean Army with a new medium to heavy lift capability.
- The acquisition of AH-1 Cobra gunships led to the formation of a new attack helicopter battalion.
- The first Korean combat electronic warfare and intelligence (CEWI) battalion has been activated.
- Over 30 F-4D/E aircraft have been added to the ROK Air Force inventory, and 12 RF-4C aircraft have been acquired, providing an improved tactical reconnaissance capability which will be even more crucial as we remove our RF-4Cs from Korea and retire them.

Phase II—3 to 5 Years:

Toward the end of Phase I, we will reexamine the North Korean threat, evaluate the progress and effects of the changes outlined above, and consider new objectives to be established for Phase II. Restructuring of the 2d Infantry Division will be considered at this point. Changes affecting the combat capability of the division will continue to be considered in terms of the state of North-South relations and improvements in ROK military capabilities.

Phase III—5 to 10 Years:

Assuming successful completion of the earlier phases, the Koreans should be ready to take the lead role in their own defense. As that happens, fewer U.S. forces would be required to maintain deterrence.

Cost Sharing:

In the context of our bilateral security relations, we must also secure from the Koreans greater near-term contributions to the common defense. Specific objectives during this phase include reaching agreement on and beginning ROK funded relocation of U.S. forces out of Seoul, and expanding Korea's share of the costs associated with maintaining U.S. forces on the peninsula.

U.S. cost sharing requests have been presented to ROK Defense Ministry personnel at several meetings, most recently during the visit of Secretary of Defense Cheney to Seoul in February 1990. Our proposals have centered on Korea assuming an increasing share of the won-based costs associated with supporting U.S. forces.

Two key elements of our proposals have been ROKG assumption of indigenous labor costs and an increase in military construction funding. We have also sought greater flexibility in administering the various cost sharing programs already in place.

U.S.-Republic of Korea Consultations:

With the ROK economy thriving, Seoul can now afford to contribute more to its own defense. The consultations on restructuring the ROK-U.S. security relationship held during Secretary of Defense Cheney's visit to Seoul in February 1990 mark the beginning of a process that will ultimately transition U.S. forces from a leading to a supporting role in ROK defense matters. In addition to presenting the phased proposals outlined above, we asked that Seoul substantially increase its contribution to cost sharing.

JAPAN

It is in the U.S. interest to maintain a forward deployed presence in Japan over the long-term for two reasons: the geostrategic location of bases and the cost effectiveness of our presence compared to anywhere else.

While leaving the exact nature of our force structure to the military commanders, in general we see a continued, substantial air and naval presence in Japan, but with possibly measured reductions of ground and some support air forces, particularly in Okinawa. On mainland Japan, we envision little change in current deployment patterns. We will maintain USAF forces at Misawa and a forward-deployed carrier at Yokosuka. We will rationalize use of our bases and facilities on Okinawa with the aim of returning property to improve civil-military relations.

Nevertheless, over the next decade our bilateral relationship will continue to be buffeted by trade disputes, a stubborn trade deficit and fears over the loss of technological competitiveness. Additionally, domestic political constituencies in Japan will continue to challenge the need for and merits of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. Moreover, from the U.S. side, there will be considerable domestic pressure to reduce U.S. presence in Japan unless Japan funds this presence to the maximum appropriate extent.

Key elements of our strategy in Japan are to:

- reduce as possible our force level in Japan while maintaining essential bases which enable us to provide regional stability and deterrence in Northeast Asia;

- continue to encourage Japan to increase its territorial defense capabilities and enhance its ability to defend its sea lanes out to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles, while at the same time discouraging any destabilizing development of a power projection capability;
- engage Japan even more closely in our political efforts with Western allies to maintain stability in key regions of the world, while encouraging Japan's support for regional adjustments, including increased financial support of U.S. forces operating from Japan;
- stress the importance of maintaining interoperability in our military weapons systems by encouraging maximum procurement from the U.S., increasing technology flowback, and discouraging the development of non-complementary systems; and
- increase political-military dialogue and revitalize the security consultative process.

Phase I—1 to 3 Years:

Based upon decisions made by the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) on how he wishes to configure his forces, we will reduce the level of our military presence in Japan in an incremental way while seeking increased Japanese support for our remaining forces. Specific actions include:

- personnel reductions of about some 5,000–6,000, including possible reductions in Okinawa;
- the return to the GOJ of excess facilities, particularly those in Okinawa, through already established procedures.

Phase II—3 to 5 Years:

Contingent upon our allies assuming more responsibilities, and the preservation of regional stability, we will pursue additional efficiencies and reductions.

The Japan Self-Defense Force will be encouraged to improve the quality, but not necessarily quantity, of its force structure through the procurement of advanced weapons systems, improved sustainability, and improved command and control and logistics infrastructure.

Phase III—5 to 10 Years:

Depending upon the state of East-West relations, we could begin to make further reductions in our force presence. U.S. deterrent capabilities in Japan—a

homeported aircraft carrier, strategic lift aircraft, and postured Air Force strike assets—will remain to fulfill our regional and global missions and to honor our treaty commitments.

U.S.-Japan Consultations:

Since U.S. forces in Japan have a regional mission in addition to aiding the defense of Japan, it is extremely difficult to identify the direct costs associated with only the defense of Japan. Japan's contribution has continued to increase over the years (Fig. 7). Because Tokyo now pays approximately 35 to 40 percent of the total costs associated with the U.S. presence in Japan, the case could be made that Tokyo is already paying the direct cost of deploying U.S. forces for its defense. However, because Japan accrues significant benefits from U.S. security efforts regionally and, to a great extent, globally, it is appropriate for the U.S. to seek additional cost sharing.

During Secretary Cheney's February 1990 trip, the GOJ acknowledged its need to do more toward assuming increased host nation support. It is difficult, however, to predict the means and timetable.

During Secretary Cheney's trip, Tokyo expressed appreciation for our close consultations to date. Japan views its security as being guaranteed by U.S. naval forces and Korean security as guaranteed by U.S. ground forces. Marked changes to these forces will impact on Japanese psychology.


A near-term reduction of some 5,000–6,000 personnel in U.S. Forces, Japan is acceptable to Tokyo if the bulk of the cuts are ground or other support units.

Efforts to consolidate facilities and areas on Okinawa are proceeding through the bilateral Facilities Adjustment Panel (FAP) process. The FAP has identified all areas of concern and the U.S. and Japan are acting to resolve them as quickly as possible. Although U.S. forces in Okinawa have the strong support of the national government in Tokyo, local political pressures are taken into consideration by the FAP.

PHILIPPINES

Our facilities in the Philippines form a cornerstone of our regional basing structure and military presence. The facilities also provide U.S. forces significant logistics, maintenance and training support. For the immediate future, we will seek to maintain most of our forces there, although we anticipate that a reduction of approximately 2,000 personnel may be possible.

Figure 7
JAPAN BURDENSHARING
(Billions of Yen)



Nationalist pressures, political uncertainty and U.S. difficulties in meeting Philippine expectations for increased compensation will complicate the negotiations on basing rights. Although a majority of Filipinos support a continued U.S. security presence in the Philippines, some appear to regard recent changes in Europe and the Soviet drawdowns from Cam Ranh Bay as fortuitous events which "justify" a relatively rapid U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines. However, the U.S. presence in the Philippines clearly serves U.S. and Philippine interests beyond containment of the Soviet Union. The Philippines is also assisted by the net benefits injected into its economy.

Although we hope to retain our military presence in the Philippines at least over the mid-term, the Philippine Government could require us to withdraw. Prudence has thus dictated careful study of basing alternatives. No single potential replacement site could accommodate all of the functions now performed in the Philippines, and none would share the strategic Philippine location. Nonetheless, alternatives exist, even if expensive, time consuming to develop, and operationally less effective.

ASEAN

Our objectives for the ASEAN nations (minus the Philippines)—Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei—are to: increase regional security, foster interoperability and good military-to-military relations through expansion of exchanges, combined training and exercises. Expanded access or new basing arrangements with ASEAN could help counterbalance a reduced military presence in the Philippines. However, while ASEAN nations are interested in enhanced bilateral co-operation, most are unlikely to enter into formal security alliances or basing arrangements with the United States. Our goal should be to strengthen our network of bilateral security relationships that will preserve our military presence in the region, meet our global military needs, and achieve our security goals with a smaller U.S. force presence in Asia and the Pacific.

ANZUS

Few American relationships are as close as those with Australia and, until recently, New Zealand. We hope to improve our relations with Australia even further over the next decade, and, if New Zealand overturns its anti-nuclear policies and legislation, we would hope to be able to reinstate the full ANZUS pact in force.


MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

Our friends and allies in East Asia are reluctant to enter into multilateral consultations on security concerns for a variety of reasons. Foremost is the wide cultural, political and economic diversity among most of the Asian states which makes bilateral security arrangements much more appropriate. In fact, the U.S. has been very successful in maintaining influence, security and stability through its network of bilateral arrangements. If the U.S. were to attempt to force a multilateral forum, we would almost certainly lose the considerable influence that we enjoy in our bilateral relationships.

In Japan, the government, backed by popular opinion, has interpreted Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution to mean that Japan does not have the constitutional right to engage in collective security. Consequently, the Japanese are unwilling to discuss any multilateral security arrangements and have repeatedly declined offers to participate in defense-related meetings and exercises held outside the treaty relationship with the United States.

Other friends and allies in the region are similarly reluctant to entertain the concept of a regional security arrangement, although they welcome the strong bilateral relationships the U.S. has with them and with other regional states, especially Japan. As a result of these regional constraints and concerns, we believe U.S. interests are best served by continuing to work within the context of the bilateral defense relationships we have developed over the years. At the same time, we will continue to consult with and keep our Asian friends and allies apprised of our regional defense objectives, such as was accomplished during Secretary Cheney's recent trip to the Asia-Pacific region.

Figure 8
CRITICAL SLOCs INDIAN/PACIFIC OCEANS



ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

Against the backdrop of continuing change in the Asia-Pacific region, the applicability of confidence-building measures and arms control should be examined. A reduction of tensions in the Asia-Pacific region is clearly in the U.S. interest, and we support any steps that could lead to a more stable environment. The reality, however, is that arms control and confidence building measures we have instituted in Europe are not always applicable to the Asian scene.

In Europe, we have had two major alliance blocs opposing each other in a ground war scenario. Such a confrontation lends itself readily to mutual reductions in the combat forces of the respective alliances. In Asia, however, there are not two opposing alliances but rather superpower competition (albeit declining) in a region which reflects wide-ranging political, economic and cultural conditions. Consequently, there is no basis for mutual reductions that can be applied evenly over the entire region. For example, while it could be argued that naval reductions would have lesser impact on U.S. obligations to Korea, any substantial drawdown of the U.S. Seventh Fleet would greatly jeopardize our ability to fulfill security and defense commitments to Japan and protect the ever more critical commercial sea lines of communications. Likewise, the removal of our forces from the Philippines would not be considered as serious to our friends in Northeast Asia as it would be in Manila, Bangkok, Singapore and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

An additional difficulty with arms control in the Pacific is that it could rapidly become a discussion of naval and air arms control. We remain strongly opposed to naval arms control discussions. Specifically, naval arms control in Asia is inadvisable. The U.S. is, has, and always will be a maritime power. Our national lifeline is wholly dependent upon the freedom of the seas and our ability to access our overseas markets. This has become particularly significant along the Pacific Rim now that 37 percent of our total trade is in Asia. The United States must be able to protect those sea lines of communication without encumbrance. We must retain our flexibility to move our forces at a moment's notice and operate without restriction on the open seas and international waterways (Fig. 8).

A corollary to this point, but one often ignored when the Soviets raise arms control in Asia, is the fundamental objective of arms control measures: to lower the possibility of misunderstanding and conflict through a reduction of forces that serves as a mutual degradation to both parties' capabilities. While arms control measures in Asia, especially naval arms control,

may adversely affect weapons systems, they will not mutually disadvantage both parties. Since the Soviet Pacific fleet serves a different function than the U.S. Seventh Fleet, there is an inherent imbalance. There is no way to adequately redress the asymmetries between the land-based Soviet forces, with substantial long-range air assets, and the sea-based strengths the United States possesses in Northeast Asia.

The Soviet proposals also ignore another very important fact of U.S. presence in the region—namely, that it is not solely Soviet-oriented. In Europe, our forces have been part of a multilateral alliance structure formed to counter the threat from the Warsaw Pact alliance structure. In Asia, our forward-deployed force structure is geared as much to maintaining regional stability outside the Soviet context as it is a counter to Soviet adventurism. This regional balancing role will take on growing significance as the Asia-Pacific region continues to increase in importance. Most regional actors recognize the necessity of and welcome our U.S. presence as a key contribution to regional stability. Moreover, the U.S. forces in Asia most likely to respond to a regional contingency are in fact the naval forces. Restrictions on our navy impair our capability to meet treaty obligations and protect other interests.

The one Asia-Pacific location where "transparency-style" confidence-building measures and arms control might be adopted is the Korean Peninsula, where the European ground context is applicable. The powerful opposing forces on each side of the DMZ, could, as a first step, negotiate transparency-style measures such as data exchanges and exchanges of observers at military exercises. The U.N. Command has made such proposals at the Military Armistice Commission. Unfortunately, North Korea has generally ignored these proposals to date. Any mutual agreement on confidence-building measures would lower tensions and promote greater understanding. The United States has encouraged both North Korea and the Republic of Korea to engage in serious discussions on military tension reduction measures in their bilateral discussions.

We continue to vigorously support a mutual reduction of tensions on the peninsula and again call on Pyongyang to enter serious discussion with Seoul. We are convinced adequate measures could be found to move combat forces away from the DMZ and to avoid dangerous misinterpretation of actions by some forms of verifiable safeguards and information exchange. Other measures could include equalizing troop levels and mutual, balanced reductions of offensive weapons. Such goals cannot be attained overnight, but we believe

that confidence building measures can begin now. North Korea should seriously consider measures such as mail exchanges, humanitarian exchanges (relief from natural disasters, etc.), and notification of exercises. The United States fully supports such actions; in fact, the U.S. and the ROK have annually invited North Korean and Chinese observers to the Exercise TEAM SPIRIT. These invitations go unanswered every year.

For some time, we and our allies have taken actions, such as the invitations to TEAM SPIRIT, that we believe

constitute confidence building measures. The Soviets recently announced some data on their Far East military force posture and have invited foreign observers to view a naval exercise. Although we welcomed these announcements, we note that U.S. force posture in East Asia has been public for years. We also remind the Soviets that our Japanese allies are limited constitutionally to developing a conventional defense capability only, a significant confidence building measure to the Soviet Union and all nations of the region.

CONCLUSIONS

Our deterrence posture and forward presence in East Asia have been successful, and it remains in our interest to maintain a forward deployed strategy, including a military presence on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Changes in the regional environment and at home may make it more difficult to maintain this presence. We must continue realistic reappraisals of our national security objectives in Asia and the force structure required to meet them. We should undertake near-term changes with caution, and in close consultation with our allies. At the same time, we must work with our allies to develop a vision for our forward strategy and presence in the year 2000 and beyond.

A coordinated strategy, within the U.S. Government as well as with our friends and allies, is essential for successfully executing our initiative. It must not be merely a reaction to budget pressures, but a reasoned response to changed strategic realities. Frequent consultation with our allies is essential. We must solicit their opinions, assuage their concerns and determine the limits of their support. We must stress that our strategy is coherent, non-destabilizing and in their interest.




This Presidential Report was prepared by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs
(East Asia and Pacific Region)



REPORT TO CONGRESS
28 FEBRUARY 1991

**A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
FOR THE ASIAN PACIFIC RIM:
LOOKING TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY**



Background

On 18 April 1990, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, delivered to Congress the Presidential report titled, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian-Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century*. That report was in response to the Nunn-Warner Amendment to the FY90 DoD Authorization Act. In the April report, the Administration outlined its intent to retain forward deployed forces in the East Asia and Pacific Region for the foreseeable future. At the same time, it stated the Administration's plan to incrementally reduce the overall presence in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines.

The report forwarded herewith is to advise Congress on the progress of the Department of Defense's efforts to reduce its forces and obtain additional commitments for defense responsibility sharing from Japan and Korea. It also provides a recap of the status of the Philippine-American Cooperation Talks (PACT) over the future of U.S. base facilities in the Philippines. This report meets the legislative requirement stated in the FY90 DoD Authorization Act.

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Introduction

The original *Strategic Framework for Asia* report was well received throughout the region. Our friends and allies were reassured that the United States does not intend to withdraw precipitously and destabilize what has heretofore been a stable strategic environment.

The demonstrated broad and strong support for a forward deployed U.S. presence in East Asia and the Pacific has not waned during the intervening months. Indeed, regional support for our presence appears to be growing. Those expressing support include, among others, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. They have forcefully reinforced our underlying assumption — the United States is a welcomed Pacific power, perceived by the regional nations to be a stabilizing influence. We must remain engaged in East Asia if we wish to preserve that influence and our interests in this crucial region.

Status of Force Reduction in the East Asia and Pacific Regions

In November 1990, the Secretary of Defense approved a plan by the unified commander, USCINCPAC, to reduce American presence in the region by more than 14,000 personnel between now and December 31, 1992 (the end of Phase I of the Strategic Framework outlined in April 1990). Subsequent announcements of additional withdrawals raised that total to more than 15,000. As stated in the April 1990 report, the Phase I withdrawals of U.S. forces will not reduce the deterrent value of our forces against potential enemies.

After detailed review of the security environment and projected requirements, the Department of Defense determined it could reduce U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines by 15,250. This total falls well within the Presidential guidelines of 10 to 12 percent of the total 135,000 personnel forward deployed to foreign countries in Asia.

Specific force adjustments to occur during Phase I include over 5,000 Army personnel, 5,365 Air Force personnel, almost 1,200 Naval personnel, almost 3,500 Marines, and 200 joint organization personnel, not broken down by service. Figures 1 and 2 display the reductions by Service and by country.

The force reductions identified include both operational and support units. Selective reductions in the size of some units have been made in addition to the withdrawal of entire units. Typical of the reductions are the following: a paring down of the overall size of Marine units on Okinawa; removal of an Air Force communications unit and the SR-71 squadron from Japan; removal of an engineering group, military intelligence and signals brigade personnel, and headquarters personnel from Korea; and, the removal of a tactical fighter wing (including two tactical fighter squadrons) from the Philippines.

Net Force Reductions by Service**Army Personnel**

Japan	22
Korea	5,000
Philippines	00
Total	5,022

Air Force Personnel

Japan	560
Korea	1,987
Philippines	2,818
Total	5,365

Navy Personnel

Japan	502
Korea	0
Philippines	672
Total	1,174

Marine Personnel

Japan	3,489
Korea	0
Philippines	0
Total	3,489

Joint Organization Personnel

Japan	200
Korea	0
Philippines	0
Total	200

Total Personnel to be Withdrawn

Army	5,022
Air Force	5,365
Navy	1,174
Marines	3,489
Joint	200
Total	15,250

Net Force Reductions by Country**Japan**

Army	22
Air Force	560
Navy	502
Marine	3,489
Joint	200
Total	4,773

Korea

Army	5,000
Air Force	1,987
Navy	0
Marine	0
Total	6,987

Philippines

Army	0
Air Force	2,818
Navy	672
Marine	0
Total	3,490

Total Personnel to be Withdrawn

Japan	4,773
Korea	6,987
Philippines	3,490
Total	15,250

Figure 2

Progress of Defense Responsibility Sharing Since April 1990

Since submission of the Strategic Framework for Asia report, the Administration has continued to negotiate with both Japan and the Republic of Korea for increased contributions to the shared defense. Both governments have evidenced greater understanding of the U.S. Government position as well as the mood in the United States regarding the importance of our allies assuming a greater share of defense costs. Thus far, the Administration is encouraged by increases in cost sharing pledged by Japan. The Republic of Korea has also made improvements in its approach to cost sharing. The ROK Government has accepted the principles

Figure 1

elaborated in the Administration's *Strategic Framework for Asia* report, and has taken the first steps to implement them as the U.S. moves from a leading to a supporting role in the defense of the Republic of Korea. The Administration continues to negotiate for significant increases in host nation support in 1992 and beyond.

Japan

In the intervening period since the original Nunn-Warner report was submitted to Congress, Department of Defense and Department of State (Ambassador-at-large for Burdensharing) negotiated with the Government of Japan for an increase in Japan's share of the costs associated with the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. While the current special agreement covering Host Nation Support (HNS) costs does not expire until calendar year 1992, Japan has agreed to enter into a new special agreement in 1991 in which it will assume 100% of utility and 100% of Japanese labor costs over the next five years. Japan has also agreed to assume additional costs for U.S. facilities in Japan. We anticipate that the agreement will result in approximately \$1.7 billion dollars in additional savings to the U.S. over the five year period, and cover a large portion of the appropriate yen-based costs that we seek from Japan.

The new HNS agreement, which Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Nakayama signed on 14 January 1991, provides for Japan to assume, over five years beginning in November 1991, payments for Japanese labor and utilities costs currently borne by U.S. Forces Japan. The HNS agreement will save the United States Government hundreds of millions of dollars each year, in increasing increments. In 1991, the GOJ's additional payments will be about \$200 million. By 1995 we project that additional payments will total about \$730 million annually. Japan presently provides about \$3 billion per year in HNS, by far the largest HNS payments of any U.S. ally. Under this agreement Japanese cost sharing will, by 1995, reach approximately \$3.8 billion annually. Including GOJ's already substantial HNS payments, total Japanese HNS contributions over the next five years could exceed \$17 billion.

Japanese commitment for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM to date has amounted to over \$13 billion. Early in the crisis, Japan earmarked \$2 billion for the frontline states and directed \$22 million toward refugee assistance and has recently pledged another \$38 million to assist refugee related problems. Separately, Japan designated \$2 billion for direct assistance to the multinational forces. Of that amount approximately \$866 million has been paid to the U.S. in the form of cash contributions for transportation expenses (this is \$16 million more than pledged due to a net favorable exchange rate at the time of transfer). About \$750 million is being used for material and equipment and associated transportation costs — a significant portion of which is being spent in the U.S. Another \$80 million was set aside and has been contracted for charter transportation to move U.S. equipment and supplies through 31 March 1991. The remainder of the first \$2 billion is set aside for other multinational forces and a reserve fund. On 24 January, the Government of Japan pledged an additional \$9 billion to the multinational forces, almost all of which is expected to be provided to the U.S. in cash. The GOJ also announced that its Air Self Defense Force would provide C-130 aircraft in support of the evacuation of refugees from the Gulf region if required.

Korea

During Phase I of the Strategic Framework for Asia the Administration pledged to attempt to secure from the Republic of Korea greater near-term contributions to the common defense. Specific objectives included reaching agreement on, and beginning, ROK funded relocation of U.S. forces out of Seoul, and expanding Korea's share of the costs associated with maintaining U.S. forces on the peninsula. Two key elements of our responsibility sharing proposals have been ROKG assumption of indigenous labor costs and an increase in military construction funding. We have also sought greater flexibility in administering the various cost sharing programs already in place.

Since the original report was delivered to Congress, the Department of Defense and the Department of State (Ambassador-at-large for Burdensharing) have conducted extensive negotiations with the

Republic of Korea which has committed \$150 million in cost sharing measures in 1991—a 115% increase over the 1990 level of \$70 million. Additionally, the ROK has established a broader construction category for cost sharing which will add military construction of essential projects for U.S. forces. A bilateral cost sharing committee has been established to identify and resolve administrative problems hampering cost sharing execution. Furthermore, both governments have agreed to discuss a future multi-year cost sharing program based upon an indexing formula to determine future ROK monetary contributions. Both governments see this method as useful to provide an orderly mechanism to facilitate out-year planning and negotiation. Principal differences remain, however, in determining the specific indexing formula and baseline upon which to begin the process.

Agreement has been reached between the ROK and U.S. Government on a legal basis for labor cost sharing, a key element of cost sharing programs. On 8 February 1991 the ROK National Assembly approved \$43 million in labor cost sharing for CY 1991.

The cost sharing negotiations with the ROKG have, of course, been pursued independently of Korean support to the Persian Gulf crisis. To date, Korean support for DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM has been timely and commendable. The Republic of Korea was the first nation to respond with vital airlift and sealift support. Subsequent offers of assistance have included \$500 million dollars to the anti-Iraq coalition (\$110M in cash to the U.S., \$105M in transportation, \$100M in economic assistance to the frontline states, \$170M in military equipment and material, and \$15M in aid to the multi-national forces) as well as aircraft and sealift support. The Republic of Korea also dispatched a medical support group consisting of some 154 personnel, and deployed five C-130 aircraft, including 156 ground support personnel to the Gulf. The cost of these two units is over and above the \$500 million in cash, transportation, and assistance-in-kind that was pledged by the ROK.

Singapore

The GOS's offer of expanded U.S. military access to its facilities is the foremost example of regional willingness to contribute to meeting common defense interests. Following an offer by former Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, the U.S. and Singapore entered negotiations to conclude an agreement permitting U.S. use of military facilities in Singapore. The negotiations culminated on 13 November 1990 when Vice President Quayle and then-Prime Minister Lee signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Tokyo.

The agreement enhances existing military arrangements. U.S. Navy ships have been docking in Singapore for more than 25 years for maintenance, repairs, supplies and crew rest and recreation. Under the terms of this agreement, there will be a modest increase in such U.S. use of Singapore maintenance and repair facilities. To support such activities, the number of U.S. support personnel permanently assigned to Singapore will increase from about 20 to 95.

As with Navy ships, U.S. aircraft have deployed to Singapore in the past on periodic training exercises with the Republic of Singapore Air Force. USAF transport aircraft have also used Singapore as a transit point. Under the new agreement, USAF will make regular deployments to Singapore. An additional 75 Air Force personnel will be assigned to Singapore on temporary duty during U.S. aircraft deployments.

The United States is not constructing a base in Singapore; rather, U.S. forces will make use of existing Singaporean facilities, Paya Lebar Airport and the Sembawang Port, which do not require significant modifications. Singapore has offered to make the facilities suitable to U.S. requirements.

Singapore's response to the crisis in the Gulf has included sending a 30-member military medical team to work with a British field unit in Saudi Arabia and cooperating with Brunei to provide airlift for refugees fleeing the Middle East.

The presence of U.S. forces in the Western Pacific helps foster stability and regional security and has contributed to the region's growing prosperity. We

believe that the Singapore offer of increased access reflects the region's accord with that axiom, and are pleased that our discussions with Singapore have come to a mutually satisfactory conclusion. We will continue to consult with ASEAN and other friends and allies as this initiative is implemented; we see ASEAN as the key to peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and will do nothing to undermine that unity.

Status of the Bases Negotiation with the Philippines

Since April 1990, the U.S. Negotiating Team, led by Richard L. Armitage, has met with the Philippine Negotiating Team on six occasions—in May, September, November, December and in January and February 1991. The Philippine Team advised the U.S. panel in May 1990 that the existing bases agreement terminates in September 1991. The Government of the Philippines (GOP) has indicated that any new agreement must address more than the future of the U.S. military facilities. It must establish a new, more equal relationship and include political and economic as well as military aspects.

With regard to the continued presence of U.S. forces in the Philippines beyond 1991, the U.S. is seeking a ten year transition period during which a phase-down of U.S. forces could be accompanied by a phase-in of Philippine military units and commercial enterprises in the facilities. At the end of this transition period, the U.S. would be left with residual forces at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base capable of facilitating continued U.S. access to the training, repair and logistical assets of these installations. While accepting the phase-down concept, the GOP has not yet determined its position on allowing for the possibility of future negotiation for follow-on U.S. access, and the duration of the phase-down period remains under discussion.

Uncertainty over Clark's future status, combined with a negative GOP media campaign against the presence of U.S. "combat" forces, played a role in the U.S. decision to remove all fighter aircraft from the Philippines by September 1991. Other U.S.

units and activities at Clark, the Crow Valley Range, and Subic Naval Base will be permitted to remain past September 1991, with some modification to our presence such as joint use of various installations on the facilities.

A prime concern of the GOP is "compensation" for continued U.S. use of the facilities. Discussions on compensation began in January 1991, and are continuing as of late February. The U.S. Special Negotiator has cautioned his counterparts that reduced presence equals reduced compensation. The removal of U.S. fighter aircraft alone makes it unlikely that the annual base-related compensation figure of \$481 million reached during the 1988 review will be equaled. Additionally, compensation is closely linked to the duration of a new agreement. A short term phase-out would have little value to the U.S., whereas a long term agreement would increase the prospects for the USG to sustain close to current assistance levels. The Philippine side has expressed interest in debt relief and trade concessions as well as more traditional forms of assistance. The feasibility of all such proposals will rest on U.S. budgetary constraints and the U.S. perception that the arrangements would allow the U.S. to fulfill its regional security objectives in a cost effective manner.

The U.S. Government fully concurs with the GOP's view that the new agreement should reflect, in the broadest manner possible, the bilateral relationship between the two states and peoples. The U.S. negotiators have made it clear, however, that future U.S. use of Philippine military facilities is the focal point of the Philippine-American Cooperation Talks (PACT). Failure to reach a satisfactory understanding on the bases cannot but have a deleterious impact on other aspects of the relationship. Although a more benign threat environment and the readiness of other allies and friends in the region to support the U.S. Pacific presence and share the responsibility of providing a stable security environment for Asia make complete withdrawal from the Philippines conceivable, this is by no means a welcome prospect. Both sides believe that a mutually satisfactory agreement can be reached soon.

Summary

The *Strategic Framework for Asia* report, delivered to Congress on 18 April 1990, concluded that the U.S. deterrence posture and forward presence in East Asia have been successful, and that it remains in the interest of the United States to maintain forward deployed forces. At the same time, it pledged to make measured, reasonable withdrawals to reflect the changing world environment. These adjustments have already begun, and in excess of 15,000 personnel will be withdrawn by December 1992.

We also declared that we would consult with our allies in the region on both our future force structure and their contributions to the common defense. We have done so extensively in the months since the original report. We believe we have secured increased allied understanding—and agreement—on our continuing presence and are cooperating closely on establishing proper force levels to insure that we are fully capable of meeting our defense treaty obligations in the region.

Of particular significance is the progress we have made with our allies in obtaining commitments from them to increase significantly their level of defense contributions. This increased support is not only in the form of host nation support which reduces the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in place, but also includes a genuine commitment to develop

more appropriate levels of indigenous force structure, thus insuring that our allies are better able to provide for a larger measure of self defense. By the end of Phase I, the United States will be well on its way to attaining a lower overall force level at a much reduced cost to itself. This will be accomplished while continuing to guarantee the required peace and stability for regional development and protection of U.S. interests, but transforming American presence into more of a regional supporting role.

As Phase I adjustments are being implemented we are looking forward to Phases II and III. We have already begun assessing how best to further adjust our force levels as our allies begin to assume a more leading role in defense. We remain convinced that if the security environment in East Asia and the Pacific evolves along the trends we see today, the Strategic Framework outlined in April 1990 will remain valid. If the regional situation continues to evolve positively, in Phases II and III, we will be working toward the removal of additional combat resources as well as support personnel. This regional strategy will result in a forward deployed presence that is appropriate to our national security needs as well as those of our allies. Because the strategy evolves in a measured way—based on the regional security situation at the time—it is an approach that reassures our friends and allies, and avoids destabilizing a region of great strategic and economic importance to the United States.



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