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## On the Rescuing of Positive Polarity Items in Japanese\*

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### 1. Introduction

This paper shows that the “rescuing” of positive polarity items in negative contexts is witnessed in Japanese, demonstrating that Szabolcsi’s (2004) generalization about the occurrence of English positive polarity items also applies to Japanese. It is then shown that some refinement of Szabolcsi’s generalization is required in order to account for certain data involving conditional sentences in Japanese. I suggest that the refinement can be achieved by adopting Giannakidou’s (1998, 2006) licensing condition for polarity items, which crucially utilizes the notion of nonveridicality. Finally, it is shown that apparent counterexamples to our analysis of Japanese positive polarity items can be handled by utilizing another proposal by Giannakidou (2006) that negative polarity items can be rescued when negative inferences are obtained.

### 2. Basic properties of positive polarity items in English and Japanese

A class of English words including *something*, *somebody*, etc. are said to be positive polarity items (PPI hereafter) because they are unable to scope below negation in such sentences as (1).

- (1) He didn’t see **something**. (✓[ some > not], \*[ not > some ]) <sup>1</sup>

The corresponding Japanese words like *nanika* ‘something’, *dareka* ‘somebody’, etc. also exhibit the PPI property, as exemplified in (2).

- (2) Kare-wa **nanika**-o mi-na-katta. <sup>2</sup> (✓[ some > not], \*[ not > some ])  
 he-Top something-Acc saw-Neg-Past  
 'He did not see something.'

To some speakers of Japanese, omitting the accusative case marker *-o* in (2), as in (3), seem to render the example unacceptable. <sup>3</sup>

- (3) \*/✓Kare-wa **nanika** mi-na-katta. (\*/\*✓[ some > not], \*[ not > some ])  
 he-Top something saw-Neg-Past  
 'He did not see something.'

However, other speakers accept sentences like (3) with the interpretation in which *nanika* has wider scope than negation, just as in (2). All speakers agree that neither (2) nor (3) allows *nanika* to be within the scope of negation. In this study, I will put aside the problem of accounting for the variation in acceptability judgments among native speakers of Japanese. What is important for the present purpose is the fact that *dareka* and other similar words exhibit the property of PPIs, regardless of whether they are attached with a case-marker or not.

Interestingly, the basic property of PPIs mentioned above – that they cannot scope below negation – is not observed in all the sentences containing PPIs. For example, consider the following sentences taken from Szabolcsi (2004).

- (4) Not every student said something. (✓not > every > some)  
 (5) John didn't say something at every party. (✓not > every > some)  
 (6) I don't think that John called someone. (✓not > some)  
 (7) No one thinks that John called someone. (✓no one > some)

Examples (4) and (5) show that the presence of a quantifier *every* enables the PPI *something* to scope below negation. Examples (6) and (7) demonstrate that someone

can scope below a superordinate negation or negative quantifier.

In order to explain the facts demonstrated by such examples as (4)-(7), Szabolcsi (2004: 417) gives the following initial generalization regarding *some*-type PPIs.<sup>4</sup>

- (8) *Some*-type PPIs do not occur within the immediate scope of a clausemate antiadditive operator. Schematically: \*[AA-Op > PPI].

Sentential negation, negative quantifiers, and the negative preposition *without* are examples of antiadditive operator (AA-Op).<sup>5</sup> The generalization in (8) correctly describes the scope facts exhibited by (4)-(7) by virtue of its appeal to the notion “immediate scope” and “clausemate.”

This generalization also applies to Japanese *some*-type PPIs, as exemplified by the following Japanese sentences corresponding to English (4) and (6).

- (9) Subeteno gakusei-wa nanika-o iw-ana-katta. (✓not > every > some)  
every student-Con something-Acc say-Neg-Past  
'Not every student said something.'
- (10) John-ga dareka-ni denwasita to-wa omoimas-en. (✓not > some)  
-Nom someone-Dat called Comp-Top think-Neg  
'(I) don't think that John called someone.'

In (9), the particle *wa* should be interpreted as a contrastive marker, not a topic marker. With this interpretation, we get a partial negation reading in (9), resulting in the scope relation [not > every > some]. The PPI *dareka* then becomes acceptable in (9), paralleling the interpretation of the English sentence (4).<sup>6</sup> Example (10) shows that Japanese PPIs are allowed to be in the scope of *non*-clausemate negation, just like English PPIs.

To sum up this section, we have seen that Japanese *some*-type PPIs share their

basic properties with English *some*-type PPIs in that they both obey the generalization given in (8). As we will see in the next section, however, the facts concerning PPIs in both languages are more complex than what (8) suggests.

### 3. PPI rescuing in English and Japanese

Szabolcsi (2004) illustrates that the generalization in (8) is not sufficient to account for data like the following.<sup>7</sup>

- (11) No one thinks that John didn't call someone. (✓no one > not > some)
- (12) I am surprised that John didn't call someone. (✓surprise > not > some)
- (13) If we don't call someone, we are doomed. (✓if (not > some))
- (14) Only John didn't call someone. (✓only > not > some)

Notice that the PPIs are allowed to occur in the immediate scope of a clausemate antiadditive operator *not* in (11)-(14). Szabolcsi (2004) calls this phenomenon PPI “rescuing.”

A significant insight of Szabolcsi (2004) is that these rescuing environments are, surprisingly, the licensing environments for negative polarity items (NPIs). More accurately, she claims that PPI rescuing occurs where weak (ever-type) NPIs can be licensed.<sup>8</sup> The following examples serve to illustrate her point.

- (15) No one thinks that John called **anyone**. (cf. (11))
- (16) I am surprised that John called **anyone**. (cf. (12))
- (17) If we call **anyone**, we are doomed. (cf. (13))
- (18) Only John called **anyone**. (cf. (14))

A weak NPI *any* is licensed in (15)-(18), showing that the PPI *someone* in (11)-(14) and its associated clausemate negation are in the weak NPI licensing context.

Szabolcsi (2004: 419) therefore proposes a revision of (8) into the following.

- (19) Some-type PPIs do not occur in the immediate scope of a clausemate antiadditive operator AA-Op, unless [AA-Op>PPI] itself is in an NPI-licensing context.

The generalization (19) correctly captures the fact that PPIs are allowed in (11)-(14): The PPI and *not* immediately above it in each of these examples constitute a semantic unit [AA-Op > PPI], which in turn is in an NPI-licensing context, as demonstrated by the acceptability of (15)-(18).

#### 4. Applying Szabolcsi's account to Japanese data

A natural question that arises at this point is whether or not the PPI rescuing of the sort discussed in the previous section is observed in Japanese. The following examples demonstrate that the answer to this question is positive.

- (20) **Nanika** se-zu-ni-wa irare-na-i. (✓[ not > some ] )  
something do-Neg-Prt-Top can.be-Neg-Pres  
'(I) can't help but do something.'  
(Lit.: I cannot exist without doing something.)
- (21) Ken-ga **nanika** iw-**ana**-katta to-wa odoroki-da.  
-Nom something say-Neg-Past Comp-Top surprise-be  
'(I) am surprised that Ken did not say something.'  
(Lit.: It is a surprise that Ken did not say something.)
- (22) **Nanika** tabe-**na**-i to, onaka-ga suku-yo.  
something eat-Neg-Pres if stomach-Nom get.empty-Prt  
'If (you) don't eat something, (you) will be hungry.'

- (23) Ken-dake-ga **nanika** iw-ana-katta.  
 -only-Nom something say-Neg-Past  
 ‘Only Ken didn’t say something.’

All the examples in (20)-(23) contain the PPI *nanika* (in boldface). They are acceptable and the PPI is allowed to be in the scope of a clausemate negation (also in boldface). Thus, the PPI rescuing we confirmed in English examples (11)-(14) is also at work in Japanese.<sup>9</sup> This rescuing is made possible by the presence of the underlined words in (20)-(23), which create NPI-licensing contexts: the superordinate negation in (20), the emotive factive predicate in (21), the conditional marker in (22), and *dake* ‘only’ in (23).

A note on NPI licensing in Japanese is in order. By analogy with the English examples (15)-(18), one may expect that Japanese NPIs can also appear in the context of (20)-(23). However, this expectation is not borne out. It is well known that the so-called NPIs in Japanese such as *daremo* ‘anyone’ and *nanimo* ‘anything’ are different from English NPIs such as *any* and *ever* in that the Japanese “NPIs” cannot be licensed in weak-NPI licensing contexts such as emotive factive predicates and conditionals.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, putting *daremo* in these contexts does not yield grammatical sentences, as shown in (24) and (25).

- (24) \*Ken-ga **nanimo** it-ta to-wa odoroki-da.  
 -Nom anything say-Past Comp-Top surprise-be  
 ‘(I) am surprised that Ken said anything.’  
 (Lit.: It is a surprise that Ken said anything.)
- (25) \***Nanimo** tabe-ru to, okorareru-yo.  
 anything eat-Pres if get.scolded-Prt  
 ‘If (you) eat anything, you will be scolded.’

What is interesting about the data in (20)-(23) is the fact that the weak-NPI licensing

contexts play a role in PPI rescuing in Japanese, despite the fact that Japanese so-called “NPIs” are not licensed in such contexts.

## 5. Some Japanese facts left unexplained by Szabolcsi’s generalization

In the preceding section, we have seen that Szabolcsi’s (2004) generalization on PPI rescuing applies to Japanese PPIs as well. As we extend our Japanese data, however, we encounter counterexamples to Szabolcsi’s generalization. For example, compare the following sentences.

- (26) Dareka ik-ana-i to, ano ko-wa komaru. (✓[ not >  $\exists$  ] )  
 someone go-Neg-Pres if that child-Top be.in.trouble  
 ‘If someone doesn’t go, that child will be in trouble.’
- (27) Dareka ik-ana-i nara, ano ko-wa komaru. (\*[ not >  $\exists$  ] )  
 someone go-Neg-Pres if that child-Top be.in.trouble  
 ‘If someone doesn’t go, that child will be in trouble.’

Both (26) and (27) are conditional sentences.<sup>11</sup> Antecedents of conditional clauses are known to license weak NPIs. As expected, the antecedent clause of (26), headed by *to*, triggers PPI rescuing, allowing the [not >  $\exists$ ] interpretation. Unexpectedly, however, the antecedent clause of the conditional sentence (27), headed by *nara*, does not rescue the PPI *dareka*.<sup>12</sup> (27) is acceptable only under the [some > not] interpretation.<sup>13</sup>

Since Szabolcsi (2004: 418) assumes that the PPI rescue contexts are weak-NPI licensing contexts, and since she takes the weak-NPI licensing contexts to be downward entailment contexts,<sup>14</sup> let us see whether the contrast between (26) and (27) can be explained in terms of downward entailment.<sup>15</sup>

- (28) a. Ame-ga huru to, tyuusi-ni naru.  
 rain-Nom fall if cancellation-Dat become



'If it rains, it will be cancelled.'

↓

b. Ame-ga tuyoku huru to, tyuusi-ni naru.

rain-Nom heavily fall if cancellation-Dat become

'If it rains heavily, it will be cancelled.'

(29) a. Ken-ga iku nara, boku-mo iku.

-Nom go if I-too go

'If Ken goes, I will go, too.'

↓

b. Ken-ga yorokonde iku nara, boku-mo iku.

-Nom happily go if I-too go

'If Ken happily goes, I will go, too.'

In both (28) and (29), the antecedent clause of the (a) sentence contains a superset VP, and that of the (b) sentence contains a subset VP. As the reader can verify, sentence (a) entails sentence (b) in both (28) and (29). Thus, we conclude that downward entailment holds in both *to*-conditional sentences and *nara*-conditional sentences. The unacceptability of sentence (27), then, constitutes a challenge to Szabolcsi's (2004) generalization.

Now, what is responsible for the unacceptability of (27)? A hint for the answer comes from Kuno's (1973: Ch.13) observation that the *nara*-clause involves an assertion of the hearer (or someone else, or people in general). He gives the following examples to support his claim.

(30) a. Mary-ga iki-tagatte iru nara, John-mo iki-tagatte iru desyoo.

-Nom go-wanting is if -also go-wanting is I.suppose

'If Mary wants to go, John will also want to go.'

b. \*Boku-ga iki-tai nara, John-mo iki-tagatte iru desyoo.

I-Nom go-want if -also go-wanting is I.suppose

‘If I want to go, John will also want to go.’

- (31) a. Samui nara, motto kinasai.  
cold if more put-on (imperative)  
‘If you are cold, put on more clothes.’  
b. \*Samui nara, motto kimasu.<sup>16</sup>  
cold if more (I) put-on  
‘If I am cold, I will put on more clothes.’

Kuno (1973: 169) claims that the (b) sentences in (30) and (31) are unacceptable because the subject of the *nara*-clause is the speaker, and “the speaker’s intention, plan, or internal feeling . . . is something that the hearer or the third party cannot assert.” On the other hand, the (a) sentences are acceptable because the assertion implied in the *nara*-clause in each of them is that of the hearer (or someone else, or people in general), but not of the speaker.

For our present purposes, what is important in Kuno’s discussion is his observation that an assertion is implied in the *nara*-clause.<sup>17</sup> This observation can be confirmed by the fact that the translations of (30a) and (31a) could be (32) and (33), respectively.

- (32) If Mary wants to go, as {you/they} say she does, John will also want to go.  
(for (30a))  
(33) If you are cold, as you say you are, put on more clothes.  
(for (31a))

The underlined parts in (32) and (33) represent the assertions implied in (30a) and (31a), respectively.

Contrary to the antecedent clause of the *nara*-conditional, the antecedent clause of the *to*-conditional does not imply any assertions. Take, for example, the following sentences that differ only in their use of a conditional marker.

- (34) Kono kusuri-o nom-ana-i **to**, yoku narimas-en.  
 this medicine-Acc take-Neg-Pres if better become-Neg  
 ‘If (you) don’t take this medicine, (you) won’t get better.’
- (35) Kono kusuri-o nom-ana-i **nara**, yoku narimas-en.  
 this medicine-Acc take-Neg-Pres if better become-Neg  
 ‘If (you) don’t take this medicine (as you say you won’t), (you) won’t get better.’

Let us imagine a situation in which a doctor is telling a patient that he/she should take a certain medicine. Unless the doctor is aware that the patient is not willing to take the medicine (since, for example, the patient has already asserted that he/she does not want to take the medicine), it is strange for the doctor to say (35). Without such awareness on the part of the doctor, (34) is the appropriate sentence to use. This fact shows that the *to*-clause in (34) does not imply any assertion on the part of the hearer, and as such, the doctor does not presuppose that the patient is unwilling to take the medicine.

Returning to the acceptability contrast between (26) and (27), the foregoing discussion suggests that the absence of PPI rescuing in (27) may be due to the presence of an implied assertion in the *nara*-clause of (27). This is the idea that I will pursue in the next section.

## 6. An account based on nonveridicality

We saw in the previous section that the Japanese *nara*-conditional sentences fail to trigger PPI rescuing, posing a challenge to Szabolcsi’s (2004) generalization. Recall that Szabolcsi assumes that the weak-NPI licensing contexts are downward entailment contexts, which in turn trigger PPI rescuing. This led to the problem of accounting for the acceptability contrast between (26) and (27), which are both downward entailing in the relevant sense. One way to solve the problem, then, is to seek for a new definition of weak-NPI licensing contexts that can correctly distinguish (26) and (27). Our

conclusion in the previous section points to a definition of weak-NPI licensing context that is sensitive to the presence or absence of implied assertion.

Fortunately, we can find such a definition in Giannakidou (1998, 2006). Giannakidou claims that the NPI licensing condition should employ the notion of nonveridicality, instead of downward entailment.<sup>18</sup> Here is how she defines the licensing condition for NPIs:

- (36) A polarity item  $\alpha$  will be grammatical in a sentence  $S$  iff  $\alpha$  is in the scope of a nonveridical operator  $\beta$  in  $S$ . (Giannakidou (2006: 592))

Note that Giannakidou (1998: 17, 2006: 575) uses the term *polarity item* instead of more common *negative polarity item*, reflecting the fact that negation does not have any privileged status in licensing what has traditionally been called NPIs. Thus, she reserves the term NPI to those polarity items (PIs) that are licensed only by negation and the like.<sup>19</sup> Although I fully support this move by Giannakidou, I will continue to use the term NPI in the more traditional sense in this paper, in order to keep the terminology consistent with what I have been using so far. Returning to Giannakidou's NPI licensing condition in (36), the notion "(non)veridical" is defined as follows:

- (37) (*Non*)veridicality for propositional operators (Giannakidou (2006: 589))  
A propositional operator  $F$  is veridical iff  $Fp$  entails or presupposes that  $p$  is true in some individual's epistemic model  $M_E(x)$ ; otherwise  $F$  is nonveridical

Giannakidou (2006: 589) takes "epistemic models" to be "sets of worlds anchored to an individual ... representing worlds compatible with what the individual believes." The reference to "an individual" in this quotation reflects the insight in Farkas (1992) that sentences are not true or false in isolation, but that they are true or false with respect to an individual. The epistemic models are further divided by Giannakidou (1998: section 1.3.3) into belief models, dream models, and reported conversation models.

With the definition of (non)veridicality in (37) in mind, let us examine our Japanese conditional sentences. We will start with the *nara*-conditionals. Take (38) for example.

- (38) Ken-ga kuru nara, biiru-o katteokoo.  
-Nom come if beer-Acc will.buy  
'If Ken comes (as you say he will), (I) will buy beer.'

As we have seen in section 5, the *nara*-clause involves an implied assertion by the hearer or someone else other than the speaker. It follows that in (38), in some individual *x*'s epistemic model ME(*x*), the proposition *Ken-ga kuru* 'Ken will come' is held to be true. Thus, the *nara*-clause in (38) is determined to be veridical.<sup>20</sup> Note that the speaker of (38) does not necessarily presuppose the truth of the antecedent clause. He/she merely acknowledges that someone (most likely the hearer) has asserted the proposition contained in the antecedent clause. This point becomes clear when we consider examples like (39):

- (39) Anatano kangae-ga tadasii nara, kono zizitu-wa setumei deki-na-i.  
your idea-Nom correct if this fact-Top explain can-Neg-Pres  
'If your idea is correct (as you say it is), this fact cannot be explained.'

The most likely situation in which sentence (39) can be uttered is when the speaker does not believe that the hearer's idea is correct. Nevertheless, in uttering (39), the speaker presupposes that the *hearer* believes that his/her idea is correct. Thus, even in sentences like (39), our point still holds: In some individual's epistemic model, the proposition contained in the antecedent clause is presupposed to be true.

Consider next the *to*-conditionals like (40):

(40) Ken-ga kuru to, kodomotati-ga yorokobu.

-Nom come if children-Nom be.happy

‘If Ken comes, children will be happy.’

Unlike the *nara*-clause, the *to*-clause in a conditional sentence involves no implied assertion by anyone. Thus, in (40), the truth of the proposition *Ken-ga kuru* ‘Ken will come’ is not presupposed in no individual’s epistemic model. Therefore, we conclude that the conditional *to*-clause is nonveridical.

At this point, let us return to Giannakidou’s (2006) NPI licensing condition in (36). This condition essentially says that NPIs are licensed in nonveridical contexts. We have seen above that the antecedent clause of the *nara*-conditional is veridical, while that of the *to*-conditional is nonveridical. Thus, Giannakidou’s NPI licensing condition predicts that the antecedent of the *nara*-conditional is an NPI licensing context, while that of the *to*-conditional is not. This is exactly what we wanted. To see this, consider once again the sentence pair (26)-(27), which we saw poses a problem for Szabolcsi’s generalization.

(26) **Dareka** ik-ana-i to, ano ko-wa komaru. (✓[ not >  $\exists$  ])

someone go-Neg-Pres if that child-Top be.in.trouble

‘If someone doesn’t go, that child will be in trouble.’

(27) **Dareka** ik-ana-i nara, ano ko-wa komaru. (\*[ not >  $\exists$  ])

someone go-Neg-Pres if that child-Top be.in.trouble

‘If someone doesn’t go, that child will be in trouble.’

The problem was that the antecedent clauses of both (26) and (27) are downward entailment (DE) environments. (See section 5.) As such, under Szabolcsi’s (2004) assumption that NPI licensing contexts are DE contexts, both (26) and (27) are predicted to rescue PPIs, contrary to fact. If we adopt Giannakidou’s NPI licensing condition, however, the antecedent clause of (26) is determined to be an NPI licensing

context due to its nonveridicality, but the antecedent clause of (27) is determined *not* to be an NPI licensing context, because it is veridical. It now follows that the PPI is rescued in (26), but not in (27).

To sum up this section, I have shown that the acceptability contrast between (26) and (27) can be accounted for once we adopt Giannakidou's (2006) NPI licensing condition. It should be emphasized, however, that Szabolcsi's (2004) generalization is kept intact in its essence: PPIs are rescued in weak-NPI licensing contexts. The only modification we have suggested is that the weak-NPI licensing condition in terms of DE be replaced with the condition utilizing nonveridicality.

## 7. Apparent counterexamples and how they are accounted for

Before closing this paper, I should mention apparent counterexamples to our analysis of PPI rescuing in Japanese. Consider the following examples taken from section 4.

- (21) Ken-ga **nanika** iw-**ana**-katta to-wa odoroki-da. (✓[ not >  $\exists$  ] )  
 -Nom something say-Neg-Past Comp-Top surprise-be  
 '(I) am surprised that Ken did not say something.'  
 (Lit.: It is a surprise that Ken did not say something.)
- (23) Ken-dake-ga **nanika** iw-**ana**-katta. (✓[ not >  $\exists$  ] )  
 -only-Nom something say-Neg-Past  
 'Only Ken didn't say something.'

As mentioned in footnote 9, the acceptability judgments on these sentences may vary from speaker to speaker, although my judgment is that they are acceptable under the [ not >  $\exists$  ] interpretation. If they are acceptable with the given interpretation, it follows that the PPIs are rescued in these sentences. Thus, we expect that these PPIs are in nonveridical contexts, given our discussion in the previous section. Notice,

however, that the PPIs in (21) and (23) are in veridical contexts. Consider (21) first. The predicate *odoroki-da* is factive, and as such, the content of the clause preceding *odoroki-da* is presupposed by the speaker. This means that the clause containing the PPI *nanika* is veridical, with respect to the speaker's epistemic model  $M_E(\text{speaker})$ . Let us turn to (23) next. Giannakidou (2006) shows that English *only* is a veridical operator. Applying Giannakidou's analysis of *only* to its Japanese counterpart *dake*, we reach the conclusion that (23) is also a veridical context.<sup>21</sup>

Given that the PPIs in (21) and (23) are in veridical contexts, we expect these sentences to be unacceptable, contrary to fact. Giannakidou (2006), however, claims that in some special cases, NPIs in veridical contexts can be rescued. Informally, she writes: "the weaker *any*-class can sometimes be 'rescued' inside the scope of a veridical operator if that operator additionally makes a nonveridical inference available in the global context of the sentence" (Giannakidou 2006: 595). For example, she claims that *any* is allowed in the complement of the emotive factive predicate *regret* because the following inference holds.

(41) John regrets that I bought a car.  $\rightarrow$  John would prefer it if I had not bought a car.

The object *a car* in the right-hand sentence of (41) is in a nonveridical context. The presence of this nonveridical inference makes *any* acceptable in such a sentence as *John regrets that I bought anything*. Adopting Giannakidou's idea of NPI rescuing, we can see that (21) and (23) are also NPI rescuing contexts. Consider the inferences in (42) and (43), where '*p*' in (42) stands for any sentence that corresponds to a proposition.

|      |                                    |               |                                    |            |
|------|------------------------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|------------|
| (42) | <i>p-to-wa odoroki-da.</i>         | $\rightarrow$ | <i>p-to-wa yokisi-na-katta.</i>    | (for (21)) |
|      | -Comp-Top surprise.be              |               | -Comp-Top expect-Neg-Past          |            |
|      | 'It is a surprise that <i>p</i> .' |               | 'I did not expect that <i>p</i> .' |            |



- (43) Ken-dake-ga warat-ta. → Ken-igai-wa waraw-ana-katta. (for (23))  
 -only-Nom smile-Past -other.than-Top smile-Neg-Past  
 ‘Only Ken smiled.’ ‘No one other than Ken smiled.’

The right-hand sentences that can be inferred from the left-hand sentences in (42)-(43) contain negation, which is a prototypical licenser for NPIs. Negation, of course, is a nonveridical operator. Thus, once we take into account that weak-NPIs can be rescued in veridical contexts, we can make sense of the fact that PPIs in the immediate scope of negation are licensed in (21) and (23): Although the [AA-Op > PPI] complex in each of them is in a veridical context, the availability of nonveridical inference rescues the complex. Interestingly enough, the PPI rescuing in examples like (21) and (23) seems to be made possible by the fact that NPIs can be rescued in the contexts of these sentences.

Before closing this section, I would like to comment on the delicacy of acceptability judgments on sentences (21) and (23) as opposed to clear-cut judgments on (20) and (22). For convenience, (20) and (22) are repeated here.

- (20) **Nanika** se-zu-ni-wa irare-na-i. (✓[ not > ∃ ])  
 something do-Neg-Prt-Top can.be-Neg-Pres  
 ‘(I) can’t help but do something.’  
 (Lit.: I cannot exist without doing something.)
- (22) **Nanika** tabe-na-i to, onaka-ga suku-yo. (✓[ not > ∃ ])  
 something eat-Neg-Pres if stomach-Nom get.empty-Prt  
 ‘If (you) don’t eat something, (you) will be hungry.’

I suspect that the delicacy involved in (21) and (23) is probably due to the extra burden of having to evoke inferences of the sort given in (41)-(42) in order for the PPIs to be rescued. Notice that the [AA-Op > PPI] complex in sentences (20) and (22) are in nonveridical contexts due to the presence of the underlined negation (20) or conditional

marker (22). Therefore, the PPIs can be in the scope of a clausemate negation, as predicted by Szabolcsi's generalization (19), repeated here.

(19) *Some-type* PPIs do not occur in the immediate scope of a clausemate antiadditive operator AA-Op, unless [AA-Op > PPI] itself is in an NPI-licensing context.

The [AA-Op > PPI] complexes in (21) and (23), on the other hand, are in veridical contexts. Therefore, for the PPIs in them to be in the scope of a clausemate negation, such inferences as (42) and (43) have to be evoked. This difference in the nature of allowing the [AA-Op > PPI] seems to correspond to the difference between delicate and clear-cut acceptability judgments on these sentences.

## 8. Conclusion

In this article, I have first shown that Szabolcsi's (2004) generalization on PPI rescuing also applies to Japanese. In Japanese, as well as in English, PPIs in the immediate scope of negation are licensed if the complex [Neg > PPI] (more generally, [AA-Op > PPI]) is in a weak-NPI licensing context. I have then shown that the *nara*-conditionals present apparent counterexamples to Szabolcsi's generalization. I then adopted Giannakidou's (1998, 2006) conception of NPI licensing that crucially utilizes the concept of nonveridicality. I have shown that according to Giannakidou's NPI licensing condition, the antecedent clause of the *nara*-conditional is not an NPI licensing context. Thus, the fact that the *to*-conditionals rescue PPIs but the *nara*-conditionals do not has been accounted for. Finally, I considered some apparent counterexamples to our account of PPI rescuing in Japanese, involving an emotive factive predicate and *dake* 'only'. Although the [AA-Op > PPI] complexes in these apparent counterexamples are in veridical contexts, it was shown that by adopting the NPI rescuing mechanism proposed by Giannakidou (2006), these cases cease to be counterexamples.

The next question we have to consider is why weak-NPI contexts allow PPIs

to be in the scope of AA-Op. Although Szabolcsi (2004) offers her own answer to this question, it seems to me that an account based on the recent theory of polarity items proposed by Israel (2011) will likely provide a more satisfactory answer. I leave it to future research to verify this assessment.

## Notes

\* This is a revised version of the paper I read at the 24th Conference of the Foreign Language & Literature Society of Okinawa, held at Okinawa Christian University on July 5, 2009. Among the audience of the conference, I am especially thankful to Takeo Kurafuji for his insightful comments and extensive discussion on the topics addressed in this paper.

<sup>1</sup> I will use ‘\*’ to indicate that the given scope relation does not obtain. The symbol ‘✓’ indicates that the given scope relation obtains.

<sup>2</sup> The following abbreviations are used in the glosses of Japanese examples.

Top=topic, Neg=negation, Pres=present tense, Past=past tense, Nom=nominative case, Acc=accusative case, Dat=dative case, Con=contrastive, Nlz=nominalizer, Cop=copula, Comp=complementizer, Prt=particle

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, McGloin (1972, 1976) and Hasegawa (1991).

<sup>4</sup> Other types of PPIs in English include expressions *like would rather, would just as soon, and far better*. See Szabolcsi (2004: 412) for reasons that she focuses on some-type PPIs. Japanese PPIs analyzed in this paper will be restricted to some-type PPIs as well.

<sup>5</sup> For the definition of antiadditivity, see van der Wouden (1997: 99) and Szabolcsi (2004: 414).

<sup>6</sup> A more natural Japanese translation of English sentence (4) would be the following:

(i) Subeteno gakusei-ga nanika-o itta no-de-wa arimas-en. (✓ not > every > some)  
every student-Nom something-Acc said Nlz-Cop-Top is-Neg  
‘It’s not that every student said something.’

Notice that this sentence is bi-clausal, as opposed to the mono-clausal status of (4). As such, (i) does not show that PPIs can appear with clausemate negation. Sentence (9) in the text, on the other hand, shows that a PPI in the scope of clausemate negation can be rescued if there is an intervening quantifier between the PPI and the clausemate negation.

<sup>7</sup> Jespersen (1909-1949) and Baker (1970) discuss the fact that PPIs in some of these examples are exceptionally licensed.

<sup>8</sup> For a three-way classification of NPIs into weak, medium, and strong NPIs, see van der Wouden (1997). PPIs are also similarly classified into three types in this work.

<sup>9</sup> Some speakers might find examples (21) and (23) to be less than perfect. See section 7 for a possible explanation for the less-than-perfect status of (21) and (23).

<sup>10</sup> See McGloin (1986), among others. Due to this and other characteristics of *daremo*, etc., Watanabe (2004) treats these words as negative concord items.

<sup>11</sup> The complementizer *to* in (26), here glossed as ‘if’, has various usages and meanings in other sentences. What is important for the present concern is that the *to* in (26) is semantically functioning as a conditional marker.

<sup>12</sup> Here are additional examples of *nara*-conditionals failing to rescue PPIs *nanika* and *dareka*:

(i) Kimi-ga nanika tukur-ana-i nara, boku-mo tukur-ana-i. (\*[ not >  $\exists$  ] )  
 you-Nom something make-Neg-Pres if I-also make-Neg-Pres  
 ‘If you don’t make something, I won’t, either.’

(ii) Kyoo dareka ko-na-i nara, kokoni iru hituyoo-wa na-i (\*[ not >  $\exists$  ] )  
 today someone come-Neg-Pres if here be necessity-Top Neg-Pres  
 ‘If someone doesn’t come today, it’s not necessary to be here.’

<sup>13</sup> Some native speakers of Japanese may consider (27) and similar sentences to be unacceptable, since a casemarker-less PPI appears with a clausemate negation in these examples. (See section 2 for discussion.) What is important for the present discussion is the fact that (27) cannot have the [not >  $\exists$  ] reading for any speakers.

<sup>14</sup> Actually, Szabolcsi (2004) uses the term “decreasing” instead of downward

entailment, but these are equivalent notions. For expository convenience, I will use the latter term, which has been introduced by Ladusaw (1980a,b).

<sup>15</sup> See Ladusaw (1980a: 13-14) for his demonstration that the antecedents of English conditional sentences are downward entailing (DE). Heim (1984), however, shows that not all conditionals are DE in their antecedents. Since we will later abandon DE as the crucial notion for NPI licensing, the problem that Heim noted disappears.

<sup>16</sup> The asterisk in (31b) should be taken to mean that this sentence is unacceptable under the given interpretation. As Kuno (1973: 169) notes, this sentence is perfectly acceptable if it is taken to mean ‘If it is cold out (as you say it is), I will put on more clothes’. This fact is in accord with Kuno’s discovery that the assertion implied in the *nara*-clause is that of the hearer (or someone else or people in general).

<sup>17</sup> Kuno (1973) is not the first to make this observation. He writes: “It is usually said that this pattern [i.e. “ $S_1$  *nara*  $S_2$ ” pattern –YY] has a strong degree of assertion about the statement represented by  $S_1$ .”

<sup>18</sup> She notes that the relevance of nonveridicality for the licensing of polarity items was originally suggested by Zwarts (1995).

<sup>19</sup> In Yoshimoto (1995), I have also proposed a similar restriction to the use of the term NPI.

<sup>20</sup> It is not a straightforward matter to verify (non)veridicality of conditionals using the definition of (non)veridicality in (37), in which the relevant operator  $F$  has only one argument,  $p$ . Conditional operators necessarily take two arguments, namely, the antecedent  $p$  and the consequent  $q$ . Giannakidou (1998) herself does not directly employ (37) to determine (non)veridicality of conditionals. Instead, she appeals to the semantics of conditionals to conclude that the antecedents of conditional sentences in general are nonveridical (see *ibid.* section 3.3.3). Her conclusion is based on the observation that the antecedent is nonassertive, while the consequent is assertive. Thus, it seems reasonable to determine veridicality of *nara*-clauses simply by the fact that the propositions contained in them are held to be true in some individual’s epistemic model.

21 For details of Giannakidou's analysis of English *only*, see section 7.1 of Giannakidou (2006).

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## 論文要旨

### On the Rescuing of Positive Polarity Items in Japanese

吉本 靖

肯定極性項目 (PPI) は通常、否定の直接作用域にある解釈を受けられないが、特定の環境においてはそのような解釈が可能であることが知られている。その解釈が可能な時、PPI は「救出」されたと言われるが、Szabolcsi (2004) は、英語の *some* タイプの PPI に関して、PPI 救出現象は、弱い否定極性項目 (weak NPI) が認可される環境において見られることを明らかにしている。本稿では、まず、Szabolcsi のこの一般化が日本語の PPI についてもあてはまることを示す。次に、日本語の「～なら」条件文がこの一般化の例外になることを示し、Szabolcsi の一般化の修正を提案する。すなわち、弱い NPI の認可条件として Szabolcsi が採用している下方含意 (DE) を改め、Giannakidou (1998, 2006) が提案する非真実性 (nonveridicality) をもとにした認可条件を採用する。こうして「～なら」条件文において PPI 救出が行われないことに対する説明が与えられる。最後に、一見したところこれまでの分析に対する反例になると思われる例文について、NPI は否定の含意の存在によっても認可される場合があるという Giannakidou (2006) の主張をここでも採用することにより、一応の説明が可能であることを示す。