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米軍基地による環境変化が与える自然および社会への影響に関する複合的研究

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When the bombs stop: Environmental issues after military base closures

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Military bases have a number of effects on the communities and environments that host them. These impacts can differ based on the type of base, the size of the base, how active the operations at the base have been, and the level of integration of the base and its personnel into the surrounding community (Gillem, 2007). Despite these variations there are a number of commonalities that can be seen in the expanding literature of the effects of militarization on host communities (Akibayashi and Takazato, 2009; Davis, Hayes-Conroy, and Jones, 2007; Enloe, 1990; Havlick, 2007; Inoue 2004; Krupar, 2007; Lutz, 2001, 2009; McCaffrey, 2002; McCormack and Norimatsu, 2012; Santana, 2006; Seager, 1993; Shigematsu and Camacho, 2010; Ueunten, 2010; Vine, 2009; Warf, 1997; Woodward, 2004). These impacts range from economic and cultural changes within a community to environmental contamination, problems with noise pollution, as well as higher levels of sexual harassment and assault.

Many people are familiar with these direct negative impacts of militarization in places like Okinawa, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, South Korea, the Philippines and the Marshall Islands. These militarized landscapes are filled with not only social and political issues related to militarization, but environmental ones as well. The munitions, fuels and solvents used by modern militaries spread chemical and radiological contamination. Combat, maneuvers and training exercises can rip up landscapes and cause erosion. Furthermore, the construction of bases, barracks, airstrips, helipads and port facilities leave structures in remote areas and affect wildlife habitat. Military activities clearly have negative environmental impacts and these threats to residents' health and local environmental security have been major catalysts for the development of protest and resistance movements.

There are also, however, many indirect effects of militarization that can effect host communities, even long after the military has departed. In this paper I address one major, often overlooked, way that militarization affects local environments and people. Paradoxically, it is not just the visible environmental destruction that can harm local environments, people's livelihoods and health, but also the landscapes the military makes which look very "natural." Some militarized landscapes are obviously scarred with bomb craters, the detritus of live-fire training, and the structures that enable military operations. Other militarized places though have a much different look. Many heavily militarized areas have recently been praised by environmentalists, tourists, wildlife managers and travel writers as "pristine" and "natural" (Davis 2007). This in no way means however that these landscapes have been treated well. Quite the opposite is usually the case. Instead, outsider labeling of these landscapes as "natural" has served as a mechanism for outside interests -from colonial administrators, to foreign entrepreneurs, to the military -to wrest and maintain control of the islands as well as to avoid the clean-up of chemical and radiological contamination. As I will argue, environmental preservation activities on current and former military areas can lead to inadequate clean-up of environmental contamination and also serve to maintain US government control over bases even after the military leaves.

Describing the relationship between militarization and the environment is a much more complex exercise than merely telling a story about landscape *destruction*. It is also a story of (ongoing) landscape control and landscape *production* (Robbins, 2012). There are a suite of activities that have gone on, and continue to go on, in militarized islands that shape the social and physical environments of these islands in intense and pervasive ways which cause the impacts of militarization on these islands to be even deeper than they initially appear. Colonialism and militarization are not only responsible for producing the built landscapes of the islands, but also for creating landscapes seen as "natural" which are attractive to tourists and conservationists. Through this discussion I aim to present a fuller picture of just how much the landscapes of these islands have been, and still are, rearranged to suit the needs of

outsider interests, including the US military, even after military use has ceased. To do this I will use examples from three places: Guam, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.

Environmental Conservation as the erasure of military colonialism on Guam

As many scholars have noted –particularly political ecologists –the labeling of any environment as “natural” necessarily involves the erasure of the social history of the landscape (Braun, 2002; Robbins, 2012). In the case of many militarized landscapes, however, there is a double erasure. First there is an erasure of the social life that existed in the place prior to its takeover by the military. Second there is an erasure of the history of the military’s use. This is nowhere more evident than in a place like Guam.

An examination of the landscape of Ritidian Point on Guam offers an interesting point-of-entry for a discussion of how environmental issues, colonialism and militarization interact. Ritidian Point on the northern end of Guam had been under US Department of Defense control from World War Two until the mid 1990s when administration of the area was turned over to the US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). When visitors enter the FWS visitors’ center at Ritidian Point which opened in 2007 they are greeted by displays representing the surrounding landscape. The displays are divided into representations of the four ecological zones that fall into FWS jurisdiction: marine habitat, beach strand, back strand, and limestone forest. Each ecological zone’s display is separated into the dichotomy of “Life as it was” and “Today.” In the display we are presented with a narrative of paradise lost. There are many culprits listed in the texts on the displays: invasive species, over-hunting, bulldozers, industrial development, garbage, commercial development, abandoned cars, over-fishing, nets that entangle turtles, broken and dying coral, ocean pollution, and habitat destruction. Conspicuous by its absence is any mention of the military presence on Guam. Even though Ritidian Point had been under the military’s jurisdiction for decades, there is no mention of the military impact on this place. Even though visitors to Ritidian Point must drive miles along a road bordered on each side

by high fences, labeled at frequent intervals with large signs warning motorists that they are passing through Northwest Field, a US Air Force installation, the visitor center's displays say nothing of this. Not only is the word "military" missing from the displays, so of course is the word "colonialism", and so too is the word "dispossession." The native Chamorro families that originally owned this land are still on Guam, and they seek a return of this land, but this is not mentioned in the museum displays. Simply put, the landscape of contemporary Guam is represented as a paradise *lost* rather than a paradise *taken*. The descriptions of degradation have an air of inevitability. It is destruction that comes from nature's contact with "people" -- that vaguely homogeneous species that seems incapable of not haphazardly despoiling "nature" because it is in human "nature" to do so. This landscape in the wildlife refuge at Ritidian is presented as a natural place under threat, but also as one that has to some degree been protected as compared to other areas of Guam. Of course this "protection" has come as a result of the land being taken away from its inhabitants and managed by the US military (Herman, 2008). In this we see a process that is in no way specific to Guam.

Militarization and the Environment in O`ahu, Hawai'i

Staring down from the side of Halawa Heights Road next to the Marine's Camp H.M. Smith in Honolulu you get a panoramic view of the naval base at Pearl Harbor (a harbor traditionally known as Pu`uloa and renamed by Americans). Hawai'i was forcefully incorporated into the United States in the wake of the 1893 overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy. While Hawai'i is technically part of the United States and has greater access to the halls of political power than Guam, the historically recent overthrow of its government, its long-term status as an American colony and its huge military presence make Hawai'i much more like other overseas military colonies than like the mainland of the United States.




Pu'uloa Lagoon (A.K.A. Pearl Harbor)

From the street next to Camp Smith you can view the expanse of the naval installation that took over the harbor as well as the nearby airfields, the enormous X-band radar on an oil platform about to be shipped to the north Pacific for the missile defense program, and the large bunkers stocked with unknown numbers of nuclear weapons. About a third of the island of O'ahu is occupied by military bases of one sort or another. It is a true military colony and, like other military colonies, Hawai'i owes its political affiliation with the US not to the riches it holds, but to its location relative to the places that do. After it was made into a US territory the island became a stopover for the US to extend its reach to the western Pacific. This was occurring in the late 1800s when Manifest Destiny was being applied out into the Pacific to the doorstep of Asia. In this era when European nations had already divided up the world among themselves the US needed a different strategy to bring wealth to its

burgeoning capitalist economy now that the age of conquest and expansion across the North American continent was coming to a close. American industrialists and politicians realized that to exploit Asia they did not need to possess colonies in Asia, they only needed to accumulate military colonies that enabled *access* to Asia. The US in the late 1800s did not have the need, or the ability, to colonize the Asian mainland, only the need and ability to ensure access to it. So colonies were made of Hawai'i, American Samoa, Guam, and the Philippines. The latter two were wrested from the Spanish in the 1898 war when the US also "freed" Cuba and gained Puerto Rico as a military colony to guard the approaches to Central America and the future Panama Canal. These new colonies were not substantially resource rich colonies, but rather were strategic locations used to enable a coal-using US Navy to maintain a presence in the western Pacific, guard the route across the Pacific to Asian resources and markets, and deny other nations the same access.

The results of these imperial decisions made since the late 1800s are littered everywhere across the Hawaiian landscape. Every branch of the military has facilities in Hawai'i. There are large air bases such as Hickam Air Force Base and the Marine Corps Air Station at Kaneohe as well as the huge naval complex at Pearl Harbor. There are also large training areas and bombing ranges around the islands. The whole island of Kaho'olawe south of Maui was bombed for decades until Hawai'i activists protested and managed to halt its use by the military. Makua Valley on Oahu was used for live-fire training for over 60 years until forced to close in 2011. Neither Makua or Kaho'olawe, however, have been adequately cleaned or decontaminated. There are also active training areas at Pohakuloa on the Big Island, Schofield Barracks on O'ahu and other locations. At present, the military footprint is not shrinking, but expanding. In the early 2000s the US brought in new "Stryker Brigades" for training in the islands which required the US military to demand even more land.



Militarized O'ahu. Darkest colors are current military controlled areas, Tan is former military lands or areas of recent military expansion. Map courtesy of DMZ Hawai'i.

A drive around O'ahu easily demonstrates the heavy imprint of the military. From the fenced off entrance to Makua Valley, to the giant Naval communication antennae at Lualualei, to the Stryker Brigade training areas in the center of the island, to the ships crammed together in the West Loch of the naval base, to the stylish neighborhoods of housing for military families and the giant PX where military dependents shop: the military is ever present in the landscape (Ferguson and Turnbull, 1998). The military presence in O'ahu is more integrated into surrounding communities than it is in some places, but this has both its positive and negative aspects. While there is less of a sharp disparity between the on-base and off-base landscapes, there is still plenty of difference. Furthermore, the leakage of military activities and personnel off the bases is more noticeable. The military uses civilian highways and roads, military planes abound in the skies, and all of the waters surrounding the Hawaiian Islands are open as areas for military training (even


environmentally protected marine preserves like the huge Papahānaumokuākea Marine National Monument). Military personnel and their families also have a large and obvious presence on island which, in addition to driving up housing costs, also has environmental and cultural impacts. This militarization of Hawai'i has also spawned active and effective resistance. As noted, training ranges in Makua Valley, and Kaho'olawe have been closed due to sustained protests. These protests involved tactics ranging from lobbying, to sign-holding and public rallies, to direct actions that involved occupying and blocking access to the ranges. While these protests are not uncommon and there is widespread support for anti-military activism and associated calls for political sovereignty –there is also much support within Hawai'i for the perceived economic, political and social benefits that militarization and incorporation into the United States have brought to the islands (Osorio, 2010).

The military, however, has also created landscapes in O'ahu that look like natural landscapes. On an island that has a tremendous amount of urbanization the bases, training areas, and radar installations that take up close to one-third of the island look like scenic “natural” open space. Furthermore, the military installation at Pearl Harbor itself is considered an important scenic tourist spot. The USS Arizona memorial in Pearl Harbor is one of the most heavily visited tourist locations on the island. From visual appearances the military gives the impression that they are a force for environmental protection and stewardship. The problem is that many of these apparently “natural” lands and harbor areas are heavily contaminated and were also created as the result of land seizures from indigenous peoples. In addition, when the military has stopped using certain areas they are reluctant to give it to local people or land agencies and they have a poor record of completing adequate clean-up (such as on the island of Kaho'olawe).

Seeing nature on Vieques, Puerto Rico

While Guam and Hawai'i are two examples of how militarization and the environment can be related in complex ways, the island of Vieques is a very important

site to consider because it is an island that successfully stopped almost all the activities of the US military in 2003. It still struggles, however, with the environmental impacts. Vieques is probably best known for the fact that the people on this small colonized island used innovative tactics to forge a broad political coalition that effectively ended the military use of the island (McCaffrey 2002, Santana 2006).



Vieques had been a key site in the global military network. It was the site of major military bombing exercises and maneuvers from the 1940s to 2003. The US used the island to train for many of the military engagements it has conducted since World War Two, including wars in Korea, Vietnam, Panama, and Iraq. The US military took over two-thirds of the island in the 1940s and forced the island's population of 10,000 people to languish in the middle of the island sandwiched between an extensively used military bombing range on the east end and a large ammunition storage facility on the west. In 1948, the first large-scale war games took place using over 60 ships, 350 planes, and 50,000 troops from all branches of the military (McCaffrey, 2002). In Vieques, the Navy rehearsed amphibious landing exercises, parachute drops, and submarine maneuvers. It conducted artillery and

small arms firing, naval gunfire support, and missile firings. Bombing the island from air, land, and sea, Vieques became the Navy's "university of the sea," a small island target range situated next to 195,000 miles of ocean and airspace controlled by the military for integrated training scenarios (McCaffrey 2002). Residents started to argue that their lives and health were compromised by the bombs, most of which fell on the Live Impact Area on the eastern end of the island. Due to the direction of the prevailing trade winds the populated area of Vieques lays directly downwind from the area of the bombing and residents expressed concern about the health effects of contaminates from the bombs blowing into the civilian area of the island. Meanwhile, on the nearby island of Culebra, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, intense anti-military activism began, eventually resulting in the Navy leaving occupied lands on the neighbor island. However, this only increased the military practices on Vieques. Once the Navy started to severely restrict local people's access to parts of the ocean, the fishermen of Vieques became one of the first groups to actively protest the military's activities.

Despite these early protests the bombardment of the island continued. In the early 1980s, for instance, the island endured an average of 3,400 bombs dropped, 158 days of naval bombardment, 200 days of air-to-ground combat exercises, and 21 days of marines practicing invasions *per year* (Aldrich and Connell 1998). Between 1983 and 1998 the Navy dropped more than 17,700 tons of bombs on Vieques. The impact of dropping bombs on a daily basis was severe - shaking and damaging houses miles from the Live Impact Area as well as depositing contaminates across the island (Grusky 1992).

Throughout the 1990s, the Navy continued to drop thousands of pounds of explosives on Vieques. While much of the bombardment on Vieques involved "conventional" weapons that distributed toxins and heavy metals into the environment, the Navy later admitted they also used weapons such as Napalm, Agent Orange, and depleted uranium on Vieques. While Vieques was used more as a site for target practice than a base for soldiers, it also hosted a number of exercises where military personnel would temporarily stay on Vieques and affect the civilian sector of the

island with the usual impacts of a visiting military presence: a mix of spending, drinking, and sexual harassment (Enloe 1990, McCaffrey 2002).

Some citizens formed organizations to fight against this militarization of Vieques. The movements focused both on the exclusion of Viequenses (the term that most Spanish speaking residents use to refer to themselves) from the land and marine resources as well as on the negative health and safety consequences that military activities had on the civilian population sandwiched between the military areas. The protests against the Navy reached a fevered pitch in the late 1990s after the death of David Sanes, a Vieques resident killed by an off-target Navy bomb. In the political and civil disobedience campaign that followed Sanes's death, enough pressure was applied to stop the military use of the island. In 2003 the Navy relinquished control of most of its holdings on Vieques (the Navy still maintains a radar installation on the southwest end of the island and a communications facility on Mt. Pirata, the island's highest point). Many activists around the world saw this as an important victory over the most powerful military on earth by a small, but well organized and active, community on a tiny colonized island. This victory, however, was somewhat incomplete as the land was given to the US Fish and Wildlife Service and it is very doubtful the US military will significantly clean up the contamination that has resulted from close to 60 years of bombardment (Santana 2006).

Even though activists were successful in banishing the military from most of their island in 2003 the legacy of militarization still haunts Vieques today. Visitors driving into the eastern section of the island are today greeted by a large brown sign welcoming them to the largest wildlife refuge in the Caribbean. The sign placed by the US Fish and Wildlife Service implores visitors in Spanish and English not to litter, not to camp overnight, and to "please help us protect the plants and animals." Visitors looking beyond the sign see a landscape of gently rolling Mesquite-covered hills that descend towards the Caribbean Sea. Like many wildlife refuges, there are few outwardly visible signs of past or present human activity. There are no large dwellings, no crowds of people, no houses, and no agricultural activity on either side of

the simple dirt road that heads east towards some of the most popular beaches on the island.

The irony is that prior to 2003 this entrance was the site of a tense stand-off between local activists and the US Navy, which was dropping high-explosive bombs on what is now a wildlife refuge. Gone today are the large police and military presences, the barbed-wire fencing, and the campaigns of civil disobedience that once characterized this site. Gone too are the jets dropping bombs, the helicopters launching missiles, the warships lobbing shells and Marines practicing invasions. What is left now in the landscape of Vieques is a paradoxical mix of bombed-out moonscape, visually unspoiled land and an unknown amount of mostly unseen contamination from sixty years of military activity.

Like with Hawaii and Guam there is a disparity between the way native inhabitants and visitors view this area of Vieques. While many local residents view the island as suffering from severe contamination, the large number of visitors, tourism promoters and North American homebuyers now flocking to the post-militarized Vieques view it as a preserved natural landscape. Some even see the wildlife refuge, as well as the Navy activities that produced it, as a positive for the island. One North American resident of Vieques is quoted as saying, “The Navy has kept the land pristine... If it weren’t for the Navy, Vieques would be just like St. Thomas” (quoted in McCaffrey 2002, p. 108).

These perceptions of contamination and purity have led to differing valuation of the landscape and contentious economic, political, and cultural battles on the island over a landscape often labeled ‘natural’ despite a history of military use and social exclusion. Like other militarized colonial sites the visual look of the landscape is critical here. In general there is a difference between visitors who *see* nature and local residents who *know* contamination (Davis, Hayes-Conroy and Jones, 2007). The situation in Vieques is illustrative of the emotional distress, social fracturing and contentious politics that are often seen in communities that have been labeled ‘contaminated’ (Barnes et al. 2002). The added twist to this post-military place is that many people who encounter the landscape on Vieques (particularly visitors and

newcomers) view the past activities of the military not as contaminating but as producing an undeveloped and 'natural' landscape by disallowing other uses of the island. While there are studies of the island's environment showing there are high levels of contamination (Santana, 2006), what the contamination *means* for the future of the island differs markedly between long-term residents and the dramatically increasing number of tourists and foreigners coming to the island.

During the struggle to remove the Navy from Vieques activists and their allies devised plans for the economic, environmental and social redevelopment of a post-military Vieques (Grupo de Apoyo Técnico y Profesional para el Desarrollo Sustentable de Vieques 2002). However, instead of the lands being returned to the municipality, on May 1, 2003, most of the former military areas were transferred to the US Department of the Interior to become a wildlife refuge. Soon after, in 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) listed the Vieques bombing range on the National Priority List of the most hazardous waste sites in the United States (a "Superfund" site). Access to much of the eastern end of the island is still limited due to the ongoing removal of unexploded ordnance and munitions debris (NAVFAC 2006). This process has been slow and furthermore has resulted in the release of more contaminants into the air of Vieques, as most of the munitions are "removed" by simply detonating them in the open air.

The landscape that is left after the Navy's departure is very different from the one it took over in the 1940s. Most of the vestiges of the past agricultural uses of the island are gone. Gone too are most indicators that the east and west ends of the island had been home to generations of Viequenses prior to the 1940s. Instead, what is left is a landscape of forest and scrub vegetation punctuated in the far eastern areas of the island with numerous craters and unexploded bombs with tailfins protruding from the ground.

Since military use has disallowed the building of structures and other obvious signs of human activities the visual landscape is considered by some to be "natural." This, along with other "logics of conversion," has helped to legitimize the US government's transfer of many Department of Defense and Department of Energy

facilities into wildlife refuges or other sites of limited human activity (Havlick, 2007). One of the major reasons the US government prefers this kind of development of contaminated lands is that it releases them from much of the financial burden of cleaning up the contamination to the level necessary for human use. In the Vieques case, this transfer of the former military lands to Fish and Wildlife was done through an act of congress. This decision has largely been met with consternation by residents, while some small groups in the community see it as beneficial (Santana 2006). Some activists on the island reported that they believe the transfer of the land to Fish and Wildlife was engineered by some members of the US congress to punish the community on Vieques for successfully stopping the military operations.

The opposition to FWS jurisdiction comes from many angles. First, FWS maintains federal (i.e. in the Puerto Rican context *colonial*) control over access to the lands. In most ways access to the eastern lands has actually been diminished since it was under the Navy. People used to be allowed access to large areas of the eastern end whenever exercises were not being conducted. Under FWS, however, all people must leave the refuge by nightfall, certain areas are completely off-limits, and certain gathering activities- such as the gathering of crabs- are more regulated and restricted. Two quotations illustrate local resistance to FWS being in charge of the eastern end of the island. One woman commented, “Fish and Wildlife – we consider it a nickname for DOD. It is the same thing.” Another female resident of Vieques said, “We see them as another oppressive element. They changed uniforms, they are not the Navy, but they are officials nonetheless.”

A second type of criticism of the FWS centers on what is seen as the hypocrisy of turning over the land to an agency in charge of environmental protection when the US government, through the Navy, is seen as the culprit behind the contamination of the island. There is a majority local perception that what is being ‘preserved’ on Vieques by the US federal government is not nature as much as it is the contamination.

Conclusion

It is important for researchers and citizens on militarized islands to understand the full scope of the relationships between military use and local environments. As I have tried to show, these relationships can sometimes be more complicated than just the obvious physical destruction of landscapes and the spreading of chemical contamination. In many places -such as Guam, Hawaii and Puerto Rico- the military also produces landscapes that look natural. This apparent naturalness however can serve to limit the amount of clean-up of environmental contaminants and it can also cause the US government to maintain federal control over lands, even if they were originally expropriated from former residents.

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