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Sovereignty and Peformativity in the Wake of a Crumbling Japanese Empire: Okinawa’s All-Island Struggle (1952–1958)

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. . . though the United States wants no territory, or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and world peace. Bases which our military experts deem essential for our protection and which are not now in our possession, we will acquire. We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter. (President Harry Truman, August 6, 1945)

Creating Territorial Sovereignty in a Vacuum

In 1945, Japan was called upon to proclaim “unconditional surrender,” after which the Potsdam Declaration stipulated that “Japanese sovereignty” was “limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands” as determined by the Allied Powers. Thereafter, the U.S. military entered a vacuum left in the wake of a crumbling Japanese Empire. Some strategists, particularly in the Navy, advocated outright annexation, and others coveted colonization of certain Pacific territories hanging in limbo, such as Micronesia. However these approaches, which became known as the making of an “American lake out of the Pacific Ocean” (Lattimore, p. 313; Friedman), proved to be unpopular because not only was the cost involved unattractive but “the effort to perpetuate the old colonial order would inevitably produce a series of conflicts and revolts” as seen in colonized European territories (Emerson, p. 268). Most importantly, the State Department was extremely conscious of the dangers of being accused of “embarking on a new surge of imperialist expansion” after signing the no aggrandizement clauses of the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the 1943 Cairo Declaration (Emerson, p. 265). President Truman finally forged a compromise between the two positions by stating that while “the United States wants no territory . . . out of this war,” the U.S. “will acquire [bases] by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter” (United States Department of State, 1985, p. 1321).

By way of this middle road, the U.S. embarked on a project to fabricate territorial sovereignty in a number of formerly colonized and occupied territories with the aid the

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United Nations. As the area studies scholar Rupert Emerson writes, “Instead of having to intervene single-handed to achieve its objectives along the lines of the older diplomacy, the United States if it chooses can, precisely in the field of dependencies and of new national governments, make the United Nations a most effective vehicle” (Emerson, p. 272). Specifically, the U.S. superimposed a postwar nation-state system drawn along territorial lines on the space of Japanese Empire and contrived various methods to integrate it into a network of political sovereignty through legal frameworks such as trusteeship “consistent with the United Nations Charter” (United States Department of State, 1985, pp. 1321–22). At the same time, President Truman made it clear that the building up of a network of military bases throughout the Pacific was a deciding factor in the particular configuration of territorial sovereignty. According to Chapter XII of the Charter, a trusteeship is designed to “promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories” so that they may accomplish “progressive development toward self-government or independence” (Charter of the United Nations). Hence, although trusteeship was administered by the U.S., which had interests in building up a network of bases, it avoided charges of imperialism because it administered in the name of promoting development toward independence.

For example, the U.S. took over the Japanese mandated islands as a strategic area trusteeship in effort to “pursue the policy of non-annexation insisted on by State Department, but at the same time meet the military’s strategic objectives” (Hara, p. 108). Japan previously ruled over these islands under a League of Nations mandate, and the Japanese Navy began illegal construction of airfields, fortifications, ports, and other military projects in the 1930s that became notoriously known as “unsinkable aircraft carriers.” A strategic area trusteeship differed from other trusteeships in that it provided for special exceptions to the administering authority, *i.e.*, the U.S., to establish U.S. military bases. Hence, the strategic area trusteeship “would enable the USA to do legally what Japan had done illegally” (Hara, p. 108).

George Kennan, director of the State Department’s policy planning staff, initially included the Ryukyu Islands in his discussion on strategic area trusteeship. Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers General Douglas MacArthur conveyed to him in February 1948 that the islands were essential in order to secure northeast Asia and keep bases out of Japan where they risked inciting anti-American resistance (Sarantakes, p. 43). As it became more and more difficult to secure cooperation from the U.N., Secretary of State John Foster Dulles ultimately decided on an arrangement where the U.S. could secure “exclusive strategic control” while sovereignty remained in Japan (United States Department of State, 1977, p. 1152). This position, which came to be known as “residual sovereignty,” ingeniously manipulated the legal framework of territorial sovereignty so the U.S. military could have exclusive control over Okinawa, as it did with the strategic trust areas, avoid charges of aggrandizement and entanglements with the U.N., and provide the foundation for the full recuperation of Japanese sovereignty in the mainland with a dramatic reduction of the bases that threatened anti-American resistance there. Japan had

already paved the way for this arrangement with the 1947 Emperor's Message, in which Hirohito conveyed to General MacArthur his wish to exchange Okinawa for Japanese sovereignty (Sebald). In this way, Japan regained full sovereignty through the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which was preconditioned on the establishment of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty that allowed for U.S. military bases in Japan and the offering of Okinawa to the U.S. as a base island.

Out of the ruins of the old European and Japanese colonial order thus emerged a new form of Empire, the global expansion of U.S. military bases that reinforces, rather than dismantles, boundaries of territorial sovereignty. Emerson unabashedly articulates the challenges of this new Empire in terms of the following contradiction:

The concept of the strategic area trusteeship was from the outset a somewhat bastard and contradictory one In brief, it is an attempt to combine a system of international supervision and inspection, as far as the management of dependent peoples is concerned, with virtually full-blown national sovereignty in military and security matters. How happy a marriage can be made of these two divergent elements is an experiment to be watched with the closest attention. (Emerson, p. 266)

While Emerson's critique is directed at the unilateralism of a strategic area trust, the "bastard and contradictory" combination of "international supervision . . . as far as the management of dependent peoples is concerned" with "full-blown national sovereignty in military and security matters" applies to many areas left open in the Japanese Imperial vacuum to varying degrees, including Okinawa. On one hand, the Okinawan population was managed according to territorial sovereignty delineated by the U.S. and recognized by the international community, which meant at least nominally it was "residually" part of Japan and not under U.S. sovereignty. On the other hand, this particular configuration served the ends of establishing a transnational Empire of U.S. military bases in Okinawa facilitated by a U.S.-Japanese partnership. The bodies of mixed-blood children born between U.S. military personnel and local Okinawan women precisely embodied this "bastard and contradictory" combination that threatened the dream of Empire's "happy . . . marriage . . . of these two divergent elements." U.S. military personnel created mixed-blood children who exceeded the limits of territorial sovereignty designated by the postwar geopolitical map while both the U.S. and later Japan tended to the maintenance of those territorial boundaries.

This paper will examine the all-island struggle (*shimagurumi tōsō*) from 1952 to 1958, or the struggle against the confiscation of land for the construction of U.S. military bases, as a pivotal moment in the discourse of territorial sovereignty in Okinawa. This was not only a struggle over the land but also a struggle for territorial sovereignty, as the roots of Okinawa's movement for "reversion" to the Japanese administration are found here. The movement toward reversion as a way to escape U.S. military domination was based on outdated assumptions about the relationship between territorial sovereignty and colonialism, and as such, unwittingly entangled itself even more deeply in a web of trans-

national U.S.-Japanese Empire instead of tearing away, as many had expected. Moreover, territorial sovereignty was racialized along the lines of a postwar fantasy of a multiracial U.S. juxtaposed with a monoethnic Japan. As a result, mixed-blood children, who embodied the contradictions of the two “divergent elements” of a racialized territorial sovereignty that was managed both transnationally and transracially, were existences that needed to be *secured* in the reversion movement.

The All-Island Struggle¹⁾

The Okinawan War and subsequent U.S. occupation radically reconfigured the relationship between the land and the Okinawan people. After the U.S. forces landed, they took possession of the land they needed through occupation under the “Laws and Customs of War and Land” of the October 18, 1907, Hague Convention, No. 4. U.S. forces occupied some 42,000 acres, or 12.7% of the total landmass of Okinawa, which resulted in about 40,000 landowners losing their land (Nakachi, p. 99). They confiscated this land without payment on the justification that it was their right as an occupying nation and that documentation proving ownership could not be confirmed since it was destroyed during the war.

However, as a result of the 1952 Peace Treaty, it became imperative that the U.S. apply “normal laws, which are usually applied in any other peace time country” and acquire the lands legally (Nanpō Dōhō Engokai, p. 37). Land surveys were conducted from 1948, and by 1951 an official assessment was made. This prompted landowners to demand payments for use of their land. In response, USCAR introduced a series of ordinances to instigate the legal process. According to Ordinance No. 91 (Authority to Contract), issued on November 1, 1952, USCAR stated that it would retroactively pay from June 1, 1950, to April 27, 1952, at a rate of 1.08 B yen for one tsubo. Additionally, the USCAR proposed a 20-year contract. However, because of the low payment, which was only a fraction of the real value of the land, and the long duration of the contract, only two percent of all landowners accepted.

Because of the opposition, USCAR was obliged to issue Ordinance No. 105 on March 23, 1953, which was the authority to accomplish the execution of leases and rental payments for privately-owned lands occupied by the U.S. from July 1, 1950, through April 27, 1952. This ordinance withdrew the abhorred twenty-year lease contract, and approximately 900 landowners accepted although the vast majority still refused to sign.

USCAR exacerbated tension with the introduction of Ordinance No. 109 (The Land Acquisition Procedure) on April 3, 1953. This proved to be the worst land ordinance of all because it outlined the compulsory acquisition of private land when landowners refused to execute a lease contract. For example, USCAR informed residents of Mawashi Village of its intention to acquire 158,000 tsubo (126,400 acres) of land on April 3, 1953, and that it would start to level the lands in seven days. With “bulldozers and bayonets,” the U.S. military violently flattened dwellings with little to no notice.

Finally, one year later in March 1954, USCAR announced its plans for a lump-sum payment on lands for which the lease period was projected to be over five years. Okinawan anger was then driven to the breaking point after a U.S. Congressman stated that it was the Okinawans themselves who desired to sell their land to the U.S. military and develop the rest of the island as farmland (Miyazato, p. 79). Opposition across the board was incited in Okinawa, which hence became known as the “all-island struggle.” The Ryukyu Legislature unanimously passed the well-known “Four Principles for Solving the Military Land Problems” resolution on April 30, 1954 as follows:

- 1) The United States should renounce the purchase of land or permanent use thereof and lump-sum payment of rentals.
- 2) Just and complete compensation should be made annually for the land currently in use.
- 3) Indemnity should be paid promptly for all damage caused by United States forces.
- 4) No further acquisition of land should be made, and the land that was not urgently needed by the United States government should be restored promptly.

At the same time the resolution was passed, the government of the Ryukyu Islands (*gyōseifu*), the Ryukyu Legislature (*rippōin*), the Mayor’s Association (*shichōsonchō-kai*), and the Landowners Federal Committee (*tochirengō-kai*) formed the Council of the Four Organizations (*yonsha kyōgikai*).

When USCAR was not responsive, the Council of the Four Organizations decided to directly appeal to the United States Congress. In response, a six-member House committee on the Armed Services headed by Charles Melvin Price was formed to visit Okinawa and entertain their grievances. They responded with the Price Recommendation on June 9, 1956, in which they maintained the intention of a lump-sum payment for the lands while adjusting the method of compensation.

The Ryukyu Legislature immediately convened and maintained a tenacious adherence to the Four Principles for Solving the Military Land Problems. Headquarters Demanding the Four Principles, made up of primarily the Council of the Four Organizations, adopted a seven-point platform on June 16, 1956, to:

- 1) form an organized body in solidarity;
- 2) transcend individual interests with an ethnic consciousness to protect of land and territorial rights based upon justice;
- 3) renounce all forms of violence in resistance;
- 4) struggle against the policies of the U.S. and respect the human rights and character of individual Americans;
- 5) eradicate all forms of criminal activity;
- 6) exercise self-governance amongst the people; and
- 7) overcome complications in strict adherence to the four principles.

The careful wording of the platform was neutral enough to capture the interests of residents across the board: there was no mention of anti-American, anti-base, or anti-communist sentiments. At this stage, directly after the announcement of the Price Recommendation

tion, the Council of Four Organizations was able to boast of the “will of 800,000 residents” in protest. What is significant about this stage of the struggle is that it was largely unorganized. The point of commonality was found in the resistance against the threat of USCAR confiscating the land, or in other words, crippling and potentially devastating the people’s ability to forge a life for themselves and their families. However, when this energy was channeled through the telos of a political goal, the movement divided in two directions: those who sought to protect the land by appealing to a notion of racialized territorialized sovereignty of the nation-state, and hence threw themselves into the reversion movement to the Japanese administration, and those who started to recognize the land as a transnational space of circulation. These two approaches are discussed in the sections below.

Racialized Territorial Sovereignty

In their study on the emergence of activism during the all-island struggle, Gabe Masao and Hiyane Teruo argue that American rule over Okinawa was severely challenged from the beginning because of the “clear fact that they were governing over a culturally, socially, and economically different race (*minzoku*)” (Gabe and Hiyane, p. 36). In order to make up for these differences, the U.S. had no choice but to justify Okinawa’s “militaristic value” in the “defense of liberalist states from communism” (Gabe and Hiyane, p. 36). However, this creation of legitimacy for America’s rule over Okinawa failed to capture the hearts of Okinawans in a way that they could be inspired to sacrifice themselves for its greater mission. As they write, “it was not something that incited internal spontaneity” (Gabe and Hiyane, p. 36).

“Therefore,” they continue, it was an “inevitable result . . . that the concept of reversion that became clear amidst the storm of the land struggle was the product of an aggregate concept of democracy and nationalism, and won over the resident masses” (Gabe and Hiyane, p. 43). What they mean here is that the struggle for life, which they define as occurring in the “private” realm, was “channeled through” the “public” sphere of “territorial sovereignty” and “self-determination” (Gabe and Hiyane, p. 34). In this way, the concept of reversion was “directed toward ousting America’s rule over Okinawa” (Gabe and Hiyane, p. 34).

It is certainly true that the U.S. initially frowned upon the reversion movement because it incited fears of communist activity and anti-Americanism (Miyazato, pp. 141–43). However, this was a minor glitch that did not pose any contradiction to the new form of governance that was encroaching on Okinawa. Rather, Okinawan resistance was contained and re-channeled through the discourse on territorial sovereignty and thus reinforced the otherwise questionable basis upon which the U.S. established the sprawling roots of Empire across the Pacific. In other words, although the specific tactical instrument²) was first coded as “anti-American,” it unwittingly subscribed to the same discourse on territorial sovereignty that foregrounded the expanse of a new form of transnational

Empire, thereby making Okinawans both the subject and object of their own subjugation. Resistance was deflected away from any impending crisis in Empire that struggled with establishing legitimacy in a vacuum.

The legitimacy here was not that of a “different race (*minzoku*)” ruling over Okinawa as indicated by Gabe and Hiyane, but the legitimacy of the postwar geopolitical map of the Pacific itself arbitrarily delineated by the whims and needs of the U.S. military. By assuming the former for the latter, both authors reify territorial sovereignty along the lines of racial categorization. Naoki Sakai has aptly articulated this as the “international division of labor . . . between the United States and Japan” in which a multiracial U.S. is contrasted with a monoethnic Japan in the postwar era (Sakai, p. 184). This combination allows for the formation of a racial fantasy whereupon the U.S. continues to unite races around the globe while the legacy of Japan’s multiethnic empire—including Okinawans who attempted to assimilate into Japan—is forgotten. White or black bodies born from Okinawan women had no place here and became egregious impediments to Okinawa’s ability to assimilate into the Japanese administration through reversion. Instead of existences that threatened to undermine the legitimacy of transnational Empire, they were rather mobilized by the reversion movement as symbols that evidenced the infringement of Japanese sovereignty on the prefectural soil of Okinawa; they became an abhorred spectacle that fueled the urgency toward reversion as shown in the next section.

Extraterritorial Miscegenation and the Creation of an Internal Sovereign Space

The reversion movement formally hit the ground in Japan on July 12, 1956, when four Okinawan representatives travelled to Tokyo to directly appeal to the Diet to be “protected by the power of a state with sovereignty” and “revert to the Japanese administration” so that “the independent state of Japan [can] deal with the independent state of America from a position of equals” (Nihon Kokkai Giroku, 1956). From this early point forward, mixed-blood children were used as evidence to reinforce the need for Okinawa to be protected under the umbrella of Japanese sovereignty. The representatives submitted a report including information on the mixed-blood problem that was addressed in the Diet. Sekō Hiroichi of the Lower House made the following comments:

In the report, it states that there is a 20:1 ratio of mixed-blood children. Here it says from October 1953 to the present, there are 250 of them. I think it is rather important for the young children to determine what kind of measures the U.S. government is taking regarding the right of subsistence (*seikatsuken*) and protection of these kinds of mixed-blood children. At the same time, I think the right of subsistence and protection of women therein implicated should be a significant human rights issue that is taken up on the international level. (Nihon Kokkai Giroku, 1956)

For Sekō, mixed-blood children are a problem for the U.S. or the international community, not Japan. Yet the responsibility that Sekō dodges here was not simply that of the Japanese government, which refused to take Okinawa under its umbrella of sovereignty.

Due to censorship during the Allied occupation, politically motivated writing about miscegenation was difficult, but given the deluge of media coverage that immediately ensued around the time of independence, it is reasonable to infer that red-light districts and mixed-blood children born outside of sovereignty were a major object of contempt for occupied Japan. For example, about one month before the official end of Allied occupation, Takada Nahoko proclaimed in the Diet that “the atomic bomb is not the only thing that can destroy a race,” referring to “contamination” of the Japanese population by the “so-called occupation baby or mixed-blood children” (Nihon Kokkai Kaigiroku, 1952). Members of the Japanese Diet identified “the real [mixed-blood] problem” as children born outside of state sovereignty, or in other words, illegitimate children who could not claim their father’s citizenship and were therefore left stateless by Japanese nationality law, which assumed the principle of *jus sanguinis* along patrilineal lines only (Shimabuku, 2010a, pp. 35–36). However, since their numbers were dwindling, the Japanese government ultimately settled on a policy of assimilation since studies suggested they could be absorbed by the larger Japanese population without posing a threat to the race. A racial equilibrium was achieved within the sovereign Japanese state, but at this point, it was clear how the U.S. military bases along with miscegenation that accompanied them were already relegated to Okinawa (Shimabuku, 2009, pp. 195–97). This is the responsibility that Sekō avoided addressing.

Yet, there were the four delegates, first petitioning the Japanese state for protection from a problem that it contributed in creating, and second, reproducing the very discourse of territorial sovereignty that constituted it. Despite Sekō’s deflection, Asato tries to reclaim the issue as another incidence of American negligence in need of Japanese sovereign protection.

. . . there is the issue of mixed-blood children. I do not have an accurate grasp of their numbers, but it is greater than what you just stated now. I think it is fair to say that there is no special protection taken [for these children.] Furthermore, whether or not America has any special interest [in these children], I think it is safe to say, no, not the slightest. (Nihon Kokkai Giroku, 1956)

While Asato is conservative in his depiction of the issue’s urgency, accounts immediately after the representatives make their plea before the Diet do not hold back in sensationally elevating it to the level of racial genocide echoing Takada Nahoko’s language of the “occupation baby” as an “atomic bomb.” For example, the prominent Okinawan historian, Higaonna Kanjun (1886–1963) contributed an article entitled “Mixed-blood Children” to a newspaper series that ran in 1957 amidst the all-island struggle. Like the Japanese Diet, he identifies the problem specifically as the type of miscegenation that occurs as a result of extraterritoriality and not “international marriage,” which is “a phenomenon[on] of cultural exchange” (Higaonna, p. 388). According to Higaonna, the former brings contamination to the “healthy sector of society.”

The mixed-blood children that creep out of the present red-light district are nothing but scars

of war damage that have inherited the inferior genes of both parents. Of course, these children are not guilty of sin or blame. However, regarding their birth, they are nothing but the crystallization of disgrace that was not planned for nor hoped (*kitai*) for. They will eternally be an enormous liability for society. Letting such a liability go, or worse yet grow larger in numbers, will condemn our communal life to darkness. We probably have no choice but to look after those already born. But it is to our greatest dissatisfaction that in these times where a limitation on the number of births in the healthy sector of society is recommended, there is no check on these unhealthy births. (Higaonna, p. 388)

Here, the relationship between sovereignty and race inscribes spatial contours to Higaonna's text. Invasion from without is the ultimate infringement of Japanese national sovereignty that resulted in the extraterritorial mixed-blood births described as "nothing but scars of war damage that have inherited the inferior genes of both parents." The children are contaminants who threaten the internal "communal life" of Okinawans who are purportedly Japanese.

In both discussions on extraterritorial miscegenation in first Japan and then Okinawa, the sovereign law appears to pre-exist the mixed-blood children who fall on its outside. However, if sovereignty is read performatively, the order is quite the opposite: imagining mixed-blood children on the outside of the law is what constitutes the internal sovereign space of the new Empire that struggled with legitimacy.

In his discussion on the relationship between laws for economic aid and the construction of a new Empire in postwar Okinawa, Tomiyama also offers such a performative reading of the law that he understands as an integral "issue of the state and the imperial system" (Tomiyama, p. 270).

Here, the subjectivation (*shutai*) that occurred amidst the act of petitioning [the law] was precisely the issue. It involved considering those who live inside of the law not as a subject outside of the law or before it, or as determined by the law, but as a performative actor". (Tomiyama, p. 270)

Those who live inside of the law, such as subjects already protected by sovereignty, did not previously live as "subjects outside of the law" in the space of extraterritoriality or as a humble subjects "before it" in the act of petitioning for reversion to Japanese sovereignty. The law does not constitute subjects unilaterally because the law and its subjects are mutually constituted through the performance of petitioning the law for protection. This relationship is expressed spatially both in metaphorical and geopolitical senses. The petitioner has a limited existence that constitutes the internal space of sovereignty precisely as he fearfully imagines the dangers of falling on its outside. This is what Tomiyama calls "presentiments of violence," which takes the title of his book.³⁾

Asato directly petitioned the Japanese Diet for sovereign protection as Higaonna appealed to the Japanese state through his journalistic activism. Both performatively posit Okinawans internal to the Japanese law by imagining the otherwise open-ended existence of mixed-blood children as outsiders. And as Higaonna declares with abandon, these outlaws are a "liability" who need to be kept in check in order to protect the "births in the

healthy sector of society.” Theoretically impoverished and lacking in a language to articulate their circumstance, both force mixed-blood children into a geopolitical map defined by territorial sovereignty to describe a new technology of transnational governance that was settling upon Okinawa as described below.

Freedom as the Law, Freedom as Circulation

Struggling for life itself, the Okinawan representatives that pleaded for sovereignty played into the hands of the new imperial order. By using old ideas to struggle with a new problem, the content of their text constantly exceeds the form of their plea. This is apparent as Asato continues to speak about the kind of freedom he thinks sovereignty could achieve immediately after his reference to mixed-blood children.

The modus operandi in place is such that if only we have food and money then we shouldn't have trouble eating; [supposedly] freedom is at least recognized under the name of democracy However, what I want to state here is if the mentality is that [a good] life in Okinawa means adequate food or things to wear, it is fundamentally erred. This might not be an appropriate example, but in recent days prison life—or in other words—the life of a prisoner, is highly protected democratically. If the problem is not having any worries about having something to eat, then it is possible to say that the prisoner chained to a prison has the most stable life of all. We are exposed to the anxiety of unemployment and danger; our human rights are ignored. On the contrary, the life of a prisoner who doesn't worry about eating enjoys more stability. The only difference is that the life of a prisoner enjoys freedom limited to a prison cell; the tall fence that surrounds them robs them of their freedom I think the meaning of our way of life is that we are inside a prison right now. The frame of our fundamental freedom is rigid. (Nihon Kokkai Giroku, 1956)

Asato's metaphor, which is enigmatically poetic for a political plea before the Japanese Diet, perhaps unconsciously offers more than a justification for reversion. Asato intends to equate the prisoner's lack of freedom with Okinawa's lack of sovereignty and the entrapment of the prison cell with Okinawa's inability to break out of the U.S. military bases that physically enveloped the island. In this way, freedom is attached to a legal subject that is protected under the umbrella of sovereignty. Yet, his text says more. While the form of his plea for freedom takes on assumptions about state sovereignty, the content of freedom is not the “stability” of being cared for but the capacity for mobility and circulation. Although the “prisoner chained to a prison has the most stable life,” it does not protect him from exposure “to the anxiety of unemployment and danger.” Even as he can only articulate the object of his plea through the reductive language of state sovereignty, the content suggests an awareness that Okinawa is entering into a new form of power that exceeds the boundaries of territorial sovereignty—that of biopower.

Precisely as Foucault writes, “we have to bypass or get around the problem of sovereignty” (Foucault, 2003, p. 27). Foucault criticizes the Hobbesian model of the repressive state that lent much theoretical purchase to the post-Westphalian discourse of interna-

tional law. In this formulation, the people submit to the sovereign of the state in exchange for their protection from both internal and external enemies, thereby delineating the territory of domestic and international law. When positioned outside of state sovereignty in the space of extraterritoriality, stateless people become a *homo sacer*, or victim exposed to raw violence as Okinawa was exposed to U.S. military violence with no recourse to legal protection. In this sense, Okinawa is like a Guantanamo Bay of the 1950s, but not quite as Agamben would have it. Foucault moves away from the repressive state concerned with war, coercion, and surveillance, and instead shifts toward a liberal biopolitics that takes security dispositifs working on a transnational population as its core. He writes: “the problem is no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement, constantly moving around, continually going from one point to another, but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out” (Foucault, 2008, p. 65).

Despite Asato’s assumption that territorial sovereignty is inextricably linked to freedom, Foucault argues that power is no longer a “problem . . . of fixing and demarcating the territory.” In this sense, colonialism is radically deterritorialized; it does not matter if Okinawa is a colony lacking in sovereignty or part of the Japanese state imbued with it.⁴⁾ Okinawa is not a repressive space of confinement but rather a productive space that allows, encourages, and even requires circulation to take place in order to protect the population from things such as “the anxiety of unemployment and danger.” The constellation of U.S. military bases across the Pacific allowed for the transnational circulation of capital and bodies and compelled the islanders to participate as a way of life, while at the same time policing them along nation-state borders. Although protection of the borders of territorial sovereignty does not entirely drop out of the equation, it is radically demoted to the level of a tactic subject to manipulations of the greater strategy of biopower. Rather, biopower takes as its object the undulations of a living, transnational population.

While the U.S. balked at the idea of annexation and colonization due to the “burden of governing a large Oriental population” (Emerson, 1947, p. 265), it still needed to manage a transnational population of first, an enormous number of U.S. military personnel “spreading democracy around the world,” second, locals who would come to integrate the U.S. military into the fabric of their lives so as to ensure collaboration, and third, the mixed-blood products of this transnational “marriage” (Emerson, 1947, p. 266). Racialized territorial sovereignty was a way to allow the nation-state system to do the work of population management for the purpose of a transnational governance in which U.S. military bases were set up across the Pacific. And like anything living, a population dies and reproduces, thereby making “sexual matters . . . foundational to the material terms in which colonial projects” are carried out (Stoler, 2002, p. 14). Reproduction of the transnational population becomes a necessity even while miscegenation is policed along the lines of racialized territorial sovereignty. Mixed-blood children present the challenge as to “[h]ow a happy marriage can be made of these two divergent elements.”

In contrast to the reversion movement, which treated mixed-blood children as evidence of Okinawa's need for sovereign protection, business owners in the red-light districts where most mixed-blood children were born fought for their ability to participate in the transnational circulation of capital and bodies. As discussed below, they literally embodied the transnational moment of biopower configured as the imperative to participate in the economy for survival.

Okinawan Federation of Night Clubs Association

When the four Okinawan representatives voiced the all-island struggle as a plea for reversion to Japanese sovereignty before the Diet, the once united movement became increasingly marred with factionalism. Particularly when the Chief Executive, Higa Shûhei, and Naha City Mayor Tōma Jūgo started to express opinions sympathetic with USCAR, the unity of the movement started to crumble.

The Association of Four Organizations grew to the Association of Five Organizations with the addition of the Mayor's Legislature (*shichōson gikai*) and amplified their call for reversion as a way to oppose the land acquisitions. While this was organized in a top down fashion, the Land Protection Association (*tochi wo mamoru-kai*), Okinawan Teachers Association, the Okinawan Socialist Masses Party, the Ryukyu Democratic Party, the Federal Committee of Landowners, and the Okinawan Commerce Committee organized from the bottom up on July 18, 1956. It elected Yara Chōbyō, who came from the Okinawan Teachers Association. Yara took leadership of the mass movement on the platform of reversion to the Japanese administration and called for the resignation of Chief Executive Higa and Mayor Tōma at a prefectural rally of 150,000 islanders on June 18, 1956. Furthermore, at the rally, they heard reports back from the four representatives that pleaded the Okinawan case to Japan and elected a second group of representatives including Senaga Kamejirō, who had been recently released from prison due to the 1954 Okinawan People's Party Incident, and Kaneshi Saiichi, who was branded a "communist."

USCAR took advantage of the division by enforcing an off-limits directive⁵⁾ on August 8, 1956. This was devastating as there were 3,500 businesses that catered specifically to the bases; thirty-eight percent, or \$49,930,000, of Okinawa's total GNP (\$131,300,000 in 1953) constituted income from the base economy (Nakachi, p. 113). When students from Ryukyu University and other Okinawan students in Japanese universities planned a rally opposing the lump-sum payment on August 8, 1956, in Koza City, where many of the bases were concentrated, the Okinawa Federation of Night Clubs Association (*Okinawa fūzoku eigyō kumiai rengō-kai*, herein known as OFNCA) opposed the demonstration. As the name suggests, OFNCA represented businesses that facilitated miscegenation surrounding the bases.

The next day on August 9, President Ōshiro Seiji of OFNCA issued a petition translated into English to USCAR. I could not locate this document but instead found a supplementary report and petition submitted on August 13.⁶⁾ In these documents, OFNCA states

that they stand by the Four Principles for Solving the Military Land Problems and plead to “[s]eparate clearly Off Limits from the land problem.” However, they are not shy in demonstrating their open hostility toward the growing leftist faction of the popular movement, in particular, the platform put forth by the Land Protection Association at the June 18, 1956, prefectural rally.

Specifically, they:

- 1) accuse Yara Chōbyō of co-opting Land Protection with “Anti-American Ideology” and suggest those “Okinawan future leaders” and “pure-minded students” are corrupted from “being under the bad leadership”;
- 2) boast of their attempt to “stop the meetings and demonstrations” directed by Chief Yara of the Land Protection Association;
- 3) report their resistance to representatives of the board of directors of the Land Protection Association;
- 4) advocate the “[e]stablishment of Pro-American underground organization and Intelligence . . . under the cooperation of Military Intelligence and CID” to counter the “people’s party and other bad ideologists” that “have an underground organization”;
- 5) articulate a plan to “stud[y] measures against” “Mr. Senaga and Mr. Kaneshi” as they “make an Anti-American Propaganda”; and
- 6) state they would “not call our representative Democrats legislators from now if they don’t make any reflection.”

What is impressive about this document is it shows how the political left, in advocating sovereignty, came to appear as enemies to their own brethren. In order to secure the right to participate in the base economy, which essentially meant the right to prostitute, OFNCA was willing to go so far as to advocated the “[e]stablishment of Pro-American underground organization and Intelligence” since the left emerged as a threat to their very survival. They were transformed into subjects of the population; bases were transformed into a commodity—an object of desire that can be fought for or cruelly deprived.

At Polar Opposites on the Same Grid of Intelligibility

The Japanese nationalist reversion movement spearheaded by the four Okinawan representatives before the Diet and the pro-American OFNCA appear to be at polar opposites of the political spectrum. Higaonna exemplifies this antagonism as he calls the OFNCA “suicidal” and claims that they are the precursor to Okinawa’s extinction.

When the representative petitioners travelled to Tokyo last year to advocate the Four Principles [for Solving the Military Land Problems], the occupying U.S. military ordered the soldier’s red light district off-limits on the grounds that it would reduce friction with the locals. Accordingly, the district’s business owners fell onto hard times. When I heard them complaining it was the revenge tactic of economic pressure, I thought as people who purport to protect the land and protect their everyday life (*seikatsu*), their argument was suicidal.

Rather, we became livid and felt that these types of unhealthy businesses should be completely eliminated. Nonetheless, they countered that ideals and reality are different. These kinds of business are proof that they have come to think it is a natural given that mixed-blood children are growing in numbers every year primarily out of these kinds of districts. (Higaonna, pp. 387–88)

Although Higaonna codes himself as anti-American and pro-Japanese, he nonetheless replicates the same discursive strategy of the USCAR since both appeal to the constitution of a legal subject. The “starve them into submission” logic of the off-limits order assumes a quantifiable lack that can be satiated by a subject who legally petitions for economic relief. Returning to Tomiyama’s discussion of the law in the postwar era, he argues that the infusion of capital into Okinawa was accompanied by laws for economic aid and recovery designed to create subjects whose lack (hunger) could be quantified, satiated, and contained by the law precisely at the moment when Empire struggled with legitimacy of rule and the constant crisis of revolt. These laws for economic aid did not necessarily function to discipline subjects into submission since they did create petitioning subjects who reinforced the notion that lack (hunger), which is always teeming with the possibility for revolt, can be satiated and neutralized for the correct dollar amount. Instead, absolute lack or hunger belonging to those who fall outside of the legal framework of sovereignty is always in excess of the law (Tomiyama, pp. 249–302). By starving the business owners to a zero point of hunger, USCAR sought to create subjects who fell within this grid of intelligibility. For Higaonna, the problem was that the subject appealed to the wrong legal entity (USCAR, not the Japanese state). This is why Higaonna “became livid” at the “revenge tactic of economic pressure.”

Rather, mixed-blood children were in constant excess of the postwar legal system. This is in sharp distinction to being on its outside, for an outside-inside binary already assumes a discursive field that fails to take into consideration its own relationship to its object of exclusion/inclusion. The formation of postwar subjects amidst an intensified circulation of capital and bodies through the U.S. military conduit inevitably produced contingencies beyond its control. And as any system that enables mobility and circulation instead of represses and curtails it, the contingencies it produces completely reframe the problem of security. No longer does security follow a Hobbesian model of repressing action into compliance with the law, but rather, it involves neutralizing the contingencies that arise from the imperative to circulate. Hence, security in the biopolitical era is fraught with a temporality that looks ahead to controlling the future. As Didier Bigo writes in his study of security in the age of biopolitics, “Security imagines the future and projects itself into it as a maximal form which has reduced the margins to non-existence; it makes a fantasy of homogeneity and seeks the end of any resistances or struggles” (Bigo, p. 109).

When Higaonna writes that mixed-blood children “will eternally be an enormous liability for society,” he means this contingency will grow into a threat to the “fantasy of homogeneity” Bigo speaks of, and must be pre-emptively neutralized. This is why he writes, “it is to our greatest dissatisfaction that in these times where a limitation on the

number of births in the healthy sector of society is recommended, there is no check on these unhealthy births,” thereby suggesting a eugenics policy for occupied Okinawa that is consistent with the contours of the racialized territorial sovereignty of a new imperial order.

After the off-limits directive, the land issue became increasingly one of economics (freedom for circulation in the market) instead of politics (freedom from extraterritoriality). After a second group of representatives was chosen, they travelled to the U.S. and negotiated directly with the State Department and Department of Defense. Both sides were able to reach an agreement, and as a result, on November 26, 1958, the U.S. announced abandonment of the lump-sum payment proposal, payment on a yearly basis, reassessment of lands every five years, and rent payment of more than six times the sum that was originally agreed upon in the Price Recommendation. This was a drastic change of heart considering the U.S. had tenaciously stuck by the Price Recommendation for the two prior years.

The U.S. once again learned that threatening the livelihood of Okinawans did not create a people that yielded to the needs of USCAR. Instead, USCAR abandoned the lump sum payment and adopted reassessment, thereby creating a base-land lessor class. Leasing land to the military was integrated into the very fabric of Okinawan lives and planted the seeds of division that exist to this day. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. eliminated the B-yen currency, introduced a dollar currency, and eliminated restrictions on international investments, thereby opening Okinawa up to foreign banks. Although this ultimately resulted in American investment in Okinawa, it was nonetheless a pivotal shift toward the liberalization of Okinawa’s economy that opened it up to the global market and carried it away from the stagnation of insularity.

Ultimately, the movement split in two directions: subjects that sought protection under the umbrella of Japanese sovereignty and subjects that sought a lifting of restrictions on the base economy. Both appeared to be at odds with each other. The former, advocating reversion to the Japanese administration, increasingly appealed to the mixed-blood issue to show how Okinawa was exposed to the violence of extraterritoriality as ammunition to justify the need for protection under Japanese sovereignty. The latter, taking distance from anti-American sentiments, instead petitioned for their right to prostitute Okinawan women to the U.S. military. By enforcing the off-limits sanctions during the all-island struggle, the bases came forth as a commodity through which subjects oriented their desire. Instead of coding each position as “pro-Japanese” or “pro-American,” it is perhaps more productive to understand each as two moments in the formation of a new imperial order in the wake of a crumbling Japanese Empire. In fact, far from being inherently contradictory, the movement for sovereignty and the drive for free circulation in the economy came closer together. That is, liberalization of the market in Okinawa became more and more closely related to Japan’s economic, and later, administrative authority over Okinawa. This was the great “success” of reversion that changed Okinawa’s location on the grid of geopolitical sovereignty while at the same time entrenching it ever more

deeply in an unchanging position vis-à-vis postwar transnational Empire.

Notes

1) I have been informed by a number of resources that provide a historical overview of the all-island struggle. These include, but are not limited to, in Japanese: Miyazato, Gabe and Hiyane, and Arasaki and Nakano; in English: Nakachi, and Tanji. Since many of the historical events are similarly recorded in multiple sources, I have forgone citing each of them below unless I found rare mention of a fact that cannot be located elsewhere.

2) Here, I echo the “tactical reversibility of discourse” that circulates time and time again as a primary methodological move in Foucauldian historiography. Foucault writes:

As the field of knowledge becomes more regular, it becomes increasingly possible for the subjects who speak within it to be divided along strict lines of confrontation, and it becomes increasingly possible to make the contending discourses function as different tactical units within overall strategies The tactical reversibility of the discourse is, in other words, directly proportional to the homogeneity of the field in which it is formed. (Foucault, 2003, p. 208)

In this way, he shows how seemingly diametrically opposed political positions appear to be in conflict on one level, but in fact, unwittingly reproduce and reinforce common assumptions that foreground their opposition. Hence, a political position in one historical period can code switch to its polar opposite in another while maintaining and reinforcing the overall discursive strategy that is common to both. This couldn’t be any truer than it is with postwar geopolitics in East Asia, where what is anti-American or anti-Japanese code switches to a position that is consistent with American and Japanese Empire because resistance is problematically carried out without any scrutiny to the formation of nation-states in the postwar era. For example, the anti-Japanese and pro-American sentiment in the southern part of post-independence Korea that congealed into the formation of a nation-state after the Korean War and the anti-American and pro-Japanese sentiment in Okinawa that congealed into its reversion to the Japanese administration both reproduced the discourse of nation-state sovereignty that left *zainichi* Koreans still living in Japan as “semi-refugees” with no belonging. Although both were coded as opposites, each ended up playing a role in the postwar geopolitical order of Empire despite being colonies of Japan in the prewar era. In this way, the fabrication of territorial sovereignty was crucial for the U.S. in order to intercept transnational connections forming amongst former colonials that took shape along with Japan’s imperial expansion. By superimposing a geopolitical map of nation-states upon the lives of those who had experienced Japanese Empire, individuals were suddenly separated by their respective postwar “nationality” and their agitation was directed at each other instead of at imperial power.

3) Although the geopolitical contexts through which they write are quite different, both Tomiyama and Judith Butler engage in performative readings of the law and sovereignty as a way to avoid Agamben’s rigid exceptionalism. In Tomiyama’s Marxian inspired approach, he understands the massive infusion of capital into postwar Okinawa through the GARIOA program as an extension of the New Deal and Marshall Plan within an East Asian context precisely at the moment when a newly forming Empire struggled with legitimacy of rule amongst colonized people agitating for liberation. The very act of petitioning the law for economic aid is a performance that legitimizes the new Empire as the entity that satiates hunger (lack) and constitutes Okinawan subjects as territorial subjects who possess a hunger (lack) as an effect (Tomiyama, pp. 249–302). Although Butler writes that post 9/11 Guantanamo Bay. operates in a zone of extraterritoriality similar to pre-reversion Okinawa, she is careful to question how this zone is constituted. On one hand, the Foucauldian notion of governmentality as a *dispositif* of biopower is in motion as Guantanamo Bay seeks to care for a transnational population in its prison while at the same time sovereignty emerges in full force as the right to suspend international law indefinitely. However, Butler does not describe the sovereign right to exception as a structural inevitability. Instead, she writes, “[i]t is not, literally speaking, that a sovereign power suspends the rule of law, but that the rule of law, in the act of being suspended, produces sovereignty *in its action and as its effect*” (Butler, p. 66). Guantanamo Bay does not exist external to a pre-existing sovereignty, but through the act of suspending the law, the internal space

of sovereignty and its outside are constituted as an effect. My argument here as well is that mixed-blood children were not born in a condition of extraterritoriality as it existed *a priori* for this would already assume the unquestioned existence of an established system of territorial sovereignty in the postwar era. Rather, my aim is to show how the performative act of positing mixed-blood children as extraterritorial creations created the internal space of the new Empire as an effect.

- 4) As Tomiyama Ichiro writes, “If Okinawa is neither a colony nor a domestic territory, then it is both,” thereby destroying the area studies model that has rehearsed debates on Okinawa’s appropriate categorization based upon a Westphalian model of international law (Tomiyama, p. 282).
- 5) Off-limits directives were issued the late 1940s wherein the U.S. military forbade its personnel from patronizing Okinawan businesses purportedly because of sanitation concerns or the need to limit fraternization in order to keep the peace. However, I have argued elsewhere that they served to create “petitioning subjects” who ask for their release. In this way, bases were transformed into an object of desire that can be given or cruelly deprived by the U.S. military (Shimabuku, 2010b).
- 6) Mention of only the August 13 petition is found in: National Archives and Records Administration; Record Group 260: Records of the United States Occupation headquarters, World War II; Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR); Department: The Administrative Office; Box No.: 48 of HCRI-AO; Folder No. 4; Title: General Administrative Files, 1956: Barred or Restricted Areas (Off Limits, Passes for). The actual August 13 petition is in the same Box, Folder No. 3; Title: General Administrative Files, 195: Morals and Conduct (Military). Also in this file is a document from the National Archives and Records Administration noting that the entire folder of 250.1 Morals & Conduct (Military) was withdrawn from the file because it contained “Otherwise Restricted Information.” Hence, it is possible that the August 9 petition was suppressed. These documents can be found at the Okinawa Prefectural Archives, Document No. 000000780.

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