

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 在沖米側要人記者  
会見・講演

メタデータ	言語: 出版者: 公開日: 2019-01-22 キーワード (Ja): キーワード (En): 作成者: - メールアドレス: 所属:
URL	<a href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/43210">http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/43210</a>

昭和四十四年

沖縄の発展とアジアの安全

琉球列島高等弁務官

フエチナント・T・アンガ

(一九六九年一月二十日

東京日米協会)

岸会長、兼知外務大臣、オズボーン公使、日米協会会員の皆さん、並びにご列席の皆さん。

本日の会合にお招き頂いたことにお礼申し上げます。

日米相互の理解と協力が多大な貢献をされてきた日米協会の皆さんにあいさつする機会を与えられたことは、私にとつて格別の喜びである。私は相互の理解と協力を實際に立証し、かつテストするよ  
うな問題に取り組んで、この二年余りを沖縄で過ごし、その任務を終えて来たのである。そこで本日はその問題——すなわち、沖縄の発展とアジアの安全について——話してみたいと思う。

しかしながら、死活的に重大なこの問題に触れることには、若干の懸念が伴う。私の友人の中には、琉球諸島の首都、那覇で無事に二カ年任務を果たしたのち、沖縄問題の事実上の中心であるこの東京で、さらに運をかけるようなことをわざわざする必要はないではないか」と忠告するものもあつた。そういう友人たちはアルバート

アインシュタイン博士が、成功の秘訣を問われたときに答えた言葉  
を私に思い出させた。アインシュタイン博士は、成功は  $X + Y + Z$   
に等しい、つまり  $X$  は勤勉、 $Y$  は遊びであると数学の方程式をもつ  
て答えたのである。では残りの  $Z$  は何かと質問者が重ねて聞いたと  
ころ、アインシュタイン博士は「 $Z$  は口をつぐむことだ」と答えた  
という。私もこの博士の忠告に従うべきだと思ふのだが、私は数学  
者ではないし、沖縄問題はこうした単純な方程式では解けないだろ  
うと思ふ。

そこで必要上、まず沖縄にある米軍基地の戦略的重要性について若干私の考えを述べてみたい。さて、これらの諸島に米國が駐留する  
ことは、戦略上の必要からみて、当然かつ必然のことであつて、沖  
繩とその将来について責任ある論議を行なう場合、そういう必然性  
に ついての健全な理解が根底になくしてはならない。

米國は、対日講和条約第三条に基づいて、沖縄の施政にたざさわ  
つてゐるのである。沖縄について、こういう協定が結ばれなければ  
ならなかつた背景は、皆さんご存知のことであり、悲しむべきこ  
とでもある。それは夢と失望、すなわち第二次世界大戦後、世界中  
のかなりの人々が抱いた恒久的で安定した平和という夢と、一九四  
〇年代の後半、侵略の脅威によつてその夢がまず破られ、次いで一  
九五〇年代初期の戦争によつて、ふたたびその夢が破られた失望を  
物語つてゐる。

今やこの夢は破られ、自由諸國の指導者たちは、一九五〇年代の  
教訓すなわち平和は安価なものでもなく自動的なものでもない、そ  
の代価は固結であり、警戒心であり、時には流血でさえあるという  
ことを学んだのである。ついで、安価な勝利にひたることこそ、確  
実に侵略を招く道であることを知つたのであり、いまやわれわれは、  
このことを銘記しなければならぬ。

この教訓を背景として、世界の自由諸國は、一連の相互安全保障  
条約によつて結束を始めたのである。これらの条約は、いかなる國

も侵略に対する反響を絶対に誤算しないようにし、個々の國が単独では存続できないこと、そして侵略の代価は、いかなる利益よりも高くつくというところをはつきりさせることを意図している。

この目的を目ざして、米國は、日本を含む多くのアジア諸國と、

二カ國間および多國間の安全保障条約を締結したのである。条約締

結後、今日に至るまで、この地域が比較的平和で安定し、これら

諸國が發展と繁栄をつづけたことが、これらの条約の正しさと条約

を作成した人々の賢明さを劇的に立証している。しかも、日本ほど

この平和と安定から多くの恩恵をうけている國はないのである。ま

た、日本ほど、この平和と安定の条件の存続に、大きな利害關係が

ある國もないのである。

すべての相互安全保障条約の基礎をなすものは、抑止の理念であ

る。しかし、理念も条約もそれだけでは、十分ではない。われわれ

の条約体制の有効性と信頼性は、条約加盟國、とりわけ米國の、そ

の条約上の約束を履行する意志と手段にかかっている。そういう意

志と手段がなければ条約は、危険な自己幻惑に過ぎず、われわれの

同盟國をなだめるだけで敵國をあさむくことはできない。一方、そ

の意志と手段があれば、条約は侵略を抑止する上で重要な役割を果

す。

この意志を実証し、その手段を提供するため、米國とその同盟

國は、東アジアに軍事基地と軍隊という防壁をつくり、これによつ

てわれわれの約束を意義あるものにし、この地域の比較的な平和を

実現してきたのである。

その防壁の中心に、沖縄が存在しているのである。東アジアの機

略上の均衡の面で沖縄が中心的な重要性をもっているのは、その位

置と、米國の施政權が沖縄駐留米軍に与えている特別の性格から来るものであ

る。沖縄の基地にあるわが米軍は、日本に対する脅威を含めて、東

アジアに対する脅威に対し、迅速かつ効果的に反撃できるよう配置

されている。沖縄駐留米軍部隊は、世界のこの地域にあるすべての

自由國家の防衛に直接貢献しているのみならず、これらの自由國家

を結ぶ重要な通信連絡線の維持にも直接貢献している。私は、この

ような基本的事実を強調するのは、沖縄問題を冷静に検討するには、

この地域にある他の自由諸國の防衛上、沖縄基地がもつ役割りと、

それら自由諸國の防衛上、日本自身もつ利益を反映しなければな

らないからである。

沖縄にある米軍がわれわれの共同防衛に全面的な貢献ができる能

力をもっているのは、米國が沖縄の施政權を保持していることによ

つて、弾力的な措置がとれることが大きな理由である。米國が近代

的裝備を完全に備えた、均衡のとれた軍隊の駐留、配備、補給を完

全に行なえる自由をもつ土地は沖縄以外アジアのどこにもない。わ

れわれは沖縄にだけいかなる種類の兵器や部隊も置くことができる。

脅威をうけたアジアのどの地域にも軍隊を展開できるのは、沖縄が

らだけである。アジアのいかなる地域に投入された部隊にも、無制

限に兵たん補給ができるのも沖縄を通じてだけである。こうした自

由は、沖縄に駐在する米軍に、アジアのいかなる土地も与えること

のできない弾力性と即応性を与える。

これらの自由も一つ、余りにも見落されることの多い要素を

加えたい。それは高度に技術化された一大基地網が存在するという

事実である。軍港、補給倉庫、滑走路、演習地、通信施設、兵舎、

熟練労働力、その他基地を構成する他のあらゆる設備や施設は、時

間と資金の膨大な投資を物語っており、すべてがわれわれの共同決

意と抑止力として、現在、待機態勢にあることを示している。技術

革新が、この膨大な機構を時代遅れにしようのではないかと考

える人もある。しかし、私は、沖縄のような前進基地が存在するこ

とは、今後ある期間、われわれの抑止力の重要な要素となるだろう

と信じている。いずれかといえば、近代戦のテンポが、侵略者が攻

撃を加えて来てから、基地をつくるというような余裕を与えないか

らこそ、さらに沖縄に基地が存在することが重要なのである。

要約すれば、わが軍事基地の戦略上の重要性は次の点にある。すなわち、高度に発達した設備をもち、中心に位置し、他の地域に駐留する軍隊に加えられるような制限がないという点で、沖縄の米軍基地は、日本だけでなく、日本を含むアジア自由諸国の防衛に、死活的に重大な要素をなしているという点である。

しかしながら、沖縄については、戦略上の立場からだけでは述べられない。それだけでよいのなら、「沖縄問題」は存在しないだろうし、私の責任もより軽くてよかつただろうが、それだけやり甲斐もなかつたであろう。そして、アインシュタイン博士の忠告に従うことも、より容易であつたとも言えよう。

沖縄問題には、人間的な面がある。それは、日本国民全体にかかわることであるが、何よりも百万の沖縄住民にかかわることである。沖縄住民は、日本本土とのつながりを回復し、一体化を回復することを望んでいる。彼等は、母国の経済的社会的進歩に、より直接的に参加したいと熱望している。この点について思い違ひがあつてはならない。米國は正当なこうした願望を認識しており、琉球諸島に對する米國の施政権を必要とした戦略上の現実と、この願望を調和するため全力をあげて努力しているのである。私の前任者たちもそうであつたように、またおそろくランバート中将もそうなると思ふが、沖縄住民のこうした願望と戦略上の必要性との調和を図ることが、この二年間、私に課せられてきた責任の中心であつた。私は、この責任を末端的な責務とは見なしてはいない。むしろ琉球諸島の一時的な管理とともに、われわれが負うべき義務だと考えている。この義務の履行にあつて、どれだけ立派な任事がなされたかは歴史が決めるだろう。米國の施政権下にあつた時代、特に近年、沖縄の住民は、経済、社会、政治の分野で感銘すべき成長を上げた。経済指數を一べつとしただけでも、目をみはらせるものがある。国民総生産は、過去五年間、平均一八%の増大をみており、昨年は六倍

四千四百万ドルに達した。そして國民一人当り所得は五百八十ドルとなり、日本全体のそれと及ばないが、本土の一部の県よりも高く、アジアでは第二位を占めている。

こうした平たんな統計も、沖縄を訪れる人には生きた姿で目に映るのである。そこには、よちよち社会をつくり上げようと懸命に働いている豊かな人々の姿があるだろうし、建設中のハイウエイや病院や港湾施設や住宅を見るだろう。また拡張改善された公立学校に通つている熱心な生徒の姿や、自動車エンジンの組みかえをしたり、近代的なビルを建設している熟練労働者の姿を見ることが出来る。さらに、日本でよくいわれるスリッパ、すなわち、カイ、クイライ、カラビネレなども目にするだろう。観光事業も始められて、従来のバイナツルや砂糖きびの他に、畜産業も新しく始められてゐる。さらに、これ以外の、より多くのことが繁榮している沖縄社会と経済を構成している事実を見ることが出来る。

しかしながら、こうした繁榮の裏にひそむ幾つかの重大な問題に言及しなければ、卒直に申しあげることにはなるまい。沖縄の経済は、外部からの財政投入に大きく依存している。昨年、米國から直接、間接に投入されたドルは、約二億六千万ドルにのぼつた。これは琉球の國民総生産の四〇%以上に相当する。基地がもたらした繁榮も、不十分な地元産業や天然資源のために、二億九千万ドルという膨大な赤字を生んだ。その上、琉球政府は近代社会が要求する政府事業の拡大をはかるために必要な、税源を欠いている。

以上は、現在の沖縄に見られる事態の複雑さを物語る一例にすぎない。われわれ、というのは米國と日本と琉球の三政府のことであるが、このわれわれは、これらの難問題に対処する上で、実質的な進歩を一つあると私は信じている。こうした進歩の基礎は、われわれ関係三政府の協力と相互理解のための未曾有の努力である。この協力を最も明白に表わしているのは、補助金と融資による直接財政援助計画である。この援助の面で、米國は本会計年度において、

約三千七百万ドルを支出し、日本政府は約四千三百万ドルを支出することになつてゐる。私は日本政府が、最近健全かつ先見の明ある投資を増額して、次期会計年度には約六千万ドルの援助を決定したことを申しあげられることを喜びとするものである。

この援助は、沖縄の社会的経済的發展に重要な貢献をしてゐる。この援助を通じて、学校は改築や拡張を行なつてゐるし、教職員の給与は増加されている。また交通、通信施設は改善と拡張を行なつてゐるし、医療と社会保険給付も増額中である。その他、沖縄住民にとつて直接恩恵をもたらす無数の措置が実施されつつある。

これらの社会、経済問題に対処する上で日米琉三政府の努力を効果的に統合するという仕事は、それ自体、一つの課題である。まず第一に、われわれの計画は、援助計画を含めて、総合的、合理的な方策に一本化されることが必要である。さらに基本的には、現在の過渡期におけるわれわれの相互の努力は、沖縄の施政権が日本に返還されたさい、本土と沖縄の一体化に必ず役立つものでなくてはならない。

佐藤首相とジョンソン大統領は、この基本的要件を念頭において、一九六七年、高等弁務官に対する諮問委員会の設置を決定した。皆さんはこの諮問委員会の基本目的をよくご存知のことと思ふ。

それは、いずれ実現する沖縄の日本復帰に備えて、日本本土と沖縄との間の経済的、社会的障害を除去または軽減するための種々の勸告を高等弁務官に行なうことである。しかし、この諮問委員会が挙げてゐるめざましい業績は、それほど知られてゐない。私はすでに三十一件の勸告を承認した。これらの勸告や今後提出される他の諸勸告は、それらが実施されたとき、沖縄住民とその制度の日本本土との一体化、ならびに沖縄住民の経済的、社会的福祉の増進に大きく貢献するであらう。

一九六七年の佐藤・ジョンソン共同声明から引用した右の文章の論理的、正確な言葉は、いち早く個々の沖縄住民にとつての具体的

な利益に移されている。その実例を挙げてみよう。その幾つかの例は、社会福祉の分野で見られるような明白なものである。例えば、日本本土のそれと同様な医療保険および年金制度をゆくゆくは全沖縄住民のために実施する案がそれである。その他それほど明白でない例として、たとえば、医療、法律、技術などの専門職業の分野で免許を有する者が、将来、沖縄または日本本土のいずれにおいても自由に開業できるようにする。つまり、本土の同業者が現在どの県においても自由に開業できるのと同じようにするという勸告などがある。このような措置が本土復帰に取つて代わるものでないことは明らかである。事実、そのようなものとして意図されてはゐない。しかし、これらの措置は、沖縄住民の境遇を改善し、復帰への道をいつそう容易にさせることにならう。

諮問委員会の設置はまた、協力のための有意義で効果的なルートを見出そうとするわれわれの共同努力に対して、新しい次元を開いた。それは、沖縄の将来にとつて極めて重要な計画の策定に、琉球政府が日米両国政府代表と共に参加する直接の手段を提供した。これは、琉球政府が必要なる実施措置の主要部分に対して多くの利害関係をもち、責任を負つてゐる以上、きわめて重要なことである。また、琉球政府の参加は、同政府の責務が着実に増大していることを示すものである。

琉球政府の責務のこの増大は、琉球の政治制度の發展をはかり、琉球住民自身の問題に対する住民の発言権を拡大するという米国の公約を反映してゐる。これは米国の政策の土台となつてゐることであるので、今後も続くものと私は思つてゐる。米国は基地の運営に重要不可欠な一部の機能の管理権を保有しなければならぬが、その他の点については、新しい責任が引き受けられるにつれて自治権も同様に拡大して行く方針である。

沖縄の自治は、沖縄の政治制度が整備され、能力を増すにつれてこの数年急速に拡大されてきた。米民政府の主な計画のひとつは、

米国の布令および布告を、琉球政府がこれに代わる適当な法律を制定し次第速かに廃棄することである。この計画に関連して、私は一九六七年に琉球立法院に出席し、二十九の布令がこのような方法で撤回され得ると述べた。すなわち、私は、撤回可能なことが最も明白なものとしてこれら二十九の布令を挙げ、その他にも廃止できる布令が疑いもなくあることを示唆した。卒直に言つて、これに対する反応は失望させるものであつた。その後二年近くの間、琉球政府はわずかに十一の布令の撤回を可能にする法律を制定したに過ぎなかつたのである。われわれは最近この点について新任の行政主席と話し合つた。そして、近いうちにこの点でさらに進展が見られるものと私は期待している。

琉球政府が私の提案に応じて速かに措置をとつた一つの分野について報告できることは喜ばしい。

一九六七年、琉球政府は沖繩の裁判制度を確立する法律を制定し、これによつて、それまでの制度を規定していた布令の廃止が可能となつた。昨年一月以来、沖繩の住民によつて選ばれた沖繩の裁判官が、沖繩住民の代表が制定した法律にもとづいて確立された裁判制度を統轄している。これは沖繩の自治の発展の上で画期的なできごとであると私は思う。

しかし、このような発展の上で最も大きな前進が見られたのは、昨年十一月の主席選挙である。沖繩の住民は、史上初めて行政主席を直接選挙で選ぶことができた。この歴史的發展の実現は、このように拡大された権限行使に伴う責任を引き受け、その機会を実現する沖繩の政治指導者および住民の分別と能力に対する米国の信頼に基づくものであつた。この信頼が正しかつたことは歴史によつて立証されるものと私は信じている。選挙前の運動を注目していた人々は、民主的な手続きにあらためて敬意を抱いたに違いない。二人の有能な候補者が活発な選挙運動を展開し、その間、住民と自由な新聞はそれぞれ意見を表明し、種々の問題について論議した。結局、

屋良氏が主席に選出された。民主的精神を発揮して、激戦つた選挙中の感情は捨て去られ、新主席は政務に取りかかった。私は屋良氏をよく知るようになった。私たちが沖繩住民の福祉のために働くという意欲をお互いに抱き合つていたことを私は知つている。

このような任事の上で、屋良氏は今後とも米國政府の支援と協力を得ることができるといふことを、私は皆さんに自信をもつて申し上げることができる。一般投票による主席選挙は、沖繩の政治的發展の上でのきわめて大きな前進であつたが、これで進歩が止つたわけではない。昨年十月、米國と日本は、沖繩住民の國政参加について原則的合意に達した。これを実施するのに必要な法律の通過と、それに続いての沖繩代表の選出が、この方針に沿つての将来の主要な措置となるだろう。

私がこれまで述べてきたことは、要するに、沖繩問題の二つの重要な面を調和させようとするユニークな國際的努力の一端である。第一の面は、日本自体および東アジアの自由諸國の安全保障上の必要であり、第二の面は、日本國民、特に沖繩に住んでいる人々の願望である。第一の面については、現在の体制の下では、沖繩駐留米軍は、自由アジアの平和と安全にわれわれ米國民と同様、大多数の日本人が重要視しているのと私は希望し、信じている目的に對して重要な貢献をしている、と私は信じている。第二の面については、同様の体制の下で、沖繩の人々は經濟的、社会的、政治的にきわめて大きな發展をすべからずして逃げ、現在は勿論、将来もこのようにな發展を遂げて行くであらう。

國際問題は決して不動なものではない。琉球列島高等弁務官の職責から去るにあたり、私は日米兩國が沖繩問題の検討をさらに押し進めてゆくことをよく承知している。究極的な解答については何らの疑問もない。なぜなら、日米兩國は、そのこと、すなわち、日本政府の施政下への琉球列島の復帰という究極的解答について約束し

ADVANCE: NOT TO BE RELEASED BEFORE 1300 JANUARY 20

ADDRESS BY LT. GEN. FERDINAND T. UNGER  
DEPARTING U. S. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE RYUKYU ISLANDS  
BEFORE A LUNCHEON MEETING OF THE AMERICA-JAPAN SOCIETY  
TOKYO, JANUARY 20, 1969

RYUKYUAN PROGRESS AND ASIAN SECURITY

President Kishi, ~~Foreign Minister Aichi~~, Charge Osborn, Members of the  
America-Japan Society, ladies and gentlemen:

Thank you for your invitation to be with you today.

I am particularly grateful to have the opportunity to address the  
members of this audience who have done so much to foster United States-  
Japanese understanding and cooperation. I am here today after living and  
working for more than two years with an issue which is both a testimony to  
and a test of that mutual understanding and cooperation. I would like to  
speak today about that issue, about Ryukyuan progress and Asian security.

(more)

68-2R

ているからである。いまお明らかでないことは、いつ、いかなる  
状況の下で、これが実現し得るかということである。その答えを知  
つてゐるなどと私は言わない。しかし、きょうここで私が説明した  
ことは、そうした答えの探求と関連があると私は思つてゐる。なぜ  
ならば、私はまた、健全な解決策は沖縄の発展とアジアの安全とい  
うわれわれの共通の関心を引続き調和させてゆかなければならぬ  
と信じてゐるからである。

その解決策を探しあてることは、容易ではないだらう。これには  
極めて大きな利害関係がかかつており、私が提案した方途を受けつ  
けない人々も一部にはいる。われわれは、われわれが住みたいと願  
うような世界をつくるために、どのような役割をわれわれの国家が  
果たすことを望むかについて、いろいろ深遠な問題に対する解答  
を求めて、じっくり考えてみなければならぬ。結局、われわれは  
アジアにおけるわれわれの大きな共通の利害を再確認し、われわれ  
は成功を収めるものと私は確信してゐる。いかならば、共通の利  
害は協力の基礎であり、協力は平和と進歩への道だからである。

ご清聴ありがとうございました。

x

-1/-



It is with some apprehension that I approach this vital issue. After surviving two years in Naha, the capital of the Ryukyu Islands, some of my friends urged me not to push my luck by speaking here in Tokyo, the virtual capital of the Okinawa problem. They reminded me of the advice that Albert Einstein once gave when asked for the secret of a successful life. Einstein replied in mathematics saying that success equals  $X + Y + Z$ , in which  $X$  equals hard work and  $Y$  equals play. "But what then does  $Z$  equal?" he was asked. "Z" Einstein replied, "is keeping your mouth shut." I should probably take that advice, but then I am not a mathematician and the Ryukyus equation will not be solved by any such easy formula.

I begin of necessity with some thoughts about the strategic importance of our bases in the Ryukyus. This is both natural and necessary, for strategic imperatives explain our presence in those islands, and a sound understanding of those imperatives must underlie responsible discussion of the Ryukyus and their future.

The United States administers the Ryukyu Islands under the terms of Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. The story behind the necessity for that agreement on Okinawa is familiar and sad. It is a story of dream and disappointment: the dream of decent men everywhere after World War II for a lasting and stable peace, and the disappointment of these same men who saw the dream shattered first by the threat of aggression in the late 1940's, and then by the fact of war in the early 1950's.

(more)

The dream broken, the leaders of the free nations remembered the lessons of an earlier decade, that peace is not cheap or automatic; that its price is unity, vigilance and sometimes even blood. They remembered then something that we cannot forget now: that the surest invitation to aggression is the lure of cheap victory.

Set against this backdrop, the free world nations began to band together through a series of mutual security treaties. These treaties were designed to help insure that no one would miscalculate the reaction to aggression, to make it clear that the individual member states would not stand alone and that the cost of aggression would outweigh any conceivable gain.

Towards this end, the United States entered into bilateral and multilateral security agreements with a number of Asian countries, including Japan. The period of relative peace and stability which the region has experienced in the intervening years and the growth and prosperity its nations have enjoyed, dramatically attest to the soundness of these arrangements and to the wisdom of those who fashioned them. Certainly no nation has benefited more from this peace and stability than Japan. And certainly no nation has a greater stake in the preservation of these conditions than does Japan.

The foundation underlying all of the mutual security treaties is the deterrent concept -- but, neither a concept nor a treaty is enough by itself. The effectiveness and credibility of our treaty network rests on the will and

(more)

the means of the signatories, particularly the United States, to meet their treaty commitments. Without the will and the means, the treaties are but a dangerous self-delusion, lulling our friends but not fooling our foes. With the will and the means, the treaties play a key role in deterring aggression.

( To demonstrate the will and to provide the means, the United States, and its allies, have constructed in East Asia a shield of bases and military forces which give meaning to our commitment and which have made possible the relative peace of this region.

( At the center of the shield lies Okinawa. Its central importance in the strategic balance in East Asia stems from its location and from the special characteristics which United States administration of the islands gives to the forces positioned there. Our Okinawa-based forces are located where they can respond promptly and effectively to threats in East Asia, including threats against Japan. Units on Okinawa contribute directly to the defense of all free nations in this part of the world, and to the maintenance of the vital lines of communications connecting them. I would like to emphasize that basic fact, because sober consideration of the Ryukyuan issue must reflect the role of the Ryukyuan bases in defense of the other free nations in this region, and Japan's own interest in their defense.

(more)

The ability of United States forces on Okinawa to make their fullest contribution to our common defense rests in large measure on the flexibility which the United States enjoys because of its administration of the Ryukyus. No where else in Asia does the United States have complete freedom to station, deploy and support balanced forces equipped with the full range of modern military resources. Only on Okinawa can we station any type of weapon or units. Only from Okinawa can we deploy forces to any threatened area in Asia. Only through Okinawa can we provide unrestricted logistical support to forces committed anywhere in Asia. These freedoms give our forces on Okinawa a flexibility and responsiveness unmatched anywhere in Asia.

( To these freedoms I will add another factor too often overlooked: the very existence of the elaborate base complex itself. The ports, depots, runways, training areas, communications facilities, barracks, skilled labor force and all the other facilities and installations making up the base represent an enormous investment in time and money and all stand ready, now, as proof of our joint determination and deterrent power. Some believe that technological change will make all this obsolete. I believe, however, that for some time to come, advance bases, in being, such as those on Okinawa will be important elements of our deterrent power. If anything, their existence is more important because the pace of modern warfare precludes the luxury of building bases after an aggressor strikes.

(more)

In brief then, this is the strategic importance of our base: a highly developed complex of facilities, centrally located, free from the restraints imposed on forces in other areas, our Ryukyuan bases are a vital element in the defense of the free nations of Asia, including Japan, but not only Japan.

But the Okinawa story cannot be told simply in terms of strategy. If it could, there would be no "Okinawa problem," my responsibilities would have been much easier but less challenging and, I might also add, it would be much easier to take Einstein's advice.

There is a human side to the Okinawa story. It involves all of the Japanese people, but most particularly the one million inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands. The Ryukyuan people wish to restore their bonds and to renew their identity with homeland Japan. They aspire to participate more directly in the economic and social progress of their motherland. Let there be no mistake about it. The United States recognizes these legitimate aspirations and is doing all in its power to harmonize them with the strategic realities which have made United States administration of the Ryukyus a necessity. As it has been for my predecessors, and as it will be, I am sure, for General Lampert, the harmonization of strategic necessity with these Ryukyuan aspirations has been central to my responsibilities during these last two years. I view this responsibility not as a peripheral burden, but as an obligation assumed with our temporary stewardship of the Ryukyu Islands.

(more)

History will judge how good a job has been done in meeting this obligation. During the period of United States administration and particularly in recent years, the Ryukyuan people have made impressive economic, social, and political gains. Even a brief look at the economic indicators is an eye opener. Gross National Product, which has averaged an annual increase of 18% over the last five years, reached \$644 million last year, and per capita income rose to \$580, second in Asia only to Japan overall, and probably higher than in some areas within Japan proper.

These cold statistics come alive to anyone who visits Okinawa. He will see a prosperous people hard at work building a better society. He will see highways, hospitals, harbors, and homes under construction. He will see eager students attending the expanding and improving public school system, and skilled workers rebuilding automotive engines and erecting modern office buildings. He will also see the three C's so familiar in Japan: cars, coolers, and color television. He will see the beginnings of a tourist industry and, in addition to the traditional fields of pineapple and sugar cane, a new cattle raising industry. He will see all this and more which go to make up this thriving society and economy.

I would be less than frank, however, if I did not mention some serious problems underlying this prosperity. The economy is heavily dependent on financial inputs from outside sources. Last year, direct

(more)

and indirect contributions from the United States amounted to about \$260 million, or over 40% of the Ryukyuan Gross National Product. Base-induced prosperity, together with inadequate local industry and natural resources, led to a staggering trade deficit of \$290 million. Moreover, the Government of the Ryukyu Islands lacks the necessary tax resources to provide expanding government services needed by a modern society.

These are only illustrations of the complexity of the situation we find in the Ryukyus today. I believe that we, and by we I here mean the United States, the Government of Japan, and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, are making real progress in addressing these difficult problems. The foundation of that progress is an unprecedented effort of cooperation and mutual understanding by the three governments concerned.

The most obvious aspect of that cooperation is the program of direct financial assistance through grants and loans. During this fiscal year, the United States contributed about \$37 million in such assistance; the Government of Japan will contribute about \$43 million, and I am glad to note that it has recently decided to increase this sound and farsighted investment to approximately \$60 million in the next fiscal year.

This aid has made a significant contribution to the social and economic development of the Ryukyus. Through such aid the school system is being rebuilt and expanded, teachers' salaries are being increased,

(more)

transportation and communications facilities are being improved and expanded, medical and social security benefits are being increased, and a host of other measures of direct benefit to the Ryukyuan people are being implemented.

The task of efficiently integrating the efforts of the three governments in meeting these social and economic problems is in itself a challenge. First, it is essential to see that our programs, including assistance, are wedded into a comprehensive, rational approach. More fundamentally, we must insure that our mutual efforts now during the transition period contribute to the integration of the Ryukyus when Japan once again assumes administrative control of the islands.

With this basic requirement in mind, Prime Minister Sato and President Johnson decided in 1967 to establish the Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner. I believe that most of you are familiar with the basic objectives of that Committee: to prepare for eventual reversion by making recommendations to the High Commissioner designed to eliminate or reduce economic and social barriers between Japan proper and the Ryukyu Islands. What is less well known, however, are the impressive accomplishments of the Advisory Committee. I have already approved 31 recommendations. When implemented, these recommendations and others to follow will contribute materially toward further identifying the Ryukyuan

(more)

people and their institutions with Japan proper, and toward promoting the economic and social well-being of the Ryukyuan people.

The logical, precise language of this last sentence, which is taken from the 1967 Communique, translates readily into concrete benefits for the individual Ryukyuan. Let me cite examples. Some are obvious, such as those in the social welfare field which should eventually bring to the entire population of the Ryukyus medical insurance and pension programs on a par with those in Japan proper; others are less obvious, such as the recommendation which will make it eventually possible for licensed personnel in such fields as medicine, law, and engineering to practice their professions freely, either in the Ryukyus or in Japan, just as similar persons in Japan are now free to move their practices among the prefectures of Japan proper. Such measures are obviously not substitutes for reversion. In fact, they are not intended to be such. They will, however, improve the lot of the Ryukyuan people, and they will make the path to reversion easier.

The creation of the Advisory Committee also gave a new dimension to our joint effort to find meaningful and effective channels for cooperation. It provided a direct means for participation by the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, or GRI, alongside representatives of the United States and Japanese Governments in the planning so essential to the future of the islands. This is vital since the GRI has much at stake, and is

(more)

responsible for a major share of the necessary implementing action. Its participation is also representative of the steady growth in the responsibilities of the GRI.

This growth reflects the United States commitment to the development of Ryukyuan political institutions, and to the expansion of the voice of the Ryukyuan people in the management of their own affairs. I expect this to continue, for it is the very foundation of our policies. The United States must retain control of certain functions vital to the operation of our base, but for the rest, we will push ahead with the expansion of Ryukyuan autonomy as fast as new responsibilities can be absorbed.

Ryukyuan autonomy has grown at a rapid pace in recent years, in keeping with the increasing maturity and capability of Ryukyuan political institutions. One of the United States Civil Administration's major programs is the rescission of United States ordinances and proclamations as quickly as the GRI enacts suitable substitute legislation. As part of this program, I went before the Ryukyuan Legislature in 1967 and stated that 29 ordinances could be eliminated in this way; I cited these 29 ordinances as the most obvious, and suggested that there were undoubtedly others which could be rescinded. Frankly, the response has been disappointing; in the nearly two years since, the GRI has enacted laws permitting rescission of only eleven ordinances. We have recently discussed this with the new Chief Executive, and I hope that we will see further progress here soon.

(more)

I am gratified to report on one area in which the Government of the Ryukyu Islands moved quickly in response to my proposal. In 1967, the GRI enacted laws establishing a Ryukyuan court system permitting the rescission of the ordinances governing the previous system. Since January of last year Ryukyuan judges, selected by Ryukyuan, have presided over a court system established under laws enacted by representatives of the Ryukyuan people. I consider this a historic milestone in the development of Ryukyuan self-government.

The greatest single step forward in this development came, however, with the November election of the Chief Executive. For the first time in history, the Ryukyuan people were able to select the leader of their government by direct ballot. The realization of this historic development was based on United States faith in the wisdom and ability of the political leaders and people of the Ryukyus to assume the responsibilities and realize the opportunities of this broadened exercise of power. I believe that history will vindicate that faith. Certainly those who observed the campaign which preceded the election have renewed respect for the democratic process. Two able candidates led a vigorous campaign in which the people and a free press voiced their opinions and argued the issues. In the end, Mr. Yara was elected. True to the democratic spirit, the emotions of the hard-fought election have been set aside, and the new

(more)

Chief Executive has now set about the task of governing. I had come to know Mr. Yara quite well, and I know that we mutually shared the desire to work for the welfare of the Ryukyuan people. In this work I can assure you that he will continue to enjoy the support and cooperation of the United States Government.

The election of the Chief Executive by popular vote was a giant step forward in Ryukyuan political development, but it was not the last. In October of last year, the United States and Japan reached agreement in principle on Ryukyuan participation in the Japanese Diet. Passage of the required implementing legislation and the subsequent selection of Ryukyuan representatives will be major future steps along this same road.

What I have described in brief is part of a unique international effort to accommodate the two major facets of the Okinawa issue. The first is the security requirements of Japan itself and the other free nations of East Asia; the second, the aspirations of the Japanese people, especially those in the Ryukyus. On the first, I believe that under the present arrangements, United States forces in Okinawa contribute significantly to the peace and security of free Asia, an objective which I hope and believe is as important to the vast majority of Japanese as it is to us Americans. On the second, and under these same arrangements, the Ryukyuan people have made, are making, and will continue to make tremendous progress economically, socially and politically.

(more)

International issues do not stand still. As I relinquish my responsibilities as High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, I realize that both our countries will push ahead in their examination of the Okinawa question. There is no doubt about the ultimate answer, for both our countries are committed to it: restoration of the Ryukyu Islands to administration by the Government of Japan. What is still not clear is when, and under what circumstances, this can take place. I do not pretend to know the answers. I believe, however, that what I have described here today is relevant to the search for those answers, for I also believe that a sound solution must continue to harmonize our common interest in Ryukyuan progress and Asian security.

The search for that solution will not be easy. The stakes are high, and some among us reject the path I have suggested. We will have to search our minds and hearts for answers to profound questions about the kind of role we would have our countries play in building the kind of world in which we wish to live. In the end, I am confident that we will reaffirm our great common interest in Asia, and that we will succeed -- for common interests, are the bedrock of cooperation, and cooperation is the path to peace and progress.

Thank you.

\*\*\*

秘密表示 (朱印)  
平文

部数指示	発信用	執務用	御	考
主	信	1	1	
付				
区				

発送日 昭和44年1月24日  
処理日  
発着 空タイプ 郵便局

文書課長印 公 信 案 (分類)

公 信 第 67 号 公 信 昭 和 44 年 1 月 23 日 日 付

大 臣 主 管 起 案 昭 和 44 年 1 月 22 日

政 務 次 官 アメリカ局長  
事 務 次 官 参 事 官  
外 務 審 議 官 北 米 課 長  
外 務 審 議 官  
官 房 長

起 案 者 電 話 番 号  
東 原 672

協 議 先

受 信 者 在 米 下 田 大 使 発 信 者 外 務 大 臣

写 送 付 先 (希 望 送 付 日) 月 日

件 名 アンガー 高等弁務官の演説テキスト送付

GA-2 23 55 外務省 回覧番号

米北才 67号

昭和44年1月23日

在米大使殿

外務大臣

アンガー高等弁務官の演説  
テキスト送付

アンガー前琉球諸島高等弁務官は、帰任の途次当地に立寄り、1月20日日米協会昼食会の席上、沖縄とアジアの安全保障問題に関し演説を行なったので、同テキスト英和両文各1部別添送付する。 付属添付

GA14

外務省

秘密表示(朱印)

平文

部数指示	発信用	執務用	備考
主信	2		
付	その手		
属	付属校査渡		

発送日	昭和44年1月23日
処理日	
発信	タイプ

公文書 (分類)

公文書番号 米北合 第 128 号 日付 昭和44年1月23日

主管 起案 昭和44年1月22日

大 臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官一房長

アメリカ局長  
参事官  
北米課長

起案者 電話番号 東京 672

受信者 日米琉球諮問委員会日本政府代表  
日本政府沖縄事務所長 外務大臣

件名 アンガー高等弁務官の演説テキスト送付

GA-2

23 56

外務省 回覧番号



米北令第128号

昭和44年1月23日

外務大臣

アングー高等弁務官の演説

テキスト送付

アングー前高等弁務官は帰任の途次  
当地に立寄り、1月20日日米協会昼食  
会の席上沖縄とアリアの安全保障問題  
に関して演説を行なつたので、同テキ  
スト英和両文各一部別添送付する。

付属添付

GA-4

外務省

本信送付先

日米琉諸問委員会  
日本政府代表

日本政府沖縄事務所長

GA-4

外務省

北米一課長

寫

総沖才 1660号  
昭和44年5月28日

総理府特別地域連絡局長 殿

日本政府沖縄事務所長

変化の時代と題するカーペンター民政官  
の演説テキスト送付

5月17日、カーペンター民政官は米軍エンジニア協会主催の奨学資金募金の夕食会に於いて、「変化の時代」と題する演説を行なわれ、その演説テキスト何れも御参考までに別添1部送付する。

本信件送付先：外務省アメリカ局長

別紙添付

総理府特別地域連絡局

44.5.30

日本政府

第 1570 号

ニュース・リリース：69-131

1969年5月17日

禁 止 禁 止 禁 止

1969年5月17日(土)午後8時まで発表を差し控えること

禁 止 禁 止 禁 止

1969年5月17日午後8時からキャスル テラス クラブで

催される米軍エンジニア協会主催の奨学資金募金夕食会に

おけるスタンリー S. カーペンター民政官の挨拶

(変化の時代)

ローシグ大佐、米軍エンジニア協会沖縄支部会員並びに来賓の皆様：

私は、皆様のような学識豊かな方々によつて組織されている協会の会合に

出席出来たことは、私の最も光榮とするところであります。実は、皆様の

会長から今晚の奨学資金募金年次夕食会で挨拶をするようにとの依頼の書簡をい

ただき、私はいささかとまどつていた次第です。皆様の会長は、その書簡の中

で、「エンジニアリングと琉球の開発」というようなテーマでなら何をお話して

もよいとの趣旨を述べておられました。が、「開発」というテーマをつけ加えて下

さつたことは、私にとつて幸運なことでありました。と申しますのは、私が当

地に民政官として赴任して以来、二年近くになつて居りますので、この分野につ

いてお話しできる立場にあるのではないかと自負しております。しかしながら、

ことエンジニアリングに関しては、私はまったくの素人でありまして、例えば次

の語に出てくるような主人みたいなものです。ある友人がその主人の奥さんに

むかつて「あなたの御主人は家の中の修繕ごとが上手ですか」と聞いたところ、

その奥さん曰く、「私は自分の夫を叱咤したくはないのですが、主人が時計を修

理して以来というものは、時計についているかつこう鳥は時を告げなくなり、そ

の代わりに、「今何時？」と聞くようになったのですよ」と答えたそうです。

ところで、琉球の現状について話し合つている時に「それは何時か」と真

剣にたづねることは結構なことであります。ここで私がいう「時」とは前進、

つまり変化の時をいうのであります。不幸なことには、この変化といふことは、

とかく懸念を抱かせるものであり、現実もまた然りであります。アメリカ人の社会にもまた琉球側の社会にも懸念が生じつつあります。

ところで、変化というのは、米国にとっては、当地においても或いは他の地域においても、ことさら目新しいものではありません。この変化は、1945年の太平洋戦争の終結にともない、米国が琉球の管理権を委ねられ、さらに、1951年9月8日の日米平和条約の調印で米国が正式に統治権者となつた時から予感されていたことでもあります。

講和会議の米国側代表団の一人、ジョン・フォスター・ダレス氏は、日本が琉球列島に対して「残存主権」を保有する旨を宣言したのであります。この考えは、アイゼンハワー、ケネディおよびジョンソンの各大統領によつて再確認され、またこれらの大統領は琉球に対する施政権は日本に返還されるということとをこれまで申し述べて来ているのであります。

その後、1967年に、ジョンソン前大統領と佐藤総理大臣は共同声明を発表し、その中で次のように述べております。すなわち、「総理大臣は、両国政府がここ兩三年内に双方の満足し得る返還の時期につき合意すべきであることを強調した。大統領は、これら諸島の本土復帰に対する日本国民の要望は、十分理解しているところであると述べた。同時に、総理大臣と大統領は、これら諸島にある米国の軍事施設が在東における日本その他の自由諸国の安全を保障するため重要な役割りを果していることを認めた。」

ごく最近の米国の政策を示す公式の宣言として、去る4月7日にワシントンでの記者会見において、記者団の質問に対して、ロジャース國務長官は次のように答えております。それを引用しますと「われわれは時の流れにともない変化を加えなければならないことを認識している。われわれは、外務大臣を含めて日本政府当局者との会談を期待しているし、また皆様も御承知のように、佐藤総理大臣が今年の秋に米国を訪問することになつており、沖縄問題について日米双方が満足のいく何かを導き出すことが出来るものとわれわれは期待している。」

今晚、私はロジャース國務長官のステートメントの二つの面について強調して見たいと思いますが、それは、当地琉球における米国の駐留を特色づけるものと私は思つて居ります。すなわち、一つには、時の流れと共に変化が訪れること、次に、日米双方が十分に条理をつくしさえすれば、沖縄問題は双方の満足

の行く総て解決が出来るであろうということです。

変化というものは、多くの人々が恐れる言葉であるが、避けられないものであつて、現実的に、かつ理性をもつて対処すべきものであります。過去24年間に、当地琉球で起こつた変化は極めて注目すべきことであり、それを知らない人々にとっては信じがたいことでもあります。今晚、ここにお集りの皆様の中には、これらの変化に貢献をしたことで誇りを感じておられる方が多数おられるで

ありまじょう。天然資源に乏しく、台風の遡路にあり、しかもひんぱんにかんばつに見舞われる琉球列島は、24年前には、農業、製造業、建築業、貿易も極めて貧弱でありました。そこへもつてきて、1945年の悲惨な沖縄戦によつて、当地は全くの廢墟に化したのであります。当時は、政府もなければ経済、運輸、学校もなく、ただあるのは、新しく出直そうという意気込みで燃えた根性のある人々とその人々を手助けしようという意欲を持つて外部からやつて来た人々だけでありました。

それから変化が始まつたのであります。住宅や学校の再建が行われ、道路は作られ、電気や水道が敷設され、近代的病院も建てられ、さらに沖縄で初めて大学が設置されたのであります。これによつて、沖縄の人々が高等教育を受けられるようになったのであります。

1952年に琉球政府が設立され、琉球住民に自治が与えられました。その当時、米国民政府は、琉球政府の日々の運営に積極的に参加しておりました。民政の参加は必要であつたのであります。と申しますのは、琉球住民は過去において自らを治める機会も、また責任も有していなかつたからであります。それで、意志と能力を有する者は高等教育と研修のため、外国に派遣され、沖縄に帰つてから政府並びに産業界で指導的役割を果したのであります。その後、除々に、琉球政府の機能と権限は拡大され、現在では殆んど完全に近い自治権を持つた政府に発展して居ります。沖縄の民主制度も一歩一歩変化を遂げて発達し、昨年、琉球史上、初めて行なわれた行政主席の公選でその頂点に達したのであります。

琉球住民もアメリカ国民も、等しくこの発展を大いに誇りとすべきであります。つまり、琉球住民はかたい決意と努力に対し、またアメリカ人は琉球住民に対する援助、指導、そして特に自ら進んで責任を住民に移譲したことに対し大いに誇りを持つべきであります。

今日、復帰の問題がひんばんに話し合われるようになり、それが地元住民にとつても、また当地に居住するアメリカ人にとつても好ましくない多くの新しい変化が起るのではないかと懸念を生み出しているのであります。すなわち、米軍基地の撤去によつて大不況が起り、かつ琉米の多くの事業も破産するのではないかという話があります。また、沖縄が再び日本の一県になると、日本の企業が自由に沖縄に進出し、その結果、地元企業に好ましくない影響を与えるのではないかという話もあります。

このような不安の大部分は根拠がないものと考えざるを得ないのであります。このような不安の多くは、(1) 未知に対する不安、(2) 現状の変化に基づいているものと思われまゝ。習慣の犠牲者である私達は、それぞれの生活様式に影響を与えるものはすべて嫌うものであります。したがつて、私達は新聞記事を読んで、または新しい噂を聞いて、将来の変化は大きな問題を起すのではないかと感じているのであります。私達は、しばしば物事を悪く考えがちであります。

私は、当地と日本本土において、また米国においてさえも、沖縄から米軍基地を完全に撤去することを主張する者が居ることも認識して居ります。しかしながら、米政府または日本政府の責任ある当局者が、このようなことを主張したことを未だかつて聞いたことがありません。佐藤総理大臣並びに日本政府も、当地の米軍基地が極東の継続的な平和と安全を確保するために大きな貢献を成していることを充分認識しているのであります。米軍基地の撤去が問題ではなく、問題となるのは沖縄の日本復帰後の当地における米軍基地の態様であります。責任ある日本人、並びに沖縄の人々は、当地の国民総生産のおよそ半分はこれらの軍事基地から得られるものであるという事実を隣隣することなく認めているのであります。それ故に、責任ある人々はこれらの軍事基地の完全撤去を主張しないのであります。したがつて、変化のために悪くなるとの不安は根拠のないものと私は確信するものであります。

しかしそうだからといって、琉球の最大産業としての基地に依存し続けることが経済的にいいことだとはいえません。バランスのよくとれた経済を築き上げるためにすべての努力を払つて新しい産業を開発すべきであると私は信じております。これらが進歩発展のための変化なのであります。

ハワイは、その意味におきまして好例の例であります。ハワイにおける資金源というのは、観光業を除いては琉球のそれとすべての点で全く類似してあります。ハワイでは観光業は、外部からの莫大な資金導入の源泉——その資金の中、大部分は日本からの投資も含まれておりますが——第一位の産業にのし上がつています。しかし、ハワイにおける軍の駐留は、ハワイの経済に多大の寄与を行つており、住民もそれを快よく受け入れ心から支持しています。

当地におきましても、このような外部からの資金の導入と、軍事支出の価値に対する理解——この軍事支出もまた、事実上「外部からの資金」であります——が極めて必要であります。民政府の努力や、海外での投資状況を研究視察してきた沖縄の方々の努力にもかかわらず、地元琉球政府並びに財界の中には外資——それが米国资本であれ、日本本土資本やその他の資本であれ、——に対して制限しようという気運が今尚あります。私並びに民政府職員としましては、現行の琉球政府外資法の不備が改正され、資本の増加を阻むのではなく、これを助長するような法律の制定が行われるよう絶えず働きかけております。

お互いの目的や手段に相違があつても、これらの相違は話し合いや相互理解を通して解決出来ないほど大きなものではないということが、戦後の記録を見れば明白にわかるのであります。これらの相違はそれほど大きなものではないので、琉球住民、日本本土および米国の三者にとって相互に満足の行くような解決が出来るのであります。私達は過去において共に多く問題を解決して来ましたし、今後も引き続き解決出来るものと私は確信しております。

エンヂニヤリング、建築業並びに建設業に従事して居られる皆様は、今晚、私がお話し申し上げた「変化」に対して大いに貢献されたことについて満足感を抱いて居られるでありませう。しかしながら、皆様が過去において成されたことが何であるにせよ、それは今後とも継続しなければならぬし、また強化すべきであります。皆様は、沖縄の同僚と今後とも協力して働き、またこれまで

達成して来た沖縄の急速な発展を維持すべく援助しなければなりません。

元政府の役人で、現在アメリカの有名な経営者の一人であるデイビッド・E. リンサル氏は次のように述べて居ります。「絶えず変化する社会の厳しい試練に対処するため、私達は一層指導者の経営技術、つまり、人間の行動と行動に対する刺激を遥して物事を成し遂げる経営技術に頼らなければなりません。

このような物事を成し遂げる能力は、実業界または政府の指導者だけに限定されるものではありません。これは生れながらの能力であつて、近所の人々、大学関係者、労働組合の組合員、工場労働者、その他の大きな変化の過程の一翼をになうあらゆる活動分野の人々が持つている能力であります。」

私はアメリカ人として、また政府の一役人として、私達が世界の他の地域と同じく、沖縄の政治、経済、教育および文化等あらゆる分野において果して来た役割、つまり平和的で秩序ある進歩を遥して変化をもたらして来たことに誇りを感じているものであります。

皆様の協会の略語の名称は、皮肉なことに「SAME」という頭文字から成つておりますが、これは決して「変らない」という意味ではなく、「変る」ということを意味するものであります。皆様の協会は、民間団体が如何に変化に対して、つまり地元住民の生活の近代化に対して援助して来たかを示すよき例であります。沖縄の恵まれない優秀な学生に対する奨学資金計画、専門技術および技術指導を遥してこの目的を遂行して来ました。皆様の協会は最近沖縄の学生1.0名に対し、また1961年以來13.9名の学生に対して奨学資金を授与して来ました。私はその勢力と行為に対して謝辞を送るものであります。皆様は更に多くの若者に夢を与える青少年科学の日の行事を毎年援助して居られることに対して称讃されるべきであります。

皆様の事業は、琉球における米匡の活動が有形、無形、すなわち物心両面の多方面にわたつているという事実を如実に示しております。奨学金の給付などは、前途有望な青年達に教育の向上と福祉の増進をもたらしたいという皆様の関心を有形に示しておりますし、青少年科学の日は無形の側を示しております。無名の若者達がコンピューターの神秘性や人工衛星から送られてくる気象観測データ、電力をスムーズに供給する電力コントロール、センターなどを見学するこ

とによつて科学やエンジニアリングに初めて関心を持つに至り、ひいては彼等の心の中にインスピレーションや大志や希望の種が植えつけられることだつてあるかも知れません。

最後に私が申し上げたいことは、当地の人々の抱負を今後ともよく理解し、敬意を払つていくようにしようではありませんか。皆様が、当琉球のおかれた諸条件を改善し、よりよき社会の建設のために、皆様の巾広い知識を今後とも活用して行かれるよう望む次第であります。私達すべての当事者が協力することによつて、沖縄の日本復帰とそれまでの過渡期を円滑に、しかも最少限の困難で実現できるのであります。

(完)

禁 止	禁 止	禁 止
1969年5月17日(土)午後8時まで発表を差し控えること		
禁 止	禁 止	禁 止

# NEWS RELEASE

PLEASE NOTE DATE



UNITED STATES CIVIL ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS  
PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

URASOE, OKINAWA  
(APO SAN FRANCISCO 96248)  
TEL. 72153

NEWS RELEASE: 69-131  
May 17, 1969

EMBARGO	EMBARGO	EMBARGO
EMBARGO UNTIL DELIVERY EXPECTED AROUND 8 P.M., SATURDAY, MAY 17, 1969		
EMBARGO	EMBARGO	EMBARGO

SPEECH PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR STANLEY S. CARPENTER AT THE ANNUAL SCHOLARSHIP FUND-RAISING BANQUET OF THE SOCIETY OF AMERICAN MILITARY ENGINEERS (SAME), AT THE CASTLE TERRACE CLUB, 8 P.M., SATURDAY, MAY 17, 1969

## TIME OF CHANGE

Colonel Loesing, members of the Okinawa Post of the Society of American Military Engineers, ladies and gentlemen. It is a great honor to appear before this very learned society.

Your president's letter asking that I speak at this, your annual scholarship fund-raising banquet, gave me some misgivings. He wrote that while I could choose my subject, perhaps it could be on a theme having to do with "engineering .... and the development of the Ryukyus." Luckily for me, he added the theme of "development". I feel qualified to cover this field after almost two years in my assignment here as Civil Administrator. But on engineering, I am like the husband whose wife was asked by a friend, if he was very good at repairing things around the house. She replied, "Well, I don't like to criticize, but ever since he fixed the clock, the cuckoo backs out and asks, "What time is it?"

One may very well ask the same question seriously, "What time is it", when discussing the present situation of the Ryukyu Islands. The time, I suggest, is clearly one of change, of forward movement. Unfortunately, change often raises anxieties and the present period is no exception. In both the American and the Ryukyuan communities there are misgivings developing.

But change is nothing new for the United States here or elsewhere. On the present scene this was forecast from the days when the United States assumed control of the Ryukyus at the end of the Pacific War in 1945, and then became the administering authority formally with the signing of the Peace Treaty with Japan on September 8, 1951.

(OVER)



John Foster Dulles, one of the U.S. delegates at the Peace Conference, first enunciated the concept that Japan retains "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyus. This concept has been reaffirmed by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, each of whom has stated that administrative authority over the Ryukyus will revert to Japan.

Then, in 1967, former President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato of Japan issued a joint statement which, among other matters, contained the following: He (the Prime Minister) "emphasized that an agreement should be reached between the two governments within a few years on a date satisfactory to them for the reversion of these islands. The President stated that he fully understands the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of these islands. At the same time, the President and the Prime Minister recognized that the United States military bases on these islands continue to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in the Far East."

The most recent public declaration of United States policy came from Secretary of State Rogers in a news conference in Washington on April 7th, when in response to a question, he said: "We recognize that changes have to be made with the passage of time. We are looking forward to our discussions with officials of the Japanese government, including their Foreign Minister, and, as you know, Prime Minister Sato is going to visit the United States in the fall and we hope that we can work something out on Okinawa that will be mutually satisfactory."

Tonight, I wish to stress two aspects of Secretary Rogers' statement, which I think particularly characterize the United States presence here: One, that, with time comes change; and next, that given a large measure of reasonableness on both the Japanese and American sides, it should be possible to achieve a mutually satisfactory solution of the Okinawan problem.

Change is a word many fear but something that cannot be avoided and something that must be realistically and intelligently faced. The changes wrought here in the Ryukyus over the past 24 years have been so remarkable that to the unfamiliar they would sound unbelievable. In this group tonight are so very many who can take pride in their contribution to these changes.

(MORE)

Twenty-four years ago these islands, bereft of natural resources, in the path of typhoons, and frequently hit by drought, had little to grow, manufacture, build or export. Then came the terrible battle of 1945 which reduced the island to shambles. There was no government, economy, transportation, schooling; there was nothing but stout-hearted people with a willingness to start anew and a people from a foreign land with the willingness to assist them.

Then started the change.

Homes and schools were reconstructed, roads were built, electricity and water were provided, modern hospitals were established and, for the first time, a university was created which provided the Ryukyuan people with their own facility for higher education.

In 1952, the Government of the Ryukyu Islands was established to provide the people with self-government. In those days the Civil Administration took a very active part in the day-to-day operation of the Ryukyuan government. This was necessary for these people had never had the opportunity or responsibility to govern themselves in the past. Ryukyuan people with the will and ability were sent to other countries for higher education and advanced training so they could return and assume leadership in government and industry. Gradually, the functions and authority of the GRI were expanded until today they have an almost autonomous government. Through change, step-by-step, the democratic process advanced to the culminating point last year with the first public election of a Chief Executive in the islands' history.

Both as Ryukyuan and Americans, we should be very proud of this progress -- the Ryukyuan people for their strong and determined efforts and the American people for their assistance, guidance and, most important, their desire to pass on these responsibilities to the Ryukyuan people.

Today, the constant talk of reversion has created some fear that many new changes will occur which will be to the detriment of the local people as well as the Americans residing here. We hear talk of great recessions because of the removal of the military base. We hear that many businesses, both American and Ryukyuan, will be going bankrupt. We hear of the effect of the free introduction of Japanese industry to Okinawa after it becomes a

(OVER)

prefecture again and the unfavorable impact this will have on local businesses.

I cannot help but feel that a great deal of this fear is unwarranted. I believe much of this is based upon (1) the fear of the unknown and (2) the change of the status quo. As victims of habit we abhor anything that could affect our personal way of life. Consequently, we read into a newspaper article or feel in a new rumor that future changes will cause great problems. We all too often look for the worse.

I recognize that there are elements both here, in Japan and even in the United States who are advocating the complete removal of the military base from the Ryukyus. However, I have not seen where any responsible official in our government or the government of Japan has advocated this. Prime Minister Sato and his government recognize all too well the contribution that the U.S. bases are making to assure the continued peace and security here in the Far East. The removal of our bases is not the issue; only the status of these bases after reversion. No responsible Japanese or Ryukyuan will hesitate to acknowledge that almost one-half of the Ryukyuan gross national product is obtained because of these bases. Therefore, no responsible person will advocate the complete removal of these bases. Thus, I believe this fear of a change for the worse is unfounded.

This does not mean, however, that continued reliance on the bases as the major industry of the Ryukyus is economically a good thing. I believe every effort should be made to develop new industries which will provide for a better balanced economy. These are changes for progress.

Hawaii is an excellent example of what I speak. The sources of funds in Hawaii are comparable in every respect to those in the Ryukyus -- except that tourism is forging into first place as a result of the huge infusion of outside capital -- much of it, incidentally, from Japanese investors. But the military presence in Hawaii contributes heavily to the economy, is well accepted by the islanders and supported wholeheartedly.

There is an urgent need here for similar infusion of outside capital -- and understanding of the value of military expenditures which, in effect, are also "outside capital". Despite the efforts of USCAR and Ryukyans who have

(MORE)

travelled and studied investment abroad, the local climate for foreign investors, be they American, Japanese or others, is still restrictive in Ryukyuan governmental and business circles. I and my staff are constantly encouraging the amendment of the current unsatisfactory GRI Foreign Investment Law and the establishment of a law which will encourage rather than discourage increased investment. There are those who say that the High Commissioner or Civil Administrator should arbitrarily force the GRI to change this law. I feel this would be contrary to everything we have done and stand for. We will continue to encourage this change through free discussion and exchange of thoughts so that a mutually acceptable law can be developed.

The record of the postwar years has clearly shown that whatever differences may exist among us on means and objectives, none are so great that they cannot be bridged through discussion and mutual understanding. None are so great that they cannot be solved to the mutual satisfaction of the inhabitants of these islands, of Japan proper, and of the United States. We have reached many solutions together in the past and I am confident we shall continue to do so in the future.

You members of the engineering, architectural and construction professions have the satisfaction of having contributed so much to the changes I have spoken of tonight. Whatever you have done in the past, however, must be not only continued but increased. You must continue to work with your fellow Ryukyans and help maintain the rapid momentum of growth achieved over the past years.

One of America's outstanding management executives, a former government official, David E. Lilienthal, says, "in meeting the tough tests of a changing world we shall turn more and more for leadership to the managerial skill of getting things done through the moving and stimulating of human beings to act. That capacity to get things done will not be confined to leadership in business or government. It is an innate capability to be found among people in the neighborhoods, in the universities or colleges, in the labor unions, in the factories, in all that vast maze of activity which is part of the great process of change."

(OVER)



As an American, and as a government official, I am proud of the role we have played in stimulating change -- through peaceful, orderly progress -- in all fields of politics, business, education and culture in these islands, as elsewhere in the world.

Your society -- ironically having initials which form the acronym "SAME" -- stands not for "sameness" but for change. Your organization exemplifies how a civic group has helped to change -- to modernize -- local life. You have done this through your programs of scholarships to deserving Ryukyuan students, your professionalism and your technical advice and leadership. I congratulate your efforts on behalf of the ten current Ryukyuan winners of your scholarships, and of the 139 other Ryukyuan students who have received your scholarships since 1961. You are, furthermore, to be praised for your annual assistance to the Science Youth Day programs which inspire so many youngsters.

Your programs graphically illustrate the fact that the United States' manifold activities in the Ryukyus are both tangible and intangible -- the material and what may be called spiritual. Scholarships provide tangible proof of your concern for the educational advancement and welfare of ambitious youth; Science Youth Day is the intangible side. Who knows? The seeds of inspiration, ambition and hope may be planted in the minds of unknown youngsters who, for the first time, become interested in science or engineering at they observe the mysteries of the computer, weather data coming from a satellite, or the smooth distribution of electric power through a single load control center.

Finally, I say to you this evening let us continue to understand and respect the aspirations of the people of these islands. May you continue to apply your vast knowledge to the improvement of conditions here in the Ryukyus and the betterment of the community. With all of us working together the transition period and eventual reversion of the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese authority will occur smoothly and with a minimum of stress to all concerned.

(END)

EMBARGO                      EMBARGO                      EMBARGO  
EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY EXPECTED AROUND 8 P.M., SATURDAY, MAY 17, 1969.

ソカヒ 万博

大政事外外僑官  
務典房  
次官兼審長長  
機文會管給

人電厚計  
官長領移長  
企  
参領旅移

参地中東  
長北東西  
参北北保  
中南  
参一  
参西東洋  
長

近ア長  
参書近ア  
参経経國万  
長協協長  
参政按二  
國一理  
参政経科  
軍社専  
参道内外  
一二

総理府 5

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

320

電信写

総番号(TA) 45394 主管  
 69年10月9日18時55分 ナハ 発着 米北1  
 69年10月9日20時20分 本省 着

外務大臣殿

岸 沖繩事務所長

LISCAR夫人クラブ 昼食会における  
アイリー民政官の演説(連)

第378号 平 至急  
(総務長官へ 才378号)

8日 アイリー民政官は LISCAR夫人クラブ  
昼食会に出席し、沖繩返還問題につきスピー  
チを行なったところ、その要旨次のとおり。

なお右は特に新味はないが従来からの問  
題点をよく整理しており、また当地米側高官  
が最近かかるスピーチを意識的に行なった  
ことは注目される(テキスト空送)。

1. 沖繩返還問題は1946年のSCAP命令  
による米国の沖繩分割統治に始まる米國

統治の要因として、最初は、

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

(1) 米軍による沖繩占領  
 (2) ソ連による千島、齒舞諸島の一方的占領  
 及び  
 (1) 沖繩が本土からみて遠隔の地にあるこ  
 とによるものであるが、更にモウーフ  
 (2) 平和条約後も米軍の駐留が必要である  
 と考えたことにある。しかし平和条約作  
 成当時のダレス大使は沖繩の永久統治が日  
 本との平和回復にとって好ましくないと思  
 え、この平和回復の理念と米国の軍事的要請  
 との調和を期して沖繩を国連の信託統治下  
 に置き得るようになるとともに日本に対して  
 は沖繩に対する潜在主権を認めた。その後  
 沖繩は信託統治下に置かれ、1957年の  
 岸・アヘンハウアー共同声明を皮切りに日米  
 両国首脳の間で相次いで行なわれ、1967年  
 の佐藤・ジョンソン会談により情勢は沖繩返還  
 実現により一層近づいて来た。

外務省

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

ス、沖縄の返還と在沖縄米軍基地の将来は密接に関係しているが、これは別個の問題である。返還は米軍駐留の終了を意味するものでなく、これは新しい法体系の下における米軍基地の活動を意味する。日米交渉の問題又は日本政府は米軍基地に対して安保条約の提供を希望しているが、他方米国は返還後も米軍基地が有効に活動的アジアにおける米国の軍事的コミットメントを果せるよう望んでいるところにある。これらの問題もどのようにして解決するのが予測することは出来ないが、発知外相とロジャース國務長官等の発表からみて基本的な安全保障上の問題と沖縄返還との調整は進展しているようである。

3. 施政権返還に伴ない通貨の交換、水道、電力、金融公社の処分等の経済問題が当然生ずる。この狭い沖縄で水道、電力下水

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

等の利用で米軍施設と現地住民とを分けて考えることは出来ない。これらの分野で公正且つ有効な配属が為さなければならぬ。その他、米国人及びその他の外国人企業下の利益の保護、道路、水道、電力、水等に付する財政援助、軍労働者の間接雇傭、米琉奨学制度、法制面での改革、運輸通信等返還等に伴う多くの困難な問題がある。

4. 沖縄の返還は長い間のわれわれの念願であったことは明らかであり、日米両国の安全保障上の利益の必要性を越えてまでわれわれは施政権を保持したいと思っていない。

(3)

新官署名?

アメリカ局長  
参事官  
北米第一課長



総沖才 378号  
昭和44年10月13日

総理府特別地域連絡局長 殿

日本政府沖縄事務所長


USCAR 婦人クラブ昼食会に  
於けるフィラー民政官の演説資料

往電才 378号に同じ、標記テキスト1部

別添送付す。

本信写送付先: 外務省アメリカ局長

- 要処理
- 首席事務官
- 南方
- 渉外調査
- 漁業
- 航空
- 科学協力
- 連絡調整
- 調査
- 力夕夕
- 局庶務



日 本 政 府

UNITED STATES CIVIL ADMINISTRATION  
OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS  
PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

URASOE OKINAWA  
(APO SAN FRANCISCO 96249)  
TEL. 72153

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: NEWS RELEASE: 69-261  
October 8, 1969 at 2:00 pm

REMARKS BY CIVIL ADMINISTRATOR ROBERT A. FEAREY  
BEFORE USCAR WOMEN'S CLUB LUNCHEON MEETING  
OCTOBER 8, 1969

Mrs. Lampert, Mrs. Simmons, members of the USCAR Women's Club, distinguished guests.

First, let me say that in the six weeks I have been here I have heard much about your club. I know that through your extensive and effective programs in the cultural, intellectual and welfare fields you are helping greatly to promote friendly and mutually beneficial American-Ryukyuan relationships. Your welfare activities are particularly impressive, both in the magnitude of the overall effort and the tremendous variety of projects you undertake. Furtherance of the welfare of the Ryukyuan people is a vital part of the U.S. Civil Administration's mission. It is also important to a favorable environment for American business here. Your club's work is therefore in direct support of your husbands' interests and responsibilities, including business husbands. Please accept my profound thanks on behalf of the entire Civil Administration for your continuing successful promotion of Ryukyuan American friendship and understanding.

I pondered quite a bit what I should talk to you about today. Having been here so short a time, I hesitated to attempt to tell you anything about Okinawa. But after considering other subjects, none of which seemed to fit the bill, I decided on an Okinawa topic notwithstanding. What I plan to do is, first, to try to put the current Okinawa reversion picture into some sort of historical perspective. I shall then indicate in briefest terms the nature of the matters now under negotiation between the U.S. and Japan in connection with reversion. Finally, I will indicate some of the problems which the U.S. and Japanese Governments, with

(Over)

active Ryukyuan Government participation, would face after a reversion agreement in working out specific arrangements for a shift of administrative responsibility in Okinawa from the U.S. to Japan, with the GRI reverting to a normal prefectural government.

Some of your husbands will be key figures in this undertaking. Many of them have already been working long hours in preparation for the complex negotiations that lie ahead. Your understanding support of their efforts is sincerely appreciated. It will remain essential if USCAR is to carry successfully the heavy responsibilities which may fall to it in the years leading to reversion.

#### Historical Background of Reversion

Looking first at the history of the matter, the reversion problem had its origin in January 1946, nearly 24 years ago. At that time, by order of General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, one of the 47 prefectures of Japan, were separated from Japanese control and administration. During the five-year remainder of the occupation, they were under the sole administration of the United States, without any of the aspects of Japanese Government and allied control obtaining on the Japanese mainland. The decision to establish such a separate, purely American administration in the Ryukyus derived primarily from American sacrifices in the defeat of the Japanese Forces on Okinawa, from the unilateral Soviet occupation of the Kurile and Habomai Islands to the north, and from the remoteness of the Ryukyus from Tokyo. However, a further factor, even in those early days, was the thought that the U.S. might need to establish a long-term military presence in the Ryukyus extending beyond the peace treaty with Japan. An exclusively U.S. Administration might facilitate this.

Moving ahead, it is sometimes forgotten that the reversion movement started before, not after, the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952. In March 1951, when the Japanese peace treaty negotiations

(More)

were just gathering steam under Ambassador Dulles, the Okinawa Gunto assembly adopted a resolution, by a vote of 17 to 3, requesting reversion to Japan. The 3 opposing votes were by the former Republican Party, which stood for independence of the Ryukyus. Two months later, in May 1951, Chobyō Yara was elected the first chairman of the "Association for the Promotion of Reversion to Japan." A founder of the Okinawa reversion movement almost 20 years ago, Chief Executive Yara has been at the forefront of the movement ever since.

An event of major consequence for reversion occurred on September 5, 1951 at the Japanese Peace Conference in San Francisco. On that day, in presenting the treaty draft to the conference, Ambassador Dulles noted that some of the allied powers had urged that the treaty require Japan to renounce its sovereignty over the Ryukyus in favor of U.S. sovereignty. Others had proposed that the Islands be restored completely to Japan. "In the face of this division of allied opinion," Ambassador Dulles said, "the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority."

I served as a member of Ambassador Dulles' peace treaty mission, and recall a number of discussions in 1951 at which the U.S. treaty position on the Ryukyus was decided. In those discussions it was noted that the Ryukyuan people are Japanese. The islands were not, in the words of the Cairo Declaration, taken by Japan "by violence and greed." Although the U.S. had long-term security interests in the Ryukyus, the "peace of reconciliation" which we and most of our allies in the Japanese war sought with Japan would be vitiated by the Islands' enforced, permanent detachment from Japan. The "residual sovereignty" formula was, I believe, personally conceived by Ambassador Dulles to reconcile

(Over)

conflicting U.S. political and security requirements. It was the most descriptive term he could devise to convey the thought to Japan and the world that although the U.S. was obliged to retain control of the Ryukyus temporarily for security reasons, historic Japanese territory was not being detached and the principle of no U.S. territorial acquisitions as a result of the war was being observed.

In any event it was at San Francisco that the promise of Japanese "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyus entered our political vocabulary. The idea of placing the Ryukyus under the UN strategic trusteeship system was never followed up as a solution to the problem of the future of the Islands.

The next noteworthy Ryukyus reversion date is June 1957. At that time, in the first of a series of communiques issued during visits of Japanese prime ministers to Washington, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi reaffirmed that Japan possesses "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyus.

In June 1961 President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ikeda again reaffirmed the principle of Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the Islands. In March 1962, following a study of our Ryukyus policies and programs, President Kennedy publicly stated that he recognized the Ryukyus "to be a part of the Japanese homeland," adding that he "looked forward to the day when the security interests of the free world will permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty."

President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato met twice in Washington -- in November 1965 and November 1967 -- and each time moved the Ryukyus closer to reversion. At the 1967 meeting they agreed on the establishment of an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner to promote the integration of the Ryukyus with Japan and thus help to minimize the stresses that would accompany reversion. They also agreed on reversion of the Bonin Islands to Japan. This left Okinawa as the only Article III territory

(More)

Page 5, News Release 69-261, PAD, USCAR (October 8, 1969)  
still under U.S. Administration, the Northern Ryukyus having been returned to Japan in 1953.

Today, after 24 years, Okinawa is approaching restoration to central Japanese Government administration. I cannot say when or under what conditions that restoration will take place because the decision is yet to be made, but it will be based on the negotiations between the U.S. and Japanese Governments now in process.

The climax to which both governments are pointing is the President's meeting with Prime Minister Sato in Washington six weeks hence.

#### Negotiation Issues

What are the negotiation issues? It should be emphasized that Okinawa reversion and the future of the American bases on Okinawa are separate, though closely related, questions. Reversion does not mean ending the U.S. military presence on Okinawa. It does mean a new legal framework under which the U.S. bases would operate after reversion. The Japanese Government wants to bring the bases under existing U.S.-Japan security treaty arrangements, including those provisions relating to prior consultation and advance Japanese consent for the launching of combat operations from Japanese bases. For our part, we want to ensure that after reversion the bases will be able to operate effectively and assist in fulfilling our Asian security commitments, particularly to Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam, as well as to Japan.

I cannot predict how these issues will be resolved. However, the public statements by Secretary Rogers, Foreign Minister Aichi and others involved in the negotiations suggest that reconciliation of the fundamental security issues connected with reversion is proceeding, preliminary to the Nixon-Sato meeting in late November.

#### Reversion Implementation Planning

We come then to reversion implementation planning. Intensive study is being given by the U.S., Japanese and Ryukyuan Governments to the many difficult and complex problems which would

(Over)



be involved in a shift from U.S. to Japanese administration here. USCAR is a key source of information and judgment on these issues.

Clearly the shift will involve economic problems. For example, how is the currency to be exchanged? What disposition should be made of the U.S. established, controlled and owned "civic infrastructure," such as the Ryukyu electric power, water and development loan corporations? In the confined area of central Okinawa, extensive U.S. installations and the domestic community cannot be separated in the production and utilization of water, electricity, sewerage systems and other utilities. Fair and effective arrangements in all these areas must be made for the future.

Another problem area concerns American and other non-Japanese businessmen who have been here for many years, contributed much to the extraordinary postwar growth of the Ryukyuan economy, and now form an integral part of that economy. Their rights and interests should be given appropriate protection as they come under the conditions applicable to foreign business on the Japanese mainland.

Who will be responsible for maintaining key highways now maintained by the U.S. Forces, highways which will continue to be used partly by those forces and partly by the civil population? Will the right-hand driving system continue? Virtually every vehicle here -- including Japanese-made -- is built for driving on the right.

Obviously new arrangements will have to be made for external assistance to the Ryukyuan government and economy. Without such assistance, key road construction, water, electric power, sewage and other projects important to the American base presence and the Ryukyuan population cannot be completed.

Ryukyuan employees paid from U.S. appropriated funds are now hired directly by the U.S. Forces. Not so on the Japanese mainland. There the Japanese Government hires Japanese workers and

(More)

provides them on a reimbursable basis to our forces.

Over the past two decades hundreds of Ryukyuan young men and women have enjoyed the benefits of studying in the United States under U.S. financed educational and training programs. How will these programs change, or will they be replaced, after reversion? What will happen to the U.S.-funded medical training program now operating so successfully at the Okinawa Central Hospital?

In the field of legal and governmental operations, we have been pressing in the direction of replacing Hicom ordinances with GRI enactments. With reversion all remaining ordinances will be replaced by Japanese and Ryukyuan legislation. One effect of this will be the end of U.S. controls over immigration into the Ryukyus. Another will be replacement of both the GRI and USCAR court systems by Japanese courts.

And existing transportation and communications systems will have to be adjusted. Answers will have to be found to difficult questions concerning the airways and airlines now serving the Ryukyus. Ryukyuan maritime, radio, television, telegraph and postal systems will have to be integrated into the various Japanese systems.

These are only a few of the complex problems USCAR experts and other experts are now studying. Once the fundamental reversion issues are resolved, attention will shift to these and other practical problems of a smooth transition to Japanese administration. It will be a time of hard work, change and adjustment for us all.

But if my remarks have served their purpose, it will be clear that reversion has long been our goal, too. We have had no desire to retain administrative authority over a million Japanese nationals beyond the time necessary to our mutual security interests. The period ahead will be full of interest and challenge. Your club's contribution will be highly important as we shift our relations with our Okinawan hosts to a new basis under Japan.

(Over)

If we do the job well, that new basis will provide a firmer foundation of friendship, mutual productive endeavor and mutual security than we enjoy here today.

(END)

高宅啓三

アメリカ局長

参事官

北米第一課長



送付先 3826 号  
昭和44年11月11日

総理府特別地域連絡局長 殿

日本政府沖縄事務所

沖縄問題に関するキハラウエー元  
高等弁務官の論文

11月9日(日)付当地モーニング・スター紙付キハラウエー  
元高等弁務官の「米軍からみた沖縄問題と題する論文  
(特別寄稿)

を掲載していただき、本件記事別添の上右要旨迄の  
ご報告いたします。

1. 日米間に於ける沖縄問題に関する議論は益々  
白熱化する傾向にあるが、沖縄の米軍基地を抜き

た(2)沖縄を論じるべきではない。日米両国民の  
間に沖縄の返還を主張する者がいるが、彼らに現

要理  
首脳官  
南  
渉外  
漁業  
航空  
科学協力  
連絡調整  
調査  
力夕  
局庶務



日 本 政 府

3725



實を知らずあるか、又はそれを直視（まじく）する者たす  
 あり。米國が対日交渉に於て穩やかな態度をとり  
 きたるに對し、日本は益々感懐的となり、沖縄に  
 對する権利を求め喚くまじにあらざり。事實、  
 日本は現在又は將來に沖縄に對する権利を有す  
 るべきは有く、かまじ権利が實現されるに（ては、  
 されはならず遠い將來のニて、日米兩國の力  
 は如何にし難い情勢の變化に懸つてあり、沖縄  
 返還時期にして、それは平和條約に基つて決定  
 される米國の專管事項である。二〇一九四九年末に  
 至り、日本は施政権返還のニ安保内題のニわ  
 け「沖縄内題」といふやかい有荷物を米國の  
 背に負わせまじと（ていふ）。  
 2. 在日米軍に對し日本に在り施設・区域の使用は地  
 位決定に對し制限され（ていふ）が、同様は沖縄に於  
 て米國の施政の安保系ゆや、地域協定、運命共

につい（て）ある（ていふ）まじ、  
 「沖縄内題」と「安保内題」  
 を併せて考へ（ていふ）は判然（と）し（ていふ）。沖縄  
 内題は米國民に（ていふ）理解し難い一つの事（ていふ）で、日  
 本國民の沖縄内題に對する考へを（ていふ）理解す（ていふ）まじ  
 あり。また日本内保に對し米國民（ていふ）は沖縄内題  
 は相互理解に寄（ていふ）り（ていふ）まじ（ていふ）。沖縄返  
 還を要求す（ていふ）意圖は、（ていふ）目的に（ていふ）て、  
 内政内  
 閣の國民の内政を（ていふ）せ、外國政府に非難す（ていふ）まじ  
 につ（ていふ）て政府の責任を（ていふ）糊塗（ていふ）し（ていふ）まじ（ていふ）  
 あり。日本内保に對し政治、経済内題の（ていふ）上  
 二つ（ていふ）の現在、（ていふ）程に（ていふ）て沖縄内題の（ていふ）大  
 き（ていふ）な内題  
 と（ていふ）まじ（ていふ）の米國の（ていふ）機軸（ていふ）は理解す（ていふ）まじ（ていふ）  
 あり。また、米國（ていふ）が（ていふ）西太平洋地域の防  
 衛の任務を（ていふ）負（ていふ）つ（ていふ）て（ていふ）まじ、日本は（ていふ）て  
 返還を（ていふ）要求し、同地域に（ていふ）て米國に（ていふ）て  
 責任を（ていふ）負（ていふ）つ（ていふ）まじ。

3. 日米両国が能合議に於けるニソソ大統領の如きは  
 判り得る如きは、<sup>本</sup>程を確信せしむるに於ては、  
 同大統領は、米国の利益に於ては、如何に  
 利権を有しさせようとするに於ては、如何なるに  
 ニソソ大統領は、沖縄を返還しければ、安保条約  
 が危くするとの自民党の叫びも影響されることが  
 疑わしい。事実、自民党は未だに沖縄と安保の関  
 係を判断して居る。米国の何れの議案が行われ  
 るに依り、それ相當の代償を伴うべきであり、要  
 して日本が施政権を返還に伴う代償を<sup>本</sup>私に用意  
 するべきである。

4. 米議会は、内政問題の如く外交政策と軍事防衛  
 の二つの面から、米国の利益を考慮せしむるに於て、  
 既に述べた通り、如何なるに、自由使用の如く其地を  
 持つに於ては、如何なるに。能合議は、海外の二つの  
 一に属する。然るに、<sup>処理</sup>沖縄問題ニソソ大統領は

上院を素通りするに於ては、如何なるに、如何なるに  
 3. 3.  
 4. 日本が、沖縄内閣を交渉の<sup>象</sup>にすることを、  
 安保問題の交渉を避けるにすれば、沖縄問題では  
 如何なるに交渉可能であるか。米国の平和条約に基  
 いて、沖縄返還の用意が、如何なるに、安保条約の平和条  
 約の何れの内閣が、如何なるに、如何なるに交渉可能  
 であるか。これは、日本の沖縄の施政権の防  
 衛の責任<sup>本</sup>日本以外の地球に於ける<sup>本</sup>責任を  
 負うべきことを判断し、拒否し、如何なるに、如何なるに  
 5. 米国の沖縄を返還するに依り、日本は、米国の  
 平和条約に基いて、如何なるに、如何なるに、如何なるに、如何なるに

3に4はてき有り。日本は、施設権を得たものの代償  
 の支払い  
 や沖縄に対し5億ドルの投資を行なう意思がある  
 どうか。また、日本は、復帰後、米国の<sup>案</sup>沖縄の企業  
 の利益<sup>保</sup>護を保障すべきであるか。  
 佐藤総理が沖縄の返還を望むのであれば  
 非現実<sup>的</sup>のり米交渉の<sup>真意</sup>と<sup>意見</sup>の相違点について  
 明らかにすべき有り。佐藤総理は全米<sup>に</sup>交渉  
 可能である、本年10月の在米横濱に於て米国の  
 再々<sup>の</sup>後退し、日本に対して無償の譲歩を行なう予  
 想(らしい)があるか。しかし、現況、日本の政治的  
 問題が<sup>走</sup>り、経済問題が<sup>声</sup>を大にす<sup>る</sup>にあり、佐  
 藤総理とニソン大統領は<sup>日米友好同盟の</sup>妥協を  
 取らず「日本が全てを得るべきである」と再々<sup>の</sup>思い込  
 んでいるかである。

本信を送付先：外務省アメリカ局長

MORNING STAR, OKINAWA  
NUMBER 9, 1966

EX-HICOM DENIES JAPAN CLAIM ON OKINAWA

The Okinawa

Question-Seen

from the U.S.

EDITOR'S NOTE: — Japanese claims on the island of Okinawa have been emphatically denied by Lt. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, (USA Retd.) the former high commissioner of the Ryukyus. In a lengthy position paper prepared for the Okinawa MORNING STAR, the man who was the virtual ruler of the Ryukyus from 1945 until 1954 said that Japan has no rights of present, or of future possession of the island's real estate, people or territorial waters based upon article three of the U.S.-Japan peace treaty which ended the war between Japan and the allies.

Caraway charged that the Japanese have made a bundle of two separate propositions which include the return of Okinawa to Japan plus the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty. The two propositions are in no way related, Caraway insists, even though the Japanese have foisted them off on the United States as one problem which face the U.S.

Calling the Okinawa question "an enigma embedded in a middle" from the United States point of view Caraway insists that Japanese demands for the return of Okinawa are nothing more than rationalization to console themselves for their defeat during World War II. Taking the kindest possible approach to Japan's demands for Okinawa, Caraway said, that the ruling Japanese politicians are attempting to divert attention away from failing political fortunes at home.

Americans, according to Caraway, tend to dismiss Japanese claims with the suggestion that the Japanese be allowed "to whistle for Okinawa" since the Americans won the island they should keep it until it is of no further value to them. Americans are mystified that the Japanese make so great outcry for the return of the Kurile Islands to the north of Hokkaido which were taken by the Russians after five days of war against the Japanese at the end of the Pacific conflict.

Other Americans feel that the security of the U.S. in the western Pacific is of greater importance to the U.S. than the friendship of Japan. Japan's insistence upon the return of Okinawa while ignoring American complaints against economic discrimination against the U.S. by the Japanese puzzles and disturbs the Americans, the former high commissioner says.

Although President Nixon has made no public statement concerning his views on the return of Okinawa Caraway says that Nixon is strong and keeps his own counsel and that his government is better organized than either that of Johnson or Kennedy. Nixon is also under heavy pressure from a hostile congress to make every defense dollar count. Under the circumstances it seems unlikely that Nixon would bypass congress in negotiations with Japan and make a present of a five billion dollar military base just to help buy Mr. Sato's political future until he decides to retire shortly after the return of Okinawa to Japan. The likelihood of the Japanese offering to pay for the American base on Okinawa is remote and even more remote would be the possibility of the U.S. maintaining a military garrison on Japanese territory under conditions not entirely to the satisfaction of the Americans. Congress will carefully scan any financial arrangement which will continue to give the Japanese a free ride at the expense of the American taxpayers, Caraway suggests.

The Japanese have done a great deal of drum beating on behalf of "negotiating" the Okinawa question, Caraway says. In reality, however, the Japanese are not prepared to negotiate but only to demand that "Japan take off" in an exchange between Japan and the U.S. The full text of Caraway's remarks follows:

The question of the status of Okinawa, the largest island in the Ryukyu Islands chain, has been the subject of discussion and argument for several years. It has now taken its place in the lexicon of relations between the United States and Japan as "The Okinawa Question," or "The Problem of Okinawa." At this point in time any discussion between the two countries is likely to generate more heat than light.

Okinawa, and its appendages in the Okinawa archipelago, is a United States military base. There is no question of sieving out the "bases on Okinawa" from the rest of the island. Roads, ports, utilities, employment of the people, industry and the areas designed for and used exclusively for military purposes form a completely integrated net that covers the island and makes up the Okinawa base. The structure was developed this way purposely.

Those people in Japan particularly, and to a lesser extent in the United States, who insist on talking about turning back the administration of Okinawa to Japan exclusive of the bases are either completely ignorant of the situation as it actually exists, or are wilfully refusing to face reality.

The United States has been extremely conciliatory in its actions and words in the frequent exchanges with the Government of Japan, while Japan has become more emotional, more inflammatory and shriller in voicing demands as to its rights to Okinawa. In fact, Japan has no rights of present, or of future possession of the island's real estate, people, or territorial waters. Such rights may mature in the far distant future depending upon the actions of certain Powers over which neither the United States nor Japan exercises effective control. The determination of the time these rights may vest is a matter of judgement to be exercised by the United States alone, acting under the Japanese Peace Treaty.

Now, near the end of 1969, the situation is again coming to a boil. This time the Government of

Japan, either through ignorance or intent, has made a bundle of two separate and distinct matters of worry to it, and is attempting to foist it on the United States as "The Okinawa Question." These are first, the administration of the Ryukyu Islands, which is empowered by the Japanese Peace Treaty; and second, the mutual security aspects of United States forces stationed in Japan, empowered under the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan."

In order to disentangle these two entirely different subjects, the parts of each document pertinent to the consideration of "The Okinawa Question" are set out hereafter:

"The Japanese Peace Treaty, Article 3.—Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nampo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, The United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters."

"THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY between the United States of America and Japan — Article VI. — For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan."

It must be noted that the grant to the United States for "the use of its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan" has been curtailed and restricted by a separate agreement with Japan titled "The Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, regarding Facilities and Areas and Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan."

It can be seen that the so-called "Okinawa Question," and the so-called "Mutual Security Renewal Problem" are not one; indeed they do not impinge one on the others to an extent that the United States administration of the Ryukyu Islands must stand or fall depending upon the fate of the Mutual Security Treaty and its Status of Facilities and Areas and Status of Forces Agreement.

What might happen to the Mutual Security Treaty, should the United States administrative rights and powers be abridged to any degree is another question that is not a part of this paper. Perhaps it can be taken up and discussed at another time.

So much for Preamble.

How does the "Okinawa Question" appear from the United States of America?

It looks to be a riddle embedded in an enigma, the majority of people in the United States who even bother to think about it. The fact that there is an "Okinawa Question" is in itself a puzzle to the people. The reasons given by the Japanese continuing to press for the return of Okinawa to Japanese administrative control are considered to be a rationalization for a defeat, of Japan's own making. Those who are not so charitable toward Japan are inclined to shrug off the rhetoric (if indeed they ever heard the reasons) with some remark to the effect that the Western people will never understand the Japanese mentality.

To those people in the United States who know the situation of Japan vis-a-vis the United States, the entire "Okinawa Question" seems to be a jolly that provides no basis for understanding. The reasons given by the Government of Japan for demanding the return of the islands, when viewed in even the kindest possible light, would seem to be that the government feels its domestic situation and failing political fortunes are driving it to seek every real and imagined diversion of attention. These observers cannot understand why a patently contrived problem is kept under such heavy pressure at this time, when all of the other problems between the two countries in the political and economic fields are also boiling.

The opinions of the people of the United States most often voiced are:

"Let them whistle for Okinawa, we won it and we will keep it until we do not need it longer;

"Why don't the Japanese press their demands for the return of the Kurile Islands?;

"We should consider the return of Okinawa when the Soviets return the islands in the Kuriles they hold;

"This is the same old trick the Japanese have used before, trying to excuse their own government's shortcomings by blaming outside forces—they are in a rut."

Others in the United States who sincerely feel that the United States must continue to fulfill its commitments to Asia and in the Western Pacific Area deplore the Japanese pressures and timing of their demands for a quick answer to the "Okinawa Question." Their belief is that the security of the United States, viewed in all its parts, political, economic, and military, requires that the United States present a highly visible interest in the area and an apparent strength sufficient to impose a solution should such imposition be required. Japan's security also demands that Japan meet its commitments; yet the Government of Japan is doing everything it can in the political and economic fields to force the United States to take another look at its position, while Japan does nothing to fill the power void which would result from the United States leaving the area.

These Americans see Japan as the epicenter of the problem. They see Japan bemused by its affluence and its industrial power, as one nation that has not learned that a "have-not" does not and cannot love a rich man, nor does Japan grasp the fact that he who is rich must be prepared to protect his wealth.

The position of the administration of president Nixon on "The Okinawa Question" has not been publically clarified. It may well not be clarified for some time to come.

The President is in many ways a more complex man than was former president Johnson. He is a more worldly man than was Mr. Johnson. He is his administration under far better control than did Mr. Kennedy or Mr. Johnson. President Nixon gives the impression of a man determined to retain his options to the maximum, thus retaining his freedom of action. He is not a Far East-Western Pacific Area "expert," but he has spent more time there than many pundits. He has viewed with a clear eye, analysed with a tough mind, and has refrained from talking until he thinks of what he is saying. No one at this point can know what the President will do when Mr. Sato comes to Washington for this last official meeting before he retires to his private affairs. It can be assumed with some assurance that whatever the President does, his actions will not be based on "keeping a friendly prime minister in power" without regard to the adverse effect such actions would have on United States interests. It is doubtful that he will be much influenced by the cries from the Liberal Democratic party of Japan that the United States must return Okinawa or see the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty doomed. As yet the ruling party in Japan has not established a connection between Okinawa and the Mutual Security Treaty. The only reasons given are the reiterated assertions of Mr. Sato, Mr. Aichi and other Liberal Democratic spokesmen that such is the case. The President's actions up to now would portend difficulties for Japanese expectations for the return of Okinawa to be realized on unilateral Japanese terms. Given the temper of the times any concessions by the United States will cost Mr. Sato a commensurate quid pro quo. The major question is whether the Government of Japan is ready to pay the price for achieving administrative control over the Ryukyus.

Turning now to a reading of the congressional attitude regarding Japan's demands for Okinawa, again there is an entirely new ballgame from that of a few years ago when an Ambassador to Japan under another administration was overly optimistic in advising the prime minister that the United States would give Okinawa to Japan, maintain its Base there on Japan's terms, and gladly pay the costs.

Congress is feeling the pressures of domestic issues to an extent that almost obliterates balanced consideration of United States' foreign affairs and overseas commitments. The Congress is in

no mood to be bludgeoned or cajoled into maintaining bases which do not allow the United States complete freedom of action in meeting its unilateral security requirements; and thereafter its multilateral commitments for collective security.

Congress is more inclined today than it has been in past years to scan narrowly all commitments to other countries, particularly an agreement with a nation in Japan's position as an "ally" which does not pull its share of the load. Lip service catches no fish in the fiscal year 1970.

Congress is measuring each commitment made in the past and to be made in the future, not on its possible, or even probable long range effectiveness alone. The measuring tape also counts in terms of costs — money, resources, and American lives. In this era the commitment must demonstrably meet a present, existing need of the United States; and, the return on the investment must be commensurate with the cost to the United States.

For many years Congress has not looked at the existing overseas commitments of the United States in terms of their making. Nowadays, the Congress is looking at the hows, the whys, and the wherefors of each agreement. All new commitments are undergoing the same scrutiny. Since almost all overseas commitments can actually be shown to fall within "Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States. Powers and Duties of the President, The Treaty Making Power," it is of value to quote the operative part of Clause 2 — "He (the President) shall have power, by and with the Advice, and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; . . . ."

The Senate and a significant portion of the people of the United States feel that this clause has been more honored in the breach than in its observance. This feeling has intensified as a result of the conflict in Vietnam. The public outcry at the disclosures (accompanied by considerable lineage in the newspapers), of the number of agreements, contingency plans, and commitments in existence in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia has served to alert the Senate of the United States, and has put the President on notice, that he will be buying trouble if he attempts to bypass the Senate as to a treaty or to follow the suggestion of Mr. Aichi and handle any Okinawa agreements on Okinawa as an Aide Memoir between the United States and Japan, and thus avoid placing a draft treaty before the Senate for its consent.

Further, the economics of the relationship between Japan and the United States has put Congress on guard regarding any agreements. Japan, due to her own internal pressures, has promised, and then postponed the execution of the promises on liberalization of trade; upon extending or setting quotas on products to be sent to the United States for sale or for the uses of trade; has refused to lessen or remove to an appreciable degree the truly inequitable tariffs. Japan has retained restrictions on export and imports, controlling the entry of United States investment, business and commercial enterprises, and manufactured products. Japan has just recently reneged on arrangements of joint commercial and business operations, the latest being the proposed joint enterprise of Chrysler and a Japanese corporation to manufacture motor cars. There are other exacerbating problems in the economic and trade sectors which are no nearer solution than they were years ago.

The two problems of a regularized aid program to underdeveloped nations in Asia and Africa; and Japan's unwillingness to take up a reasonable share of her own defense have not yet been resolved. And now, on top of all the other points of bitterness, the Government of Japan is attempting an either/or play on the return of administrative rights to Okinawa at once, in this case "at once" being the year 1972.

Members of Congress view this new effort to get something for nothing with distaste, and without doubt are willing and able to embarrass Japan and President Nixon's administration in the matter of Okinawa. The fact that the Congress is controlled by the opposition party makes the President even more cautious.

One last comment. The Government of Japan has done a great deal of drumbeating about "negotiating" the "Okinawa Question", tied always to

not renegotiating the Treaty for Mutual Cooperation and Support between Japan and the United States. It occurs to all informed United States citizens to wonder and then to ask what is negotiable in the Okinawa question? Is not this question of Okinawa really a straightforward confrontation that the Liberal Democratic party's leader, Mr. Sato, seems determined to force upon the United States? There is no question here of a negotiated agreement. If the United States is not ready to give up its administration of Okinawa on the grounds stated in the Peace Treaty, what is to be negotiated? (since under that Treaty, "Pending the making of such a proposal to the United States and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.") Under the Treaty, what is there to negotiate? The Japanese Peace Treaty itself? Certainly there is nothing else, since the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States" has no bearing whatever upon the "Okinawa Question." Why? Because Japan explicitly refused to accept any responsibility under the latter document for the administration or defense of the Ryukyu Islands; or, for that matter, anything else outside the Japanese main islands. Perhaps Japan is expecting the President to give Okinawa to her as a fully going concern, with troops in place to implement the non-existent commitment to defend Japan's non-existent interest in Okinawa under the Treaty for Mutual Security?

Even on the off chance that the United States would agree to abrogate Article 3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty and turn the administration back to Japan, which might raise a storm of considerable intensity in the United States, has Mr. Sato and his party considered whether this treaty is negotiable? Japan can give the United States nothing in addition to what it now has under the Treaty. What, then, is there to negotiate?

Will Japan be willing to pay the quid pro quo to get the administrative control of Okinawa? This operation that Mr. Sato apparently has entered into as a means of getting his good conduct medal for being a "friend" of the United States carries a high price tag.

Is Japan willing to pay approximately \$5 billion for the capital structure alone in the Ryukyu Islands? Yet that is a conservative estimate of the value of the area to the United States. The United States Congress will agree without hesitation that this is a proper value to place on the capital structure.

Will Japan bind itself by iron-clad "non-negotiable" guarantees to protect the interests of the United States and the Ryukyuan business enterprises in the Ryukyu Islands after the United States abrogates its own treaty, bypasses the United Nations and turns over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan? It is quite probable that this will be the minimum agreement and guarantee acceptable to the United States in such a deal with respect to its own nationals. These are only two of a number of non-negotiable items that the President faces.

Can Mr. Sato explain to his own people, their Diet representatives, the Ministry of Finance, and the monied men in the business and commercial community of Japan the real facts of a "non-negotiable" negotiation, and where it differs from a confrontation? Yet this is what must be done if he expects to regain the administrative rights to the Ryukyu Islands.

On Japan's side, what will Japan do when the United States takes a leaf from the Soviet book and either says "No" or says "Yes," and the cost will be . . . ??"

It is doubtful that Japan will seriously consider declaring war on the United States over Okinawa; and there are no worthwhile economic sanctions it can apply against the United States, thanks to its many abrogated promises in this and the trade fields.

Or does Mr. Sato assume that everything is negotiable; and, that in the world situation as it exists in October 1969 the United States will again step back and once more give up something of value for nothing of value in return? Perhaps the political hacks and the economic quacks have once again convinced Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon that a "proper trade between friends" is "Japan take all."