

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

復帰準備1

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米議公関係

ソカヒ 大 博 蔵

大政事外務省
次次 典房
官官密寄長長
備録入電厚計
備書文会常給
備参調析企
備参領旅移
備参地中東
備参北北保
備参一
備参西東洋
備参西東
備参近ア
備参総経国芳
備参経国
備参政技二
備参国一理
備参参協組
備参参政科
備参参社専
備参参道内外
備参文

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電 信 写

総 番 号 (T A) 16388
70 年 4 月 7 日 21 時 12 分 米 国 主 管
70 年 4 月 8 日 11 時 29 分 本 省 着 米 北

外 務 大 臣 殿 下 田 大 使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ問題に関するサーモンド上院議員の演説

第1036号 平 大至急

往電第1023号4。に関し

サーモンド議員は7日午前上院本会議においてオキナワ問題に関し約1時間にわたり要旨次の如き演説を行なった(テキスト空送する)。

1. オキナワ返かんの合意について詳細にわたり検討をしたが、行政府の取り組み方には次の3点からみてしつくりしないものがある。

(1) 行政府はオキナワ返かんに関する上院の「ADVISE AND CONSENT」の権利について明白な態度を表明していない。

(2) 極東における軍事活動の縮少がなされ、政治的安定が回復される前の返かんには軍事的理由から反対である

(3) オキナワ返かんとともに、日本は日米間において相互に支持できるような経済政策の展開のために明確な責任を負うべきである。米国の開放的通商政策と米国の軍事力とは日本の経済復興と非常に大きなつながりをしてい

外 務 省

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るところ、今や日本の新米輸出は米国の経済の一部を占めるにさしている。領土の返かんとあわせ、相互に支持し得る(MUTUALLY SUPPORTING)通商政策について話し合う時期が来ている。

2. 前記(1)については客年11月5日ペード提案(客年往電第3496号等参照)が63対14で可決されており、しかも軍事及び外交両委員会委員長が賛成票を投じていることは右決議の重要性を示すものである(当館注。同決議はその後両院協議委員会に削除された)。

3. 前記(2)については、極東の同盟諸国に対する約束及び最近のラオス・カンボジア情勢、在ベトナム米軍の安全の問題との関連でオキナワ基地の使用の範囲が縮少されることはインコンステブルである。オキナワに安保条約が適用されることになれば、同基地の使用については移ろい。事前協議が適用されるが、これがINDEFECTIVEであることはブエノスアイレス事件の経緯からみても明らかである。

4. 前記(3)の点については米国の経済力と国防能力を弱めてくる日米通商問題について日本が話し合うことを拒否しているとの際、返かん合意をめぐり日本をどりして「A PARTNER OF EQUAL STATUS AND RESPONSIBILITY」と考えることが

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できようから、日本の対米せん維輸出は米国せん維産業のか
なりの部分 (CRITICAL PROPORTIONS)
) に影響を及ぼしている。

5. 以上の点に加え、サトウ総理訪米直後行なわれたハリ
ス世論調査では対象の 50% の米国人がオキナワ返かんに
反対している (客年住信政第 10377 号参照)。

6. (以上に引続きオキナワが米国の施政権下におかれるに
至つた経緯、米国のアジア諸国に対する防衛上の約束、オ
キナワの軍事的、戦略的価値 (オキナワよりの第 52 南爆
の例を引用している)、安保条約がオキナワに適用される
場合の在オキナワ米軍基地機能の低下、ラオス、カンボジ
ヤにおいても不安定な情勢が続くおりに、なぜオキナワを
返かんしなければならぬのか等を述べ、返かんに反対の
意向を表明したが、この間日米通商問題に関し日本の対米
貿易の激増に(触れ) 米国のせん維産業は重大な打撃を受け
ており、南カロライナ州だけでも数千の労働者が失業して
いる。先月自分ばかりの情勢に対処するための法案を提出
したが、議会はまもなく右につきアクションをとるものと
考える。

6. (サトウ・ニクソン共同声明を簡単に REVIEW し
た後) 本件につき次の 3 点を指摘したい。

(1) 行政府はオキナワ返かん問題につき上院の J.A.D.V

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ICE AND CONSENT」を求める旨はつきりと
宣言すべきである。

(2) 極東における政治情勢がいちじるしく改善し、同地
域における軍事活動が縮小されるならば、オキナワ返かん
に関し軍事的見地から反対する根拠は多少は少なくなる。

(3) 日本はもつと理にかなつた (AMENDABLE)
かつ相互に支持できる対米通商政策をとるべきであり、右
は米国のせん維産業の危機をかん和することができよう。
以上を考察すると、1972 年におけるオキナワ返かんは
米国の利益にそうものでないと考えらる。

(3)

ソカヒ 万大 傳紙

大政部外務省
事務次長 典房
臣官官審審長長
儀總入電厚計
儀書文会當給
國資長 参調析企
参領旅移
長

ア 参地中東
長 北東西
参北北保
中南
参一二
参西東洋
西東
長

近ア長 参審近ア
経 次総経國万
長 参賀統國
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参余協規
長 参政経科
長 軍社專
参道内外
長

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電信写

総番号(TA) 16374 米 国 主管
70年 4月 7日 20時32分 米 国 発着
70年 4月 8日 10時36分 本 省 着

外務大臣殿 下月 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

サーモンド議員の演説(報告)

第1037号 平 至急(ゆう先処理)

往電第1036号に關し。

サーモンド議員の演説に引続き7日の本会議においてバード議員(ヴァージニア州)はこれを支持して次のとおり発言した。

1。平和条約の地位変更をもたらすオキナワ返かんについては議会の助言と同意を求めるべきである。

議会の助言と同意を行政政府が求める意向か否かにつき、ホリングス議員はさきに大統領に対し照会したが、行政政府は助言と同意を求めることをこの機会に再保証するよう希望する。

2。アジア諸国の自由を保證するためには米國がオキナワ基地の自由使用を引続き求めることが論理的である。

外務省

ソカヒ 万大 傳紙

大政部外務省
事務次長 典房
臣官官審審長長
儀總入電厚計
儀書文会當給
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参領旅移
長

ア 参地中東
長 北東西
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西東
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近ア長 参審近ア
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長 参政経科
長 軍社專
参道内外
長

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総番号(TA) 16380 米 国 主管
70年 4月 7日 20時45分 米 国 発着
70年 4月 8日 10時47分 本 省 着

外務大臣殿 下月 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

サーモンド議員の演説(報告)

第1038号 略 至急(ゆう先処理)

往電第1036号に關し。

1。7日アサオが国務省フィン日本部長に対し本件につき照会したところ。同部長は本演説の内容詳細につき承知していないがと前置きして次のとおり述べた趣。

(1) サーモンド議員の演説に対しては今のところバード議員のみが支持を表明しただけであり、オキナワ返かん反対の動きが議員の間でゆきだるま式に大きくなることは考えられない。

(2) 本件演説にもかかわらずオキナワ返かん協定につき上院の承認を求めるか否かについての国務省の態度には何ら変更はない。即ち、ジョンソン次官の客年11月のはい景説明で明らかにした如く、上院の承認を求めるか否か。またいかなる方式で議会の支持(LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT)を求めるかについても未定である。

2。サーモンド議員のルシーア秘書はアサオに対し次の通

外務省

秘

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り答えた趣。

(1) 同議員がこの時期に演説した理由としてはせん維問題の深刻化とラオス、カンボディア情勢の悪化があげられる。

(2) 本演説につきバード議員が早速賛成したことはサーモンド議員を力づけており、また、本演説により他の議員に対し問題意識を提起しえたと信じている。

(7)

サーモンド米国上院議員の
沖縄問題に関する演説につ
いて

昭和45 4/6
アメリカ局北米第一課長

4月7日上院本会議における本件演説（同本会
議におけるバード上院議員の支持発言を含む）及
び同演説を支持する旨の4月8日上院本会議での
ホリングズ議員発言の公式議事録を、在米国大使
館より送付越しましたので、御高覧に供します。

アメリカ局長


参事官

北米第一課長

送付公信

政 第 3062 号	昭和 45 年 4 月 10 日
外 務 大 臣 殿	在 米 下 田 大 使
引用(来)(往)公信・電信番号 往電才1036号	
送 付 資 料	
サーモンド・バード議員の沖縄問題に関する発言	
【註】 4月7日上院本会議において実際に述べた形のカサーモンド議員の発言と、それを支持するバード議員の発言(5/59頁以下)。	
(希望配布先:)	
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April 7, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

S5153

SECTION 1. The proviso at the end of section 8c(6)(I) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (as reenacted by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, and as subsequently amended, (7 U.S.C. 608c(6)(I)), is amended by inserting "papayas," immediately after "applicable to cherries."

The title was amended so as to read: "A bill to amend the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 to authorize marketing agreements providing for the advertising of papayas."

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an excerpt from the report (No. 91-755), explaining the purposes of the measure.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

This bill would extend to papayas those provisions of the marketing order law which now authorize paid advertising to be provided for in marketing orders for cherries, carrots, citrus fruits, onions, Tokay grapes, fresh pears, dates, plums, nectarines, celery, sweet corn, limes, olives, pecans, and avocados. The Senate recently passed a similar bill, S. 1455, extending this authority to apples. The policy of Congress has generally been to extend this authority to any commodity for which such action is generally supported.

The Department of Agriculture estimates that the annual costs to the Department for administering each new marketing order that is issued approximate \$25,000.

COMMITTEE AMENDMENT
The committee amendment would amend the title of the bill by striking out the word "Hawallian" so that the title will conform to the text of the bill.

CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE GODDARD ROCKET AND SPACE MUSEUM

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 49) providing for congressional recognition of the Goddard Rocket and Space Museum was considered and agreed to, as follows:

S. CON. RES. 49
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress hereby recognizes the Goddard Rocket and Space Museum of the Roswell Museum and Art Center, Roswell, New Mexico, as a fitting memorial to Doctor Robert H. Goddard, who pioneered in rocket experimentation and contributed to America's success in landing men on the moon, and who is known as the "Father of the Rocket", and as an appropriate and outstanding institution for the collection, preservation, and display of the works and memorabilia of Doctor Goddard.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an excerpt from the report (No. 91-755), explaining the purposes of the measure.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

PURPOSE
Senate Concurrent Resolution 49 would provide for congressional recognition of the Goddard Rocket and Space Museum of the Roswell Museum and Art Center, Roswell, N. Mex., as a fitting memorial to Dr. Robert H. Goddard, an outstanding pioneer in American rocketry. The museum already a repository of some of Dr. Goddard's memorabilia

would be an appropriate and outstanding institution for the further collection, preservation, and display of his works.

BACKGROUND

The Roswell Museum and Art Center was started in late 1937 through the combined efforts of the city of Roswell, N. Mex., Chaves County Archaeological Society and the Roswell Friends of Art. The structure has grown from one gallery and a few small offices to one of 11 galleries, a workshop, planetarium, and three offices and workrooms. Much of the expansion during the last 20 years has been made possible by the finances and talents of Mr. Donald A. Anderson of Roswell, N. Mex.

As early as 1949, Mrs. Esther Goddard, widow of Dr. Robert H. Goddard, arranged for the original launching tower used in his early experiments to be brought to the area of the art center from Eden Valley and refurbished. A replica of one of the professor's rockets was placed inside the tower.

However, the idea for the Goddard Rocket and Space Museum as a wing of the Center was not conceived until 1957 when, at a dinner honoring Mrs. Goddard in Roswell, N. Mex., the subject was discussed. Mrs. Goddard agreed to make the collection of Goddard rocket memorabilia available to the Roswell Museum. Subsequent to that time, the city council of Roswell authorized the enlargement of the museum and art center to provide the necessary space for the proper display of the historic collection. On April 25, 1959, the Robert H. Goddard Rocket and Space Museum was dedicated with Dr. Werner von Braun making the dedicatory address.

Through the efforts of many individuals, the collection of memorabilia has grown to its present size. The Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Foundation gave generously to the project, the Smithsonian Institution gave, on a long-term loan, one of the few existent complete Goddard rockets for display in the museum; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration presented the museum with a scale replica of Dr. Goddard's first successful liquid-fueled rocket.

In 1965, the Roswell Rotary Club voted unanimously to take on as a project the reproduction of Dr. Goddard's original workshop. Equipment used in this workshop was in the possession of the Curtis-Wright Corp., and this firm generously made this historical machinery available to the museum. Through the efforts of many persons an exact replica of the workshop, even to a 1931 calendar, was constructed and dedicated in June 1969.

In conjunction with the Goddard workshop reconstruction, the Robert H. Goddard Planetarium was constructed through the efforts of Mr. Donald R. Anderson of Roswell, N. Mex. It, too, was dedicated on June 2, 1969.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the conclusion of morning business today, the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 650, H.R. 11102, and that at that time it be laid before the Senate and made the pending business.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for the information of the Senate, after the disposal of the Carswell nomination on tomorrow, it is anticipated that the Senate, at that time, will proceed to the consideration of Calendar No. 761, Senate Joint Resolution 190, a joint resolution providing for the settlement of the labor

dispute between certain carriers by railroad and certain of their employees.

I thank the distinguished Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) for his courtesy.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND) is recognized 1 hour.

REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, since last November's agreement between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato of Japan on the reversion of Okinawa, I have given this matter considerable study and thought.

Several aspects of this planned reversion are disturbing to me.

First, there is no clear recognition by the executive branch of the right of the Senate to advise and consent on Okinawa reversion—despite the Senate's expression on this matter.

Second, there are compelling military reasons against reversion before a reduction in military operations in the Far East is made, and political stability is restored.

Third, with the reversion of Okinawa, the Japanese should incur certain clear-cut responsibilities for the maintenance of mutually-supporting economic policies between the United States and Japan. To a great extent, the U.S. open-door trade policy and the continuing umbrellas of U.S. military protection contributed to Japan's amazing industrial recovery. Today, Japanese imports threaten portions of our economy, and the time has come to talk of mutually supporting trade policies as well as reversion of old territories.

Mr. President, let me comment on these disturbing aspects briefly.

With regard to the Senate's wish to advise and consent on reversion, this was made plain November 5, 1969, when the Senate approved, 63 to 14, the amendment of the distinguished senior Senator from Virginia (Mr. BYRD). This amendment read as follows:

It is the sense of the Senate that any agreement or understanding entered into by the President to change the status of any territory referred to in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, shall not take effect without the advice and consent of the Senate.

The strength of the vote supporting the Byrd amendment speaks for itself, but the point is driven home ever more firmly when one realizes that both the chairmen of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees supported the Byrd amendment, and of the membership from the two committees only five dissenting votes were cast.

With regard to military arguments against reversion, I cite our commitment to our allies in the Far East, and the safety of our forces in Vietnam, as being inconsistent with the relinquishment of our unrestricted use of Okinawa through reversion.

April 7, 1970

This opinion is greatly fortified by the presently deteriorating situation in Cambodia and Laos which could result not only in the removal of two neutralist governments but could further endanger our fighting men in South Vietnam.

While it is true the "specific arrangements" referred to by President Nixon and Mr. Sato in the communique on their meeting might soften the impact of reversion, Okinawa would nevertheless come under the 1960 Treaty of Security and Cooperation executed by the two nations at the close of the Eisenhower administration.

This means simply that the United States could not place nuclear weapons of any type on Okinawa, and would have to obtain permission of the Japanese Government before conducting combat operations from the island.

The 1960 Security Treaty, which now applies to our forces on Japan, contains this prior consultation clause. Its significance may be illustrated by the *Pueblo* incident in which immediate support from our military aircraft was required. Aircraft were launched from Okinawa to aid the *Pueblo* but it was nightfall before they reached the critical area. Before planes could have been launched from our bases in Japan, bases which were much closer to the location of the *Pueblo* prior consultation would have been required with the Japanese Government. Although Japan may well have approved such a request, the time lost in these procedures would have certainly been critical to the crew of the *Pueblo*.

Mr. President, we come to the third disturbing aspect of reversion—our trade with Japan and the necessity for mature, mutually supporting policies. How can we consider Japan as a partner of equal stature and responsibility in a territorial agreement when she refuses to negotiate an economical matter that is weakening both the economy and defense capability of the United States? The situation created by Japanese textile imports has reached critical proportions in the American textile industry, forcing me, last March 20, to introduce legislation to protect it.

I will discuss this aspect in more detail later.

Mr. President, in addition to the aspects of Okinawa reversion which I have just discussed, there are other important considerations. Not the least of these is the attitude of the American people as reflected in a poll by the Harris survey.

Following the announcement that reversion had been agreed to between President Nixon and Mr. Sato, the Harris survey took a poll and found 50 percent of the American people opposed reversion. Of the remaining 50 percent, some 26 percent favored return of Okinawa to Japan and 24 percent said they were not sure.

In this same poll, which was published throughout the Nation on December 22, 1969, those contacted were asked if they felt the United States should encourage or discourage Japan to have a greater role in the Pacific. Forty-two percent said they favored encouraging Japan to take a greater role and 31 percent said they should be discouraged. The remaining 21

percent were not sure how they would stand.

As I have indicated, Mr. President, the question of reversion of Okinawa is rather complex. We gained Okinawa under the Peace Treaty with Japan which was ratified by the Senate with a vote of 66 to 10 in 1952. While the Okinawa question stems from this treaty, reversion would put the island under the Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, which was signed in 1960.

The Okinawa issue is also tied to our treaty commitments in Southeast Asia, the political and economic atmosphere in Japan and other matters. At this time I would like to take a detailed look at these various subjects one by one. The order in which I discuss them follows:

First. Okinawa-United States involvement.

Second. U.S. treaty obligations.

Third. Military importance of Okinawa.

Fourth. 1960 Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan.

Fifth. United States-Japanese economic picture.

Sixth. Why reversion now?

Seventh. Crisis in Laos and Cambodia.

Eighth. Byrd amendment on Okinawa.

Ninth. Nixon-Sato agreement.

First, let us take a look at how and why this vast base was established in the Pacific by the United States.

1. OKINAWA-UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT

American involvement in Okinawa dates back to the Second World War when U.S. forces invaded and seized the island from the Japanese. Our landing was made on Easter Sunday, April 1, and in the next 3 months we lost 12,520 men and had 36,631 wounded. Although the Ryukyu Islands had been administered as an integral part of Japan since 1879, the United States, in planning for the post-war period, decided on separating them from Japanese jurisdiction, along with stripping Japan of most of its island possessions.

Language to this end was incorporated into the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945. The Big Three stated that Japanese sovereignty after the war would be limited to the four home islands "and such minor islands as we determine."

Subsequently, the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 divided Japan's island possessions into two distinct categories. Under article II, Japan renounced "all rights, title, and claim" to a number of islands and island groups, including Formosa and the Pescadores, the Kuriles—part of which Japan presently claims from the Soviet Union—Sakhalin, and the Central Pacific Islands held by Tokyo in prewar days under League of Nations mandate.

Article III dealt with the second category, which included the Ryukyus. It reads in full:

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansai Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of 30° north latitude (including the Bonin Islands, Roraro Island and the Volcano Islands) and Papeete Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the mak-

ing of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

In explaining the treaty to the delegates at the San Francisco conference, John Foster Dulles, the President's representative at the conference, described Japan's relationship to the Ryukyus as one of "residual sovereignty" and emphasized that article III conferred no obligation on the United States to have the islands placed under United Nations trusteeship.

Dulles took a further step in a letter to the Government of India of August 25, 1951. He not only asserted that the pact left the future of the Ryukyus to subsequent determination, but also omitted the word "residual" in describing the islands as remaining under Japanese sovereignty. In short, while giving Japan no specific commitment to return the Ryukyus, Dulles held out the possibility of reversion.

Throughout his 8 years in office, General Eisenhower followed this general line of policy. During this period Japan joined the United Nations and thus removed the trusteeship issue, since under the Charter of the United Nations, the world body cannot impose trusteeship on the territory of a member state. By this time Okinawa had become the largest U.S. military base complex in the Western Pacific, and the Eisenhower administration linked the future disposition of the Ryukyus to security considerations in East Asia.

While the United States-Japanese Security Treaty of 1960 avoided any specific commitment on Okinawa, it did reaffirm Japan's residual sovereignty over the Ryukyus. This was shortly followed by the first explicit statement of American intent to return administrative rights to Japan when President Kennedy declared on March 19, 1962:

I recognize the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and look forward to the day when the security interests of the free world will permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty.

President Johnson reaffirmed his predecessor's position in a joint communiqué issued with Prime Minister Sato on November 16, 1967, in which they stated the two governments should keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of return administrative rights over these islands to Japan and in the light of their discussions.

Although both men pledged eventual reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan, neither set a specific date. Moreover, they generally held to President Eisenhower's linkage of the islands' future with East Asian security.

2. U.S. TREATY OBLIGATIONS

Mr. President, the United States has extensive treaty obligations in the Far East. In the past I have called for a review of these obligations and this should be done before we implement steps such as the reversion of Okinawa.

I ask how can we fulfill our commitments in the Far East without the un-

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restricted use of Okinawa that we now enjoy? We have extensive commitments in this area beginning with the 11-nation Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and including the Australia-New Zealand-United States ANZUS Treaty, and the bilateral defense pacts with the Republic of China, 1954; South Korea, 1953; and the Philippines, 1951.

Many here in the Senate feel we are overcommitted in Southeast Asia and throughout the world. This is certainly a valid argument. President Nixon has called upon our Asian allies to bear a greater burden in the defense of that area, and this is a view in which I subscribe wholeheartedly. For too long we have borne the brunt of the burden of preserving the peace in Eastern Asia as testified by our losses in Korea and Vietnam.

The President is to be commended for directly calling upon our allies in that area to shoulder more of this burden, but I question seriously the weakening of our position in Okinawa until we see some demonstration of the willingness and the ability of our allies to assume this responsibility.

To carry out the commitments under these treaties we have stationed some 1 million men in this area; we have spilled the blood of our soldiers in Korea and now Vietnam, and we have spent billions of our Nation's dollars to support his effort. I do not believe this sacrifice has been in vain; nor do I wish to see it jeopardized by unwise steps.

Two of our strongest allies in the Far East, South Korea and Nationalist China, feel the unrestricted use of Okinawa is tied directly to their own national security. Prime Minister Sato recognized in the communique that the defense of these two countries was closely tied to that of Japan. He made some very clear statements in a speech before the National Press Club regarding the security of South Korea. Such a view is encouraging, but the full interpretation or implementation of these expressions is something else again.

It seems to me a review of our treaty obligations and possible adjustments should precede the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. I do not see how we can carry out our treaty obligations if Okinawa goes under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security which now covers mainland Japan. Military operations from Okinawa would be at the discretion of the Japanese Government. To allow such a situation now would be dangerous indeed.

To date our Government has not advocated the scrapping or changing of our commitments in Southeast Asia. Therefore, until something of this nature takes place, it would be sheer folly to place in jeopardy our use of Okinawa.

Oddly enough Japan itself would have a great deal to lose if the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia is weakened. This is used as an argument in favor of reversion. Fortunately, the present Prime Minister of Japan and the majority of the Members of the Japanese Diet recognize this fact, but what assurance do we have this government will continue to take such a stance?

Japan is a free nation with the right to determine its own course. That such is the case reflects credit upon the United States and its handling of this former enemy. The Sato government is strong today, more so than ever due to the reversion agreement. But who is to say what the future holds?

At present Japan depends upon the United States to guarantee its safety from external attack. This is a situation of our own making, one which deserves review prior to any major changes in U.S. posture in the Far East. While the Japanese are gradually assuming a greater defensive role, it is minimal compared to the burden borne by the American people. Japan is spending less than 1 percent of its gross national product on defense while the United States is spending from 7 to 8 percent of its gross national product for a defense which in part protects Japan.

3. MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF OKINAWA

The importance of Okinawa as a means to meet our treaty obligations in the Far East and in providing for the security of Hawaii and this country cannot be overemphasized.

Okinawa's strategic geographic location makes it virtually impossible to replace. It lies approximately 600 miles from Seoul, 800 miles southwest of Tokyo, 750 miles northeast of Manila, 325 miles from Taipei and 700 miles northeast of Hong Kong.

None of its functions—nearly staging base, logistics and administrative base, vital communications and surveillance link and visible indication of our power to deter—can be duplicated by relocation to other places in the Pacific. No other routing of communications in the Pacific will give us the reliability now achieved through Okinawa, nor can our readers provide proper warning from fallback positions. The critical reaction time, area of coverage, relative security, and present invulnerability to foreign political control can neither be matched nor duplicated by relocation to any other base or combination of bases in the Pacific.

This relatively small island has become the keystone of our Asian security system because of our willingness to make a multibillion-dollar investment in the more than 100 military facilities there. This willingness to make such a large investment was based upon the knowledge of continued unrestricted use of these facilities.

This country maintains what American military officials refer to as a \$1 billion complex on Okinawa. About 110 square miles—or 25 percent of the total land surface—have been appropriated for 120 bases on an island three-eighths the area of Rhode Island. Added to a population of 909,000 Okinawans are approximately 40,000 U.S. troops. The United States spends about \$250 million annually in Okinawa—in addition to official U.S. Government aid of about \$24 million.

This tiny island has played a significant role in the Vietnam war, serving as a transient point for Vietnam-bound troops and as a vast warehouse for Amer-

ican supplies and weaponry. Our B-52 bombers en route from Guam to Vietnam have been refueled by tankers from the Kadena Air Base; and in January 1968, following the *Pueblo* incident, the Air Force moved some of the B-52's from Guam to Okinawa. This cut their flight time to Vietnam in half, and the distance from 2,500 to 1,300 miles.

Okinawa also serves as a fueling and supply station for American activities in Asia, including combat operations in Vietnam. A counterterrorism warfare school, extensive warehouses and military hospitals and the computer center for Vietnam logistics are located on the island. The 5,620-acre Kadena Air Base is one of the largest Air Force installations in Asia and is able to handle an almost unlimited number of all types of U.S. planes. Special forces train for Vietnam in the Okinawan jungles; the Marines have a division headquarters; and the Navy operates several ports. Psychological warfare operations, radio monitoring, intelligence operations, Voice of America broadcast facilities to the Asian mainland—all are located on Okinawa.

Okinawa's military importance to the United States has been stressed by high military and civilian officials of the United States. The outgoing American commander of the island, Lt. Gen. F. T. Unger, said in Tokyo in January 1969:

Nowhere else in Asia does the United States have complete freedom to station, deploy and support balanced forces equipped with the full range of modern military resources. Only on Okinawa can we station any type of weapons or units. Only from Okinawa can we deploy forces to any threatened area in Asia. Only through Okinawa can we provide unrestricted logistical support to forces committed anywhere. These freedoms give our forces on Okinawa a flexibility and responsiveness unmatched anywhere in Asia.

The island's strategic value was also pointed up in a House Armed Services Committee report of September 1967:

First, and more important, Okinawa, the largest island, is by any measure our most important single military base in the Far East. Without it radical changes would have to be made in virtually every element of our military structure. Loss of it would induce a chain reaction which would affect not only every aspect of our defensive and offensive capability in the Pacific but would require major modifications in military establishments far removed from Okinawa and from the Pacific itself. Its importance to the United States from a military standpoint cannot be overemphasized.

The various alternatives to military basing in the Pacific are not appealing. Moving forward to Formosa or Korea would have political implications nearly as complicated as the subject of Okinawa reversion itself. Moreover, the stationing of strategic forces so close to a possible forward battle area is a distinct liability.

The extent to which the United States could fulfill its military commitments to Japan, Taiwan, Korea, the countries of the Southeast Asia Treaty, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand plus the protocol states of Laos and Vietnam after having been denied the use of bases

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on Okinawa is highly debatable, particularly if we must attempt to do so from a fallback position.

4. 1960 COOPERATION TREATY

In view of the recent developments concerning Okinawa and President Nixon's agreement to bring Okinawa under the 1960 Treaty of Cooperation and Security with Japan, it would be well to take a brief look at this treaty.

The United States and Japan concluded the Security Treaty of 1960 at the initiative of the Tokyo government. President Eisenhower had planned to visit Japan for the signing of the treaty but street demonstrators protesting its provisions prevented him from making this trip. Essentially the treaty strengthened the American commitment to defend Japan against external attack. The first paragraph of article V read:

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

While placing the U.S. commitment in firmer language, the new pact deemphasized Japan's "obligation" to refrain by referring to the two countries' constitutional provisions—meaning in effect, article IX, of the Japanese Constitution. Article III of the Security Treaty stated:

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

The 1960 Security Treaty also strengthened the prior consultation clause. Article IV declared:

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

Further, this country gave a specific pledge on prior consultation through an exchange of notes between Premier Kishi and Secretary of State Christian Herter:

Major changes in the deployment into Japan of the United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultations with the Government of Japan.

Thus, with this brief examination of the 1960 treaty we can get an idea as to what would be involved when it applied to Okinawa.

At this point I wish to inject that on June 23 of this year the 10-year period of the treaty expires.

At present it appears to be the desire of both countries to allow the treaty to continue in its present form, but if allowed to do so it would be subject to termination by either side in a 12-month period.

5. UNITED STATES-JAPAN ECONOMIC PICTURE

Mr. President, in this country we are in a period of close examination of our world commitments and the necessary

costs to fulfill them. This issue relates directly to the economic health of the United States and is even more critical in that we are suffering from inflation as a result of policies during the past decade.

In some measure the high defense costs we have been paying have resulted from the heavy burdens we have assumed in the Far East in an effort to preserve the rights of the people in that area to a free choice of their government. The action of the North Vietnamese is aiding the Vietcong to overthrow the government in South Vietnam, and the dispatch of their own troops into South Vietnam, has been the chief cause of the huge costs we have borne in recent years.

However, the American people have also paid a high price to insure the safety of Japan, a strong and valued ally. We have provided the Japanese with a U.S. nuclear umbrella in an area where force of arms seems to be the chief instrument of national policy.

The result of this effort has been a straining American economy while Japan has been free to accelerate its industrial growth with little requirements for providing for its own defense. This is amply illustrated by Japan's expenditure of \$1.3 billion for defense in fiscal year 1969 and \$1.5 billion in fiscal year 1970. This amounts to .84 percent of Japan's gross national product in 1969 and even less in 1970, when the Japanese defense expenditure fell to .78 percent of their gross national product. In fiscal year 1969 the United States spent 8.7 percent of its gross national product for defense and in fiscal year 1970 spent 8 percent. For fiscal year 1971 it is estimated the United States will spend 7 percent.

As the Okinawa question is discussed in this country, people are quite properly asking the question as to why we should be giving up our unrestricted use of Okinawa to Japan while at the same time guaranteeing the safety of Japan and our other allies in the Far East.

Japan is certainly in a strong economic position as evidenced by the growth of its gross national product from \$24 billion in 1955 to an estimated \$200 billion this year. Their growth rate over the past 10 years has averaged 12 percent as against 4 percent in this country. This tremendous growth has resulted in part from restrictive trade policies through which Japan prevents many imports from coming into their nation while at the same time they are flooding U.S. and world markets with goods of all types.

In just the past 10 years their exports have risen from \$3.5 billion in 1959 to \$15.7 billion in 1969. Of this amount the United States allowed \$4.9 billion of Japanese exports to come into this country in calendar year 1969, resulting in a trade deficit with Japan of \$1.4 billion. This trade deficit was especially harmful in view of our Nation's already critical balance-of-payments problems.

While the United States-Japanese trade question is a subject of great complexity and too involved to address at length here, there is no doubt present

conditions favor Japan. This situation is not in the best interests of the economic health of the United States, and is even more unrealistic when you weigh it against the fact we are guaranteeing Japan's defense and thereby strengthening their hand in the area of trade between the two countries.

Especially hard hit by this trade situation is the U.S. textile industry. In my State of South Carolina alone, thousands of workers have been laid off in recent years as the direct result of flooding of this country with low-wage Japanese textile imports. This crisis has accelerated in the past 6 months.

Other industries in this country have similar problems and the best efforts of the Nixon administration to bring about corrective action have failed.

Last month I introduced legislation to correct this situation as it applies to textiles, and in my opinion the Congress will act soon to apply controls which will liquidate this unfavorable trade problem.

6. WHY REVERSION NOW?

One might ask why the question of reversion of Okinawa to Japan has evolved at this point in time. The answer may be found in the political situation in Japan, where some opponents of the Sato government have continually taken an anti-American stance and have used Okinawa and American bases in Japan proper as the cutting edge for their attacks.

These forces, largely nationalist but fomented in part by a small but militant Communist Party, rioted in 1960 when the Eisenhower administration was negotiating the present security treaty. They opposed the treaty and succeeded in forcing President Eisenhower to abandon his plans to visit Japan in 1960 for the actual signing.

The treaty reflected Japan's lack of interest in rearming and thus showed the continued strength of postwar pacifist feelings among the Japanese people. While leftist, ideologically tinted thinking—as embodied in the Japan Socialist Party, labor unions, and student and intellectual groups—strongly opposed the 1960 treaty, the pact actually reaffirmed Japan's noninvolvement in the cold war in Asia, even if it did not veer the country directly toward a neutralist or pro-Communist foreign policy as advocated by these groups.

Since that time the Socialist Party has continued pressure on the government to demand reversion of Okinawa and reduce American military bases and personnel on the main island.

This situation found its genesis after World War II. As a result of American occupation following the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese people adopted an attitude of pacifism. To some degree this resulted from the American policy of demobilization and democratization in the early stages of the occupation.

Opposition to nuclear weapons became an important element in Japanese pacifism, and every government since World War II has upheld three nonnuclear principles: Nonproduction, nonpossession, and no storing of atomic weapons

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on Japanese soil. This principle is now being applied to Okinawa in keeping with the agreement between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato.

Interacting with the force of pacifism is leftist opinion. The rigidly Marxist-oriented Japan Socialist Party has consistently received around one-third of the vote in national elections. The base of Socialist Party strength rests in the trade union movement and among intellectual and student groups. Neither its foreign policy positions nor its hardcore backing has changed significantly since its formation in 1955. The Socialists picture America's containment policy, including the Vietnam war, as aggressive and provocative toward Communist China and other Asian Communist states. Leftist propaganda portrayed the U.S. air campaign against North Vietnam as the white man's aggression against Asians. They argue that Japan can best avoid war by abrogating the United States-Japanese Security Treaty and by demanding that the United States dismantle its bases in Japan. The Socialists have consistently opposed proposals that Japan rearm, fearing that as a course would tighten bonds with Washington.

The Socialists have repeatedly attacked the existence of the Japanese self-defense forces as being in violation of article IX of their Constitution and accuse the ruling Liberal Democrats of attempting to drag Japan into a war through remilitarization.

Added to the leftist forces has been the reemergence of national self-confidence in Japan in the form of a new nationalism. This has meshed with those other forces that wish to limit the country's association with the United States. This new nationalism looks toward a reassertion of Japan's role in Asia but not necessarily in full conjunction with American policy. It can be seen in the rising demand among all political factions for the return of Okinawa to Japan. This nationalism, however, is also changing Japanese public opinion in that they are now more inclined to support a larger self-defense force. Further, recent polls reveal that between 20 and 40 percent of the Japanese people favor acquiring nuclear weapons for their own defense.

The leftist element in Japan has continued to pressure the Japanese Government to pressure the Japanese Government on the Okinawa issue and the Security Treaty. Besides the close ethnic and cultural ties with Okinawa, the Japanese have gradually increased their demands for reversion until in 1968 Prime Minister Sato said reversion could no longer be delayed.

About this time the Japanese Government issued the results of a nationwide poll showing 80 percent of the Japanese people favored reversion as soon as possible and they claimed a similar consensus among the people on Okinawa. Thus reversion became a big political issue and Sato's ability to accomplish it was seen as a key if he was to be assured of success in the elections of 1969. This pressure was further accelerated by riots from leftist groups in early 1969.

The Nixon administration apparently saw reversion as compatible with our mutual defense and treaty obligations in the Far East. President Nixon also placed great importance on strengthening the friendly Sato government which it was felt would face other important issues of U.S. interest in the early 1970's.

Thus, the approval in principle of reversion for Okinawa was reached in the Nixon-Sato talks in November of 1969, and Sato's Liberal Democratic Party was returned to power in December of last year for a 4-year period, by an even greater vote than in previous elections.

7. CRISIS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA

Mr. President, the critical nature of the Okinawa issue has been drawn into sharper focus in the past few weeks because of the deteriorating situation in the part of the world.

Our commitment in Vietnam and Korea alone should be sufficient to require continued unrestricted use of Okinawa but now we are confronted with a rapidly changing situation in Cambodia and Laos.

The crisis in Cambodia and Laos today was not present when President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato met and issued their communique last November. If the crisis in these two countries had taken place last October, I do not see how the United States could have agreed to reversion of Okinawa in November.

In Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk was deposed last month, and North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops have attacked Cambodian border outposts and generally threatened the security of the new leaders.

The new government in Cambodia, which has declared itself as a neutral, has been forced to enlist many of its young men from colleges into hastily formed military units in order to assure its defense. The Cambodian leaders have also stated that if the military situation continues to deteriorate they would be compelled to request weapons and equipment from friendly countries. At the same time, they have ruled out the use of foreign troops to fight the Communists in Cambodia.

In Laos, North Vietnamese troops have pushed across the Plain of Jars once again and the neutralist government is in a difficult situation. Some U.S. supplies and equipment, as well as air support, have been given to the Government of Laos at their request.

The United States has no legal obligation to send troops into either Laos or Cambodia, and both Governments have indicated they wish to handle the crisis without such help.

However, should either country fall to the North Vietnamese forces, the U.S. position in Vietnam would be much more difficult. While it is hoped the situation will develop in such a way that the neutralist governments of both countries can be maintained, we must be prepared to take steps to protect U.S. forces in Vietnam in the event that they are threatened by developments in Cambodia or Laos.

In such a circumstance our unrestricted use of Okinawa would be necessary

for the safety of our fightingmen in the Far East.

8. BYRD AMENDMENT ON OKINAWA

Mr. President, last November the distinguished senior Senator from Virginia (Mr. Byrd) introduced an important amendment to H.R. 12964, which read as follows:

It is the sense of the Congress that the President shall not enter into any agreement or understanding, the effect of which would change the status of any territory referred to in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, without the advice and consent of the Senate.

The purpose of this amendment was to insure the U.S. Senate had the opportunity to consider any change to this treaty which it ratified in 1952.

Senator Byrd stated:

If the Senate is to fulfill its Constitutional responsibility in the field of foreign policy, it must make clear that any change in the Treaty of Peace with Japan must be ratified by the Senate.

During the discussion of this amendment, I had the opportunity to speak in its support, and I was pleased that the Senate agreed with the Byrd amendment, and passed it by a vote of 63 to 14.

The feeling in the Senate was clear that the issue of Okinawa was not solely an executive decision. Unfortunately, President Johnson in 1968 returned the Bonin Islands to Japan without consulting with the Senate, although they were secured under the same article as was Okinawa.

The Byrd amendment passed just prior to Prime Minister Sato's visit last year. Its passage was properly recognized in the communique issued by the two leaders.

This recognition was evidenced in a sentence of the communique which followed the agreement to immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa. Quoting directly from the communique, it read as follows:

They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972, subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support.

Senator Byrd felt this part of the communique adequately recognized the Senate's role in the matter, and that any specific arrangements reached in the discussions and the revision itself would come before the Senate for approval or disapproval.

However, my distinguished colleague from South Carolina (Mr. Hollings) did not feel this language was clear enough so he wrote President Nixon on November 25, 1969, asking for clarification.

In his reply on January 9, 1970 President Nixon stated:

Let me assure you that the Executive Branch will continue to maintain close contact with the Legislative Branch in order to work out mutually satisfactory arrangements for handling the problem of Okinawa reversion, including the appropriate form of Congressional participation in this matter.

Mr. President, I am encouraged on this point by the views of Senator Byrd, and

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I also find reason for encouragement in the correspondence from the President to Senator HOLLINGS, particularly since it came in January of this year.

This point is important, because in a press briefing by a high State Department official following the issuance of the communique last November, this official stated the Department had not yet taken a position on what they would consider necessary legislative support. This remains true today.

The official said other possibilities besides ratification by the Senate were present and he mentioned specifically a joint resolution.

He further stated the issue would not really be faced until the specific arrangements called for in the agreement were completed. He pointed out negotiations of these arrangements would be long and detailed, and under the best of circumstances he did not foresee their end until the middle of 1977 at the earliest.

Mr. President, it should be noted that these remarks were made prior to the letter of January 9, 1970, to Senator HOLLINGS. It also should be noted that they were made by a high official of the same State Department that told President Johnson he did not have to seek the advice and consent of the Senate when he returned the Bonin Islands to Japan in 1968.

The situation is somewhat different now, in that we have the presence of a strong expression by the Senate on this matter, and recognition of that expression in the communique. However, it should be noted that neither the communique nor the letter from President Nixon referred specifically to seeking the advice and consent of the Senate.

9. NIXON-SATO AGREEMENT

Mr. President, that brings us up to the agreement between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato last November. The Nixon-Sato communique was issued here in Washington on November 21, 1969.

The key points in the communique as it applies to Okinawa may be found in points 4 through 11. It would be useful at this time to briefly examine the content of these paragraphs in the communique.

An examination will show that items 4, 5, and 6 are most important to an understanding of the meaning of the communique.

In item 4 both Governments recognized the importance of the security of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China to the security of their own nations. Prime Minister Sato seeing the security of South Korea as "essential" to Japan's own security. This statement was most significant and was further strengthened in a speech by Mr. Sato before the National Press Club. In this speech he said the importance of Korea to the security of Japan would dictate a positive reply from Japan under any prior consultation clause between the United States and Japan, should Korea be attacked.

Further in item 4, President Nixon spoke of the earnest efforts of this country to secure a just peace in Vietnam and both expressed the hope the war would be concluded before reversion. In the

event the war was not concluded by 1972, then the two leaders agreed their Governments would "fully consult with each other in the light of the situation at that time so that reversion could be accomplished without affecting the U.S. efforts to assure the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without outside interference."

Mr. Sato also stated in this section that the Japanese people were exploring ways in which they could play some role toward bringing stability to the Indochina area.

Mr. President, item 4 of this agreement is quite important, for it provides consultation on our use of Okinawa as it relates to Vietnam prior—and I emphasize prior—to reversion. This could be critical to our ability to meet our obligations in this area if the war in Vietnam is still in an active phase. Unfortunately, the fulfillment of our other treaty commitments in the Far East are not given similar importance.

In paragraph 5 of the communique, we find another important element of the agreement. This is the expression on the part of both powers that the Security Treaty of 1960 be continued in effect. It should be noted that this is the first formal reaffirmation by both Governments of their intention to continue the 1960 treaty indefinitely. Without such an agreement, reversion of Okinawa would be out of the question. However, it should be recognized, under the extension, that either Government can withdraw from the treaty on 12 months' notice, as is the case with most of our other treaties.

Thus, we are faced with the possibility that a change in the political situation in Japan could result in the renunciation of the 1960 Security Treaty and thereby seriously affect our position on Okinawa. This risk must be weighed against our refusal to grant reversion and the subsequent weakening of relations with an important ally such as Japan.

In item 6, the President and Sato agreed that the mutual security interests of the two countries could be accommodated within the arrangements for the return of Okinawa to Japan. In this connection, they agreed to begin immediate talks regarding specific arrangements for the early reversion of Okinawa to Japan, with a view of completing the accomplishment of this goal during 1972.

It was further agreed, in item 6, that Japan would gradually assume the responsibility for the defense of Okinawa but that the United States would retain, under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required for the mutual security of both countries.

Perhaps the key point in item 6 is the specific recognition of the importance of U.S. bases and personnel in Okinawa and their direct relationship to the security of ourselves and our allies in the Far East. In the middle of this paragraph is the point Senator BYRD referred to on November 25, 1969. This point is that the communique provides that the two gov-

ernments will enter into consultations regarding the specific arrangements before the reversion date. This is followed by a very important statement that the reversion target date would be 1972, and, "Is subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with legislative support."

The extent of the entire agreement was tightly drawn in item 7 in which the United States agreed that, upon the return of the administrative rights, "the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification thereof." Later in this item, Mr. Sato did state that in this connection it was agreed that the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without peace in the Far East. He said further, in view of this point, the return of administrative rights to Japan "should not hinder the effective discharge of international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East, including Japan."

In item 8, Mr. Sato described the sentiment in Japan against nuclear weapons; and President Nixon stated:

Without prejudice to the position of the United States government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

In item 9, the two leaders took cognizance of the financial and economic problems involving American businesses in Okinawa which would result from reversion, and decided to conduct detailed discussions toward their resolution.

In items 10 and 11, President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato outlined their plans for implementing this agreement and expressed their belief that it will further strengthen the friendship and security of both countries.

Of course, the key section of the agreement is item 6, in which the agreement is made to bring about reversion. This part of the agreement also alludes to the "necessary legislative support" for reversion.

In summary, the agreement lays the groundwork for reversion of Okinawa to Japan in the form of granting administrative rights to the Japanese; provides that any nuclear weapons on Okinawa would be removed prior to 1972; allows that Okinawa would come under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security which now governs our military relationship with the main islands of Japan; provides for the continuation of American bases in Okinawa in that they assure the defense of both countries; announces the intention of both governments to continue the 1960 Security Treaty; and grants prior consultation with Japan regarding the use of any such bases in combat operations throughout the Far East.

The latter point is covered in the section of the agreement which states Okinawa would come under the Cooperation Treaty which now deals only with Japan. Under this treaty, the United States agrees to prior consultation before conducting any U.S. combat operations from

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mainland Japan or any significant build-up of weapons at our bases on mainland Japan.

At present the United States has unrestricted use of Okinawa, but after reversion this would not be the case, as the Cooperation Treaty would apply and we would be faced with the same restrictions we now operate under on the main island of Japan. U.S. military men have found these conditions restrictive in Japan.

At this point it may be well to state that both Governments agree that prior consultation means that the agreement of the Japanese is necessary for combat operations, but the Japanese reserve the right to say yes or no after such consultation.

It should be noted that both leaders expressed the hope that some of the problems present today may not be with us in 1972 when the reversion agreement is executed. This is a hope in which we all would share, but on which we cannot plan our national security. In conclusion, Mr. President, last year, prior to the Nixon-Sato talks, Secretary of State Rogers visited Japan and conferred with the Prime Minister. He urged Mr. Sato to pay more attention to Japan's military responsibility, but the Japanese Prime Minister made it clear that he was still looking to this country to guarantee the safety of Japan and Okinawa.

In view of our military commitments in Southeast Asia and the other issues I have discussed here today, and especially the worsening situation in Laos and Cambodia, it does not seem wise from a military view for the United States to agree to reversion of Okinawa now or in the near future. In my opinion, this is the feeling of a number of the Members of the Senate. It is certainly the majority opinion among the American public.

Three things could take place which would ease my concern in this matter.

First, a clear declaration from the Nixon administration that it would seek the "advice and consent" of the Senate on the question of reversion, and not just legislative support or a resolution. This would certainly be in keeping with President Nixon's often expressed desire to consult with the Congress on matters of such importance.

Second, a significant improvement in the political stability of the Far East, together with a reduction in military operations there. This would mitigate some of the compelling military arguments against early reversion.

And third, the Japanese would adopt more amenable and mutually supporting trade policies with the United States. This could ameliorate the threatened disintegration of the U.S. textile industry, which obviously will weaken our economy.

Barring the realization of these three developments, which I have just described, the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 is, in my judgment, not in the best interests of the United States.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia, Mr. President, will the Senator from South Carolina yield?

Mr. THURMOND. I am happy to yield to the the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia, Mr. President, I have been tremendously interested in the very able address just made by the distinguished senior Senator from South Carolina (Mr. THURMOND).

I know that a great deal of hard work went into this matter. It seems to me that the distinguished Senator has rendered a splendid service in calling the attention of the Senate and the Nation to the vital problems involved in regard to our greatest military base complex in the far Pacific; namely, Okinawa.

I associate myself with the belief and the feeling of the distinguished Senator from South Carolina that a substantial number of Members of the Senate are deeply concerned about this matter. As a matter of fact, I have been surprised, in private conversations, that certain Senators have expressed a keen interest in the fact that Okinawa should not revert to the Japanese as long as we have the great commitments we have in the far Pacific.

The distinguished Senator from South Carolina points out that, in his judgment, probably a large majority of the American people would not favor giving up the unrestricted right of this country to use Okinawa as we think best, as long as we have such heavy commitments.

In my judgment, the Senator from South Carolina is on sound ground in that assumption.

I spoke last night to a large audience in the western part of Virginia and I mentioned the subject of Okinawa. As I go about Virginia discussing the great matters which affect our Nation, I find great interest in Okinawa.

I want to say, just as the distinguished Senator from South Carolina has said, that it seems to me to be very important—I repeat, very important—that any agreements which are made by our Nation with Japan affecting the treaty of peace, which was ratified by the Senate, or any change in its status, must come back to the Senate for approval or disapproval.

The Senate itself is on record by an overwhelming vote on the adoption of a sense-of-the-Senate resolution last November to this effect.

I was very much encouraged by the communique issued by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato. I was further encouraged, as the Senator from South Carolina pointed out in his address, by the correspondence between the junior Senator from South Carolina (Mr. HOLLINGS) and President Nixon.

I believe that the administration will submit to the Senate, for approval or disapproval, any change in the treaty of peace with Japan. To do otherwise would run directly counter to the expressed will of the Senate, which is a partner with the President in establishing foreign policy.

I think it would be helpful, as the distinguished and able Senator from South Carolina pointed out in his magnificent address, if the Government would take the three steps which he recommends, first, a clear declaration from the Nixon administration that it would seek the advice and consent of the Senate on the

question of reversion. I think it would be well if that were done. I have faith, however, that the administration plans to do that.

I think that the communique between our Government and the Japanese Government involving Premier Sato's visit clearly indicates this. But I think it would be well, as the distinguished Senator from South Carolina suggests, that that should be made even clearer.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). The time of the Senator from South Carolina has expired.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 3 additional minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. If we are going to guarantee the freedom of Japan, of the Philippines, of all the SEATO nations, and Australia and New Zealand, if we are going to do that, then it seems only logical that we must retain the unrestricted right to our greatest military base, which is Okinawa.

Thus, I am very much pleased to be in the Chamber today and to associate myself with the distinguished Senator from South Carolina who has taken such a keen interest in this problem and who has done so much to focus attention on the importance of Okinawa.

Mr. President, I believe that as more of the American people know the subject, the more they ponder and consider it, the more firmly will they hold to the belief that there should be no change in the status of Okinawa until the Senate has had an opportunity fully to explore any suggested change and approve or disapprove.

Once more, I commend and associate myself with the distinguished and able Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wish to thank the distinguished Senator from Virginia for his remarks.

The able Senator from Virginia has given a great deal of thought and study to this subject. He is one of the best informed men in this country on this particular topic.

As a member of the Armed Services Committee, he has had an opportunity to go into this matter from a military standpoint and from the standpoint of the security of the country.

What he says on this subject should be given close attention not only by the Senate but also by the American people.

I might say again that the poll I was referring to showed that 50 percent of the American people oppose—I repeat, oppose—returning Okinawa to Japan. Only 26 percent favor returning Okinawa, and the other 24 percent are uncommitted or undecided.

I think this clearly reveals how the American people feel on this subject.

It is my sincere hope that the administration will follow the steps I have outlined in this address. I fear it would be nothing less than a calamity to see Okinawa returned without following the proper procedures.

Again I wish to commend the able Senator from Virginia for his pertinent and significant remarks.

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Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following three articles be placed in the Record following these remarks: First, the Harris survey which appeared in the Washington Post on December 22, 1969; second, an article entitled "Japan's Drive To Outstrip United States," which appeared in the March 1970 issue of the U.S. News & World Report; and third, the joint communiqué between President Richard Nixon and His Excellency Prime Minister Sato of Japan, of November 21, 1969.

There being no objection the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Dec. 22, 1970]
THE HARRIS SURVEY: 50 PERCENT DISLIKE U.S. RETURN OF OKINAWA
(By Louis Harris)

Despite the fact that agreement has been reached in principle between President Nixon and Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato, the American people are opposed to the United States giving Okinawa back to Japan by a margin of 50 to 26 per cent.

Originally Japanese territory, Okinawa was taken over by the United States after World War II and since then has been used by this country as a major Pacific military installation.

A cross-section of 1,798 people was recently asked:

"Do you feel that the United States should give Okinawa back to the Japanese or not?"

RETURNING OKINAWA TO JAPAN

(In percent)

	Give back	Don't do it	Not sure
Nationwide.....	26	50	24
By Region:			
East.....	27	43	30
Midwest.....	45	37	18
South.....	19	55	26
West.....	34	51	15
By Education:			
8th grade or less.....	16	50	34
High School.....	22	55	23
College.....	40	41	19

The public was also asked:
"Do you feel that the United States should encourage or discourage Japan to have a greater role in the Pacific?"

GREATER ROLE FOR JAPAN IN PACIFIC

(In percent)

	Encourage	Discourage	Not sure
Nationwide.....	42	37	21
By region:			
East.....	44	31	25
Midwest.....	45	37	18
South.....	31	46	23
West.....	54	34	12
By Education:			
8th grade or less.....	25	48	27
High School.....	30	40	30
College.....	61	25	14
By Race:			
White.....	44	37	19
Black.....	28	40	32

These results clearly indicate that not only are there many lingering doubts in this country about seeing Japan grow in power in the Pacific, but that some extensive public education will have to take place before the American people view with favor the return of Okinawa to the Japanese.

[From the U.S. News & World Report, Apr. 6, 1970]

JAPAN'S DRIVE TO OUTSTRIP UNITED STATES
Tokyo—Japan, adding more and more muscle to its economic miracle, is convinced that it can and will replace the U.S. as the richest nation in the world.

From the defeat and devastation of World War II, this island realm of 103 million people has climbed to third place among industrial powers, outranked only by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and is driving boldly and confidently ahead.

Japanese ambitions are unconcealed. The energetic islanders are clearly determined to be Number One. Many Japanese leaders believe that the goal can be reached in this century.

"Within 30 years," says one economic prophet, "Japan will not only have overtaken Russia but the U.S. as well."

Others, more cautious, say that it may take 50 years. But among experts—in both Asia and the West—there is agreement that Japanese competition confronts the U.S. with the toughest challenge it has ever had.

The charts on these pages show the phenomenal growth and global scope of Japan's booming economy.

Sales territory: the world. On every continent, evidence of Japanese achievement is dramatic. In America, such products as Sony and Panasonic television sets and radios, Honda motorcycles, Toyota and Datsun autos are becoming commonplace. Young Australians, aware of their country's significant trade ties with Japan, are learning Japanese. West Germans are buying Japan's cameras. In places as far apart as Afghanistan and Bolivia, rugged Japanese trucks outsell the competition.

Japanese salesmen, tireless and aggressive, are working the whole world, from Sverdlovsk to San Francisco.

Consider this: Japan's annual output is nearly triple that of all Africa, one and a half times that of Latin America, greater than that of all the rest of Asia, excluding China.

For the future—Japanese growth projections are impressive.

Total economic output this year is expected to reach about 200 billion dollars. This is about one fifth of the U.S. level. But Japan's growth rate over the last 10 years has averaged about three times that of the U.S.—12 per cent annually vs. 4 per cent, in real terms. If Japan can maintain this rate, its output is expected almost to double in the next five years and nearly to quadruple in 12 years.

As Japan consolidates its position as an economic superpower, predictions are heard that it will surpass the U.S. not only industrially but in standard of living.

Among indicators of Japan's great industrial strides are these:

For 14 years, the Japanese have led the world in shipbuilding. Nearly half of all new tonnage in 1969 was launched in Japanese shipyards.

In the last decade, Japanese automobile production has jumped from seventh to third place in the world.

Some steelmakers here believe that Japan's output could hit 160 million tons in 1975, surpassing both the U.S. and Russia.

The Japanese now use more computers than any other country except the U.S. and West Germany. By 1985, planners say, Japan will be using as many computers per capita as the U.S.

The good life gets better. The tremendous economic thrust already is producing unprecedented prosperity.

Many Japanese consumers no longer are content with what they once regarded as status symbols—cars, color TV, air conditioners. The desire now is for such things as electronic ovens, central heating and weekend cottages.

Japanese are spending as never before on travel and recreation. Guam and Hawaii are becoming favorite destinations for honeymoon couples and vacationing businessmen. Golf clubs have long waiting lists for membership. Sports centers—from bowling alleys to ski resorts—are jammed. Even private flying clubs are becoming popular.

Japan has not been altogether transformed, of course. Substandard housing, inadequate sewage disposal, bad roads are just a few of the problems. Under the system of national priorities, these have had to wait. Industry came first. Now, however, social-investment needs are commanding attention as national wealth increases.

Japan's "economic miracle"—15 years of explosive growth—and more to come
[Total spending in Japan—gross national product—in billions of dollars]

1955.....	24
1963.....	68
1970 (est.).....	200
1975 (est.).....	375

Westerners often ask how the Japanese have managed to come so far so fast.

Many factors are involved. One misconception is that cheap labor is the key to Japan's industrial success. The fact is that labor costs are lower in many other parts of Asia. Those other Asian countries—whose supplies of raw materials exceed those of Japan—have not come close to matching Japanese development.

While Japanese pay scales are generally lower than in the West, they are at European levels in such fast-growing categories as steel and machinery.

Among elements of Japan's success are freedom from heavy expenditures for defense—because the U.S. provides Japan's outer defense perimeter; a skillful, disciplined force, and an ability to adapt the best in borrowed technology. But there is another, major element, rarely mentioned by the Japanese themselves. That is the national "team spirit" which overrides dividing lines among Government, business and labor.

Unique motivation. A U.S. businessman who knows Japan well explains that spirit this way:

"At home, Japanese compete keenly against each other. But abroad, they all appear to be on the same team. They are bold and confident because they know that not only their own company but all Japanese firms and banks and Government officials will stand behind their deal."

"All Japanese work first and foremost for the 'national family'—the 'Rising Sun family.' That's not true of the Americans, the British, the West Germans and others. Consequently, a Japanese company is more competitive than its foreign rivals, no matter how big they are."

Japan's team spirit is seen in the operations of the country's giant conglomerate.

These huge financial combines, so carefully pulled apart by the conquerors during the U.S. occupation just after the war, have been carefully reassembled and are stronger than ever. Ways in which they use their strength amplify Japan's economic punch.

Search for raw materials. It is standard procedure, for example, for conglomerates to organize special task forces to comb the world for raw materials that Japan needs. Right now, 28 of these forces are developing

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sources of petroleum, copper, nickel, uranium and aluminum.

Until recently, foreign capital was the mainspring of Japanese expansion. It still is important. But in 1969, Japan turned a corner and became a net capital exporter.

The nation's investment abroad now amounts to about 2 billion dollars. It is expected to soar to 10 billion by 1980.

Moving into Australia. A good example of Japanese methods in the drive for economic aggrandizement is seen in Australia.

Advance groups of Japan's economic warriors arrived "down under" less than 10 years ago. They had no ready cash. But they did have industrial facilities at home in need of raw materials, markets to be filled—and long-term purchasing contracts in hand. Says a top Australian executive:

"We could take those contracts to any banker in the world and get the money we needed to dig our minerals out of the ground. The more the Japanese contracted for, the more we found. And the more we found, the more they bought."

Japanese commitments to buy Australian iron ore, bauxite and coal over the next 15 years now add up to 2.5 billion dollars, and new deals are still being made. In addition, Japan has become the main buyer of Australian wool and has moved ahead of Britain to become second only to the U.S. as a supplier of Australia's imports.

Some comments by Australians on what they regard as the economic "battle of the century" between Japan and the U.S.:

A mining man: "Do Americans really know they are getting into the toughest competition they've ever had?"

Another mining expert:

"Most American steel companies seem slow to understand that the huge ore bodies and coal fields we have found here have changed the industrial geopolitics of the world. The Japanese understand it."

From still another Australian: "Instead of messing around with low-grade ore carried long distances by slow trains to antiquated inland mills, the Japanese are taking our high-grade ore to ultramodern plants situated on the deep-water highroads of the world."

An economist:

"The Japanese started with small ore carriers, soon shifted to 70,000-ton ships, now use 100,000-tonners and are urging us to prepare for 300,000-ton vessels. Using methods like this, they can undersell American steel everywhere in the world, including the United States."

FIRM CONTROLS

Government control over the economy is a key element in the Japanese success story. Thus, "sunset" industries such as cotton textiles and soap get minimum attention from Government planners. Instead, new investment is poured into "sunrise" industries—those with the greatest growth potential.

Under this system, growth rates of 30 per cent or more in each of the past five years have been racked up in production of cars, trucks, color-TV sets, synthetic rubber, and several chemicals. The "sunrise" industries of the '70s include computers, aircraft, electronic goods, and products related to housing, nuclear power, and oceanography.

An Australian businessman asserts:

"The Japanese are running rings around the Americans in steel, aluminum and electronics. They will soon be doing the same thing in control systems, major industrial equipment, even computers."

Japan's economic growth rate is now at least double that of any other advanced nation. For the past 15 years, its trade has been expanding at twice the world rate.

Some warnings. Can that pace be maintained? Economists here point to some possible roadblocks. For example—

Japan's ambitious targets may be unacceptable to trading partners who are increasingly concerned about deficits in their trade with Japan. Also, there is grumbling about Japanese competitive practices and about Japan's calls for free trade everywhere while it is acting very slowly to lower its own barriers.

A dispute over exports of Japanese woollens and synthetic textiles threatens to result in U.S. protectionist retaliation. A trade war involving the U.S. would be extremely damaging to Japan. The American market absorbs 30 per cent of Japanese exports.

Asian nations are increasingly resentful of what they see as a determination by Tokyo to have them remain primarily suppliers of raw materials and markets for Japanese finished goods. The influential Tokyo newspaper "Yomiuri" warns:

"Japan cannot hope to live down its reputation as an economic animal unless she corrects her excessively commercial attitude toward Asian nations."

Danger in nationalism? Another thing that worries some Japanese is the possible effect of the accelerated rise in nationalism on the country's future.

Defense forces are getting more attention. The munitions industry is reviving again. Some observers believe that Japan's acquisition of nuclear arms is just a matter of time. The fear of some Asian countries that Japan may dominate them militarily as well as economically contributes to doubts about the durability of friendly ties. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, has said, "In the '70s, I think Japan would be more of a vexing problem than Communist China."

In Japan, much is made of this 2,000-year-old nation's "racial purity" and of the need for national unity to cope with a hostile world. This alarms some outsiders. But Japanese at home believe the alarm is exaggerated or groundless and that Japan's growth and influence as an industrial and financial—not military—power will go forward unchecked.

Whatever happens in the future, Japan has shown that its economic system is not only efficient but dynamic and aggressive, geared to goals of higher and higher productivity.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON AND HIS EXCELLENCY PRIME MINISTER SATO OF JAPAN

1. President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato met in Washington on November 19, 20 and 21, 1969, to exchange views on the present international situation and on other matters of mutual interest to the United States and Japan.

2. The President and the Prime Minister recognized that both the United States and Japan have greatly benefited from their close association in a variety of fields, and they declared that, guided by their common principles of democracy and liberty, the two countries would maintain and strengthen their fruitful cooperation in the continuing search for world peace and prosperity and in particular for the relaxation of international tensions. The President expressed his and his government's deep interest in Asia and stated his belief that the United States and Japan should cooperate in contributing to the peace and prosperity of the region. The Prime Minister stated that Japan would make further active contributions to the peace and prosperity of Asia.

3. The President and the Prime Minister exchanged frank views on the current international situation, with particular attention to developments in the Far East. The President, while emphasizing that the countries in the area were expected to make their own efforts for the stability of the area, gave assurance that the United States would continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far

East by honoring its defense treaty obligations in the area. The Prime Minister, appreciating the determination of the United States, stressed that it was important for the peace and security of the Far East that the United States should be in a position to carry out fully its obligations referred to by the President. He further expressed his recognition that, in the light of the present situation, the presence of United States forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area.

4. The President and the Prime Minister specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean peninsula. The Prime Minister deeply appreciated the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The President and the Prime Minister shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations. The President referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China which the United States would uphold. The Prime Minister said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan. The President described the earnest efforts made by the United States for a peaceful and just settlement of the Vietnam problem. The President and Prime Minister expressed the strong hope that the war in Viet-Nam would be concluded before return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. In this connection, they agreed that, should peace in Viet-Nam not have been realized by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the two governments would fully consult with each other in the light of the situation at that time so that reversion would be accomplished without affecting the United States efforts to assure the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to determine their own political future without outside interference. The Prime Minister stated that Japan was exploring what role she could play in bringing about stability in the Indochina area.

5. In light of the current situation and the prospects in the Far East, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that they highly valued the role played by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in maintaining the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, and they affirmed the intention of the two governments firmly to maintain the Treaty on the basis of mutual trust and common evaluation of the international situation. They further agreed that the two governments should maintain close contact with each other on matters affecting the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, and on the implementation of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

6. The Prime Minister emphasized his view that the time had come to respond to the strong desire of the people of Japan, of both the mainland and Okinawa, to have the administrative rights over Okinawa returned to Japan on the basis of the friendly relations between the United States and Japan and thereby to restore Okinawa to its normal status. The President expressed appreciation of the Prime Minister's view. The President and the Prime Minister also recognized the vital role played by United States forces in Okinawa in the present situation in the Far East. As a result of their discussion, it was agreed that the mutual security interests of the United States and Japan could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two governments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East, including

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Japan. They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support. In this connection, the Prime Minister made clear the intention of his government, following reversion, to assume gradually the responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa as part of Japan's defense efforts for her own territories. The President and the Prime Minister agreed also that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries.

7. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that, upon return of the administrative rights, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification thereof. In this connection, the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his government that the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. The Prime Minister was of the view that, in the light of such recognition, the return of the Japanese Government to the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa in the manner agreed above should not hinder the effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan. The President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's view.

8. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

9. The President and the Prime Minister took note of the fact that there would be a number of financial and economic problems, including those concerning United States business interests in Okinawa, to be solved between the two countries in connection with the transfer of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan and agreed that detailed discussions relative to their solution would be initiated promptly.

10. The President and the Prime Minister, recognizing the complexity of the problems involved in the reversion of Okinawa, agreed that the two governments should consult closely and cooperate on the measures necessary to assure a smooth transfer of administrative rights to the Japanese Government in accordance with reversion arrangements to be agreed to by both governments. They agreed that the United States-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo should undertake overall responsibility for this preparatory work. The President and the Prime Minister decided to establish in Okinawa a Preparatory Commission in place of the existing Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands for the purpose of consulting and coordinating locally on measures relating to preparations for the transfer of administrative rights, including necessary assistance to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The Preparatory Commission will be composed of a representative of the Japanese Government with ambassadorial rank and the High Commissioner

of the Ryukyu Islands with the Chief Executive of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands acting as adviser to the Commission. The Commission will report and make recommendations to the two governments through the United States-Japan Consultative Committee.

11. The President and the Prime Minister expressed their conviction that a mutually satisfactory solution of the question of the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, which is the last of the major issues between the two countries arising from the Second World War, would further strengthen United States-Japan relations which are based on friendship and mutual trust and would make a major contribution to the peace and security of the Far East.

12. In their discussion of economic matters, the President and the Prime Minister noted the marked growth in economic relations between the two countries. They also acknowledged that the leading positions which their countries occupy in the world economy impose important responsibilities on each for the maintenance and strengthening of the international trade and monetary system, especially in the light of the current large imbalances in trade and payments. In this regard, the President stressed his determination to bring inflation in the United States under control. He also reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to the principle of promoting freer trade. The Prime Minister indicated the intention of the Japanese Government to accelerate rapidly the reduction of Japan's trade and capital restrictions. Specifically, he stated the intention of the Japanese Government to remove Japan's residual import quota restrictions over a broad range of products by the end of 1971 and to make maximum efforts to accelerate the liberalization of the remaining items. He added that the Japanese Government intends to make periodic reviews of its liberalization program with a view to implementing trade liberalization at a more accelerated pace than hitherto. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that their respective actions would further solidify the foundation of overall U.S.-Japan relations.

13. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that attention to the economic needs of the developing countries was essential to the development of international peace and stability. The Prime Minister stated the intention of the Japanese Government to expand and improve its aid programs in Asia commensurate with the economic growth of Japan. The President welcomed this statement and confirmed that the United States would continue to contribute to the economic development of Asia. The President and Prime Minister recognized that there would be major requirements for the post-war rehabilitation of Viet-Nam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister stated the intention of the Japanese Government to make a substantial contribution to this end.

14. The Prime Minister congratulated the President on the successful moon landing of Apollo XII, and expressed the hope for a safe journey back to earth for the astronauts. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the exploration of space offers great opportunities for expanding cooperation in peaceful scientific projects among all nations. In this connection, the Prime Minister noted with pleasure that the United States and Japan last summer had concluded an agreement on space cooperation. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that implementation of this unique program is of importance to both countries.

15. The President and the Prime Minister discussed prospects for the promotion of arms control and the slowing down of the

arms race. The President outlined his Government's efforts to initiate the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union that have recently started in Helsinki. The Prime Minister expressed his Government's strong hopes for the success of these talks. The Prime Minister pointed out his country's strong and traditional interest in effective disarmament measures with a view to achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

THE WHITE HOUSE.

ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. In accordance with the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the transaction of routine morning business.

COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. METCALF) laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

REPORT ON PROPERTY ACQUISITIONS OF EMERGENCY SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

A letter from the Director of Civil Defense, Washington, D.C., reporting, pursuant to law, on property acquisitions of emergency supplies and equipment, for the quarter ended March 31, 1970; to the Committee on Armed Services.

REPORT ON DISBURSEMENTS BY SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

A letter from the Administrator, Small Business Administration, Washington, D.C., reporting, pursuant to law, on disbursements made by that Administration, dated April 1, 1970; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

CONTINUANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT ACT OF 1968

A letter from the Secretary of State, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to continue until the close of September 30, 1973, the International Coffee Agreement Act of September 30, 1973, the International Coffee Agreement Act of 1968, with an accompanying paper; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

LAWS ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, copies of laws enacted by the Legislature of the Virgin Islands in its 1969 Special and Regular Sessions, with accompanying papers; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

PROPOSED GRANT AGREEMENT WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

A letter from the Deputy Director, Bureau of Mines, Washington, D.C., transmitting, pursuant to law, a proposed grant agreement with the University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa., for a research project entitled "Development of an Air Quality Simulator for Coal Mines," with accompanying papers; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

PETITIONS

Petitions were laid before the Senate and referred as indicated:

By the ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. METCALF):

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of Idaho; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry;

アメリカ大使

参事官

送付公信

北米第一課長

政第 3057 号

昭和45年4月10日

外務大臣殿

在米下田大使

引用(来)(往)公信・電信番号 往電才1036号に因り

送付資料

ホリングズ議員の沖繩問題に関する発言

〔要旨〕

4月8日ホリングズ上院議員は

前日のサーモンド議員の沖繩問題に

関する発言と支持する発言をした。

(本会議で)

(希望配布先:)

付録添付

✓

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
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本信号送付先:

(別添とも)



April 8, 1970

Are you against "instant analysis and querulous criticism?" The public was asked to speak up on this issue. Do you know what's happened?

If a television network today legs on some analysis after covering a news event, it gets a bushel of critical mail saying "Shame, shame," and worse.

Conversely, if a network judges an event to need no immediate news analysis, it gets a bushel of critical mail saying "why not—you've been intimidated."

Personally, I like to hear how knowledgeable people interpret things. I thought this was a traditional function of the press in America. I've met many of the top newsmen. Any of them worth their salt—and that's most—can analyze what they're covering a lot better than I can. Particularly on short notices.

I've paid my dime for their paper. I've tuned my TV set to their station. I'm entitled to their conclusions. I might not agree with them. I'll make up my own mind whether they're querulous. But they are the professionals in their business, not me. I'm only the boss down on the Ponderosa.

People's feelings about television are emotional, not reasoned. It's a highly personal medium. A fixture in 59 million American homes. People react differently to it because people in their great variety are different. How do you please them all, all those conflicting tastes and opinions?

Television's not perfect. It has never claimed to be. It can and should thrive on meaningful criticism. But one vital truth seems to constantly escape critics and those who nod yes to all the criticism. They want to remake television to fit their own image of what the medium should be. Folk singer Bob Dylan hit it in the lyrics of a song he wrote called "Maggie's Farm":

"Well, I try my best
To be just like I am
But everybody wants you
To be just like them."

I happen to think there's a lot right with television instead of wrong with it. And I suspect that it is satisfying somebody—even if it only happens to be the overwhelming majority of the people who own television sets. We cannot define public tastes in terms of our own personal preferences and project them as the standard for the majority.

For 22 years America has lived with television. No medium before or since has become so deeply a part of our normal living pattern. It gives most of us our news, most of our entertainment and, according to some observers, a great many of our attitudes and beliefs.

I know one entertainment program intimately. I've been involved with "Bonanza" for 11 years now. It's reaching some 31 and-a-half million people a week in this country, and an astounding 400 million additional viewers in 82 countries around the world.

Naturally, my feelings are biased. But for a show to endure this long, and to reach this many people, speaks well for its universal entertainment quality. If, beyond entertaining, "Bonanza" is shaping any attitudes and beliefs among its international audience, I'd like to think these intangibles are honesty, integrity, reliability, and conviction. This is what "Bonanza" is all about—besides entertainment.

Rarely, however, do television's critics mention entertainment for its own sake. A lot of intellectual snobishness is behind this. To admit liking television just isn't chic among many of my friends, and I'm sure many of yours. The drums are being beaten for cultural programming—serious drama, dissertations on the problems of the world, specialized music, massive doses of news and information.

Television, of course, supplies all of this, although apparently not in the quantities

each special interest faction would like. A mass medium, responsible to a total audience, high-brow and low-brow alike, just isn't going to do enough to satisfy any one group. But it has more balance than many people imagine, or care to admit. Approximately 25 per cent of the total NBC Television schedule, for instance, is composed of news and informational programming.

The medium may appear to be dominated by shows like "Bewitched" and "Bonanza" and "Carol Burnett" because that's what most of the public prefers. But the aesthetes who claim that he can't find anything worth watching is not looking.

There are thousands of network and local programs to choose from every television season. There is change and variety. There is an increasingly robust educational television service. There is something for everybody. And when television moves in to cover a moon voyage, a national political convention and election, or a Presidential speech, it does stimulate universal interest.

And credit some of those so-called "popular" entertainment shows with a lot more than eye-appeal. Their mind-appeal shouldn't be dismissed.

"Laugh-In," aside from its fun and tremendous popularity, may be teaching us to laugh at ourselves and our ingrained prejudices. It has proven that comedy doesn't have to be some innocuous thing that produces laughter but must have nothing to do with the real issues of living.

Johany Cash and Glen Campbell, by the force of both television and their attractive personalities, may be popularizing a side of American music not to mention values and a region of America—for too long considered corny.

For all that is said about it, television has brought people, for the first time in history, face to face with the variety and reality of life.

Anthropologist Margaret Mead calls television a shatterer of myth, a medium through which "the whole world can participate simultaneously in events about which it is impossible to lie."

We've been fond of some of our myths and we reject some of the things we see. But the sights and sounds of the world which television confronts us with—wars, rioting, starvation, prejudice—will not disappear unless we are aware of them, and concerned enough to do something about them.

If television seems too bland to you, remember that somebody else considers it too bold. If you think television is a pacifier and a tool for escape, remember that others consider it an agitator. For the very reason that it is all things to all people—it should be—I think it's a success. And I've been proud to be a small part of it.

REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, on April 7, my colleague from South Carolina (Mr. Thurmond) presented a fine statement regarding the problem surrounding the reversion of Okinawa to the Government of Japan. Unfortunately, due to this pressing business before the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, I had to be present at their executive session and could not be on the Senate floor at that time. I wish to associate myself with the remarks and analysis made by Senator Thurmond on this vital issue and the colloquy which resulted with the Senator from Virginia (Mr. Byrd).

Although the Senate on November 5, 1969, by a vote of 63 to 14, approved Senator Byrd's amendment regarding the understanding entered into by the

President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan concerning article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan that it shall not take effect without the advice and consent of the Senate, I felt it necessary to communicate with the President in that I did not believe that the joint communique issued on the question of Okinawa was absolutely clear as to the Senate's role in this matter. The President replied to my correspondence in January 1970, indicating that the executive branch would maintain close contact with the legislative branch, including the appropriate form of congressional participation. Such participation would of course, give this body an opportunity to approve or disapprove, which is fundamental to the entire issue.

I believe Senator Thurmond has provided an extremely beneficial service to the Senate by analyzing this complex issue.

EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN-OWNED PROPERTIES ABROAD

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, in December of last year, the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Long) called our attention to the unpleasant experience of an American mining company in Mexico. As I recall, he characterized the actions of Mexico toward the sulfur operations of Gulf Resources & Chemical Corp. as "creeping expropriation." The means by which this is apparently to be accomplished are first the placing of restrictions on the company's operations, thereby forcing it to seek a purchaser of Mexican nationality, and second, the subsequent refusal of the Government to follow the procedures found acceptable to it in the Mexicanization of other sulfur companies. Being aware of the growing concern of many of us over the expropriation of American-owned properties abroad, I have followed the Gulf Resources case with interest.

Unhappily, I must report that no relief for the company is in sight and that little effort is being made by the Mexican Government on the company's behalf. On the contrary, the issue is clouded by evasions and counterclaims.

To view these events in proper perspective, we must be aware that almost 20 years ago Gulf Resources was issued a concession contract by the Mexican Government to produce sulfur in the State of Veracruz. The legality and validity of such concessions, and Gulf's vested rights thereunder, have never been seriously questioned. With pioneering effort and the expenditure of large sums of money, Gulf created in the remote jungle of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec an industry employing more than 500 persons, nearly all Mexican nationals, and providing housing, utilities, medical care and schools which otherwise would not be possible.

During its operating history, more than 80 percent of Gulf's sales dollar has been paid as salaries, royalties, and taxes or reinvested in the Mexican economy. All this was done in the good faith belief by Gulf that its concession contract would be honored and that expropriation could not be a serious threat.

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注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

あることはなほだし。同報告書は上院では問題にもされまい。

5. A B Mの展開が今後一層困難になつたとは必ずしも思わない。初年度スタートするかどうかの昨年の議会審議が最大の山場であり、幸いスタートはきつたのであるから、今年はテンポが遅れるといった程度の問題にとどまるということができよう。

6. ヴィエトナム。カンボディア共に米国としては勝利を求めているのではなく、あくまでもコミットメントの遂行を期しているだけである。したがって、ニクソンの政策は正しい。オキナワとの関連でもコミットメントの重要性につき日本は認識を深めるべきである。

(2)の基地の態様については共同コミュニケ、総理演説等し細に検討するまでもなく、日米共に期するところは同じであること。ただし、方法論において日本側のアプローチの方が性急でなく、实际的であり、これは長期的には日本戦後の歩みが世界に実証したこと、短期的には昨年末の総選挙が実証したこと等、るる応しゅう、説明をしておいた趣。先方は、総選挙の結果については大かん迎しており、今後とも彼がの論点をつきあわせてゆきたいと述べていた趣。なお、「パ」はサーモンド議員の国防面での強こう論

注意

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電信写

議には便乗、同調することはあり得ても、せん維の問題には特にきょう味関心もなく、また、「レ」が述べるとおり他の上院議員はカンボディア、ヴィエトナムといった選挙に直接関係のある問題にはぼうさつさされていても「オキナワ」ではさしたる関心を示していないというのが当面の実感と感じられた趣である。）

米国の対中政策

役立っている 経済援助計画

ラッパ・高野井
宣統、五月十四日
米の米価急落中

海外論調

● 米国の対中政策は、経済援助計画を通じて、米国の利益を保護し、中国の経済を復興させることを目的としている。この計画は、米国の利益を保護し、中国の経済を復興させることを目的としている。この計画は、米国の利益を保護し、中国の経済を復興させることを目的としている。

軍事基地の重要性強調 屋良主席の行政は効果的

● 屋良主席の行政は、軍事基地の重要性を強調し、効果的な行政を行っている。この行政は、軍事基地の重要性を強調し、効果的な行政を行っている。この行政は、軍事基地の重要性を強調し、効果的な行政を行っている。

● 屋良主席の行政は、軍事基地の重要性を強調し、効果的な行政を行っている。この行政は、軍事基地の重要性を強調し、効果的な行政を行っている。この行政は、軍事基地の重要性を強調し、効果的な行政を行っている。

アメリカ上院のハト派議員たち

● アメリカ上院のハト派議員たちは、平和を重視し、軍事行動を抑制しようとしている。この派閥は、平和を重視し、軍事行動を抑制しようとしている。この派閥は、平和を重視し、軍事行動を抑制しようとしている。

アジア軽視歴然

底に流れる孤立主義姿勢



● アジアに対する軽視の姿勢は、底に流れる孤立主義の表れである。この姿勢は、底に流れる孤立主義の表れである。この姿勢は、底に流れる孤立主義の表れである。

[illegible]

【ワシントン二十五日共同】米

國務省局長は二十五日、沖繩返還の取り決めを遂行せざるやない新しい問題や理由は何も生じていないと説明し、沖繩返還の時期について京での交渉は進んでいると述べ、決り取めを遂行せざる特別の事情が生じているのではないかと、この疑問を否定的に答えている。

を強固した。

岡田局長はジョンソン國務次官が一月の上院外交委員インストン分科会で「仮に満足できる細目取り決めが出来ない場合、沖縄返還が一九七二年以降に遅れることもありうる」と答えたのは既定の問題に対する仮定の答弁であると述べ、「必要を取り決めが出来ない」と考へる理由はない」と語った。沖縄問題を担当している國務省當局者は、知っている限りでは東

沖繩問題を担当している国務省当局者は、知っている限りでは東