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JAPAN VIEWS THE FUTURE

By Kiichi Aichi

Japan celebrated the hundredth anniversary of the Meiji Restoration, which marked Japan's entry into the modern world, in 1968. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which I now happen to head, marked its centennial this year. Shortly after that I learned that the State Department of the United States would be two hundred years old after only twelve more years. America, regarded as a young nation, nevertheless has institutions twice as old as those in Japan, a country whose founding is lost in the mists of antiquity. My alma mater Tokyo University, in existence for 92 years, cannot compete with Harvard's 333 years.

A long list of similar comparisons can be compiled to prove the fact that modern Japan is very new, so new that only a decade ago there were people living with personal experience of the feudal Tokugawa days. This very newness means that change, rapid, relentless and often violent, has been the keynote in Japan for the past century. Indeed, ever since the West sent America's Black Ships to open up Japan in 1853 and discovered the feudal levy arrayed on the beach at Kurihama with matchlocks and pikes "as on Bosworth field," painful adaptation to forcible change has been the main lot of

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the Japanese people. In this sense Japan is unique among the so-called "advanced nations" today. Japan truly lives in an "Age of Discontinuity," and all Japanese feel it personally.

In my view, the two greatest manifestations of discontinuity in Japan's modern history are, first of all and obviously, the events leading to the Meiji Restoration which entailed Japan's forcible integration into the world diplomatic jungle in the 1850's, and secondly but less obviously, total defeat in the Second World War which changed Japan's direction as a modern state. The first change threw Japan into a world where powerful and ruthless Western states, strong in their organized society and their instruments of war forged in the Industrial Revolution were either hungrily eying the weaker lands in Asia and Africa or reducing them to colonies and dependencies.

In the Far East in particular an ailing China, long the cultural and political leader in the area, was slowly being nibbled by the Western Powers, while Korea lay dormant in seclusion and immense areas in Southeast Asia were under Western domination. An aggressive Czarist Russia was casting a long shadow over the Siberian wastes to the very northern approaches of the Japanese islands, while all-powerful Britain held the seas under sway and had thrashed the Chinese Empire in the Opium War, an event which

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deeply impressed the Japanese. In fact, the civil war before the Restoration had been marked by British and French intrigues, and even before that, Japan had felt the bite of Western arms when warships of various nations in punitive action had reduced to ashes the ports of the recalcitrant Lords of Choshu and Satsuma, then the most powerful men in Japan.

No wonder, then, that the Japanese considered themselves threatened in their very existence and embarked on a long quest for military and diplomatic security. Since isolation was now a thing of the past, they had to participate in the life of the outside world; a passive form of participation allowing Japan to stay at home in modest comfort, a kind of "Little Japan-ism", was impossible in the absence of a stable and established Far Eastern community of nations a la Europe to keep the regional balance and fend off alien intruders. Furthermore the sheer lack of resources in Japan to sustain a modern economy thrust her from the very first into overseas trading activities. Thus the Japanese had no choice but to adapt to the new circumstances in an aggressive manner, embarking on perilous adventures after ever-receding security frontiers.

This great process can be divided chronologically into three sub-periods of roughly a quarter-century each, in keeping with

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changes in the world environment. The first, a preparatory period when Japan laid the foundations for future growth by reforming her society and institutions and commencing the Industrial Revolution ended with the advent of the era of accelerated Western Imperialism in the 1890's. The second period leading up to the end of World War I saw the previous preparations bear fruit and Japan develop fully into a strong military power, defeating the Chinese and then the Russians and finally attaining membership in the world Big Five, fifty years after Commodore Perry's visit. The third period which culminated in the holocaust of 1945 was Japan's attempt to cope with the post-World War I environment with methods of the previous sub-period.

The events which unfolded like a Greek tragedy and transformed Japan herself into a conqueror in the very image of the alien Powers also affected the popular psyche hard beset by the rapid changes due to modernization. For the almost incredible length of two and a half centuries Japanese enjoyed unbroken peace under the Tokugawa regime's policy of seclusion; now major wars visited them regularly at intervals of ten years or so. The state demanded a spirit of sacrifice and the people responded faithfully for three-quarters of a century, at the expense of social and political development and the standard of living,

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with results still apparent today in certain areas. Such was the intensity of the initial fear inspired by the West and the determination which sustained this spirit; the slogan of the times, "Rich Country for Strong Arms" symbolized the direction of the nation to overtake and surpass the West. Finally, the last and supreme war effort which saw Japanese arms carried to far-flung regions in Asia and the Pacific ended in utter ruin on the bitter ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

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I have dwelt at length on the recent history of Japan because the present, and thus the future, can be fully understood only in comparison with the pre-1945 times. It is my belief that 1945 brought about a momentous change which fundamentally transformed the Japanese state and society. The reforms introduced by the seven-year long American Occupation gave the initial impetus to this transformation and without doubt contributed to vast changes in the Japanese mind, but in my view it was the Japanese people themselves, painfully adapting to changed circumstances, who ultimately shaped the new Japan.

As Japan lay exhausted in her home islands under the forcible protection of victorious America which had stepped into the power vacuum left in the Far East by Japan's disappearance as a major power, the sparks of nationalism fanned in part by Japan's forays burst into flame. The Far East seethed with turmoil, China writhed in the birth-throes of the Communist state, the dark clouds of the Cold War were gathering rapidly, and the groundwork was being laid for today's Far East where the two superpowers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as well as Communist China meet while the divided Korean and Vietnamese states as well as the stronghold of Taiwan lie at the center of international tensions, and where what later

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came to be called the East-West and North-South problems manifest themselves in concentrated form. Japan, insulated from the outside world by the U.S., was powerless to act or react to the momentous events almost on her doorstep. Herein lies one of the basic reasons why for a long time a strong and overriding feeling that Japan should play an active role in the area failed to manifest itself in the Japanese popular mind. In any event the Japanese people who had suffered grievously and were utterly disillusioned by the past were for the time being wholly engrossed in the daily desperate struggle for their livelihood amid shortages and inflation, and had little interest in external events. Even basic moral and social values were shattered or thrown into disuse by the catastrophe, and the pain to us was as much spiritual and moral as physical.

The Japanese people were drawn into themselves as never before, and as their daily life "improved" to a slow grinding toil their revulsion at the emptiness in the nuclear age of the glory of a warring Great Power made them doubly yearn for modest prosperity as a middle-class economics-oriented nation, quietly content in the home islands and shunning foreign involvement, above all war. This was Little Japan-ism itself, and although the lack of a stable Far Eastern community of nations was a fatal flaw, nevertheless as long as the

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seemingly perpetual American presence appeared like a substitute few were inclined to question the desirability of this inward-looking attitude, which to most reflected the realities of their national experience. "Outward-looking" attitudes were unthinkable because they were equated with the black past.

Thus the national quest became one for economic security and though no "national objective" as such was evolved, the nearest thing to it became Economic Recovery and the watchword "Increase Production." The feeling embodied in the war-renouncing Constitution was genuinely Japanese for all its espousal by the American Occupation. Few welcomed defeat and foreign occupation, but still less thirsted after revenge and the lost days of greatness of the Empire.

The energy which had gone into building up strong armaments was now concentrated on rebuilding and then expanding industrial equipment, and again as in the Meiji days the lack of resources propelled Japan into external trade. An inward-looking people were searching for their livelihood in the outside world, but lack of political interest effectively kept them as they were. Here lies one of the reasons for the epithet "economic animal" often levelled at us.

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At the same time the defunct Meiji body politic had enough sturdiness to serve as a base for new development. Old controls designed to ensure the perpetuation of the strong Meiji state were discarded in favor of individual freedom and civil liberties, all consolidated in the new Constitution with the support of the people who remembered with dislike the seemingly fruitless sacrifices of the past. Institutions were reformed or evolved anew in all fields, especially in education, labor-management relations and mass consumption. This free open society combined with hard work, sound technology, efficient administration, social and political stability despite occasional turmoil became, in retrospect, the basis for Japan's initial adaptation to the new post-World War II world.

The multilateral, free and open world economic system buttressed by institutions for international cooperation built up after the Second World War by the West was just the environment in which the new Japan could hope to function most effectively. Neither the jungle of the late nineteenth century nor the protectionist thicket of the 1930's, while secured from disastrous all-out wars by the shield of American might which balanced the Soviets', the postwar system after the initial years of rebuilding and recovery made it possible for the free advanced nations to increase trade and to expand their economy. After

After initial U.S. material aid much later followed by American sponsorship to join the important economic institutions such as GATT and the International Monetary Fund, the Japanese economy favoured by world developments (among them the courageous defense of the Republic of Korea) started to grow, and after the end of the Occupation in 1952 overcame its lack of resources, remodeled its means of production and started to compete favorably in world markets. Thus the economy not only recovered, but after two decades surged forward to the point of surpassing all in the Free World but the U.S. in terms of Gross National Product. The livelihood of the people progressed from bare adequacy to modest prosperity though not by any means affluence, handicapped as it is by a large though almost stationary population which kept Japan's ranking in world per capita national income to twentieth at \$1,110 in 1968. It is also suffering from a serious deficiency in what is known as "social capital" such as roads, sewers, housing, parks and other items which sustain the high standard of living in Europe and America.

Today the Japanese economy is still growing at one of the highest rates in the world and the sights of its leaders are set high. Certain long-standing weaknesses in such fields as traditional-style small enterprises and agriculture still are problems

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but are gradually being ameliorated. Japan has become a global economy buying and selling to and from the remotest corners of the world, though the U.S. still is the leading partner with roughly one-third of total trade both ways. The Japanese economy is too large and dynamic now to be confined to old autarchic regional units such as the long-defunct "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" concept. Instead the countries in East Asia and Japan are freely working towards prosperity through trade as well as economic cooperation from Japan. A quarter-century from Hiroshima, a strong base for further economic and social development has been established. The modest hopes of the early postwar years for a Little Japan have been surpassed beyond the wildest dreams, and Japan has now attained membership among the leading countries of the world, twenty-four years after General MacArthur's arrival in Japan.

III

The remarkable thing was that this successful adaptation had been sustained by a popular psychology which was essentially inward-looking. To be sure, the public showed great interest in absorbing foreign, mainly Western, trends and achievements in the cultural and recreational fields as well as the economic, scientific and technological, while foreign travel increased by leaps and bounds in keeping with the improvement in living standards. International contacts and interchange both private and official reached unprecedented proportions. Likewise, the Government re-established its diplomatic network after the coming into effect of the Peace Treaty, became a member of almost all international organizations from the United Nations down, and participated in various international cooperative ventures. Public interest in world affairs voluminously reported by the influential Japanese mass media was high.

Nevertheless, even a cursory study would reveal that this interest had not yet developed into strong popular demands for an active or leadership role for Japan. Any sign of international strife near Japan's shores was viewed with great apprehension and sensitivity lest Japan become involved in a conflict not to its own making and not to its concern, as the media usually

emphasized.

emphasized. The public impression was that the main stress in foreign affairs was laid on what came to be known as "Economic Diplomacy", at least while affluence is yet to be attained at home. The press on its part for many years regarded the Economic Affairs Bureau as playing the leading role in the Foreign Ministry.

It seems that the Little Japan concept accepted foreign involvement insofar as it was related directly to national prosperity. Apparently there was an instinctive fear that the alternative to Little Japan was the hateful and discredited one of foreign adventures. Perhaps this might explain the attitude of a public which accepted as necessary the vital and mutually profitable Security Treaty with the United States and expressed themselves affirmatively at the polls by voting for the Liberal Democratic Party (my party supporting the Treaty) but at the same time showed uneasiness when incidents involving American bases or forces occurred. Even those who rejected Little Japan spoke in terms of an influential Japan "great without armaments."

However, to dismiss this inward-lookingness as a temporary phenomenon due to horror at defeat and devastation or to treat it as a form of naivete to be dispelled by Governmental public relations, is to disregard the role it has played in sustaining Japan's successful adaptation for the past twenty-four years.

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A quarter-century in the short history of modern Japan is very significant -- after all, it corresponds to as much as one-third of the time lapsed between the Meiji Restoration and Hiroshima. It would be more realistic to assume that this sort of mentality has grown roots in the new Japan, especially when crowned with the aura of success. Japan has not only achieved prosperity but has enjoyed unbroken peace for the longest time since the Tokugawa era. During this time people have not only rebuilt the economy but have also busied themselves in the arts, in literature and other vital areas of civilized life, concentrating on their own heritage.

There has been a great revival of traditional things which antedated the Meiji Restoration; the amazing postwar development of archaeology has pushed back the frontiers of Japan's national origins and together with renewed interest in Japanese history, especially pre-Meiji, deeper self-concentration is evident. Inward-lookingness apparently was satisfying a deep-seated need for the Japanese people to find themselves and re-establish their identity. In this sense it might even have something in common with the fierce Meiji determination to keep Japan free from foreign domination.

Another

Another remarkable result of the Japanese adaptation is that it brought about a fundamental change in the national personality. With a little exaggeration, it could be said that the postwar Japanese is as different from the prewar, let alone the Meiji, as the Meiji man was from the Tokugawa, though biologically it is the very same individual. This phenomenon, unique in the world and quite unlike the cases of Germany and Italy, has been manifest in politics, in business, in labor relations, in the day-to-day intercourse of all Japanese, high and low. A symbolic phenomenon is the way the Government has gone into public relations: the most conservative bureaucrat knows that the public must be "sold" on something, not "guided". It is also a fact that considerable sales resistance is evident on the part of the public, especially on "outward-looking" subjects such as military security and "political roles" for Japan. The often-mentioned Japanese lack of consensus concerning foreign policy may thus be explained to a certain extent, while not disregarding the existence of political forces which thrive on the lack of consensus.

On the other hand, the Japanese mind is not totally blind to external events, however disturbing emotionally. An awareness of the changing environment has been reflected in a new way.

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The habits of free speech which characterize postwar Japan have been coming into the fore even in such "taboo" fields as the dreaded subject of nuclear weapons, especially in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Japan is now studying closely. Serious discussions on "outward-looking" subjects have started, and even carried by the generally inward-looking media, though not yet popularized to a large extent. These are indications that the Japanese people are slowly becoming aware of changed circumstances and are groping towards new forms of adaptation. Some people describe this tendency as a "revival of nationalism", although whether this is accurate or not remains to be seen.

IV

Up to now I have concentrated on analyzing the past, for reasons already stated. It is now time to proceed to the present and thus to the future. It seems to me that almost a quarter-century from the commencement of our second great adaptation since the feudal days, various important elements in the environment, both internal and external, are changing rapidly and perhaps decisively. In other words, we are being challenged anew domestically and internationally; perhaps we are on the threshold of a sub-period of adaptation. Quite apart from that, the passage of time will before too long bring about a generational change in various areas of Japanese leadership, and it might be said that we are at least on the threshold of a new period in our postwar history.

On the domestic side Japan is faced with two very great problems both of which have been made more visible by Japan's attaining the present degree of prosperity. These are public hazards and the lack of social capital, the former created by industrialization, the latter a legacy of prewar sacrifices followed by postwar concentration on production, and both exacerbated by prosperity. Intense industrialization brought with it pollution and other blights constituting a growing threat to the safety of the public.

Prosperity accelerated the urbanization of Japan, spawning huge sprawling megalopoli while reducing centuries-old villages to

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near-emptiness. Urbanization made more apparent the lack of social capital at a time when the public was becoming more and more vocal on its right to enjoy life, and was increasingly asking when it could live like citizens of the second greatest economy in the Free World. This problem was also threatening to become a bottleneck to production in some cases such as lack of good access roads.

Thus it is acknowledged throughout Japan that the next stage in the quest for economic security would be to improve the Japanese environment itself. It is widely believed that the next decade should concentrate not on the simple expansion of production but on the creation of more social capital and the solution of problems of prosperity such as public hazards and imbalance between the city and country. The press is busy pointing out the shortcomings of the citizens' livelihood, politicians sensing the trend are setting themselves up as the champions of the people's demands. The Government is under daily pressure, while scholars and experts are full of suggestions on how best to solve these problems.

In short the whole issue has more and more assumed the character of a national challenge, a fit subject to occupy national energies in the immediate future. Some estimates on the effort required go as high as 60 to 70% of the national strength for the next twenty years. It is hardly strange that this very important development

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promises to strengthen, not weaken, the inward-looking tendency. Doubly so when we have unsolved problems on the spiritual and material side especially the alienation of youth, symbolized daily in student disturbances, although I intend to concentrate in this essay on the material side of our national challenges.

Turning to the external side there have been three striking developments. One is the greatly heightened impact of the Japanese economy on the rest of the world, the other is the changing nature of the U.S. role in the Far East, and the third is the growth of a confidence in their own efforts at development coupled with a strengthened regional awareness among Asian nations, all of them highlighting Japan's new position.

The Japanese economy by its sheer size and strength (the GNP in 1975 is expected to be four times that of 1960) has become a factor formidable in its own right. Whatever the subjective wishes resulting from inward-lookingness, Japan's influence could not but be felt with greater intensity by her partners, including the United States and the nations in Asia and the Pacific. Even the Soviet Union could no longer ignore Japan, especially when her relations with China had changed so much from the early postwar years. Influence is but another name for responsibility and attention is now focussed on how Japan will fulfil her role

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in the company of such leading countries as France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Japan could no longer be a passive agent in international affairs, particularly since economic power had become, especially in the eyes of the world, political power. For the United States in particular what she considered as continued Japanese restrictions on access to the latter's domestic market has assumed the proportion of a major issue.

The advent of the so-called stage of multipolarity in international relations and the attendant changes in the relations of the two superpowers with their principal, but less powerful allies though not changing the fundamental framework of U.S.-Soviet world-wide equilibrium of force, nevertheless had set into motion, especially in the United States carrying the heavy burden of the war in Vietnam, deep soul-searching on what role to play in guaranteeing regional stability, mainly in Asia. The answer, though far from being finalized, seems from most indications to be one of selective intervention after weighing each case carefully on its merits, and to ask locally influential friendly countries to play a more positive role in contributing to regional stability. Japan therefore has become more and more visible to Americans as the logical Far Eastern power to play such a role. Likewise some countries in the area itself have started to ask questions about

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the possibility of Japan as the leading economic power to help their efforts at nation-building.

The Asian nations from Korea to the great Indian subcontinent had, during the two decades since the end of World War II, been struggling to establish viable states, and have attained a good measure of success chiefly through their own efforts helped in varying degrees by external aid and in many cases the stability resulting from the American presence. However, because of historical reasons and cultural, religious, ethnic and other differences, it would not be practical at the present time to hope to develop in Asia lasting regional groupings which would one day lead to a community of nations such as that in existence in Europe for more than two centuries.

Japan responded to this new tendency by setting up a Southeast Asian Development Ministers Conference which met for the first time in 1966, positively contributing a decisive share of the capital of the Asian Development Bank, established the same year, and cooperating in the development of the Asian and Pacific Council. Although these actions, as well as Japan's long-standing activities as a leading member of the U.N. Economic Commission on Asia and the Far East, were consistent with the economics-oriented tendency of public opinion they still were manifestations of Japan's willingness to play a useful role in the Far East, and therefore

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important milestones in regional cooperation.

Reviewing the domestic and external challenges together, it is apparent that in many aspects the two tend to conflict, both in the competition for allocation of Japanese resources and energies and in capturing the loyalties of the popular Japanese mind. It would not be exaggerating too much to speculate that if nature were allowed to take its course, the average Japanese would be more interested in solving the knotty and multitudinous problems at home than making the painful switchover to an "outward-looking" frame of mind in order to arrive at a consensus on the role to play in the outside world. However, the Japanese mind is characterized by a resilience and shrewdness and as I have remarked above a recognition of changed external circumstances is slowly but steadily spreading.

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I have now come to the point of examining how we will respond to these challenges. The more I study the external challenges the more apparent to me become the dangers of failure to respond to them. First of all an unwillingness to fulfil international responsibilities in the economic field would not only be undesirable from the point of view of maintaining the cooperative international framework of the world economy, but would be ultimately against the interests of Japan which depend so much on the untrammelled functioning of the multilateral cooperative system. Unwillingness to accommodate Japan's interests with that of her partners, such as an overly cautious attitude in lowering its barriers to foreign trade and investments, if pushed to extremes could in the long run very well result in isolation and alienation akin to that which Japan experienced fully in the bitter 1930's. It is more profitable to defend our interests within the framework of the world system than outside of it, and to that end Japan should help as much as possible in strengthening and improving the system. Not all our partners' demands are just and equitable all the time and therefore should be treated firmly, but only within the framework of the system.

Another dangerous result of not replying to the expectations for regional roles in the Far East would be to retard Asian development of a viable community of nations which is vital from the point

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of view of the very existence of Japan, because it is only thus that we can participate in an active and cooperative manner in the life of our region. Without such development Japan must be excessively dependent on the U.S. presence to keep our security frontiers stable, especially when the Little Japan mood is taking U.S. power for granted as the substitute for regional cohesion, a substitution which the U.S. itself is always capable of denouncing.

It is clear from the above that Japan should shoulder its external responsibilities. It is equally clear that the domestic challenge must be met if we are going to prevent our home environment from becoming unfit to live. Therefore it appears that a successful adaptation to the changed conditions of the new sub-period must require a skilful blending of both sets of responses. It seems obvious that the domestic challenge would cost vastly more than the external. Thus the problem of the allocation of resources can be solved if a rational set of priorities be worked out to meet the external requirements, although of course with enough flexibility to cope with the unforeseen elements of such a long-term undertaking.

Japan is prepared to play her part in the maintenance and development of the world economic system. The Government is actively pursuing the liberalization of trade and capital investment, at maximum speed consistent with domestic economic factors. However,

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it is evident that the difficult problems facing the multilateral economic system today, both in the monetary and trade fields, can be overcome only through close international cooperation. The leadership of economic giants such as the United States and the European Economic Community is essential here.

In any case, there is no question that Japanese initiatives could be most usefully directed towards problems in Asia. One form of this would certainly be economic and technical aid, which Japan has already been providing in very substantial amounts and is willing to increase, as I told the assembled Southeast Asian Development Ministers in Bangkok last April, and as my distinguished colleague Mr. Takeo Fukuda the Finance Minister made clear to the Second Annual Meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Sydney last April. In fact the Government of Japan regards the 1970's as the decade to help develop Asia in concert with other nations, and the Cabinet confirmed this in July of this year.

However, aid is not the only form; there are many other initiatives to be taken. What is needed is a target or objective on which all these diverse efforts could be concentrated. I personally believe that from our own historical experience and our view of the future, nothing is more important than helping in the building of a viable

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and stable community of nations in the Far East, embodying "unity in diversity". I am of the opinion that helping each nation develop according to its own particular conditions, yet aiming at the eventual attainment of a harmonious whole, would be the wisest way. In short, we should put at the disposal of these countries our experience of adaptation so that they could adapt in their own fashions.

Japan's role should be one of service to each regional country which is willing to accept it and to the region as a whole; needless to say such a role is something that can be assumed only with the agreement of the partners. A long series of talks, both bilateral and multilateral, must precede and accompany the undertaking so that there will be no doubt in the minds of those concerned. This is a task which will take a very long time and will involve a great number of people, both Japanese and others. It will certainly cost money and energy and will come under heavy criticism from all quarters, while praise would be few and far between. Planning and sub-priorities must be geared to each country's particular conditions and, of course, to Japan's capabilities. Concrete steps must be taken gradually and carefully over a long period of time.

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So far I have not touched upon the most important problem: how to secure support from the Japanese people. Obviously it is not enough to harangue the public on the necessity of divesting themselves of inward-looking mentalities; a large degree of sales resistance is already apparent. To my mind the only way is to appeal to their innate good sense while nurturing as carefully as possible the tender shoots of dialogue on which I have remarked earlier emerging slowly out of the public mind. The Government owes it to the Japanese people that a full explanation be given on the necessity of this endeavor from the viewpoint of the national interest, and that their voluntary support is solicited. The leadership should be patient in explaining to the people, both through the Diet and directly, and should always bear in mind the following words spoken by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in a recent speech to the Tokyo Foreign Correspondents Club:

It is clear that the (Japanese) people are no longer satisfied with a merely negative pacifism aiming only at this country's safety. However, at the same time, national objectives which are not in harmony with the way individual citizens view the world in today's modern society are not viable.

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Since this is a very long-range undertaking, it is both possible and desirable to devote a large amount of time and energy in seeking to gradually interest the public in outward-looking ideas and to wean them away from Little Japan-ism. At the same time necessary practical measures to initiate the various aspects of the endeavour could be commenced by the Government where it has the authority, and where it has not Diet approval could be sought. I personally am confident that the cumulative effects of both action and explanation would bring favorable results.

VI

I have been concentrating on the inner workings of the Japanese mind so far. I should now discuss the external world with which we have to work anew. It is obvious that we must be extremely sensitive and careful to the requirements of the Asian countries we would be working with. It is also obvious that we should give careful thought to two of the three great entities of our region: Communist China and the United States. The Far East in the 1970's will show more and more complicated relationships between the two superpowers, Communist China and Japan, especially if the undertaking described above gets under way.

The Chinese Communists at this moment do not show any predictability as to the direction of their policies, both internal and external, and therefore I am not able to foretell with any confidence what their reaction would be. It is fairly clear that they realize that all the countries from the Japan Sea to the Indian Ocean are unanimous, including the Communist regimes, in not welcoming the establishment of a Chinese sphere of influence in their area. Whether the Chinese would interpret our intentions in hostile or indifferent terms in connection with that realization remains to be seen.

However it can be said with reasonable accuracy that they will have to take more and more notice of Japan as our national influence,

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in keeping with our responses to the new challenges, continues to rise. For our part we are prepared to continue our present policy of de jure diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and de facto economic and cultural relations with Peking, and as long as there is the danger that the Republic of China will be evicted from the United Nations, to avoid such an eventuality. On the other hand I have been aware that according to some, perpetuating the isolation of Peking is conducive to neither stability nor peaceful development in Asia, and am of the opinion that in the coming years more thought should be given to this aspect.

I privately think that the question of attaining a riable equilibrium in the relations between nuclear-equipped Peking and ourselves would be answered by perhaps the decade after the next. Suffice it to say that the Communist Chinese question is a fundamental one and as such is reflected in our domestic political life, where many elements are trying to prove that we are being forced by the U.S. to follow its lead. It is hardly necessary for me to deny this allegation.

It is obvious that the regional military balance in the Far East is essentially that between our ally the United States and Communist China, and for quite some time to come the deterrent power of the U.S. will effectively counter any intentions for large-scale military adventures in the area. I am sure that the United States will welcome my proposed effort to help the regional countries' nation-  
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building, which after all is the foundation of all security and stability.

It is my belief that our most effective role should be in helping the regional countries achieve a viable national existence in economic and social fields which in turn would enhance their ability to shoulder their security responsibilities. In the case of certain countries, this would enable them when necessary to take over with their troops any part of the visible American presence which Washington chooses to transfer elsewhere in the future. In any case a simple transfer of roles from the U.S. to Japan, whether in the field of security or of aid, is not only difficult to implement because of the fundamental difference in the make-up of the two countries' sources of strength, but would be difficult to be fully understood by Japanese public opinion in view of the psychology as described in the foregoing pages. I am again sure that responsible Americans understand that my type of initiative is much more rational and effective than ill-conceived Japanese military contributions to Asian stability which would accomplish little except squander Japan's security capabilities, her painstakingly built up goodwill in Asian countries as well as Japanese domestic support for the Self Defense Forces.

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As for the contribution of our Self Defense Forces to the general keeping of the peace in the Far East, I am of the view that they are performing a vital role in guaranteeing the primary defense of Japan itself and as a result enabling the American presence to concentrate on its war-preventing functions. The same would apply to Okinawa after reversion and Japanese assumption of local defence. It is not widely realized that our military expenditure is increasing annually at the same rate as our very high GNP growth rate; according to certain projections, this would mean that after ten years the amount would correspond to the spending of Communist China, with a much smaller growth rate, on her huge armed forces and her back-breakingly expensive nuclear development program.

Turning to the current bilateral issues between Japan and the U.S., strong public attention is focussed on the problems of the reversion of Okinawa and the economic relations between the two countries. The problem of the return of Okinawa, which has been the subject of visits to our respective countries by the Secretary

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of State Mr. Rogers and by myself, will hopefully be resolved during the coming visit in late fall of Prime Minister Sato to President Nixon. It is meaningful not only in the obvious sense that a long-separated part of our people will return to the fold, and not only that this will be accomplished by peaceful and friendly talks between the two governments, but in the sense that the return of Okinawa will lift the last excuse in our popular mind that we cling to our inward-lookingness. Okinawa, so long a symbol of our defeat and impotence, back in our midst will mean that our strength has been made whole again, and that we are ready for our responsibilities. Here lies the importance of Okinawa to history.

In addition to the foregoing, this will give more force to our demand on the Soviets to give back our Northern Islands. It will also help in surmounting the so-called "problem of 1970" where opposition forces are planning to make a grand effort to make the government abrogate the Security Treaty with the U.S. something which the government has certainly no wish of doing. I would likewise stress the fact that <sup>the</sup> U.S. <sup>is</sup> ~~deterrent~~ forces will be kept on the island to keep the peace in the region. As for the very complicated economic problems, I have already touched briefly upon some of their aspects; I would like to add that in my view economic relations between us are by nature mutually profitable in the long run and that we need each other; thus there should be no issue between the two of us which cannot be settled by honest and well-thought-out give-and-take.

Unique

Unique among the advanced nations we have been obliged to make fundamental adaptations in the short span of a century. Though our national psyche might bear the scars we have been resilient and so far successful. We must respond to the new problems confronting us because if we fail to do so we may not be successful when the next major challenge might come. I am an optimist, and one of my favorite sayings is: "Listen to the call of the 21st Century." It is my hope that with hard, and perhaps painful work, my country by that time would have transcended discontinuity and be living in active participation in the affairs of both the world and Asian communities.