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JAPAN VIEWS THE FUTURE

by Kiichi Aichi

For a nation whose founding is lost in the mists of antiquity, Japan is in many respects a very new country. Last year we celebrated the hundredth anniversary of the Meiji Restoration, which marked our entry into the modern world. This year the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which I am honored to head, observes its centennial. By contrast, the United States, which is in every respect a young nation, boasts a number of institutions that are far older than many of Japan's. The Department of State, for example, is only a dozen years short of its bicentennial, and Harvard, with its 333-year old history, is more than three times the age of my own alma mater, Tokyo University, now in its ninety-second year.

This newness of modern Japan, which makes it unique among the so-called "advanced" nations, is also an essential key to the Japanese view of the world. To understand Japan's outlook and its vision of the future, it is necessary first to comprehend Japan's brief and turbulent history as a modern state, and

the effects these compressed events have had on the Japanese mind.

Two sets of events in particular have been decisive in their impact: the developments leading to the Meiji Restoration, which forcibly integrated Japan into the 19th century jungle of world diplomacy, and total defeat in the Second World War, which profoundly changed Japan's direction as a modern nation-state.

The first of these traumatic national experiences is so recent that, until a decade or so ago, there were people still living with personal memories of the feudal Tokugawa era. Indeed, Japan's "age of discontinuity," to borrow Peter Drucker's apt phrase, began not with the contemporary technological explosion, but with the arrival in 1853 of America's "black ships," which came to open up Japan, and were met on the beach at Kurihama by a feudal levy armed with matchlocks and pikes, "as on Bosworth field."

From that moment to the present, the main lot of the Japanese people has been forced change -- rapid, relentless and often violent -- and painful adaptation to change.

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At the moment of Japan's forced emergence from 250 years of peaceful seclusion, the world was indeed a jungle. Powerful, well-organized and ruthless Western states, armed with tools and weapons forged in the Industrial Revolution, were engaged either in imposing their will on the weaker lands of Asia and Africa, or in reducing them outright to colonies and dependencies. Ailing China, long the cultural and political leader of Eastern Asia, was slowly being nibbled away by the Western powers. Korea, like Japan, lay dormant in seclusion, but vast areas of Southeast Asia were already under Western domination. Aggressive czarist Russia cast a long shadow over the Siberian wastes, touching the northern approaches of the Japanese islands. All-powerful Britain had recently thrashed the Chinese Empire in the Opium War (an event which deeply impressed the Japanese), and its fleets dominated the seas of Pacific Asia.

Japan itself had felt the bite of Western arms when warships from the West, in punitive action, reduced to ashes the ports of the recalcitrant Lords of Choshu and Satsuma, then the most powerful men in feudal Japan. Moreover, the civil war which preceded the restoration was marked by British and French intrigues. No wonder the Japanese people, sensing a threat to their very existence, began their long quest for military and diplomatic security.

The pattern this quest took, over the next seventy-five years, was largely determined by Japan's view of the world environment in which it found itself. Clearly, isolation was

no longer a realistic alternative; some form of participation in the outside world was required. To Japanese eyes this participation could be neither passive nor confined to a regional scale, in the shelter of some stable East Asian community of nations, capable together of keeping a regional balance of power while fending off alien intruders. No such community or capability existed. Finally, Japan's almost total lack of natural resources necessary to the building of a modern economy dictated active participation in world trade.

Thus Japan felt it had no choice but to adapt aggressively to its changed circumstances and, as a matter of survival, to embark on a perilous competition with the West, in pursuit of ever-receding security frontiers.

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During the first quarter century of its modern history, Japan laid the foundations for future growth and security by selectively Westernizing its social, economic and political institutions, and by launching its own delayed industrial revolution. With the beginning of its second quarter century, in the 1890's, those preparations bore fruit. In the environment of accelerated Western imperialism, Japan developed into a strong military power, capable of defeating first the Chinese and then the Russians. Whithin fifty years of Commodore Perry's visit, Japan had attained membership in the World's Big Five. With these credentials, which involved transforming itself into the conquering image of the alien powers it had feared, Japan plunged into its third quarter century, which culminated in the holocaust of 1945.

The events of those first seventy-five years, which in retrospect unfolded with the inexorability of a Greek tragedy, exacted a great price in Japanese public spirit and personal sacrifice. For three quarters of a century the state made enormous demands on the people, at the expense of social and political development, and the people responded faithfully. The slogan of the times, "Rich Country for Strong Arms," expressed the intensity of Japan's initial fear of the West, and symbolized its determination to overtake and surpass the West.

Yet this single-minded course, whose supreme and final effort was the war in which Japanese arms were carried to far-flung reaches of Asia and the Pacific, ended in utter ruin in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It is my belief that the trauma of utter defeat in 1945, and the restructuring of the international environment which followed, produced changes in Japan as momentous as those initiated by the coming of the black ships in 1853. For the second time the Japanese state, society and world view were fundamentally transformed.

No doubt the reforms introduced by the seven-year long American Occupation gave great impetus to these changes, but in my view it was the Japanese people themselves, painfully adapting once more to drastically altered circumstances, who shaped contemporary Japan.

In defeat, the Japanese people were drawn into themselves as never before. They had suffered grievously from the war, were utterly disillusioned with the past, and for the time being were consumed by the daily desperate struggle for a livelihood amid shortages and inflation. Even their basic moral and social values had been shattered or discarded by the national catastrophe, and the pain was as much spiritual as physical. The earlier quest for security -- and then for power and glory -- held no meaning or attraction in the nuclear age. Stripped of their trappings as a major power, exhausted in their home islands under the forcible protection of victorious America, and confronted with the mammoth tasks of economic reconstruction, the Japanese people had no stomach for involvement in the troubles surrounding them.

Asia seethed in the immediate postwar years. The sparks of Asian nationalism, fanned in part by Japan's wartime forays, suddenly burst into flame throughout South and Southeast Asia. China writhed in the birth throes of the Communist state, the dark clouds of the cold war were gathering rapidly, and the groundwork was being laid for today's three-way confrontation among the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and Communist China. Related ~~contemporary~~ problems of the divided Korean and Vietnamese states, and the two Chinas, and the gap (so wide in Asia) between North and South, rich and poor, had already been defined, and needed but a little time to sharpen into major concerns of our age.

Yet the Japanese people felt insulated from all this by their own powerlessness, and by the fact that their security was under the protection of the United States, which had entered the Asian vacuum left by Japan's defeat. They felt incapable as well as disinclined either to act or react in the face of the momentous events on their doorstep. Their sole concern was economic recovery, and their watchword was "Increase Production." What they yearned for was the modest prosperity of a middle-class nation, quietly content in its home islands, shunning unnecessary foreign involvement, and above all, renouncing war.

The postwar "peace" Constitution, though espoused by the American Occupation, embodied the genuine feelings of the Japanese people. ~~In addition, the new Constitution~~

Few welcomed defeat and foreign occupation, but still fewer thirsted for revenge or yearned for the lost days of greatness of empire. In addition, the new Constitution discarded the old controls, designed to perpetuate a strong state, and provided for individual freedom and civil liberties. Institutions were reformed or evolved anew in all fields, especially in education, labor-management relations, and emphasis on mass consumption. All these innovations received wide popular support -- among the older generations, who resented the profitless restraints and sacrifices of the past, as well as among the younger generations, who now take for granted both their freedom and their progress toward affluence.

The freedoms of the new open society well served the national quest for economic security. The energy which had gone into maintaining strong armaments was redirected into rebuilding and then expanding the industrial plant, and improving mass living standards. By dint of grinding toil, sound technology, efficient administration, and prevailing social and political stability (despite occasional turmoil), the Japanese people made, in retrospect, their initial adjustment to the radically changed environment of the postwar world.

Moreover, the multilateral, ~~free~~ and increasingly free and open world economic system, built up by the West since the Second World War, and buttressed by global and regional institutions for cooperation, has provided the ideal environment for Japan and other nations to pursue their national economic objectives. It is neither the jungle of the late

19th century nor the protectionist thicket of the 1930's. Since postwar recovery, the expanding world economic system, secured from all-out war by the relatively stable superpower balance, has favored its economic animals, and Japan among them has prospered.

Japan's postwar recovery was speeded by generous U.S. material assistance and, indirectly, by international developments such as the courageous United Nations defense of the Republic of Korea. By 1952, which also marked the end of the American Occupation, the rebuilt Japanese economy was beginning again to compete successfully in world markets. In subsequent years, under American sponsorship, Japan joined all the major international institutions -- the United Nations and its agencies, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, and others.

Beginning in the mid-1950's, Japan set consistent records in rates of economic growth, progressing from bare subsistence to today's modest prosperity, in which its gross national product surpasses all but the United States in the free world. The goal of affluence, however, remains distant, since Japan's 1968 per capita income of $1,110 ranks but twentieth in the world, a lag reflected in the low incomes of the smaller-scale manufacturing and agricultural enterprises, and in such unmet social-capital needs as roads, sewers, housing, parks and other taken-for-granted public amenities of Western Europe and North America.

This concentration of the Japanese people, first on recovery and then on building the bases for their economic security, has produced gratifying results. The economy continues to grow at one of the highest rates in the world; long-standing weaknesses in the traditional sectors of the economy are gradually being ameliorated; and future growth targets have been set high. In international trade the dynamic Japanese economy has long since outgrown the conceptual confines of a regional autarkic unit, implied in the defunct "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." Although through trade, investment and economic assistance Japan is a major factor in the economic development of free Asia, the Japanese economy is effectively integrated into the global economic system, trading with the remotest corners of the world. (The United States is, of course, the leading partner, accounting for roughly one third of Japan's two-way trade.)

A quarter century after Hiroshima and the arrival of General Douglas MacArthur, Japan has established a strong base for future economic and social development, has earned membership among the world's leading industrial powers, and finds itself accused, from time to time, of being little more than an "economic animal."

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The postwar quest for economic security has been that of an inward-looking people, forced for lack of resources to seek their livelihood in the outside world. Propelled by circumstances into external trade, the Japanese people have nonetheless remained politically aloof, apprehensive of any strife near their shores, fearful lest they become involved in a conflict not of their own making (and, as the mass media frequently emphasize, not their concern). The public conviction has been that the main stress in Japan's foreign relations should be on what came to be known as "economic diplomacy," at least while affluence is yet to be attained at home. The Japanese ~~press, for its part, long regarded the~~ public has long regarded the Economic Affairs Bureau as the principal department in the Foreign Ministry. Nowhere in the popular psychology has there been an popular appetite for Japan's active political leadership in international affairs.

To be sure, the desire to remain aloof from political involvement has not meant disinterest in the rest of the world. The Japanese people have avidly absorbed foreign (mainly Western) trends and achievements in the cultural and recreational fields, as well as the economic, scientific and technological. Foreign travel has increased by leaps and bounds, in keeping with the improvement in living standards. International contacts and interchanges, both private and official, have been growing at an extraordinary rate, and public interest in world affairs (reported voluminously by the influential

Japanese mass media) must be considered at least as great as in any other nation in the world. Reestablishment of the world-wide diplomatic network as soon as the Peace Treaty came into effect, and subsequent affiliation with all the major international organizations, were accepted as a matter of course, largely because this degree of involvement appeared directly related to national prosperity.

Apparently the concept of an inward-looking "little Japan," free of unnecessary foreign entanglement, has appeared preferable to the instinctively feared and discredited alternative of foreign adventurism. This may also explain the public attitude which accepted as necessary the vital and mutually beneficial Security Treaty with the United States, expressing its support at the polls for the Liberal Democratic Party, which sponsored the treaty, while at the same time displaying great uneasiness over any incident involving American bases and forces. Even those who have rejected the little Japan concept speak in terms of an influential Japan, "great without armaments."

However, to dismiss this inward-lookingness as a temporary phenomenon due to horror at defeat and devastation, or to treat it as a form of naïveté that can be dispelled by governmental public relations, is to disregard the role this popular psychology has played in sustaining Japan's successful adaptation over the past twenty-four years.

A quarter century in the short history of modern Japan is not an inconsiderable span. After all, it corresponds to one third of the time elapsed between the Meiji Restoration and Hiroshima. A more realistic reading would be to assume that the inward-looking mentality has deep roots in the new Japan, especially when crowned with the aura of success. Japan has not only achieved reasonable prosperity, but has also enjoyed unbroken peace for the longest period since the Tokugawa era. During this time the people have not only rebuilt their economy, but have also busied themselves in the arts, in literature and other vital areas of civilized life, enriching their great heritage.

There has been a ~~great~~ revival of interest in traditional things which antedated the Meiji Restoration. The amazing postwar flourishing of archeology has pushed back the frontiers of Japan's national origins, and together with the renewed enthusiasm for Japanese history, especially pre-Meiji, there is a strong concentration on things Japanese. Inward-lookingness is apparently satisfying a deep-seated need for the Japanese people to find themselves, and to reestablish their identity. In this sense it may have something in common with the fierce Meiji determination to keep Japan free from foreign domination.

Another remarkable result of Japan's postwar adaptation is the transformation apparent in the national personality, as manifested in politics, in business, in labor relations, and in the daily intercourse of all Japanese, regardless of

station. The democratization of Japanese society is especially evident in politics, since even the most conservative bureaucrat now knows that the public cannot be "guided," but must be "persuaded" or "sold." He also knows that ~~the~~ sales resistance on the part of the public is high, especially on "outward-looking" subjects such as military security and Japan's political role in the world. Governmental efforts at public relations have yet to produce a consensus on foreign policy, although it must also be acknowledged that there are political forces in Japan that thrive on the lack of consensus.

Interestingly, the now well-established habits of free speech have opened up for discussion such dreaded and once-taboo subjects as nuclear weapons, especially in connection with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, now under close study. There is evidence that serious discussion of "outward-looking" subjects has begun, even in the generally (widely) inward-looking media, although not yet on a popular basis.

Indications are that the Japanese people are slowly becoming aware of further changes in their circumstances, at home and abroad, and are groping toward new forms of adaptation. Some people describe this trend as a revival of nationalism, although whether this assessment is accurate remains to be seen.

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Japan is being challenged anew, domestically and internationally, and may ~~well~~ be on the threshold of a new era of change and adaptation. If so, this period of change may well coincide with a significant generational change in all areas of Japanese leadership.

Domestically Japan faces two great problems, both of which have become increasingly visible irritants with the growth in prosperity. These are ~~the~~ public hazards, which are the by-products of industrialization, and the lack of social capital, which is a legacy of prewar sacrifices, followed by postwar concentration on production. Intense industrialization brought with it pollution and other blights that constitute a growing threat to the public safety. Industrialization also accelerated the urbanization of Japan, spawning huge and sprawling megalopolises while nearly emptying centuries-old villages. Urbanization, in turn, highlighted the inadequacy of public services and amenities during a time when the public was becoming more vocal about its right to enjoy life, and was insistently asking when it might live like the citizens of the second greatest economy in the free world. In some cases, such as the lack of good access roads, the problem has threatened to become a bottleneck to the expansion of production.

Thus it is now acknowledged throughout Japan that the next stage in the quest for economic security must be to improve the Japanese living environment. The next decade, it is widely

agreed, should concentrate not simply on the expansion of production, but (also) on the creation of more social capital and the solution of the problems that prosperity has brought, such as public hazards and the imbalances between city and country life. The press is busy pointing out the shortcomings of the citizens' living conditions, and politicians sensitive to the trend are setting themselves up as champions of the people's demands. The Government is under daily pressure, while scholars and experts are full of suggestions on how best to solve these problems.

In short, the whole issue has more and more assumed the character of a national challenge, a fit subject to occupy national energies for the immediate future. Some estimates of the effort required range as high as 60 to 70 percent of the ~~gross national product~~ over a twenty-year period. It may also be presumed that concentration on these problems will strengthen, rather than weaken, the inward-looking tendencies of the Japanese people.

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On the international front, Japan's adaptability is now being challenged by three striking developments. One is the greatly heightened impact of the Japanese economy on the rest of the world. Another is the changing role of the United States in Pacific Asia. The third is the growth among Asian nations of confidence in their own development efforts, coupled with a ~~strengthening~~ growing sense of regionalism. Together these trends highlight Japan's unique position in Asia, and call for a considered Japanese response.

The Japanese economy, because of its sheer size and strength (by 1975 the gross national product is expected to be four times that of 1960), has become an international factor formidable in its own right. Whatever the subjective wishes of its inward-lookingness, Japan's economic influence could hardly be felt with greater intensity by her partners, including the United States and most of the nations of Asia and the Pacific. Even the Soviet Union can no longer ignore Japan, especially in light of the shift in Sino-Soviet relations. Influence is but another name for responsibility, and the Japanese people are beginning to focus attention on how Japan will fulfill its new role in the company of such industrial powers as France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Clearly Japan can no longer be a passive agent in international affairs, particularly since economic power has become, in the eyes of the world, political power. The United States, for example, which objects to what it considers continuing ~~Japanese~~ restrictions on foreign access to ~~domestic~~ Japanese markets, has raised this matter to the

proportions of a major political issue.

It is unthinkable that Japan will not respond, in the spirit of give and take, to its international responsibilities in the economic field. To fail to do so would not only be damaging to the cooperative framework of the world economic system, but would also ultimately be contrary to the best interests of Japan, which depends for its own economic viability on the harmonious functioning of the multilateral cooperative system. Japan's unwillingness to accommodate our interests to those of our partners -- such as an overly cautious attitude in lowering its barriers to foreign trade and investment -- if pushed to an extreme, could in the long run result in the isolation and alienation which Japan experienced in the bitter 1930's.

It is more profitable in the long run for Japan to defend its interests within the framework of the world system than outside it, and toward that end Japan should do its part in strengthening the system. Not all the demands of our trading partners are just and equitable, all the time, and each issue should be dealt with firmly on its merits, but only within the framework of the system.

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Japan's second important challenge in external affairs is the advent of what is called multipolarity in international relations, and the attendant changes in the relations of each of the two superpowers with its less powerful allies. This trend has not altered the fundamental structure of the U.S.-Soviet global equilibrium of force, but it has led the United States, after deep soul-searching on the burdens it has carried in Vietnam, to reexamine its role in the maintenance of international peace and stability, especially in Asia. As President Nixon has now made clear, the United States, while it has every intention of fulfilling its treaty commitments, nonetheless expects the nations of Asia to assume increasing responsibility for their own internal and external security, apart from cases involving the threat of nuclear weapons.

In this context, Japan has naturally become highly ~~very~~ visible to Americans as an Asian power with the potential for contributing to the security of the region. Obviously a simple transfer of peace-keeping responsibilities in Asia, from the United States to Japan, is out of the question because of both Japanese Constitutional limitations and the great disparity in both actual and potential military power between our two countries. The psychology of Japanese public opinion, which we have examined at some length in these pages, is not at all prepared for such an undertaking, nor I ~~am sure~~ believe would the other free nations of Asia welcome it. ~~In practical terms, moreover,~~

Responsible Americans will understand, I am sure, that any ill-conceived Japanese military contributions to Asian stability would accomplish little except to squander Japan's security capabilities, and her painstakingly built-up goodwill in Asian countries, as well as domestic public support for the Self-Defense Forces.

In practical terms, moreover, it is reasonable to assume that for some time to come there will be no substitute for the continuing presence of American deterrent power to counter effectively any designs for large-scale military adventures in the area.

What is feasible, ~~however,~~ as President Nixon has suggested, is for the nations of Asia to enhance their ability to shoulder their own security responsibilities. In the case of certain countries, this might mean that when necessary they would be ready to take over with their own troops any part of the visible American presence which Washington, under its modified strategy, may transfer elsewhere.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces, I believe, are now making an important contribution to the keeping of the peace in East Asia because of the vital role they play in guaranteeing the primary defense of Japan, including the immediate security of U.S. bases in Japan. As a result, the American military presence in the Japanese Islands is able to devote itself to the ultimate mission which it alone is equipped to perform: the deterrence of major war. This same division of labor will be applicable to Okinawa, after reversion, when Japan will be prepared to assume full responsibility for the security of

the American bases there.

Japan's self-defense capability is not inconsiderable. Although Japanese military forces may not Constitutionally be deployed abroad, they constitute a formidable homeland defense, 000,000 strong, with conventional firepower greater than that of the Imperial forces at their wartime peak. Our military expenditures, $000,000,000 in the current fiscal year, are increasing annually at 14-15 percent, or at the same rate as our growth in gross national product. According to some projections, this means that in about ten years Japan's defense budget will correspond to Communist China's, plus China's backbreakingly expensive nuclear-weapons development program. Japan, in short, is already self-reliant in terms of its own security, apart from the threat of nuclear war. This, in the framework of our security treaty relations with the United States, is, I believe, a useful contribution to the peace and stability of East Asia.

I am also convinced that Japan is performing another vital role in furthering Asian stability. This is in the form of our support to Asian nations in their efforts to achieve a viable national existence in economic and social fields. Their success in these areas is not only essential to their internal stability, but can also insure, in the long run, their capacity to assume greater responsibility for their own security.

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The nations of Asia, from Korea to the great Indian subcontinent, have been struggling since the end of World War II to establish viable states. Despite great obstacles, they have made progress, chiefly through their own efforts, but also with varying degrees of external aid. In many cases their progress has been possible because of the stability resulting from the American presence in Asia. There has been no real movement, during this same period, toward any lasting form of regional groupings that might one day lead to a community of nations such as has developed in Europe. This is understandable for historical reasons, and because of the great cultural, religious, ethnic and other differences which characterize Asia.

Nevertheless, successes in internal development of these nations has now led them to a stage where they are showing active interest in effective regional cooperation. Some countries in the area have been asking questions about Japan's capabilities, as the region's leading economic power, to expand its assistance to Asian nation-building efforts.

An early Japanese response to this fresh development was the setting up of the Southeast Asian Development Ministers Conference, which held its first meeting in 1966. That same year Japan made a decisive contribution to capital of the Asian Development Bank, insuring its early operation. At about the same time Japan lent its cooperation to the establishment of the Asian and Pacific Council, which held its fourth

ministerial meeting in Japan earlier this year. These initiatives, combined with Japan's long standing activities as a leading member of the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (where plans for the Asian Development Bank originated) have been accepted by the Japanese public as ~~types~~ forms of constructive economic cooperation, and as manifestations of Japan's willingness to play a useful role in promoting wider regional cooperation.

This is a cause in which Japan I believe can perform most effectively. To fail to respond to the expectations of our Asian neighbors would retard the development of a viable Asian community with Japan as an active and cooperating member. In the absence of such a community Japan would be excessively dependent on the United States to maintain the stability of its security frontiers. While the "little Japan" mood takes the U.S. presence for granted, and treats it as a substitute for regional cohesion, it would be dangerous to count on this substitution as permanent. The sensible alternative is for Japan to shoulder its external responsibilities in the framework of expanding regional cooperation.

An important element in this cooperation is Japanese economic and technical aid. ~~This~~ Assistance to Asian countries reached the level of $000,000,000 last year, and will rise 00 percent to $000,000,000 in the current year. As I promised the assembled Southeast Asian Development Ministers in Bangkok last April, and as my colleague Finance Minister Takeo Fukuda made clear to the Second Annual Meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Sydney that same month, Japan is prepared to increase

its economic aid substantially, and hopefully to double present levels of aid to Asia within five years. In confirmation of this intent, the Cabinet approved in July Japan's commitment to participate in a decade-long Asian development effort during the 1970's.

Economic assistance, however, is only part of the task. What is also needed is a larger objective toward which all our diverse cooperative efforts may be directed. I personally believe, on the basis of our own historical experience and our view of the future, that no objective is more important than the construction in East Asia of a viable community of nations, embodying "unity in diversity." I believe the nations of Asia should help each other develop, each according to its own particular conditions, aiming toward the attainment of a harmonious and stable whole. Japan should put at the disposal of other Asian countries its own experience at adaptation, so these countries too may adapt to modern conditions in their own ways.

Japan's role should be one of service to each country in the region that is willing to accept it, and to the region as a whole. Needless to say, this is a role Japan can perform only with the agreement of its partners. A long series of talks, both bilateral and multilateral, must precede and accompany this undertaking so there will be no doubts about the intentions of all concerned. This is a task that will take a very long time, and will involve great numbers of people, Japanese and others. It will certainly cost money

and energy, and will no doubt produce much criticism and little praise. Careful planning will be required, and plans and priorities will have to be geared to each country's particular conditions and, of course, to Japan's capabilities. It will be a vast and demanding enterprise, but it is in Japan's own interests to take vigorous part in it.

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Comparing the domestic and external challenges Japan now faces, it is apparent that the two sets of problems are in competition with each other -- for the allocation of available resources and energies, and in capturing the interest and loyalties of the popular Japanese mind. It would not be much of an exaggeration to speculate that, if nature were to take its course, the average Japanese would be far more interested in solving the knotty and multitudinous problems at home than in making the painful switchover to an "outward looking" frame of mind, in order to reach a consensus on Japan's role in the outside world. However, the Japanese mind is characterized by resilience and shrewdness, and has proved it is capable of adapting. Furthermore, as I have already observed, the recognition is steadily spreading that Japan's external circumstances are changing.

It is becoming clearer that Japan must deal with both its external responsibilities and its domestic challenges. We must act domestically if we are going to prevent our home environment from becoming unfit for life, and we must act internationally to insure that our external environment will be livable. Successful adaptation to these changing conditions requires a skillful blending of both responses. Obviously the domestic challenges will cost vastly more than the external. The problem of resource allocation can be solved, therefore, by working out a rational set or priorities to meet external requirements, leaving ample flexibility to cope with unforeseen problems in such a long-term undertaking.

So far I have barely touched on the most important problem: how to secure the support of the Japanese people. Obviously it is not enough to harangue the people on the need to divest themselves of inward-looking attitudes. Sales resistance to this approach is strong. In my view the only course is to appeal to the innate good sense of the Japanese people, nurturing carefully the tender shoots of dialogue that are already emerging in public discussion. The Government owes the Japanese people a full explanation of the national interests involved in these endeavors. The public's voluntary support should be solicited. Leadership should be patient in explaining to the people, both through the Diet and directly, bearing in mind Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's recent observations to the Tokyo Foreign Correspondents Club:

> It is clear that the [Japanese] people are no longer satisfied with a merely negative pacifism aiming only at the country's safety. However, at the same time, national objectives which are not in harmony with the way the individual citizens view the world in today's modern society are not viable.

Since these are very long-range undertakings, it is both possible and desirable to devote considerable time and energy ~~in~~ to encouraging public interest in outward-looking ideas, gradually weaning ~~them~~ the public away from little-Japanism.

At the same time, various aspects of the external program can be initiated through practical measures, where the Government has the authority, and where it does not, Diet approval can be sought. I am confident that the cumulative effects of both action and explanation will bring favorable public response.

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Finally, I should like to touch briefly on the future environment with which we must learn to deal anew. In carrying out the endeavors I have proposed it is obvious that Japan must be extremely sensitive to the requirements of the Asian countries with which we will be working. It is equally obvious that we should give careful thought to two of the three great entities of our region: Communist China and the United States. If the undertakings I have suggested get under way, we may expect that Pacific Asia in the 1970's will display increasingly complex relationships among the superpowers, Communist China and Japan.

The Chinese Communists at this moment show no predictability as to the future direction of their policies, internal or external, so I cannot foresee with confidence what their reaction will be. They must realize by now that none of the countries from the Japan Sea to the Indian Ocean, including the Communist regimes, would welcome the establishment of a Chinese sphere of influence in this area. Whether China will interpret our intentions in hostile or indifferent terms remains to be seen.

It seems safe to predict, however, that the Communist Chinese will have to take more notice of Japan as our national influence, in keeping with our responses to new challenges, continues to rise.

For our part, we are prepared to continue our present policies of maintaining diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and nongovernmental economic and cultural contacts with Peking, and as long as there is any danger that the Republic of China may be evicted from the United Nations, of avoiding such an eventuality.

At the same time I am aware that, according to some, perpetuating the isolation of Peking is conducive to neither stability nor peaceful development in Asia, and I am of the opinion that in coming years serious attention should be given to this problem. I privately think that the question of attaining a viable equilibrium in relations between nuclear-equipped Peking and ourselves should be answered by perhaps the decade after the next. Suffice it to say that the Communist Chinese question is a fundamental one and, as such, figures in our domestic political life, where many elements are attempting to prove that we are being forced by the United States to follow its lead. It is hardly necessary for me to deny this allegation.

As I have already implied, the regional military balance in East Asia is essentially that between our ally the United States and Communist China. In the context of the U.S. deterrent, I am sure the United States will welcome my proposals to help the countries of the region with their nation-building, which after all is the foundation for their security and stability.

Turning to current bilateral issues between Japan and the United States, considerable public attention has been focused in both countries on the problems of the reversion of Okinawa and of economic relations between the two countries.

The problem of the return of Okinawa, which has been the subject of exchange visits to our respective countries by Secretary of State William P. Rogers and myself, will hopefully be resolved late this fall when Prime Minister Sato visits President Nixon. Resolution of this issue will be meaningful, not only in the obvious sense that a long-separated part of our people will return to the fold, and not only because this will be accomplished through peaceful and friendly talks between our two governments. It will be meaningful also in the sense that the return of Okinawa will lift the last excuse in our public mind that we can cling to our inward-lookingness. With Okinawa -- so long a symbol of our defeat and impotence -- back in our midst, our strength will have been made whole again, and we will be ready for our responsibilities. Here lies the importance of Okinawa to history.

Furthermore I anticipate that the return of Okinawa will give greater force to our demand on the Soviet Union to return our Northern Islands. It will also help surmount the so-called "problem of 1970," when Opposition forces plan a grand effort to force the Government to abrogate the Security Treaty with the United States, something the Government has no wish to do.

I wish also to stress the fact that U.S. forces will remain on Okinawa, to keep the peace in the region.

As for the very complicated economic problems, I have already touched briefly on some of their aspects, pointing out that Japan is prepared to play its part in maintaining and developing the world economic system, and that it is actively pursuing the liberalization of trade and capital investment, at the maximum speed consistent with domestic economic factors. It is also self-evident that the difficult problems facing the multilateral economic system, both in monetary and trade fields, can be overcome only through the closest international cooperation, and with effective leadership from such economic giants as the United States and the European Economic Community. I should like to add that economic relations between the United States and Japan have proved by their nature to be mutually profitable over the long run. We need each other. Thus there should be no issue between us that cannot be settled by honest and well-thought-out give-and-take.

Unique among the world's advanced nations, Japan has been obliged to make extraordinary adjustments and adaptations in the short span of a century. Though our national psyche may bear some scars, we have been resilient as a people, and so far, successful. Now we must respond to new problems, because if we fail to do so we may not succeed when the next major challenge confronts us.

I, for one, am an optimist, and one of my favorite sayings is: "Listen to the call of the 21st century." It is my hope that with hard and perhaps painful work, my people by that time will have transcended the discontinuities of their past, and will be vital participants in the affairs of both the Asian and the world communities.

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