

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

## 米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 啓発・広報(Ⅲ)

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参事官

国務部副官課長 杉本  
5/15 5/21

北米米一課長  
5/13 5/21  
西村

昭和44年4月15日

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外務大臣殿

在ニューヨーク  
奈良総領事



沖縄・安保問題に関する講演  
報告

1. 当館野口副領事は当地 Fordham University の Student Bar Association の要請により 11 日同大学の Law School に於いて沖縄・安保問題に関する講演を行なった。同講演はキリスト教別荘に於いて行な

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将以下記のとおり報告す。

2. 野口副領事によれば、当日付の Student Bar Association へは、約 60 名が集まり、終始熱心に傾聴し、講演後も活発な質問が行なわれた。

質問の内容は、「安保条約は日本の利益に於いて、米国の利益に於いて如何か如何」、「日本は米国の核の傘の下で経済的發展を専心し、今や世界最大の工業国となつたが、アジアの安定に如何の責任を果して居るのか」、「ウイナム戦争では日本は全然協力して居るのか、北越も貿易しており、sit on the fence の態度を執つて居ると思ふ如何」、「極東、東南アジアにおける日本の経済的利益は如何の地域

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か共産主義の支配下に入れば大連打撃を  
受けたと拘らず日本は仍改訂の地域  
防衛に協力するかの。」「再軍備と海外派  
兵を禁止して日本現憲法は近いうち改  
正の可能性があるか。」「もし日本が日  
本及びアジアから米軍を引上げれば日本は  
どうなると思いか。」等極めて批判的の多  
かつた。 此ら質問に対して、日本は  
極東を共産侵略から守るべくして米軍  
の利益、日本の国民感情、憲法上の制約、日  
米間における中共に対する見方の相違、中  
国のウイグルなどを含む後進国援助の実績等  
を挙げて説明しておいた趣である。  
予 ~~（経歴）~~ を通じて野に副領事か得た  
所最次、と対。

3. 以上の質疑応答からみて 何時バタム  
戦争に召集されるかもしれぬ米国の  
若い世代にとつて、日本が共産主義との  
対決において 然るべき責任を果していけ  
ぬに不満があり、日本が米国の肩代り  
してアジアの安定に一層寄加することを  
望む気持が強いことが伺われる。  
~~今後~~ 今後対米PRの行方として  
日本が抱えている多くの問題（一人当り  
国民所得の低さ、社会資本蓄積の  
少なさ、経済の二重構造、憲法上の  
制約、核アレルギー等）の理解を深め  
~~これを説明する~~ <sup>（の）</sup> ことも必要であるが  
他方日本がアジアの安定と発展のために  
大いに寄与しては実績（8億、5500万ドル）

の援助、1万人以上の技術留學生の受け入れ、  
300人以上の技術援助員の派遣、加3次  
防衛計画等)を積極的にPRすることが  
肝要であると考えられる。

本信送付先: 在米大使

本者

"Beyond 1970"

A Speech by Mr. Y. Noguchi, Vice-Consul  
at the Student Bar Association, Law School  
Fordham University, on April 10, 1969

Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is indeed a great honor and a privilege for me to have this opportunity to address all of you today. I would like to thank the Student Bar Association for its kind invitation to speak before you on the important subject of Japan-U. S. relations.

People often say these days that Japan-U. S. relations are on the verge of a severe crisis, that somehow we are reaching a major turning point in our relations. A few days ago the League of Women Voters in Connecticut held a conference under what might be considered an alarming title: "The United States and Japan: A Time of Crisis?" And so the question immediately occurs, are we really approaching some kind of unavoidable crisis, and if so, what is the nature of this crisis?

When people say it is "a time of crisis," they usually have the year 1970 in mind. Now no doubt the year 1970 will become a most crucial time for the relationship between our two countries, for on the 23rd of June of that year either Japan or the United States will have the right to abrogate the Security Treaty between our two countries in accordance with the provisions contained in it. In Japan

itself those who are opposed to the treaty are presently engaged in expanding their protest movement which will increase in intensity and scope. So Japanese public opinion is divided on this question.

But there is another important issue pending between our two countries, namely the explosive one of the early reversion of Okinawa to Japanese civil administration, which is intimately related to the treaty issue. Unlike the divided public opinion over the Security Treaty, Japanese national feeling in favor of the early reversion of Okinawa is unanimous; and so unless this issue is solved in such a manner as to meet the Japanese people's earnest desire, the opposition to the Security Treaty will gain tremendous popular support and may succeed, by applying irresistible pressure on the Japanese Government, in its goal of having the treaty repealed. Put in other words, how the Okinawa issue is settled will determine in which direction public opinion will be swayed in regard to the Security Treaty. And it goes without saying that if the Security Treaty is discontinued, this will have a disastrous effect upon the future course of Japan-U. S. relations.

In this very real sense, the year 1970 will be a time of great trials, if not "a time of crisis," in the history of our post-war relations. In order to weather the difficult times ahead, we need,

now more than ever, greater mutual understanding of the problems not only between our two governments but also between our two peoples. I say we need the mutual understanding between our two peoples because no government policy can be successful in the end unless it has the understanding and backing of its people as demonstrated in this country by the Vietnam issue. For this very reason, I am here today, having accepted your kind invitation to speak on the issue of Okinawa in recognition of its significance.

Okinawa is a coral island, the largest of the Ryukyu Chain, which is located in the East China Sea, occupying roughly the center of a triangle formed by the southern Japanese island of Kyushu, the Asian Mainland, and northern Taiwan. Equidistant from each by less than 500 miles or less than the distance between Buffalo and Chicago, it is comparable in size to Long Island with a circumference of 268 miles and in shape to New Zealand. The Ryukyu Islands consist of 72 islands with a land area of 936 square miles. Okinawa, the main island, is 453 square miles in area. The islands are mountainous, being composed mainly of elevated coral reefs which have formed tablelands and isolated hills, and they have a population of over 960,000.

Scholars agree that in terms of cultural, linguistic and ethnic background, the Okinawans are indisputably Japanese. Being far from

the central Japanese authority, however, until the early 19th century, the Ryukyu Islands had remained a small kingdom that paid tribute both to Japan and to China. But from the beginning of the 17th century, their trade and cultural contacts with Japan proper, particularly with the Satsuma feudal fief in Southern Kyushu, became closer. And finally, in 1879, shortly after the Meiji Restoration, the islands were incorporated as a prefecture into the administrative jurisdiction of the Japanese Government.

With the U. S. occupation at the end of World War II, the Ryukyu chain was placed under U. S. military administration. The Peace Treaty of 1951, which officially terminated the state of war between Japan and the United States and ended the occupation of Japan proper, endorsed the continuation of this military administration in Article 3. That Article states: "Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and Daito Islands)... Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters." Although Japan renounced in the

Peace Treaty its right, title, and claim to all territories it acquired since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 through World War II, it did not do so with regard to the Ryukyu Islands, for they were incorporated, as I have already said, into Japan proper at the time of the Meiji Restoration and since then considered as an integral part of the country. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State at the time of the Peace Treaty, himself indirectly recognized this fact when he admitted at the Peace Conference that Japan has "residual sovereignty" over those islands.

Thus the status of the Ryukyu Islands as stipulated in the Peace Treaty was a compromise formula. It was worked out by taking into account the necessity of maintaining American military control over the islands and the possibility of eventually returning them to Japan. And yet today, almost 17 years after the Peace Treaty, these islands remain under U. S. military control. To the Japanese people, this is an intolerable situation, for it reminds them, as an unhealed wound, of the bitter experience of the war.

It should be understandable, therefore, after nearly a quarter of a century since the end of the war, that the Japanese people's earnest desire for the reversion of Okinawa has overwhelming popular support. We believe that the independence, regained through the Peace Treaty of 1951, will not be complete until and unless Okinawa is returned to Japanese civil administration. This national desire has become increasingly intense in recent years both in Japan proper and in Okinawa. The Okinawan people themselves have vividly expressed

their desire to return to their motherland in the recent election of Mr. Chobyō Yara as the Chief Executive of the Ryukyu Government, an individual whose campaign slogan was "the immediate, complete, and unconditional return of Okinawa" to Japan. This fact alone is, I believe, sufficient to refute a misleading and ill-informed contention, sometimes heard among certain quarters, that the people in Okinawa prefer independence to a return to Japan.

With the growing desire in Japan proper and Okinawa for the return of Okinawa, Prime Minister Sato came to the United States in November, 1967 and conveyed it to then President Johnson. President Johnson expressed a full understanding of the Japanese people's desire, but due to the grim realities of the Vietnam War, he was unable to commit himself to a definite timetable. In the communique issued after their talk, it was stated that Prime Minister Sato stressed that both governments would, within a few years, agree upon the date of the return of Okinawa which would be satisfactory to both of them. Prime Minister Sato is expected to visit the United States again this fall for talks with President Nixon on this issue.

But the question of Okinawa is not very simple; it also involves the existence of huge American military bases which compounds the problem. And the handling of this question of military bases on Okinawa is necessarily related to the significant role these bases are playing not only in the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East, but particularly in the defense of Japan. Any assessment of

this role will, of course, be affected by an evaluation of the nature of the existing threat in these regions and <sup>by</sup> the conceptions of how peace can be best maintained there.

According to a report issued by the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the U. S. Congress on February 18, 1966, there are 117 military bases in the Ryukyu Islands, occupying 13% of the land. On the main island of Okinawa, American military bases occupy nearly one quarter of the land area. Before the direct U. S. involvement in the Vietnam War, the total number of U. S. forces was about 48,000. As for the presence of nuclear weapons, former Secretary of Defense McNamara, in his statement on the defense budget for 1965, said that the United States had deployed two divisions of Mace B missiles on the island. From these simple facts it is clear that Okinawa, being the site for major training, supply, transit, and operational bases, is an important "stepping stone" in the strategy for the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

The existence of huge military bases has created economic and social problems on Okinawa. On the one hand, the island economy has become heavily dependent upon their existence with many Okinawans' jobs related, directly or indirectly, to the bases. The use of these bases in the Vietnam conflict, on the other hand, has given rise to fears among the Okinawans that they might become directly involved in another war, these apprehensions having resuscitated,



in effect, the haunting memories of their miserable experiences during the closing days of World War II. In addition, occasional accidents involving B-52 bombers and the storage of nuclear weapons on the island further exacerbate these apprehensions.

Given the existence of these military bases, the question of the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese civil administration cannot be solved without dealing with their future status. At present there are many divergent views concerning this matter, ranging from the demand for complete withdrawal of all bases to that for their continuation under present conditions. Those who advocate the former believe that the existence of military bases is not a stabilizing factor in the maintenance of peace in the Far East. On the contrary, they argue that the bases in fact promote instability by threatening the security of Communist China. The Japanese Government, on the other hand, recognizes the important role which the bases have played in maintaining peace and stability in the Far East, and in the defense of Japan itself. At the same time, however, the government cannot disregard the growing feeling among the Japanese that the return of Okinawa with nuclear weapons intact and/or the unconditional use of these bases might invite nuclear attack from Communist China or the Soviet Union or involve Japan in a war which it does not want.

On March 8th, the Research Society of the Okinawa Base Question, composed of leading Japanese intellectuals, issued a report titled, "The Return of Okinawa and the Status of the Bases." This report urges that the return of Okinawa be expedited as early as possible, preferably no later than 1972, and it goes on to state that the American military bases on Okinawa should come under the same status as those in Japan proper in accordance with the provisions of the Security Treaty.

In fixing the date of the return of Okinawa and agreeing upon the future status of the military bases, both the Japanese and the United States Governments will have to take such an opinion into serious consideration. Prime Minister Sato himself, with this kind of public opinion behind him, reportedly said in a recent session of the Diet that it would be difficult to place Okinawa on a different status from that of Japan proper in relation to United States military bases after the reversion of the islands. He also pointed out that whether or not the United States deploys nuclear weapons in Okinawa, its bases would not be effective unless understanding of the Okinawans is gained and that if nuclear weapons are stationed there, the effectiveness of the bases will be further reduced. Therefore, in order to avoid anti-American movements around the military bases and to insure

their effective operation, it would be most advisable for the United States to return the islands in such a way as to meet the Okinawan people's desire.

It is expected that the Okinawa reversion issue will be dealt with in a considerably relaxed manner when the islands are actually returned to Japan. This expectation is based on a number of assumptions. The first is that, by the time Okinawa is actually returned to Japan--which is hoped to be within the next 3-5 years--the Vietnam War will have been settled and the situation in Asia will be stable. Second, it is assumed that advances in science and technology by the time of its return will make maintenance of nuclear weapons on Okinawa unnecessary. So upon these two assumptions the Japanese Government hopes to solve simultaneously the two questions of the reversion timetable and the future status of the military bases.

Whenever the status of the Okinawa bases after reversion is discussed, the question is inevitably raised of the extension of the Security Treaty to the islands and of the conditions under the treaty regarding the use of military bases. At this point the problem of Okinawa converges with that of the Security Treaty--arguments about the former inevitably lead to the latter. Those opposed to the Security Treaty, for example, regularly try to capitalize on the

national desire for the early return of Okinawa. So at this point I would like to refer to this second major issue in present Japan-U. S. relations.

Let me begin by mentioning one salient feature of this treaty which many Americans are unaware of or misconstrue. The existing Security Treaty, revised in 1960, will not expire automatically in 1970. According to the terms of this treaty, either party after 1970 can abrogate it by giving a one-year advance notice of his desire to do so. Hence, unless either Japan or the United States notifies the other of its wish to terminate the treaty, it will continue to be in force after 1970 as long as both parties want it.

With 1970 around the corner, the controversy over the Security Treaty, as that over the Okinawa issue, has been increasing in intensity in Japan. And again like the Okinawa issue, there are many divergent opinions on this matter. The socialists and the other leftists are at one extreme. Favoring a foreign policy of unarmed neutrality, they vocally demand the total abrogation of it. Then, at the other extreme there are those who argue that the security set-up with the United States should be further stabilized and strengthened by deleting the one-year advance notice clause and fixing in its stead another period of ten or more years for the Security Treaty to be in effect.

Now it is true that there are strong feelings in Japan against the treaty, but at the same time many people admit the important

role which it has played and is still playing in the defense of Japan. Public opinion, therefore, is seriously divided on this vital question, and it is no exaggeration to speak of it as a very volatile situation. In view of this delicate situation, the Japanese Government, in order to avoid violent demonstrations such as those which occurred in 1960 against the existing treaty, may consider it advisable to take no action to terminate the treaty, thereby allowing it to remain in force. By doing so the anti-American and anti-government movement will be denied a chance to mount vociferous attacks, particularly of the kind which marked the passage of the treaty through the Diet in 1960. If the Okinawa issue, however, is not handled properly, this very same anti-American and anti-government movement will be able to muster a national outcry to force the government to repeal the Security Treaty. A failure to correctly analyze this situation and respond appropriately, therefore, by either the Japanese or the U. S. Governments, will only feed the fires of this movement and help it to grow. In short, the communist elements will be able to capitalize on such a failure out of proportion to their actual strength.

To you Americans who have been fighting in Vietnam against Communist aggression, the strong Japanese feelings in opposition to American military bases may be difficult to comprehend. We know the idea is increasingly expressed here that the U. S. ought to curtail its foreign commitments and pass on some of its responsibility as world policeman to other countries. Some Americans go as far as to insist that Japan ought to reinforce its self-defense forces

and assume more responsibility for maintaining the peace and prosperity in Asia in return for the reversion of Okinawa and the continuation of the Security Treaty beyond 1970. Such an insistence ignores the real situation in Japan and, if pushed too hastily, will only invite strong anti-American sentiments among the Japanese.

Certainly the Japanese Government and many of its people recognize that Japan, having reached its present high level of economic development, should share the responsibility for the peace and economic development of Asia which is commensurate with its position as the second largest industrial power in the free world. Recently the government has been actively disseminating not only this sense of responsibility, but also the sense of love of country and its defense among the populace. Yet despite these efforts the fact remains that the necessity of reinforcing our self-defense forces is not widely felt among them.

This attitude of the Japanese people can be attributed to two psychological factors resulting from World War II. One is a deeply imbedded resolve never to repeat the war experience, for the Japanese as a people have known the incalculable miseries wrought by the devastation of war. This natural abhorrence of war has produced an extreme sensitivity in the minds of the people, indeed to such an extent that they react very emotionally to war-

related issues and even shun the vital question of the defense of their own country. The second psychological factor causing Japanese reluctance to assume more responsibility in Asian affairs is related to the first. Japan's political and military ventures in Asia during World War II were generally regarded by Asians and others as an attempt to dominate Asia, and so the Japanese feel today that Japan had better not take any action which might be interpreted again by Asians as another attempt to gain political and military hegemony.

Another factor, which should be mentioned here, is the Japanese people's lack of a sense of foreign threat. The findings of a recent public opinion poll conducted in Japan indicate that a high percentage of the people still feel no foreign threat, although the possibility of communist take-over of the entire Korean Peninsula is increasingly regarded as a definite threat to the security of Japan. These many factors, when tied to the idealistic concept of pacifism, tend to cause the Japanese to adopt a negative or a passive attitude toward the maintenance of American military bases and the strengthening of its self-defense forces. Even to this day these attitudes are widely held and strongly supported by a majority of the people, despite the efforts of the government in recent years to awaken them to the realities of international politics, to force them to recognize the necessity for strengthening our self-defense forces, and to assume more responsibility for the peace and prosperity of Asia.

I have presented to you the real situation in Japan. While we in the government are now trying to the best of our ability to bring the Japanese state of mind in accord with the realities of the world, it will take some time to accomplish this fully. If the United States, either out of ignorance or disregard, continues to insist on holding onto Okinawa as it is at present, or demands impetuously that the Japanese greatly increase their military capabilities rapidly, then strong anti-American sentiments will surely be induced and Japan will find itself in a great turmoil. The end result, needless to say, would be disastrous to the relations between our countries. If the United States, on the other hand, correctly understanding this situation, meets the Japanese people's desire for the return of Okinawa, it will serve to cement the friendly relationship we now have and lay a firm foundation for our future harmony.

The recent Japan-U.S. Conference which took place in Kyoto in January, and was attended by prominent Japanese and Americans, endorsed this view. The Chairmen summarized the conference as follows: "The problem of Okinawa is urgent because the manner of its solution is bound to exert decisive influence on the future course of Japan's efforts to identify a new role for itself in the arena of international politics. And this in turn will decide the future of U.S. -Japan relations." Prime Minister Sato himself said on March 7th that "the fact that to this day Okinawa remains separated from the Japanese mainland has given rise to all sorts of misunderstandings

involving basic problems in Japan-U. S. relations."

Indeed there has never been a time in the post-war history of Japan-U. S. relations when so much mutual understanding is required. We Japanese will recognize that the American people, being overly concerned with the Vietnam War and domestic problems, are not in a mood to understand the real situations faced by other people and that you tend to be impatient with requests for understanding from them. In addition, it may seem to many Americans that the Okinawa issue has no importance to the United States.

But the Okinawa issue is important, a fact which I cannot repeat and stress enough, so important that it will have a decisive effect upon future Japan-U-S. relations. And precisely because it is decisive, neither the U. S. Government nor the American people can afford to treat it lightly or remain ignorant of the factors involved. To do so, as I have already stated, is to give ammunition to the anti-American movement which, in all likelihood, will burst out over the length and breadth of Japan. If this should come to pass, Americans, upon hearing of violent waves of Japanese anti-American demonstrations, might conceivably demand the total withdrawal of American forces, which of course will be necessarily related to the antecedent misunderstanding of Japanese feelings regarding the

Okinawa issue. Japan-U. S. relations will then have suffered a severe setback. A few days ago at the League of Women Voters' meeting in New Haven, Professor Reischauer even conjectured that if the United States should repeal the Security Treaty and withdraw all American forces from Japan as well as other Asian countries, Japan, feeling a power vacuum in Asia, might go down the path of rearmament and eventually seek nuclear arms. At the same time he expressed his opinion that this will not actually occur, and I fully share his view. But no one can predict the ~~future~~<sup>future</sup>. We can only say this need not happen if the United States, with the full understanding of the Japanese people's earnest desire, returns Okinawa at an early date in such a manner as to meet it.

In conclusion, it is my conviction that what is called a 1970 crisis can be avoided and even turned into a time for cementing the foundation of the present friendly relationship between our two countries. Let us hope that the leaders and people of both our countries will show wisdom and understanding in successfully surmounting this time of trials in our relations.

Thank you.