

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 啓発・広報(Ⅲ)

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高杉ロスマンネルズ総領事演説


高橋

参事官
北米第一課長

「ロス」第108号
昭和44年12月1日

外務大臣殿

在ロス・アンジェルス
高橋 総領事



沖縄問題に関する演説テキスト送付

当地の西のアンジェルス日系市民協会(JACL)及び当市
郊外 Huntington Park 市のクリスタル・クラブの会合にお
いて、本官の沖縄返還について夫々12月6日及び8
日演説を行なわれ、そのテキスト各一部別添送
付する。

同様の会合においても与えられた時間が短か

GA-4

外務省

4035

問題の全貌を説明する事ができない事が予め明
らかである。事前協議の問題の論旨をいし
外務省に英を請う承りた。

別紙添附

GA-4

外務省

要処理
首 事務官
南 調査
漁 業
航 空
科学協力
連絡協力
調 査
力 学
局



"AFTER THE SATO-NIXON TALKS..."

by Consul General Kanji Takasugi
before the West Los Angeles J. A. C. L.

Saturday, December 6, 1969

I am very happy and honored to be invited to take part in your important Installation Dinner this evening. First of all, I wish to pay due respect ("gokuro-sama") to the past President and other officers of the West Los Angeles J.A.C.L. for the efforts and contributions they have made in the past year for J.A.C.L. I also wish to express my sincere congratulations ("omedeto") to the incoming President and the new officers who were just installed to their new posts.

I am aware that all of you want to relax to the fullest measure this evening by talking, drinking, and dancing. While it is not my intention to disrupt this mood of yours, my remarks tonight will be somewhat on the serious side.

Last month in Washington, D. C., Jerry Enomoto and Mike Masaoka met our Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon and presented them with medallions commemorating the centennial anniversary of the arrival in California of the first immigrants from Japan. Jerry also gave the leaders of the two nations copies of the newly published book, "Nisei: The Quiet Americans", written by Bill Hosokawa. The occasion was one of the most memorable events that J.A.C.L. has ever had in recent years, and I think that it was not only an outstanding, historical moment but also vivid testimony of how remarkably the Japanese Americans have attained "status" in this country since the end of World War II. The occasion was also one of

- 2 -

of the highlights in the meeting of our two national leaders, demonstrating the very amicable relations existing between our two nations.

As you know, the Sato-Nixon talks took place in Washington, D. C. from the 19th to the 21st of last month. I was so impressed by the results of the talks that I cannot help but pass on to you some background information in the relations between our two countries.

For your reference, I should like to begin by covering some of the historical facts regarding the problem of Okinawa's reversion to Japan - which was the main subject matter of the talks.

Since the end of the war, Okinawa has been and still is under American administrative rule by virtue of Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, Okinawa has never been a part of the territories of the U. S. A. Secretary Dulles stated at the Peace Conference in San Francisco in 1951 that "the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty" over Okinawa.

While it was recognized that Japan retained residual sovereignty over Okinawa and although Japan's status in the comity of nations has been elevated to a remarkable degree in the last few years, no major country other than Japan has had an integral part of her territory, including almost a million people, placed under foreign occupation for almost a quarter of a century. Its national aspiration became focussed on the return of the territory she lost as a result of the war. This is a vital and significant fact which I am inclined to believe the average "man-in-the-street" here does not realize.

Nevertheless

Nevertheless, the development of international situations in Asia, particularly in the 1950s, necessitated not only the continuing presence of U. S. military forces in Okinawa but also resulted in the further re-enforcement of the military bases in those islands. Thus, the American military complex in Okinawa is now the largest overseas base in Asia and is often called the "Keystone in the Pacific." It is publicly admitted that U. S. forces store nuclear weapons in Okinawa and are using the bases for deploying American forces to the neighboring Asian countries. More specifically, Okinawa is a storage point for tactical nuclear weapons, including the MACE-B intermediate range missiles, and has the largest air base in Asia - the Kadena Air Base - from where B-52 strategical bombers are flying to Viet Nam almost daily. Okinawa serves also as the most efficient logistic center for the U. S. in Asia, from where various kinds of weapons, ammunitions, and daily necessities for military personnel are being delivered to all other American military bases located in Asia.

Despite the international developments, the Japanese people, on the other hand, have been very reluctant since the war's end to become involved in any kind of military or political problems arising in Asia and have been extremely sensitive or even "allergic" to anything nuclear. Against this background of national sentiments, the so-called "Prior-consultation system" was introduced when Japan and the U. S. agreed upon the present Security Treaty in 1960. The system purports that the U. S. Government should consult with the Japanese Government for its approval

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if U. S. military forces are to be sent from their bases in Japan to neighboring countries. Consultation for approval also applies if the U. S. is to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan.

Upon reversion, Okinawa will become an integral part of Japan and will regain the status of Okinawa Prefecture as in pre-War days. This is quite clear. The important point we must bear in mind is that the Japan-U. S. Security Treaty will be fully applied to Okinawa. In other words, if Okinawa Prefecture is to be treated, after reversion, on an equal basis with other prefectures in Japan proper, the free use of military bases and the storing of nuclear weapons in Okinawa by the U. S. military forces should be automatically subject to "prior-consultation" between Japan and the U. S. This is the legal and political reason why the Japanese Government took such a firm stand from the outset of the negotiations in proposing to the U. S. Government that the American military bases in Okinawa should be restricted to the same status as that of other military bases located in Japan proper.

Now, the question arises as to how to coordinate those two conflicting factors: first, Japanese legal and political requirements and second, the American military necessities. This question is the most important part of the negotiations between our two Governments.

In the course of the talks with President Nixon (of all the American Presidents, he is best acquainted with Japan, having visited our country six times), Prime Minister Sato recognized an acceptance by Japan of a new, broader strategic concept of Asia, in which Japan will regard attacks on South Korea or Taiwan as threats to the security of Japan. Mr. Sato also agreed

agreed that the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa should not hinder the effective discharge of obligations by the U. S. for the defense of the Far East. The statement by Mr. Sato is the most clear and direct statement ever made by a leading Japanese politician to indicate that Japan is ready to make contributions to the security of that part of Asia which involves Japan. On this particular point, the Los Angeles Times went so far as to state that Japan will not haggle over the use of military bases in Japan in order to facilitate American counter-blows.

As regards nuclear weapons, President Nixon deeply understood the particular sentiment of the Japanese people concerning such weapons. The Joint Communique announced by the two leaders can be interpreted, in effect, that, by the time of the reversion, the U. S. will remove nuclear weapons which are reportedly stored in Okinawa and will consult with Japan if the U. S. is to re-introduce such weapons into Okinawa in an emergency.

In addition to nuclear weapons, the discussion of our two leaders was on Viet Nam, a matter of great concern to the American people and to all of us. As I mentioned earlier, B-52 bombers are flying over to Viet Nam from the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa. Our two leaders agreed that, if peace in Viet Nam is not realized by the time of Okinawa's reversion, the two Governments will consult with each other in order that the reversion will not affect the American efforts to settle the knotty Viet Nam problem.

Now, the important point is this. Immediately after the end of the talks with Mr. Nixon, Mr. Sato in his statement at the National Press

Club

Club in Washington, D. C. made it clear that Japan will take a positive and prompt attitude in consultations with the U. S. in an emergency. In the context of the new, broader strategic concept of Asia which Mr. Sato accepted in the course of his discussion with Mr. Nixon, Mr. Sato's statement reveals his forward-looking posture regarding the execution of prior consultations with the U. S. in the event of an emergency. It is normally interpreted by the American side - not by the Japanese side - that Mr. Sato has admitted that there might be a case where Japan will say "yes" in its consultation with the U. S.

Whether or not Japan takes the forward-looking posture on prior consultations with the U. S. is a most controversial point in the domestic politics of Japan and, naturally, it will be the major subject in the coming general election of the House of Representatives of the Japanese National Diet, which will take place at the end of this month.

Hitherto, the "Prior-consultation system" has been understood by the Japanese left-wingers as a brake to prevent Japan from plunging into war. Their position, which they adhere to very strongly, is that the Japanese Government should always say "no" to any "prior-consultations" with the United States.

Those Japanese who are critical of the Sato Government look upon the new understanding with the United States as too expensive a compensation to pay to the U. S. for the reversion of Okinawa. The opposition parties will severely censure Mr. Sato and his government party on this point in the new session of the National Diet which will be convened early next year. Their contention will be that Sato's policy contradicts the so-called

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"Peace Constitution" of Japan by precipitating Japan into war and that he will nullify the nationally accepted 3-point principles of the non-nuclear policy, namely no possession, no manufacture and no importation of nuclear weapons. It is also feared that the political climate in Japan next year will be extremely turbulent and might be comparable to the political disturbances of 1960 which erupted on the occasion of the signing of the present U. S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Since the end of the last war, the Japanese people have had a tendency to ignore actual situations of international power politics and have viewed the world with too idealistic a pacifism. It has not been until recent years, however, that we have become more and more aware of what our overall national interests are. I am quite confident that the reversion of Okinawa will provide the Japanese people with the most opportune impetus to act upon our overall national interests. We will become used to thinking more realistically and will face squarely the developments in international power politics.

In closing, I wish to emphasize that the reversion of Okinawa was agreed upon within the framework of the close, traditional friendship between Japan and the U. S. Okinawa is a highly political question, particularly for the Japanese people. The agreement reached in finding a solution to the Okinawa question will further strengthen the bonds of mutual trust and friendship between our two countries. I am convinced that it will mark the beginning of a new era in the history of Japan-U.S. relations and that Japan will play a leading part in the conduct of international policies in Asia with the close cooperation of the U. S.

"AFTER THE SATO-NIXON TALKS, WHAT?"

by Consul General Kanji Takasugi
before the Huntington Park Rotary Club

Monday, December 8, 1969

It is a great pleasure for me to be here at your invitation to join the members of the Huntington Park Rotary Club at this enjoyable luncheon today. Since coming to Los Angeles, this is my second appearance before a Rotary Club meeting where I have been given an opportunity to speak at some length.

When I spoke before the previous group of Rotarians some 10 months ago, my subject was voluntary restrictions on exports, particularly on woolen and man-made fiber products, to the United States. At that time, I found that almost all the audience was on our side and that they represented the consumers' interests in the United States in wanting to buy the best possible quality goods at the lowest possible prices regardless of the country where the goods originated. We, the audience and I, were in agreement that by minimizing voluntary export restrictions, the expansion of trade would be further promoted.

Assuming that all of you here today, too, share the same thinking, I should like to change the area of my talk to a subject which I believe to be more timely in terms of our immediate future relations. With your indulgence, therefore, I will limit my remarks in the economic field by briefly citing one example -- to illustrate the tremendous expansion in our national economy. This was the area I had originally planned to discuss in principal.

In 1954, Japan made a reparations agreement with Burma whereby Japan would provide Burma with 20 million dollars worth of goods and services on an annual basis for the duration of the agreement, covering ten years and with the total amount coming to 200 million dollars.

The reparations agreement with Burma was the first of its kind. My position at that time was as a secretary of the conference regarding the reparations agreement, and I vividly recall the serious discussions conducted by officials representing the highest echelon of the Japanese Government and the quandaries on the selection of suitable products for payment to Burma without jeopardizing Japan's national economy. I also recall that besides the top governmental officials, there was considerable concern among the Japanese business world - yet, in looking back, the amount involved was only 20 million dollars a year!

Since the meager days of 1954, involving only 20 million dollars a year, our economic aid to developing countries has increased year by year in keeping with the growth of our economy, and in the calendar year of 1968, the total amount of aid contributed by Japan amounted to more than 1 billion dollars - and this amount is expected to be doubled by the middle '70s as the Japanese economy continues to surge forward.

At this point, I wish to turn now to the subject which I feel is timely for this afternoon. Before doing so, I wish to mention that I served in Okinawa for 20 months before being assigned to my present post in Los Angeles. The reversion of Okinawa to Japan has been a very strong and long-cherished national aspiration of the Japanese people. The return

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of Okinawa to Japan was agreed upon between Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon in their meeting last month in Washington, D. C. I was moved and impressed by the results of the meeting to the extent that I decided to devote the time given me today to the Sato-Nixon talks and to a background of the relations between our two countries.

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