

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国議会（上院審議）(2)

| | |
|-------|---|
| メタデータ | 言語: 出版者: 公開日: 2019-02-05 キーワード (Ja): 外交委員会, 軍事員会, 調書, 想定問答 キーワード (En): 作成者: - メールアドレス: 所属: |
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未
往
電

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

58

電信写

大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会營給

総番号(TA) 57134 主管
71年11月02日12時50分 米 国 発着 米北1
71年11月03日02時57分 本 省

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ上院外交委審議

第3521号 平 大至急

往電第3496号に関し。

上院外交委は2日朝の会合(非公開)でオキナワ返かん協
定を全会一致で承認し、上院本会議へ送付(REPORT
OUT)することに決定した趣。詳細確認の上追電するも
とりあえず。

(了)

(沖縄代表に転電済、電信課)

(米北1千葉課長に連絡済、3日03:05)

調査長
企折調
領移
参領旅査移
長

ア 参地中東
長 北東西
米 参北北保
中 参一二
欧 参西東洋
長 西東

近 参書近ア
長 次総経国資
経 源
長 参貿統国
参政技一理
長 国
参政経科
長 軍社専
長 参道内外
長 一二

外務省

注意

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560

電信写

大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会營給

総番号(TA) 57191 主管
71年11月02日18時30分 米 国 発着 米北1
71年11月03日08時43分 本 省

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ上院外交委審議 (外交委決定)

第3523号 略 大至急

往電第3521号に関し

外交委員会スタッフ(トリンプル)が2日サトウに述べた
ところ次のとおり。

1. 外交委員会は2日朝の会合でオキナワ返かん協定を賛
成/6。反対なし(欠席議員も代理者を通じて意思表示し
た由)の全会一致で承認し、同協定を上院本会議に送付す
ることに決定した。

2. 今後の外交委員会としての手続きとしては外交委員会
の上院本会議に対する報告書を起草することが残っている
が、2日午後6時マンスフィールド上院民主党院内総務より
外交委員会に対し、2日よるまでに報告書を作成し、印さ
つに付すよう指示が来た。従つて明3日にも協定が上院本
会議に送付される可能性が出て来た。(実際にとりあげら
れる日については他の議案との関連もあり、不明)当初の
外交委員会の予定としては5日までにちよう開会の記録を
オープンにしておいて、一般からの文書によるステートメ

調査長
企折調
領移
参領旅査移
長

ア 参地中東
長 北東西
米 参北北保
中 参一二
欧 参西東洋
長 西東

近 参書近ア
長 次総経国資
経 源
長 参貿統国
参政技一理
長 国
参政経科
長 軍社専
長 参道内外
長 一二

外務省

秘

注意

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電信写

ントをうけつけることになっていたことでもあり、今週一
ばいに報告を作成のうえ、来週にでも協定を本会議に送付
するということであつたが、マンズフィールドの指示によ
り急に作業を急ぐこととなつた次第である。従つて今後5
日までの間に予定されていた一般からのスタートメント受
けつけは事実上立ち消えとなる見込みである。(貴電米北
/第2470号と関連)

(マンズフィールドのスタッフによれば同議員が外交委の
報告書の提出を急がせたのは何か休会前にオキナワ協定
の上院本会議における審議をあげてしまいたいとの同議員
の考えによるもの由。)なお、外交委の報告書はメン
パーに回らんして了承をとるのみであり、議決は行なわれ
ない。

3. 外交委員会の報告書にはオキナワ協定に対する支持の
表明のほか、(イ)批准書交換は日本側が協定実施に必
要な国内法の立法を完了するのを待つて行なうべしとの行
政府に対する指示(協定実施に必要と判断される日本側国
内法がいかなるものかについては具体的に列挙することは
しないので、所要の立法措置がとられたか否かの判断は事
実上行政府にまかせられることになる由)、(ロ)オキナ
ワを含む在日米軍基地、人員の削減の方針に対する支持表
明及び(ハ)せん閣諸島の領有権をめぐる問題について米

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電信写

国が中立的立場をとるべしとの外交委員会の立場の表明(せ
ん閣諸島に対する施政権を日本に返かんすることに対し
ては異論をとらえない。)の3点を含めるが、協定内容に
ついての留保は一切付さないことに決定した。

4. 外交委員会が本日、オキナワ協定の上院本会議への送
付を決定した結果、外交委員会として、核兵器の問題等に
つき秘密ちよう聞会を行なう可能性は事実上なくなった。
また、軍事委員会が別途、オキナワ協定を取り上げる可能
性もほとんどないと考えられる。

(丁)

(沖繩内務局電報、電機課)

(米北1. 千葉課長に連絡済、3日09:15)

(部の内 号) 注意

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電信写

総番号(TA) 5072 主管
 71年 月 日 20時 05分 米 国 発
 71年 月 日 0時 21分 本 省 着

外務大臣殿 大河原 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ上院軍事委員会

第3550号 極秘 大至急

往電第3523号に関し

1/3日エリクソン日本部長は木内に次のとおり述べた。
 本日急拠上院軍事委員会秘密会が開かれたのは昨日マン
 フールド院内総務がオキナワ協定の承認を早くするため
 外交委に早く本会議の方に差しまわすように指示したため
 軍事委の連中がそれでは本件協定につきなんら説明にあ
 ずからないまま明日にでも通過してしまつたのではかた手
 落ちと考え、急に行政府の連中を集めて説明会を開いた次
 第である。

政府側国務省からブラウン大使、日本部長、国防省からド
 ウーリン次官補代理、カーティス少将が出向いた。自分も
 本件会合を知つたのは正午ごろで、2時30分に議会に赴
 き4時15分までフリーイングを行なつた。その間本会
 議の投票等のためフリーイングは度々中断された。

軍事委からはステンス委員長、サーモンド、スミス、ハリ
 ー、ハード(ヴァージニア)、マツキンタイア、ヒューズ

大政外務省
 務務典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 儀給入電厚計
 書文会管給

調査長
 参企析調
 領移長
 参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
 長 北東西
 参北北保
 中南番
 参一
 参西東洋
 長 西東

近ア 参書近ア
 長 次総経国資
 経 源

長 参貿統国
 経 参政技一理
 協 長 国企二

参参協規
 長国 参政経科

長 軍社専
 参参内外
 長文 一二

外務省

極秘

注意

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電信写

ベントウエン、サクスピーが出席した。結論的にいつて問
 題なく、本日の会合を了した。日米関係一般とかせん維等
 には触れず、軍事的な問題に対する質疑応答に終始した。
 すなわち、返かんに伴いどのような軍事面での影響を覚
 しなければならぬか、基地の機能は今後とも維持できる
 か、右機能確保につき日本政府を信頼できるか、日本での
 政局が動ようしているとき今後ともサトウ政権下同様信頼
 し続けることができるかどうか等の質問が出た。余りべん
 強したとも見られないような質問も出ており、質問中最も
 すどかつたのはバード議員であり、同議員は原潜の日本
 寄港問題を提起し、右をめぐつても応しゆうが行なわれた
 。何故せつかく拳中に行っているオキナワ基地を日本に手放
 さなければならないのかといったプリミティブな質問もあ
 った。

今後軍事委員会が再度フリーイングを求めるかどうか見
 当つかない。しかし、本日の会合で同委員会としてもかお
 が立ち、一応満足しているものと思う。

上院本会議は早ければ来週にでもとりあげることとなるう
 。

2、3日上院軍事委サクスピー議員のガードナー秘書は木
 内に対し、本日の軍事委の会合についてこれが秘密会であ
 るため内容につき言及することはできないが、なんら日本

外務省

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電信写

例において心配されるような動向はなく、軍事委も本日の
会合で満足しているので、実際には来週以降となろうが、
理論的には明日でも本会議の討論採決が行なわれる素地が
できた旨述べた趣。

|(了)|

(回覧番号 2901) 外務省電信案 (分類)

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| 機密表示 (極秘・秘の朱印) 秘 無期限 | 符号表示 暗 略 平 第 2485 号 | 総第 1104 168 号 |
| 昭和 年 月 日 時 分 発 1. 4 22. 24 | | ※大至急・至急・普通・LTF |
| | | ※発電係 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

電信課長
代
子
林

(※印内は電信課記入)

| | | |
|--|----------------------------------|--|
| 大 臣 政 務 次 官 事 務 次 官 外 務 審 議 官 外 務 審 議 官 官 房 長 | 主 管 アメリカ局長 参 事 官 北米才一課長 | 主管局部課(室)名 米北1 起案 昭和22年11月4日 起案者 電話番 525 2464 |
|--|----------------------------------|--|

漢

| | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|
| 協議先 R 総務課 中 務 課 官房書記官 | 条約課長 安全保障課長 | 臨時代理大使 あて 5133 大臣 発 総領事 代理 |
|--------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|

| | | |
|-------|----------------------|----|
| 電 報 在 | 大 使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理 | あて |
|-------|----------------------|----|

件名 沖繩返還協定(上院軍事委員会審議)

参考 3550 号に因り、
1. 貴院軍事委員会記録は公表せられ
たことと了解あり、その公表せられたる
は 貴院国会審議との関係も有り、
予り前記に入手の上 要報列した。

写
済

101

(昭和四二・七・一改正)

GB-1

2. 当地4日夜のTV放送は8A1=軍事
の着せに行う各報に7.13.67 右確認あり
したく、確認の上は、証言者名等
結果回電ありた。

大至急

37

GB-3

外務省

(回覧番号) 外務省電信案 (分類)

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------|---|
| 機密表示 (極秘・秘の朱印) 秘 黒期限 | 符号表示 暗 略 平 | 総第 1104 169 号 |
| | 第 248 6号 | 昭和 年 月 日 時 分 秒 46.11.4 22.24 |
| | 至急・普通・LTF | 発電係 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

電信課長
代
十
林

(※印内は電信課記入)

| | | |
|--|----------------------------------|--|
| 大 臣 政 務 次 官 事 務 次 官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官 房 長 | 主 管 アメリカ局長 参 事 官 北米才一課長 | 主管局部課 (室) 名 米北 1 起案 昭和46年11月4日 起案者 電話番号 526 2464 |
|--|----------------------------------|--|

漢

| | |
|---------------------|----------------|
| 協議先 24徳也 中江多雄 | 条約課長 安全保障課長 |
|---------------------|----------------|

在米 臨時代理大使
あて 5263 大臣 発
総領事 代理

電 報 在 大使 臨時代理大使
総領事 代理 あて

件名 沖繩返還協定 (上院外交委の報告書)

貴電才3523号に准じ、

4日付当地各紙 (新聞) は外交委員会

報告書全文を報道していること、右を英文

のみを告知して回電したい。

本件報告書本、冒頭貴院に於ては外交

(昭和四二七一改正)

GB-1

委員会の本会議に對し意見書と解す中、
協定に付帯したものは認められたいと
し、右に付いて確認の上結果を以て之に
回電したい。

137

GB-3

外務省

写
済

97

注意

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63

電信写

大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会營給

総番号(TA) 57543
71年11月4日16時30分 米 国 発 北
71年11月5日08時33分 本 省 着 北

外務大臣殿 大河平 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ上院審議

第3558号 平 至急(ゆう先処理)

貴電米北/第2486号に関し

上院外交委の報告書別電のとおり全文報告する。なお、本
件報告書は外交委の本件協定に関する意見をもつたもので
協定の一部として付帯されたものではない。
(了)

調査長 参析調
参領旅査移

了 参地中東
長 北東西
参北北保
中南
参西東洋
長 西東

近 参書近ア
長 次総経国資源
参質統国
参政技一理
長 協長条
参参協規
長 参政経科
長 軍社專
参道内外
長 文長 一二

外務省

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3000

電信写

大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会營給

総番号(TA) 57580
71年11月4日16時25分 米 国 発 北
71年11月5日10時14分 本 省 着 北

外務大臣殿 大河原 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄上院審議

才の559号 平 至急(優先処理)
往電才の558号別電

MR. MANSFIELD FOR MR. FULBRIGHT, FROM THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SUBMITTED THE FOLLOWING

REPORT

(TO ACCOMPANY EX. J, 92D CONG., FIRST SESS.)

THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TO WHICH
AS REFERRED THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN CONCERNING THE RYUKYU
ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON
AND TOKYO ON JUNE 17, 1971, HAVING CONSIDERED THE
SAME, REPORTS FAVORABLY THEREON WITHOUT RESERVATION
AND RECOMMENDS THAT THE SENATE GIVE ITS ADVICE

調査長 参析調
参領旅査移

了 参地中東
長 北東西
参北北保
中南
参西東洋
長 西東

近 参書近ア
長 次総経国資源
参質統国
参政技一理
長 協長条
参参協規
長 参政経科
長 軍社專
参道内外
長 文長 一二

外務省

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電信写

AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION THEREOF.

BACKGROUND

UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE 1951 PEACE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES ASSUMED ALL POWER OF "ADMINISTRATION, LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION" OVER, INTER ALIA, THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS (HEREINAFTER SOMETIMES REFERRED TO AS "OKINAWA"). HOWEVER, JOHN FOSTER DULLES, THE US DELEGATE TO THE PEACE TREATY CONFERENCE, STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT REGARD THE PEACE TREATY AS TRANSFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THESE ISLANDS WHICH WAS INSTEAD RETAINED BY JAPAN. THIS US DISCLAIMER OF SOVEREIGNTY WAS REAFFIRMED BY ALL SUBSEQUENT ADMINISTRATIONS AND IN 1967 PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRIME MINISTER SATO IN SUBSTANCE AGREED THAT REVERSION SHOULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN A FEW YEARS.

IN NOVEMBER OF 1969, AT THE CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS, PRESIDENT NIXON AND PRIME MINISTER

外務省

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電信写

SATO ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH THEY AGREED TO COMMENCE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE EARLY REVERSION OF OKINAWA, TO BE ACHIEVED BY 1972 PROVIDED AGREEMENT ON THE NECESSARY SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS AND THE REQUIRED "LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT" WERE OBTAINED. THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO FORMALLY CONFIRMED THE INTENTION OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN THE US-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY. PRIME MINISTER SATO OFFICIALLY STATED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT THE SECURITY OF JAPAN COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED WITHOUT PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE FAR EAST, THAT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THAT END THE UNITED STATES SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO FULFILL ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS IN THE AREA AND THAT REVERSION SHOULD NOT HINDER EFFECTIVE DISCHARGE BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS DEFENSE COMMITMENTS IN ASIA. FOLLOWING PROTRACTED DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS, THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN CONCERNING THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS (HEREINAFTER CALLED THE AGREEMENT) WAS SIGNED ON JUNE 17, 1971, IN WASHINGTON AND TOKYO. OKINAWA IS NOW ADMINISTERED BY A US HIGH

外務省

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2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

COMMISSIONER, WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE US ARMED SERVICES. THE OFFICE IS CURRENTLY HELD BY GENERAL LAMPERT WHO IS ALSO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC, AND IS THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE US ARMY IN OKINAWA. THERE IS A UNICAMERAL LEGISLATURE ELECTED BY THE OKINAWANS WHICH HAS AUTHORITY COVERING LEGISLATION OF DOMESTIC APPLICATION. A CHIEF EXECUTIVE, ALSO ELECTED BY THE OKINAWANS, EXERCISES DOMESTIC EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY. THE LEGISLATURE IS NOW CONTROLLED BY THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (WHICH ALSO CONTROLS THE JAPANESE DIET), BUT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE IS CHOBYO YARA, AN INDEPENDENT CANDIDATE ELECTED WITH THE SUPPORT OF A VARIETY OF MODERATE AND LEFT OPPOSITION GROUPS. ALTHOUGH ELECTIONS WOULD NORMALLY HAVE BEEN HELD IN NOVEMBER 1971, THEY HAVE BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL AFTER REVERSION. THE US HIGH COMMISSIONER HAS THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE LAWS HIMSELF IF HE DEEMS IT NECESSARY FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF HIS MISSION. HE ALSO CAN VETO AND ANNUL LAWS PASSED BY THE LEGISLATURE AND REMOVE PUBLIC OFFICIALS FROM OFFICE IF SUCH ACTION IS DEEMED IMPORTANT IN ITS EFFECT ON THE SECURITY OF OKINAWA, ON FOREIGN

外務省

注意

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電信写

RELATIONS OR ON THE SECURITY, PROPERTY OR INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES OR ITS NATIONALS. FOLLOWING REVERSION OKINAWA WOULD BECOME ANOTHER PREFECTURE (OR PROVINCE) OF JAPAN, AND THE PRESENCE OF US FORCES ON OKINAWA WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME TERMS AND CONDITIONS APPLYING TO US FORCES IN JAPAN PROPER.

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS.

THE AGREEMENT CONSISTS OF A PREAMBLE AND NINE ARTICLES. A SUMMARY OF ITS MAJOR PROVISIONS, AS SET FORTH BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN HIS LETTER OF SUBMITTAL DATED SEPTEMBER 5, 1971, IS SET FORTH BELOW.

UNDER PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE 1 THE UNITED STATES RELINQUISHES IN FAVOR OF JAPAN ITS RIGHTS AND INTERESTS WITH RESPECT TO THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS UNDER ARTICLE 3 OF THE PEACE TREATY, AND JAPAN ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF ALL GOVERNMENTAL POWERS OVER THESE ISLANDS. PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE

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電信写

I DEFINES THESE ISLANDS FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENT. AN AGREED MINUTE TO ARTICLE I DESCRIBES THE TERRITORY BY GEOGRAPHICAL COORINATES.

ARTICLE II CONFIRMS THAT TREATIES AND OTHER AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN BECOME APPLICABLE TO THE ISLANDS UPON REVERSION.

PARAGRAPH 1 OF ARTICLE III COMMITS JAPAN TO GRANT THE UNITED STATES UPON REVERSION THE USE OF MILITARY FACILITIES AND AREAS IN OKINAWA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1960 UNITED STATES JAPAN TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY AND ITS RELATED ARRANGEMENTS. BY A MOMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING ARTICLE III, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED UPON THE SPECIFIC FACILITIES AND AREAS TO BE GRANTED FOR USE BY THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES UPON REVERSION, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY, REGARDING FACILITIES AND AREAS AND THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN JAPAN (THE SO-CALLED SOFA).

PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE III REFERS TO THE PROVISION OF THE SOFA WHICH EXEMPTS THE UNITED STATES FROM

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電信写

ANY OBLIGATION TO RESTORE FACILITES AND AREAS TO THEIR ORIGINAL CONDITION UPON THEIR RETURN AND WHICH EXEMPTS JAPAN FROM ANY OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE THE UNITED STATES FOR ANY INPROVEMENTS MADE BY THE UNITED STATES ON FACILITES AND AREAS WHICH ARE RETURNED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN. THIS PARAGRAPH FIXES THE CONTION OF THE PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF THESE EXEMPTIONS AS THAT EXISTING AT THE TIME UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES FIRST USED THE FACILITIES AND AREAS. IT ALSO CLARIFIES THAT JAPAN NEED MAKE NO SPECIFIC COMPENSATION TO THE UNITED STATES FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN FACILITES AND AREAS MADE PRIOR TO REVERSION.

UNDER ARTICLE IV JAPAN WAIVES ALL CLAIMS OF JAPAN AND ITS NATIONALS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATIONALS AND AGAINST LOCAL AUTHORITIES ARISING OUT OF THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS, EXCEPT FOR CERTAIN CLAIMS SPECIFICALLY RECOGNIZED UNDER UNITED STATES LAW OR LOCAL LAWS APPLICABLE DURING THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION (WHICH INCLUDE THE CLAIMS SET FORTH IN THE AGREED MINUTE

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TO ARTICLE IV), PARAGAPH 2 OF ARTICLE IV GRANTS AUTHORITY TO THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN A CLAIMS OFFICE ON OKINAWA TO SETTLE ANY CLAIMS REMINING AFTER REVERSION. PARAGAPH 3 OF ARTICLE IV PROVIDES THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL MAKE EX GRATIA CONTRIBUTIONS TO JAPANESE NATIONALS WHOSE LANDS IN THE ISLANDS WERE DAMAGED PRIOR TO JULY 1, 1950, AND WERE RELEASED FROM THE USE OF UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES AFTER JUNE 30, 1961. IN PARAGAPH 4 OF ARTICLE IV JAPAN RECOGNIZES THE VALIDITY OF ALL OFFICIAL ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE PERIOD OF ITS ADMINISTRATION.

ARTICLE V CONCERNS CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION. PARAGAPH 1 PROVIDES JAPANESE RECOGNITION OF THE VALIDITY OF FINAL JUDGEMENTS RENDERED BEFORE REVERSION IN CIVIL CASES. IT OBLIGATES JAPAN TO CONTINUE SUCH JUDGEMENTS IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT. PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 PROVIDE FOR THE ASSUMPTION BY JAPAN OF JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES PENDING AT THE TIME OF REVERSION WITHOUT IN ANY WAY AFFECTING THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS INVOLVED.

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電信写

PARAGAPH 4 PROVIDES THAT JAPAN MAY CONTINUE THE EXECUTION OF ANY FINAL CRIMINAL JUDGEMENTS RENDERED PRIOR TO REVERSION. AN AGREED MINUTE TO ARTICLE V DEALS WITH THE QUESTION OF EXERCISE OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER MEMBERS OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES WITH RESPECT TO OFFENSES COMMITTED PRIOR TO REVERSION SEMICOLON JAPAN WILL NOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER SUCH CASES.

ARTICLE VI TRANSFER TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN CERTAIN PROPERTIES OF THE UNITED STATES. THE MAJOR PART OF SUCH PROPERTIES CONSISTS OF PUBLIC UTILITY CORPORATIONS. DURING THE PERIOD OF ITS ADMINISTRATION THE UNITED STATES CREATED CERTAIN NEW LANDS BY RECLAMATION FROM THE SEA, OR OTHERWISE ACQUIRED SUCH LANDS. THESE RECLAIMED LANDS WILL ALSO BECOME THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN UPON REVERSION. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT OBLIGED TO COMPENSATE JAPAN OR ITS NATIONALS FOR ANY ALTERATION MADE PRIOR TO REVERSION TO LANDS UPON WHICH PROPERTIES TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN ARE LOCATED.

ARTICLE VII CONSTITUTES THE PAYMENT PROVISION

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電信写

OF THE AGREEMENT. CONSIDERING , INTER ALIA, THE TRANSFER OF ASSETS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN UNDER ARTICLE VI, THE FACT THAT REVERSION WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 21, 1969, AND CERTAIN EXTRA COSTS BORNE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES RESULTING FROM REVERSION, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WILL PAY THE UNITED STATES 320 MILLION DOLLARS IN STATED INSTALLMENTS WITHIN FIVE YEARS OF REVERSION. THE FIRST INSTALLMENT OF 100 MILLION DOLLARS IS TO BE PAID WITHIN ONE WEEK AFTER REVERSION.

ARTICLE VIII CONTAINS AUTHORITY FOR THE VOICE OF AMERICA RELAY STATION ON OKINAWA TO CONTINUE IN OPERATION FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS AFTER REVERSION, WITH CONSULTATIONS REGARDING FUTURE OPERATION OF THE STATION TO BEGIN TWO YEARS AFTER REVERSION. ADDITIONAL DETAILS REGARDING THE OPERATION OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA STATION ARE CONTAINED IN AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING THE VOICE OF AMERICA FACILITY ON OKINAWA

外務省

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ARTICLE IX PROVIDES FOR RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND FOR ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE TWO MONTHS AFTER THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION ARE EXCHANGED. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE I, REVERSION WILL TAKE PLACE ON THE DATE THE AGREEMENT ENTERS INTO FORCE.

CERTAIN IMPORTANT ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVED IN OKINAWA REVERSION ARE DEALT WITH IN THE OTHER DOCUMENT SUBMITTED WITH THE AGREEMENT. THESE INCLUDE ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS AND FIRMS ON OKINAWA, THE ASSUMPTION BY JAPAN OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA, AND COMMERCIAL AIR SERVICES TO AND THROUGH OKINAWA.

THE ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS AND FIRMS IS CONTAINED IN A LETTER OF JUNE 17, 1971, FROM THEN FOREIGN MINISTER KIICHI AICHI TO AMBASSADOR MEYER. THE LETTER SETS FORTH THE POLICIES DECIDED UPON BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT RESPECTING POINT THAT WERE OF MAJOR CONCERN TO AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS IN OKINAWA.

外務省

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電信写

THE ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING ASSUMPTION BY JAPAN OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA, SIGNED ON JUNE 29, 1971 ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY, SETS FORTH THE AGREED MODALITIES FOR NECESSARY COORDINATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF JAPANESE SELF DEFENSE FORCES IN OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION. THE ARRANGEMENT PROVIDES FOR JAPANESE TAKEOVER OR JOINT USE OF CERTAIN INSTALLATIONS OR SITES NOW USED BY UNITED STATES FORCES ON OKINAWA, DESCRIBES GENERALLY THE MISSIONS AND STRENGTHS OF THE JAPANESE FORCES TO BE DEPLOYED TO OKINAWA FOLLOWING REVERSION, AND SETS TIMETABLES FOR FULL ASSUMPTION OF THE MISSIONS DESCRIBED.

A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OF JUNE 17, 1971 CONCERNING AIR SERVICES TO AND THROUGH OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION PRESERVES EXISTING TRAFFIC RIGHTS FOR AMERICAN COMMERCIAL AIR CARRIERS NOW SERVING OKINAWA. IN ADDITION THERE WILL BE A FIVE YEAR "NO CHARGE" PERIOD FOLLOWING REVERSION DURING WHICH THE BENEFITS AMERICAN CARRIERS RECEIVE BY SERVING OKINAWA WILL NOT BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN CALCULATING THE OVERALL

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電信写

BALANCE OF BENEFITS WHICH THE UNITED STATES RECEIVES UNDER THE BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN.

COMMITTEE ACTION

THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS HELD PUBLIC HEARINGS ON THE AGREEMENT ON OCTOBER 27, 28, AND 29. ON OCTOBER 27 SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS INITIATED THE PRESENTATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON THE AGREEMENT. ON OCTOBER 28 DAVID PACKARD, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AND LT. GEN. JAMES B. LAMPERT, HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, DISCUSSED THE MILITARY SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. ON OCTOBER 29 THE COMMITTEE HEARD THE FOLLOWING PERSONS: SENATOR JOHN V. TUNNEY, MR. C.N. YANG, MAJ. GEN. DALE O. SMITH (RET.), EDWARD REEVES, ROBERT MORRIS, SHIEN-BIAU WOO, MARK SELDEN, E. RAYMOND WILSON, THOMAS C. DUNN, AND PROFESSOR JPHN FINCHER. ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS FROM PERSONS UNABLE TO APPEAR PERSONALLY WERE INCLUDED IN THE RECORD.

外務省

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電信写

ON NOVEMBER 2 THE COMMITTEE MET IN EXECUTIVE SESSION AND ORDERED THE AGREEMENT REPORTED FAVORABLY TO THE SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION. THIS ACTION WAS TAKEN BY A UNANIMOUS VOTE OF 16-0 WITH ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE REPRESENTED EITHER IN PERSON OR BY PROXY.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

IN AN AGREED MINUTE TO ARTICLE I, THE PARTIES SPECIFY THE GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES DEFINING THE TERRITORY COVERED BY THE TREATY. THESE COORDINATES MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE SENKAKU (TIAO YU TAI) ISLANDS ARE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE TERRITORY ADMINISTERED. IN ADDITION, TWO OF THE MILITARY FACILITIES LISTED AS BEING RETAINED BY THE UNITED STATES ARE IN THE SENKAKUS. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND JAPAN CLAIM SOVEREIGNTY OVER THESE ISLANDS. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT THE SOLE SOURCE OF RIGHTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THIS REGARD DERIVES FROM THE PEACE TREATY UNDER WHICH THE UNITED STATES MERELY RECEIVED RIGHTS OF ADMINISTRATION.

外務省

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NOT SOVEREIGNTY. THUS, UNITED STATES ACTION IN TRANSFERRING ITS RIGHTS OF ADMINISTRATION TO JAPAN DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A TRANSFER OF UNDERLYING SOVEREIGNTY (WHICH THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE), NOR CAN IT AFFECT THE UNDERLYING CLAIMS OF ANY OF THE DISPUTANTS. THE COMMITTEE REAFFIRMS THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT DO NOT AFFECT ANY CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY WITH RESPECT TO THE SENAKU OR TIAO YU TAI ISLANDS BY ANY STATE.

A NUMBER OF LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER STEPS MUST BE TAKEN BY JAPAN IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVED IN THE OKINAWA REVERSION WHICH ARE DEALT WITH IN THE DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED WITH THE AGREEMENT TO THE SENATE. THESE STEPS INCLUDE STEPS REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT THE INTENT OF THE LETTER DATED JUNE 17, 1971, FROM THEN FOREIGN MINISTER AICHI TO AMBASSADOR MEYER. THE COMMITTEE NOTES THAT SECRETARY ROGERS STATED ON OCTOBER 27 THAT "THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WILL NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE UNTIL THE PRESIDENT HAS DEPOSITED THE INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION. HE WILL NOT TAKE SUCH ACTION UNTIL

—11/5/71

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電信写

AFTER THE JAPANESE DIET HAS ENACTED THE NECESSARY IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION. THE COMMITTEE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION WILL NOT BE DEPOSITED BY THE UNITED STATES UNTIL THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN HAS TAKEN, TO THE EXTENT APPROPRIATE, ALL IMPORTANT STEPS, INCLUDING LEGISLATIVE ACTION, REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT THE AGREEMENT AND THE RELATED ARRANGEMENTS.

BY RECOMMENDING THAT THE SENATE CONSENT TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT, THE COMMITTEE DOES NOT IMPLY ITS APPROVAL OF MAINTAINING THE EXISTING LEVEL OF US TROOPS OR BASES ON OKINAWA FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD. THE COMMITTEE APPROVES THE POLICY OF REDUCING, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, THE AMERICAN PRESENT IN THAT AREA TO THE EXTENT APPROPRIATE IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN US-CHINA RELATIONS AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN ASIA. THE COMMITTEE NOTES WITH APPROVAL THAT THE AGREEMENT CONTEMPLATES THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION.

RECOMMENDATION

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電信写

THE COMMITTEE UNANIMOUSLY URGES THAT THE SENATE GIVE ITS PROMPT ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT. THE AGREEMENT REPRESENTS THE END OF AN ERA IN US-JAPAN RELATIONS. IT SETTLES THE LAST REMAINING MAJOR ISSUE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ARISING OUT OF WORLD WAR II, RETURNING TO JAPAN THE REMAINING OCCUPIED TERRITORY WHICH HAS BEEN PROMISED IT. RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD REMOVE THE LAST VESTIGE OF OCCUPYING POWER STATUS NOW HELD BY THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD FORMALIZE A RELATIONSHIP OF EQUALITY BETWEEN THE TWO STATES. AS THE PRESIDENT STATED IN HIS LETTER TRANSMITTING THE AGREEMENT TO THE SENATE, THE RETURN OF OKINAWA IS ESSENTIAL TO THE CONTINUATION OF FRIENDLY AND PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. PARTICULARLY AT THIS TIME, AS THE NEW US CHINA POLICY EVOLVES, IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT SOUND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN BE FIRMLY MAINTAINED. PROMPT ACTION BY THE SENATE, DEMONSTRATING OUR COMMITMENT TO THESE OBJECTIVES, WILL BE AN IMPORTANT STEP TO THAT END.

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電信写

TEXT OF RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION

RESOLVED, (TWO-THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCURRING THEREIN), THAT THE SENATE ADVISE AND CONSENT TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN CONCERNING THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON AND TOKYO ON JUNE 17, 1971, (EX. J, 92-1).

(了)

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電信写

総番号(TA) 57556 主管
 71年11月4日18時30分 米 国 発 着 米 1
 71年11月5日08時58分 本 省 着 米 1

外務大臣殿 大河原 大使 (臨時代理大使) 総領事 代理

オキナワ上院審議

第3564号 略 至急(ゆう先処理)

貴電米北/第2485号に関し

4日上院軍事委員会はきたる8日再度秘密会を開く旨発表した。米当局者によれば、昨3日の会合では主として交渉に当ったカーティス海軍中將及びドワーリン国防省次官補代理による国防省としての立場からの説明をちよう取したが、統合参謀本部のいわゆる戦略戦術に直接携わる職業軍人からの説明に未だ接していないので(この点では上院外交委も同様である)、8日の会合を改めて持つことになった。出席者は未だ確定していないが、ムーラー統参議長はレゾード国防長官に随行して、不在なので、代りにウエストモerland陸軍参謀総長が出席するものと予想され、その他カーティス海軍中將、国防省、國務省の代表者が出席する予定なる趣である。なお、軍事委事務局スタッフのウルセイもアラフネ書記官に対し、8日の本件説明会も3日のと同様順調に推移する旨述べた由である。

(了)

外務省

大政事外外儀官
 務務 典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 儀総人電厚計
 書文会營給

調査 参企析調
 長 領移
 移 参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
 長 北東西
 参北北伊
 中 参一
 南 参西東洋
 審 西東
 欧 長

近 参書近ア
 ア 長 次総経国資
 経 源
 長 参貿統
 経 参政技一
 協 理
 長 国
 案 企二
 参多協規

長 参政経科
 国 軍社專
 情 参道内外
 長 文
 文 一

(回覧番号 2899) 外務省電信案 (分類)

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| 機密表示 (極秘・秘の朱印) 秘 無期限 | 符号表示 暗 略 平 | 総第 1105 103 号 |
| | ※ 第 2491 号 | ※ 昭和 年 月 日 時 分 発 |
| | | 46.11.5.18.19 |
| | 大至急・至急 普通・LTF | 発電係 |

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| 大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官房長 | 主管 アメリカ局長 参事官 北米第一課長 | 主管局部課(室)名 東洋課 起案 昭和 46年 11月 5日 起案者 電話番号 2464 |
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| 協議先 中江幹事 下条約課長 安全保障課長 |
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| 大使 臨時代理大使 在米大原 総領事 代理 | あて 福田 大臣 発 |
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件名 沖繩返還協定(軍事委員報告)

貴電第3564号に因り、

貴電第3564号の軍事委員報告に因り、往電

第2376号の要領に報告された。

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(※印内は電信課記入)

(昭和四二・七一改正)

GB-1

注意

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電信写

| | |
|--------------------|----------|
| 総番号(TA) 57557 | 主管 |
| 71年 11月 4日 18時 15分 | 米 国 発 米川 |
| 71年 月 5日 08時 52分 | 本 省 着 |

外務大臣殿 牛場 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

キナワ協定上院審議

第3566号 略 大至急

電第3564号に関し

日民主党政務委員会のリーチ参事は木内に対し、上院は

日の上院軍事委の説明会を経て、9日午後におキナワ協

定の本会議討論を行うことに決定した旨述べた。同参事に

ればバード上院議員、スランス軍事委員長等が発言する

の観測があるが、正直のところ何人が発言するか、その

場にならないと確定的なことはいえず、また、9日一日の

討論で投票に持つてゆくことを考え、かつ希望しているが

討論が長びけばよく日まわしになることもあり得べく、

のへんはその場にならないれば見当がつかない旨述べた

なお、民主党政務委はマンスフィールド院内総務の下に

つて議事運営の問題をとりしきる機関でもあるので、リ

チの上記発言は責任あるものとして御了解いただきたい

に転電した。

(了)

- 大政事外外官
- 務務 典房
- 次次 典房
- 臣官官審審長長
- 備総人電厚計
- 書文会営給
- 調査長 参企折調
- 領移長 参領旅査移
- ア 参地中東
- 長 北東西
- 長 参北北保
- 中南参一
- 欧参西東洋
- 長 西東
- 近ア参書近ア
- 長 次総経国資源
- 長 参貿統国
- 経協参政技一理
- 長 国企二
- 長 参参協規
- 国 参政経科
- 長 軍社専
- 長 参道内外
- 長 文長
- 長 一二

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

115

電信写

総番号(TA) 57624 主管
 71年11月4日2時45分 米国 発 米田
 71年 月 5日 4時 分 本省 着 米田

外務大臣殿 大河原 大使 [臨時代理大使] 総領事 代理

オキナワ上院外交委ちよう開会速記録

第3590号 略 至急(ゆう先処理)

往電第3494号に關し

オキナワ返かん協定上院外交委ちよう開会の速記録の最終こう確定ばんを入手したので(テキスト空送する)既報分と異なる主要部分につき別電のとおり報告する。

なお、核撤去に関するサイミントン上院議員に対するロジャース長官の答弁は正確を期して訂正されているので申し添える。また、別電以外の部分についても若干の修辭上の訂正がなされているが実質には関係ない。

(了)

秘

大政事外外儀官
 務務 典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 儀総人電厚計
 書文会營給

調査長 参企析調
 領移 参領旅査移
 長

ア 参地中東
 長 北東西
 参北北保
 中南番
 欧 参西東洋
 長 西東

近ア 参書近ア
 長 次総経国資
 経 源
 長 参貿統国
 経 参政技一理
 協 国企二
 長 参条協規
 国 参政経科
 長 軍社專
 参道内外
 文 一 二

注意

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1000

電信写

総番号(TA) 57630 主管
 71年11月4日2時47分 米国 発 米田
 71年11月5日16時36分 本省 着 米田

外務大臣殿 大河原 大使 [臨時代理大使] 総領事 代理

沖縄上院外交委聴開会速記録

米3591号 平 至急(優先処理)
往電米3590号 別電

1. 往電米3441号 (3) について

(1) ロジャース長官発言中 "We do not have any nuclear weapons on Okinawa" と "We will not have" の訂正

(2) サイミントン議員の発言中 "I do not want to get into semantics ---- about the nuclear weapons situation & "I do not want to get into semantics about it but say with respect that it would not help our trade and other relationships with the Japanese people if there was not true understanding"

大政事外外儀官
 務務 典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 儀総人電厚計
 書文会營給

調査長 参企析調
 領移 参領旅査移
 長

ア 参地中東
 長 北東西
 参北北保
 中南番
 欧 参西東洋
 長 西東

近ア 参書近ア
 長 次総経国資
 経 源
 長 参貿統国
 経 参政技一理
 協 国企二
 長 参条協規
 国 参政経科
 長 軍社專
 参道内外
 文 一 二

添付なし

注意

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電信写

--situation in their part of the world."
と訂正あり。

2. 往電オ3491号(2)のレポート「国防省
発言中

"order of 3500 people" と "order of 2700
people" に同 "in the some 45,000"
と "in the some 50,000 military
personnel" に訂正あり。

3. 往電オ3407号のサミント議定書
カード次官及びレポート弁解官の座疑は
字句の修正が著しく多し、このため該部
確定版テキスト全文次の通り書きかえ
願いたい。

Senator Symington. General, it
is pleasant to see you. I have
one line of questioning.

Ignorance of U.S. position
concerning nuclear

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電信写

WEAPONS ON OKINAWA

REGARDLESS OF WHETHER WE DO OR DO NOT HAVE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA, IS OUR POSITION KNOWN
TO ANYBODY IN THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA OUTSIDE
OF----

GENERAL LAMPERT. OUR STANDARD RESPONSE IN ALL
DISCUSSIONS IN ANSWER TO ALL QUESTIONS WITH ALL
FOREIGNERS, AND THIS INCLUDES OF COURSE ALL
OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA, IS THAT
WE NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY THE PRESENCE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOR DO WE DISCUSS THE SUBJECT WITH
THEM.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. DOES THAT INCLUDE THE
HIGHEST PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA?

GENERAL LAMPERT. THAT IS INCLUDING THE HIGHEST
PEOPLE.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. IS THIS ALSO TRUE OF OUR
POSITION IN JAPAN?

GENERAL LAMPERT. SIR, I AM NOT QUALIFIED TO
COMMENT ON THAT SINCE I DO NOT SERVE IN JAPAN.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. SO WHATEVER THE POSITION IS
WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IF ANY, IN OKINAWA,

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電信写

THE PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA ARE IGNORANT OF THAT POSITION. CORRECT?

GENERAL LAMPERT. THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN NO INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO ANY QUESTION SEMICOLON YES, SIR.

EFFECT OF SECRECY ON PEACETIME APPLICATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY

SENATOR SYMINGTON. I WORRY ABOUT ALL THIS SECRECY BECAUSE AS DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY PACKARD KNOWS, WE ARE ASKING FOR DORUJIRUSI 7.9 BILLION FOR DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND LESS THAN 10 PERCENT OF THAT AMOUNT IS BEING REQUESTED FOR THE PEACETIME APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. IF EXPERTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION ARE RIGHT IN WHAT THEY ARE TELLING US, RE THIS LATTER FIELD, IT MIGHT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE ENERGY, PERHAPS THE GREATEST PROBLEM WE HAVE TODAY.

OUR REQUIREMENT FOR ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER HAS DOUBLED EVERY DECADE FOR FOUR DECADES. THIS MIGHT ALSO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF POLLUTION, OF CLEAN FRESH WATER, AND NOT ONLY HANDLE WASTE BUT RECYCLE

外務省

注意

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IT. SO ONE MIGHT SAY THAT IN THE POWER WHICH LIES IN THE ATOM COULD WELL BE THE HOPE OF A PEACETIME WORLD. BUT WE HAVE SURRENDERED THIS WHOLE SUBJECT WITH SO MUCH SECRECY THAT THE PEOPLE DO NOT KNOW JUST HOW MUCH WE HAVE SLIGHTED THESE PROBLEMS AS AGAINST THE PROBLEMS OF WEAPONRY. WHEN YOU FIND GREAT UNIVERSITIES, WITH BUDGETS RUNNING ALMOST TO A BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR, HALF OF WHICH COMES FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO RUN ONE UNIVERSITY SEMICOLON THEN WHEN YOU SEE PEOPLE FROM THOSE UNIVERSITIES COME BACK HERE AND DEFEND IN OPEN SESSION WEAPONRY AND GADGETS WHICH MANY OF US DO NOT THINK IS NEEDED FOR OUR SECURITY, YOU WONDER WHY WE DO HAVE ALL OF THIS SECRECY, WHY WE CANNOT BREAK IT OUT, SO THE PEOPLE WILL UNDERSTAND WHAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO IN THESE PEACETIME FIELDS. THAT IS WHY I ASKED THE QUESTION.

REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA

SECRETARY PACKARD. LET ME JUST SAY THIS: I BELIEVE SECRETARY ROGERS SAID "YES" IN RESPONSE

外務省

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TO THE QUESTION, "WILL NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW ON OKINAWA BE REMOVED ON REVERSION DAY?" I AM GOING TO PUT IT IN THESE TERMS, IF YOU WISH. WHILE AGREEING WITH WHAT THE GENERAL SAID IS OUR POLICY, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IF THERE ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA, THEY WILL NOT BE THERE ON REVERSION DAY.

SECREC Y CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS QUESTIONED

SENATOR SYMINGTON. I APPRECIATE THAT, MR. SECRETARY, BUT WE HAVE ALSO DEVELOPED A SUDDEN AND COMMENDABLE INTEREST IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BEING BETTER FRIENDS WITH US. IF WE ARE GOING TO TAKE THOSE WEAPONS OFF OF OKINAWA, FOR EXAMPLE, AND THIS IS STRICTLY HYPOTHETICAL, AND PUT THEM IN OTHER COUNTRIES BASED ON RECENT EVENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK, WE ARE NOT SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF MORE AND BETTER FRIENDS. I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE HAVE SO MUCH SECREC Y ABOUT THESE WEAPONS WHEN JUST ABOUT EVERYBODY NOW KNOWS ABOUT THE NUCLEAR ART.

SINCE THE SMYTHE REPORT CAME OUT IN THE MID

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電信写

FORTIES, THERE HAS BEEN NO REASON FOR ALL THIS SECREC Y. IT MAY HAVE HELPED SOME MUNITIONS MAKERS, ALSO THOSE WHO COULD BE OVEREMPHASIZING VARIOUS TYPES OF WEAPONS INSTEAD OF MAKING DECISIONS AS TO WHICH ONE IS THE BEST AND SO FORTH SEMICOLON BUT THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE FACT IT HAS SERIOUSLY RETARDED PEACETIME NUCLEAR EFFORT. HAVE YOU ANY COMMENTS?

SECRETARY PACKARD. I WOULD AGREE, SENATOR, THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE AND I ASSURE YOU WE GIVE CONSIDERATION TO ALL OF THE THINGS YOU HAVE ALLUDED TO.

I THINK IN TERMS OF THE SUBJECT WE ARE DISCUSSING TODAY, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS A SEPARATE ISSUE. WE HAVE ESSENTIALLY AGREED TO DO WHAT I THINK IS NECESSARY AND PROPER IN TERMS OF THE REVERSION AGREEMENT, AND I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WHAT WE HAVE DONE HERE IN ANY WAY LIMITS OR COMMITS US TO WHATEVER WE MAY WANT TO DO IN TERMS OF THE THINGS YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. WELL, THIS IS THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND WE ARE INTERESTED IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL COUNTRIES.

外務省

注意

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電信写

SOMEBODY WROTE NOT TOO LONG AGO THAT WE MUST HAVE CREDIBILITY TO OBTAIN CONSENT, AND MUST HAVE CONSENT TO ACHIEVE DEMOCRACY. THE LONGER WE PUT UP WITH UNNECESSARY SECRECY TO THE EXTENT WE HAVE IN THIS FIELD, THE MORE WE ARE GOING TO REGRET IT.

SECRETARY PACKARD. I AM SURE YOU KNOW, SENATOR, WE ARE TAKING SOME STPS IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF TRYING TO REDUCE THE SECRECY. WE HAVE NOT GONE FAR ENOUGH TO KNOW ALL THE PROBLEMS, BUT I THINK WE RECOGNIZE THERE IS SOMETHING WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION IN THIS AREA.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. THANK YOU, MR. SECRETARY.

(3)

アメリカ大使館

参事官

北米才一課長

送付公信

| | |
|--------------------------|-------------|
| 政 第 9377 号 | 昭和46年11月5日 |
| 外 務 大 臣 殿 | 在米大河原臨時代理大使 |
| 引用(来)(往)公信・電信番号 往電才3590号 | |

送付資料

上院外交委員会聴問会
報告書 'Okinawa Reversion
Treaty' (3部)

報告書添付あり

- 処理
- 送付資料
- 参事官
- 査
- 漁業
- 航空
- 科学協力
- 事務調整
- 調査
- 力夕夕
- 局庶務



(希望配布先)

付属添付
 付属空便(行)
 付属空便(DP)

本信写送付先 (別添とも)

注意

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64

大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会営給

電信写

総番号(TA) 58101
71年 11月 08日 15時 20分 米国 主管
71年 11月 09日 05時 19分 本省 発着 米北1

調査長
長
領移
長

参企析調
参領旅査移

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん協定(軍事委ちよう開会)

第3628号 平 大至急

往電第3625号に関し

8日の上院軍事委のオキナワ協定に関する秘密ちよう開会
におけるウエストモーランド統ばく議長代理のステートメ
ント(軍事委より公表された。)別電のとおり。

(了)

参地中東
長北東西
参北北保
中南番
欧参西東洋
長西東

近ア長経
参書近ア
次総経国資
源

長経協長条
参貿統国
参政技一理
国企二

長国
参条協親
参政経科

長傳長文
参軍社專
参道内外
一二

外務省

注意

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1300

大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会営給

電信写

総番号(TA) 58112
71年 11月 08日 15時 15分 米国 主管
71年 11月 09日 06時 08分 本省 発着 米北1

調査長
長
領移
長

参企析調
参領旅査移

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん協定(軍事委ちよう開会)

第3629号 平 大至急

往電第3628号別電

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

THE OKINAWA REVERSION ISSUE HAS BEEN WITH US FOR
OVER TWENTY YEARS. DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME, THE
PRESSURES FOR REVERSION OF OKINAWA STEADILY INCREASED,
CULMINATING WITH THE DECISION ANNOUNCED IN THE NIXON-
SATO COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 1969 TO PLAN FOR REVER-
SION DURING 1972 SUBJECT TO CONCLUSION OF SPECIFIC
ARRANGEMENTS, TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY LEGISLA-
TIVE SUPPORT. ON JUNE 17, 1971 WITH THE SIGNING OF
THE REVERSION AGREEMENT SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WERE
COMPLETED, AND ON JUNE 29, 1971 THE ARRANGEMENT
WHEREBY JAPAN WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA NO LATER THAN ONE YEAR
AFTER REVERSION WAS FORMALLY APPROVED.

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF OKINAWA WAS RECOGNIZED

参地中東
長北東西
参北北保
中南番
欧参西東洋
長西東

近ア長経
参書近ア
次総経国資
源

長経協長条
参貿統国
参政技一理
国企二

長国
参条協親
参政経科

長傳長文
参軍社專
参道内外
一二

外務省

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電信写

BY BOTH THE US AND JAPAN IN WORLD WAR II, AND US FORCES CAPTURED IT ONLY AFTER A HARD AND COSTLY BATTLE. OKINAWA RECOVERED SLOWLY IN THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR YEARS, BUT ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE WAS AGAIN HIGHLIGHTED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT WHICH RESULTED IN INCREASED CONSTRUCTION TO MORE FULLY DEVELOP ITS POTENTIAL. THE WISDOM OF THIS INVESTMENT AND OKINAWA'S STRATEGIC VALUE FOR EAST ASIA REGIONAL DEFENSE WAS AGAIN JUSTIFIED IN THE 1960'S AS THIS BASE COMPLEX MADE A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO US OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF OKINAWA HAS NOT DIMINISHED OVER THE YEARS AND A CONTINUED MILITARY PRESENCE THERE WILL BE REQUIRED FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD INTO THE FUTURE.

THE MILITARY DEVELOPMENT IN OKINAWA REPRESENTS AN INVESTMENT OF OVER 600 MILLION DOLLARS. THIS PRESENTLY INCLUDES 134 SEPARATE FACILITIES OF ABOUT 13,000 ACRES WHERE VITAL STRATEGIC FUNCTIONS AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT ARE PERFORMED.

OKINAWA HAS THREE AIRFIELDS SEMICOLON A MAJOR USAF BASE AT KADENA AND SMALLER BASES AT NAHA

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電信写

USAF AND USN) AND FUTEMA (USMC), WHICH SERVE THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS SEMICOLON STATION FOR USAF TACTICAL AND TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, NAVY PATROL (ASW) AIRCRAFT, AND USMC TACTICAL/HELICOPTER/ LOGISTIC AIRCRAFT SEMICOLON SUPPORT OF SAC TANKER OPERATIONS SEMICOLON AIR DEFENSE OF RYUKYUS AND TYPHOON HAVEN FOR WESTERN PACIFIC AIRCRAFT.

THE EXTENSIVE LOGISTIC FACILITIES ON OKINAWA CAN SUPPORT RAPIDLY DEPLOYING FORCES AND PROVIDE A MAINTENANCE AND EMERGENCY SUPPLY BASE FOR SUSTAINED OPERATIONS IN KOREA OR SOUTHEAST ASIA. THE PORT FACILITIES AT NAHA, THE MACHINATO COMPLEX OF THE SECOND LOGISTIC COMMAND, AND THE IMMENSE COVERED AND OPEN STORAGE CAPACITY PROVIDE A LOGISTIC AND TAGING BASE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING UP TO 500,000 MEN.

OUTSTANDING PERMANENT CAMP FACILITIES AND MANEUVER AREAS EXIST IN OKINAWA FOR FORWARD DEPLOYED COMBAT READY TROOPS. ELEMENTS OF THE THIRD MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE ARE NOW DEPLOYED IN THESE FACILITIES.

EARLY WARNING RADARS LOCATED ON OKINAWA ARE PART OF THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM FROM JAPAN TO

注意

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電信写

THE PHILIPPINES. SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES AVAILABLE ON OKINAWA ARE FOR LOCAL AIR DEFENSE ONLY. AIR DEFENSE AIRCRAFT ON OKINAWA ARE SPECIFICALLY TASKED TO DEFEND OKINAWA.

THE COMMUNICATIONS COMPLEX IN THE RYUKYUS IS ESSENTIAL TO THE CURRENT US SECURITY POSTURE IN JAPAN, KOREA, TAIWAN, THE PHILIPPINES, AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND THE CONTIGUOUS WATERS. THERE IS NO ALTERNATE LOCATION AVAILABLE TO REESTABLISH JAPAN-TAIWAN-PHILIPPINE LINK, GIVEN THE LOSS OF OKINAWA.

OUR BASIC SECURITY OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. AS A RESULT:

- A MILITARY FLEXIBILITY CONSISTENT WITH THE 1969 NIXON-SATO COMMUNIQUE AND THE US-JAPAN TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY WILL BE AVAILABLE AFTER REVERSION.

- ESSENTIAL MILITARY BASES WILL BE RETAINED SEMICOLON HOWEVER, SOME 34 INSTALLATIONS AND SITES WILL BE RELEASED ON OR PRIOR TO REVERSION AND AN ADDITIONAL 12 FACILITIES AND AREAS WILL BE RETURNED TO JAPAN WITHIN APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AFTER REVERSION.

-4-

外務省

注意

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電信写

- JAPAN WILL ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA BY JULY 1973 RESULTING IN SAVINGS FOR THE US.

- RELOCATION OF US UNITS HAS BEEN MINIMIZED CONSISTENT WITH THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE US AND JAPAN.

THE MAJOR MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF REVERSION ARE: SOMEWHAT REDUCED MILITARY FLEXIBILITY DUE TO THE REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN CONCERNING MAJOR CHANGES IN EQUIPMENT, MAJOR CHANGES IN DEPLOYMENTS AND USE OF BASES FOR DIRECT COMBAT OPERATIONS.

IN MILITARY TERMS, THESE LIMITATIONS MEAN THAT THE US MAY NOT INITIATE A SUBSTANTIAL BUILD-UP OF US FORCES IN OKINAWA WITHOUT THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN'S PERMISSION. HOWEVER, SMALL UNITS MAY BE DEPLOYED INTO OKINAWA WITHOUT CONSULTATION. THIS HAS HAPPENED IN JAPAN ON A FAIRLY REGULAR BASIS, WITH ONLY NOTIFICATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN. IN TERMS OF MOVING OUR UNITS OUT OF JAPAN OR OKINAWA THERE IS TO BE NO REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. THE PRIOR

-5-

外務省

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CONSULTATION PROVISION ALSO APPLIES TO MAJOR CHANGES IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE US CANNOT STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN JAPAN WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. FOLLOWING REVERSION THIS SAME CONDITION WILL APPLY TO THE RYUKYUS. THE REMAINING CATEGORY OF ACTIONS INCLUDED IN THE PRIOR CONSULTATION FORMULA REQUIRES THE APPROVAL OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO UNDERTAKING MILITARY COMBAT OPERATIONS FROM OUR BASES IN JAPAN, AND ON OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, DIRECT COMBAT SORTIES CANNOT BE FLOWN FROM BASES IN JAPANESE TERRITORY WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION. THE EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT FROM THESE AREAS TO OPERATE IN A ZONE OF HOSTILITIES HOWEVER, WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE PRIOR CONSULTATION PROVISION. THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS PROVIDED TO OUTCOMBAT FORCES FROM FACILITIES IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA WOULD NOT AND DO NOT REQUIRE CONSULTATION.

ADDITIONALLY, THERE MAY BE SOME INCREASE IN LOCAL POLITICAL PRESSURES ON US FACILITIES IN OKINAWA DUE TO PART TO SCARCITY OF LAND. THESE PRESSURES PRESENTLY EXIST AND MAY BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE SOMEWHAT AFTER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL IS

注意

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2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

RETURNED TO JAPAN.

ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LEDGER A MORE POSITIVE OUTLOOK IS SUGGESTED BY JAPANESE STATEMENTS, THROUGH THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE AND SPEECHES BY PRIME MINISTER SATO, WHICH INDICATE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MUTUAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN ASIA.

THIS IS REINFORCED BY JAPANESE RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF KOREA AND TAIWAN TO ITS SECURITY AND A SUGGESTION THAT, ALTHOUGH PRIOR CONSULTATION IS REQUIRED, A FAVORABLE RESPONSE COULD BE EXPECTED WHERE OUR SECURITY INTERESTS COINCIDE.

ON BALANCE, IT APPEARS THAT OUR MILITARY POSITION IN THE PACIFIC WILL NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY WEAKENED.

WHILE REVERSION DECREASES THE FLEXIBILITY OF OUR FORCE STRUCTURE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE POLITICAL PRESSURES FOR REVERSION WERE OVERWHELMING AND THAT A CONTINUED DENIAL OF REVERSION WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A RAPID EROSION OF THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE IN OUR MILITARY BASES IN RYUKYUS. THIS, IN TURN, WOULD HAVE CAUSED US CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES IN THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THESE BASES IN THE YEARS AHEAD. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF UNDERSTAND

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電信写

AND ACCEPT THE JUDGMENT THAT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS CASE OUT-WEIGHED THE PARTIAL LOSS OF MILITARY FLEXIBILITY ENTAILED IN REVERSION. WE WILL FIND OTHER WAYS TO GET THE JOB DONE SO AS TO MINIMIZE ANY LOSS OF CAPABILITY. IN THIS RESPECT, FAVORABLE RESOLUTION OF THE FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF MICRONESIA WILL PARTIALLY COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS IN FLEXIBILITY ASSOCIATED WITH OKINAWA REVERSION. IN SUMMARY, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT OUR NEGOTIATORS HAVE OBTAINED A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT RELATIVE TO THE RETURN OF OKINAWA TO JAPANESE CONTROL AND EARLY AND FAVORABLE ACTION BY THE SENATE IS RECOMMENDED.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

-8-

外務省

注意

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電信写

大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総入電厚計
書次会管給

総番号(TA) 58118 主管
71年11月8日17時25分 米 国 発
71年11月9日07時36分 本 省 着 米北1

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん協定(ヘアー議員の演説)

第3632号 平 大至急

往電第3628号に關レ

ヘアー、ヘアー上院議員が8日の上院本会議において、オキナワ返かん協定に反対する演説を行なつたところ、右オキナワ返かん協定の通り。

(了)

(千葉米北1課長に連絡。9日08:40)

調査長
領移長
参企析調
参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
長 参北北保
中南番歐
参一三
参西東洋
西東
長

近ア長
参書近ア
次総経国資
源

長 参貿統国
経協長 参政技一理
条 国企二

長 参条協規
国 参政経科

長 軍社專
情参道内外
文

外務省

注意

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1500

電信写

大政事外外儀官
 務務 典房
 次次
 臣官 審審長長
 儀総 人電厚計
 書文会営給

調査長 領移長
 参企析調
 参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
 長 北東西
 米北北保
 中南審
 欧 参西東洋
 長 西東

近ア長 参書近ア
 経 次総経国資
 長 参賀統国
 経協長 参政技一理
 条 国企二
 参条規
 長 参政経科
 国 軍社專
 情 参道内外
 文 二
 長

総番号(TA) 58129 主管
 71年11月08日17時25分 米 国 発
 71年11月09日08時40分 本 省 着 米北1
 外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄返還協定(バード議員の演説)

才3633号 才 大至急
 往電才3632号 別電

(以下別紙/英文)

(千葉米北1課長に連絡。9:08:40)

外務省

注意

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電信写

MR. PRESIDENT, ON TUESDAY THE SENATE WILL BE CALLED UPON TO RATIFY OR REJECT THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF JAPAN.

THIS PROPOSED AGREEMENT WOULD BE A CHANGE IN THE TERMS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE OF 1951 BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES.

UNDER TERMS OF THE PEACE TREATY THE UNITED STATES HAS UNRESTRICTED USE OF MILITARY BASES ON OKINAWA.

TWO YEARS AGO, WHEN OFFICIAL DISCUSSION BEGAN CONCERNING THE PROPOSED REVERSION OF OKINAWA, I SPONSORED LEGISLATION THAT CALLED UPON THE PRESIDENT TO SUBMIT ANY AGREEMENT CHANGING THE STATUS OF OKINAWA TO THE SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT. THIS LEGISLATION WAS APPROVED BY THE SENATE, AND NOW THE QUESTION OF RATIFICATION BY THE SENATE MUST BE DECIDED.

AFTER LONG CONSIDERATION, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT I CANNOT SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT FOR REVERSION OF OKINAWA, WHICH PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE JAPAN A VETO OVER THE USE BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS FACILITIES ON OKINAWA.

外務省

注意

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電信写

IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO ORGANIZE OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENT. I WISH, HOWEVER, TO MAKE MY OWN VIEWS KNOWN.

I SHALL VOTE AGAINST THE PROPOSAL, EVEN IF I BE THE ONLY SENATOR TO CAST SUCH A VOTE.

I AM AMONG THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BECOME OVERCOMMITTED AROUND THE WORLD. WE HAVE MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS WITH 44 DIFFERENT NATIONS.

MORE THAN 25 YEARS AFTER THE END OF WORLD WAR II, THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINS 310,000 MEN IN EUROPE, INCLUDING THE 2ND FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEMI-COLON AND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC, THE UNITED STATES HAS 370,000 TROOPS ON DUTY.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES CAN CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO CARRY SO HEAVY A MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT OTHER NATIONS MAKE A GREATER CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR OWN SECURITY.

BUT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, OUR MILITARY COMMITMENTS ARE A FACT.

AMONG THE AREAS IN WHICH WE ARE MOST HEAVILY COMMITTED IS ASIA. NOT ONLY IS THE UNITED STATES ENGAGED IN A SHOOTING WAR IN VIETNAM, BUT THE NATION

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電信写

IS ALSO COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF SOUTH KOREA, TAIWAN, JAPAN, THE PHILIPPINES, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, PAKISTAN AND THAILAND.

WE MUST VIEW THE OKINAWA PROPOSAL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

FIRST, IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT IS THE 1951 TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN WHICH CONFERS UPON THE UNITED STATES THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF MILITARY BASES ON THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA.

THE TREATY OF PEACE IS ENTIRELY SEPARATE FROM THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY OF 1960 BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. THE TWO AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED.

AGREEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES TO TURN OVER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

OF OKINAWA TO THE JAPANESE IS A CHANGE IN THE TREATY OF PEACE. IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY.

THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO THE CONTROL OF JAPAN WOULD INVOLVE SURRENDER BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE OKINAWA BASES. NO ONE DISPUTES THAT STATEMENT.

I THINK THAT IN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT THE REVERSION AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED, MEMBERS OF

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電信写

THE SENATE SHOULD GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE EXTENSIVE DEFENSE COMMITMENTS WHICH WE HAVE IN ASIA.

WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT ALL OF OUR ASIAN COMMITMENTS WERE UNDERTAKEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT UNRESTRICTED USE OF OKINAWA WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES.

CAN WE AFFORD TO GO ON GUARANTEEING THE DEFENSE OF SO MANY ASIAN NATIONS, IF WE ARE TO SURRENDER AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE FAR EAST?

OUR MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY WITH JAPAN, FOR EXAMPLE, IS SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL ON 1 YEAR'S NOTICE. SHOULD IT BE CONTINUED INDEFINITELY?

THE STATE DEPARTMENT FEELS IT SHOULD. I QUESTION THAT.

WE HAVE COMMITMENTS TO 10 ASIAN NATIONS UNDER THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT OF 1954. THIS TREATY ALSO IS SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL BY ANY PARTY ON 1 YEAR'S NOTICE. CAN WE CONTINUE THESE COMMITMENTS INDEFINITELY?

THE SATO GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN HAS ASSURED THE UNITED STATE THAT IT WILL COOPERATE IN PERMITTING

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電信写

THIS NATION TO USE OKINAWA IN ORDER TO FULFILL OUR OBLIGATIONS. THOSE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO FAVOR HAVING OKINAWA REVERT TO JAPAN PUT GREAT STRESS ON THIS.

BUT ONCE REVERSION IS ACCOMPLISHED, THE FINAL DECISION ON THE USE OF OKINAWA IN EACH CONTINGENCY WILL REST NOT WITH THE UNITED STATES, BUT WITH JAPAN - WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE UNDER THE RULE OF THE SATO GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME. IN FACT, SATO VERY LIKELY WILL BE OUT OF OFFICE IN A MATTER OF MONTHS.

THESE, I FEEL, ARE SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS.

I WANT TO SEE OUR COMMITMENTS IN ASIA REDUCED.

BUT NO PROPOSAL HAS BEEN MADE TO REDUCE OUR COMMITMENTS.

THE ONLY PROPOSAL IS THAT WE VOLUNTARILY GIVE UP THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT TO USE OUR GREATEST MILITARY BASE COMPLEX IN THE FAR PACIFIC.

JAPAN IS SEEKING, AND WOULD BE GETTING, CONTROL OVER OUR MILITARY BASE. AT THE SAME TIME, JAPAN WOULD HAVE A PLEDGE FROM THE UNITED STATES TO GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF JAPAN.

TO STATE IT ANOTHER WAY, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

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電信写

WANTS THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF JAPAN SEMICOLON TO CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF OKINAWA SEMICOLON TO CONTINUE TO SPEND HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS ON OKINAWA - DORUJIRUSI 260 MILLION LAST YEAR. BUT IT SEEKS TO PUT RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTE 42 PERCENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA.

JAPAN WANTS A VETO OVER ANY U.S. ACTION AFFECTING OKINAWA. IT SPECIFICALLY WANTS THE RIGHT TO DENY TO THE UNITED STATES THE AUTHORITY TO STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA AND WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR CONSULTATION BEFORE OUR MILITARY FORCES BASED THERE COULD BE USED.

IN OTHER WORDS, THE UNITED STATES NO LONGER WOULD HAVE UNRESTRICTED USE OF OKINAWA.

OUR ROLE AS THE DEFENDER OF THE FAR EAST HAS ENABLED JAPAN TO AVOID THE BURDEN OF REARMAMENT - ONLY ABOUT 1 PERCENT OF HER GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS SPENT ON DEFENSE - AND THUS CONCENTRATE ON EXPANDING AND MODERNIZING ITS DOMESTIC ECONOMY.

IN DEFENSE MATTERS, THE JAPANESE HAVE GOTTEN A FREE RIDE. AS A DIRECT RESULT, JAPAN'S PRESENT

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電信写

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT RANKS THIRD IN THE WORLD, BEHIND ONLY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

WHILE THE PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN GIVES THE UNITED STATES UNRESTRICTED RIGHTS ON OKINAWA, THE 1960 MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY PROVIDES THAT OUR MILITARY FORCES BASED IN JAPAN CANNOT BE USED WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

UNDER THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE SENATE MUST SOON VOTE ON, JAPAN WOULD HAVE A SIMILAR RIGHT OF CONSULTATION WHICH REGARD TO AMERICAN FORCES ON OKINAWA.

WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN AND THE VAST AREAS OF THE WEST PACIFIC AND SOUTHEAST ASIA IS OPEN TO QUESTION.

BUT AT THE MOMENT, THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF THESE REGIONS. AND IT IS ONLY COMMONSENSE, IN MY VIEW, THAT SO LONG AS THESE COMMITMENTS CONTINUE IN FORCE, THEN IT IS ONLY LOGICAL AND RESPONSIBLE THAT THIS COUNTRY RETAIN THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF ITS GREATEST BASE IN THE WEST PACIFIC, NAMELY OKINAWA.

I AGREE THAT EVENTUALLY OKINAWA AND THE RYUKYU

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電信写

ISLANDS WILL REVERT TO CONTROL OF JAPAN. BUT I THINK IT UNWISE TO TURN OVER SUCH CONTROL AT A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED SO DEEPLY TO THE DEFENSE OF ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC.

IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY, IN MY OPINION, FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE ITS COMMITMENTS TO THE DEFENSE OF ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC WHILE AT THE SAME TIME GIVING UP THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE MILITARY COMPLEX ON OKINAWA.

IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT PUBLIC ATTENTION BE FOCUSED ON THIS ISSUE OF UNRESTRICTED USE OF OUR BASES ON OKINAWA.

I SPEAK AS ONE WHO IS NOT SYMPATHETIC TO OUR DEEP INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, ONE WHO FROM THE BEGINNING REGARDED IT AS AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A GROUND WAR THERE.

I SPEAK AS ONE WHO QUESTIONS THE WISDOM OF OUR COUNTRY'S COMMITTING ITSELF TO MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS WITH 44 DIFFERENT NATIONS.

I SPEAK AS ONE WHO FEELS THAT WE CANNOT LOGICALLY BE THE WORLD'S POLICEMAN.

IF BY THE ACT OF GRANTING JAPAN ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER OKINAWA, THE UNITED STATES COULD INSURE

9
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電信写

A MULTINATIONAL DEFENSE STRUCTURE IN THE FAR EAST, WITH INCREASED PARTICIPATION BY JAPAN - IF THIS ACTION WOULD RELIEVE OUR COUNTRY OF A MEASURE OF ITS HEAVY INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES - THEN, I WOULD SUPPORT A REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPANESE CONTROL.

BUT THIS IS NOT THE CASE.

QUITE THE CONTRARY. SURRENDER OF CONTROL OVER OKINAWA WOULD ONLY MAKE MORE DIFFICULT OUR ROLE IN THE PACIFIC.

IN FACT, SHOULD THE TREATY FOR REVERSION OF OKINAWA BE APPROVED, THEN I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE ITS COMMITMENTS IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC AREAS.

IF THE UNITED STATES CHOOSES TO GIVE UP THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT OF USE OF ITS BASES ON OKINAWA, THEN I BELIEVE THIS ACTION WILL BE AN APPROPRIATE SIGNAL FOR THE REDUCTION OF COMMITMENTS IN THIS REGION.

SURELY WE CANNOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO CARRY THE CHIEF BURDEN FOR DEFENSE OF ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC WHILE GIVING UP THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF OUR MOST STRATEGIC BASE.

10
外務省

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電 信 写

IN THE LONG RUN, I BELIEVE WE MUST REDUCE OUR
ASIAN COMMITMENTS.

WHEN THIS HAS BEEN DONE, THEN IT WOULD BE PROPER
TO TURN OVER OKINAWA TO THE CONTROL OF JAPAN.

BUT IN THE SHORT RUN, THE COMMITMENTS OF THIS
NATION IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC AREAS REMAIN IN
FORCE.

AND SO LONG AS THIS IS THE CASE, I CANNOT SUPPORT
AN AGREEMENT WHICH SACRIFICES THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT
OF THE UNITED STATES TO USE ITS BASES ON THE ISLAND
OF OKINAWA.

(J)

(回覧番号 2926) 外務省電信案 (分類)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 機密表示 (極秘・秘の朱印) 秘 | 符号表示 暗 略 平 | 総第 1109 003 号 |
| ※昭和 年 月 日 時 分 秒 第 2527 号 4 11. 9 03. 35 | | ※発電係 5 |
| 大至急 至急 ・普通・LTF | | |
| 大 臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官 房 長 | 主管 アメリカ局長 米北 参事官 北米才一課長 | 主管局部課 (室) 名 起案 昭和 46 年 11 月 8 日 起案者 電話番号 加藤 2465 |
| 協賛先 官房総務参事官 官房書記官 条約課長 | 安全保障課長 | |
| 在米 参事 大使 一臨時代理大使 総領事 代理 | あて 外務 大臣 発 | |
| 在沖 参事 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理 | あて | |
| 件名 上院外交季職補会 貴電 3422 号に因り、 8日 参院予算委の席上、宮之原 貞光議員 (社)より、10月27日の本参職補会にて 「ビザ」国務長官は 日本との関係法令が 国会で承認されたこと、米側は協定を | | |

電信課長
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三瓶
四瓶
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五十瓶

(※印欄内は電信課記入)
上下院職補会、上院外交職補会、補正あり

2

FCCの准許は112"ありとの趣旨を述べた由
あり、"日本の関係法令"と具体的に
何を指すのかとの質問あり、これに対し
本大臣は回答を保留し検討し、明9日
の参院予算委にて112"次の趣旨の
回答を行う予定あり、貴国政府側
にその旨を通報しなかった。

1. 米側に念の爲 照会したところ、米側は、
返還協定の実施のため日本側において
1) かかる口内措置の必要が是れより
日本側が判断するところにて、米側と
してはどの法律案というように特定のものを
指したものはなく、内閣府は沖縄の
返還が実現されし後の日本側の口内
措置を全般的に指したものと見ること
とであった。しかして日本側において所要の
口内措置がとられ得ることとなり、これにて
返還協定の実施が確保され得る旨、
従って日本側としては批准書の交換を
行なう旨の通報に接すれば、米側
としては、批准に關する立憲府の支持を
得られるは、日米間協定の上 月時と

宛てて批准書の交換を行はうことである。

2. (これは、日本政府はかかる口内措置が
とれるは返還協定の実施が確保される
と考へてゐるが、と追及された場合) 沖縄
の復帰準備は、又日本側としての仕事と
あつて返還協定の実施のためには沖縄の
復帰のため全般的法律案が多ければ
かれ困難があり、従つて政府としては、
今国会に提案する全閣連法案が
成立すること強く期待している。

沖縄に転電した。

(部の内 号) 注意

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電信写

総番号(TA) 58/43
 71年 11月 08日 20時 00分 米 国 主管
 71年 11月 09日 10時 16分 本 省 発着 北1

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ協定上院審議(軍事委)

第3645号 極秘 大至急

往電第3625号に関し

上院軍事委は8日の午前、午後にわたりオキナワ協定に関する秘密ちよう開会を開催したところ、右につき軍事委スタッフ(ウールセイ)、国防省シーツ日本課長、且且(軍事委出席の上院議員より直接情報収集している。)等よりちよう取したところを総合して次の通り御報告する。

なお本件内容については外部にもれざるよう御配慮願いたい。

ちよう開会は午前、午後の2回にわたり行われた。委員会側よりはステンス委員長他、サイミントン、ペンツェン(以上民主党)、サーモンド・タワー、ドミク、ゴールドウオーター(以上共和党)が出席した。(オキナワ協定反対の急先ぼうであるハリー・バードは午前、午後とも欠席)、政府側よりはウエストモーランド

外務省

極秘

大臣官舎
 事務次官
 大臣官舎審議長
 秘書官
 電厚計
 書文会管給

調査長
 参企析調
 領移長
 参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
 長 北東西
 参北北保
 中南
 参一
 参西東洋
 長 西東

近ア長
 参書近ア
 経 次総経国資
 源

長 参質統
 経 参政技一理
 協 国
 長 国
 参政二

参余協規
 長 参政経科
 国
 長 参道内外
 文
 長 一

注意

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電信写

ばく議長代理、ジョンソン国務次官、ランパート高等弁務官等が出席した。

議事の内容は、核兵器の問題と事前協議の問題が中心であり、そのほか基地関係投資や、安保条約の安定性(日本側が一方的に破きする可能性)あるいは日本が経済大国から軍事大国に進むにつれ在日米軍基地をすべて米国の手からうぼうのではないかといった問題等についてもさん発的に言及があつた。

審議の過程において、議員側より、オキナワ基地の重要性に関する統合参謀本部側の説明に従来からの統合参謀本部の説明と一致しない点があるとして追求し、審議が長びく気配も見えたが、結局その点もおさまり、良好なふん囲気の中に終らした。

本日の会議はハリー・バンド、サーモンド議員等オキナワ協定返かんの軍事面の処理に不満をいやく議員より統合参謀本部の説明を聞きたいとの要望があり、それに対しステンス委員長としても軍事委員会の委員長及び南部議員としての立場から、軍事委のメンバーに十分聞きたいことを聞かせる機会をつくるためちよう開会開催に積極的し勢をとつてのぞんだ結果開かれることになったものである。なお3日の軍事委に対する国防省の説明会は単なるブリーフィングであり、8日のちよう開会

外務省

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電信写

が軍事委員会としての正式のちよう開会とされている。

4. 軍事委員会としてのオキナワ協定審議は、8日のちよう開会をもつて終了したが、ステンス委員長はちよう開会終了後、軍事委員会としては何等の報告も声明も発出しない旨明らかにした由。

なお8日のちよう開会の審議の過程でサーモンド議員が協定支持にINCLINEDであるともらした由であり、またタワー、ペンツェン、ヒューズ議員等も協定承認に賛成する旨発言した由である。

(了)

外務省

(部の内 号) 注意

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電信写

大政事外外機官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会営給

調査長 参企析調
領移長 参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
長 北東西
氷 参北北保
中南 参一二
審 参西東洋
吹 長 西東

近ア長 参書近ア
経 次総経国資
長 参貿統国
経協長 参政技一理
条 参参協規
長 参政経科
情 軍社專
長 参道内外
文 一二

総番号(TA) 58150 主管
71年 11月 08日 20時 25分 米 国 発
71年 11月 09日 10時 20分 本 省 着

外務大臣殿 牛場 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ協定上院審議(本会議の見通し)

第3646号 極秘 大至急

往電第3645号に関し

軍事委員会のオキナワ協定審議の終了に伴ない、上院本会議による協定審議が開始される運びとなつたが、右の見通しにつき当館において関係方面を打しんした結果及び且、且を通じて上院に打しんせしめた結果と総合し次の通り御報告する。

1. 8日の上院本会議の審議がまるも続行されているため、9日の審議日程が未定である(当館注)本会議の終了時により9日の審議日程を確定する)がマンスフィールド院内総務としては9日の本会議においてオキナワ協定を取りあげる予定である。

2. 審議はフルブライト外交委員長が協定承認を求め演説をするほか、パーシ、ター等が支持演説をし、またサーモンド、バード等が反対ないし疑念表明の発言をすることが予想されるので、全体として2時間ないし長ければ4時間程度かかると予想される。

外務省

極秘

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電信写

3. マンス・フィールド民主党院内総務としては十分な議員の出席を確保するため9日に各議員の出欠、投票傾向を打しんし、3分の2の支持確保を確認した上で10日に表決をする方が安全ではないかとの考え方もつていられるので表決は10日に回される可能性もある。

4. 表決結果の予想については、パード、サモンド、ジョーダン(ロス・カロライナ)等若干名が積極的に反対することが予想されている(注: サモンドについては冒頭往電の通り軍事委において協定支持の意見表示を行なった由であり、賛成にまわる可能性もある)。ほかには全般的に協定支持のふん囲気であり、本会議の協定承認はまず間違いないという見方が一般的である。ただし、最近リベラル派の出席率の悪さから保守派の意見の通るケースも数見され、その意味でマンスフィールドがしん重を期して各議員の出欠等を打しんした上で表決に付そうとしているのも意味がないことではないと考えられる。

(了)

外務省

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電信写

総番号(TA) 58373 米 国 主管
 71年 11月09日 9時00分 米 国 発 米北
 71年 11月10日 9時04分 本 省 着 米北

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん協定上院審議

第365/号 略 大至急

往電第3646号に關し

1. オキナワ返かん協定の上院本会議は9日午前10時30分より開催された。冒頭マンスフィールド院内総務より、本9日は出席議員が少いので本件協定の承認のための採決は明10日午後3時に行うこととし、協定に関する討議は本日中に終了すべきであるとの提案が行われ、会議の了承を得た。

2. まず協定を本会議にリポート・アウトしたフルブライト外交委員長より、日米関係が如何に緊密なものであるかを示す見地から協定につき上院は速やかに承認を与えるべきであると協定締結の意義、日米関係の重要性を強調するちん述が行われた。

3. このほかマンスフィールド院内総務、外交委で証言したターナー(民主、加州)のほか、ロス(共和、テラウエア)、ケース(共和、ニュージャシー)、グリーン共和党内幹事(ミシガン)、パーシー(共和、イリノイ)、ジャヴァイツ(共和、ニューヨーク)、フオン(共和、ハワイ)。

外務省

大政事外外備官
 務務典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 備総人電厚計
 書文会營給

調査長 参企析調
 長 参領旅査移
 長

ア 参地中東
 長 北東西
 米 参北北保
 長
 中南 参一二
 審 参西東洋
 歐 西東
 長 三三

近 参書近ア
 ア 長 次総経国資
 経 源

長 参貿統国
 経 参政技一理
 協 国企二
 長 条

参案協規
 長 参政経科
 国 軍社專
 長 参道内外
 情 一
 長 文

秘

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電信写

④ステニス軍事委員長（民主、ミシシッピ）、ハンセン（共和、ワイオミング）の各議員が協定に賛成する旨発言した。

4. 反対の発言はバード議員（ヴァージニア）及びゴールドウォーター議員（共和、アリゾナ）より行われた。

5. 上述の発言中、ハンセンはバードの反対論につき質問する問答形式で発言し、賛成と了解される発言を行なっており、またゴールドウォーターはステニスに質問する問答形式で結局は軍事委員長の主張にもかかわらず反対である旨結んでいる。またフオン議員は協定に賛成ではあるが、センカクの帰属に関連し、上院外交委の報告が本協定がセンカク諸島の主権の問題については影響しないことを明らかにしている点に言及すると共に、外交委および開会第3日目に弁論し（ロバート・モーリス）をたてて同島の所有権を主張したGRACE HESUの立場に考慮が払われるよう希望する旨ちん述している。

6. 賛成論の主たる論点は日米関係の重要性、アジアにおける日本の重要性、日米経済関係の重要性（日本の自由化努力、せん維をめぐる政府間交渉の妥結にも言及）、日本の協力なくして軍事基地の有効な機能維持の困難性であり、そのためにはオキナワが日本に返かんさるべきで、米国の統合参謀本部も右返かんに賛成している旨述べている。

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電信写

7. 反対論の主たる論点は、米国としては対外コミットメントがあるところ、オキナワ返かんは基地の機能を低下せしめるだけで好ましくなく、将来における返かんには反対しないが現在は時期しよう早なる旨述べている。なおバード議員は3月10日の議会原子力合同委における原子力委員会のリックオーヴァー中將の原子力せん水艦の日本寄港問題に関する証言録のそう入方要請している。

8. 以上の通り全体の空気はいうまでもなく協定賛成であり、特にステニス軍事委員長が軍事委員長の立場において本件支持をおんころうろちん述したのは印象的というべく、他方バード議員の場合も日米関係の重要性を認め、日本との友好を望むものである旨力説することをわすれず、決して反日一点張りというものではなく、持論である信念を訴えたまでであるとの印象を与えている。即ち本年3月、4月ごろに当国議会の対日空気を御報告したころにくらべその後の諸事態の推移発展により、また日本を「いためつけた」ということに対する反動からいわゆる「GET JAPAN」の気分は目下のところ弱まっていることが指摘されよう。従つて明日の投票について協定承認に必要な3/2の支持は間違いのないというのが米側関係者（議会、行政府、新聞）の一致した意見である。

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電信写

なおオキナワが終つたら次は「鉄鋼」だともらひていた上院議員がいるくらいで、明日の投票を了することは日米関係にとって最大の好材料であるが、その後に更に多くの難問がひかえていることもまたまぎれもない事実である。在米各館（国連、アンカレジを除く）に転電した。（了）

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- 大政事外外儀官
- 務務典房
- 次次
- 臣官官審審長
- 儀認人電厚
- 書文会普
- 調査長
- 領移長
- 参企析調
- 参領旅査
- 参地中東
- 長北東西
- 参北北保
- 参一二
- 参西東洋
- 長西東
- 参書近ア
- 次総経国
- 参實統
- 参政技一
- 国企二
- 参条協規
- 参政経科
- 軍社專
- 参道内外
- 一二

総番号(TA) 58372 主管
 71年11月09日17時20分 米 国 発 着
 71年11月 日 時 分 本 省 着 米北

外務大臣殿 半場大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄協定上院審議(フルブライト議員発言)

次3652号 平大急
 往電次3651号に因り

MR. PRESIDENT, I RISE TO SUPPORT SENATE
 ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION OF THE
 AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN CONCERNING THE RYUKYU
 ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS, WHICH PROVIDES
 FOR THE REVERSION OF RIGHTS OF ADMINISTRATION
 OVER OKINAWA TO JAPAN. THIS TREATY WILL FULFILL
 A PROMISE MADE BY EVERY ADMINISTRATION, JDEMO-
 CRATIC AND REPUBLICAN ALIKE, SINCE 1951. MORE
 THAN 25 YEARS AFTER WORLD WAR II, IT WILL FORMALLY
 TERMINATE THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN.
 THIS TREATY REPRESENTS THE LOGICAL CONCLUSION
 OF AMERICAN POLICY FOLLOWING THE OCCUPATION WHICH
 HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE THE EMERGENCE

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電信写

OF AN ECONOMICALLY STRONG AND POLITICALLY
 STABLE JAPAN.

THAT POLICY HAS SUCCEEDED WELL AND THE RESULT
 HAS BEEN TWO DECADES OF MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY AND
 PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. WITH
 THE WORLD'S MOST DYNAMIC ECONOMY, JAPAN HAS
 BECOME THE WORLD'S THIRD LARGEST ECONOMIC POWER,
 AND, AFTER CANADA, THE LARGEST CUSTOMER OF THE
 UNITED STATES. IN 1970 U.S. EXPORTS TO JAPAN
 WERE VALUED AT DORUJIRUSI 4.7 BILLION, ALMOST
 TWICE AS MUCH AS OUR NEXT LARGEST MARKET (
 GERMANY). JAPAN IS ALSO THE LARGEST IMPORTER
 OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. AND IN THE DECADE
 ENDING IN 1970, U.S. EXPORTS TO JAPAN EXPANDED
 BY 247 PERCENT, MAKING JAPAN OUR FASTEST GROWING
 MARKET.

THE RAPID GROWTH OF TRADE AND THE EXPANSION
 OF OUR TWO COMPETITIVE ECONOMIES HAVE NATURALLY
 PRODUCED TENSIONS, SOME OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE.
 NEVERTHELESS, JAPAN HAS RECENTLY TAKEN A NUMBER
 OF STEPS TO ALLEVIATE THESE TENSIONS. IT HAS

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電信写

REDUCED IMPORT QUOTAS ILLEGAL UNDER GATT FROM A 1969 LEVEL OF 122 TO THE CURRENT LEVEL OF 40. IT HAS ALSO INCREASED THE AMOUNT OF PERMISSIBLE IMPORTS UNDER EXISTING QUOTAS AND HAS STATED ITS INTENTION OF REDUCING VARIOUS TARIFFS. IN ADDITION, JAPAN HAS CONCLUDED A FOUR-STAGE LIBERALIZATION PROGRAM COVERING FOREIGN INVESTMENT WHICH, WHILE NOT COMPLETELY SATISFACTORY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF U.S. BUSINESS, STILL OPENS THE DOOR TO 50 PERCENT INVESTMENTS IN MOST INDUSTRIES. IN ADDITION TO LIMITING TEXTILE EXPORTS, JAPAN HAS IMPLEMENTED RESTRAINTS ON 73 CATEGORIES OF GOODS, COVERING APPROXIMATELY 25 PERCENT OF ITS EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING IRON AND STEEL. ON OCTOBER 15 THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED A FURTHER AGREEMENT TO LIMIT MAN-MADE AND WOOL TEXTILE EXPORTS, PROVIDING FOR A GROWTH RATE OF JAPANESE TEXTILE EXPORTS OF FIVE PERCENT PER YEAR FOR A THREE-YEAR PERIOD (SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN THE GROWTH RATE OF THE U.S. MARKET BUT WELL BELOW THE GROWTH RATE OF NEARLY 70 PERCENT ACHIEVED EARLIER BY JAPANESE TEXTILE EXPORTS)

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電信写

。 ALTHOUGH IMPORTED SYNTHETIC TEXTILES ACCOUNT FOR LESS THAN TWO PERCENT OF THE TOTAL U.S. CONSUMPTION, THIS AGREEMENT WILL PROVIDE A BENEFIT TO THE U.S. TEXTILE INDUSTRY AND THE U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. FINALLY, AND POSSIBLY MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, STEPS HAVE BEEN INITIATED WHICH WILL ULTIMATELY LEAD TO A MORE REALISTICALLY VALUED YEN.

THIS SUMMARY OF ADJUSTMENTS MADE BY JAPAN IN ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES ILLUSTRATES, I BELIEVE, AN APPROACH TO ECONOMIC ISSUES WHICH IS DEDICATED TO THE PRESERVATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. IT REFLECTS AN ABILITY OF BOTH SIDES TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS ON THE MANY INEVITABLE ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE INTEREST OF THE MORE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

IT IS THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS BASIC POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP ON WHICH, I BELIEVE, WE MUST FOCUS

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電信写

ATTENTION TODAY. IN THE MIDST OF GREAT FLUX IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, IT IS EASY TO LOSE SIGHT OF THE MORE DURABLE, AND MORE IMPORTANT, ASPECTS OF OUR POLICY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED TRIP TO PEKING AND THE SEATING OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS ARE RADICAL CHANGES WHICH ARE NOT ANY THE LESS WELCOME FOR BEING LONG OVERDUE. THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS AN OBJECTIVE WHICH THE SENATE HAS ENDORSED. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NECESSITY OF PRESERVING A VIABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN MUST NOT BE OVERLOOKED IN THE PROCESS. PRESIDENT NIXON HAS STATED:

'A CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IS VITAL TO BUILDING THE PEACEFUL AND PROGRESSIVE WORLD BOTH OF US WANT FOR ALL MANKIND. THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN STRENGTHENING THE FABRIC OF PEACE IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE CHALLENGING. BUT IF JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES GO SEPARATE WAYS,

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電信写

THEN THIS TASK WOULD BE INCOMPARABLY MORE DIFFICULT. WHATEVER DIFFERENCES MAY ARISE BETWEEN OUR NATIONS ON SPECIFIC POLICY QUESTIONS, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE BASIC NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP REMAIN CLOSE AND CORDIAL.'

BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF JAPAN AND ITS ENORMOUS POTENTIAL IN THE CONTEXT OF EAST ASIA, THE UNITED STATES CANNOT AFFORD TO PURSUE POLICIES WITHOUT CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN. THE PRIME IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IN EAST ASIA IS THE MAINTENANCE OF A VIABLE, FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WITH THAT COUNTRY. AN INDISPENSABLE STEP IN THE REALIZATION OF THIS OBJECTIVE IS THE EXPEDITIOUS REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN.

OF COURSE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT THE RESULTS OF THE CHANGES IN U. S. POLICY IN ASIA, SUCH AS THE NEW ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA AND THE DIMINISHING WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. AS DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DAVID PACKARD STATED BEFORE

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電信写

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE:

••WE ARE GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE....

•AND THAT INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN RELATION TO A FRIENDLY COUNTRY LIKE JAPAN.

OUR PRESIDENT, IN OPENING THE DOOR TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, IS TAKING A NEW STEP.

I DON'T THINK WE CAN ASSESS AT THIS TIME THE LEVEL OR THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT OUR MILITARY PRESENCE WILL BE REQUIRED THERE. ••

WHILE THERE INEVITABLY MAY BE CONSIDERABLE UNCERTAINTY OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS, THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE MADE UNEQUIVOCALLY CLEAR THAT THE OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT PRESENT U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN ASIA. SECRETARY PACKARD INFORMED THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE:

••THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE BEEN CONSULTED FULLY DURING THE OKINAWAN NEGOTIATIONS AND

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

HAVE PARTICIPATED FULLY IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. ADMIRAL MOORER, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, WHO IS AWAY FROM WASHINGTON TODAY, ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT AND URGE YOUR FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION OF IT. ••

INDEED, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE DOUBT THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD MAINTAIN ITS BASE STRUCTURE AT THE LEVEL PROPOSED IF THE TREATY WERE NOT RATIFIED. POLITICAL PRESSURE HAS BEEN SEVERE BOTH IN JAPAN AND ON OKINAWA IN FAVOR OF REVERSION, WHICH HAS BEEN PROMISED IN PRINCIPLE BY THE UNITED STATES FOR TWO DECADES. THE ELECTED CHIEF EXECUTIVE ON OKINAWA AND THE LOCAL LEGISLATURE ARE UNIFORMLY DEDICATED TO REVERSION. THE CONSEQUENCE OF FAILING TO RATIFY THE TREATY WOULD NOT ONLY AFFECT THE ABILITY OF THE U.S., AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, TO OPERATE ITS BASES THERE, BUT IT COULD ALSO SET OFF AN UNPREDICTABLE CHAIN OF EVENTS CAUSING FUNDAMENTAL DAMAGE TO U.S.-JAPAN

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電信写

RELATIONS.

IN REPORTING OUT THIS TREATY, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HAS MADE CLEAR THAT IT DOES NOT IMPLY APPROVAL OF THE EXISTING LEVEL OF U. S. TROOPS AND BASES ON OKINAWA FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE ON OKINAWA, AS WELL AS IN OTHER AREAS OF ASIA, HAS BEEN LARGELY DIRECTED AT A PRESUMED THREAT FROM CHINA. AS THE SITUATION IN ASIA CHANGES, PARTICULARLY IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE, WE MUST CONSTANTLY REASSESS THE CONTINUED NEED FOR THIS MILITARY PRESENCE. THE CHANGES ARE ALREADY EVIDENT. NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA HAVE TAKEN TENTATIVE STEPS TOWARD RESUMING TALKS WITH EACH OTHER. THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND ARE REASSESSING THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD CHINA IN VIEW OF THE U.S. INITIATIVE. AND, OF COURSE, JAPAN ITSELF IS MOVING RAPIDLY TOWARD A NEW BASIS FOR ITS GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS WITH PEKING. IT IS TOO EARLY TO FORESEE ALL THE STEPS WHICH MAY BE TAKEN. NEVERTHELESS, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT, IN ADDITION TO THE 50,000 TROOPS MAINTAINED ON OKINAWA, WE

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電信写

KEEP 30,000 IN JAPAN, 43,000 IN KOREA, 18,000 IN THE PHILIPPINES, 32,000 IN THAILAND AND 9,000 IN TAIWAN. AS A NEW SET OF RELATIONSHIPS EMERGE IN ASIA, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO DEVELOP A NEW SET OF PRIORITIES. ONE OF THE FIRST ITEMS TO BE QUESTIONED SHOULD BE THE NECESSITY OF THIS PERVASIVE U. S. MILITARY PRESENCE.

FINALLY, MR. PRESIDENT, A WORD SHOULD BE ADDED CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE TREATY CONTEMPLATES THAT AFTER REVERSION THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OKINAWA. THIS IS A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO JAPAN AND, WHILE SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS PRECLUDE ANY DISCUSSION OF THESE MATTERS IN OPEN SESSION, I POINT TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE'S APPROVAL, NOTED IN THE COMMITTEE REPORT, OF THIS EFFECT OF THE TREATY.

IN CONCLUSION, LET ME REITERATE THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF THIS TREATY TO FUTURE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS. THE TREATY EMBODIES A SETTLEMENT OF THE

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電信写

LAST POLITICAL ISSUE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
 GROWING OUT OF WORLD WAR II. IT PLACES OUR RELATION-
 SHIP FOR THE FUTURE ON A BASIS OF TRUE EQUALITY
 AND OPENS THE DOOR FOR THE CONTINUATION OF OUR
 POLITICAL ALLIANCE ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL INTEREST
 AND RESPECT. BY CONSENTING TO THE RATIFICATION
 OF THIS TREATY THE SENATE WILL RESPONSIBLY
 DISCHARGE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE IN THIS AREA
 AND WILL DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THE DEPTH OF THE
 U.S. COMMITMENT TO CONTINUED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH
 JAPAN.

(了)

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電信写

総番号(TA) 58370 主管
 71年 月 9日 17時 30分 米 国 発 北1
 71年 月 10日 08時 21分 本 省 着

外務大臣殿 半場 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄協定上院審議(米-議院発言)

才3653号 平 大急急
 往電才3651号に同

MR. PRESIDENT. ON JUNE 17, 1971, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN SIGNED AN HISTORIC TREATY PROVIDING FOR THE REVERSION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS TO JAPAN. THIS AGREEMENT LAYS THE FOUNDATION FOR A NEW JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP WHICH CAN BENEFIT BOTH ASIA AND THE ENTIRE WORLD.

THE SENATE, IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO RATIFY THE TREATY, MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT U.S. CONTROL OVER OKINAWA AND THE RYUKYUS AROSE OUT OF A SITUATION FAR DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH EXISTS TODAY. IN 1945, WHEN THE UNITED STATES ASSUMED FORMAL CONTROL OF THE ISLANDS, JAPAN WAS DEFEATED

大政事外外儀官
 務務 典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 儀総人電厚計
 書文会営給

調査長 参企折調
 領移長 参領旅査移

参地中東
 長 北東西
 参北北保
 参一二
 参西東洋
 長 西東

近ア長 参書近ア
 経 次総経国資
 源

長 参貿統国
 経協長 参政技一理
 条 国企二

参参協規
 長国 参政経科

長情長文 参軍社專
 長文 参週内外
 一 二

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AND UNDER AMERICAN OCCUPATION. BY THE TIME THE KOREAN WAR BROKE OUT, THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN WAS NEARING AN END SEMICOLON BUT BECAUSE OF THE KOREAN WAR AND THE EMERGENCE OF COMMUNIST CHINA AS AN ALLY OF THE SOVIET UNION, OKINAWA HAD BECOME IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES AS ITS MAJOR MILITARY BASE IN THE FAR EAST. SO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYUS WAS CONTINUED AND WAS FORMALIZED IN THE 1951 TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN. BY THE TIME OF THE PEACE TREATY, JAPAN HAD ONLY JUST BEGUN TO REESTABLISH ITSELF AS A VIABLE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENTITY. GIVEN JAPAN'S WEAKNESS AND THE PRESUMED DANGERS IN THE AREA, THE UNITED STATES CONCLUDED THAT IT COULD NOT AFFORD TO GIVE UP CONTROL OVER THE RYUKYUS AT THAT TIME.

NEVERTHELESS, THE UNITED STATES NEVER INTENDED TO KEEP THE ISLANDS PERMANENTLY. WHILE THE PEACE TREATY ADMITTED THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFORMING THE ISLANDS INTO A UNITED NATIONS TRUST TERRITORY, JOHN FOSTER DULLES, CHIEF U.S. DELEGATE AT THE PEACE

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CONFERENCE, POINTED OUT IN A LETTER TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ON AUGUST 25, 1951, THAT JAPAN STILL POSSESSED SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE ISLANDS AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WAS PRESUMPTUOUS IN BELIEVING " THAT FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING THE RYUKYU AND BONIN ISLANDS, THE TERMS OF WHICH ARE NOT YET FORMULATED, WILL HEREAFTER BE A SOURCE OF DISSATISFACTION TO LARGE SECTIONS OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE." " DULLES WAS SUGGESTING EVENTUAL REVERSION OF THE ISLANDS TO JAPANESE CONTROL.

SUBSEQUENT ADMINISTRATIONS GAVE FIRMER COMMITMENTS THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD ONE DAY RETURN THE RYUKYUS TO JAPAN. PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER NISHI OF JUNE 21, 1957, DECLARED THAT " JAPAN POSSESSED RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THESE ISLANDS," BUT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONTINUE TO ADMINISTER THEM " SO LONG AS THE CONDITIONS OF THREAT AND TENSION EXIST IN THE FAR EAST."

THE FIRST EXPLICIT STATEMENT OF AMERICAN INTENT

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TO RETURN ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS TO JAPAN CAME FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY. HE SAID ON MARCH 19, 1962,

''I RECOGNIZE THE RYUKYUS TO BE A PART OF THE JAPANESE HOMELAND AND LOOK FORWARD TO THE DAY WHEN THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD WILL PERMIT THEIR RESTORATION TO FULL JAPANESE SOVEREIGNTY.''

PRESIDENT JOHNSON REAFFIRMED THAT POSITION. A JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT AND JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER SATO ON NOVEMBER 16, 1967, STATES THAT ''THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD KEEP UNDER JOINT AND CONTINUOUS REVIEW THE STATUS OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, GUIDED BY THE AIM OF RETURNING ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS OVER THESE ISLANDS TO JAPAN...''

PRESIDENT NIXON HAS MOVED BOLDLY TO FULFILL THESE PAST PLEDGES. IN NOVEMBER 9 1969, THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER SATO AGREED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TOWARD REVERSION OF THE RYUKYUS

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IN 1972. THE TREATY OF JUNE 17 IS THE CULMINATION OF HIS EFFORTS.

THE REVERSION TREATY STEMS FROM NEW CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DIFFER VASTLY FROM THOSE OF 20 YEARS AGO. BY AGREEING TO RETURN THE RYUKYUS TO JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THAT JAPAN CAN NO LONGER BE DEALT WITH AS A CLIENT STATE. AS THE WORLD'S THIRD GREATEST INDUSTRIAL POWER WITH A GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT THAT MAY OVERTAKE THE SOVIET UNION'S BY THE END OF THIS CENTURY, JAPAN WILL EXERCISE AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT ASIA AND THE WORLD IN THE YEARS AHEAD. THE UNITED STATES MUST NOW SEEK A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN BASED ON A MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS AND OPERATING ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS.

ELIMINATION OF THE VESTIGES OF WORLD WAR II IS AN ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP IN FORGING A NEW JAPANESE-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP. THE RETURN OF OKINAWA AND THE OTHER RYUKYUS TO JAPAN WILL DEMONSTRATE

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電信写

TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE THAT THE UNITED STATES SEEKS SUCH A RELATIONSHIP IN GOOD FAITH.

IF THE SENATE SHOULD FAIL TO RATIFY THIS RATIFY THIS TREATY, IT WILL HAVE TO BEAR A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY FOR FUTURE EVENTS. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT REJECTION OF THE TREATY WOULD SO DAMAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN THAT THE MODERATE GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER SATO WOULD FALL AND BE REPLACED BY ANTI-AMERICAN ELEMENTS OF THE JAPANESE LEFT AT THE NEXT PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS WHICH MUST BE HELD NO LATER THAN DECEMBER 1973. IF THESE ELEMENTS SHOULD GAIN POWER IN JAPAN, WE COULD EXPECT A SHARP SHIFT IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AWAY FROM COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES.

MOREOVER, WE COULD ALSO EXPECT SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THE 800,000 RESIDENTS OF OKINAWA. ALL MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES ON OKINAWA FAVOR REVERSION TO JAPANESE CONTROL. ON OCCASION, VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE OCCUPATION HAVE OCCURRED. IF THE SENATE REJECTS THIS TREATY, WE COULD EXPECT INCREASED VIOLENCE ON OKINAWA AND AN UPSURGE IN

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電信写

HOSTILITY TOWARD AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL. WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES NOW WHETHER WE WOULD WANT TO CONFRONT THE ANTAGONISM OF 800,000 OKINAWANS WHO WISH TO BE REUNITED WITH JAPAN. IN SUCH A SITUATION WE WOULD APPEAR AS A COLONIAL POWER SUPPRESSING THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE. IN SUCH A SITUATION OUR MILITARY BASES ON OKINAWA WOULD BECOME TARGETS OF MILITANT ELEMENTS AND LOSE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS.

FINALLY, WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF OUR OKINAWA BASES HAS BEEN TO SUPPORT OUR POLICIES IN ASIA. IF U.S. -JAPANESE RELATIONS DETERIORATE BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE REVERSION QUESTION, OUR ENTIRE ASIAN POLICY WILL BE IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY. WITHOUT JAPAN'S COOPERATION, IT IS GOING TO BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE UNITED STATES TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES IN THE FAR EAST. WITH A HOSTILE JAPAN, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE.

THE GOVERNMENT OF PRIME MINISTER SATO SEEKS TO SUSTAIN THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN ALLIANCE. THE PRIME

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MINISTER HAS INDICATED TIME AND TIME AGAIN THAT HE DOES NOT WISH TO SEE U.S. BASES ON OKINAWA REDUCED TO THE POINT OF INEFFECTIVENESS. THE TREATY PERMITS THE UNITED STATES TO RETAIN ITS BASES SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE U.S.-JAPANESE SECURITY TREATY. THERE IS GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY WILL NOT ROB THEM OF THEIR USEFULNESS. AS I HAVE TRIED TO POINT OUT, THE GREATER DANGER TO THE BASES MAY LIE IN REFUSING TO RATIFY THE TREATY.

IT IS WRONG TO CONSIDER THE RETURN OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN AS A SETBACK FOR THE UNITED STATES. ACTUALLY IT IS THE CULMINATION OF A SUCCESSFUL POLICY THIS COUNTRY HAS FOLLOWED SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR. WHEN WE BEGAN THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN IN 1945, WE SET OUT TO TURN THE TALENTS AND ENERGIES OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE TOWARD THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRY. WE SUCCEEDED. WE ALSO SOUGHT TO ESTABLISH A STABLE AND WORKABLE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN. WE SUCCEEDED IN THIS, TOO. JAPAN HAS BECOME ONE OF THE

-- 8 --

外務省

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電信写

WORLD'S MOST DYNAMIC DEMOCRACIES.

NOW IT IS TIME TO END OUR OCCUPATION OF AN ISLAND GROUP THAT HAS BELONGED TO JAPAN FOR A CENTURY AND IS POPULATED BY JAPANESE-SPEAKING PEOPLE WHO CONSIDER THEMSELVES PART OF THE JAPANESE NATION. BY DOING SO, WE WILL SHOW THE WORLD THAT TWO OF THE WORLD'S GREAT DEMOCRACIES CAN SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS IN A SPIRIT OF GOOD WILL.

THERE HAS BEEN TALK OF LINKING THE TREATY WITH SOME OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WE HAVE WITH JAPAN. I WILL NOT DOWNPLAY THESE PROBLEMS, FOR THEY ARE SERIOUS. JAPANESE IMPORTS IN SOME CASES HAVE HURT U.S. DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES, AND THE U.S. TRADE DEFICIT OF OVER DORUJIRUSI 2 BILLION ANNUALLY WITH JAPAN PLACES A SEVERE STRAIN ON OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, BUT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO WITHHOLD RATIFICATION WITH SOME KIND OF ECONOMIC BLACKMAIL IN MID. ANY SUCH TACTIC COULD PRODUCE A BACKLASH IN JAPAN WHICH WOULD JEOPARDIZE PROSPECTS FOR ANY AGREEMENT ON THE ECONOMIC ISSUES.

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IN RECENT MONTHS WE HAVE SHOCKED JAPAN POLITI-
CALLY WITH THE SURPRISE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE KISSINGER
TRIP TO PEKING SEMICOLON WE HAVE SHOCKED JAPAN
ECONOMICALLY WITH THE SURPRISE IMPOSITION OF THE
TEN PER CENT BORDER TAX SEMICOLON AND WE HAVE
SHOCKED JAPAN EMOTIONALLY WITH THE NUCLEAR TEST
AT AMCHITKA.

REJECTION OF THE REVERSION TREATY COULD BE THE
STRAW TO BREAK THE BACK OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN
ALLIANCE. RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY IS CLEARLY
IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST.

(3)

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電信写

総番号 (TA) 58390 主管
71年 11月 9日 19時 25分 米 国 発 北!
71年 11月 10日 10時 08分 本 省 着

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄協定上院審議(夕二一議員発言)

才3654号 平 大至急
往電才3651号に關し、

MR. PRESIDENT, I HAVE ALREADY TESTIFIED BEFORE THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY, BUT I BELIEVE THAT
THE URGENCY OF THE NEED FOR RATIFICATION REQUIRES ME
TO EXPAND UPON THOSE REMARKS.

MR. PRESIDENT, AMERICA'S POLITICAL, MILITARY,
AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS REQUIRE THE UNITED STATES
SENATE TO RATIFY PROMPTLY THE OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY

WORLD WAR TWO HAS BEEN OVER FOR MORE THAN A
QUARTER OF A CENTURY. YET, THE UNITED STATES
CONTINUES TO OCCUPY THE TERRITORY OF OKINAWA AND AN

大政事外外儀官
務務 典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会管給

調査長 参企析調
領移長 参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
長 北東西
長 参北北保
中南審 参一二
吹 参西東洋
長 西東

近ア長 参書近ア
経 次総経国資
長 参貿統国
経協長 参政技一理
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長 参参協規
国 参政経科
長 軍社專
情長 参道内外
文長 一二

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電信写

AMERICAN GENERAL EXERCISES EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
OVER ONE MILLION JAPANESE PEOPLE.

THAT OCCUPATION IS THE LAST VESTIGE OF A WARTIME
RELATIONSHIP . IT CONTINUES TO AFFECT DETRIMENTALLY
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO CLOSE FRIENDS, THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN.

WE CANNOT ALLOW THAT RELATIONSHIP TO CONTINUE TO
SUFFER BECAUSE OF OKINAWA . ITS CONTINUED
DETERIORATION WOULD HAVE DRASTIC ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR BOTH COUNTRIES .
THAT RESULT IS HARDLY NECESSARY , ESPCECIALLY
SINCE THERE IS NO SOUND MILITARY REASON FOR OUR
RETAINING OKINAWA . THE SUPPORT OF THE JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF FOR RATIFICATION SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE THAT THE REVERSION AGREEMENTS IS IN AMERICA'S
SECURITY INTEREST AND DOES NOT THREATEN OUR ABILITY
TO MEET OUR COMMITMENTS.

ALTHOUGH THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA WILL HAVE
NO ADVERSE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES FOR US, THE RETENTION
OF OKINAWA MIGHT THREATEN OUR MILITARY POSITION IN

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注意

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電信写

THE FAR EAST. THE UNITED STATES CAN EFFECTIVELY
MAINTAIN AN OVERSEAS BASE IN JAPAN LNLY SO LONG AS JAPAN
HERSELF PERCEIVES OUR PRESENCE TO BE IN HER OWN INTER-
ESTS. IT MAKES NO POLITICAL OR MILITARY SENSE TO
ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY A BASE IN ANOTHER SOVEREIGN NATION
AGANIST THE WILL OF THAT NATION. SUCH A COURSE OF
ACTION WOULD REQUIRE FORCE AND WOULD DESTORY
AMICABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

YET, SUCH A POSTURE WOULD BE NECESSARY IF WE WERE
TO ATTEMPT TO CONTINUE TO OCCUPY OUR BASES IN OKINAWA
IN THE ABSENCE OF REVERSION. THAT POSTURE , MR.
PRESIDENT, WOULD BE UNTENABLE .

MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR
THE SENATE TO RATIFY PROMPTLY THE REVERSION TREATY
IN LIGHT OF THE DELETERIOUS MANNER WITH WHICH PRESIDENT
NIXON HAS TREATED OUR JAPANESE FRIENDS IN THE PAST
SEVERAL MONTHS. IN THOSE PAST FEW MONTHS, THIS NATION
HAS WITNESSED A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF HOW NOT TO DEAL
WITH JAPAN. PRESIDENT NIXON'S CALLOUS DISREGARD FOR
OUR JAPANESE FRIENDS-- -- BOTH IN HIS FAILURE TO

外務省

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電信写

CONSULT WITH JAPAN BEFORE ANNOUNCING HIS PEKING TRIP AND IN HIS INADEQUATE MANNER OF ADVISING JAPAN OF HIS AUGUST ECONOMIC PROPOSALS -- REFLECTED AN INSENSITIVE STYLE OF DIPLOMACY THAT IS INAPPROPRIATE AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

CONSEQUENTLY, MR. PRESIDENT, I BELIEVE THAT A NEW DIPLOMACY IS NECESSARY IN THE FAR EAST. THIS DIPLOMACY REQUIRES A RECOGNITION THAT AMERICAN POLICY IN THE FAR EAST AFFECTS JAPANESE INTERESTS AS DRAMATICALLY AS IT AFFECTS AMERICAN INTERESTS.

THIS DIPLOMACY REQUIRES A RECOGNITION THAT -- IF STABILITY IN ASIA IS TO BE MAINTAINED -- THE COOPERATION OF FOUR NATIONS IS CRITICAL. THESE FOUR NATIONS ARE THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

THIS DIPLOMACY REQUIRES A RECOGNITION THAT WE HAVE MADE A PROFOUND MORAL COMMITMENT TO JAPAN SEMIKORON THAT WE HAVE DISSUADED JAPAN FROM DEVELOPING AN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR DETERRENT SEMIKORON AND THAT, CONSEQUENTLY, IN THIS QUADRANGLE OF FOUR ASIAN SUPER-POWERS, THREE OF WHICH POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE UNITED STATES ASSUMES THE ROLE OF MILITARY AND

外務省

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NUCLEAR LYNCHPIN BETWEEN JAPAN, ON THE ONE HAND, AND RUSSIA AND CHINA, ON THE OTHER HAND.

ACCORDINGLY, MR. PRESIDENT, THIS DIPLOMACY REQUIRES A RECOGNITION THAT, TO IGNORE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR JAPANESE ALLY IS TO IGNORE THE SECURITY, STABILITY AND PEACE OF THE FAR EAST. IT IS DELETERIOUS TO OUR OWN INTERESTS TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH JEOPARDIZE OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND WHICH THREATEN THE STABILITY OF ASIA.

THEREFORE, I BELIEVE THAT THIS NEW DIPLOMACY REQUIRES THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD TAKE NO ACTION WHICH AFFECTS THE SECURITY OF THE FAR EAST WITHOUT CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN SEMIKORON SHOULD CONSULT FULLY WITH JAPAN ON ALL MATTERS OF VITAL INTEREST TO HER SEMIKORON AND, IF POSSIBLE, SHOULD MOVE IN THOSE AREAS ONLY IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN.

THAT POLICY, MR. PRESIDENT, WOULD DEMAND THAT THE SENATE PROMPTLY RATIFY THE REVERSION TREATY THAT BOTH SIDES BEGIN ANEW TO PUT FOREVER TO REST THE

外務省

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電信写

POSTWAR ERA.

THIS NEW DIPLOMACY OF OURS SHOULD ALSO SUGGEST A NEW DIPLOMACY FOR JAPAN. JAPAN MUST RECOGNIZE THAT AMERICA'S MILITARY PROTECTION CONTRIBUTES NOT ONLY TO JAPAN'S SECURITY BUT ALSO TO HER PROSPERITY. ACCORDINGLY, THE JAPANESE SHOULD DIVERT A GREATER PROPORTION OF HER RESOURCES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASIA -- AND BECOME A MORE ACTIVE PARTNER OF OURS IN THE GROWTH AS WELL AS THE SECURITY OF ASIA.

IT IS IN JAPAN'S INTEREST AS WELL AS OURS TO DIVERT SOME OF HER RESOURCES INTO AID TO DEVELOPING NATIONS. FOR STABILITY IN ASIA WILL CONTRIBUTE TO MAINTAINING THE PEACE IN JAPAN.

THUS, MR. PRESIDENT, THIS NEW DIPLOMACY SHOULD BE INAUGURATED WITH BY US AND BY JAPAN SEMI-KORON DIPLOMACY WHICH WILL CONTRIBUTE TO POLITICAL STABILITY AND TO MILITARY SECURITY.

THAT DIPLOMACY SHOULD BEGIN WITH THE PROMPT RATIFICATION OF THE OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY.

外務省

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IT SHOULD BE EXPANDED BY JAPAN'S INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE DEVELOPING NATIONS OF ASIA. IT SHOULD BE NURTURED BY THE CLOSEST OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. AND IT SHOULD BE MAINTAINED BY BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN CONTINUOUSLY EXERCISING THE GREATEST OF CARE WHEN DEALING WITH MATTERS WHICH CONCERN THE OTHER.

MR. PRESIDENT, THIS DIPLOMACY AND SOUND INTERNATIONAL POLICY REQUIRES THAT THE SENATE PROMPTLY RATIFY OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY.

(J)

外務省

大政事外外儀官
 務務 典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 備総人電厚計
 書文会営給

調査長 参企析調
 領移長 参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
 長 北東西
 参北北保
 中南審 参一二
 欧 参西東洋
 長 西東

近ア長 参書近ア
 経 次総経国資
 一源

長 参貿統国
 経協長 参政技一理
 条 国企二

参条協規
 長 参政経科
 国 軍社専
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総番号(TA) 58386 主管
 71年11月9日17時40分 米 国 発 北
 71年11月10日09時53分 本 省 着

外務大臣殿 半場 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄協定上院審議 (ロス議員発言)

才3655号 平 大至急

往電才3651号に關し

MR. PRESIDENT, I RISE IN SUPPORT OF RATIFICATION OF THE OKINAWA TREATY. THERE ARE MANY SOUND REASONS WHY IT MAKES GOOD SENSE TO RETURN OKINAWA TO JAPAN, BUT NONE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE BASIC FACT THAT FUTURE PEACE IN THE FAR EAST AND OUR BEST INTERESTS DEPEND UPON AN ERA OF CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN.

I AM A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE NEW INITIATIVES TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY. THESE NEW INITIATIVES -- THE NIXON DOCTRINE, SALT AND THE PROMISED MUTUAL BALANCE REDUCTION TALKS, THE VISITS TO MOSCOW, AND ESPECIALLY TO PEKING -- HAVE GIVEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE CAUSE TO HOPE THAT PERHAPS

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WE ARE ENTERING A PERIOD OF BONA FIDENEGOTIATIONS AND MOVING AWAY FROM AN ERA OF CONTINUOUS CONFRONTATION. THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED CONTACTS WITH THE GREAT MASS OF CHINESE PEOPLE HAS CREATED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST HERE IN AMERICA. YET, AS IMPORTANT AS THAT POSSIBILITY IS, I THINK IT CRUCIAL THAT THE UNITED STATES -- THE CONGRESS AS WELL AS THE PEOPLE -- RECOGNIZE THAT CHINA DOES NOT REPRESENT AN ALTERNATIVE TO U.S.--JAPAN COOPERATION BUT THAT OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON STRENGTHENING AND EXPANDING THE BONDS OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. CHINA HAS NEITHER THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH TO PLAY THE DOMINANT ROLE THAT JAPAN SHALL ENJOY IN THE FAR EAST NOR SHOULD WE BE MERELY OPTIMISTIC AT THE BEGINNING AS TO THE CONCRETE MEASURES THAT SHALL RESULT FROM IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH PEKING.

I SPOKE OF THE FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION THAT HAVE CHARACTERIZED RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S. IN RECENT YEARS. I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS RELATIONSHIP MORE FULLY. WHAT I HAVE TO SAY IS NEITHER ORIGINAL NOR UNSAID. IN FACT, MUCH OF IT

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HAS BEEN BETTER SAID BY FAR EASTERN EXPERTS, SUCH AS FRANK GIBNEY, GEORGE W. BALL AND EDWIN O. REISCHAUER SEMICOLON NEVERTHELESS, I BELIEVE IT TO BE IMPORTANT THAT IT BE SAID ON THE SENATE FLOOR.

HIS EXCELLENCY, NOBUHIKO USHIBA, AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN TO THE UNITED STATES, IN A MEMORABLE ADDRESS AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY ON JULY 9, 1971, CORRECTLY POINTED OUT THAT THE POSTWAR PERIOD OF WORLD POLITICS IS AT AN END SEMICOLON THAT THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ARE NOW AT A CROSSROAD IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ONE ANOTHER AND WITH THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. WITH THIS, I AGREE. THE QUESTION IS, IN WHICH DIRECTION SHALL WE TURN AND THAT IN TURN LARGELY DEPENDS UPON THE WILL OF THE JAPANESE AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

AS AMBASSADOR USHIBA POINTED OUT IN HIS ADDRESS, THIS CROSSROAD IS BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY AND A DANGER, DEPENDING UPON THE INTELLIGENCE WITH WHICH WE FACE THE FUTURE, SHEDDING -- AS WE SAY -- MANY OF THE CLICHES OF THE PAST. WE RUN THE DANGER OF GOING OUT SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT WAYS. THAT COULD RESULT NOT ONLY IN INSTABILITY IN THE FAR EAST, BUT IN

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THE PROLIFERATION OF WORLD NUCLEAR POWERS. I BELIEVE BOTH JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES SHALL GAIN THROUGH GENUINE COOPERATION AND CAN ONLY LOSE IF WE PERMIT CURRENT DIFFERENCE TO PART OUR WAYS.

HISTORY IS OFTEN SAID TO BE A LESSON FOR THE FUTURE. THIS IS CERTAINLY TRUE IN THE CASE OF UNITED STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS. ONCE BEFORE OUR COUNTRIES HAD THE CHOICE OF WORKING TOGETHER OR GOING ALONE. TRAGICALLY, THE LATTER COURSE WAS CHOSEN.

U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS BEGAN WITH THE ARRIVAL OF ADMIRAL PERRY'S "BLACK SHIPS" IN 1853, WHICH WERE MET BY A MILITIA AT KURIHAMA BEARING MATCHLOCKS AND PIKES. IT WAS THE EXPOSURE OF JAPAN TO WESTERN CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY BEGUN BY PERRY'S VISIT WHICH MOVED JAPAN RAPIDLY TOWARDS THE MEIJI RESTORATION, A PERIOD WHICH BROUGHT NOT ONLY AN AWARENESS OF THE WORLD OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, BUT DEVELOPED THE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH TO PARTICIPATE WITH THE WEST AS A PARTNER. ALL OF THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS.

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THE UNFORTUNATE MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN WHICH LED TO WORLD WAR II CLOSED AN ERA OF WARM RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AND ENDED THE THRUST OF JAPAN TOWARD A POSITION OF WORLD LEADERSHIP.

THE GROWTH OF JAPAN FROM 250 YEARS OF PEACEFUL ISOLATION DURING THE FEUDAL TOKUGAWA PERIOD TO A MODERN, WESTERN NATION OCCURRED WITH WRENCHING RAPIDITY AND MOVED JAPAN INTO A WORLD WHICH WAS TRULY A DIPLOMATIC JUNGLE WITH EUROPEAN POWERS BENT ON THE ACQUISITION AND COLONIALIZATION OF ASIAN TERRITORIES. THE WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION WERE USED TO INTIMIDATE AND SUBVERT THE LESS DEVELOPED AND WEAKER ASIAN COUNTRIES.

BY SELECTIVELY WESTERNIZING THE JAPANESE MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CULTURES, JAPAN BY THE TURN OF THE CENTURY FIELDDED A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WHICH WAS ABLE TO DEFEAT DECISIVELY THE RUSSIAN BALTIC FLEET, TO DEFEAT CHINA, TO PARTICIPATE WITH THE WESTERN POWERS IN THE SUPPRESSION OF THE BOXER

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REBELLION, AND TO CONCLUDE A NAVAL ALLIANCE WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

DURING THE FOUR DECADES PRIOR TO 1895, WHEN JAPAN DEFEATED CHINA, THE UNITED STATES VIEWED JAPAN AS A "WILLING STUDENT," CAPABLE OF ASSIMILATING MODERN WESTERN WAYS, AND TOOK THE ROLE OF A "BENEVOLENT TEACHER." JAPAN VIEWED THE U.S. AS THE MOST FRIENDLY OF THE WESTERN POWERS WITH LITTLE OR NO COLONIAL INTENTIONS.

TEN YEARS FROM 1895 TO 1905 MARKED A PERIOD OF TRANSITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. THE UNITED STATES ACQUIRED THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS IN 1898, DECLARED AN "OPEN DOOR" POLICY ON CHINA IN 1899, AND PROMOTED A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN IN 1905. THUS, BOTH NATIONS EMERGED SIMULTANEOUS AS "PACIFIC POWERS" WITH SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERESTS INVOLVED. FROM 1905 THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ASSUMED A COMPETITIVE STANCE. THE UNITED STATES BEGAN TO VIEW JAPAN AS A RIVAL FOR THE NEWLY DEVELOPING CHINA MARKETS, AS JAPAN PURSUED

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A POLICY OF ECONOMIC EXPANSION IN SOUTHERN MANCHURIA. THIS UNEASINESS WAS INTENSIFIED BY THE U.S. REALIZATION THAT JAPAN HAD THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DEFEAT A WESTERN NAVY, SUCH AS RUSSIA, AND COULD POSSIBLY CHALLENGE U.S. SUPREMACY IN THE PACIFIC. JAPAN, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD ACHIEVED WITH ITS VICTORY OVER RUSSIA THE GOAL WHICH IT HAD PURSUED SINCE PERRY HAD "OPENED" JAPAN FIFTY YEARS EARLIER - EQUAL STATUS WITH WESTERN POWERS.

MUCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN CONCERNING THE SEEDS OF HOSTILITY WHICH RESULTED IN THE FATEFUL DECISION OF JAPAN TO ATTACK THE U.S. IN RETROSPECT IT NOW SEEMS CLEAR THAT BOTH COUNTRIES WERE GUILTY OF GROSS MISCALCULATION AND OF A MISUNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S AIMS AND PURPOSES.

THE CATASTROPHIC DEFEAT OF JAPAN IN WORLD WAR II THRUST IT BACK INTO A POSITION OF UNCERTAINTY, FEAR, AND INSECURITY WHERE IT HAD TO DEPEND UPON THE UNITED STATES TO ASSIST IT TO BECOME, ONCE AGAIN, AN IMPORTANT MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF NATIONS.

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FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II, JAPAN REASSUMED THE ROLE OF A WILLING AND CAPABLE STUDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AND PAINFULLY BEGAN THE TASK OF REBUILDING ITS SHATTERED ECONOMY. THE VAST EFFORT OF THE UNITED STATES TO REBUILD MARKETS AND INDUSTRY IN THOSE AREAS OF THE WORLD REVAGED BY WAR CREATED AN ENVIRONMENT FOR JAPAN AND OTHER NATIONS FREE OF THE PICKETED PROTECTIONIST WALLS OF THE 1930'S, AND OF THE WESTERN COLONIALISM WHICH DOMINATED THE LATER PART OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. BY THE END OF THE OCCUPATION BY U.S. FORCES IN 1952, JAPAN AIDED BY U.S. MATERIAL, FINANCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE, WAS BEGINNING TO COMPETE IN WORLD MARKETS.

DURING THE POSTWAR PERIOD, AND AS A RESULT OF THE TRAUMATIC SHOCK OF DEFEAT, JAPAN HAD WITHDRAWN CONSTITUTIONALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY FROM PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS SEMICOLON INDEED IT SHOWED NO DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY WAY IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE WORLD OR FOR THAT MATTER OF ASIA. FOREMOST IN THE MINDS OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE WAS ECONOMIC RECOVERY: "INCREASE PRODUCTION" WAS THE

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SLOGAN OF THE FIFTIES. THE RACEHORSE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY IN THE SIXTIES IS WELL KNOWN. IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IT RANKS SECOND ONLY TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE FREE WORLD, AND MOST CERTAINLY WILL OVERTAKE RUSSIA BY 1980. INDEED, SOME PROJECTIONS SHOW JAPAN EXCEEDING THE UNITED STATES IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT BY THE YEAR 2000.

THE UNITED STATES HAS ALSO ENCOURAGED JAPAN TO REBUILD ITS MODEST MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UNDER A LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE POSTWAR "PEACE" CONSTITUTION, WHICH RESTRICTED JAPAN TO "NON-NUCLEAR SELF-DEFENSE FORCES." TODAY, THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL REPUGNANCE AMONG THE JAPANESE PEOPLE TOWARDS THE CONCEPT OF A STRONG MILITARY FORCE. THEY APPEAR AT THIS TIME TO BE UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, APPARENTLY SATISFIED TO DEPEND UPON THE UNITED STATES DETERRENT AS LONG AS IT REMAINS CREDIBLE. HOWEVER, SOME JAPANESE COMMENTATORS FEEL THIS ANTI-MILITARY FEELING IS DYING OUT AND FORESEE THE REARMING OF JAPAN AS A LOGICAL EXTENSION OF ITS ECONOMIC GROWTH AND OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE.

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IN ANY EVENT, U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS ARE AT A TRANSITION POINT, AS THEY WERE 70 YEARS AGO. THEN THE TRANSITION RESULTED IN A PERIOD OF STRAIN CHARACTERIZED BY MISUNDERSTANDING AND CULMINATING IN CONFLICT. RELATIONS ARE STRAINED AGAIN TODAY, BOTH BY WORLD EVENTS AND BY ECONOMIC COLLISION. IT IS TRAGIC THAT ECONOMIC EVENTS HAVE COMBINED WITH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS TO STRAIN OUR TRADITIONAL TIES OF FRIENDSHIP, BUT SUCH ARE THE FACTS OF THIS CHANGING WORLD.

OUR NATION IS NO LONGER THE WORLD ECONOMIC COLOSSUS OF THE 50'S AND 60'S. IT HAS FOUND IT NECESSARY TO ADOPT STRONG MEASURES TO STAVE OFF ECONOMIC DISASTER. BECAUSE OF PAST LIBERAL TRADE POLICIES, COMPETITION FROM ABROAD, IN PARTICULAR FROM JAPAN, HAS MADE SERIOUS INROADS INTO THE AMERICAN MARKET. THESE INROADS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO UNEMPLOYMENT AND HAVE AGGRAVATED OTHER ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. THIS HAS GIVEN RISE TO ADVERSE CRITICISM OF JAPAN WITHIN THE U.S., ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF JAPAN'S FAILURE TO LIBERALIZE ITS TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICIES ON A RAPID ENOUGH SCALE.

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CONVERSELY, THE U.S. STEPS -- STEPS WHICH I SUPPORT -- TO STRENGTHEN ITS DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND ITS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITION HAVE CREATED SHOCK-WAVES IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY. THESE, IN TURN, HAVE UNDERSTANDABLY CREATED ILL WILL TOWARDS THE U.S.

IT WOULD INDEED BE TRAGIC IF THE STRONG COMPETITION DEVELOPING BETWEEN OUR TWO ECONOMIES SHOULD CAUSE IRRECONCILABLE RIFTS IN THE RELATIONS OF OUR TWO NATIONS. YET, REALISTICALLY, THIS COULD HAPPEN IF WAYS AND MEANS ARE NOT FOUND TO ESTABLISH A BALANCED TRADE RELATIONSHIP. CERTAINLY, THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH THE GREATEST ECONOMIES IN THE FREE WORLD SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF FINDING MEANS OF DEVELOPING FAIR TRADE MEASURES. I THINK THERE IS TOO LITTLE RECOGNITION BOTH IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES THAT OUR ECONOMIES ARE IN LARGE MEASURE INTER-DEPENDENT. IN ANY EVENT, I SHOULD WARN MY JAPANESE FRIENDS THAT FAILURE TO DEVELOP PROMPTLY FAIR TRADE MEASURES WILL ONLY RESULT, IN MY JUDGMENT, IN AN INCREASE IN PROTECTIONIST SENTIMENT IN AMERICA. I RECOGNIZE THAT MANY OF OUR MONETARY AND TRADE PROBLEMS REQUIRE MULTILATERAL ACTION.

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BEYOND THE REALM OF ECONOMICS, CHANGING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS HAVE ALSO LED TO UNCERTAINTY AND UNEASINESS BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS. THROUGH THE NIXON DOCTRINE, THE U.S. SEEKS TO LOWER ITS PROFILE IN THE FAR EAST. AS WE LIGHTEN OUR BURDEN, MANY OF US HOPE THAT JAPAN WITH ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH WILL ASSUME A GREATER SHARE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY OF THE FAR EAST. THE JAPANESE ARE CONCERNED BECAUSE THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND PRECISELY WHAT THE NIXON DOCTRINE MEANS. THEY ARE UNCERTAIN CONCERNING BOTH OUR INTENTIONS AND THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR DEFENSE UMBRELLA.

OTHER EVENTS HAVE GREATLY STIRRED INTERNATIONAL WATERS, ESPECIALLY THE NIXON VISIT TO CHINA. THE NEW CHINA POLICY, ANNOUNCED WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN, HAS CAUSED THE JAPANESE PEOPLE TO QUESTION THE CLOSENESS OF OUR TIES.

I PERSONALLY SUPPORT BOTH THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE NEW CHINA POLICY. BUT COMING AS THEY DID, UNANTICIPATED AND ONE UPON THE OTHER, THEY HAVE PARTICULARLY CONTRIBUTED TO INSTABILITY IN THE

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RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATE

THE QUESTION IS WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE. THERE ARE CONCEIVABLY SEVERAL ROUTES JAPAN MAY GO, IF SHE SHOULD DECIDE TO RE-EVALUATE HER CLOSE TIES WITH AMERICA. SOME COMMENTATORS FEAR JAPAN MAY SCRAP ITS PEACE CONSTITUTION, ABOLISH ITS MUTUAL SECURITY PACT WITH THE U.S. AND ENTER FULL BLOWN INTO AN ARMS RACE TO PROVIDE HERSELF WITH THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO PROTECT HER ECONOMIC GROWTH. SENATOR GOLDWATER, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS PREDICTED ON THE SENATE FLOOR THAT JAPAN IS DESTINED TO BECOME ONE OF THE WORLD'S GREATEST MILITARY POWERS WITHIN THE NEXT TWO TO THREE DECADES. CLEARLY, SHE HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR TO DO SO AND ONLY NEEDS A THREAT TO HER ECONOMIC SECURITY TO PROVIDE THE IMPETUS. OTHERS FORESEE HER MOVING AWAY FROM THE U.S. TO SOME KIND OF ACCOMMODATION WITH CHINA OR EVEN WITH RUSSIA SEMICOLON OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TURNING BACK INTO HERSELF, RENOUNCING, AS IN THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD, ANY ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ASIA AND RELYING ON A STRONG DEFENSIVE MILITARY FORCE AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM TO PROTECT HER WAY OF LIFE.

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I HAVE NO CRYSTAL BALL AND NO MEANS OF FORESEEING THE FUTURE. I DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO BOTH NATIONS AND TO WORLD PEACE THAT WE CONTINUE ALONG THE ROAD OF COOPERATION. THIS IS TRUE BECAUSE NOT ONLY DO OUR SECURITY INTERESTS LARGELY COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF JAPAN, BUT INDEED OUR ECONOMIC INTERESTS ARE LARGELY INTERDEPENDENT. FAILURE TO COOPERATE CAN ONLY CREATE AN INSTABILITY IN ASIA THAT WOULD ENHANCE THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMED CONFLICT THERE AND WOULD HELP BRING ABOUT ECONOMIC WARFARE OR PROTECTIONISM BETWEEN THE WORLD'S GREATEST TRADING AREAS. THE ROAD OF COOPERATION WILL NOT BE EASY, AS OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE NOT ALWAYS CO-EXTENSIVE. BOTH SIDES WILL HAVE TO PROCEED WITH GREATER SKILL AND SENSITIVITY THAN HAS CHARACTERIZED PAST DEALINGS. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE FUTURE WILL HAVE TO BE THAT OF FULL PARTNERS, NEITHER PARTY TAKING THE OTHER FOR GRANTED. AS I HAVE STATED, JAPAN IS TODAY ECONOMICALLY A SUPER POWER. SHE WILL HAVE A MAJOR VOICE IN WORLD EVENTS, ESPECIALLY IN ASIA. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANY OTHER ASIAN POWER WILL HAVE THE ECONOMIC VIABILITY DURING THIS CENTURY TO INFLUENCE ASIAN

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DEVELOPMENTS TO THE EXTENT THAT JAPAN CAN.

I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES SHOULD LOOK UPON THIS DYNAMIC COUNTRY AS AN ALLY AND NOT AS A RIVAL. WE MUST REVERSE THE RECENT TREND THAT ABETS THOSE IN JAPAN WHO DO NOT FAVOR A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. PRIME MINISTER SATO HAS DEMONSTRATED BY HIS ACTIONS THAT HE BELIEVES THE BEST INTERESTS OF HIS NATION ARE SERVED BY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE SUPPORTED THE UNITED STATES IN TAIWAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS EVEN THOUGH IT WAS AT THE RISK OF GREAT PERSONAL LOSS OF PRESTIGE AND PUBLIC SUPPORT. THE SENATE CAN HELP STRENGTHEN OUR BASIC RELATIONSHIP BY RATIFYING THE OKINAWAN TREATY, WHICH IS IN LARGE MEASURE THE PRODUCT OF PRIME MINISTER SATO'S DIPLOMACY.

THERE ARE, IN ADDITION, A NUMBER OF STEPS THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN BY OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO HELP ENSURE AN ERA OF CLOSE ALLIANCE AND COOPERATION.

FIRST WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE AND ACKNOWLEDGE THE DOMINANT ROLE WHICH JAPAN WILL PLAY IN THE DRAMA OF

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THE PACIFIC AND ITS CONTINUED IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. AS AN ALLY. PROFESSOR EDWIN O. REISCHAUER HAS WRITTEN OF THE "TRIANGULAR" RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. - JAPAN AND CHINA:

"THE KEY RELATIONSHIP IN EAST ASIA

ONCE AGAIN IS THAT BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN

SEMICOLON THE CRUCIAL ISSUE IS HOW IT AFFECTS

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN,

THE NUMBER ONE AND NUMBER THREE ECONOMIC POWERS IN THE WORLD, WHOSE HITHERTO CLOSE COOPERATION SUDDENLY SEEMS THREATENED BY A NUMBER OF SERIOUS PROBLEMS."

SECOND, WE SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO RESTORE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AND THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT THAT, IN THE PURSUIT OF A DETENTE WITH THE "OTHER LEG OF THE TRIANGLE" - SINO-U.S. RELATIONS - THE MORE IMPORTANT LEG - U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS -

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WILL NOT BE NEGLECTED, BUT STRENGTHENED. SEVERAL MEANS ARE AVAILABLE TO ILLUSTRATE THAT THIS IS A FIRM COMMITMENT.

(1) THE PRESIDENT SHOULD VISIT JAPAN IF AT ALL POSSIBLE PRIOR TO HIS TRIP TO CHINA SEMICOLON AT LEAST HE SHOULD CONSULT JAPAN WITH REGARD TO HIS INTENTIONS. HIS VISIT WITH THE EMPEROR IN ALASKA WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. FURTHER INVITATIONS TO PREMIER SATO AND THE EMPEROR TO VISIT THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES WOULD GIVE CONTINUITY TO A GOOD START.

(2) THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MAINTAIN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN ON ITS FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR ASIA. THIS SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY SO IN MATTERS CONCERNED WITH TAIWAN AND KOREA AND WITH FOREIGN AID TO THOSE COUNTRIES.

(3) THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MOVE TO HELP JAPAN AND THE WORLD RECOGNIZE THAT JAPAN IS NOT ONLY AN ASIAN POWER, BUT A POWER WITH CONSIDERABLE IMPACT ON OTHER NATIONS OF THE WORLD. WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT

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電信写

JAPAN QUALIFIES FOR A SEAT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SUPPORT HER CANDIDACY, AND IN SO DOING ENCOURAGE HER TO PARTICIPATE MORE FULLY IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE FREE WORLD.

(4) PROCEDURES AND A STRUCTURE SHOULD BE INSTITUTED TO ALLOW FOR PRODUCTIVE BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION. NO OTHER STEP COULD GREAT GREATER GOOD-WILL IN AMERICA FOR JAPAN THAN PROMPT JAPANESE ACTION TO BRING OUR TRADE INTO BALANCE. AS I PROPOSED DURING MY RECENT VISIT TO JAPAN, I WOULD ESTABLISH A JOINT COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH SOUND TRADE RELATIONS. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, I WOULD HOPE SUCH A COMMITTEE COULD AVOID OR MINIMIZE TRADE CONFLICTS BEFORE THEY DEVELOP INTO POLITICAL DISPUTES. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, A PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE COMMITTEE SHOULD BE TO FIND AREAS WHERE TRADE COULD BE EXPANDED TO OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT. AS PART OF THIS PROGRAM, THE COMMITTEE COULD SEEK AREAS FOR BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS OF AMERICA AND JAPAN TO COOPERATE IN THE SOUND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS OF ASIA. FINALLY, MANY OF OUR MONETARY AND TRADE PROBLEMS ARE MULTILATERAL IN SCOPE. PART OF THE

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TRADE PROBLEM - BOTH JAPAN AND U.S. - IS CAUSED BY THE EUROPEAN DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS AGAINST JAPANESE PRODUCTS. WE SHOULD WORK TOGETHER IN SEEKING MULTILATERAL SOLUTIONS.

(5) PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY THE U.S. AND JAPAN SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT MANY OF THE DIFFERENCES IN THE PAST HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY DIFFERENCES IN CULTURE AND LANGUAGE BARRIERS. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE NEEDS TO BE AN EXPANDED PROGRAM OF CULTURAL AND STUDENT EXCHANGES TO PERMIT BETTER UNDERSTANDINGS AMONG OUR PEOPLES.

MR. PRESIDENT, IN CLOSING I WANT TO RE-EMPHASIZE THAT I BELIEVE THE U.S. AND JAPAN ARE ON THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP. THE DIRECTION THIS NEW RELATIONSHIP TAKES DEPENDS TO A LARGE PART UPON THE WISDOM DISPLAYED BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. WE CAN, AS WE DID ONCE BEFORE, MOVE APART TO A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY AND EVEN HOSTILITY, OR WE CAN MOVE TOGETHER AS TWO NATIONS WHO DESPITE DIFFERENT CULTURAL ORIGINS, TODAY SHARE A COMMON BELIEF - REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

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SEMICOLON WHO HAVE THE ABILITY, WORKING TOGETHER, OF HELPING BRING ABOUT STABILITY IN THE PACIFIC AND BRINGING OTHER UNDEVELOPED COUNTRIES INTO THE 20TH CENTURY. COOPERATION CAN BE THE KEYNOTE TO PEACE IN THE FAR EAST. WE WILL TAKE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD A SOUND RELATIONSHIP BY RATIFYING THE OKINAWA TREATY TODAY.

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大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総入電厚計
書文会営総

電信写

総番号(TA) 58407
71年 11月 9日 18時 45分 米 国 主管
71年 11月 10日 12時 02分 本 省 発着 半北1

外務大臣殿 半場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄返還協定上院審議

才3656号 平 大至急
往電才3651号に關し、

9日上院審議の概要次のとおり。

AT 10:30 A.M. MAJORITY LEADER MANSFIELD ANNOUNCED CONSIDERATION OF THE OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY AND ASKED UNANIMOUS CONSENT THAT A VOTE ON THE TREATY BE TAKEN AT 3 P.M. NOVEMBER 10 TO ACCOMMODATE SENATORS OF BOTH PARTIES AND TO HAVE AS LARGE A NUMBER OF SENATORS PRESENT AS POSSIBLE.

THE FIRST STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE TREATY WAS MADE BY SENATOR FULBRIGHT (D. ARK.), CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. HE SUPPORTED SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT AS A FORMAL TERMINATION

調査長 参企折調
領移長 参領旅査科
参地中東
長北東西
参北北保
中南審
参一二
参西東洋
長西東
近ア長 参書近ア
経次総経国
長参質統国
経協技一
長条 参参協規
長国 参政経科
長情長文 参道内外
長文 一二

外務省

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OF THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF JAPAN MORE THAN 25 YEARS AFTER WORLD WAR II. HE OBSERVED THAT THE RAPID GROWTH OF TRADE AND THE EXPANSION OF OUR TWO COMPETITIVE ECONOMIES HAVE NATURALLY PRODUCED TENSIONS, SOME OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. NEVERTHELESS, JAPAN HAS RECENTLY TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS TO ALLEVIATE THESE TENSIONS. HE RECOUNTED THOSE ACTIONS WITH REFERENCE TO LIMITATION OF TEXTILE EXPORTS AND OTHER MATTERS. HE COMMENTED ON THE NECESSITY OF PRESERVING A VIABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN AND USED A STATEMENT FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO THE EFFECT THAT A CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S. IS VITAL TO BUILDING THE PEACEFUL AND PROGRESSIVE WORLD BOTH OF US WANT FOR ALL MANKIND. HE INDICATED THAT THE PRIME IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF THE U.S. IN EAST ASIA IS THE MAINTENANCE OF A VIABLE FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIP WITH (JAPAN). HE REFERRED TO THE FACT DOD AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE MADE UNEQUIVOCALLY CLEAR THAT THE OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT PRESENT U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN ASIA. HE SUGGESTED THERE IS DOUBT THE

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U.S. COULD MAINTAIN ITS BASE STRUCTURE AT THE LEVEL PROPOSED IF THE TREATY WERE NOT RATIFIED AND CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT CONSENT TO THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY BY THE SENATE WILL RESPONSIBLY DISCHARGE ITS CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE AND WILL DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THE DEPTH OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO CONTINUED CLOSE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN.

IN ADDITION TO HIS PREPARED STATEMENT, SENATOR FULBRIGHT REFERRED TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE REPORT ON ITS HEARINGS AND HIGHLIGHTED FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE REVERSION AGREEMENT RESULTING IN A U.S. BUDGETARY SAVING OF DORUJIRUSI 65 MILLION PER YEAR, LESS THE EXPECTED INCREASE IN LABOR COSTS. HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE DORUJIRUSI 320 MILLION PAYMENT BY JAPAN TO THE U.S. HE INDICATED THAT ECONOMIC AID TO OKINAWA SINCE 1963 BY THE U.S. WAS IN THE SUM OF DORUJIRUSI 338,189,559, AND, IN ADDITION, DORUJIRUSI 98,061,000 IN LOANS. HE ESTIMATED THE VALUE OF SURRENDERED FACILITIES AT DORUJIRUSI 56 MILLION AND OF FACILITIES RETAINED BY THE U.S. AT DORUJIRUSI

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610 MILLION. HE INDICATED THE ADMINISTRATION HAD DONE A "CREDITABLE JOB OF NEGOTIATION" AND HE COMPLIMENTED THE ADMINISTRATION ON SUBMITTING THE AGREEMENT AS A TREATY FOR SENATE RATIFICATION.

SENATOR AIKEN (R. VT.) OBSERVED THAT DURING THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON THE TREATY THERE HAD BEEN NO REQUEST FOR APPEARANCES IN OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY AND THAT THE COMMITTEE VOTED UNANIMOUSLY TO APPROVE IT.

SENATOR ROTH (R. DEL.) STATED HE SUPPORTED RATIFICATION FOR MANY SOUND REASONS INCLUDING THE FACT THAT FUTURE PEACE IN THE FAR EAST DEPENDS ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIPS, THAT THE TREATY SUPPORTS PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEW INITIATIVE IN FOREIGN POLICY AND THAT IT GIVES THE U.S. PEOPLE NEW HOPE. HE STATED IT WAS CRUCIAL THAT THE U.S. RECOGNIZE THAT CHINA IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO U.S.-JAPAN COOPERATION AND THAT OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH JAPAN MUST BE STRENGTHENED. HE COMMENDED AMBASSADOR

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USHIBA'S GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY ADDRESS IN JULY 1971 AND AGREED THAT THE U.S. AND JAPAN ARE AT A CROSS-ROADS IN THEIR RELATIONSHIPS. HE SUGGESTED THE U.S. AND JAPAN GAIN THROUGH GENUINE COOPERATION BUT THAT THOSE RELATIONSHIPS HAVE BEEN RECENTLY STRAINED BY ECONOMIC EVENTS. HE SAID THAT WHILE THIS IS UNFORTUNATE THE U.S. HAD TO TAKE STRONG MEASURES TO STAVE OFF ECONOMIC DISASTER. HE OBSERVED THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM OF JAPAN IN THE UNITED STATES BUT THAT ECONOMIC COMPETITION SHOULD NOT DRIVE US APART. HE SAID THE U.S. AND JAPAN SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF DEVELOPING FAIR TRADE MEASURES AND THAT FAILURE OF JAPAN TO DO SO WILL ONLY INCREASE PROTECTIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES. HE STATED THAT UNDER THE NIXON DOCTRINE THE U.S. HOPES TO LOWER ITS PROFILE IN THE FAR EAST WITH A LARGER ROLE FOR JAPAN. HE INDICATED THAT JAPAN MAY BE UNCERTAIN AS TO WHAT WE MEAN AND THAT THE NEW CHINA POLICY WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION HAD CONFUSED THE JAPANESE AND CONTRIBUTED TO U.S.-JAPAN INSTABILITY IN RELATIONSHIPS. CONTINUED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN IS

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IMPORTANT TO WORLD PEACE AND HE SUGGESTED BOTH SIDES MUST USE MORE SKILL THAN IN THE PAST AND DEAL AS FULL PARTNERS. HE REFERRED TO JAPAN AS AN "ECONOMIC SUPERSTATE" AND THAT THE U.S. SHOULD REGARD IT AS AN ALLY AND NOT A RIVAL. HE REFERRED TO PRIME MINISTER SATO'S SUPPORT OF THE U.S. POSITION AND THAT THE TREATY IS A PRODUCT OF SATO'S DIPLOMACY. RATIFICATION WOULD RESTORE CONFIDENCE OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE IN THEIR GOVERNMENT AND THEREBY STRENGTHEN U.S. RELATIONS. IN CONCLUDING HIS REMARKS, SENATOR ROTH SUGGESTED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON SHOULD VISIT JAPAN BEFORE GOING TO CHINA OR AT LEAST CONSULT. HE SUGGESTED THAT CONTINUED CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN IS NECESSARY AND THAT THE U.S. SHOULD CONTINUE TO HELP JAPAN ASSUME ITS NEW LEADERSHIP ROLE IN THE FREE WORLD. WE NEED "BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION TO BRING U.S.-JAPAN TRADE INTO BALANCE" AND HE RECOMMENDED A JOINT COMMITTEE ON TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN AS HE RECOMMENDED ON A RECENT VISIT TO JAPAN. HE CONCLUDED WITH A

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RECOMMENDATION THAT MULTILATERAL MONETARY PROBLEMS MUST BE SOLVED SULTILATERALLY AND RECOMMENDED AN INCREASE IN CULTURAL EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN.

SENATOR MANSFIELD (D. MONT.) ROSE TO EXPRESS HIS "FULL SUPPORT OF THE TREATY." HE REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES CONSIDERED OKINAWA WITHIN THE RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY OF JAPAN AND THAT THIS POSITION HAS BEEN AFFIRMED BY EVERY PRESIDENT SINCE. HE STATED THAT JAPAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE MACARTHUR CONSTITUTION PERMITTED JAPAN TO DEVOTE ITS ENERGIES TO ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT. DESPITE "SOME RECENT SHOCKS", INCLUDING THE 10 PERCENT SURCHARGE, THE TEXTILE PROBLEMS AND THE AMCHITKA TEST, THE U.S. AND JAPAN MUST BE GOOD FRIENDS. HE SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER SATO PROVED HIS FRIENDSHIP FOR THE U. S. AND "WENT ALL THE WAY TO SUPPORT THE U.S. IN THE UN" ON THE CHINA AND TAIWAN QUESTIONS. HE COMMENDED PRESIDENT NIXON FOR WORKING OUT THE AGREEMENT AND LOOKED "TO THE DAY ALL THE RYUKYUS ARE RETURNED TO JAPAN." HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE TREATY WOULD BE

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電信写

"OVERWHELMINGLY APPROVED" AND THAT IN THE NOT-TOO-DISTANT FUTURE THE BALANCE OF THE RYUKYUS BE RETURNED TO JAPAN ITSELF.

SENATOR CASE (R. N.J.) STATED HE SUPPORTED THE TREATY FULLY, COMMENDED THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE'S REPORT AND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO REFER THE TREATY TO THE SENATE FOR CONSIDERATION.

AT THIS POINT, SENATOR BYRD (D. VA.) TOOK THE FLOOR IN OPPOSITION TO THE TREATY. HE STATED HE FAVORED CLOSE COOPERATION AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE U. S. AND JAPAN AND AGREED "WITH PRACTICALLY ALL" SENATOR MANSFIELD HAD SAID, EXCEPT HIS CONCLUSION. HE AGREED THE RYUKYUS AND OKINAWA SHOULD EVENTUALLY REVERT TO JAPAN BUT QUESTIONED THE TIMING OF THE PROPOSED TREATY. HE RECALLED THAT OKINAWA WAS "GIVEN TO THE U.S. BY THE PEACE TREATY OF 1951 AND SINCE THAT TIME THE U.S. HAS HAD UNRESTRICTED RIGHTS TO USE THIS GREAT MILITARY BASE COMPLEX AS IT FEELS BEST."

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HE DEVELOPED THE COMMITMENTS OF THE U.S. IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND ITS OBLIGATION TO DEFEND A NUMBER OF NATIONS AND SAID THAT THESE COMMITMENTS "ASSUMED UNRESTRICTED U.S. RIGHTS TO BASES IN OKINAWA". HE REFERRED TO JAPAN'S RIGHT UNDER THE TREATY TO "VETO THE USE OF U.S. FORCES (BASED) ON OKINAWA" AND OBSERVED THAT THE U.S. UNDER THE TREATY WOULD NO LONGER BE UNRESTRICTED IN ITS RIGHTS TO USE THOSE BASES. HE SUGGESTED OKINAWA SHOULD "EVENTUALLY REVERT TO JAPAN BUT I QUESTION WHETHER IT SHOULD BE DONE WHILE WE HAVE OUR PRESENT COMMITMENTS IN THE PACIFIC."

AT THIS POINT, SENATOR HANSEN (R. WYO.) BEGAN A DIALOGUE WITH SENATOR BYRD. HANSEN INQUIRED IF U.S. FORCES WOULD BE HANDICAPPED AS A RESULT OF OUR TREATY OBLIGATION OF PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN. BYRD REPLIED THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT THE U.S. WOULD BE HANDICAPPED IN CARRYING OUT ITS COMMITMENTS IN THAT AREA. HE OBSERVED THE FACT PRIME MINISTER SATO HAS AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH US AND TO KEEP RESTRICTIONS AT A

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MINIMUM SEMICOLON HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT SATO MAY NOT BE THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN MUCH LONGER AND "IN MY BELIEF THERE MAY BE A NEW PREMIER IN JAPAN BEFORE VERY LONG." IN RESPONSE TO THIS QUESTION, BYRD ALSO MADE REFERENCE TO THE PUEBLO INCIDENT. HE STATED ADMIRAL JOHNSON SAID HE WAS UNABLE TO SEND AIRCRAFT TO AID THE PUEBLO BECAUSE PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED AS THE AIRCRAFT WERE BASE IN JAPAN. HE SAID THIS PRIOR CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT IS NOT NOW APPLICABLE TO OKINAWA BUT WOULD RESULT FROM THE NEW AGREEMENT. HANSEN ASKED IF THE U.S. HAS COMMITMENTS TO THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES, TAIWAN AND OTHER NATIONS IN THAT AREA. BYRD REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. HANSEN ASKED IF OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE WERE CONTRIBUTING TO THAT DEFENSE, AND BYRD REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. HANSEN "IF OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE OUT OF OKINAWA, HOW DO WE MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE UMBRELLA FOR A DISARMED JAPAN" BYRD REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW SEMICOLON THAT OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST BE STORED SOMEWHERE ELSE BUT HE COULD NOT SAY WHERE. HANSEN

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ASKED IF JAPAN HAD RETIFIED THE NON-PROLIFERA-
TION TREATY AND IF NOT, WHY NOT GIMONHU BYRD
REPLIED IT HAD NOT BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT SPECU-
LATE AS TO THE REASON.
HANSEN INQUIRED WHETHER IT WAS NOT A FACT THAT
WE HAD OVER DORUJIRUSI 2 BILLION INVESTED IN
OKINAWA WHICH JAPAN WOULD BE ACQUIRING FOR
DORUJIRUSI 32 MILLION GIMONHU BYRD AFFIRMED THE
JAPAN PAYMENT TO THE U.S. BUT SAID HE WAS NOT
CERTAIN ON THE U.S. TOTAL INVESTMENT IN OKINAWA.
HE STATED THAT REPLACEMENT VALUE WOULD BE UP TO
FOUR TIMES AS MUCH AS ORIGINAL INVESTMENT COST.
HANSEN INQUIRED WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING IN
THE 1951 PEACE TREATY REQUIRING THE RETURN OF
OKINAWA TO JAPAN. BYRD REPLIED THERE WAS NOT AND
THAT HE DOUBTED THE WISDOM OF REVERSION NW
WHILE WE HAVE THESE VAST COMMITMENTS NOT LESSEN-
ED BY OUR RETURN OF OKINAWA. HANSEN REFERRED
TO BYRDS COMMENTS ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE
(NOVEMBER'S) AND BYRD SAID WE ARE CONTINUING
OUR COMMITMENTS BUT REDUCING OUR ABILITY TO MEET
THEM AND MAKING IT CONTINGENT ON AGREEMENT OF

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ANOTHER NATION. HE STATED JAPAN IS A GREAT AND
CLOSE FRIEND BUT WE SHOULD NOT PUT OURSELVES IN
A POSITION OF DEPENDENCE. HANSEN STATED THAT
DESPITE PRIME MINISTER SATOS ASSURENCES, SATO
DOES NOT SPEAK WITH THE FULL BACKING OF JAPAN
AND THEREFORE SHOULD WE NOT RELY ON OUR TREATIES
FOR GUIDANCE FOR THE FUTURE RATHER THAN ASSURA-
NCES FROM THOSE IN ELECTIVE OFFICES GIMONHU
BYRD AGREED AND STATED THAT IN GREAT MATTERS
LIKE THIS WE NEED SOMETHING MORE DURABLE THAN
THE POLITICAL LIFE OF ANY INDIVIDUAL. HANSEN
EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR BYRDS REMARKS AS A
MEMBER OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE AND IN-
QUIRED WHETHER OUR ALLIES IN EUROPE WOULD NOT
HAVE MORE ASSUANCE IF WE FULLY DISCHARGED OUR
COMMITMENTS IN ASIA. BYRD REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY
TO THIS SUGGESTION AND STATED " I HOPE TIME PROVES
ME IN ERROR IN VOTING AGAINST THIS TREATY. I FEAR
I WILL BE PROVED RIGHT. I PREFER TO BE IN ERROR. "
HE REFERRED TO HIS AS PERHAPS ONE OF THE LONE VOTES
AGAINST THE TREATY BUT STATED " I AM NOT PERSUADED
IT IS LOGICAL TO VOLUNTARILY GIVE UP RIGHTS NEEDED

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TO FULFILL OUR COMMITMENTS.°°

AT THIS POINT SENATOR BYRD ASKED PERMISSION (WHICH WAS GRANTED) TO SUBMIT FOR THE RECORD EXTRACTS OF ADMIRAL RICKOVER'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY ON MARCH 10, 1971, IN WHICH HE COMMENTED ON SEVERAL INSTANCES WHERE JAPAN PREVENTED US VESSELS FROM USING JAPANESE PORTS OR DELAYED ENTRY INTO JAPANESE PORTS. SENATOR BYRD CONCLUDED BY RESTATING THE NEED FOR FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND JAPAN. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR JAPAN'S SUPPORT OF THE US ON THE CRUCIAL VOTE IN THE UN AND HOPE THAT PASSING YEARS STRENGTHEN THIS FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION. SENATOR PERCY (R. ILL.) STATED THAT DURING THE KOREAN WAR AND AS A RESULT OF CHINA-SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS, CONTINUED US CONTROL OF OKINAWA WAS NECESSARY BUT THAT JAPAN'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER OKINAWA WAS ALWAYS RECOGNIZED. HE REFERRED TO A SERIES OF PRESIDENTIAL REFERENCES TO THIS FACT BY EISENHOWER, KENNEDY AND JOHNSON AND COMMENDED NIXON FOR MOVING BOLDLY WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE OPENING OF REVERSION NEGOTIATIONS IN NOVEMBER 1969. HE

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STATED THAT JAPAN IS NO LONGER A CLIENT STATE AND THAT NEW BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS MUST BE BASED ON EQUALITY. HE PREDICTED THAT REJECTION OF THE TREATY BY THE SENATE °° WOULD CAUSE THE FALL OF THE SATO GOVERNMENT °° AND THE POSSIBLE EMERGENCE OF AN ANTI-US GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN WITH A POSSIBLE °° SHARP-SHIFT IN JAPAN FOREIGN POLICY AGAINST THE US °° HE REFERRED TO POTENTIAL VIOLENCE IN OKINAWA AND INCREASED HOSTILITY TOWARD US FORCES THERE IF THE TREATY IS REJECTED. HE REFERRED TO HIS VISIT TO JAPAN AND ATTENDANCE AT A LEGISLATIVE CONFERENCE THERE A YEAR AND HALF AGO AT WHICH TIME IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REVERSION ISSUE. HE REFERRED ALSO TO A VISIT TO OKINAWA ON THAT OCCASION. HE COMMENTED THAT RECENT °° DETERIORATION OF US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIPS JEOPARDIZE OUR OBJECTIVES IN THE FAR EAST. °° HE STATED PRIME MINISTER SATO FAVORS STRONG US-JAPAN RELATIONS AND THAT THIS TREATY IS °° NOT A SETBACK FOR THE US BUT THE CULMINATION OF A CONSIDERED POLICY TOWARD JAPAN. °° HE MADE REFERENCE TO SUGGESTIONS FOR LINKING TREATY APPROVAL TO OUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH JAPAN BUT SAID THE TREATY SHOULD NOT

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電信写

BE USED "AS BALCKMAIL." HE SAID THE US HAD SHOCKED JAPAN BY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE KISSINGER TRIP TO PEKING, BY THE 10 PERCENT SURCHARGE AND BY THE AMCHITKA TEST AND THAT "FAILURE TO RATIFY THE TREATY COULD BE THE STRAW THAT BREAKS THE CAMEL'S BACK." HE CONCLUDED THAT APPROVAL OF THE TREATY WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN.

SENATOR JAVITS (R. NY) STATED THERE WERE FEW MATTERS BEFORE THE SENATE MORE IMPORTANT THAN THIS TREATY AND THAT HE REGARDS THIS MOMENT "AS A TRUE WATERSHED IN US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIPS." HE SAID OKINAWA REVERSION IS THE MOST IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUE IN JAPAN TODAY AND THAT NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY IS A MAJOR POST-WAR ACCOMPLISHMENT. HE SAID THE WISDOM OF PRIME MINISTER SATO'S ALLIANCE WITH THE US IN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS WILL BE AFFIRMED BY APPROVAL OF THE TREATY BUT THAT FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD HAVE PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES AND WOULD UNDERMINE THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN ASIA AND POSSIBLY PRODUCE A NEW UNFRIENDLY GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN. HE REFERRED TO THE TREATY AS A MAJOR TEST OF OUR

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STATEMANSHIP AND THAT THE TREATY SHOULD NOT BE HELD HOSTAGE TO OTHER ECONOMIC OR FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS. HE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF PEKING AND THE US COOPERATING TO DEVELOP JAPAN'S NEW ROLE IN THE PACIFIC AND ALSO COMMENTED ON REVALUATION OF THE YEN. HE STATED JAPAN HAD AGREED TO DOUBLE ITS MILITARY PROCUREMENT FROM THE US TO 200 MILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR AND REMINDED THE SENATE THAT JAPAN "WAS WITH THE US ALL THE WAY ON THE CHINA ISSUE IN THE UN." HE HOPED THAT APPROVAL OF THE TREATY WOULD MAKE UP TO THE SATO GOVERNMENT FOR SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES THAT HAVE RESULTED FOLLOWING OUR LEAD. HE SUGGESTED JAPAN MUST DEVELOP "TACT AND STATESMANSHIP IN ITS ECONOMIC DRIVE" AND SUGGESTED OVER-AGGRESSIVENESS IN THE PAST. HE REGARDS RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY "AS A LANDMARK" IN US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIPS AND STATED THERE WAS EVERY INDICATION IT WOULD BE RATIFIED.

RECOVERING FOLLOWING A SHORT RECESS, SENATOR STENNIS (D. MISS) COMMENTED THAT HE MUST NECESSARILY BE AWAY FROM THE SENATE WHEN THE TREATY IS REACHED FOR A VOTE NOVEMBER 10 AND THAT HETHEREFORE WISHED

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TO SPEAK TO THE MATTER TODAY IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. SENATOR STENNIS STATED THAT ALTHOUGH THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE TOOK TESTIMONY ON MILITARY PHASES OF THE TREATY, PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY WAS WITH THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, AND ARMED SERVICES WOULD FILE NO FORMAL REPORT. HE STATED HIS COMMITTEE'S HEARINGS WERE VALUABLE AND PROFITABLE AND THAT THE REVERSION QUESTION PRESENTS SOME DIFFICULT PROBLEMS FOR THE SENATE AND ESPECIALLY TO HIS AS CHAIRMAN OF ARMED SERVICES. HE STATED HIS COMMITTEE HEARD GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL LAMPERT, ALEXIS JOHNSON AND OTHERS AND THAT WHILE THERE ARE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US, THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION IS SOVEREIGNTY. HE POINTED OUT THE DIFFICULTIES OF OPERATING A MILITARY BASE ON THE SOVEREIGN TERRITORY OF ANOTHER NATION AND THAT HE HAD QUESTIONED GENERAL WESTMORELAND CLOSELY ON HIS POSITION IN THIS MATTER. HE STATED THAT WESTMORELAND SAID THAT "POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ASIDE, HE PREFERES THE STATUS QUO BUT THAT THE US WILL REALIZE MORE UNDER THE TREATY, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED." STENNIS SAID THIS WAS SIGNIFICANT TO HIM AND THAT WESTMORELAND

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INDICATED FAILURE TO RATIFY THE TREATY WOULD CREATE AN UNFAVORABLE CLIMATE FOR THE US IN JAPAN. STENNIS REFERRED TO OUR OTHER BASES IN JAPAN AND THAT THE JCS IN THEIR VIEW ACCEPTED THE JUDGEMENT THAT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONTROLLED. STENNIS SUGGESTED JAPAN SHOULD ASSUME AN INCREASING RESPONSIBILITY IN ASIA AND THAT IF IT FAILS TO DO SO, "PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH ARE GRIM INDEED." HE ADMITTED THAT UNDER THE TREATY THE US LOSES SOME OF ITS MILITARY FLEXIBILITY AND DETAILED THE OPERATION OF SOME OF THE SPECIFIC TREATY PROVISIONS, INCLUDING THE FACT THE US CANNOT MAKE MAJOR ADDITIONS TO US FORCES THERE WITHOUT CONSULTATION, CANNOT MOUNT COMBAT OPERATIONS FROM OKINAWA WITHOUT CONSULTATION AND CANNOT STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE WITHOUT APPROVAL. HE CONCLUDED THE US WOULD BE BETTER OFF WHEN JAPAN ASSERTS ITS FULL SOVEREIGNTY OVER OKINAWA.

AT THIS POINT, SENATOR GOLDWATER (R. ARIZ.) INTERRUPTED TO OBSERVE THAT THE HEARINGS BOLSTERED HIS FEARS CONCERNING THE TREATY AND THAT HE WOULD

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RELUCTANTLY VOTE AGAINST IT. HE STATED THAT HIS OBJECTION IS THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE US LANCHING OPERATIONS FROM OKINAWA WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN. GOLDWATER ASKED IF THE US WAS ATTACKED IN SOUTH KOREA, WOULD WE NEED CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN BEFORE °°HELPING OUR OWN TROOPS?°° STENNIS DID NOT DIRECTLY ANSWER THAT QUESTION AND GOLDWATER SUGGESTED JAPAN MAY HVE AN ALLIANCE WITH THE SOVIET THAT WOULD, IN A GIVEN CASE, AFFECT AGREEMENT OF JAPAN ON CONSULTATION. STENNIS REMINDED GOLDWATER THAT PRIME MINISTER SATO HAD SAID THE SECURITY OF SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN WERE ESSENTIAL TO THE SECURITY OF JAPAN. GOLDWATER STATED HE WOULD HAVE FAVORED RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY A WEEK AGO BUT THAT THINGS HAVE CHANGED SEMICOLON °°OUR ALLIANCES ARE WEAKENING,°° HE SAID AND HE HAS FEARS OF WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE. HE ASKED °° WHERE WE WOULD PUT OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS REMOVED FROM OKINAWA AND ASKED WHO WILL PROVIDE THE NEEDED NUCLEAR UMBRELLA? HE CONTINUED °° THAT MUST BE JAPAN°° AND THAT REVERSION OF OKINAWA WILL MAKE JAPAN THE FIFTH WORLD POWER MILITARILY AND THIS TENDS TO MAKE FUTURE WAR MORE CERTAIN. HE STATED HIS RESPECTFUL

19
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DISGREEMENT WITH STENNIS AND THAT HE WILL VOTE AGAINST THE TREATY WITH REGRET. HE SAID THE TREATY PROVISIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN °°MORE LENIENT TO THE UNITED STATES.°°

STENNIS REPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE EASY FOR HIM TO VOTE AGAINST THE TREATY BUT THAT HE HAS A GREATER DUTY. HE SAID IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE US TO HAVE ITS OKINAWA RIGHTS UNDER THE TREATY THAN THE ALTERNATIVES IT WOULD FACE IF THE TREATY IS REJECTED. HE RECOGNIZES THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TOWARD THE US COULD CHANGE BUT THAT WE DO NOT HAVE A CHOICE TO °°CONTINUE AS WE ARE.°° HE STATED THAT °°ON BALANCE, WE SHOULD APPROVE THE TREATY TO CONTINUE AN ERA OF COOPERATION AND THAT THE US INTERESTS WILL BE BEST SERVED BY APPROVAL.°° HE INDICATED HE WOULD NOT DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SENATOR GRIFFIN (R. MICH.) COMMENDED STENNIS ON HIS STATEMENT AND DEVELOPED THAT ALTHOUGH WE ARE TURNING BACK STRATEGIC ISLANDS TO JAPAN, THE SOVIET UNION HAS SINCE WORLD WAR II OCUUPIED

20
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ISLANDS NEAR JAPAN AND HAS NOT AGREED TO RETURN THEM. HE STATED HE WOULD VOTE FOR THE TREATY BUT THAT THE CONTRAST IN OUR POSITION AND THAT OF THE SOVIET °° SHOULD NOT GO UNNOTICED AS WE ENTER A NEW ERA OF RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN. °° STENNIS SAID THIS WAS °° A GOOD POINT °° AND OBSERVED °° WE HAVE BEEN FORTUNATE TO HAVE AS GOOD A DEAL AS WE HAVE FOR THE PAST 25 YEARS AND I HOPE WE HAVE IT FOR THE NEXT 25. °°

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THESE REMARKS SENATOR MANSFIELD MADE A PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY WHETHER ALL OF THE PROCEDURAL STEPS FOR APPROVAL OF THE TREATY HAS BEEN COMPLETED. UPON RECEIPT OF AN AFFIRMATIVE RULING, HE INDICATED THAT THE TREATY WOULD BE CALLED FOR VOTE TOMORROW AT 3 PM (NOVEMBER 10) WITHOUT FURTHER DEBATE. SENATE DEBATE ON THE TREATY CONCLUDED AT 2:45 PM

PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE DEBATE AT 10:30 AM SENATOR TUNNEY (C. CALIF) READ A STATEMENT ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE IN SUPPORT OF THE TREATY REPEATING SUBSTANTIALLY HIS REMARKS MADE BEFORE THE FOREIGN

21
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RELATIONS COMMITTEE. FOLLOWING THE 2:45 PM RECESS, SENATOR FONG (R, HAWAII) SUBMITTED A STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE TREATY AND INCLUDING SUPPORT OF THE CLAIM OF MRS. GRACE HSU TO THE SENKAKU ISLANDS (WHICH HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE BY HER ATTORNEY).

(了)

22

外務省

大政事外外儀官
 務次典房
 臣官官審審長長
 儀総人電厚計
 書文会営給

調査長
 参企析調
 参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
 長 北西
 参北北保
 中南審
 参一
 欧 参西東洋
 長 西東

近ア
 参書近ア
 長 次総経国資
 経 源
 長 参質統
 経 参政技一理
 協 長 国
 参 参条協規
 長 参政経科
 国 軍社専
 参 参道内外
 長 文
 二

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電信写

総番号(TA) 58405 主管
 71年11月9日20時45分 米 国 発着
 71年11月10日10時58分 本 省 着

外務大臣殿 午場(大使)臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄協定上院審議(イノウエ議員発言)

才3668号 平 大至急
 往電才3651号 米 用し

MR. PRESIDENT, I URGE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY BEING SIGNED TODAY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN FOR THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN. AFTER ALMOST 26 YEARS OF U.S. RULE, OKINAWA AND THE ADJOINING RYUKYU ISLANDS ARE TO BE RETURNED IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO THEIR PRIOR STATUS UNDER JAPANESE RULE. I SUPPORT THE RETURN OF OKINAWA AND THE OTHER RYUKYU ISLANDS TO THEIR HISTORICAL POSITION AS A PREFECTURE OF JAPAN.

IN SUBMITTING THE OKINAWA TREATY TO THE U.S. SENATE AS A TREATY RATHER THAN AS AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT, THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION RISKS UNDULY DELAYING RATIFICATION OF THE REVERSION ACCORD. THE

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POSSIBILITY THEREBY EXISTS THAT THE DOMESTIC U.S. TEXTILE LOBBY MAY WELL ATTEMPT TO HALT REVERSION IN ORDER TO GAIN LEVERAGE ON JAPAN TO REDUCE TEXTILE EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES. OPPONENTS OF FREE TRADE MAY WELL DELAY A RATIFICATION TO A JAPANESE VOLUNTARY CUTBACK OF TEXTILE EXPORTS. PRESSURE COULD ALSO BE PUT ON JAPAN TO INCREASE THE VALUE OF THE YEN, A MOVE THAT WOULD RENDER JAPANESE PRODUCTS SOMEWHAT LESS COMPETITIVE IN AMERICAN MARKETS. WHILE I BELIEVE THAT JAPANESE TRADE LIBERALIZATION IS CERTAINLY LONG OVERDUE, I HOPE THAT THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA WILL NOT BECOME A HOSTAGE OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENERAL AND TEXTILE NEGOTIATIONS IN PARTICULAR. I NOTE THE RECENT JAPANESE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN EIGHT-POINT PROGRAM OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENCOURAGE THE VICE-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FORMED TO IMPLEMENT SUCH LIBERALIZATION TO GENERATE SUBSTANTIAL REFORMS IN CURRENT TRADE RELATIONS.

MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN TRADE ARRANGEMENTS IS THE POLITICAL STABILITY WHICH OKINAWA'S REVERSION SHOULD

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FOSTER. OKINAWA MUST NOT BE CONSIDERED IN THE PAROCHIAL CONTEXT OF ASIAN POLITICAL STABILITY. AT STAKE IS NOT ONLY THE DOMESTIC STABILITY OF BOTH OKINAWA AND JAPAN, BUT ALSO THE POLITICAL STABILITY OF THE PACIFIC AND THE FAR EAST, WHICH DEPENDS IN LARGE MEASURE UPON AMERICAN AND JAPANESE COOPERATION. RETURN OF OKINAWA TO JAPANESE RULE IS THE KEY TO CONTINUED GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, AND THE JAPANESE ALLIANCE IS THE CORNERSTONE OF THE U.S. POLITICAL AND SECURITY POSITION IN THE ORIENT. THE RETURN OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN, WHERE IT IS AN EMOTIONAL AND NATIONALISTIC ISSUE, IS CRUCIAL TO THOSE RELATIONS. IN JAPAN, THE TREATY HAS AROUSED SO MUCH INTEREST THAT TODAY'S CEREMONY IS BEING TELEVISED THROUGHOUT THE NATION. EIGHTEEN MONTHS OF DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT NOW BE EXCHANGED FOR TRADE BENEFITS AT THE EXPENSE OF POLITICAL STABILITY.

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電信写

総番号(TA) 58405 主管
 71年11月9日21時00分 米 国 発 北北1
 71年11月10日11時18分 本 省 着

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖繩協定上院審議(ファン上院議員発言)

第3669号 平 大 至 急
 往電第3651号に同し

MR. PRESIDENT: THE SENATE IS TODAY DECIDING WHETHER IT SHOULD GIVE ITS ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN CONCERNING THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS. THIS TREATY PROVIDES FOR THE RETURN OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF JAPAN.

AFTER READING AND STUDYING THE STATEMENTS THAT WERE GIVEN BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON THIS MATTER, AND AFTER PONDERING ALL THE RAMIFICATIONS AND REPERCUSSIONS THAT COULD RESULT FROM EITHER ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION OF THIS TRATY, I

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大政事外外僑官
 務務 典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 儀総人電厚計
 文会営給

調査長 参企析調
 領移長 参領旅査移

参地中東
 長 北東西
 参北北保
 中南番
 欧 参西東洋
 長 西東

近ア長 参書近ア
 経 次総経国資
 源

長 参貿統
 経協長 参政技一理
 条 国企二

長 参参協規
 国 参政経科

長 軍社專
 情長 参道内外
 文長 一二

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AVE CONCLUDED THAT RATIFICATION OF THE
KINAWA REVERSION TREATY IS INDEED IN THE
BEST INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES.

I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THIS AGREEMENT WILL
SOON BE SEEN AS A HISTORIC AND SIGNIFICANT
DOCUMENT BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT ONLY RESOLVE
THE LAST MAJOR U.S.-JAPANESE ISSUE ARISING
FROM WORLD WAR II, BUT IT WOULD ALSO ALLOW
THE CONTINUATION OF FRIENDLY AND
PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN.

AS PRESIDENT NIXON RECOGNIZED IN HIS
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO THE SENATE:

JAPAN'S PHENOMENAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
REPRESENTS A MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT
FOR US AND FOR THE OTHER NATIONS OF THE
PACIFIC. JAPAN IS NOW THE THIRD LARGEST
PRODUCER IN THE WORLD AND HAS DEVELOPED
WITH US THE GREATEST TRANSOCEANIC
COMMERCE IN THE HISTORY OF MANKIND. THE
POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR
TWO ECONOMIES, THE WORLD'S MOST PRODUCTIVE
AND THE WORLD'S MOST DYNAMIC, IS CLEARLY

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IMMENSE. FOR THIS AMONG OTHER REASONS,
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE A STRONG
MUTUAL INTEREST IN THE PEACE AND SECURITY
OF THE PACIFIC AREA. THIS INTEREST IS
RECOGNIZED IN OUR TREATY OF MUTUAL
COOPERATION AND SECURITY, WHICH BOTH OUR
COUNTRIES RECOGNIZE AS A KEYSTONE OF OUR
SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS IN THAT PART OF
THE WORLD. I THINK ALL AMERICANS ALSO
REALIZE THAT A CLOSE AND FRIENDLY
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED
STATES IS VITAL TO BUILDING THE PEACEFUL
AND PROGRESSIVE WORLD BOTH OF US WANT FOR
ALL MANKIND. THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED
IN STRENGTHENING THE FABRIC OF PEACE
IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC WILL UNDOUBTEDLY
BE CHALLENGING. BUT IF JAPAN AND THE
UNITED STATES GO SEPARATE WAYS, THEN THIS
TASK WOULD BE INCOMPARABLY MORE DIFFICULT.
WHATEVER DIFFERENCES MAY ARISE BETWEEN
OUR NATIONS ON SPECIFIC POLICY QUESTIONS,
IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE BASIC NATURE

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OF OUR RELATIONSHIP REMAIN CLOSE AND
CORDIAL.

I AGREE WITH THE PRESIDENTS ASSESSMENT
THAT IT IS IN OUR COUNTRY'S INTEREST TO
MAINTAIN A STRONG AND POSITIVE PARTNERSHIP
WITH JAPAN. I WILL VOTE FOR RATIFICATION
BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THIS TREATY WILL
CONTRIBUTE MUCH TO STRENGTHENING AND
IMPROVING THE TIES THAT BIND US IN OUR
COMMON PURSUIT FOR PEACE, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN BETTERMENT.

MR. PRESIDENT, BEFORE CLOSING, I WISH TO
CALL MY COLLEAGUES ATTENTION TO AN ISSUE THAT
HAS BEEN STIRRING AS A RESULT OF OUR
DECISION TO RETURN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
RIGHTS OVER THESE ISLANDS TO JAPAN. THE
QUESTION THAT IS ON THE MIND OF MANY
PEOPLE IS: WHO HAS THE LEGAL AND SOVEREIGN
RIGHTS OVER THE TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS?

WHILE TESTIFYING BEFORE THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE REGARDING
THIS MATTER, SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM
P. ROGERS CONCEDED THAT THIS TREATY

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DOES NOT AFFECT THE LEGAL STATUS OF THOSE
ISLANDS AT ALL. WHATEVER THE LEGAL
SITUATION WAS PRIOR TO THE TREATY IS
GOING TO BE THE LEGAL SITUATION AFTER
THE TREATY COMES INTO EFFECT.

LIKEWISE, THE REPORT ISSUED BY THE
COMMITTEE LEFT UNRESOLVED THE QUESTION
OF LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TIAO-YU
TAI ISLANDS. ON PAGE 5 OF ITS REPORT
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE STATED
THAT:

THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND JAPAN CLAIM
SOVEREIGNTY OVER THESE ISLANDS. THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS TAKEN THE
POSITION THAT THE SOLE SOURCE OF
RIGHTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THIS
REGARD DERIVES FROM THE PEACE TREATY
UNDER WHICH THE UNITED STATES MERELY
RECEIVED RIGHTS OF ADMINISTRATION, NOT
SOVEREIGNTY. THUS, UNITED STATES ACTION IN
TRANSFERRING ITS RIGHTS OF ADMINISTRATION
TO JAPAN DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A TRANSFER

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OF UNDERLYING SOVEREIGNTY NOR CAN IT AFFECT THE UNDERLYING CLAIMS OF ANY OF THE DISPUTANTS. THE COMMITTEE REAFFIRMS THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT DO NOT AFFECT ANY CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY WITH RESPECT TO THE SENKAKU OR TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS BY ANY STATE.

THE TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS ARE A GROUP OF EIGHT SMALL UNINHABITED BUT OIL-RICH ISLANDS THAT ARE INTIMATELY RELATED TO THE CHINESE MAINLAND AND TAIWAN. THEY ARE LOCATED ABOUT 120 MILES FROM TAIPEI AND 240 MILES FROM OKINAWA. LIKEWISE, THE SURROUNDING WATERS ARE LESS THAN 200 METERS DEEP WHILE THE WATER WHICH SEPARATES THESE ISLANDS FROM THE RYUKYUS IS OVER 1000 METERS DEEP.

BESIDES THE GEOGRAPHICAL ARGUMENTS FAVORING ITS EXCLUSION FROM THE PRESENT TREATY, BOTH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN CLAIM THAT THE TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS ARE HISTORICALLY AND POLITICALLY PART

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OF THE TERRITORY OF TAIWAN, WHICH BOTH GOVERNMENTS AGREE IS A PROVINCE OF CHINA.

MR. PRESIDENT, IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE REASONS ARGUING AGAINST THE INCLUSION OF THE TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS INTO THE OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY, I HAVE IN MY POSSESSION A FACSIMILE OF AN IMPERIAL EDICT WHICH SHOWS THAT IN 1893 THE EMPRESS DOWAGER TZU HSI AWARDED THE THREE SMALL ISLANDS OF TIAO-YU TAI, HUANG WEI YU, AND CHIH YU TO SHENG HSUAN HUAI AS HIS PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE OF COLLECTING MEDICINAL HERBS.

ONE OF MR. SHENG'S LAWFUL DESCENDENTS, MRS. GRACE YI HSU, A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, HAS THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT AND THEREFORE CLAIMS OWNERSHIP TO THE THREE ISLANDS IN BEHALF OF HERSELF AND THE OTHER DESCENDANTS OF MR. SHENG. IT IS MY SINCERE HOPE THAT SHE BE ALLOWED EVERY CONSIDERATION IN PROVING HER FAMILY'S CLAIM TO THE THREE ISLANDS.

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MR. PRESIDENT, I ASK UNANIMOUS CONSENT THAT A TRANSLATED COPY OF THE IMPERIAL EDICT OF EMPRESS DOWAGER TZU HSI REGARDING THE TIAO YU TAI ISLANDS BE PRINTED IN THE RECORD AT THIS TIME.

(TRANSLATION)

IMPERIAL EDICT OF EMPRESS DOWAGER TZU HSI ISSUED ON THE 10TH MONTH OF THE 19TH YEAR OF EMPEROR KUANG HSU, 1893)

THE MEDICINAL PILLS SUBMITTED BY HENG HSUAN HUAI, TAI CHANG SZU CHENG (-) HAVE PROVED TO BE VERY EFFECTIVE. THE HERBS USED IN MAKING THE PILLS ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN COLLECTED FROM THE SMALL ISLAND OF TIAO YU TAI, BEYOND THE SEAS OF TAIWAN. BEING MADE OF INGREDIENTS FROM THE SEA, THE PRESCRIPTION IS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THAT AVAILABLE IN THE CHINESE MAINLAND. IT HAS COME TO MY KNOWLEDGE

外務省

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

THAT THE SAID OFFICIALS FAMILY HAS FOR GENERATIONS MAINTAINED PHARMACIES OFFERING FREE TREATMENT AND HERBS TO DESTITUTE PATIENTS. THIS IS REALLY MOST COMMENDABLE. THE THREE SMALL ISLANDS OF TIAO YU TAI, HUANG WEI YU, CHIH YU ARE HEREBY ORDERED TO BE AWARDED TO SHENG HSUAN HUAI AS HIS PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE OF COLLECTING MEDICINAL HERBS. MAY THE GREAT UNIVERSAL BENEVOLENCE OF THE IMPERIAL DOWAGER EMPRESS AND OF THE EMPEROR BE DEEPLY APPRECIATED.

(-) TAI CHANG SZU HAD CONTROL OF THE IMPERIAL COURT INFIRMARY. TAI CHANG SZU CHENG WAS AN OFFICIAL IN TAI CHANG SZU.

(了)

外務省

至急

アメリカ局長

参事官

北米第一課長

送付公信

| | |
|------------|-------------|
| 政 第 9512 号 | 昭和46年11月18日 |
| 外 務 大 臣 殿 | 在 米 牛 場 大 使 |

引用(来)(往)公信・電信番号 往電才365/号=周L

送付資料

沖縄協定上院審議(議事録)

審議 S-17951~17967

参事官發言 S-17898~17899

参事官發言 S-17944~17945

議事録添付あり

議事録添付あり

| | |
|-------|--|
| 要処理 | |
| 省長事務官 | |
| 総務課 | |
| 渉外課 | |
| 漁業課 | |
| 航空課 | |
| 科学協力課 | |
| 連絡調整課 | |
| 調査課 | |
| 力大 | |
| 局長 | |



渉外課 (希望配布先)

付属添付 付属空便(行) 付属空便(DP) 付属船便(貨)

(郵)

本信写送付先 (別添とも)

(部の内 号) 注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

極秘

電信写

大政事外外儀官
務務 典房
次次 長
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会営給

総番号(TA) 584/6 主管
71年11月09日22時20分 米□ 発米北/ 着米北/

71年11月10日12時27分 本省 着米北/

外務大臣殿 午場 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ協定上院審議(フオン議員発言)

第3670号 極秘 大至急

電第3669号に関し

フオン議員のスタッフ(ニシムラ)はサトウに対しフオン議員がセンカク諸島に言及したのは、上院のゆい一の中国議員として、在米中国人(特にGRACE HSU)が強い働きかけを受けたため何等かのことをせざるを得ず、よつて議事録にとどめるという形で処理しようとしたものであり、返かん協定に賛成することによりセンカク諸島の施政権が日本に返かんされることは十分承知しての上で発言であるので、その間の事情を了承してほしい旨述べた由。以上御参考まで。

(了)

調査長
領移長
参企析調
参領旅査移

参地中東
長 北東西
参北北保
中南審
参西東洋
長 西東

近ア長
経 次総経国資
長 参貿統国
経協長 参政技一理
参 国
参 参条協規
長 参政経科
参 軍社専
参 参道内外
長 文
一 二

外務省

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

大政事外外儀官
務務 典房
次次 長
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会営給

総番号(TA) 58588 主管
71年11月10日15時38分 米□ 発米北/ 着米北/

71年11月17日05時59分 本省 着米北/

外務大臣殿 午場 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん上院審議

第3672号 平 大至急

往電第3651号に関し

上院本会議は10日午後3時よりの表決において賛成84、反対6をもつてオキナワ返かん協定の批准を承認した。委細追電するも取りあえず。

(了)

(千葉米北1課長に連絡 // 06:10)

調査長
領移長
参企析調
参領旅査移

参地中東
長 北東西
参北北保
中南審
参西東洋
長 西東

近ア長
経 次総経国資
長 参貿統国
経協長 参政技一理
参 国
参 参条協規
長 参政経科
参 軍社専
参 参道内外
長 文
一 二

外務省

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

大政事外外閣官
務務 典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
備総人電厚計
書文会営給

総番号(TA) 58644 主管
71年 11月 10日 20時 05分 米 国 発 米 北
71年 11月 11日 10時 08分 本 省 着 米 北

外務大臣殿 牛場 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん協定(ロジャース長官声明)

第3683号 平 大至急

往電第3672号に關し

ロジャース國務長官は10日上院のオキナワ協定承認に關し別電の通りの声明を發表した。

(了)

調査長 参企析調
領移長 参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
長 北東西
米 参北北保
中南審 参一二
欧 参西東洋
長 西東

近ア長 参書近ア
経 次総経国資
源

長 参賀統国
経協長 参政技一理
国 企二

長 参参協規
国 参政経科

長 軍社專
参道内外
長 文 一二

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

大政事外外閣官
務務 典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
備総人電厚計
書文会営給

総番号(TA) 58639 主管
71年 11月 10日 20時 00分 米 国 発 米 北
71年 11月 11日 09時 09分 本 省 着 米 北

外務大臣殿 牛場 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄返還協定(ロジャース長官声明)

第3684号 平 大至急
往電第3683号 別電

I AM DEEPLY GRATIFIED THAT THE SENATE TODAY
AND BY AN OVERWHELMING MARGIN VOTED TO GIVE
ITS CONSENT TO RATIFICATION OF THE OKINAWA
REVERSION TREATY. TO ME, THIS VOTE
CONSTITUTES A RINGING AFFIRMATION BY THE
PEOPLE OF THE U.S. TO OUR JAPANESE FRIENDS
AND ALLIES OF THE FRIENDSHIP, TRUST AND
MUTUALITY OF INTEREST WHICH FORM THE BASIS
OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THAT GREAT NATION.
IN GIVING ITS CONSENT TO THIS HISTORIC
TREATY, THE SENATE HAS, I BELIEVE, ACTED
WITH GREAT WISDOM. IT HAS MADE A MAJOR
CONTRIBUTION TO WHAT WE ALL HOPE WILL BE
AN ENDURING AND MUTUALLY BENEFITIAL ASSOCIATION
BETWEEN JAPAN AND U.S.

調査長 参企析調
領移長 参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
長 北東西
米 参北北保
中南審 参一二
欧 参西東洋
長 西東

近ア長 参書近ア
経 次総経国資
源

長 参賀統国
経協長 参政技一理
国 企二

長 参参協規
国 参政経科

長 軍社專
参道内外
長 文 一二

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

大政事外外儀官
 務務 典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 儀総人電厚計
 書文会管給

参企析調
 参領旅査移
 長

参地中東
 長 北東西
 参北北保
 参一
 参西東洋
 長 西東

参書近ア
 次総経国資
 長 参質統国
 参政技一理
 国企二
 参衆議規
 長 参政経科
 長 軍社専
 参内外

総番号(TA) 58655
 71年 月/0日 時/分
 71年 11月/1日 時/22分 本省
 主管 発着

外務大臣殿 中場 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん協定(上院の承認)

第3686号 平 大至急

往電第3672号に関し

1. 上院本会議は10日午後3時よりオキナワ返かん協定の批准を承認する決議案についての表決を開始し(1人づつ名前を読みあげ発声による賛否の意思表示を求めた。所要時間約22分)賛成84、反対6で右決議案を採択した。

その後マンスフィールド、スコット、フルブライト、ジャヴィッツ各議員が立ちあがり、上院が圧倒的(OVERWHELMING)多数で協定を支持したことに満足の意を表明するとともに、本件協定を締結したニクソン大統領とサトウ総理のイニシアテイヴをたたえ(マンスフィールド)また今回の上院の措置が日本の国会の協定審議に好影響を与え日本の国会も米上院と同様問題なく協定の批准を承認することを希望する(フルブライト)といった発言を行なった。

2. 反対者はアレン(民主、アラバマ)、ハリソン、バード

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

(民主、ヴァージニア)、(共和、アリゾナ)、(共和、ワイオミング)、(共和、マグナソン)、(民主、ワシントン)、(共和、ノースダコタ)の6名で、欠席者はベルモン(共和、オクラホマ)、プロウク(共和、テネシー)、ベネット(共和、ユタ)、キヤリン(民主、ネヴァダ)、クック(共和、ケンタッキー)、ハリス(民主、オクラホマ)、マント(共和、サウスダコタ)、マスキー(民主、メイン)、タフト(共和、オハイオ)、ステンス(民主、ミシシッピ)の10名である。反対者中、(イ)アレンはせん維関係で早い時期より協定反対を選挙区に対する公開書簡等で明確にしているためその立場をつらぬこうとしたものと思われ、(ロ)バード、ゴールドウオーター、ハンセンの3名は軍事面の考慮から協定反対の立場をとつたものと思われる。(ハ)ヤングについては極たんな保守派であり、軍事面の考慮から反対したものと考えられる。なおヤングは独立独行の投票態度をとる傾向がある。(ニ)マグナソンの今回の投票態度については議会関係者の中でも不可解とされており、同議員の反対理由は明らかではないが、選挙区の有力者からの働きかけ等何等かの個人的理由によるものではないかとの見方が強い。

3. 外交委員会の審議を含め上院によるオキナワ協定審議

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

を通じてみられる特によくは、一部の議員による軍事的見地からの懸念の表明はあつたものの協定承認を中止しようとする動きが全くなかつたことであり、このことは貿易問題等の問題を超越したオキナワ返かんの政治的重要性に対する認識が上院を支配した結果とみられる。(このことはアレンを除きせん維問題の急先ぼうであつたサーモンド、ホリングスといった議員が協定に賛成したことにも示されている。)またマンスフィールド、スコット両院内総務、フルブライト外交委員長、特にマジョリティーのリーダーとしてのマンスフィールドの政治的指導性が大きな力となつていたことは見のがせない。なお米議会関係者は一致して今回の投票結果が上院のかん行からみれば極めてまれなほどの圧倒的的支持であると指摘している。

|(了)|

(回覧番号) 外務省電信案 (分類)

| | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|
| 機密表示 (極秘・秘の朱印) 平 | 符号表示 暗 略 平 | 総第 1111 048 号 |
| | ※ 第 2542 号 | ※ 昭和 46 年 11 月 13 日 13:30 分発 |
| | 大至急・至急・普通・LTF | ※ 発電係 子 |

| | | |
|--|-------------------------------|--|
| 大 臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官房長 | 主管 アメリカ局長 参事官 北米才一課長 | 主管局部課(室)名 アメリカ局北米才一課 起案 昭和 46 年 11 月 11 日 起案者 電話番号 2499 |
|--|-------------------------------|--|

協議先

在 米 牛 場 大使 臨時代理大使
総領事 代理 福 田 大臣 発

在 中 韓 高 津 大使 臨時代理大使
総領事 代理 あり

件名 上院 沖繩返還協定の承認 (謝意伝達)

貴電第 3686 号に用し、
ロニヤニ國務長官に對し、
1. 本件協定が上院の圧倒的多数に
より承認されたこと、
深甚なる謝意と、同右官以下米政界の
努力に對する最大の敬意を然るべし伝達

享 濟 (23)

(※印欄内は電信課記入)

(昭和四二・七一改正)

ありたい。

2. ミスフィールド、スコット両院内総務
及び フィルブライト外交委員に對し、今回の
上院の協定承認に關する本大臣からの
丁寧なる謝意を然るべし伝達ありたい。

沖繩返還電文

(回覧番号) 外務省電信案 (分類)

| | | | | |
|------|----------------|------|----------------------|-------------|
| 電信課長 | 機密表示 (極秘・秘の朱印) | 符号表示 | ※ 総第 | 1111 113 号 |
| | 平 | 略 | ※ 昭和 | 年 月 日 時 分 秒 |
| | 第 | 号 | 46 年 11 月 17 日 17.36 | ※ 発電係 |

| | | |
|---|-------------------------|--|
| 大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官房長 | 主管 | 主管局部課(室)名 |
| | アメリカ局長 参事官 北米才一課長 | アメリカ局北米才一課 昭和 46 年 11 月 17 日 起案者 電話番号 2499 |

協議先
次官 参事官 参事官

在 大使 臨時代理大使
総領事 代理 大臣 発

電 在 大使 臨時代理大使
報 総領事 代理 発

件名
(和光) THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. ROGERS,
SECRETARY OF STATE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON D.C.,
U.S.A.

外
箱

字
濟
64

(※印刷内は電信課記入)

(昭和四二・七一改正)

GB-1

I am most gratified to learn that the Senate gave an overwhelming approval of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. I would like to express my sincere thanks for your consistent efforts which brought about this most satisfactory result.

Kiichi Aichi,
~~Tokyo, JAPAN~~
1~20, SENDAGAYA,
SHIBUYA-KU,
PARK AVENUE APARTMENT (301),
TOKYO, JAPAN.

64

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

大政事外外儀官
 務務 典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 儀儀人電厚計
 書文会営給

調
 査長
 領移
 長
 参企析調
 参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
 長 北東西
 参北北保
 中南審
 欧 参西東洋
 長 西東

近
 ア 参書近ア
 長
 経 次総経国資
 源
 長 参質統
 参政技一理
 国
 参政経科
 長 参道内外
 長 参道内外
 文 一二

総番号(TA) 58856 米 国 主管
 71年 11月 11日 18時 10分 発 北
 71年 11月 12日 08時 20分 本 省 着 北

外務大臣殿 午場 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄返還協定(上院の批准承認)

第3699号 平至急
 往電第3698号 別電。

RESOLVED, (TWO-THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT
 CONCURRING THEREIN),
 THAT THE SENATE ADVISE AND CONSENT TO THE
 RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED
 STATES OF AMERICA AND JAPAN CONCERNING THE RYUKYU
 ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS, SIGNED IN WASHINGTON
 AND TOKYO ON JUNE 17, 1971.
 (EX. J, 92-1)

外務省

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

大政事外外儀官
 務務 典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 儀儀人電厚計
 書文会営給

調
 査長
 領移
 長
 参企析調
 参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
 長 北東西
 参北北保
 中南審
 欧 参西東洋
 長 西東

近
 ア 参書近ア
 長
 経 次総経国資
 源
 長 参質統
 参政技一理
 国
 参政経科
 長 参道内外
 長 参道内外
 文 一二

総番号(TA) 58865 米 国 主管
 71年 11月 11日 18時 50分 発 北
 71年 11月 12日 08時 50分 本 省 着 北

外務大臣殿 午場 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

ニクソン大統領に対する謝意表明

第3700号 略

貴電第2544号 に関し

// 日本使よりキッシンジャー補さ官に対しサトウ総理の
 ニクソン大統領に対する深甚なる謝意の伝達方要請せると
 ころ、キは速やかなる伝達方を約するとともに、圧倒的多
 数をもつて上院が返かん協定を承認せることをよろこんで
 おり、オキナワ問題の解決により今後日米両国が緊密なる
 関係維持のために一層努力することが出来ることを期して
 居る旨述べた。

外務省

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米才一課長

送付 公信

政 第 11848 号
昭和 46 年 11 月 12 日

外 務 大 臣 殿
在 米 牛 場 大 使

引用(来)(往)公信・電信番号

送付資料

沖縄返還協定上院審議(11月10日)
議事録)

沖縄協定関係部分 18083 18087
 (1) S18083 ~ S18092. (2-10-1, マンス & -10-1)
 ハンフリー, モス, マキーン, バックレイ, 4-4 各議員
 18087 の発言. 18088 18088 18089 18090
 (2) S18100 ~ S18101 (表決)

46.11.15

(希望配布先)

付属添付 付属空便(行) 付属空便(DP) 付属船便(貨)
 (郵)

本信写送付先 (別添とも)

2987

州送多120... 議事録添付なし

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米才一課長

送付 公信

政 第 9791 号
昭和 45 年 11 月 11 日

外 務 大 臣 殿
在 米 牛 場 大 使

引用(来)(往)公信・電信番号 経信政中9377号

送付資料

上院外交委員会沖縄協定聴内会記録
聴内会各委員の発言録等
文書: 58 行-11 等。

46.11.22

(希望配布先)

付属添付 付属空便(行) 付属空便(DP) 付属船便(貨)
 (郵)

本信写送付先 (別添とも)

3036

。全部取手中
ステートメント添付なし

米地... 調査

(回覧番号) 外務省電信案 (分類)

| | | |
|---|-------------------------------|--|
| 機密表示 (極秘・秘の朱印) | 符号表示 暗 略 略 | ※ 総第 1125 189 号 |
| ※ 第 2865 号 | ※ 昭和 46 年 11 月 25 日 19 時 20 分 | ※ 発電係 青山 |
| 大至急・至急・普通・LTF | | |
| 大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官房長 | 主管 アメリカ局長 参事官 北米才一課長 | 主管局部課(室)名 アメリカ北米才一課 起案 昭和46年11月25日 起案者 電話番号 2465 |
| 協議先 | | |
| 在米 牛嶋 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理 | あて 福田 大臣 発 | |
| 電報 在 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理 あて | | |
| 件名 | 上院外交委聴取会記録 ANNEX | |
| | 貴(官)外才9791号を以て送付あり | |
| | 本件記録の ANNEX 10部 空送あり | |
| | たし。 | |
| | (3) | |

漢

電信課長

(※印刷内は電信課記入)

(昭和四二・七一改正)

GB-1

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

| | | |
|---------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| 大政官 務次官 臣官官審審長長 儀総人電厚計 | 典房 長長 計 | 主管 |
| 文会營給 | 東 国 | 発着 |
| 調査長 領移長 | 71 年 11 月 2 日 12 時 15 分 | 71 年 11 月 3 日 04 時 20 分 |
| 参企折調 | 外務大臣殿 | 牛嶋 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理 |
| 参領旅査移 | 1966年下院軍事委の記録 | |
| | 第3721号 平 至急 | |
| | 電米北 / 第2547号に關し | |
| | 66年2月7日付下院軍事委報告は見当らないので、目下 | |
| | さんさく中である。同3月23日のちよう開会記録は空送 | |
| | した。同記録中ホルト次官代理の証言關係英文別電のと | |
| | り。 | |
| | (了) | |
| 近ア長経 | 参書近ア | |
| 長経協長 | 次総経国資 | |
| 長国 | 参貿統 | |
| | 参政技一理 | |
| | 国企二 | |
| | 参条協 | |
| | 参政経科 | |
| | 軍社專 | |
| | 参道内外 | |
| | 一二 | |

添付なし

大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
備備人電厚計
書文会営給

調査長
領移長
参企析調
参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
長 北東西
参北北保

近ア長経
参書近ア
次総経国資
源
長 参賛統
参政技一理
長 参協
参政経科
長 参道内外
長 一二

注意

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電信写

総番号(TA) 59054 主管
 71年 11月 12日 12時 05分 米 国 発 着
 71年 11月 13日 04時 20分 本 省 着

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

1966年下院軍事委の記録

オ3722号 卒 至急
 往電オ3721号 別電

THE RYUKYUS SERVE A THREEFOLD PURPOSE IN OUR
 DEPLOYMENTS TO MEET OUR SECURITY COMMITMENTS IN THE
 WESTERN PACIFIC. THEY PROVIDE A CENTRALLY LOCATED
 LOGISTICAL BASE SEMICOLON THEY PROVIDE A CLOSE-IN
 SAGING AREA AND OPERATIONAL BASE FOR U.S. FORCES
 WITH MISSIONS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC SEMICOLON AND
 THEY ARE AN IMPORTANT CENTER OF MILITARY COMMUNICA-
 TIONS AND TRANSPORTATION. MOREOVER, THE RYUKYUS
 SERVE OTHER IMPORTANT PURPOSES, SUCH AS PROVIDING
 STES FOR MAJOR VOICE OF AMERICA OPERATIONS. THE
 VALUE OF THIS BASE HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED REPEATEDLY,
 FROM THE TIME OF THE KOREAN WAR TO THE PRESENT DAY.
 IDEED, TODAY THIS BASE IS PLAYING AN INCREASINGLY
 IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS IN
 ETNAM. (了)

外務省

大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
備備人電厚計
書文会営給

調査長
領移長
参企析調
参領旅査移

ア 参地中東
長 北東西
参北北保

近ア長経
参書近ア
次総経国資
源
長 参賛統
参政技一理
長 参協
参政経科
長 参道内外
長 一二

注意

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電信写

総番号(TA) 60037 主管
 71年 11月 7日 19時 55分 米 国 発 着
 71年 11月 8日 10時 17分 本 省 着

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん米側説明(財政面)

第3787号 略 至急

往信政第9377号に關し

オキナワ協定に関する外交委ちよう開会においてパツカー
 ド国防次官が述べた米軍関係投資額、施政権返かんにより
 期待される経費節約額等の数字(冒頭往信にて送付したち
 よう開会記録5/ページ)につき、6日国防省シート日本
 部長がサトウに述べたところ次のとおり。なお、シート課
 長は日本政府が本件を部外説明用に使用する場合にはちよ
 う開会における米政府説明どおりの概算数字によることと
 されたい旨述べていた。

1. 投資額
 施政権返かん後、米国が維持する88基地(A表基地)に
 対する投資額(投資が行なわれた時点のもの)の総額が約
 6億1,000万ドルであり、右を概算6億ドルと述べた
 のが、ちよう開会で米政府関係者があげた数字である。な
 お、B表基地及びC表基地に対する投資額は、総計5,60
 0万ドルである。過去においてオキナワの米軍基地に対す

外務省

秘

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電信写

る投資額としてあげられた数字は極めて大ざつばな計算によるものゝないし実際に投資が行なわれた時より後の時点において同種の投資をした場合に予想される投資額であり、根拠がはつきりしないものが多い。

2. 節約額

返かんにより米側が支払わなくてすむようになった各種費用の推定合計で、機能別には(イ)13,500万ドルは(1) AIR DEFENCE BATTALION (ナイヤホーク) (ii) AIRCRAFT CONTROL AND WARNING MISSION (レーダー) (iii) OPERATION OF NAHA AIRFIELD 等がその主なものであり、(ロ)2,000万ドルは(1) 過去における米国の対オキナワ援助の最高額に米民政府行政予算を加算したものである。そのほかに(ハ)土地借料は約1,000万ドルと推定した。

3. 労働関係費用増

労働関係を本土なみにすることにより予想される支出増は約1,700万ドルと推定したが、右はさい出外資金関係の労働関係費は含んでいない。

(丁)

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電信写

大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀器入電厚計
書文会営給

総番号(TA) 60367
71年11月18日20時30分 米D 主管
71年11月19日10時43分 本省 発着 米D

外務大臣殿 中場 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん協定上院通過(新聞社説)

第3807号 平

11月/8日付ワシントンポストは、OKINAWAの JAPAN AND CHINA と題する社説を掲げているところ、その内容次のとおり。

上院のオキナワ返かん協定批准は多年にわたりくり返し日本に対してなされた約束を果すものである。数カ月後には第2次大戦後米国が講和条約で日本に潜在主権を認めたオキナワの施政権は日本政府に返かんされるが、クーパー上院議員は上院で「わが国は太平洋における日本との戦争を終結させるために他のどの同盟国よりも力をつくしたにもかかわらず、日本に対しいかなる領土の割譲も要求しなかつたことはえいきゆうにわが国の名よとなることだと思ふ」と語つた。

もち論、オキナワは太平洋における政治の一要素を構成し続けるだろう。米国はオキナワの大軍事基地を維持しつづける。日本とオキナワにおける相当数の意見はサトウ総理がかかる規模の米軍の存在を容認したことを批判すること

参企析調
参領旅査移

参地中
長北西
参北北保

参一
参西東洋
長西東

参書近ア
次総経国資
源

参貿統
参政技一理
国企二

参条協
参政経科
軍社専

参道内外

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電信写

の批判はニクソン大統領の北京訪問により激化しそうである。

日本国民は米国がてい察任務のためにオキナワの基地を使用し、そこにあるVOA放送は主に中国に向けられたものであることを非常によく知っている。日本人は日本領土から行う米軍の活動につき中共が日本に責任を問うと推測している。米国が中国とのより友好的な関係に向って進もうとするに従い、この米国の動きは他の太平洋諸国に対し米国と同じ方向に向おうとする大きな圧力をつくり出す。オキナワの例が示すようにアジアの同盟諸国がわれわれ自身以上に中国に対し敵対的な態度をとることをわれわれが期待するとすれば、それは理くつに合わないことである。

(了)

注意

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電信写

- 大政事外外係
- 事務典房
- 次次
- 臣官官審審長長
- 儀秘入電厚計
- 書文会管給
- 調査長
- 領移長
- 参企析調
- 参領旅査移
- ア 参地中東
- 長 北東西
- 米 参北北保
- 中南
- 審一
- 欧参西東洋
- 長 西東
- 近ア長
- 参書近ア
- 経次総経国資
- 長 参質統国
- 経協長
- 参政技一理
- 国企二
- 参参協規
- 長 参政経科
- 軍社專
- 参道内外
- 長 参一
- 文

総番号(TA) 67497
 71年12月21日20時
 71年12月22日12時03分 本省 着
 主管 米子 発着 米子

外務大臣殿 中場 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん協定の国連通過と国連中国代表権問題について
 のわが国の対米協力

第4306号 略

当館PRコンサルタント、ランクルはオキナワ返かん協定が米国上院において圧倒的支持を得たは景として、わが国が国連における中国代表権問題につき米国に積極的に協力したこと、せん維問題が解決したこと、多くの上院議員は米政府が日本に対して既に余りにもかこく、かつ無感覚であり、これ以上日米間の緊張を激化させるべきでないと思っていたこと等、種々の要因が考えられるが、なかでも同協定批准に強こうに反対していた南部出身議員の態度を変更せしめた最大の要因は国連における中国代表権問題についてわが国の対米協力振りであった旨のメモ(空送)を提出越した。

右メモは、わが国の国連における対米協力振りは米国のプレスにはほとんど取り上げられなかつたが、有力上院議員の多くはこの対米協力振りに留意し、オキナワ返かん協定審議に際して感謝の念をもつてこれに言及したとしつつ、

外務省

7
秘

注意

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電信写

マンスフィールド、ハンフリー、バード、モス及びサーモ
 ンドの発言を引用しているほか、更にタルマッジ(ジョー
 ジア州)のトップ・アシスタントは「タルマッジの上院で
 の投票振りは何よりもこの事実(国連での対米協力)によ
 って左右されたし、自分の知る限りこれは多くの南部出身
 議員にとって決定的要因であった。他のほとんどの国々が
 米国を見ずていたときに、日本が米国の味方になったこ
 とは、ミリタントな選挙区をかかえるこれら南部議員達に
 にとって特に重要であった」と説明した旨述べている。

在米各公館へ転報した。

(了)

外務省

10736
 送付
 信
 参事官
 北米第一課長
 アメリカ局長
 中国代表
 冲縄駐在

情 第 [redacted] 号
 昭和46年12月22日
 外務大臣 殿
 在米牛場大使

引用(来) (在) 公信・電信番号 才 4306号

送付資料

| | |
|-----|--|
| 類 | |
| 首 | |
| 総 | |
| 沖 | |
| 渉 | |
| 漁 | |
| 航 | |
| 力 | |
| 速 | |
| (査) | |
| 力 | |
| (査) | |

冲縄返還協定の上院通過と中国代表権問題
 についてのかい口の対米協力(ランクルメモ)



(希望配布先)

付属添付 付属空便(行) 付属空便(DE) 付属船便(貨)
 (郵)

本信写送付先 在米各公館 (別添とも)

WASHINGTON-INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS

1627 K STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C., 20006

NA 8-6308

16 December 1971

Memo for: The Embassy of Japan, Washington, D.C.

Subject: Factors Contributing to U.S. Senate Vote on
the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.

As recently as last July, it was estimated by well-informed observers of Congress that there were as many as 25 Senate votes that might be cast against ratification of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. Given the need for a two-thirds majority, this was perilously close. Yet, finally, the approval was made by an overwhelming vote, with only two votes cast against.

"The most significant single factor in the Okinawa treaty vote was Japan's support for the United States in the U.N. on the China issue", explains the top assistant to Senator Eugene Talmadge of Georgia. He states that Talmadge's own vote (he is a leader among the senators) was swayed by this fact more than any other thing, and adds that to his knowledge it was also decisive with many of southern senators. These southerners had previously formed the backbone to opposition to ratifying the treaty. This same source says: "The fact that Japan stood with us, when everyone else was deserting the United States, was particularly important to southern senators, with their large military constituencies."

Japan's support in the U.N. was very little reported in the American press (it was a week of much dramatic news) but it was noted by a number of key senators. In the Senate debate on the treaty, several of them alluded specifically to the U.N. vote, and with obvious approval and appreciation,

The Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield said:

"The Japanese Government and people have received some shocks in recent months from the policies of this Nation. The imposition of the 10-percent surcharge was one. The textile agreement, which was worked out finally, was another. The detonation on Amchitka Island in the Aleutians last Saturday or Sunday was another. During all this period, however, the Government of Japan remained steadfast in

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friendship, even going so far as to join in a major way in trying to bring about not only the admission of Peking into the United Nations, but also the retention of Taiwan as well. The Japanese Government went all the way in support of the position of this country in the U.N. on the question of the admission of Peking and the retention of the Government of China on Taiwan."

On the following day of the debate, Senator Mansfield repeated in slightly different words his earlier statement:

"As I tried to indicate yesterday, the Japanese people have been the recipients of some severe shocks of late from this Nation -- the imposition of the 10-percent surcharge, which was worldwide, the textile agreement, and the announcement of President Nixon's visit to Peking. I also tried to indicate yesterday that Japan was one of the few nations which stood by the United States in the attempt to bring about the admission of mainland China to the United Nations and the retention of the Republic of China on Taiwan in that body."

Senator Hubert Humphrey, in a speech where he praised Japan and described it as a vital ally of the U.S., also said:

"Finally, Mr. President, Japan was with the United States all the way in the two-China policy in the U.N. The fruit of this for the Sato government has been very bitter; and we hope that the fruit of the ratification of the Okinawa Treaty plus the new sense of cooperation in the development of Asia about which I have spoken, will be a sweet fruit for the Sato government, and will make up for some of the difficulties it has encountered in respect of following our lead on the China policy in the United Nations."

Senator Byrd of Virginia, a very conservative southerner, stated:

"Japan is a fine ally. I think that all of us appreciate the support which Japan gave to the United States on the crucial vote in the United Nations 2 weeks ago. I hope that as the years go by, this friendship will survive and be strengthened."

Senator Moss said:

"During recent months, the Nixon administration has evidenced callous disregard for our relationship with Japan. The President failed to consult Japan prior to announcing his trip to Peking. Japan was also not consulted prior to the announcement of the new economic policy on August 15, which imposed the 10-percent surcharge. The nuclear detonation on Amchitka Island in the Aleutians is still another example of insensitive diplomacy

toward Japan. The Government of Japan, however, has remained steadfast in friendship and even fully joined in support of U.S. policy favoring 'dual representation' of China in the United Nations, thus sharing with us this major diplomatic defeat."

Even Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, who in the past has shown more animus toward Japan than any other single senator, felt constrained to note Japan's support, without commenting on it. He said:

"On the expulsion vote (of Taiwan) only Australia, Japan, Brazil and South Africa, along with a group of less influential countries, followed out leadership. Aside from those mentioned, not one of our traditional great allies nor even one member of NATO was with us."

While Japan's stance in the U.N. was probably, as Senator Talmadge's assistant asserts, probably the most important single factor in deciding the Okinawa vote, it was not the only factor, of course. Also important was elimination of the textile issue, plus the fact that many senators felt that the Administration had already been excessively harsh and insensitive toward Japan, and were in no mood to add to U.S.-Japanese tensions. But the factor which broke the back of the southern opposition was Japan's action in the U.N.

Scott F. Runkle
Scott F. Runkle

S 17956

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

November 9, 1951

nance. As I proposed during my recent visit to Japan, I would establish a joint committee to establish sound trade relations. On the negative side, I would hope such a committee could avoid or minimize trade conflicts before they develop into political disputes. On the positive side, a primary purpose of the committee should be to find areas where trade could be expanded to our mutual benefit. As part of this program, the committee could seek areas for both the public and private sectors of America and Japan to cooperate in the sound development of the underdeveloped nations of Asia. Finally, many of our monetary and trade problems are multilateral in scope. A part of the trade problem—both Japan and the United States—is caused by the European discriminatory provisions against Japanese products. We should work together in seeking multilateral solutions.

Fifth, Perhaps most importantly the United States and Japan should recognize that many of the differences in the past have been caused by differences in culture and language barriers. Consequently, there needs to be an expanded program of cultural and student exchanges to permit better understandings among our peoples.

Mr. President, in closing I want to re-emphasize that I believe the United States and Japan are on the threshold of a new relationship. The direction this new relationship takes depends to a large part upon the wisdom displayed by our two governments. We can, as we did once before, move apart to a period of uncertainty and even hostility, or we can move together as two nations who despite different cultural origins, today share a common belief—representative government and private enterprise; who have the ability, working together, of helping bring about stability in the Pacific and bringing other undeveloped countries into the 20th century. Cooperation can be the keynote to peace in the Far East. We will take the first step toward a sound relationship by ratifying the Okinawa Treaty today.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to express my wholehearted support and approval of Executive J, 92d Congress, the agreement with Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

Well over a century ago, an American naval officer, Commodore Perry, arrived at the Port of Shimoda with a number of vessels which, I believe, the Japanese referred to as the black ships. I am going on my memory. I have not had a chance to do any research or reading on this matter.

Sometime during the latter part of the last century, the Japanese acquired full dominative control from China of what was then known as the Loo Choo Islands, now known as the Ryukyu Islands, that comprise the prefecture of Okinawa.

About 20 years ago, a treaty of peace was signed between this country and Japan, and at that time one of the American delegates, John Foster Dulles, and others indicated that Okinawa was in the residual sovereignty of the Empire of Japan.

That has been emphasized and reiterated by every President since then. It

is over a quarter of a century since the end of the Second World War, and during that period of time Japan, like us, has had its ups and downs.

The Japanese accepted the so-called MacArthur constitution which called for a greatly reduced military force. Notwithstanding the Japanese adherence to that particular clause in that particular constitution, there are those among us today who seem to think that the Japanese should rearm to a greater degree than they have. But I would emphasize the fact that this was a constitution drawn up for and by General MacArthur which the Japanese adopted. As a result Japan has a very small home defense force at the present time, comprising about 250,000 troops, a small navy, and a small air force.

This was one factor, I believe, in making it possible for Japan to devote its energies to economic development, so much so that Japan today ranks third, if not second, among the industrial powers of the world.

Japan has had excellent relations with this Nation since the end of the Second World War. It would be my hope that the United States and Japan would remain friends not only in the decades ahead, but also in the centuries to come.

The Japanese Government and people have received some shocks in recent months from the policies of this Nation. The imposition of the 10-percent surcharge was one. The textile agreement, which was worked out finally, was another. The detonation on Anchitka Island in the Aleutians last Saturday or Sunday was still another. During all of this period, however, the Government of Japan remained steadfast in the friendship, even going so far as to join in a major way in the policy of the administration in trying to bring about not only the admission of Peking into the United Nations, but also the retention of Taiwan as well. The Japanese Government went all the way in support of the position of this country in the U.N. on the question of the admission of Peking and the retention of the Government of China on Taiwan.

The close Japan-United States relationship covers a long time in this day and age, but a short time in the pages of history. It is, I think, to the credit of President Nixon that he met with the Japanese to work out the treaty which is now pending before the Senate. It is a further fulfillment of what has been this Government's position, that the sovereignty of the Ryukyu Islands was residual in Japan. It is a mark, I think, of the growing awareness of each country of the needs of the other. It is a mark of a continued partnership. It is a mark of a continued friendship.

I would hope, there would again be a full return to the traditional friendship between our two peoples and our two governments which began a century ago. I would hope that this treaty would be approved overwhelmingly and I would express the hope that in the not too distant future we would go the rest of the way.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I supported the Okinawa reversion treaty in committee and I shall vote in favor of it to-

morrow. The admirable report and I say that without reservation because I did not draft it which our committee submitted on this matter, covers all important and salient points.

I rise only to express what was the unanimous feeling of the committee of our satisfaction that there was no effort to dispose of this matter by executive agreement which would not have required Senate approval. The course was taken here. I commend the administration for proceeding in this fashion, and I express the hope, as submission to the Senate will become a guiding rule and normal procedure in matters of substance in regard to agreements with other countries.

The Senate has a clear constitutional responsibility to pass on agreements with other countries, but in recent years the Senate has often been ignored. This Senate responsibility to give its advice and consent to international agreements must again be recognized, as the administration has done in this case.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I think it is important that there be a close cooperation and friendship between the United States and Japan. I agree with practically all of the remarks made by the distinguished majority leader except the conclusion that he draws.

I agree also that the Ryukyus and Okinawa should eventually revert to Japan. I question, however, the timing of the proposed treaty on which the Senate will vote tomorrow.

Okinawa was given to the United States by the Treaty of Peace of 1951.

The United States since that time has had unrestricted right to use this great military base complex in the Pacific as it feels best. The United States now has great commitments throughout the Far Pacific.

We are obligated by treaty to defend and guarantee the security of a large number of nations in that area. When these commitments were made they were made on the assumption that the United States would have the unrestricted right to the use of our military bases on Okinawa.

As I mentioned earlier, this unrestricted right to use Okinawa was obtained by the United States under the Treaty of Peace between the United States and Japan in 1951. Now, the proposed change in the Treaty of Peace, the pending business before the Senate, would give Japan a veto power, a veto as to the use of U.S. military forces on Okinawa. The United States would no longer have the unrestricted right to use this base.

As I mentioned earlier, I feel that eventually the Ryukyus and Okinawa should revert to Japan but I question whether that should be done so long as we have the tremendous commitments which the United States does now have in the Far Pacific.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I am glad to yield to the distinguished Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, I would like to ask my distinguished colleague from Virginia if what he is saying in his

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quishment to the Ryukyuan Government of several operational civil administration functions. During Phase III we plan to relinquish to the Ryukyuan Government additional operational civil administration functions, such as administration of quarantine, customs and other related controls. During that final phase many actions will be taken in connection with the turnover of U.S. public corporations, the sale of our controlling interest in the Bank of the Ryukyus, and other aspects of our civil control preparatory to the complete relinquishment of that control to Japan on reversion day.

Although the Okinawan people seem aware that reversion will not take place without the approval of the United States Senate and the Japanese Diet, they nonetheless generally expect that reversion will occur by 1 July 1972 if not earlier. Chief Executive Yara and the ORI Legislature have expressed the desire that reversion take place on 1 April 1972. There can be no decision on the date of reversion, however, until after the Treaty is approved by the Senate and the Diet. We foresee a number of practical problems in preparing for a smooth reversion and for planning purposes we are thinking in terms of 1 July 1972.

Should reversion be delayed much beyond 1 July 1972, I believe we would see a strong adverse reaction from the Okinawan people. I would expect rapid intensification of anti-American sentiment and activity which could make it very difficult to exercise U.S. administrative authority and to maintain a favorable environment for our bases and American personnel. The longer the delay the greater the adverse reaction which is to be anticipated since it is evident that U.S. bases in Okinawa require at least the acquiescence of the Okinawan people.

While a minority of Okinawans continue to demand immediate and complete removal of the American bases, the majority appear to accept the fact that the United States will continue to maintain a military base structure on Okinawa. Irritations and problems of our course continue to arise from the presence of our bases and from two people of such different language and culture living so close to each other in a small, densely populated geographic area. The Okinawans, nevertheless, are basically warm, friendly people. I continue to find in my frequent travels throughout the Ryukyus and in my personal contacts with Okinawans substantial goodwill toward the United States and an appreciation for what the United States has done since World War II to promote the welfare of the people of Okinawa. Individual Okinawans frequently go out of their way voluntarily to express these sentiments to me. I think that with intelligent management of our bases we can preserve these friendly sentiments.

I believe that with the continuing support of our Japanese ally, and with a smooth reversion, our military bases on Okinawa will continue after reversion to be of major value to the United States. Because of the strategic location of Okinawa, our extensive and highly developed complex of military bases there are extremely important in U.S. defense arrangements. They contribute in a major way to our ability to fulfill U.S. commitments to the security of Japan and our other allies in the Pacific.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes on the bill.

I take this occasion to commend the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, who, as always, has expressed himself precisely, and, as always, has reached the heart of the matter in very few words.

I join him in what he has stated about General Lampert, who I think has been and is an extraordinarily capable administrator, a man in the mold of such earlier statesmen as Marshall and Ridg-

way, to name two; a man who has indicated a knowledge not only of things military, but of things political, cultural, and social as well.

It appears to me, Mr. President, that what is happening in this first year of the 1970s indicates that there is a tremendous amount of movement around the world. We find, for example, not only Okinawa, the Ryukyus, and the Daito Islands now on the verge of being returned to Japan, but we also find that Japan has come to occupy a very important position in the scheme of affairs in the Pacific, and for that matter in the world. As I tried to indicate yesterday, the Japanese people have been the recipients of some severe shocks of late from this Nation—the imposition of the 10-percent surcharge, which was worldwide, the textile agreement, and the announcement of President Nixon's visit to Peking.

I also tried to indicate yesterday that Japan was one of the few major nations which stood by the United States in an attempt to bring about the admission of mainland China to the United Nations and the retention of the Republic of China on Taiwan in that body.

Those occurrences are indications of a shift, of a change. There are other indications as well. There is some ice being broken in the area of Berlin, and an accord of sorts has been reached with the East Germans and the West Germans now talking to one another, seeking to reinforce and interpret specifically what the Berlin accords are. Once that is done, and the prospects seem fairly good, then we should find the four ambassadors putting the final imprint on the Berlin accords, and at that time making them into an agreement. That would be followed by Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, the move toward the East, the conclusion of the treaties between the Federal Republic of West Germany and Poland and the Soviet Union, and finally, hopefully, a European security conference, which will discuss not only the matter of a mutual reduction of forces on both sides, but the Warsaw Pact countries as well as NATO, but other measures seeking to bring about a detente in Europe which could well contribute immeasurably to the peace of the world.

Then we have President Nixon going to Moscow sometime after the first of May, following, though not immediately, his visit to Peking.

We find the administration trying to cleave a line between the Israelis and the Arabs in the Middle East, a policy of which I thoroughly approve, and trying to bring the parties together on a face-to-face basis. Then we find the President withdrawing troops from Southeast Asia, from a high of 546,000 to a figure of 190,000, or just a little bit under, today. We find a total reduction of the Armed Forces since Mr. Nixon came into power of roughly 1,100,000 men.

So we find all these things happening. In addition, the president of the Soviet Union, Mr. Podgorny; the chairman of the party, Mr. Brezhnev; and the premier or prime minister, Mr. Kosygin, have embarked on a series of travels taking them to various of the world's continents. We even see, for example, the Prime Min-

ister of Cuba, Fidel Castro, today, I believe, arriving in Chile for a week's visit.

What I am trying to say, in brief, is that there is movement in world affairs today, that things are occurring which we cannot as yet decipher; but perhaps out of all this movement will come a new hope.

Perhaps there will arise a realization of what confronts the world today and what faces us tomorrow, and perhaps out of it will come also an end to our looking backward to policies which were good a decade ago, two decades ago, a quarter of a century ago, and a facing up to the realities of the present.

I agree with the distinguished Senator from Kentucky when he states, indirectly and implicitly, that this is a most important vote today. This, too, could signify a change in direction for the better. I think it is overdue. But I am glad that at last we are facing up to it, and I hope that very shortly this matter will be disposed of in the affirmative and by an overwhelming vote.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, are we under a time limitation?

Mr. MANSFIELD. How much time does the Senator desire?

Mr. HUMPHREY. About 5 minutes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I want to register at this time my support for the ratification of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty. I view this treaty as an essential step in the preservation of friendly relations between the United States and Japan. Second, ending our administration over the Ryukyu and Daito Islands represents the clearing away of one of the unsettled remnants of the postwar era.

Were the Senate giving its advice and consent a few months ago, I would merely have stressed in my remarks how the treaty was consistent with our historic policy of maintaining a close association with Japan; how it could serve to move their bilateral relations onto another plane, more in keeping with the future needs of both countries and other countries as well.

Mr. President, I am absolutely convinced that our relationships with Japan are of the utmost importance. While I know that we are now entranced with the prospect of better relationships with mainland China, I think it should be well understood that for the foreseeable future, friendly, cooperative, and healthy relationships between the United States and Japan are absolutely essential for peace in Asia, for the development of Asian countries, and for the promotion of a world of peace and a generation of peace.

Now the ratification of the Okinawa Treaty takes on another significance in addition to those I just mentioned. The Senate's vote comes at a time when relations between our two countries have seriously been shaken due to recent diplomatic maneuvers. I have pointed out repeatedly that our Government's apparent failure to recognize the importance of Japan as a major U.S. ally, a relation-

ship which has been carefully built up through the years, has led us to startle and offend our close friends unnecessarily.

Mr. President, it is of the utmost importance that our national policy relating to mainland China be changed. For this, I commend the President.

The President's announcement of going to Peking was welcome news for all but was very unsettling to the Japanese and other allies who had not been consulted. Next, came the announcement of our new economic game plan which included for the Japanese the single option of reevaluation of the yen. Simultaneously, we were pressuring the Sato government to cosponsor our resolutions on the China question in the United Nations, a position the Japanese Government had been ready to accept at an earlier date, but which it withheld publicly in deference to the wishes of the United States. We were also negotiating a rough and tough textile agreement, presented in the form of an ultimatum to the Japanese Government.

Finally, we had declarations by Government officials which gave credence to rumors spreading that the United States was encouraging Japan to go nuclear. I have tried to have the matter clarified as to what the position of our Government is, but I am still waiting for the Secretary of Defense's reply to my letter. Somehow, communication between branches of Government is as difficult as between the United States and its allies these days.

The Okinawa Treaty, therefore, comes at a crucial time in Japanese-American relations. In the joint communique of November 21 between President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato which led to the Reversion Treaty, two points stand out as offering the most promise:

- (1) They (the government of the United States and the government of Japan) would maintain and strengthen their fruitful cooperation in the continuing search for world peace and prosperity and in particular for the relaxation of international tensions.
- (2) The reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese government as described by the Prime Minister (The Prime Minister described the sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons.)

In addition to Senate Foreign Relations Committee determined from the testimony of our Government officials that nuclear weapons would not be stored on Okinawa after reversion.

Taken together, these points offer us the hope of a changing world where security is not only expressed in the deployment of nuclear weapons, but in solid understanding and communication between countries. My vote is a vote for the treaty and a vote for solidification of our relations with Japan in a multipolar world.

I, too, commend the distinguished Senator from Kentucky for his statesmanlike efforts in bringing this treaty to us in the Senate.

The Senate is performing a very valuable service in its advise-and-consent responsibilities, particularly in this treaty. I think all of us know that Japan is an important nation in the modern world, that its relationships to the United

States are of vital importance to us, that the Okinawa Treaty represents a forward step in the improvement of those relations—something that needed to be done, something for which I commend our Government—and, hopefully, that this treaty will be a very important step in strengthening and improving the cooperation between Japan and the United States.

I shall, as I have said, vote for this treaty, and I have no doubt that it will be ratified.

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I rise to support the ratification of the Okinawa Treaty which provides for the reversion of U.S. rights of administration over Okinawa to Japan. It is not really a reversion. I think we have recognized the sovereignty of Japan over Okinawa since the war in which we occupied the islands.

Twenty-five years after the end of World War II, the United States continues to occupy the territory of Okinawa and measures of executive authority over 1 million Japanese is exercised by American military services. That occupation is the last vestige of a wartime relationship.

Today, the United States and Japan stand on the threshold of a new relationship. The Okinawa Treaty represents the logical conclusion of American occupation policy which has been designed to encourage the emergence of an economically strong and politically stable Japan.

The treaty now places our future relationship on the basis of true equality and opens the door for the continuation of our political alliance on the basis of mutual interest and respect. Cooperation between Japan and the United States can be the keynote to peace in the Far East.

During recent months, the Nixon administration has evidenced callous disregard for our relationship with Japan. The President failed to consult Japan prior to announcing his trip to Peking. Japan also was not consulted prior to the announcement of the new economic policy on August 15, which imposed the 10-percent surcharge. The nuclear detonation on Amchitka Island in the Aleutians, is still another example of insensitive diplomacy toward Japan.

The Government of Japan, however, has remained steadfast in friendship and even fully joined in support of U.S. policy favoring "dual representation" of China in the United Nations, thus sharing with us this major diplomatic defeat.

Because of the economic importance of Japan and its enormous potential in the context of East Asia, the United States cannot afford to pursue policies without consideration of their implication for Japan. The United States and Japan can move apart to a period of uncertainty and even hostility or we can move together as two nations who share a common belief in representative government and private enterprise, despite different cultural origins.

The prime U.S. objective in East Asia must be the maintenance of a viable friendly relationship with Japan. Our two countries must work together to bring stability into the Pacific and to assist other undeveloped countries. We

take a great step toward this sound relationship with Japan by ratifying the Okinawa Reversion Treaty today.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, today, the Senate Committee on Armed Services concluded executive sessions on the military implications of the agreement between the United States and Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands calling for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. After listening very carefully to the testimony received and after personal review of the issue over the past few months, I intend to vote for ratification of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty.

The committee was privileged to hear U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior military officials intimately familiar with the impact of reversion on U.S. security arrangements.

The essence of the JCS opinion is that while reversion does decrease the flexibility of our force structure, other ways will be found to get the job done to minimize any loss of capability. In my opinion, an important point recognized by the JCS is that a continued denial of reversion would have resulted in a rapid erosion of the acquiescence of the Okinawan people in our military bases in the Ryukyus and, in turn, would have caused us considerable difficulties in the effective operation of those bases in the years ahead.

A more overriding consideration is the impact nonratification could have on the Sato government. Although the United States will be somewhat more restricted in the deployment of forces from Okinawa in support of security agreements in the Pacific area, failure to ratify the treaty could bring about the downfall of the Sato government. The possibility would then exist that a new Japanese Government could cancel all base agreements in Japan proper thereby forcing our complete withdrawal from there.

In summary, there are many more political advantages, both to the United States and Japan, in returning Okinawa to Japanese control. Japan, for the foreseeable future, will continue to be a major cornerstone in the power structure of the Western Pacific. As a strong ally and good friend she will remain essential to the maintenance of our security arrangements in the Pacific. The immediate military disadvantages, while not desirable, can be effectively overcome and, therefore, should not cause rejection of the treaty.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I rise to urge passage of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty which is presently before this body awaiting final action.

This agreement represents the ultimate step in ending an era in American-Japanese relations. It resolves the last remaining major issue between these two nations which arose out of World War II by returning to Japan the remaining occupied territory which we have long promised. Ratification of this document would remove the last vestige of occupying power status now held by the United States.

The importance attached to the need

will distribute the very large sums which we have been contributing to them. The amendment, in other words, reflects nothing more nor less than a loss of confidence in the United Nations which necessitates a more careful examination by the Congress of the extent to which the United States should channel her aid to underdeveloped countries through the U.N.

I have stated repeatedly in the last few weeks that while I support our continued membership in the world body, we should understand that that organization has developed into something quite different from the effective instrument for peace for which we had so feverently hoped at the time of its foundation. The United Nations has demonstrated time and again its inability to cope with major international crises for the reason that any proposal for U.N. action which even remotely inconvenienced the special purposes of the Soviet Union has been killed by her veto; and now that Peking has been invited to occupy a permanent seat on the Security Council, we can anticipate still further obstructions to any meaningful action by the United Nations in those areas which are most critical to world peace.

But the United Nations has proven useful and at times very effective in a dozen other ways. It provides a forum where nations, large and small, can let off steam, can express themselves; and as such, it has provided an important safety valve and face saver. The United Nations has been able to handle effectively such lesser peacekeeping missions as are relegated to it by the major powers, witness Cyprus. But most importantly, it is an instrument which facilitates international cooperation in an increasing number of technical areas which serve the mutual convenience and needs of member nations and which lie outside the scope of world politics.

The distribution of tens of millions of dollars worth of development funds and commodities, however, is something which is particularly subject to political pressures; and this being the case, I believe we have a strong prima facie case for preferring that the United States retain full control over the funds and commodities which it wishes to distribute to developing and needy countries.

The amendment now under consideration will leave intact our contributions to such well-established, well-known activities as the World Health Organization, the World Meteorological Organization, and the U.N. Children's Fund. It does provide, however, that before future voluntary contributions are made to the U.N. Development Fund and to the UN/FAO world food program, the Congress will have the opportunity to investigate their activities in detail and, in the light of the reassessment of the United Nations which is now being made by the American people, to make certain that such contributions will in fact be serving our national interests.

I hasten to add, Mr. President, that there is nothing in the slightest bit immoral or illegal in our taking such an attitude with respect to these contributions. The sponsors of this amendment

are not suggesting that the United States demand the right to approve or disapprove the specific activities of those various U.N. agencies to which we are required to make contributions as a result of mandatory assessments. Rather, we are suggesting that the United States has the moral and legal right, and that the Congress has the responsibility, to exercise a high degree of care before making purely voluntary contributions aggregating \$150,000,000 in value, to agencies over which we have little or no control.

Mr. President, I believe the Senator from South Carolina would like to have 5 minutes; I yield to him.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from New York. I rise in support of the amendment of the Senator from New York.

I fully support the moves which are being proposed today to reduce our funding of the United Nations organization and its allied groups. Secretary of State Rogers was quoted in the paper the other day saying that we had paid more than our fair share and I think the action of the United Nations on Monday indicates the kind of gratitude that we are to expect.

The expulsion of free China from the United Nations and the seating of Communist China in her place is a defeat of the first magnitude for U.S. foreign policy. We must face the fact that in an organization to which the United States has been the single largest contributor from the beginning, we could not gain support for the clearly legal and moral position of keeping free China as a member. On the expulsion vote only Australia, Japan, Brazil, and South Africa followed our leadership, along with a group of less influential countries. Aside from those mentioned, not one of our traditional great allies nor even one member of NATO was with us.

The meaning of this defeat goes beyond the China issue itself. For it now means that the coalition of anti-American interests can inflict a similar defeat on any policy issue which affects the vital interests of the United States. It means that we will be faced with the choice in the future of supporting positions which are against our interests, or else being accused of obstructing world peace.

The reason is that we are now faced squarely with the fact that Communist Russia and Communist China can control the votes on such major issues. The United Nations has always been a source of Communist influence in subversion in the United States because such evil influences were carried on through agencies and diplomatic cover. Now, however, the Soviets, with their bloc of Socialist nations, and the Communist Chinese with their influence over some African and Asian countries, can agitate any issue in the propaganda forum on New York's East River.

We are faced, therefore, with the need for a fundamental reassessment of our Nation's role in the U.N., and a reduction of our excessive financial support.

Let us not act with any feeling of retaliation for the past. Let us rather act with a sense of prudence and foresight for the future. Since it is now clear that

the majority of the United Nations can and will act against the cause of freedom, it is time to withdraw our support of the many multilateral activities conducted under the U.N. aegis. We can no longer afford to be paying the big dollars in support of activities which are contrary to our basic interests.

Ideally, the best course would be to reduce the level of our dollar support to the ratio of U.S. population to that of the population of all the members of the United Nations. This would cut U.S. support from approximately 38 to 6 percent. It would save the United States nearly \$250 million a year. This approach has been proposed in the House and I think that it is a good effort.

However, the realities of the present situation are that we are now debating the very legislation which will authorize the voluntary contributions to the United Nations and other international organizations. As we know, there are two kinds of payments which we make to the U.N. and its allied agencies. The first kind includes the so-called assessed contributions which are required for membership; and the second category consists of the voluntary contributions which we make to various U.N. projects of a general nature. As a minimum, therefore, we ought to first examine the so-called voluntary contributions which we have been making with monotonous regularity over the years.

We come then to the category of voluntary contributions which, in the proposed list of \$139 million, is considerably more than the \$117 million which we paid last year in assessed contributions. Many of these voluntary contributions consist of humanitarian projects and certain worthwhile relief programs. In my judgment, our long-range goal should be to seek to take care of humanitarian needs through our own agencies so we will have control over the distribution of funds. However, I am in full support of the move we are now discussing to strike contributions to the United Nations Development Fund and the Food and Agricultural Organization. For the past 2 years we have given \$86 million to the United Nations Development Fund and this year the request is for \$100 million. As I have already pointed out, we do not have the ability to control, or even to influence significantly, the method in which these funds are distributed; and I think it is pointless to assist the development of nations which actively oppose our interests.

In the assessed contributions category, only slightly more than \$50 million went to the administrative support of the United Nations itself. Others went to such international organizations as the International Labor Organization, UNESCO, World Health Organization, and so forth. Some of these are plainly Communist dominated, such as the International Labor Organization. We have already set the precedent of withholding support to ILO for 2 years and there is no reason why we could not eliminate support to other dangerous or worthless U.N. activities. Thus, even the so-called assessed contributions can easily be reduced or eliminated entirely. Such a

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reassessment of our support for the U.N. would work for the cause of peace because it would prevent the U.N. from engaging in operations which are contrary to the interests of freedom. I wholly support any kind of move which would reduce the assessed contributions. Unless we demonstrate our will to cut these contributions—especially the so-called voluntary category—they become, in effect, an international tax levied upon us. Our national sovereignty will be eroded, and our freedom of action will be constrained. It is time for the United States of America to act with prudence and foresight to stem the collapse of our international leadership.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Colorado.

Mr. BUCKLEY. I thank the distinguished Senator from South Carolina for his contribution.

I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Colorado.

Mr. DOMINICK. I thank my friend from New York.

Mr. President, I just wish to say for the record that I am extremely happy to be a cosponsor of this amendment. It is not hard to see, from the amount of money we have been spending on the United Nations, that most of the countries up there are relying on the United States for primary financial support.

I remember very well when my colleague from Colorado was a Delegate to the United Nations as Senate representative some years ago, his coming back and making a report on the detailed financial troubles of the United Nations, and pointing out quite clearly that continued reliance on the United States was not the way that the U.N. programs were really going to be productive, but that we had to get a much broader and much wider financial representation in each of the programs if they were to be successful.

It strikes me that what the Senator is doing here goes along with that theory, because we are paying over and beyond our mandatory ratio in the support of the U.N. Development Fund. As long as we are doing that, we are exceeding, in a voluntary way, what we are required to do under our dues. We are, in fact, in the U.N. Development Fund alone, putting almost an equal amount of money into that one program as we are required to provide under the mandatory assessment.

It just does not seem to me to make any sense to have us disburse our money in this way, when what we ought to be doing is concentrating on those items which will be effective from our own foreign relations point of view.

So I am very happy to support the Senator from New York.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, does the Senator from New York yield?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Could I just say a word on my own time? I was inquiring whether the Senator wished to yield the floor. I intended to speak on my own time.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is all I want to do.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I yield myself 2 minutes.

All I wish to say is that I personally favor the annual authorization of these programs. The committee provided a 2-year authorization rather than 1 year. I personally favored the 1-year. So that part of the Senator's amendment does not cause me any concern.

The real sticker of the amendment is striking the \$139 million and inserting \$37.5 million. I simply call attention to what this would affect. It affects not only the development program, but the Children's Fund, the Fund for Drug Abuse Control, the international atomic energy program, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Health Organization, and the International Secretariat for Voluntary Service. All those items are involved in this proposed cut.

I do not know how the Senator arrived at \$37.5 million for all practical purposes the committee approved the amount requested by the administration.

At this time, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman for giving me some time to speak very briefly.

The figure, of course, that the committee has reported reflects the request of the President. It reflects the administration's program, and I think as such deserves the consideration of the Senate.

Beyond that, I would like to point out the theory which underlies this kind of appropriations, and I should like to speak, not in my own words—and perhaps I can be helpful to the Senator from Colorado, who raised this question—but in the words of the report of the commission appointed by President Nixon which was headed by the former very distinguished Member of the Senate and former Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge. I shall quote from the recommendations in the report of the Lodge Commission.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired.

Mr. MATHIAS. May I have 3 additional minutes?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. MATHIAS. The Commission recommends that—

An increasing proportion of U.S. technical assistance, official loans, and credits to the developing nations of the world be channeled through the multilateral agencies of the UN system.

Further, the Commission says:

Every dollar of input by the United States to the UN Development Program helps to generate more than six dollars of actual development work by other nations.

Further: The Commission particularly urges that greater contribution be made to the UNDP. . . . Among officials and in all public testimony before the Commission, we found almost universal support for the UNDP as the most tangible success of the UN system. The very significant results thus far produced could be multiplied many times over in the years ahead. This will only happen if

adequate resources are made available to the UNDP. . . . The Commission recommends that U.S. contributions to UNDP be significantly increased year by year to reach a minimum of \$200 million by 1975, subject to a continuing improvement in the administrative efficiency of UNDP and the UN specialized agencies.

Mr. President, as I have said, these are not my words. These are the words of the Commission appointed by President Nixon, chaired by Henry Cabot Lodge. I think they are based on the evidence before that commission and they should be of great influence in persuading the Senate to turn down this amendment.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, may I have 5 minutes?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, we are coming now to the heart of the argument: The United Nations rebuffed us on China. They were wrong. What they did was wrong. The question is, How do we react? The lawyers have a way of expressing it. The lawyers always say that it does not matter what the facts are.

My colleague from New York can talk all he wishes about the fact that we are not being punitive and we are not acting out of petulance or out of resentment, but what member of the United Nations is not going to write it down exactly as that, especially as this very move has been advertised for a considerable number of days as being exactly that? Indeed, it is my judgment that we lost votes in the United Nations, which we badly needed because of the resentment of the fact that we threatened to cut off the money.

The best answer to this argument is that 8 percent of the people of the world have one-half the gross national product of the world, and that, with all our troubles, we still enjoy twice the average individual income of the people of any other country on earth.

Mr. President, we can take on the world if we wish, or we can try to live with the world. There is a great deal more here than appears from the face of this amendment. We can take on the world.

What is the \$102 million being taken from? It is being taken from the underdeveloped countries, from the United Nations development program, and from the World Health Organization—their dearest programs. Interestingly enough, it is ironic that the UNDP is right now spending money to determine upon the validity of a project for navigation flood control and power between Greece and Turkey; and I should imagine that those who feel as this amendment reflects are not anxious to be hard on Greece. Nevertheless, they will be, if there is a material cut here.

Laying that aside, my point is this: The United States can give any notice it wants as to how tough it is going to get on policy or on collecting past installments, and so forth. But within a day or two after the China vote, to vote petulantly to cut these critical programs for the underdeveloped countries of the world is doing ourselves the greatest harm possible. It is said that this comes