

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

## 沖縄関係21 返還交渉前史（対米・対内）

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三木(三)ヨシノ大使会談(七月十五日)

(回覧番号) 外務省電信案 (分類)

特秘・極秘・秘・平文・館長符号 (朱印)	暗 略 平	総第 030738 号
特 秘	第 1189 号	昭和 42 年 7 月 14 日 20.38
	大至急・至急・普通・LTF	発電係 村田

大 臣	主管 局長 (部) 長	主管局課名
政務次官	参事官	米 比
事務次官	課 長	起案 昭和 42 年 7 月 14 日
外務審議官	課長補佐	起案者 (消込) 電話番号 (445)
官 房 長		

協議先

在 米 下田 大使 総領事あて 三本 大臣 発 臨時代理

電 在 大 使 総領事あて 臨時代理

件名 沖縄、小笠原問題

本件は、本大臣は 15 日午前 ジョーンズ大使と  
限致し、わが方考え方を申入れたいと申し渡す。  
14 日夕刻 北米局長より 同大使に好し、電  
表を 1 通し、同電表のうち、具体的提案に因  
りて 2 項以下を  
可成り別電第 1190 号のとす。

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(※印欄内は電信課記入)

(昭和四〇・四一改正)

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なお、電表の第 2 項は日本政府が送來から  
本問題と日本友好関係の枠の中で解決するとの  
方針を対処してまいり、及び 最近の諸情勢にも  
かんがみ、その解決のため 技術的な検討を  
開始する必要があると認めらるゝこととす。  
その結果、電表全文及びその準備のため 省内外  
検閲用に作成した文表は、19 日 発 パリで 送  
る。

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外務省

(回覧番号) 外務省電信案 (分類)

特秘・極秘・秘・平文・館長符号 (朱印)	※ 暗 略 平 ※ 第 <del>1180</del> 号 ※ 大至急・至急・普通・LTF	※ 総第 030777 号 ※ 昭和 年 月 日 時 分 発 1967 JUL 14 21.34 ※ 発電係
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夫 閣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 官房長	主管 局(部)長 参事官 課長 課長補佐	主管局課名 北 起案・昭和 42 年 7 月 14 日 起案者 (波) (445)
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協議先

在 米 下田 大使  
総領事あて 日本大臣 発  
臨時代理

電 在 大使  
報 総領事あて  
臨時代理

件名  
沖縄、小笠原内閣

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(※印欄内は電價課記入)

(昭和四〇・四一改正)

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3. After giving a most serious consideration to the situations described above, the Japanese Government is now convinced that our two Governments should begin to explore means of solution to the problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara on the basis of their common interest in the maintenance of peace and security in the Far Eastern region, and for the purpose of maintaining and further developing friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries. The following are the proposals of the Japanese Government for this purpose.

(1) As regards Okinawa:

- (A) To examine possible means which could provide for accommodation between the national desire of the Japanese for the return of the administrative right over Okinawa and the military role which Okinawa should play:

The basic attitude of the Japanese Government on the problem of Okinawa is, as stated above, to make necessary adjustments between the desire of the Japanese people for its restoration and the military role it plays. When this is logically carried a little further, it would mean to search for a formula which enables the restoration of the administration to Japan while arranging for continued existence of military bases of the United States in Okinawa.

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From this point of view, our two Governments should examine (i) strategic role of Okinawa and requirements of military facilities therein in the light of the present and future security needs of the region, and (ii) problems which may arise from the application of the Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement to Okinawa.

- (B) To make further improvements on more immediate problems:

Parallel with the examination of means of the restoration of the administrative right, our two Governments should confirm as their common policy, for the purpose of preventing legal, administrative as well as social and economic difficulties which might arise at the time of the reversion, to make further progress in a well-planned and systematic manner in such areas as (i) identification of Okinawa with Japan proper, (ii) expansion of autonomy of the Okinawa residents, (iii) improvement of the administrative abilities of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and (iv) elimination of gaps which exist in economic and social standards between Okinawa and Japan proper.

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For the effective implementation of this policy, greater contribution by the Japanese Government to the administration of Okinawa within the bounds of the administrative right of the United States would be necessary and desirable. With this in mind, the two Governments should examine and implement appropriate measures whereby the Japanese Government will be able to render more positive contribution to the administration of Okinawa by, for example, giving advice and assistance to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands in its legislative and administrative functions.

Further efforts should also be made to minimize sources of friction between the United States forces and the Okinawan residents.

(2) As regards Ogasawara:

To reach an understanding that the administration over Ogasawara be returned to Japan, and to make necessary arrangements for this end:

In view of the seemingly limited military significance of Ogasawara, it is difficult for the Japanese side to understand the reason why the United States should retain the administrative right on Ogasawara. Moreover, as there

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is a fact that a part of the former residents who have the Caucasian origin were allowed to return to the islands soon after the war, it is extremely difficult to persuade the Japanese people to accept the continuation of the present situation concerning the problems of the return of the former residents to the islands or of the restoration of the administration to Japan.

If it is possible to have the former residents return to the islands, it would of course be welcome. However, as it might give rise to troublesome problems in relation to the administration over these residents, it is more pertinent to take another step forward so as to agree to an early restoration of the administration to Japan, and make necessary arrangements for it, including the examination of the United States military facilities to be continued on Ogasawara.

The return of the administrative right over Ogasawara would be a concrete proof of good faith of the United States and would strengthen the belief on the part of the Japanese that it will be possible to solve the problem of Okinawa also within the context of the relationship of mutual trust between Japan and the United States.

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4. The problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara is one of the security of Japan and of peace and security in the Far East. We should not, therefore, let it disturb cooperation and friendly relations between our two countries; neither should seeds for difficulties be left for the future because of hasty decisions. One cannot, however, help feeling that problems relating to Okinawa and Ogasawara have been left to a force of habit of twenty years during which these island groups have been under the administration of the United States. While fully recognizing the difficulties involved in the attempt to solve this problem, the Japanese Government is of the view that to neglect the solution of this problem because of such difficulties would make its solution in future all the more difficult.

The Japanese Government is convinced that the time has come for our two countries to squarely face the Okinawa and Ogasawara issue in the interest of everlasting stability and prosperity in the Far Eastern region. It is hoped from this point of view that the United States will fully examine the above proposals.

Tokyo, July 15, 1967.