

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

沖縄関係21 返還交渉前史（対米・対内）

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会談打金用資料(寛青果等)

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沖縄、小笠原に関する対米話
合いの進め方について

昭和42 7.8
北米局長

1. 沖縄、小笠原問題については、米政府におい
ても日本政府と内々に実質的な協議を行ないた
いとの気運にあると認められるので、今後の覚
書の趣旨で大臣よりこれを米大使に提起され
ば、米側はその態度を9月の大臣訪米、あるい
は11月の総理訪米まで保留することなく、む
しろそれらの機会への準備として覚書に含ま
れた諸点につき早々に実質的な、かつ、非公式な
話し合いに応ずることも予想しうるので、わが方
においても今後の対米話し合いに臨むわが方の腹
案を用意し置く必要がある。
2. 沖縄の施政権返還の方法の探求（覚書3(1)(イ)
）についての問題の中心は返還後存続すべき米軍
基地の地位であるが、この問題についてはまず
軍事的見地から沖縄の基地には本土の基地以上
にぎりぎりいかなる「自由」を認める必要あり

やを究明するとともに、核配備及び戦闘作戦行
動の許容につきわが方がどこまで譲りうるやを
検討し、その間に妥協点を見出しうるや否やの
問題である。仮りに米側がこれらの点につき完
全な「自由」に固執する場合は、返還問題の見
通しは容易に立て難いが、より柔軟性ある態度
にててくることも予想しうるので、その場合に
はわが方としては(1)米側に許容すべき「自由」
の範囲、(2)わが方の負担すべき防衛責任の範囲
等につき重大な決断を要することとなる次第で
ある。

よつて、米側と話し合いを行なうに当つてはこ
の間の事情をわが国の防衛姿勢の問題として総
理に十分認識願うとともに、早い段階において
防衛庁最高当局を話し合いの実質に加えかく必要
がある。

3. 沖縄に関する当面の対処策（覚書3(1)(イ)）に
ついては、話し合いを進めるに当つて従来どおり
総理府特遣局と密接に連絡協議するものとし、
またその進捗に応じ総理府を中心として関係各

省に広く協力を求める必要がある。本省としては、特に南支事務所の強化と経済財政政策の分野における日本政府の実質的参画に重点をおくべきものとする。

4. 小笠原(覚書3(2))に関しても、前記2と並行して適当な段階で防衛庁と連絡協議する必要がある。

5. 米側と実質的話し合いを行なうに当つては、その機密保持に特に留意する必要あり、これが新聞種となつては政府としても話し合いの途上動きのとれぬ被目に追込まれることともなるので、関係各省庁に対する連絡に当つては機密保持につき慎重な取扱いが必要である。

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沖縄、小笠原問題に関する
大臣、米大使会議のため先
方に手交すべき覚書

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1. サン・フランシスコ平和会議以来、わが国は一貫して沖縄、小笠原問題は日米友好関係の枠内で解決しうる問題であることを内外に明らかにしてきた。吉田総理は、平和条約調印後、1951年10月の国会において、「国民諸君が冷静に事態に対処して米國政府の善意に信頼をおかれ、これら諸島の地位に関する日米兩國の協定の結果を待たれるよう希望いたします。」と述べてあり、爾來歴代内閣は、沖縄、小笠原の日本及び極東の平和と安全のため果している役割りを強調し、返還を要望する国民に対し、米國の善意に信頼して時期の到るのを待つよう願ってきたのである。

1963年1月の佐藤総理、ジョンソン大統領
領会議の共同声明は、沖縄、小笠原の施政権返
還問題に関し、「総理大臣はこれら諸島の施政

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権ができるだけ早い機会に日本に返還されるよ
うにとの願望を表明し、さらに琉球諸島の住民
の自治の拡大及び福祉の一層の向上に対し深い
関心を表明した。大統領は施政権返還に対する
日本政府及び国民の願望に対して理解を示し、
極東における自由世界の安全保障上の利益がこ
の願望の実現を許す日を得望していると述べた。
]としている。沖縄、小笠原問題に関する今日ま
での日米両政府の態度はこの共同声明に示され
たとおりであるので、佐藤総理は、種々の機会
に、「沖縄、小笠原は日本の領土であり、住民
は日本国民である。これが20年以上にわたり
外国の施政下にあることははなはだ不自然であ
り、その返還は日本国民の熱望である。同時に
政府は沖縄、小笠原が日本を含む極東の平和と
安全に果している役割りを認識し、これを念頭
におきつつ、日本国民の願望と沖縄、小笠原に
対する軍事的要請とをいかに調整して行くか
について米國と密接に協議し、この困難な問
解決に努力する。」ものなる趣旨を説いて
るのである。

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2 沖縄、小笠原問題は夙に日本国内における反
政府勢力の政府攻撃材料であつたが、最近一兩
年はこの問題は広く国内各方面の関心を集める
ところとなり、既往のごとく単に反政府方面か
ら全面返還と基地撤去を呼号するのみにとどま
らず、若干の与党関係者を含む各界より、いわ
ゆる施政権の機能別返還、地域別返還、ある
いはさらに基地付全面返還等の意見が聞取られ
るに至つた。

このような傾向は、1960年の安保条約改
訂後日米兩國間の大きな問題は逐次解決し、沖
縄、小笠原問題のみが残つて次第に前面に現わ
れてきた事情もあるが、基本的には日本の領土
及び国民の一部があたかも半永久的に外国の施
政下におかれているという事実に発するところ
である。近年日本国民の国民的意識の伸張する
べきものあり、これに伴い自國の領土及び国民
が20年以上の長きにわたつて外国の施政権下
におかれている状態を放置すべきにあらずとの
主張は、日本国民にとりその政治的立場のいか

んに拘わらず広く支持されることとなつてきた。殊に沖縄、小笠原問題をめぐる論議は、安保条約のいわゆる1970年問題とも関連して今後ますます活発化することが予想せられ、かかる動向を放置すれば、日米関係を離間せんとする勢力の利用するところともなるおそれあり、日米両政府間の率直な協議を通じこの問題の打開を図ることが急務となつてきている。

他方沖縄においても施政権返還問題が逐次激化し、これに伴い沖縄において与野党間の分極化の傾向が強まりつつあり、米側の施政権実施も漸次複雑の度を加えているやに観察され、このまま推移すればやがて基地の運用にもと角の支障をきたすおそれなしとみられる。

3. 日本政府としては、以上の情勢を真摯に考慮した上、日米両国政府は日米友好協力関係の維持発展の見地から、また極東地域における平和と安全の確保のための共通の利益の上に立つて、沖縄、小笠原問題の解決の方途を探索すべき時期に当面していると信じ、下記のように提案す

るものである。

(1) 沖縄について

- (a) 沖縄の果すべき軍事的役割りと施政権返還の国民的願望を調整する方途を見出すより検討を進めること。

沖縄問題に対するわが方の基本的態度は、既述のごとく、沖縄の果している軍事的役割りと返還に対する日本国民の願望を調整することにある。この立場を論理的に一步進めれば、沖縄には米軍基地を存続せしめつつ施政権を返還する方途を探索することとなる。

この見地より、(1)極東地域の現在及び将来の安全保障上の要請にかんがみて沖縄の果すべき戦略的役割り及び沖縄所在の軍事施設の要件、(2)安保条約及び地位協定の沖縄への適用上生ずべき問題等につき日米間に検討を進めることとする。

- (b) 沖縄に関する当面の諸問題の改善を図ること。

日米^①両政府は、施政権返還の方途の検討と並行し、返還実現の場合の法制上、行政上、あるいはまた社会的、経済的の支障をきたさないよう、(1)本土との一体化、(2)自治権の拡大、(3)琉球政府の強化、(4)本土との経済的、社会的格差の是正を計画的、かつ、組織的に推進することを両国共通の政策として確立すべきである。この政策を推進するためには、米国の施政権の枠内において日本政府が沖縄の施政により大きな貢献をすることが必要であり、また望ましいと思われる。

この見地から両国政府は、日本政府がたとえば琉球政府の立法及び行政機能について助言と援助を与える等、沖縄施政に対しより積極的に貢献することを可能とするため、^②適当な措置を検討し実施する。

なお、米国軍隊と沖縄住民の間の摩擦の原因を最少限にするため、さらに一設

の努力を払う。

(2) 小笠原について

小笠原の施政権を返還することとし所要の措置をとること。

小笠原の果している軍事的役割りが限られているやにみられることにかんがみ、米国の小笠原の施政権を保持し続けなければならない理由は容易に理解し難いところである。さらに米側が戦争直後西欧系住民のみに帰島を許したという事実もあり、小笠原の帰島ないし返還の問題について現状のまま推移することを日本の国民に納得の行くよう説明することはきわめて困難である。帰島実現はもとより歓迎するところであるが、帰島に伴い住民に対する施政について煩瑣な問題が生起することも予想されるので、この際一歩を進めて早急に施政権を返還することとし、小笠原に存続すべき米軍施設の問題を含め、所要の措置を進めることとするのが時宜に達している。

小笠原の施政権返還は、米国の善意の具体的な証明となり、沖縄の問題をも日米相互信頼関係の枠の中で解決しうるとの日本国民の信念を強化するに役立つであろう。

4 沖縄、小笠原の問題は、日本の安全保障の問題であり、極東における平和と安全の問題である。従つてこの問題のために日米友好協力関係が阻害されることがないよう努めるべきであるが、一方、軽率な決定の故に将来に禍根を残すような誤りを犯すべきでないことももちろんである。しかしながら、沖縄、小笠原が米国の施政下に入つてより20年を経過し、これが諸島に関する問題が20年の情性に流されて動いていくことが多いとの感を醸じえないのである。日本政府としてはこの問題解決の至大な困難性を十分認識しているものであるが、その困難性の故にこの問題の解決への努力を怠ることはかえつて将来その解決をより困難ならしめるものと考えらる。われわれは今や将来にわたり極東地域の安定と繁栄を図るためにも、日米両国が、

沖縄、小笠原問題に正面から取り組むべき時期が訪れていると信ずるものであり、この見地より以上の提案に対し米側において十分検討を加えられることを期待する。

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1. Ever since the San Francisco Peace Conference, the Japanese Government has been consistent in maintaining domestically and internationally that the problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara can be solved within the context of friendly relationship between Japan and the United States. Immediately after the signing of the Peace Treaty, Prime Minister Yoshida stated at the Diet in October 1951: "It is my hope that all of my fellow countrymen will meet the situation calmly, place your faith in the good intentions of the United States Government and look forward to an eventual solution by agreement between Japan and the United States on the status of these islands." Subsequent cabinets have urged the Japanese people, in the face of their demand for the return of these islands, to trust the good intentions of the United States and wait for a ripe opportunity, emphasizing the role Okinawa and Ogasawara play for peace and security in the Far East including Japan.

The Joint Communique issued by Prime Minister Sato and President Johnson at their talks in January 1965 contains the following passage as regards the question of reversion of the administrative right over Okinawa and Ogasawara:

"The

"The Prime Minister expressed the desire that the administrative control over these islands will be restored to Japan as soon as feasible and also a deep interest in the expansion of the autonomy of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus and in further promoting their welfare. Appreciating the desire of the government and people of Japan for the restoration of administration to Japan, the President stated that he looks forward to the day when the security interests of the free world in the Far East will permit the realization of this desire."

This passage well reflects the basic positions of our two governments on the problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara which they have maintained up to the present. Hence, Prime Minister Sato has been stating in effect on various occasions:

"Okinawa and Ogasawara are territories of Japan and their residents are Japanese nationals. It is indeed unnatural that they have been placed under the administration of a foreign country for more than twenty years, and it is an ardent desire of the Japanese people that they be returned to Japan. At the same time, the Government recognizes the role which Okinawa and Ogasawara are playing for peace and security in the Far East including Japan. While keeping this in mind, the Government will consult closely with the United States on how to adjust the desire of the Japanese people and military requirements for these islands, and will

make

make its efforts for the solution of this difficult problem."

2. The problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara has long been used as ammunition to attack the Government by the opposition forces. In the past year or so, however, it has come to draw broader attention from other circles in Japan. These days, not only the cry for total reversion and removal of military bases is raised from the opposition forces, but a number of other views have been expressed from various quarters in Japan including some members of the government party in the form of such ideas as the so-called functional reversion, reversion on the basis of regional separation of bases and other areas, or total reversion while retaining the existing military bases.

These developments result partly from the fact that major problems between Japan and the United States have been gradually solved after the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960, and the problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara has come to the fore as the only remaining issue in the eyes of the public. More fundamentally, however, they are derived from the fact that a part of the territory and people of Japan has been placed under the administration of a foreign country as if on a semipermanent basis. As the Japanese people have regained to a great extent their national consciousness

consciousness in recent years, they have come to support strongly regardless of their political affiliations the assertion that they should not neglect the situation where a part of their territory and fellow countrymen has been placed under the administration of a foreign country for more than twenty years. Particularly, in connection with the so-called 1970 problem of the Security Treaty, discussions on the problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara are expected to grow much intensified in years to come. If such a trend is left to take its own course, it might increasingly be exploited by forces which try to sow discord between Japan and the United States. For these reasons, the Japanese Government considers it opportune that our two governments attempt to find a solution to this problem through frank consultations between themselves.

In the meantime, reversion movements have been intensified in Okinawa, and the trend of polarization between the government party and the opposition in Okinawa has seemingly been strengthened. It appears in these circumstances that the United States authorities might gradually face complications in the exercise of their administrative powers, and in case the present trend continues, it is not inconceivable that the operation of bases itself might some day face inconveniences.

3. After giving a most serious consideration to the situations described above, the Japanese Government is now convinced that our two Governments should begin to explore means of solution to the problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara on the basis of their common interest in the maintenance of peace and security in the Far Eastern region, and for the purpose of maintaining and further developing friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries. The following are the proposals of the Japanese Government for this purpose.

(1) As regards Okinawa:

(A) To examine possible means which could provide for accommodation between the national desire of the Japanese for the return of the administrative right over Okinawa and the military role which Okinawa should play:

The basic attitude of the Japanese Government on the problem of Okinawa is, as stated above, to make necessary adjustments between the desire of the Japanese people for its restoration and the military role it plays. When this is logically carried a little further, it would mean to search for a formula which enables the restoration of the administration to Japan while arranging for continued existence of military bases of the United States in Okinawa.

From

From this point of view, our two Governments should examine (i) strategic role of Okinawa and requirements of military facilities therein in the light of the present and future security needs of the region, and (ii) problems which may arise from the application of the Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement to Okinawa.

(B) To make further improvements on more immediate problems:

Parallel with the examination of means of the restoration of the administrative right, our two Governments should confirm as their common policy, for the purpose of preventing legal, administrative as well as social and economic difficulties which might arise at the time of the reversion, to make further progress in a well-planned and systematic manner in such areas as (i) identification of Okinawa with Japan proper, (ii) expansion of autonomy of the Okinawa residents, (iii) improvement of the administrative abilities of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and (iv) elimination of gaps which exist in economic and social standards between Okinawa and Japan proper.

For

For the effective implementation of this policy, greater contribution by the Japanese Government to the administration of Okinawa within the bounds of the administrative right of the United States would be necessary and desirable. With this in mind, the two Governments should examine and implement appropriate measures whereby the Japanese Government will be able to render more positive contribution to the administration of Okinawa by, for example, giving advice and assistance to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands in its legislative and administrative functions.

Further efforts should also be made to minimize sources of friction between the United States forces and the Okinawan residents.

(2) As regards Ogasawara:

To reach an understanding that the administration over Ogasawara be returned to Japan, and to make necessary arrangements for this end:

In view of the seemingly limited military significance of Ogasawara, it is difficult for the Japanese side to understand the reason why the United States should retain the administrative right on Ogasawara. Moreover, as there is a fact that a part of the former residents who have the Caucasian origin

origin were allowed to return to the islands soon after the war, it is extremely difficult to persuade the Japanese people to accept the continuation of the present situation concerning the problems of the return of the former residents to the islands or of the restoration of the administration to Japan.

If it is possible to have the former residents return to the islands, it would of course be welcome. However, as it might give rise to troublesome problems in relation to the administration over these residents, it is more pertinent to take another step forward so as to agree to an early restoration of the administration to Japan, and make necessary arrangements for it, including the examination of the United States military facilities to be continued on Ogasawara.

The return of the administrative right over Ogasawara would be a concrete proof of good faith of the United States and would strengthen the belief on the part of the Japanese that it will be possible to solve the problem of Okinawa also within the context of the relationship of mutual trust between Japan and the United States.

4. The problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara is one of the security of Japan and of peace and security in the Far East.

We

We should not, therefore, let it disturb cooperation and friendly relations between our two countries; neither should seeds for difficulties be left for the future because of hasty decisions. One cannot, however, help feeling that problems relating to Okinawa and Ogasawara have been left to a force of habit of twenty years during which these island groups have been under the administration of the United States. While fully recognizing the difficulties involved in the attempt to solve this problem, the Japanese Government is of the view that to neglect the solution of this problem because of such difficulties would make its solution in future all the more difficult.

The Japanese Government is convinced that the time has come for our two countries to squarely face the Okinawa and Ogasawara issue in the interest of everlasting stability and prosperity in the Far Eastern region. It is hoped from this point of view that the United States will fully examine the above proposals.

Tokyo, July 15, 1967.

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AIDE-MEMOIRE

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make its efforts for the solution of this difficult problem."

2. The problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara has long been used as ammunition to attack the Government by the opposition forces. In the past year or so, however, it has come to draw broader attention from other circles in Japan. These days, not only the cry for total reversion and removal of military bases is raised from the opposition forces, but a number of other views have been expressed from various quarters in Japan including some members of the government party in the form of such ideas as the so-called functional reversion, reversion on the basis of regional separation of bases and other areas, or total reversion while retaining the existing military bases.

These developments result partly from the fact that major problems between Japan and the United States have been gradually solved after the revision of the Security Treaty in 1960, and the problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara has come to the fore as the only remaining issue in the eyes of the public. More fundamentally, however, they are derived from the fact that a part of the territory and people of Japan has been placed under the administration of a foreign country as if on a semipermanent basis. As the Japanese people have regained to a great extent their national

consciousness

consciousness in recent years, they have come to support strongly regardless of their political affiliations the assertion that they should not neglect the situation where a part of their territory and fellow countrymen has been placed under the administration of a foreign country for more than twenty years. Particularly, in connection with the so-called 1970 problem of the Security Treaty, discussions on the problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara are expected to grow much intensified in years to come. If such a trend is left to take its own course, it might increasingly be exploited by forces which try to sow discord between Japan and the United States. For these reasons, the Japanese Government considers it opportune that our two governments attempt to find a solution to this problem through frank consultations between themselves.

In the meantime, reversion movements have been intensified in Okinawa, and the trend of polarization between the government party and the opposition in Okinawa has seemingly been strengthened. It appears in these circumstances that the United States authorities might gradually face complications in the exercise of their administrative powers, and in case the present trend continues, it is not inconceivable that the operation of bases itself might some day face inconveniences.

3. After giving a most serious consideration to the situations described above, the Japanese Government is now convinced that our two Governments should begin to explore means of solution to the problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara on the basis of their common interest in the maintenance of peace and security in the Far Eastern region, and for the purpose of maintaining and further developing friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries. The following are the proposals of the Japanese Government for this purpose.

(1) As regards Okinawa:

- (A) To examine possible means which could provide for accommodation between the national desire of the Japanese for the return of the administrative right over Okinawa and the military role which Okinawa should play:

The basic attitude of the Japanese Government on the problem of Okinawa is, as stated above, to make necessary adjustments between the desire of the Japanese people for its restoration and the military role it plays. When this is logically carried a little further, it would mean to search for a formula which enables the restoration of the administration to Japan while arranging for continued existence of military bases of the United States in Okinawa.

From this point of view, our two Governments should examine (i) strategic role of Okinawa and requirements of military facilities therein in the light of the present and future security needs of the region, and (ii) problems which may arise from the application of the Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement to Okinawa.

(B) To make further improvements on more immediate problems:

Parallel with the examination of means of the restoration of the administrative right, our two Governments should confirm as their common policy, for the purpose of preventing legal, administrative as well as social and economic difficulties which might arise at the time of the reversion, to make further progress in a well-planned and systematic manner in such areas as (i) identification of Okinawa with Japan proper, (ii) expansion of autonomy of the Okinawa residents, (iii) improvement of the administrative abilities of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands and (iv) elimination of gaps which exist in economic and social standards between Okinawa and Japan proper.

For

For the effective implementation of this policy, greater contribution by the Japanese Government to the administration of Okinawa within the bounds of the administrative right of the United States would be necessary and desirable. With this in mind, the two Governments should examine and implement appropriate measures whereby the Japanese Government will be able to render more positive contribution to the administration of Okinawa by, for example, giving advice and assistance to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands in its legislative and administrative functions.

Further efforts should also be made to minimize sources of friction between the United States forces and the Okinawan residents.

(2) As regards Ogasawara:

To reach an understanding that the administration over Ogasawara be returned to Japan, and to make necessary arrangements for this end:

In view of the seemingly limited military significance of Ogasawara, it is difficult for the Japanese side to understand the reason why the United States should retain the administrative right on Ogasawara. Moreover, as there

is

is a fact that a part of the former residents who have the Caucasian origin were allowed to return to the islands soon after the war, it is extremely difficult to persuade the Japanese people to accept the continuation of the present situation concerning the problems of the return of the former residents to the islands or of the restoration of the administration to Japan.

If it is possible to have the former residents return to the islands, it would of course be welcome. However, as it might give rise to troublesome problems in relation to the administration over these residents, it is more pertinent to take another step forward as to agree to an early restoration of the administration to Japan, and make necessary arrangements for it, including the examination of the United States military facilities to be continued on Ogasawara.

The return of the administrative right over Ogasawara would be a concrete proof of good faith of the United States and would strengthen the belief on the part of the Japanese that it will be possible to solve the problem of Okinawa also within the context of the relationship of mutual trust between Japan and the United States.

A.

4. The problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara is one of the security of Japan and of peace and security in the Far East. We should not, therefore, let it disturb cooperation and friendly relations between our two countries; neither should seeds for difficulties be left for the future because of hasty decisions. One cannot, however, help feeling that problems relating to Okinawa and Ogasawara have been left to a force of habit of twenty years during which these island groups have been under the administration of the United States. While fully recognizing the difficulties involved in the attempt to solve this problem, the Japanese Government is of the view that to neglect the solution of this problem because of such difficulties would make its solution in future all the more difficult.

The Japanese Government is convinced that the time has come for our two countries to squarely face the Okinawa and Ogasawara issue in the interest of everlasting stability and prosperity in the Far Eastern region. It is hoped from this point of view that the United States will fully examine the above proposals.

Tokyo, July 15, 1967.

特

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

極秘

- 大政事外外官
- 務務房
- 次次
- 臣官官審審長
- 領審
- 旅營
- 參資
- 參北東
- 長中西
- 參保
- 參南
- 中住
- 參英
- 長西東
- 近
- 次商国米ア
- 二カ
- 歐
- 統ラ
- 近
- 長
- 通ス
- 參經
- 賠償
- 政技
- 賠經
- 長
- 參規
- 國參軍社專
- 長政経科
- 參内
- 長道外
- 文文
- 長

總番号 (T A) 22720
 67年07月14日20時00分 7シト 主管
 67年07月15日09時16分 本省 着 北米局長

外務大臣殿 下田(大使)臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ問題

第1862号 暗 特秘 至急
 貴電米北第1189号及び第1190号に関し
 1. 往電第1849号は、冒頭貴電と行き違いとなりたる
 ところ、同往電にて意見具申の趣旨にもかんがみ、貴電御来示
 の措置は極めて時きを得たものと存せられる。
 2. 14日ペンデイー次官補に電話をもつて明15日オキナ
 ワ。オカサワラ問題に関し貴大臣よりジョンソン大使に覚書
 手交の運びとなるべき旨とりあえず内報すると共に、これに
 対する米側コメントは当地にてもおうかがいすべきも、東京
 で覚書が提出された以上、本件に関する主たる会談地は東京
 とするのが本国政府の意向と推察する旨述べた。
 3. その際ペンデイーは、往電第1807号1. 末段の日本
 側への御連絡は、ミキ大臣のモスコへの御出発が迫りおる
 ことでもあり、御出発前に東京においてジョンソン大使を通
 じて行いうる様目下準備中なる旨連絡があつた。

丁場

ぐる四つの海峡が、日本海に面する開港の海軍、現況にはソ連の海軍にだけ通航を許すといふが、これは、対内的にも対外的にも日本を無防備のままにしておき、近隣の強い力の犠牲にしようとする意向が明瞭に暴露されておる、と反駁されておるのであります。(拍手) 條約において、わが主権に何らの拘束を加えておりません。従つて、日本がみずからの軍備を持つ道が平和條約でとぎれておらないのであります。現況日本としては、近代の軍備に必要な陸海軍を欠いておる、再軍備のためはの上預備をいたすことは、國民の附え得るところではないのであります。さらに、今日の日本は、いまだ敵軍の捕手からいえず、軍備主義、國家主義の再現への警戒は、いままなおつておるではありません。かかる事柄を前にして、ソビエト全權がわが国における軍國主義復活云々というのは、まことに根拠なき宣伝であります。(拍手)

また日本安全保障條約は、平和條約と同日に署名されて、これによつて独立回復後の日本の安全について一応の保障を得るに至つたのであります。国内の治安は自力をもつて當るべきは当然であり、外部からの侵襲の安全保障の道として、平和條約と

の集團安全保障、すなわちこの際には日本條約による安全保障以外に方法はな

外、連合國の好意と理解にたえるゆ

取除き得、諸君が理解と寛大と懇情

昭和二十六年十月十二日 衆議院會議録第三号 吉田首相大臣の演説