

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

## 米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 日米琉諮問委員会 (代表会合第121回～140回) (7)

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米一三一回

総理府 5

ソカヒ 万博

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

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総番号(TA) 31022 主管  
69年7月18日5時41分 ナハ 着  
69年7月18日8時47分 本省 着 米北1

外務大臣殿 高瀬 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

諮問委員会(連)

オ56号 平(秘扱)

18日、オ12/国会令。

1. 教育および社会福祉各小委員会は、今後、勧告として取上げが可能と目される事項につき目下検討中であるが、ショットより、同リスト提出を8月12日を目途とするにつき発言があり、これを了承した。
2. 経済小委員会より、長期経済開発計画に關しアドコムのみすべき役割についてのレポートが本委員会に上程され、各代表これを検討することに合意を見た。

秘

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電信写

(改訂文別途送)

3. ショットより、往電オ52号の2を要請した沖縄工業開発計画基礎調査報告書の入手につき本使の助力を望むて要請したので、本件至急お手配請う。

(3)

秘

アメリカ局長  
参事官  
北米第一課長

公信第 49 号

昭和44年7月18日

外務大臣  
愛知揆一殿

日米琉諮問委員会日本国政府代表  
高瀬侍郎

長期経済開発計画に関し、諮問委員会の果す  
べき役割、と題するレポートの送付について。

往電オ56号をもちつて報告申上げた標記

レポートを部別添のとおりに送付するから仰査

収めたい。

付属添付

本信写送付先 総理府総務長官

要処理  
首席参事官  
南一  
渉外(査)  
漁業  
航空  
科学協力  
連絡調整  
調査  
カナダ  
局庶務



日 本 政 府

17 July 1969

TO: Advisory Committee  
FROM: Economic Subcommittee (SC)  
SUBJECT: A Long Range Economic Plan; Role of AdCom

### 1. Introduction

The subcommittee has given extensive thought to the dual subject of this initial report to the AdCom. The conclusions and thoughts which we have compiled for this report reflect the contributions of each of the elements of the Advisory Committee. The subcommittee concurs unanimously in the report as submitted.

In this report we have not only suggested a role for the Advisory Committee to play in developing the much discussed "long range plan," but have formulated some general principles concerning the preparation of the plan. In some instances the guiding principles delineated here are at variance, significantly, with ideas currently prevailing in interested circles outside of the AdCom. However, rather than being deterred by this situation, we are moved to emphasize these differences all the more. They highlight the pressing need for the AdCom to exercise its potentially constructive role in coordination and guidance. Primarily because of these differences the AdCom is in a position to make an immediate and significant contribution to the thinking and the discussion underway regarding the prospective long range plan.

We wish to draw particular attention to the fact that the principles alluded to in the foregoing paragraph are those concerned with preparation of the plan itself. They are not the "principles for the future economy" as suggested by the AdCom a short while ago, ideas on which to conceptualize the image of the future economy. We do not yet have sufficient information to develop, with any justified confidence, meaningful guidelines of that kind. We carefully considered the information available to us and concluded, unanimously and without reservation, that the approach which we have suggested in this report is an essential prerequisite to development of the set of "basic principles" earlier discussed by the AdCom. Those principles will be developed in due course, hopefully very soon, and very likely as a direct result of the ideas set forth herein. The pooling of minds and the focus of authority and effort which we suggest in this report is an important step in the desired direction.

If the AdCom, upon review of the report, concurs in the principles set forth as well as the proposed course of action of the economic subcommittee, the subcommittee is prepared to move forward accordingly as rapidly as circumstances will permit. In so doing, we fully expect to encounter perhaps considerable difficulty. The initial moves may well be critical to our ultimate success. Therefore, the subcommittee requests some guidance from the Advisory Committee as to the actual procedures or tactics which should be followed, for maximum effectiveness, in implementing the proposed course of action, i.e., in establishing the contacts and relationships which we recommend.

### 2. Guiding Principles

Our observations and discussions, both within the subcommittee and in business and government circles outside of the AdCom, lead us to the following conclusions:

#### 2.1 That a more positive note should be taken regarding the economic impact of reversion.

We do not suggest promotion of a false sense of euphoria. However, we do believe that the unqualified pessimism apparently prevailing in the economic community is equally unwarranted. This pessimism, where it exists, is based on the premise that the economy will be severely affected (negatively and unavoidably) by the sudden heat of large scale, efficient mainland competition. We do not mean to minimize the potential impact of reversion. Some very significant adjustments will have to be made, adjustments requiring enlightened actions and motivations by the GRI, the local business community, and the GOJ and USG. If the necessary cooperation does materialize, however, the immediate and longer range impact of reversion, the negative aspects, can be mitigated considerably.

A more optimistic posture, by the GRI in particular, is especially called for vis-a-vis discussions with Japan (both government and private). The tune of "help the poor prefecture" is played with perhaps more intensity and consistency than necessary. We suggest that what is needed is more emphasis on "what Okinawa might do for Japan" and less on "what Japan should do for Okinawa," more emphasis on the opportunity than on the economic threat of reversion. While the GOJ unquestionably is the key factor in the future economic health of Okinawa, the prefecture need not be the economic liability so often suggested. Okinawa does offer some very definite, positive considerations for the Japanese Government and business community, and possibly for foreign investors. The economic planning and programming should lay heavy stress, therefore, on Okinawa as an economic asset; it should take the most optimistic, positive stance that reason and realism will allow. The primary characteristic of any burgeoning, healthy economy is the attitude of government and business regarding the future. Optimism in a developing as well as advanced economy feeds on itself, as does its debilitating counterpart.

2.2 That an action program needs to be developed for immediate implementation.

An economic plan in the traditional sense is a guide or map for policy makers to determine the future direction of the economy. This unquestionably is needed. The development of a comprehensive guide, incorporating numerous revisions and adjustments as circumstances require, is a long-term and continuing process.

The more immediate and pressing need, however, is for development of a conceptual framework on which an action program can be built. We (i.e., all those concerned with the problem) need to get into the nuts and bolts of what must be done (and when and how) if the viability of the economy is to be improved on. It is not sufficient to conclude that a particular local industry probably would not be competitive in a more open economy, or that the emphasis for the future, given some of the promising new possibilities, "should" be encouraged along a particular line under the plan. What is needed is a strategy for moving beyond these conclusions and recommendations--- an explicit definition of the institutions and procedures necessary to bring about the changes we seek. We need to identify not only the goals but the magnitude and source and specific composition of the necessary inputs. We need also to determine the feasibility of obtaining these inputs (e.g., US and GOJ policy changes and commitments, financial assistance, technical expertise, etc. The subcommittee already has developed some concrete ideas along this line).

Sufficient work has already been done to provide an adequate base for a crash development/adjustment program. While gaps still exist and will have to be filled in when specifically identified, there is already at hand a great body of information and analysis to be digested; e.g., the two DMJM reports, the work of the Economic Study Institute, the efforts of the "Young Economists," etc. If the optimism of the "Takase Plan" or vision is to be validated, as we believe it could be, the catalytic role of the entrepreneur (i.e., the GRI; see 2.3 below) must be exercised to mobilize the necessary effort and move the deliberations from the talking stage to concentration on immediate, pragmatic steps which can be taken to buoy the outlook for the economy and prepare it, pointedly, for the difficult period ahead.

2.3 That the primary focus of activity and responsibility must be with the GRI.

Regardless of the particular role to be played by the GRI in the top level negotiations on reversion between Japan and the US, there is no denying the fact that the administration and the local business community must and will be a key factor, if not THE key, in determining the nature and viability of the future economy. For any program to have an impact in the pre-reversion period it must be reflected in the policy decisions and the budgeting and other activities of the administration and local enterprise. It must have the full support of the GRI and the active participation of the local business community. A USCAR plan or a GOJ plan,

or even a tripartite effort by the AdCom, initiated and developed outside the GRI, would tend to be suspect and "foreign." To the extent that it is so regarded, it would lack the full local support needed for successful implementation.

It is in the interests of both the USG and the GOJ to have Okinawa move as far as possible toward a viable economy prior to reversion. This objective can best be realized, we believe, by explicitly conceding to the GRI the prime responsibility for preparation, with USCAR, GOJ and AdCom assistance as necessary, of a sound development program. Acknowledgment of this prime responsibility as lying with the GRI would facilitate the development of the overall framework by providing necessary cohesiveness to the efforts already underway in many quarters.

This is not to say that independent proposals and thinking on this subject by the USG and GOJ are to be terminated, only that such proposals should be consciously oriented toward and incorporated into the general conceptual framework being developed by the GRI. In assuming this prime responsibility the GRI would not be in conflict with other interested parties but rather would be responding positively to the urging of various GOJ officials and the local business community to show more initiative in developing a "vision" for the future and a program to realize it. Such a program, even in rough outline, would also provide a monitoring device for the GRI and a guide for AdCom in enlisting the required assistance of the GOJ and USG.

2.4 That the subcommittee should begin to work directly with GRI officials, as the situation permits, in identifying the economic problems and requirements generated by imminent reversion.

This aspect of our package of recommendations touches on a delicate and potentially very difficult matter, the relationship of the GRI to the AdCom. However, we are convinced that the timing and general situation at present are conducive to fruitful, direct contacts in the economic sphere between AdCom and the GRI. The tripartite nature and informal structure of the AdCom, reinforced by the high level decision which created it, offer a unique role to the Advisory Committee. The AdCom is in a position to help marshal the technical and financial assistance required (this is a latent usefulness of AdCom unnecessarily neglected by the GRI) and can be constructive, in a coordinating and guidance capacity, perhaps in a way that no other concerned party can be. As a first step, we would hope to sell to the GRI the substance of section two of this report.

Therefore, we suggest a more assertive role for the subcommittee, assertive in the sense of "more active" but not to the extent of impinging on the action areas of others working on relevant economic problems. This does not mean that we advocate abandoning our essentially advisory role in favor of an operational one. The latter role is not included in the parameters of the Advisory Committee's responsibility. We do, however, propose establishment of an effective working relationship with the GRI, a relationship in which we jointly strive to identify specific areas where outside

help is needed. Then a meaningful recommendation, including detailed specifics on the assistance required, could be channeled by the subcommittee through the Advisory Committee for appropriate USCAR or GOJ implementation.

Recommendations thus generated by the subcommittee can be extremely productive. By becoming more involved in the work we would thereby become more familiar with the existing problems and current developments. The AdCom's submissions to the High Commissioner on economic matters, while probably greater in number, would be more incisive and narrower in scope. In place of "a general study should be made of sector X or problem Y," we would hope to propose, with direct GRI cooperation and participation, more specific studies or actions with sharper focus, perhaps in certain instances with a general or even detailed scope of work. In our transmissions to the HICOM we would note the way in which that particular recommendation fits into the overall scheme of activities and would comment on the extent to which the basic preliminary work has been done. We would observe that the GRI is prepared to move as necessary and that the GOJ or USCAR is prepared to supply the required technical expertise or to contract as necessary to meet the demonstrated need.

The suggested AdCom/GRI relationship, if it can be realized, would permit the AdCom to make a truly constructive contribution. If the official function of the Advisory Committee is expanded as a result of the forthcoming November talks, the type of involvement we suggest for AdCom over the next few months will provide an excellent backdrop of experience. On the other hand, if the Committee's role is decreased or dissolved, as a result of the Nixon/Sato talks, the necessary basic work hopefully will have been completed for the benefit of AdCom's successor organization. Given the considerable efforts already underway in all quarters---GRI, Tokyo, USCAR, Washington---a responsible function for the AdCom in the economic sphere must be defined in the developing framework of activity. Otherwise, the subcommittee will be limiting its efforts to the simple movement of paper and maintenance of a continuing, internal discussion and monitoring of what is being done by others. More importantly, we shall have passed up the opportunity to exercise fully the unique and perhaps critical role ostensibly available to us.

2.5 That the period of the long-range plan/program should not exceed 5 years.

This time frame is somewhat in conflict with the GRI concept of a ten-year plan (in two stages). The subcommittee feels strongly that planning beyond 5 years is entirely unrealistic since there are too many variables (especially of a policy nature) to make such planning meaningful. To be meaningful even in the short run the program developed must fully reflect GRI and GOJ intentions regarding the future role of Okinawa. While the distant vision of the Okinawan economy, with desired long term goals and requirements, naturally must be developed to provide necessary perspective, the primary and immediate focus should be on the practical measures which can be implemented in the next 3-5 years.

More important than the period itself is the requirement for it to span, to overlap, the time of formal transfer of administrative rights.

Assuming this will occur within three years, this time period unquestionably is the critical period for establishing an effective development program. It is necessary to include at least two years after reversion in the plan if the recommendations and guides to be presented in it are to be accorded some degree of official acceptability by the GOJ. Taking the plans only to the point of reversion because of the uncertainties involved beyond that point would be too short a period to be effective. Furthermore, the idea of a post-reversion adjustment period already is pretty well accepted in many quarters. Therefore, we recommend conceptualization of a three stage program: three years pre-reversion and two years post-reversion, followed by a "normalization period" in which the majority of any special concessions granted to Okinawa will be terminated and the islands will receive subsequent assistance from the central government on the same basis as other "poorer prefectures" of Japan.

In the five year development/adjustment period contemplated, the GOJ and USCAR would be required to formally participate in the planning and implementation of the program, thus assuring to some extent at least the official concurrence and support of the GRI effort. The AdCom, or its successor, can play a key role in formalizing, through official recommendations approved by the HICOM, the carefully conceived requests by the GRI for USG and GOJ support.

2.6 That the action plan should be formalized much sooner than the June 1970 date now contemplated.

The GRI has frequently noted its intention to complete a long range plan in one year, by June 1970. With slippage, this completion date could well be pushed back. If reversion is actually to occur in three years, as conjecture would have it, the economy cannot afford to use a full 1/3 or 1/2 of that time in the planning phase of the program. The time available does not permit the luxury of a leisurely approach.

Initially the subcommittee was inclined to emphasize a planning period of no more than six months. After further deliberation we have concluded that even this would be too long. A draft of the proposed development/adjustment program should be available for review by all interested parties prior to the Nixon/Sato talks in November. The time is extremely short. But a rough outline in this time period is not beyond possibility if the necessary enthusiasm and responsible cooperation can be generated. This draft would be subject, of course, to further refinement and development after November. The tempo of events presumably will accelerate greatly after November and the inherent advantages of a substantive Okinawan input (both government and private) may be lost if the program is not substantially outlined by that time; vigorous actions by others simply will overtake the GRI, thus making the administration's efforts a meaningless academic exercise.

By July 1, 1970, the current target date of the GRI for completion of the planning phase, the program should be well into the implementation stage rather than at the point of being launched.

2.7 That the document should not be a highly sophisticated economic treatise but basically a simple guide for GRI policy makers.

The basic motivation for development of an economic plan is to provide a sense of direction, a sort of map, for the policy makers. It is not to give credence to the definition of economics "as common sense made difficult." The concept of planning involves choices, which means rejection as well as selection. These choices should be clearly defined on the basis of professional analysis, but the final result should be a working paper not for GRI economists and technicians but for GRI administrators--- in effect, a negotiating document for tripartite deliberation on the matter of specific technical, financial, and administrative/legislative assistance required in the period of the next 3-5 years.

There is always the temptation in preparing an economic plan to compile an esoteric document which provides a delightful professional exercise for the economists involved but which invariably holds little meaning for the policy makers for which it is, or should be, primarily intended. Experience shows that such plans are little used after completion, except perhaps as a proud decoration in a government or university bookshelf. If the economy is to be at a given level and structure at some specified time in the future, then certain essential steps must be defined and taken now to mobilize the necessary effort and allocate the required resources. These steps should be clearly laid out in the planning document. The document should be not only concise but in non-technical language which can be easily comprehended by policy makers.

2.8 That the plan should avoid a "building-block approach."

There is a tendency, already apparent in public discussions of the proposed plan, to regard the listing of potential projects as a "plan" in itself. A vague conception for implementing this listing somehow adds up to a "development program." If this not unusual pattern continues, a series of generalized goals will eventually be outlined which will tend to suffice as labeled receptacles for the set of projects. However, the projects themselves invariably will proceed toward implementation on the basis of normal economic forces rather than as a product of overt government assistance and guidance designed to expedite implementation on the basis of some desired order of priority. The normal working of market forces often is at a slower pace than sufficient, in time and substance, to meet the real requirements of accelerated development. Any sense of real planning through this "building-block approach" is minimal.

A truly fresh look should be taken at the potential of the Okinawan economy, fresh in the sense of the basic approach. Continued, long-term protection, even if it could be arranged under the forthcoming GOJ administration, is unrealistic, unwise, and uneconomic. The very difficult adjustments inherent in reversion should not be pushed into the indefinite future to gain a brief respite for the present. The real cost of that respite will be the loss of opportunity which now presents itself, the opportunity to

make the adjustment, inevitable anyway, while necessary resources are available (or could be made so) through the sympathetic attitude of the governments involved.

If we look only, or primarily, at the raw advantages and basic resources of Okinawa, the potential would appear to be quite limited. However, had Japan itself undergone a similar assessment some 25 or even 50 years ago, and oriented its economy accordingly, the main product of Japan today would probably still be rice. Therefore, we suggest an analysis not on where the economy could go but where the GRI and GOJ might want it to. What we are suggesting is an analysis in which existing GRI/GOJ policies, priorities, and procedures are taken not as immutable deterrents but rather regarded as policy variables. The explicit purpose of the analysis, taking all sectors into account, would be to identify those key changes and decisions which are necessary to realize latent potential in resources, geography, and experience---changes which are feasible in the light of major constraints such as limitations in the time available, competing claims on available resources, political realities, etc. The difficulties of this approach cannot be overemphasized. However, the potential rewards of success should be sufficient lure to justify an attempt to overcome the problems we anticipate.

3. Conclusion

The economic subcommittee has developed some thoughts regarding specific actions which could be taken and problem areas which should be analyzed; that is, we have developed some tentative conclusions as to where the economy could go and what steps are necessary to get it there. Our thinking, some of which is already in rough draft, at present extends into the areas of investment promotion, encouragement of exports, industrial productivity, and others. This thinking must be hardened and refined in the fires of critical discussion both internally and outside of AdCom. This is being done.

We recognize that there are numerous conflicting interests among the three governments and private enterprises involved. Perhaps in some instances these potential conflicts cannot be reconciled, at least in the time we have in which to work. However, we are unanimous in our belief that the effort must be attempted if the Advisory Committee is going to make a significant contribution, and if a useful program is to be developed in the time available and launched on the scale necessary to be effective. It is not so important that the subcommittee is correct in each of its assessments itemized in section 2 of this report. It is important, however, that the quarters responsible for preparing Okinawa for reversion begin to react to ideas of this kind. Even a strongly negative reaction to some particular point would give us something on which to work, a focus.



This in itself would be a net gain. AdCom could be an effective, if not critical, catalytic agent in moving the work forward.

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