

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

## 日米関係（沖縄返還）3

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日米関係委まで

(44.7.10 58.1)

米

倒

原

正  
字  
原

極 秘  
無 期 限  
2 部 の 内  
1 号

米 次  
自 主  
長

極 秘

共同 232=4 米側の提示

44.9.23

本考

記 録

22日午後オズボ-2公使 米印局長に  
来訪。 本考の訓令の基に趣意を以て

別添共同 232=4 米側案を提示  
すことには、 当方慣例に於て

11月任米訪米時の日米両方の合意は  
共同 232=4 の形にあり、 従って

その形に於て 他に 11月附属の  
合意文書は考慮されず 進めざる旨

述べらる。

本考「オズボ」は「オズボ」は

本件米案は日米両大臣と話し合  
ひの内容が十分加味されたり可。

日頃側にて不備と訂正と云ふ事  
心と思ふ中にて、率直に諒訓

1直可成るの余裕中存せし故  
兎井角日頃側に、率直に指示

可成るを、率直に指示、此旨  
述べる。

SECRET

Draft Communique

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the status of the Ryukyu Islands and agreed that the mutual security interests of the United States and Japan could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of administration of these islands to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments will enter immediately into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without detriment to the security of the area. Although determination of a final date for reversion will not be possible until negotiations are completed on the details, the two leaders agreed that every effort should be made to carry out the transfer of administrative rights in 1972.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that upon reversion of the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa. They were also of the view that the presence of US forces and their equipment in the Ryukyu Islands make a major contribution to the security of the Far East and to the defense of Japan. The Prime Minister stated that the United States would therefore be granted continued use of its current military facilities and areas in the Ryukyu Islands unless otherwise mutually agreed. The Prime Minister also agreed that it was in the interests of Japan that the deterrent capability of the US military forces on the islands should in no way be diminished by reversion.

In this connection, the President and the Prime Minister carefully reviewed the security situation in the Far East. The President and the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of both their Governments that the peace and security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without peace and security in the Far East and, consequently, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for both Governments. In their review of the security situation in the Far East, the President and the Prime Minister thoroughly considered possible threats to peace in the area. The Prime Minister stated that his Government fully recognizes the continuing obligations of Japan to facilitate the support of United Nations forces engaged in any United Nations actions in the Far East, which it assumed in the Exchange of Notes signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951 and reaffirmed in the Exchange of Notes signed at Washington on January 19, 1960. It was agreed that this

SECRET

obligation had particular relevance to the situation in the Republic of Korea where United Nations forces are still stationed. The Prime Minister also made clear the basic recognition of his Government that an armed attack against the Republic of Korea would seriously affect the security of Japan, and that on the basis of this recognition and the Exchange of Notes above referred to the GOJ will, under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, agree to the use by US armed forces of facilities and areas in Japan (including Okinawa Prefecture) to meet an armed attack against the Republic of Korea.

It was further agreed that threats to the peace which would require similar action by the two Governments could arise in other areas in the Far East, particularly in the area of Taiwan and in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister made clear the basic recognition of the Government of Japan that an armed attack on United States forces in the Far East or an armed attack in an area of the Far East which would require the United States to carry out its obligations for the protection of its own forces or the defense of countries in the area would also affect the security of Japan. Accordingly, this recognition forms the basis upon which the Government of Japan will agree, under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, to the use of facilities and areas in Japan (including Okinawa Prefecture) for military measures required to deal with such an attack.

The Prime Minister stated the intention of the Government of Japan following reversion gradually to assume the same responsibility for the immediate defense of what will then be the Prefecture of Okinawa as it has for the defense of other areas of Japan.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee should expand and deepen its consultative functions in regard to the defense situation in the Far East in order to assist both Governments in the discharge of their obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

The President and the Prime Minister also agreed that with the assumption by the Government of Japan of complete responsibility for the welfare of the people of the Ryukyu Islands and with restoration of full authority over the Ryukyu Islands to the Government of Japan, the Government of Japan will equitably compensate the United States for United States assets and expenditures in the Ryukyus according to formulas of valuation to be agreed upon.

Draft Communique

The President the Prime Minister reviewed the status of the Ryukyu Islands and agreed that the mutual security interests of the United States and Japan could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of administration of these islands to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments will enter immediately into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without detriment to the security of the area. Although determination of a final date for reversion will not be possible until negotiations are completed on the details, the two leaders agreed that every effort should be made to carry out the transfer of administrative rights in 1972.

The President the Prime Minister agreed that upon reversion of the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa. They were also of the view that the presence of US forces and their equipment in the Ryukyu Islands make a major contribution to the security of the Far East and to the defense of Japan. The Prime Minister stated that the United States would therefore be granted continued use of its current military facilities and areas in the Ryukyu Islands unless otherwise mutually agreed. The Prime Minister also agreed that it was in the interests of Japan that the deterrent capability of the US military forces on the islands should in no way be diminished by reversion.

In this connection, the President and the Prime Minister carefully reviewed the security situation in the Far East. The President and the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of both their Governments that the peace and security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without peace and security in the Far East and, consequently, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for both Governments. In their review of the security situation in the Far East, the President and the Prime Minister thoroughly considered possible threats to peace in the area. The Prime Minister stated that his Government fully recognizes the continuing obligations of Japan to facilitate the support of United Nations forces engaged in any United Nations actions in the Far East, which it assumed in the Exchange of Notes signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951 and reaffirmed in the Exchange of Notes signed at Washington on January 19, 1960. It was agreed that this



obligation had particular relevance to the situation in the Republic of Korea where United Nations forces are still stationed. The Prime Minister also made clear the basic recognition of his Government that an armed attack against the Republic of Korea would seriously affect the security of Japan, and that on the basis of this recognition and the Exchange of Notes above referred to the GOJ will, under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, agree to the use by US armed forces of facilities and areas in Japan (including Okinawa Prefecture) to meet an armed attack against the Republic of Korea.

It was further agreed that threats to the peace which would require similar action by the two Governments could arise in other areas in the Far East, particularly in the area of Taiwan and in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister made clear the basic recognition of the Government of Japan that an armed attack on United States forces in the Far East or an armed attack in an area of the Far East which would require the United States to carry out its obligations for the protection of its own forces or the defense of countries in the area would also affect the security of Japan. Accordingly, this recognition forms the basis upon which the Government of Japan will agree, under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, to the use of facilities and areas in Japan (including Okinawa Prefecture) for military measures required to deal with such an attack.

The Prime Minister stated the intention of the Government of Japan following reversion gradually to assume the same responsibility for the immediate defense of what will then be the Prefecture of Okinawa as it has for the defense of other areas of Japan.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee should expand and deepen its consultative functions in regard to the defense situation in the Far East in order to assist both Governments in the discharge of their obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

The President and the Prime Minister also agreed that with the assumption by the Government of Japan of complete responsibility for the welfare of the people of the Ryukyu Islands and with restoration of full authority over the Ryukyu Islands to the Government of Japan, the Government of Japan will equitably compensate the United States for United States assets and expenditures in the Ryukyus according to formulas of valuation to be agreed upon.

秘密表示 (朱印)

**極 秘**

無 期 禁 限

部の内  
号

館  
長  
印

此部935才行才取  
(27.735才取) 和

部数指示	発信用	執務用	備考
主 値	✓	11	2
付	✓	11	493
異			

発送日 昭和44年7月28日

処理日

発信 込 タイプ 校査

文書課長

公 信 案 (分類)

公 信 番 号	米IC1 第 1012 号	公 信 日 付	昭和 昭和44年7月24日
大 臣	主 管	起 案	昭和44年7月24日
政 務 次 官	下物白紙		
事 務 次 官	33 下		
外務審議官	朱一長	起案者	朱一長 電話番号443
外務審議官			
官 房 長			
協 議 先			
朱一長			
受 信 者	在 米 吉野臨時代理大使	発 信 者	愛知大臣
写 送 付 先		(希望 発送日)	月 日
件 名			
沖縄問題 (記録送付)			

GA-2

24 外務省 75

回覧番号

米北米1012<sup>0</sup>/<sub>3</sub>

昭和44年7月24日

在米大使殿

外務大臣

沖縄問題 (記録送付)

7月22日の松本公使のA440局長宛の  
に付した記録別添送付す。

付属添付

極 秘

無 期 限

内 務 省  
シ 号

写

7/24

米北第1012号

昭和44年7月24日

在 米 大 使 殿

外 務 大 臣

中 途 内 題 (記 録 送 付)

7月22日のオーストリア公使のアムド局長との  
10分間の記録を別添送付す。

付 属 添 付

極	秘
無	期 限
4 部 の 内	
4 号	

1- 総理  
2- 大蔵 > 大蔵 24/77  
3- 神  
4- 77/77

共同声明米側案要旨

昭和四四、七、二四

一 総理、大統領（以下「双方」という。）は、沖縄の返還に合意し、両国政府は詳細につき直ちに協議に入り、一九七二年中に返還を実現すべくあらゆる努力を払う。

二 返還後沖縄に安保条約が適用され、米軍施設区域は引き続き使用を許されることに双方合意した。総理は米軍とその装備の沖縄での存在は重要であり、その抑止力は甚かも減殺されるべきでないことに同意した。

三 極東の平和と安全をくして日本の平和と安全のありえないことに双方は合意し、総理は（）極東での国連軍の行動を支援する日本の義務（吉田・アチソン交換公文で負い、岸・ヘイター交換公文で確認したもの）は、特に在韓国連軍についてあてはまることを述べ、また（）韓国への武力攻撃に日本の安全に重大な危険を及ぼすことを認識し、安保条約の規定により米軍が対韓武力攻撃に対

処するため在日（沖繩を含む）施設区域を使用することに同意した。

四 極東の他の地域、特に台湾及び東南アジアで両国政府が（韓国に対する武力攻撃の場合と）同様に行動すべき脅威が存在するところが合意され、総理は（イ）極東地域にある米軍に対する攻撃、（ロ）及び右米軍または極東の同盟国に対する米国の防衛義務を発動しななければならぬという攻撃は、日本の安全に影響を及ぼすとの基本的認識を言明し、右認識は日本政府が安保条約のもとに在日（沖繩を含む）施設区域を右攻撃対処のための軍事措置に使用することに同意する基礎となる。

五 総理は、日本政府が沖繩県防衛の責務を逐次負うつもりなるとを述べ、双方は日米安全保障協議委員会（協機）の拡大強化、及び返還後日本政府が米国の在琉資産及び支出につき適正に対米補償することに合意した。

2470 4

極 秘

共同声明米側案要旨

四四七二四

一 總理、大統領（以下双方という）は沖繩の返還に同意し、両国政府は詳細にわたる趣意に

協議の下、一九七二年中に返還を實現するべく、ありゆる努力を払う。

二 返還後沖繩に安保条約が適用される米軍施設区域は引続き使用を許すこと双方

同意した。總理は米軍とその裝備の沖繩

この存在は重要であり、その抑止力は止るか  
減殺されるべきでないことに同意した。

/// 極東の平和と安定を確保し、日本の平和と安定  
のありえないことは双方は同意し、総理は(4)

極東の国連軍の行動を支援する日本の  
義務 (吉田・アキノ交換公文に負い、岸・ハーター

交換公文の 確決した(4)は (続) 是れ(4) 特(4) 在(4)

(国連) 軍に(4) あり(4) 五(4) 速(4) 主(4) (4) 種(4) 同(4) への(4)

武力放棄は日本の安全に重大な危険を伴う





を含む)施設区域を右改革のための軍需措置に  
使用する事に同意する甚(対知)礎となる。

五、總理は日本政府が沖縄県防衛の責務を

遂次負うべきなる事を述べ、双方は日米安全保障

協議委員会との協議機能の拡大強化、及び返還後

日本政府が米国の在琉資産及び支出につき

適正に對米補償する事に同意した。

第19次  
対米交渉

極 秘  
無 期 限  
8 部の内  
2 号

SECRET

Draft Communique

[The President the Prime Minister reviewed the status of the Ryukyu Islands and agreed that the mutual security interests of the United States and Japan could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of administration of these islands to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments will enter immediately into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without detriment to the security of the area. Although determination of a final date for reversion will not be possible until negotiations are completed on the details, the two leaders agreed that every effort should be made to carry out the transfer of administrative rights in 1972.]

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that upon reversion of the administrative rights over Okinawa [the Ryukyu Islands] to Japan, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America and its related arrangements should apply intact to Okinawa, requiring no additional arrangements in their application, that necessary measures to this end, including the removal from Okinawa of nuclear weapons, if any existed, should be taken by the time of the reversion, [would apply to Okinawa.

They were also of the view that the presence of U.S. forces and their equipment in the Ryukyu Islands make a major contribution to the security of the Far East and to the defense of Japan. and that, after the reversion, United States armed forces should be granted the use of facilities and areas in Okinawa in accordance with the provisions of the said Treaty and arrangements /The Prime Minister stated that the United States would therefore be granted continued use of its current military facilities and areas in the Ryukyu Islands unless otherwise mutually agreed. The Prime Minister also agreed that it was in the interests of Japan that the deterrent capability of the U.S. military forces on the islands should in no way be diminished by reversion.

In this connection, the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his Government /The President and the Prime Minister carefully reviewed the security situation in the Far East. The President and the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of both their Governments that the security /the peace and security/ of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security /peace and security/ in the Far East and, consequently, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. /both Governments/. The Prime Minister was of the

view that, in the light of such recognition on the part of the Government of Japan, the reversion of the administering powers over Okinawa to Japan in a manner stated in the preceding paragraph should be compatible with effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defence of countries in the Far East, including Japan.

The President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's view. /In their review of the security situation in the Far East, the President and the Prime Minister thoroughly considered possible threats to peace in the area. The Prime Minister stated that his Government fully recognizes the continuing obligations of Japan to facilitate the support of United Nations forces engaged in any United Nations actions in the Far East, which it assumed in the Exchange of Notes signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951 and reaffirmed in the Exchange of Notes signed at Washington on January 19, 1960. It was agreed that this obligation had particular relevance to the situation in the Republic of Korea where United Nations forces are still stationed.]

Separate statement on Korea [Communique] The Prime Minister also made clear the basic recognition of his Government that, in particular, an armed attack against the Republic of Korea, if it occurred, would seriously affect the security of Japan. The Prime Minister further stated that such recognition

would form the basis on which the Government of Japan would determine its position vis-à-vis prior consultation under the exchange of notes concerning the implementation of Article 6 of the Security Treaty on the use by United States armed forces of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations from Japan to meet the armed attack against the Republic of Korea /and that on the basis of this recognition and the Exchange of Notes above referred to the GOJ will, under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, agree to the use by U.S. armed forces of facilities and areas in Japan (including Okinawa Prefecture) to meet an armed attack against the Republic of Korea<sup>7</sup>.

/It was further agreed that threats to the peace which would require similar action by the two Governments could arise in other areas in the Far East, particularly in the area of Taiwan and in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister made clear the basic recognition of the Government of Japan that an armed attack on United States forces in the Far East or an armed attack in an area of the Far East which would require the United States to carry out its obligations for the protection of its own forces or the defense of countries in the area would also affect the security of Japan. Accordingly, this recognition forms the basis upon which the Government of

Japan will agree, under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, to the use of facilities and areas in Japan (including Okinawa Prefecture) for military measures required to deal with such an attack.

The Prime Minister stated the intention of the Government of Japan following reversion gradually to assume the same responsibility for the immediate defense of what will then be the Prefecture of Okinawa as it has for the defense of other areas of Japan.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed that the United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee should expand and deepen its consultative functions in regard to the defense situation in the Far East in order to assist both Governments in the discharge of their obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

The President and the Prime Minister also agreed that with the assumption by the Government of Japan of complete responsibility for the welfare of the people of the Ryukyu Islands and with restoration of full authority over the Ryukyu Islands to the Government of Japan, the Government of Japan will equitably compensate the United States for United States assets and expenditures in the Ryukyus according to formulas of valuation to be agreed upon.<sup>7</sup>

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極 秘  
赤

(FIR 部長等との会談)

新設 4.

沖縄返還交渉に際し FIR 部長との話合

(44. 8. 1)

朱北一長

1. 朱側の諸内題 (激会対策のウツリタ)

(1) 先方より ロジャス 国務長官の最近議会

特に上院 (就中フルサイト 外務委員長) から強い圧力  
を受けており、沖縄返還協定は奄美、小笠原の

行政取極 (朱側のウツリ) <sup>が有る</sup> 上院の承  
認回避をむかひ、コニニと協定の双方を合

WHOLE PACKAGE による新工作の結果上院にヒツ

満足すべし切 <sup>と</sup> いうニヒ有る <sup>と</sup> 不可有い <sup>と</sup>

の云

五院調 <sup>上院側</sup> からの <sup>コニニ</sup> といふ <sup>と</sup> 沖縄を  
GIVE AWAY するの <sup>は</sup> 怪 <sup>し</sup> かつ <sup>い</sup>、 <sup>と</sup> いう <sup>と</sup> 有 <sup>ら</sup> ぬ

協定)

上院提出 <sup>を</sup> 尋 <sup>ね</sup> る <sup>と</sup> 依 <sup>り</sup> 之 <sup>を</sup> (7月30日の受知

大正の公債の除同長官が述べた“OPERATIVE PART”云々の二つを意味する由)

(2) 現在先方外務省に在りては何等かの外交政策上特に重大な問題であり、この二つ

は、戦争開始の69年に去るといふが若しと指摘、当方先通国時に戦争が来るといふ

と云ふは、南煤風流の通国延期の選択と有るべしと述べた

## 2. 財政問題

(1) 先方外務省1日朝の10分一財務次官補の叙述

國務次官補代理との対大蔵省話し合ひに於いて、財務省現地の調査の報告書は

8月~~10日~~に完成、~~10月~~その有るに對しては、~~10月~~済すと有る~~と~~と披露したる旨述べた、

(2) 当方は、少くとも交渉当初は、外務大蔵、  
国防財務と者の合同 合従は不適當

有るに、特に理論的方面で心算地  
始末と BOB DOWN の懐あり、先ず半例の

補償の度 参考の方を角に示しと  
述べたに對し、又一方は自衛に

（2）一般的原則を外務者と、技術的右  
面は外務者と信し合ふ、等と示しと等と示す  
大蔵

と述べた。

### 3. 沖繩向地防軍問題

先方は、案例部内にて検討開始早と云ふ

也少く終つて居るに、先方~~も~~有と  
少くも数回向方何も出ずと、表明、二大

（在日）  
12月、先方は 8月後半に軍人交渉

2307 号加 ~~の~~ ~~事~~ ~~を~~ ~~主~~ ~~として~~ ~~は~~ ~~り~~ ~~て~~ ~~は~~ (2) かつ 始めに  
一般的な話し合い ~~の~~ ~~上~~ ~~に~~ 入り ~~て~~ ~~は~~ 準備

總理訪米以後と右了りと述べた。

且 沖繩復帰準備上の諸問題

(1) 準備の検討開始早くて、8月中旬の話し

合いは早速進めようか。70年上半に入つたが早速  
WORKING GROUPS を作る。復帰の前と

後に問題を分けておく。地位協定適用の  
準備や基地の劃定を開始する必要がある

あると述べた。 (しかも琉球の沖縄県庁の準備)

(2) 進めよう。復帰は年内終了 ~~のため~~ ~~に~~ ~~は~~ ~~り~~ ~~て~~ ~~は~~ 琉球

と準備の中間に立ち、50-51年頃の本土の  
中央総連の如き ~~組織~~ ~~を~~ ~~必要~~ ~~とし~~ ~~て~~ ~~は~~ ~~り~~ ~~て~~ ~~は~~   
 (井岡)

現在の諮問委と異なり EXECUTIVE POWER

をもちきることには必要だが、右井閣への  
琉政例の採りかへ問題ありと指摘

(右のに対し 先方より日米一措を以て考へる  
こととすべく、余り早く固めて了る可からぬ、

と述べた。 (本席也)

(3) 先方より現在の立法院体制の如何、

衆議院と有るのか、それとも新に選挙を  
要するかと疑問、当方より本例にも

両論あり未決定の旨回答した。

(4) 先方よりVOA中継所に言ふ、近く

尋問と語らるる Model 取極めを~~五~~手交  
すと述べた、また FBIS (外国放送信

愛井閣)に2012年終了個人問題ありと指摘。