

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

## 日米関係（沖縄返還）5

メタデータ	言語: 出版者: 公開日: 2019-02-13 キーワード (Ja): キーワード (En): 作成者: - メールアドレス: 所属:
URL	<a href="http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/43777">http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/43777</a>

東郷、スナイダー

(九・一〇)

Aの米程

(九・一二)

九  
/  
〇

ソカ 万  
ヒヒ 博

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

極秘  
50

電信写

天(外)官(外)機(官)  
務(次)典(房)  
巨(官)官(審)審(長)長  
儀(書)文(会)營(務)

総番号(TA) 40141  
 69年9月10日 21時05分 米 国  
 69年9月11日 10時19分 本 省  
 主管 米 田  
 発着 米 田

総人電厚計  
 国資長領移長  
 参調析企  
 参領旅移

外務大臣殿 吉野 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん問題に関するアメリカ局長のスピーチ  
 公使会談

第2820号 極秘 至急

ア 参地中東  
 長 北東西  
 米 参北北保  
 中南審  
 欧 参西東洋  
 長 西東

10日午後会談概要次の通り。(当方米北一長、木内、先方、日本部マクエルロイ同席)

1. 大臣、国務長官会談  
 先方より、とつ然の予定変更につき遺憾の意を表した後、明朝国務長官と打合せてからでないと言えないが、(イ)一般事項(大臣の訪ソ、経済問題等)、(ロ)、グイエトナム問題、(ハ)、交渉上の主要点を取り上げていただくこと如何と述べ、当方も異議なき旨表明した。

2. 韓国、台湾、グイエトナムに関する米側文書  
 (1) 先方より、共同声明及び総理発言中表記問題につき日米それぞれの案を対比した文書(空送する)を手交の上、右は大臣、長官に双方の相違点をうきぼりにするための ILLUSTRATIVE なものであると説明し

近ア長 参書近ア  
 経 次総経国万  
 長 参質統  
 経 参政技二  
 協 国一理  
 長 参条協規  
 国 参政経科  
 長 軍社専  
 情 参道内外  
 文 一二

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検討方要望越した。

(2) 同文書では (イ) (発言案に関し韓国では FAVORABLE 台湾では韓国同様 THEREFORE 以下 FAVORABLE を含み RECOGNITION までの文言を含 (ロ) 共同声明案に関しては合 ヲ イエトナムにつき「総理が。。。。返かん時戦闘継続中の際は日本政府は軍事行動が返かんにより言されないことを保証する旨述べた」となっている。)

(3) 当方より合 韓台同列は困る旨指摘せるところ合 先方は実質は同じであり合 後者が現在はリスクが少ないと言えるが CONTINGENCY のことを考えれば同等の表現が必要であり合 かつたがた国府対策上の理由もあると説明した。

3 秘密取極及び核の問題

(1) 当方より合 秘密取極に対する日本側の強い難しよくを再説せるに対し合 先方は米側にとつては共同声明等のちゆう象的表現は不十分で判然たるアシユアランス確保の強い主張があり合 上記 2 合 の米案をかりに日本側が受け入れれば秘密取極への要求かん和に極めて有用である合 と述べた。

(2) 核につき合 当方の質問に対し合 実質問題につき合 意があれば文言は大体日本案のごときものでよい旨を示

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さしつづ、先日の会談でジョンソン次官がシモダ大使に述べたところをふえんし大統領としてはオキナワについての諸取極の他の面の状況に照らして現在のステータス変更の検討方を考慮する意向であると述べた。

4. 米側の議会対策

当方の質問に対し、先方より、國務長官としては議会で大きな問題をじゃつ起させないことを主がんとして立法府の支持を求めており、一般的表言をもつて議会に説明する積りであるとして、上院の正式の承認を必ずしも求める気はないことを表明した。

ベルギーに転電した。

(了)

アメリカ局長  
参事官  
北米第一課長


**極秘**

政 第7572号

昭和44年9月16日

外務大臣殿

在 米 下 田 大 使



沖縄返還問題に関するアメリカ局長・ス  
トラー公使会談

往電才2820号の件、12月2日

米側より手交の文書別添子郵送付致

付属物添付

一部集込

要処理
首席事務官
南方
涉外調査
漁業
航空
科学協力
調整
調査
力子夕
局庶務



9/10/54 9 26 52

SECRET

U.S. and GOJ Language

1. Korea

a. Communique:

The Prime Minister and the President specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean Peninsula. The Prime Minister highly appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security.

b. GOJ Unilateral Statement:

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

c. U.S. Version of Above Statement:

Replace final clause as follows: "The policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to give prompt and favorable consideration to such a request on the basis of foregoing recognition."

2. Taiwan

a. Communique:

The Prime Minister and the President shared the hope that Communist China would

SECRET



adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations. The President, however, recalled that Communist China had so far refused to join with the United States in a mutual renunciation of the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area, and referred to the treaty obligations of his country to the Republic of China which the U.S. would uphold. The Prime Minister expressed his full understanding of the position of the United States and stated that the Japanese Government also continued to view the situation in the Taiwan area with close attention and concern.

b. GOJ Unilateral Statement:

The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also an important factor for the security of Japan. I believe in this regard that the determination of the United States to uphold her treaty commitments to the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. However, should a situation ever occur in which these treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, though, I am glad to say, such a situation cannot be foreseen today. The policy of our government is to continue to keep a close watch on the situation in the Taiwan area and to deal with it as our national interest requires on the basis of the foregoing considerations.

c. U.S. Version of Above Statement:

Add additional sentence to above:

"Furthermore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in the eventuality of an armed attack on the Taiwan area to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to give prompt and favorable consideration to such a request on the basis of foregoing recognition."

3. Viet-Nam a. GOJ Version of Communique:

The President described the earnest efforts made by the United States for a peaceful and just settlement of the Viet-Nam problem. The Prime Minister expressed his earnest hope for a substantial progress towards that end. He further stated that Japan was exploring what role she could play in bringing about stability and reconstruction in the Indochina area.

b. U.S. Version of Communique:

The President described the earnest efforts made by the United States for a peaceful and just settlement of the Viet-Nam problem. The Prime Minister expressed his earnest hope for a substantial progress towards that end, and stated that if hostilities have not concluded there by the time reversion is scheduled to take place, the Japanese Government would assume that the military effort would not be impeded because of reversion. He further stated that Japan was exploring what role she could play in bringing about stability and reconstruction in the Indochina area.

九、一、一 米案

特

注意

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電信写

外務大臣官房  
 次官官署長  
 秘書官  
 文書室

総番号(TA) 40607  
 69年 9月 12日 21時 30分 米 国 管  
 69年 9月 13日 11時 40分 本 省 発着 米 後

外務大臣殿 下田 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん問題 (米側新提案)

第2858号 特秘 至急 (ゆう先処理)

往電第2820号に関し

1. 11日夕刻国務省フィン部長は冒頭往電2. の日米案を對比せる文書に更に米側提案をもち込んだ改訂文書をわが方に手交した(往電第2857号の1. 冒頭参照)ところ。内容次のとおり。

(イ) 朝鮮につき一方的発言末段を以下のとおりとする。

THE POLICY OF GOJ TOWARD P  
 RIOR CONSULTATION WOULD BE  
 TO GIVE PROMPT AND FAVORAB  
 LE CONSIDERATION TO SUCH A  
 REQUEST ON THE BASIS OF FO  
 REGOING RECOGNITION

(ロ) 台湾

(ハ) ミニニケ関係部分末文を削り次の文章を加える。

116  
 116

参調析企  
 参領旅移  
 参地中東  
 北東  
 北北保  
 参一  
 参西東洋  
 西東  
 参参近  
 次総経國万  
 参官統  
 参政技二  
 国一選  
 参条切規  
 参政経科  
 軍社専  
 参道内外  
 一

特

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電信写

極秘

THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT US SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO DISCHARGE EFFECTIVELY ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS FOR THE DEFENSE OF COUNTRIES IN THE FAR EAST INCLUDING JAPAN.

(2) 一方的発言の末びに武力攻撃があつた場合事前協議に対し PROMPT AND FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION を与える旨朝鮮の場合と同じ文章を加える。

(ハ) ヴィエトナムにつき コミュニケ関係部分第2文を削り次の2文章を加える。

THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE WAR IN VIETNAM WILL BE CONCLUDED BEFORE RETURN OF ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS IN OKINAWA. THEY NOTED THAT THERE ARE FULLY ADEQUATE PROVISIONS FOR CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO G

-2-

特

注 意

電 信 写

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極 秘

OVERNMENTS ON THE IMPLICAT  
IONS OF A PROLONGATION OF  
THE WAR IN VIETNAM ON THE  
REVERSION OF OKINAWA, SO TH  
AT THE RETURN OF OKINAWA W  
ILL NOT AFFECT US MILITARY  
ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE  
VIETNAM WAR.

2. 12日のアイチ大臣・ロジャース長官の会談を能率的  
にするため、以上の諸点につき大臣主幹の下に打合せの  
結果それぞれ往電第2857号別電1. 2. 3. 4. のと  
おりの案を作成し、12日会談前に米側に手交しおいた。

以上往電第2857号と前後せるも事情右のとおり。

(7)

— 3 —

SECRET

(朱案)  
IX-11 2/2

Redraft of Joint Communique, September 12, 1969

1. The Prime Minister and the President had a broad exchange of views on Japan-U.S. relations as well as on the respective positions of the two countries in the present international situation. The President expressed the deep interest of his government and his own in Asia and stated his belief that Japan and the United States should cooperate in contributing to the peace and prosperity of the region. The Prime Minister, appreciating the view of the President, made it clear that Japan would make further active contributions befitting her capabilities to the peace and prosperity of Asia.

2. The Prime Minister and the President exchanged frank views on the recent international situation, with particular attention to developments in the Far East. The Prime Minister expressed his recognition that, in the light of the present situation, the presence of U.S. forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area. The President, while emphasizing that the countries in the area were expected to make their own efforts for the stability of the area, gave assurance that the United States would continue to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East by honoring its defense treaty obligations in the area.

3. The Prime Minister and the President specifically noted the continuing tension over the Korean Peninsula. The Prime Minister highly appreciated the peace-keeping efforts of the United Nations in the area and stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security. The Prime Minister and the President shared the hope that Communist China would adopt a more cooperative and constructive attitude in its external relations. The President, however, recalled that Communist China had so far refused to join with the United States in a mutual renunciation of the threat or

SECRET

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.





administrative rights over Okinawa returned to Japan on the basis of the friendly relations between Japan and the United States and thereby to restore Okinawa to its normal status. The President expressed due appreciation of the Prime Minister's view. The Prime Minister and the President also recognized the vital role played by U.S. forces in Okinawa in the present situation in the Far East. As a result of their discussion, it was agreed that the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two governments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East including Japan. They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of <sup>these</sup> specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support. In this connection, the Prime Minister made clear the intention of his government, following reversion, to assume gradually the responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa as part of Japan's defense efforts for her own territories. The Prime Minister and the President also agreed that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries.

6. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that, upon return of the administrative rights, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements would apply to Okinawa without modification thereof. In this connection, the Prime Minister affirmed the recognition of his government that the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan. The Prime Minister

was of the view that, in the light of such recognition on the part of the Japanese Government, the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa in the manner agreed above should be compatible with effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan. The President replied that he shared the Prime Minister's view.

7. GOJ Version. The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his understanding of the position of the Japanese Government and assured the Prime Minister of the intention of the U.S. Government to ensure the reversion of Okinawa to be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

72 (U.S. Version: The Prime Minister agreed that it was in the interests of Japan that the deterrent capability of the U.S. military forces in the islands should in no way be diminished by reversion.

(Not Agreed)

8. The Prime Minister and the President agreed that with respect to financial questions which could arise in connection with the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, a mutually satisfactory solution should be found by the time of the reversion.

9. The Prime Minister and the President, recognizing the complexity of the problems involved in the reversion of Okinawa, agreed that the two governments should consult closely and cooperate on the measures necessary to assure a smooth transfer of administrative rights to the Government of Japan in accordance with reversion arrangements to be agreed to by both governments. They agreed that the Japan-United States Consultative Committee

in Tokyo should undertake over-all responsibility for this preparatory work.

The Prime Minister and the President decided to establish in Okinawa a preparatory commission in place of the existing advisory committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands for the purpose of consulting and coordinating locally on measures relating to preparation for the transfer of administrative rights, including necessary assistance to the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. The preparatory commission will be composed of a representative of the Japanese Government with ambassadorial rank and the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, with appropriate staff, with the Chief Executive of the Government of Ryukyu Islands acting as adviser to the commission. The commission will report and make recommendations to the two governments through the Japan-United States Consultative Committee.

10. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their conviction that a mutually satisfactory solution to the question of the return of the administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, which was the last of the major post-war issues pending between the two countries, would be to strengthen further the Japan-U.S. relations based on friendship and mutual trust and would also make a major contribution to the peace and security of the Far East.