

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

## 日米関係（沖縄返還） 14

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44  
4-16 東御高長 Council on Foreign Relations Group

意見交換

取扱注意

近藤善次郎

PIYAPONG

参事

信託長 参事 朱保長

朱北一

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 一行のPIYAPONG長  
訪向。

4. 4. 16

朱北一

一行中 JESSUP (CIA 対外輸送局長), AELINGHUSEN  
(下院特使, 参事ニ任ズ), SWING (COUNCILの

PIYAPONG長補), BARRAND (MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST  
CO 社長), BROOKS (U-C-D 大学工学部長)

PIEL (SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 誌主幹) の参事自南16日

午後 東京 PIYAPONG長を参事訪。始1時10分

参事と交換 (在米) 要談 次の方。 (当参  
干参 北米才一参事 同席)

1. 東京局長の参事訪の方の参事訪に  
その要旨は(1)朱北一局長の参事訪の参事訪

である。朱北一局長の参事訪の参事訪に、参事  
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7月17日付の、7月10日付の東京の電報  
日本政府の反応を定例（左の通り）局長

は、~~格別な非難を蒙る~~（7月24日付の  
世論は漠然と概算論と格別）あり、また

<sup>（おのれの地位）</sup>  
その故に支持を予見せしと思ふ。政府も  
格別な署名はなしと有る。この點を

述べた。

JAPAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS (I)  
(FOR COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS GROUP)  
APRIL 16, 1969

I

Japan lies in the eastern coast of the Asiatic Continent, where three of the four divided states are located. Each of the three divided States, the Republic of Korea, Nationalist China, not to mention South Vietnam, heavily depends on the support of the United States. A power balance in East-Asia is barely maintained by the presence of the United States in this part of the world. This power balance sustains Japan's security.

Economically Japan can survive only so long as the supply of raw materials from abroad is secured. Japan's trade route in East Asia is protected by the powerful presence of the United States.

These are obvious facts. As long as Japan lives as a free nation, stabilized and prosperous, friendly relations with the United States are in the national interest of Japan; hence, the Security Treaty with the United States, close economic and trade relations, intimate cultural and scientific interchanges as between the United States.

A

- 2 -

A policy of friendly relations with the United States has been identified with the successive Governments in power since the end of the war. Even though this policy has lead the country to prosperity in the last quarter of a century, the foreign and security policy of the Government has been subject to constant public attack. The criticism of government in power is generally more vocal than its support in any country with democratic form of government. In this respect, the Security Treaty and Okinawa are two of the important issues the Government of Japan faces in its relations with the United States.

II

The Security Treaty was first concluded in 1950, simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace with Japan. At that time the Korean War was still being fought, and Japan was to come into the Far Eastern international scene completely disarmed. It was a logical choice, as stipulated in the Preamble of the Security Treaty, for Japan to let the United States have the right to dispose armed forces in and around Japan, leaving the security of the country in the hands of the United States.

As time went on, the original Security Treaty had been criticized as being one-sided in the sense that while the

United

United States had the right to dispose her armed forces in and around Japan, she was not obligated to defend Japan against external attack; being incompatible with Japan's independence in that the Treaty anticipated United States intervention in case of internal disturbances; being unilateral since the Treaty could not be terminated unless the United States chose to do so. Consequently, the Treaty was rewritten in 1960 and its alleged defects were rectified to the best practicable extent.

The problem of nuclear weapons was one of the issues in the course of the negotiations for the revision of the Treaty. After lengthy discussions, it was agreed, in the light of the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons, that the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan should be a subject of prior consultation between the two Governments. It was further agreed that the use of United States bases in Japan for military combat operations should also be a subject of prior consultation.

It is a fact, silently but widely accepted in Japan, that the Security Treaty has served the interest of Japan. Because of the existence of the Treaty, there was no occasion that Article V of the Treaty, stipulating the United States obligation to defend Japan, had to be acted upon. The

United

United States bases in Japan have served effectively for the support of activities of United States forces in the Far East.

Nevertheless, it has been the habit in the parliamentary interpellation to talk as if the United States presence in East Asia is creating, rather than coping with, tension. More recently, the United States military bases in Japan are frequently referred to as sources of public hazard, rather than means of deterrence against external threats.

### III

Okinawa is currently under the United States administration by virtue of the Peace Treaty. Some three years ago, Mr. Sato visited the island, as the first Prime Minister to do so, and made a famous remark that the post-war period of Japan does not end until the return of Okinawa. For the Japanese, the issue of Okinawa is a territorial issue, and as such, the demand for its return is pure and strong.

Year before last in November, Prime Minister Sato and President Johnson agreed that the two Government would continuously review the status of Okinawa with the aim of returning the administration to Japan. What is holding the

return



return is not the basic issue of reversion itself, but whether the reversion would be compatible with the security needs involving the islands.

It is again silently but widely accepted in Japan that Okinawa plays an important military role for the security of the Far East including Japan, and that therefore United States bases would remain in Okinawa even after reversion, consistent with the purpose of the Security Treaty. What is at issue, more specifically, is how to deal with the prior consultation in respect of nuclear weapons and military combat operations in relation to Okinawa after reversion. Okinawa being the keystone in the military structure of the United States in the Far East, the freer the use of bases the better from military standpoint. On the other hand the Japanese popular theme of "mainland status" stems from the resistance against introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan and against treating Okinawa after reversion in a discriminatory manner. The Government of Japan is called upon to find ways and means in the coming negotiations with the United States Government to find a solution, at once militarily tenable and acceptable to the Japanese public sentiment.

IV

IV

The aim of the Government of Japan is to deal with these problems in such a way as to contribute to maintaining durable and dependable relations between the two countries. This endeavour has to be based on proper assessment of the prevailing circumstances in both countries.

There seems to be in the Japanese mind a latent sense of "being imposed on" by the United States, retrospectively tied in with the days of General MacArthur's occupation. Side by side with it goes a habit of taking the United States for granted, one which may not be limited to Japan. Viewed in the mixture of these sentiments, the United States presence is imposed upon Japan for the self-interest of the United States, but the United States will always act to defend Japan regardless of whatever complaints Japan may lodge against the United States on the so-called "hazard" resulting from the United States military bases in Japan.

The pacifism embodied in the Preamble and the so-called no-war provision of the Constitution has strongly influenced Japanese public thinking. Paragraph 1 of that provision is a policy statement, but paragraph 2 prohibits rearmament. A limitation or prohibition of rearmament, if stipulated in a peace treaty, will sooner or later be dissolved, as history shows,

shows, in the face of the resurgent nationalism which revives after defeat. In Japan's case, however, the resurgent nationalism has been encased in the pacifism framed by the Constitution. Furthermore, there is a curious lack of awareness among the Japanese of external threat or danger. This state of mind is perhaps a reflection of the long-drawn sense of abandonment resulting from the defeat, but is supported by the fact that Japan has no land border, by the traditional sense of affinity with the Chinese, or by a sense of security assured by the presence of the United States in Japan and the Far East.

These circumstances have been effectively utilized by the opposition forces against the Government, which constitute over one third in the National Diet. Only recently, there is a marked sign of "neutrality without armament", a favorite theme of the Socialist Party, losing public appeal. However, the parliamentary debate on Japan's foreign and security policy continues to be an exchange of contradicting views based on platform strategies between the Government and the opposition, and it will be a long way before there will develop a common ground and a common rule of game for constructive discussions.

It is in these circumstances that the Government of Japan leads the country to the road of security and prosperity. In a way it is a continuous fight within the country. The question is how this fight will develop.

To make forecast on Japan's political future is not easy. Perhaps, if the Security Treaty could be experimentally abrogated, Japan would go through a severe test in choosing her future destiny. However, such a political experiment is not in the realm of reality. On the contrary, Japan's political reality is confused by a variety of platform stands which do not have to be substantiated by the objective conditions and circumstances. There is a Japanese habit of thinking, first to establish an abstract concept, and then to approach facts in the light of that preconceived concept. However, given the fact that it is accepted by the majority of population that Japan lives as a free nation, political platform strategies are, even slowly, bound to conform to real issues.

External circumstances are another factor which will prescribe Japan's future course. Again, a massive reinvasion of North Korea into the South would give a severe test to

the Japanese, but this cannot be tried experimentally. However, there is a growing awareness that Japan cannot shun from taking more political responsibilities in Asia, and that Japan, as an economically developed nation, has to have a new concept in the economic aid to developing countries.

These underlying trends are vaguely termed recently as Japan's new nationalism. The task of the Government is, instead of indulging in academic analyses and forecasts on Japan's future, to guide these trends from the traditional insular and often inward-looking nationalism to an enlightened one, true to Japan's own interest and ready to cooperate with other nations for broader common interest.

International relations are not a one-sided affair. It is up to the United States how to approach her Japanese relations. However, presuming that Japan and the United States share common interests in maintaining friendly relations, it is not too much to expect that the United States would interpret and assess day-to-day occurrences in Japan and between the two countries in the light of what is going on in Japan and where Japan intends to go.

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 無期限

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昭和44年4月23日

在米大使殿

外務大臣

Council on Foreign Relations 一行  
 とアメリカ局長との会談録、を送付

4月16日、Council on Foreign Relations  
 一行 (Jessup タムライツ海運委員長外5名)

は、東郷アメリカ局長と東談、意見を交換  
 (北米才一課長) 会談録(要旨)を別添の

通り送付する。  
 付属添付

GA-4

外務省