琉球大学学術リポジトリ

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39 市

昭39年

主管課長へ

本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課検閲班に連絡こう

電信写

(配布先○印)

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3日付及び4日付ワシントン、ポストはOur Happy Asia Basiionと題した在京スタインバーグ記者のおきなわよりの現地報告を掲げている。要旨次の通り(記事空送する)

1。おきなわでは自治の拡大と日本への復帰が遅々として進まないので米国に対する不満がたかまつている。キャラウエー高等弁務官が事ごとにおきなわの政治にかい入していること、日本への渡航手続がはんさなこと、1962年のケネデイー声明が発表されてからも事態が改善されていないこと、等が不満の種子となつている。

2。ケネデイー声明は日米のおきなわ援助を調整すべきことをうたつており、この情報協議のための二つの委員会を

外務省

アジア局 39.5.6

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電信写

設置することになつたが、キャラウエーは日本のおきなわ援助をかん迎せず、つめたい態度をとつたこと、日本側一部政治家が委員会に政治的なしきさいをも与えることを要求したこと、等により交渉は手間どり、先月ようやく妥結した。ケネデイー声明はまたできる限りりゆうきゆう政府に行政機能を委任すべきことをうたい、おきなわのじゆう民はこれを自治権の拡大と混同して大いに期待を寄せたが、自治権の拡大はもち論のこと、行政機能の委任もその後行なわれていない。キャラウエーは米国が施政権をにぎる間おきなわの『自治』なるものはしん話にすぎない、と公言しておきなわ住民をおどろかせたことがあるが、キャラウエーに言わせると行政機能の委任はおきなわの住民が責任を回避したがるので困難である由。

3。現地の米軍当局は道路、港湾の整備等経済面における業績を挙げておきなわ住民の不満に反論するのが常であるが、住民側に言わせれば日本政府の低開発国に対する援助は米国のおきなわ援助よりも大きい由である。もつとも急に基地を閉さすることはおきなわの経済に混乱をじゃっ起せしめることは広く認められている。また米軍当局は常におきなわの基地としての重要性を強調するが、確かにおきなわが日本に復帰すればおきなわに核兵器をちよ蔵するとか、ヴイエトナム向けの基地に利用するとかは不可能とな

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電信写　本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課検閲班に連絡こう

り。基地としてのおきなわの価値はほとんどなくなろう。オオ田主席やナガミネ立法院議長はおきなわ住民の大部分は日本への即時復帰が困難なことを認めており。当面は自治の拡大を望んでいる。と語っている。

4。おきなわにいる米軍人。軍属はアメリカ式生活様式をたのしんでおり。加うるに低賃金の現地労働力を利用している。基地周へんの料いんがいにおける米軍人の中の白人。こく人のけんかが最近増えて問題となっている。

（了）

外務省

The Washington Post Outlook

THE METROPOLIS
THE NATION
THE WORLD
EDITORIALS
COMMENTATORS

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Our Unhappy Asia Bastion

By Rafael Steinberg
Special to The Washington Post

NAHA, Okinawa—America's mightiest military base in the Far East, a billion-dollar complex of battle-primed troops and atom-armed planes and missiles, Okinawa is an island of frustration and discontent.

Ruled by an American general who makes plain his feeling that he knows better than they do what is good for them, unprotected by any constitution and unable to carry on normal commerce and travel with Japan, which all of them consider their homeland, the people of Okinawa today are convinced that the United States has let them down.

Almost every Okinawan complaint is earnestly refuted by the American Army administrators of this base, who point to economic growth, the roads, harbors and waterworks and the settlement of many vexing land claims as examples of progress. But what cannot be denied is that Okinawans of all political faiths are convinced that they are making no real advance toward self-rule and little real advance toward greater contact with the homeland. The clamor for both is increasing.

American concessions have often come too late, and been too small, to prevent a steady erosion of the good will necessary to the maintenance of this or any foreign base.

(For example, a bill for $22 million, covering land and damage claims between 1945 and 1950, has been languishing in Washington unpaid for a year and a half although both the High Commissioner and the Department of the Army have approved it.)



The Washington Post

The large map shows Okinawa's strategic position 400 miles from Red China. The inset shows the island in reference to the United States.

Unilateral 'Freedom'

OKINAWA is considered vital to American military security not only because of its extensive installations and strategic location but because the Army, Air Force and Navy can freely deploy here, or to here, whatever weapons and forces they may need in any emergency without any other government's permission.

On no other plot of foreign soil does the United States exercise such authority, and this one is just 400 miles from Red China.

This freedom of action is something Americans may be thankful for, but its corollary, the strict, uncompromising rule over an alien people 12 years after the state of war with them ended, is something unique in American experience.

This tight administration of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands is usually defended on military grounds, and it is certainly true that civilian and military areas are so closely intertwined on this narrow isle that the loss of physical control could cripple the bases.

It is also clear that the bases would lose most of their value as a "forward deterrent" to Communist aggression if Okinawa were to "revert" to Japan, as all Okinawans passionately desire. For in that case, the United States-Japan Security Treaty, and Japanese public opinion, would make it impossible to keep nuclear weapons here or to use the island as a jumping-off point for Viet-Nam and other brush-fire wars.

'So Far Behind'

BUT INTERVIEWS with scores of Okinawans and Americans here also make clear that the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) and High Commissioner Lt. Gen. Paul Caraway, who is retiring in August, concern themselves with hundreds of detailed issues far removed from military security, and that they and Congress have failed to give the Ryukyuan people—and there are more of them than there are Hawaiians and Alaskans combined — economic development equal to Japan's.

Even Seisaku Ota, the mild Ryukyuan government Chief Executive who is appointed by the High Commissioner and is widely regarded as an American yes-man, says that "our hearts are afflicted" because "we are so far behind the rest of Japan in such things as social welfare."

The United States, says Ota, "has failed to grant us the progress that we hoped for and expected as the result of President Kennedy's new policy for Okinawa that was proclaimed more than two years ago. We have a saying in the Orient that 'there is no better government than self-government,' and although there are a few points that have the look of progress, there has been no real advance commensurate with our hopes."

THIS is the first of a series of articles on Okinawa by Rafael Steinberg, who has spent most of the last 14 years in the Far East.

A 1950 Harvard graduate, Steinberg was a war correspondent in Korea in 1951-3, first with International News Service and then with Time magazine. For the next five years, he worked in Time's bureaus in New York and London.

In 1959, he became Tokyo bureau chief for Newsweek magazine and remained in that post until last year, covering Japan, Korea, Okinawa and other parts of Asia. He left Newsweek to write a book and at the same time has written articles for The Washington Post, the Saturday Evening Post and other publications.

Steinberg lives in Tokyo with his wife Tamiko and daughters Summer and Joy. Fluent in Japanese, he appears occasionally as a panelist on Japanese TV.



Commercial and military traffic crowds Highway No. 1 through Naha. Okinawa's major north-south artery, it was built by United States Army Engineers and is maintained with American money.

'I Am Right'

OTHER UNSETTLING conclusions emerge from these conversations:

- Democracy in the Ryukyus is a sham, and from Ota on down the people resent it. Only one man's opinion really counts, and that is Caraway's. Akio Nagamine, Speaker of the Ryukyuan Legislature, describes him this way:

"The High Commissioner studies hard. He goes around and talks to people. This is good. But because he knows so much, he acts in a straightforward way without discussing things. He says, 'I am right, even if you are not satisfied, even if it makes you unhappy. My way is right, so do it my way.' That's how he is. Everything is decided according to his opinion."

- Although the 32,000 jobs the bases provide, armed forces construction and off-base spending by troops have brought a considerable measure of prosperity to the islands, many Okinawans believe that they would have been better off sharing Japan's phenomenal economic growth without the base income, although they admit that any sudden shutting of the bases now would cause serious economic dislocation.

They pointed out that the Japanese government pours into other underdeveloped prefectures like Okinawa financial subsidies running two to three times the total of American economic aid.

- Travel to and from Japan is still an issue, although fewer than 100 people were actually denied entry or exit last year after being investigated by Army Intelligence.

"This is what bothers us most of all," says Chobyo Yara, president of the Okinawa Teachers Association. "After all, the United States admits that Japan has 'residual sovereignty' over the Ryukyus. Japan is not a foreign country. It's not right to have to apply for a passport and wait weeks and weeks."

Most Americans here have little

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Our Mighty Asian Bastion Is Unhappy

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sympathy for or understanding of Okinawan traditions and desires, "The Okinawans have all the autonomy they need," says one high official. Caraway adds: "They show no inclination to accept further responsibility." And another American officer complains: "All they know how to do is imitate Japan."

"The Americans don't want us to imitate Japan," says an American-trained Ryukyuan professor with a sad smile. "They just want us to be Ryukyuans. But at the same time they are trying to teach us the American way of life."

"Our customs, manners, history and ways of thinking are different from America's," Speaker Nagamine points out. "If Okinawans think that 'A' is the best way of doing something, then the Americans will undoubtedly think that 'B' is best. So we cannot finish our budget in time or pass a law that we want . . . America must try to understand Okinawan ways of doing things. Even when they are doing something admirable, it must accord to the real situation."

NAGAMINE IS a member of the majority Okinawa Liberal-Democratic Party, the conservative group that supports the maintenance of the bases. But in March his party attacked the United States for falling down on its promises to the Ryukyus.

The Speaker explains the party stand this way: "It would be unreasonable for us to demand complete autonomy now, since America has such mighty bases all over the island. We also recognize that the return of administrative rights to Japan is far in the future. Ninety per cent of the Okinawan people have no objections to the bases remaining.

"But on matters that are not connected with the safety of the bases, USCAR should leave more decisions to us. It should not be necessary for Chief Executive Ota to get USCAR permission before he signs every little bill or before he sends every single draft law to us in the Legislature."

NAGAMINE'S POINT is that the High Commissioner anyway retains two powerful safeguards that should be enough to protect vital American interests. According to the term of a presidential executive order, the HICOM can issue ordinances which have the full effect of law without reference to any Ryukyuan official. And he can veto any bill or annul any law that he thinks threatens "the interests of the United States or nationals thereof."

But Caraway, whose parents were both United States Senators from Arkansas, has artfully avoided the use of the veto. "Why can't he just use his veto power straightforwardly?" asks a professor.

"If he vetoes a bill," the chief of the leading opposition party correctly points out, "he has to explain why in a letter to Washington, and this could lead to a public debate in which our views would be heard. Besides, the reasons for wielding the veto are restricted."

THERE SEEM to be no restrictions, however, on the degree to which Caraway and his aides can participate in the legislative process. All draft bills are "pre-adjusted" with USCAR before going to the Legislature and, according to standing USCAR instruction, "if a modification or objection is advanced by USCAR, the department concerned revises the draft as suggested."

And before a bill gets to the Chief Executive's desk for final signature, after being passed by the Legislature, it must be cleared again by USCAR officials.

This "pre-adjustment" system irks Okinawan political leaders more than any other aspect of American rule. Okinawan newspapers refer to it as a "wall" blocking legislative action. But it has made it possible for Gen. Caraway to spend three years as High Commissioner without once formally invoking his veto power.

"IT WOULD cause more of a furor if I vetoed a bill," the efficient and conscientious General explains. "They could pass any kind of a law knowing that the United States would not let it go through . . . This is just a matter of practical administration."

To many Okinawans, it is also a clear violation of at least the spirit of President Kennedy's executive order. And it certainly is not a system that encourages the Ryukyuan government to assume more responsibility.

It was after a special presidential commission headed by Prof. Carl Kaysen had studied the Okinawan situation, and after Attorney General Robert Kennedy visited here and Japan in early 1962, that President Kennedy on March 19, 1962, proclaimed what was hailed in this part of the world as a "new policy" for Okinawa.

THE PRESIDENT had sent the Kaysen group here after Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda made a plea on Okinawa's behalf when he visited Washington in 1961.

The new policy included a substantial increase in economic aid authorization (Congress granted less than half of what Mr. Kennedy requested) and a statement by Mr. Kennedy that "I recognize the Ryukyus to be part of the Japanese homeland." But it also emphasized "the military imperative" for continued American administration.

Two provisions of the new policy the islanders considered vital. The first called for discussion with Japan to work out "precise arrangements" for coordinating Japanese and American aid to the Ryukyus. These discussions have been going on in Tokyo for a year and a half. Only last month was agreement finally reached to set up two committees, one in Tokyo and one here.

Caraway, who has continually given the impression that he is not anxious to see Japanese aid to the Ryukyus expanded, makes clear that he did not consider the formation of the committees urgent, and his lack of enthusiasm contributed to the delay. Another obstacle was the demand by some Japanese politicians that the committees be empowered to talk about "reversion" of the Ryukyus as well as economic aid.

THE SECOND vital provision ordered "a continuous review of governmental functions . . . to determine when and under what circumstances additional functions that need not be reserved to the United States . . . can be delegated to the government of the Ryukyu Islands."

No such delegation of function, no "expansion of autonomy," as the Ryukyuans somewhat erroneously term it, has in fact taken place in these two years, and Caraway admits this readily.

A year ago, he shocked the Okinawan public by declaring in a speech that autonomy for the Ryukyus was a "myth" because the United States must retain final authority for the time being. Meanwhile, he says, he has not been able to delegate authority because the Ryukyuans won't accept responsibility.

IN RECENT months, the HICOM has concerned himself in detail with a raft of problems far removed from base security. He has urged the consolidation of sugar mills and passed on the applications of Japanese wishing to visit the islands.

All of these actions draw sharp criticism from Okinawans. The biggest controversy he is involved in at present concerns a sweeping ordinance proclaimed April 3 which strictly regulates the sale of more than 1000 drugs and patent medicines.

Okinawans consider this an inappropriate and excessively strict application of American standards and point out that many Okinawan communities do not have doctors to write the prescriptions necessary to buy these medicines. American officials say that the misuse of sedatives, hypnotics and tranquilizers by GIs and young Ryukyuans was getting out of hand and that legislative inaction forced the HICOM to act.

Next: The Life of Riley.



Photo by Rafael Steinberg

A native proprietor welcomes young customer to an Okinawan general store.

Island in Tug-of-War

THE RYUKYU ISLAND archipelago, to which Okinawa belongs, has had the historical misfortune to be plunked into the sea between two powerful and territorially ambitious neighbors, China and Japan.

The original Ryukyuans had their own independent kingdom centered at Shuri, on Okinawa, the island which accounts for about half the 1850-square-mile area of the 140 pieces of the archipelago.

China first invaded the Ryukyus in the seventh century and, 700 years later, began exacting tribute from its Ryukyus fiefdom. The Ryukyuans apparently didn't resist too much for a Ming Dynasty emperor bestowed upon them the title of "Land of Courtesy" for the cooperative way the islanders had accepted Chinese customs.

Then, in the 17th century, a Satsuma prince of southern Japan invaded the Ryukyus and made the islanders pay tribute to him as well as China. This was during the Tokugawa period when the shogun rulers had imposed isolation on Japan and the Satsuma clan saw the Ryukyus as a means to maintain sub-rosa trade relations with the world outside.

Commodore Perry established a coaling station in the Ryukyus in 1853 during the trip which put an end to Japan's several centuries of isolation. Japan then followed the lead of the Satsumas and formally annexed the archipelago in 1879, introducing the Japanese language and a school system aimed at wiping out any memories of Ryukyuan culture and independence.

The Chinese, however, never formally gave up their claim to the islands and asserted them right up until 1945. That was the year when they were placed under U.S. control as a means of stripping the defeated Japanese Empire of its overseas possessions.

Ryukyu Rule Is a Rarity

BESIDES THE Ryukyu Islands, (Okinawa), there are only two other areas under the American flag in which civilians are under the administration of a military governor.

One not quite comparable case is the Panama Canal Zone, which has an Army general as governor. He reports to the Secretary of the Army and the Government-owned Panama Canal Co.

The other is the Bonin-Volcano Islands in the Western Pacific. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, serves as military governor. Under him is an Officer-in-Charge of U.S. Navy Facility administering 215 Japanese civilians on Chichi Jima — only populated island in the group—and an Air Force officer commanding the air base at Iwo Jima, which has no civilian population.

America's Unhappy Bastion—II

Okinawa's Americans Enjoy Luxury Living

By Rafael Steinberg
Special to The Washington Post

NAHA, Okinawa — The tall, sunburned American leans easily against the polished bar of the Okinawa Yacht Club and sips his beer. "Our biggest problem," he says, "is not letting it be known how good we've got it."

For the American civilians who work for the military, for the officers, and for many enlisted men, life can be beautiful on Okinawa.

The island has three military golf courses, about a dozen bowling establishments, two yacht clubs. At military bathing beaches — artfully landscaped and carefully segregated into areas for officers, noncoms and enlisted men, and surrounded by high wire fences to keep out "unauthorized personnel" (Okinawans) — American families can buy charcoal and stateside paper plates for their picnics, take showers, borrow sports equipment, play miniature golf, consume hamburgers, hot dogs and Cokes, or whisky (at 25c a shot.)

If you are in the Armed Forces, or an American working for them, you and your dependents can shop at any of the 67 PX stores on the island. At prices far below those offered by the most daring stateside discount house, you can purchase just about everything you need, or think you do.

There are mink stoles in the PX, at prices running up to

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$695; there are diamonds and fancy cameras and skin-diving equipment. One stereo tape recorder, with a stateside $599.95 price tag showing, sells for $325. The biggest PXs carry a complete line of delicatessen products, including cocktail onions and hot pepperoni sticks. You can buy Vigoro to make your grass grow, a power lawn mower to cut it, and any of a dozen brands of American dog food for your pet.

The PX also operates 27 snack bars, 6 mobile canteens, 3 "custard cups," 9 restaurants and 15 theater refreshment stands. According to the monthly eight-page shopping guide published by the central Ryukyu Exchange office, these stands sell 105,600 hamburgers and 110,000 hot dogs a month.

The PX guide gives fashion tips too ("Beige is the most flattering of all makeup colors") and reminds readers that beauty consultants from stateside cosmetic manufacturers are always on hand to give advice at one PX or another.

If you care for liquid refreshment and don't mind the clatter of slot machines, there are 50 military clubs on the island (to say nothing of the thousand or so bars and cabarets off-base), but of course they are not all open to you: 14 are for officers, 5 for civilians, 31 for enlisted men. Some of the enlisted men's clubs are for noncoms only.

At the Harborview Club (U.S. Army Civilian Open Mess), the Rotary Club meets on Tuesday.

Locally Staffed

All these facilities are of course staffed with Okinawans. Minimum wage for these employees of the U.S.: 16 cents an hour.

No other spot in Asia looks moke like the United States than this mighty base. Driving north along Rte. 1 out of Naha, the broad four-lane highway sweeps and curves on land that used to be sugar field and paddy, linking the bases with a steady stream of military and civilian traffic.

Along the roadside spills all the flotsam of highway culture: used car lots and pizza joints, TV repair shops and auto junkyards, billboards, gas stations, auto salesrooms, furniture stores, bars, plumbers and dry cleaners. There is a VFW Post, an American Legion Post, a Masonic Temple and several churches.

You can drive off the road, walk a dozen steps, and immediately borrow money, buy insurance or mutual funds, rent a house or a jukebox, book air passage, get a permanent wave, pose for your portrait, slurp a malted or have a tooth pulled.

Sometimes you can see an old Okinawan woman trudging solemnly along the shoulder of the road, ignoring the autos whizing by. Behind the car wheel, ignoring her, may be a Marine major on the way to the golf course, an Air Force fighter-pilot, a gaggle of U. S. wives enroute to a tea party—or a Special Forces sergeant in his green beret, still weary from the Viet-Nam jungles, driving slowly and thoughtfully home, from a day of heavy training, to the neat ranch-style house where a tricycle stands in the grass and Captain Kangaroo guffaws from the TV in the living room.

Living High on Hog

"I'm making more money than I ever did before," says the man at the Yacht Club, who came here as a GI and took his discharge here. "I've got a housing allowance, too. And that little sloop you see there, the fourth one in the line. And look at the price of liquor, look at the price of food, and maids."

Ironically, while the Americans here can buy necessities and luxuries much more cheaply than at home, and thus live higher off the hog than they ever have stateside, the Okinawans have to pay higher prices for basic commodities than they would in Japan.

One unhappy aspect of America that has turned up here along with the pizzas and the bowling balls is the race problem. On base, of course, discrimination and segregation are prohibited. But when night falls over the town of Koza, one large district of bars and shabby night clubs is patronized exclusively by Negroes, and another, slightly more tony section a half-mile away, is frequented by white servicemen.

A bar proprietor can lose his license if he discriminates against customers, but his customers do the segregating themselves. Very few Negroes or whites cross the line between Koza Four Corners (Negro) and Koza Business Center (white). Those who do usually regret it.

Recent Violence

For years, this situation was tolerated or even encouraged by the base comanders in the interests of racial peace. But recently, racial violence has

参事官

主管課長へ

本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課検閲班に連絡こう

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第 1160 号 平 略暗

5日付ワシントン・ポストは沖縄に関する社説を掲げた。要旨次の通り。

米軍による沖縄支配の結果、沖縄住民の自治は奪われ、日本との歴史的な関係は絶たれ沖縄住民の不満が高まっている。米軍が沖縄にとどまっているについては、それだけの理由があり、日本や沖縄住民の防衛にも役立っているが、なんと云っても軍政と云うものは如何なる場合にも不人気とならざるを得ない。沖縄の住民は自治と日本への復帰を望み、米国は自由世界の防衛のための基地の維持を望んでいるが両者の希望を妥協せしめることは出来ないものであろうか。目下本紙に連載されているスタインバーグ記者の記事は、米国がこのような妥協を貫らすことに失敗していることを示している。沖縄に居る米人が植民地の支配者然として振る舞うようなことがあれば沖縄でパナマよりも遥かに深刻な危機が爆発しよう。当面、米国の沖縄政策は、次のようなものでなければならない。第1に、在沖縄米軍を出来るだけ目立たないものとし、安全保障を害しない範囲で出来るだけ

外務省

主管課長へ

本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課検閲班に連絡こう

電信写

(2)

外務省

主管課長へ

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小きくすることに努力すべきである。
次に軍事的な要請と競合しない範囲内において出来るだけ沖縄住民に自治を与えるべきである。次に、沖縄の日本復帰のための適当なスケジュールを作成すべきである。米国としては沖縄住民の正当な権利を尊重するためにも太平洋防衛体制を整備するためにも以上のような措置を執るべきである。
と云うのは沖縄百万の住民を敵にまわせば沖縄の基地としての価値は害されることになろう。その上、沖縄住民の不満が日本の政治にはねかえるもと云う現象が続けば、早晩、日米関係は悪化することになろうが、良好な日米関係の維持は太平洋防衛体制の整備のためには、一基地の保持よりも遙かに重要な要素である。危機が発生して

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から、これらの問題を処理することは出来ない相談で、今のうちに、手を打つ必要があると。

(終)

WASHINGTON POST

MAY 5 1964

Okinawa

A people who commenced their own independent national existence with the military occupation of Boston ought to understand the dislike of Okinawans for the military rule that we have imposed upon them. This rule has deprived them of self-government and has cut their historic relations with Japan at the same time, furnishing them with a local and national resentment.

In behalf of the policy of the United States Government, it must be said that the American military presence does not spring from any impulse of reprisal or punishment, or arise from any predilection for colonialism or emerge from any antipathy toward the Okinawans. It is an occupation that arises incidentally and accidentally from the discharge of a responsibility that has been imposed on the United States. Japan as a whole and the people of Okinawa as well derive national benefit from that assumption of responsibility, for it is their defense as well that is involved. So the Okinawans do not have the grievance of a people who are under an occupation inspired by reprisal or resentment.

Nonetheless they have a grievance that is very real, and one that the most benign administration of the occupation is not likely to diminish. However well American military commanders may deal with Okinawan problems, their efforts are not likely to find favor with their charges. Most people who have experienced any degree of democracy prefer bad self-government to good military government. History discloses few people who would sooner be run by a foreign general, however competent, than by their own elected leader, however limited.

What the Okinawans wish to have is their own government and their old connection with Japan. What we wish is a base where we can mount the defenses on which the security of the non-Communist world must depend. Can these purposes be reconciled?

The Washington Post has been publishing a series of articles by Rafael Steinburg, an able Far Eastern correspondent. They show how far we have failed to reconcile these interests.

No forethought or managerial skill can divest of difficulty the predicament of a large military garrison in the midst of an alien civilian population. The very presence of our troops, with their different customs, habits and morals and with their ostentatious affluence is a daily affront to Okinawans. That affront cannot be totally eliminated; but it can be diminished if its diminution is made a first object of policy.

If American civilians and soldiery came to look upon Okinawa with the eyes of colonial administrators, we may one day have a crisis in Okinawa that will make Panama look tame. It is one thing to ameliorate the conditions of Americans abroad in the service of their country. It is quite another thing to transport some of the less desirable aspects of our culture to a foreign base.

Our aims in Okinawa must be threefold. We must try to make the American military presence as inoffensive as possible and as small as is practicable and consistent with security; we must confer upon the civilian population all the self gov-

北米課長 アジア局長 ~~参事官~~ 参事官 ~~参事官~~ 総務参事官 (正)

送付公信

政第3136号	昭和39年5月8日
大臣	北米大使
引用公・電信番号	往電第1160号に関し
送付資料及び備考	沖縄に関するワシントン・ポストの社説送付の件

別紙添付
別紙同着

文書課受信班 39.5.11 282

回覧番号
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experienced any degree of democracy prefer bad self-government to good military government. History discloses few people who would sooner be run by a foreign general, however competent, than by their own elected leader, however limited.

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WASHINGTON POST

MAY 5 1964

ernment that can be reconciled with military objects; we must devise an appropriate schedule for the return of Okinawa to Japan.

We are required to do these things out of a decent respect for the legitimate aspirations of Okinawans, and out of a decent regard for the future of our Pacific defenses. The strictly military purposes of our Okinawa base would be obstructed by the hostility of nearly a million people on the island. Our relations with Japan, infinitely more important to us than any single military base in the larger scheme of our Pacific defenses, will be damaged, sooner or later, if the discontents of Okinawans continue to roil Japanese politics.

It will be easier to deal with all these problems before there is a crisis than it will be to deal with them after a crisis has developed.

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主管課長へ
本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課係関班に連絡こう

電信写

(配布先○印)

大臣 政務次官 官房長官 官房長 総務長官 人事恩給局 文化局 電電公社 厚生省 亜細亜局長 参事官 北米 総務 中近東 西欧 北米 参事官 北米 欧亜 参事官 西欧 東欧 近アフ局長 国際資源課長 調査 参事官 資源 欧亜 ラテン 通商 米国 近東 統合 国際 次官 参事官 調査 総務 亜細亜 二国 経済協力局長 技術 協力 参事官 貿易 経済 調査 産業 貿易 経済 条約局長 参事官 条約 協定 国際法局長 参事官 政府 社会 専門 経済 情報文化局長 参事官 渉外 文化 文化 移民 参事官 総務 振興 移民 長官

TA 13601 亜総

年 月 日 時
64 05 06 2000 発

年 月 日 時
64 05 07 09 09 着

外務大臣殿

ワシントン 武内 大使 総領事 領事

件名 沖縄に関するワシントン・ポストの記事の件

第 1164 号 (平) 略 暗

往電第1141号に関し

5日付及び6日付ワシントン・ポストは引続きスタインバーグ記者の沖縄報告を連載している。要旨次の通り。

イ、高等弁務官及び米民政府は善意をもって仕事をしているが免角結事件の処理に走るため沖縄住民側の意思を十分尊重せずその不満を買っている。例えば高等弁務官は

回覧番号 外務省 亜総
アメリカ局 39.5.7 総務室

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電信写

立法院の審議が遅いとして4月3日に一方的に菓子販売規制法を布告したが沖縄住民側は高等弁務官が沖縄の実情を無視して同法を作成したこと、しかも一方的にこれを押付けたことを不満としている。これに対し米側はこのような法律が緊急に必要となっていたことを強調している。同じような例はキャラウェーの沖縄人登用をめぐる論争にも見られる。キャラウェーは米国に留学したことのある英語の出来る人達を多く登用しているがこれがまた一般住民の反感を買っている。

ロ、沖縄経済は一応繁栄しており生活水準も向上しているが住民側はこれに満足していず沖縄の生活水準が日本の生活水準と同じテンポで上昇していないこと沖縄の繁栄が専ら米軍の支出に依存していることを指摘する。住民側に言わせれば軍事支出

主管課長へ

電信写　本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課検閲班に連絡こう

はいずれなくなるものであるから沖縄経済の健全化のためもっと手が打たれるべきだとしており、また那覇市は兎も角、農村が立ち遅れていることを強調する。米国の対沖縄援助は今年度は780万ドルであるがこのほかに高等弁務官がガソリンの売上げ利益等から500万ドル位の資金を開発計画に注ぎ込んでいる。

米議会は対沖縄援助をどしどし削減するが今年は那覇とゴザのため下水道建設予算が半額に削られたため米基地に近いゴザだけが予算をもらうこととなった。米軍に云わせれば沖縄の建設は進められており、米軍は感謝されこそすれ非難される根拠はないとしているが住民側は日本の経済の枠内における産業開発、日本の社会福祉制度への均霑等を強く希望している。

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外務省

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May 5, 1964
WASHINGTON POST

America's Unhappy Bastion—III

High-Handedness of U.S. Authorities Causes Friction Among Okinawans

Third of a series

By Rafael Steinberg
Special to The Washington Post

NAHA, Okinawa—When an administrator holds the power to rule by decree, can veto laws or administer them, and controls the economy and the courts, then public opinion may not seem very important.

But in the view of many responsible and influential Okinawan leaders, including some of those most friendly to the U.S., many of the problems faced by the American rulers of Okinawa, and much of the grumbling and dissatisfaction of the population, might fade away if the high commissioner paid as much attention to local desires as he does to pure efficiency.

They also argue that he should spend as much time educating local leaders as he does, they say, in telling them how irresponsible and incompetent they are.

The high commissioner and USCAR, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus, are so autocratic, say the Okinawan leaders, so convinced that they have a monopoly on worthwhile projects, they common sense, that even when they are embarked on manage to antagonize the very people who should be cooperating with them.

"Even where we are weak," says the pro-U.S. Speaker of the Ryukyuan legislature, Akio Nagamine, "they should take us by the hand and lead us, guide us, advise us, show us why their way is better, instead of just giving orders. Sometimes, what USCAR could do today, the Ryukyuan government could do tomorrow if USCAR helped. So on things that are not so urgent they should be patient, and help us."

And an American-educated teacher adds: "It is poor tactics for the high commissioner to decide when the Ryukyu government is responsible or not. Were the American people responsible when they declared their independence? The Americans should encourage us to make our own decisions, in accordance with our own customs and society. Even

See OKINAWA, A18, Col. 1

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OKINAWA—From Page A1

U.S. Autocracy Antagonizes Okinawans

if we make mistakes, as long as it doesn't conflict with the security of the bases."

Many Okinawans are apt to believe that if Okinawan feelings and wishes are ignored, then Okinawan interests also are being impaired. This, of course, does not necessarily follow, and Americans who see their good intentions doubted are quick to accuse the Okinawans of irresponsibility and hostility.

What results is mutual misunderstanding that doesn't seem to have changed much since Okinawan villagers decided they'd rather build a Teahouse of the August Moon than a pentagon-shaped school house.

The most recent glaring example is the controversy over the high commissioner's sweeping drug-control ordinance, which makes it illegal to sell narcotics, sedatives, hypnotics or tranquilizers without a prescription from a doctor and a license from the U.S. Civil Administrator.

Shortage of Doctors

Some kind of control was clearly needed, as young servicemen and Okinawan teenagers had been misusing some drugs for cheap and dangerous binges. Most of the drugs could be purchased over the counter at any Ryukyuan drugstore, although they all require prescriptions under U.S. law.

But the Okinawans charge that the ordinance is much too extensive, "even including cold remedies and stomach powders used in daily life." They point out that many Okinawan communities have no doctors to write prescriptions, and that Japan solved a similar teen-age problem a couple of years ago with far less restrictive regulations.

American doctors, of course, retort that the Okinawans "are better off without these drugs if they are prescribing them for themselves."

Marine Murdered

But what cannot be explained on medical grounds is the way in which the ordinance was promulgated. USCAR officials claim they have been trying to get the Ryukyuan legislature to pass a law along those lines "for years." Actually, the first approach on a staff level was not made until June of last year.

As late as February this year High Commissioner Caraway did not consider the situation urgent enough to include it in the legislative program he sent to the Ryukyu government, although he did recommend a raft of other laws, including the abolition of prostitution and a law halting traffic while school buses are unloading.

But after a U.S. Marine was murdered by another Marine during a barbiturate jag, U.S. officials decided the matter couldn't wait. In early March, a draft law was sent to the Ryukyu government executive branch, and Chief Executive Seisaku Ota was told by the American civil administrator to get it passed in a month.

The month of March failed to produce agreement between USCAR and Ryukyu views—the Okinawans wanting much less control—and so on April 3 the High Commissioner unilaterally issued the ordinance, which has all the force of law.

Ability Not Questioned

At no point had USCAR made any serious attempt to educate public opinion on the subject, or prepare the people for the edict. As a result, press and politicians immediately denounced the High Commissioner for "arbitrary" actions, and the controversy still is raging.

Another field where High Commissioner Caraway's headlong insistence on U.S.-style efficiency and competence creates misunderstanding is in his appointment of officials.

Quite naturally, he leans toward English-speaking Okinawans. Without being aware of how the Okinawans look at it, he has appointed to positions of importance and responsibility a disproportionate number of members of the Golden Gate Club, an organization of young Okinawans who have gone to college in the U.S.

The ability, even brilliance, of some of these men is not questioned. "But," says one Okinawan, "Caraway gives the impression he trusts the Golden Gaters more than other people. Everyone is talking about the 'Golden Gate route' to power. This kind of elite will harm the growth of Okinawans ability to govern themselves. I used to be a member of the club myself ... but I have stopped paying my dues."

One of the men considered a High Commissioner's favorite is a brash, boyish, boastful businessman recently appointed to an important economic post. He praises Caraway "for making us work, even if it's unpopular," and is so much more royal than the king that he tries to use English to speak to his subordinates. He brags openly about his relationship with Caraway, and shouts at his countrymen that they are "incompetent." Once he told other Golden Gaters that they had a moral obligation to support all U.S. policies because the U.S. had paid for their U.S. education.

Needless to say, most Okinawans laugh when his name is mentioned.

High Commissioner Caraway denies favoring a special group. "I don't agree there's an elite," he says. "Any man who displays leadership, competence and skills, we would take. I spend more time talking to non-Golden Gate people than to members of the club."

Caraway's appointees are often the most competent people around. But Okinawans feel that they get the big jobs just because they can speak English well and can hobnob with Americans. Generally, despite their efficiency, they do not command the respect that Okinawans who have risen through more traditional routes can muster, and therefore many Okinawans look on their present prominence as some kind of cabal.

To Caraway, none of this matters. "Okinawa must modernize," he says, and he has been trying to promote modernization, the American way. Most Okinawans would rather do it the Japanese way.

NEXT: Okinawa's artificial boom.



Photo by Rafael Steinberg

Okinawans demonstrate at the Civil Administration Building in a wage dispute.

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May 6, 1964
WASHINGTON POST

OKINAWA—From Page A1

Okinawa Low-Cost Haven to GIs



Photo by Steinberg

The Moon Light Cabaret, in the "white" section of Koza, Okinawa.

come to Okinawa, and the situation in Koza may be making it worse.

In February, a mob of Negro servicemen stormed a police box, hurling rocks at a white MP who had arrested a Negro. The crowd felt the MP had been unfair. Some weeks later, the body of a Negro was found in a reservoir at a Marine Corps camp. The cause of death was not determined and the death was listed as accidental, but the man had died before going into the water.

A few weeks ago, in what may have been fancied retaliation for this or some other incident, a white Marine was waylaid at night just outside his barracks and beaten to death. Four Negro Marines have been charged with his murder and will stand court martial.

Said a white Marine, a Southerner: "Something's going to happen. We're just playing it cool, now. Not saying anything, just passing 'em by. But I can tell you, there's going to be trouble."

It's usually the Marines that have these troubles, because they are the only outfit on the island without their families. The Marine VD rate is so high that it has been "classified" by the command.

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American's Unhappy Bastion—IV

Okinawa Economy Rosy But Picture Has Flaws

Fourth of a Series

By Rafael Steinberg
Special to The Washington Post

NAHA, Okinawa.—Economic progress is immediately visible to a visitor who returns to this island after an absence of two years. There are new buildings, more cars and appliances, stylish clothes. Everything looks a little more substantial, and cleaner.

"Yes," says a Naha theater operator. "Things are a lot better than they were a couple of years ago. People seem to have more money to spend . . ."

Statistics confirm what is seen and heard. The Gross National Product has gone up 31 per cent and per capita income is up to $292, a 23 per cent increase in two years, while consumer prices have increased only about 5 per cent in the same period. The minimum wage is still only 9 cents an hour, but the general wage level is rising and the 32,000 Ryukyuans who work on the military bases now make an average of 43 cents an hour, compared to only 26 cents hourly four years ago.

From an Okinawan viewpoint, however, there are two things wrong with this rosy view. First, for all their progress, they say they are not improving living standards as fast as Japan is. "We are being left behind," wails

See OKINAWA, 15, Col. 1

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OKINAWA—From Page A1

Economic Glow About Okinawa Has Some Dark Spots

Ryukyuan Chief Executive Seisaku Ota.

Secondly, the prosperity they do have represents little more than a steady increase in United States military spending and Okinawans don't like to rely on that.

The Ryukyuan balance of trade, for example, is getting steadily worse. Last year the trade gap amounted to $118 million. The islands had to import two-and-a-half times as much as they could export.

Most of the gap was filled by military spending: $91 million. Direct United States aid ($7 million), other United States assistance (about $5 million), and aid from Japan ($5 million) helped bring the accounts into near-balance.

U.S. Bolsters Income

Looking at it another way, Ryukyuan "national income" more than doubled between 1955 and 1963. Expenditures by United States Forces and personnel increased by more than 70 per cent in the same period, and it is obvious that the first could not have happened without the second. The money the United States military spends in Okinawa every year, for its own purposes, amounts consistently to between 35 per cent and 40 per cent of the total national income of the Ryukyu Islands.

For this, the Ryukyuans refuse to feel grateful. This very dependence on military spending worries them, for they believe not enough is being done to insure their economy against the day when the United States may cut down the bases, or stop building new facilities.

And they claim that despite the economic improvements, their living standards are still behind comparable prefectures on the Japanese main islands, where an unprecedented boom also has been taking place over the past few years.

Ryukyuan per capita income is indeed far below the national Japanese average, though slightly higher than some of the poorer Japanese agricultural prefectures. But since Okinawa—which grows mainly sugar—must import most of its food from Japan, consumer prices in the Ryukyus are higher. According to Ryukyu officials, their over-all living standard is only about 80 per cent of that in the poorest mainland prefectures.

Poverty in Villages

American officials, who see mainly this bustling city, don't agree. But rural villages in Okinawa, with their ramshackle houses and shabby little stores, are definitely below the standards of rural Japan today. About 40 per cent of the Ryukyu Islanders still depend on agriculture for their livelihood, but agriculture accounted for only 17 per cent of the Ryukyuan national income last year.

Furthermore, Okinawan workers get only a fraction of Japan's vast, paternalistic welfare, pension and health insurance benefits.

If the Ryukyus were again to become a Japanese prefecture, as the Islanders desire, they would qualify for a big slice of the subsidies and tax transfers that the Japanese government makes available to such underdeveloped areas of the country.

No one knows exactly how much this would be, but, even deducting national taxes, it is clear that the Ryukyus would net three or four times as much in aid from the Japanese taxpayer as they are currently getting in aid from the American taxpayer.

Until two years ago, United States economic aid to the Ryukyus never totaled more than $5 million a year. Last year it went up to $7 million and this fiscal year it will reach $7.8 million.

In addition, the United States High Commissioner makes another $5 million or $6 million available yearly for development projects, but as this is money which comes from the High Commissioner's investments and enterprises within the Ryukyus, it is not considered aid. Some of this, for example, is profit from the sale of gasoline in the islands.

Congress has consistently cut, sometimes by as much as one-half, the sums for the Ryukyus requested by the Department of Defense and the Administration.

One direct casualty of a congressional cut in the current fiscal year aid total was a sewer system for Naha. Half a million dollars had been planned for sewer development in Naha and Koza, but when the aid total was cut, Naha lost out. Koza, which is closer to most United States bases and where thousands of servicemen spend their evenings, will get $250,000 for sewers.

Many American military men here feel that since the United States won this island by conquest, Ryukyuans should be grateful for the roads, harbors, waterworks and electric and telephone networks that the United States military has built, and even more thankful for the few million dollars of outright aid.

But the Okinawans feel that since the utilities were installed for military reasons the United States owes them all this and much more for the use of their island for so many years, especially since it is now apparent that they are not going to be permitted to become Japanese again in the foreseeable future.

"What we cannot endure, says Koichi Taira, a legislator and member of the moderate opposition Okinawa Social Masses Party, "is that we have given up, have lost, all these things which we would have as part of Japan—development of industry, a sense of nationality, freedom of travel, welfare benefits—just in order for the bases to be here, to safeguard the peace and so forth."

Furthermore, charges a political scientist at Ryukyu University, "USCAR (United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus) wants to control the aid from Japan, to limit it to certain types of welfare. But this is money Japan wants to give to the Okinawan people. If the U.S. Congress can not give us what we need, what we would be getting from Japan if the Americans were not here, why must the Americans regulate what Japan wants to give?"



Photo by Rafael Steinberg

This scene in Naha points up the prosperity being experienced on Okinawa now.

NEXT: *Okinawa's unwavering political wish is to rejoin Japan.*

アジア局長
参事官
参事官 (正)
総務参事官

北米課長

タイプ・ステンシル
ミニ配布 [illegible]

送付公信

政 第 3138 号	昭和 39年5月 [illegible] 日
大臣	北米大使
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送付資料及び備考	5/6 [illegible]

沖縄に関する ワシントン、ポストの
連載 記事 送付の件

(2)

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[illegible] 30.5.1 [illegible]

May 7, 1964
WASHINGTON
POST

5

America's Unhappy Bastion—V

Longing to Rejoin Japan Runs Deep in Okinawa

Last of a Series

By Rafael Steinberg
Special to The Washington Post

NAHA, Okinawa — The underlying, unwavering political fact in Okinawa today is the people's wish that they once again become part of Japan. This desire crosses party lines and often transcends economic interest. Frequent American attempts to revive Ryukyuan nationalism, to remind the islanders of their own culture and ancient language, are met with derisive smiles.

Even U.S. high commissioner Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway admits sadly that the Okinawans "are more Japanese than Japan, because Japan is changing and they are not."

"My students resent any implication that they are not 100% Japanese," says a dean at Rykuyu University.

This feeling is expressed every year by unanimous resolutions in the Ryukyuan parliament, calling for immediate reversion of Okinawa to Japan. This year's resolution, to the embarrassment of the U.S., was sent not only to Tokyo and Washington, as in the past, but to all the signatories of the Japanese Peace Treaty. It is this treaty which gives the U.S. its rather shaky legal claim to "exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the Ryukyus."

And on April 28, the 12th anniversary of the Peace Treaty, Okinawan and Japa-

See OKINAWA, A26, Col. 1

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OKINAWA—From Page A1

Okinawa's One Wish Is to Rejoin Japan

nese delegates held an emotional "ocean rally" in two ships on the 27th parallel, which divides U.S. and Japanese-administered waters.

Returning from the watery rendezvous, the Okinawan delegates paraded the length of Okinawa in a cavalcade of 150 vehicles, past cheering villagers and puzzled GIs. In Naha they joined the biggest political demonstration in Okinawan history — 30,000 people—to listen to speeches denouncing "American military colonialism" and "Caraway autocracy," and to demand immediate return to the fatherland."

Then, carrying paper lanterns and Japanese flags, they paraded through the streets, chanting "fuk-ki, fuk-ki" (reversion) for hours.

Communists and professional anti-Americans, fully aware that reversion would render the U.S. bases here useless, are quick to exploit the islanders' frustrations, and to try to turn all disappointments in USCAR (United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus) policies into resentment of the U.S. presence itself. Since it is apparent that the U.S. bases must remain here for some time to come, sensitive Americans and pro-American Okinawans urge that everything possible be done to alleviate Okinawan grievances.

Blame Us for Their Ills

"We know America is trying in some ways to help us," said one college student, "but most of us feel that we are poor, because the U.S. is here, we are not free, because the U.S. is here, we cannot travel, or govern ourselves, because the U.S. is here."

Sometimes American businessmen, who are encouraged to invest here to help the development of the economy, succeed only in making matters worse. For the past month, for example, four strikers have been perched atop the 130-foot chimney of the American-owned Okinawa Plywood Company in a bizarre climax to a long and bitter labor dispute.

The chimney sitters say they won't come down until the company "agrees to collective bargaining," and the communist organizers who have taken over the union say the four men are "martyrs to American exploitation and American imperialism."

So ugly has the situation become that company president Fred Pierson of Seattle had to hire a squad of a dozen karate-expert pug-uglies, under the command of a well-known hoodlum, to "protect" himself and his factory after a group of workers had surrounded him and hustled him forcibly to their headquarters in order to "bargain" with him.

Although the Communists are clearly trying to make anti-American propaganda out of the dispute, and are not being reasonable, it is equally obvious that Pierson did everything that an American businessman abroad should not do.

Abolished Benefits

He set out to hire the cheapest labor (female employes of Okinawan Plywood start at 10c an hour), abolished the traditional oriental twice-yearly bonus system and seniority raises. Other officials of his company were shocked to learn he failed to keep promises to improve workers' facilities.

When the chimney strike was in its third week, some of the company's principal stockholders flew in from Seattle, held a meeting in Naha and abruptly "accepted the resignation" of Pierson. The new president made a conciliatory statement, but the strike continues.

American officials here have long been distressed by the Okinawa Plywood situation, and many of them tried conscientiously to persuade Pierson to give the workers their due. But most Okinawans assume that American business and the American administration of the Ryukyus must be working hand in glove.

One Okinawan editor declares that "American businessmen seem to feel that they are protected by American law and so they are not so obedient to Ryukyuan law."

American lawyers, on the other hand, complain because neither American law nor the American Constitution does apply here, although the U.S. administers the islands. Some of them would like to see Okinawa turned into an outright U.S. colony, "America's Hong Kong."

There is evidence that some of the military privately go along with this view. But the State Department, which must consider U.S. relations with Japan, and the White House and official American policy are fully committed to the principle that the Ryukyus are part of Japan.

Some Suggestions

So bitter is the feud between State Department and the military over the question of Okinawa that the High Commissioner less frequently withholds important information from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, and embassy officials have been known to exaggerate grossly reports of the military's autocratic rule.

What could be done to lower tension and eliminate some grievances?

- Congress could appropriate a few million dollars more economic aid each year to protect the foundations of this vital and strategic billion-dollar base.
- Congress could get around to paying the $22 million claims bill for land expropriation, use and damage between 1945 and 1950, that was agreed on by the High Commissioner and the Department of Defense a year and a half ago and has been kicking around Washington ever since. Half of the Okinawan population would benefit.
- Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson II, who takes over as High Commissioner in August from Caraway, could easily use the change of command as an oppporunity to let the Ryukyu legislature write their own laws.
- Instead of trying to limit and tightly control Japanese aid, USCAR could use the newly-created joint economic committees to let Japan participate freely in Okinawan economic development. There is no way this could endanger security.
- Travel restrictions could be relaxed and procedures simplified. Instead of barring the travel of all those with any "anti-American" blot on their record, only those Okinawans and Japanese who it is considered might actually commit espionage or sabotage need be halted.

These measures would not remove the desire for reversion, but they would make the American occupation much more endurable for the Okinawan people—and consequently would help assure that, for as long as they are needed, the Okinawan bases themselves will endure.

主管課長へ
本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課検閲班に連絡こう

電信写

1A 1375 亜総

年	月	日	時	
64	05	07	2000	発
64	05	08	0940	着

外務大臣殿

ワシントン、武内 大使 総領事 領事

件名 おきなわに関するワシントン、ポストの記事の件

第1173号 平

往電第1160号の件

7日付ワシントン、ポストはおきなわに関する第5回目（最終回）の記事を掲げた。要旨次の通り。

1. 今日のおきなわでは党派、階層を問わず日本への復帰が大きな念願であり、りゆうきゆうの独自性を強調せんとする米国の努力は水ほうに帰している。立法院は毎年満場一ちで日本への即時復帰を決議するが、今年の決議は日米両政府のほか対日平和条約の全署名国に送付された。また去る4月28日平和条約の12しゆう年にあたり27度線の洋上で日本とおきなわの代表が会合し、右会合より帰えつたおきなわ代表はがいせん将軍のように迎えられた。共

(配布先○印)
大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 官房長
総務 人事院 文部省 会計検査院 管理局 厚生省
亜局長 参事官 総務 北米 中南米 東南アジア 西欧
条約局長 参事官 北米 保障 南方
欧亜局長 参事官 西欧 東欧
近東局長 近東 アフリカ
西欧資金局長 参事官 資金 調査
経済協力局長 参事官 総務 統計 調査 国際 国際 商務 通商 欧亜 ラテンアメリカ 北米 近東
経済協力局長 貿易 政策 協力 経済 賠償 賠償 経済 賠償 業務 賠償 経済
条約局長 参事官 条約 協定 規則
国際法局長 参事官 政策 社会 科学 専門 経済 オ
情報文化局長 参事官 総務 内政 文化 文化 文化 文化
移住局長 参事官 総務 振興 移住

所管番号 亜総 357

39.5.9

主管課長へ
本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課検閲班に連絡こう

電信写

産主義者等はこの空気を利用して反米気運をじよう成することに努めているが、しん米的なおきなわの人々は米国がこの危険性に留意しておきなわ側の願望を容認するよう勧めている。

2. 米人実業家で問題を起す者もある。一時険悪な事態となつた「おきなわ合ばん会社」のストライキは多分にビアソンという社長の不手際によつて起されたものであつたが、同人はその後辞任させられた。

3. おきなわでは米国法が適用されないので一部米人はおきなわがホンコンのようなしよく民地とされ、米法の適用を受けることを希望しているが、国防省とホワイト、ハウスはおきなわは日本への一部であるという公式路線をけん持している。おきなわをめぐる国防省対軍部の対立は激れつて高等弁務官は在京米大使館に情報を流さず、在京米大使館は軍政のへい害をこ張して伝えている。

4. 米国はおきなわで次のような措置をとるべきである。これらの措置をとつたからといつて日本復帰の念願がなくなることはないが、おきなわ住民が米国の占領をがまんしやすくなり、従つて基地としてのおきなわの価値が確保されよう。

(イ) 議会は経済援助を年数百万ドル程度増額すべきである。

(2)

外務省

主管課長へ

本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課検閲班に連絡こう

電信写

(ロ) 議会はここ1年半たな上げされてきたおきなわ住民に対する土地収用に関する2200万ドルに上る補償を規定する法案を可決すべきである。

(ハ) ワトソン新高等弁務官は立法院にある程度の自由を与えるべきである。

(ニ) 米民政府は日本のおきなわ援助を制限する態度を改め、今度成立した協議委と技術委を通じ日本がおきなわの経済開発に参加することをかん迎すべきである。これは安全保障の問題とは無関係である。

(ホ) 旅行制限をかん和し、手続きを簡素化すべきである。過去に反米的な行動があつたすべての人達の旅行を禁止するのを止めて、スパイ行為あるいはサボタージを行なう恐れのある日本人やおきなわの人々の旅行のみを禁止すべきである。

(了)

〈第三種郵便物認可〉

沖縄の日本返還考えよ

ワシントン・ポスト紙社説

ワシントン・ポストは五日の社説で沖縄問題を論じ①米軍が沖縄にいることは沖縄の人びとに日々侮辱感を与えている②米軍の規模を縮小し、住民に自治を与え、沖縄の日本返還について適切なスケジュールをつくらねばならない――とのべた。以下は同社説の全文である。

住民の悲しみを理解しよう

英軍のポスト・占領（一七七三年）をきっかけに英国の植民地から独立国家としての第一歩を踏み出した国民（米国民）は、沖縄の人びとが沖縄に課せられた軍政に反感を抱いていることを理解すべきである。軍政によって沖縄の人びとは自治を奪われ、同時に日本との歴史的関係を断ち切られた。そして沖縄の人びとは地方的かつ国家的なウラミを抱くことになった。

米政府にかわってひとことことわっておかなければならないが、米軍が沖縄にいることは、なにも報復の下心からでもなければ、こらしめのためでもない。また植民地主義におかされているからでもなければ沖縄の人びとを嫌悪しているからでもない。この軍事占領という事態は、米国に課せられた責任をはたすために、たまたま生じているものなのだ。

日本全体も沖縄の人びとも、米国がこうやって責任をはたしていることで国家的利益をえている。なぜなら、米軍の沖縄占領は米国の防衛であると同時にかれら（日本と沖縄）の防衛にもなっているからである。

こういうわけで、沖縄の人びとのいだいている悲しみは、報復とか、うらみから生じた占領のもとにおかれている人びとのような悲しみではない。だが、それにもかかわらずかれらは身にしみて悲哀を感じている。それはどんなりっぱな占領行政でも消すことのできないものだ。

米国の軍司令官がどんなにうまく沖縄の問題を処理しようとも、その努力が好意をもって報いられることはあるまい。いささかでも民主主義を体験したことのある人びとなら、りっぱな軍政と貧弱な自治のどちらをとるかといわれれば、ためらいもなく後者をえらぶものである。歴史が示しているよ

相いれぬ二つの目的と利益

沖縄の人びとがもちたいと望んでいるのは、自分たちの政府と日本との古くからの結びつきである。一方、われわれが希望するのは非共産圏世界の安全を守るための防衛力の基地である。これらの目的を調和させることができるだろうか。

本紙（ワシントン・ポスト）はこれまでにもラファエル・スタインバーグ極東特派員による一連の記事をのせているが、それをみてもわれわれがいかに双方の利益を調和させることができなかったかがわかる。どれほど深い思慮があり、行政的手腕があっても、外国の住民のなかに大規模に部隊を駐留させることの困難をなくすことはできない。異なった慣行、習慣、道徳をもち、豊かさをみせびらかすような米軍がいるということ自体が沖縄の人びとにとっては日々うける侮辱なのだ。

この侮辱感を完全にとり除くことはできないが、それを軽減することを政策の第一の目標とするならば、それを軽減することはできる。米国の文官、軍人が植民地行政官のような目で沖縄をみるならば、パナマ事件をはるかにしのぐような危機がいつの日か沖縄で起きるかもしれない。

米国のために海外で働く米国人の条件を改善することと、われわれの文化のあまり好ましくない面を海外の基地にもち出すことはまったく別問題である。

適切なスケジュール組もう

沖縄での米国の目的は三つある。一つは米軍の存在をできるだけ攻撃的でなくまた安全を確保しうる範囲でできるだけ小規模にすること、第二に軍事目的と合致するかぎりでの自治を住民に与えること、第三に沖縄を日本へ返還するための適切なスケジュールをつくることである。われわれは沖縄の人びとの正当な願望にたいするじゅうぶんな尊重からして、またわれわれの太平洋防衛の将来にたいするじゅうぶんな考慮からして以上のことを行なう必要がある。

沖縄米軍基地の敵愾に軍事的な目標は同島に住む約百万の住民の敵対で妨げられることにもなろう。また沖縄の人びとの不満が日本の政治をゆさぶりつづけるならば、日本との関係がおそかれ早かれ傷つけられるだろう。それは米国の太平洋防衛の大切な計画の中では一軍事基地よりはるかに重要なのだ。

危機が発生したあとより、危機が発生する前にこれらすべての問題を処理するほうが、危機が深まったあとで処理するよりもいっそう容易であろう。

1964.5.8

BB 394

OUR DIALOGUE WITH JAPAN

By Edwin O. Reischauer

The rioting crowds that clamored at the gates of the Japanese Diet building in May and June and the throngs of Zengakuren students who snake-danced wildly down the streets of Tokyo and swarmed over Hagerty's car at Haneda Airport have given pause to many persons in both the United States and Japan. . . . Never since the end of the war has the gap in understanding between Americans and Japanese been wider than over this incident. . . .

All this reveals a weakness of communication between the Western democracies and opposition elements in Japan. Though the latter include the most fervent supporters of peace and democracy, their thinking is so far removed from that of their counterparts in the West that sometimes no real dialogue is possible. On top of the ever-present language barrier stands an even higher barrier of unspoken assumptions that make true understanding difficult.

THESE quotations are from "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," an article which I wrote for the October 1960 issue of this review. There I pointed out that the disturbances might be seen by some as "a sign of the growing gap between the party in power and its opponents, of rising tension and violence that can only end in leftist revolution or a Fascistic suppression of the opposition." I also noted that "an unfriendly Japan or even a strictly neutralist Japan might well mean the inevitable withdrawal of the American defense line to the mid-Pacific." My own conclusions, however, were more optimistic. I did not foresee a break in the defense relationship between the two countries and predicted that "Japan's practical politics will probably continue on its remarkably level course." I am glad to say that this hopeful prognosis seems fully justified today. The present article will report on what has happened in our "dialogue" in the interval, during which time I served as Ambassador to Japan.

II

Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, who succeeded Kishi in July 1960, was a statesman of rare wisdom. He realized that the Japanese people were still spiritually confused by the terrible war experiences they had been through and were divided by deep political fissures. They needed time to find their bearings and develop a national consensus on the problems they faced. He therefore adopted a go-slow policy, which he dubbed the "low

posture." He did not push issues, as had some of his predecessors, but waited patiently for consensus to emerge from unhurried discussion and compromise.

At the same time, Ikeda drew attention away from the controversial areas of defense and international alignment toward the safer field of economic growth. He called for a "ten-year income doubling plan," which was not a plan so much as an estimate that Japan's economic productivity would double over a ten-year period. Under his leadership Japan continued on its breakneck rate of economic growth, averaging about 10 percent in real terms per year, thus getting well ahead of the announced "plan." The economy boomed, burgeoning visibly in every direction. Tokyo became a nightmare of new construction—multi-storied buildings, elevated highways and new subways. Workers became accustomed to seeing their pay checks increased by around 10 percent each year. There was a continuing consumers' revolution, as television sets, fine cameras, washing machines, refrigerators, room coolers, motorcycles and private cars spread ever more widely throughout the households of the nation. People spoke of the "leisure boom" and devoted themselves with enthusiasm to holiday activities. (1)

Ikeda was aided by the international situation in his effort to calm political tensions and seek a broader consensus. For one thing, once the new Security Treaty had gone into effect, the interest of the opposition forces shifted from the immediate effort to block its ratification to the long-range objective of preparing for its cancellation in 1970, when, according to the terms of the Treaty, either side could denounce it. Another factor was the tremendous popularity in Japan of President Kennedy. His image of youthful hope and idealism made association with the United States seem less hazardous and more attractive even to many of the opposition elements. Despite recurring Cuban crises, there appeared to be a growing détente between the Soviet Union and the United States that gave promise of a more peaceful future.

At the same time, the widening split between the Chinese and Russians threw the leftists into confusion and began to undermine many Marxist premises. China's first nuclear explosion in October 1964 heightened the confusion. It split wide open the popular anti-nuclear bomb movement, which had been used previously as a means of stirring up anti-American sentiment.

On the one side, the Communists were forced to distinguish henceforth between "good" and "bad" nuclear explosions, while the more idealistic supporters of the movement remained opposed to all.

Another important factor was the growing Japanese knowledge of the outside world. Most occidental observers had been shocked by the lack of information among Japanese, and particularly intellectuals, about what had actually been happening in the world since 1945. Japan's relative isolation from world affairs under the Occupation and its continuing absorption with its own problems explained this situation, but it left the political debate in Japan a matter of rarefied theories curiously divorced from world realities. By the early 1960s this situation was beginning to be corrected. The cumulative effect of programs of cultural and intellectual exchange and the widening flow of Japanese abroad in connection with Japan's rapidly expanding foreign trade were resulting in a slowly deepening knowledge of what was really going on in the outside world.

Under these conditions Japan moved a long way toward the consensus Ikeda desired. When he relinquished the helm on November 9, 1964, stricken by the cancer that was to take his life nine months later, he left behind a very different Japan from the one he had taken over a little more than four years earlier. Not only was it vastly more prosperous, but the Japanese people were fully aware of this. As a result they were much more relaxed and self-confident. Japan was clearly rushing ahead. Already it was pushing into sixth place in the world in terms of economic productivity. At the rate it was going it would within a few years pass the United Kingdom and France and might in time even pass West Germany, to become the third largest economic unit in the world, ranking next to the two great superstates—the United States and the Soviet Union.

General elections in November 1960 and November 1963 had shown the continuing stability of Japanese politics. There had been a slow rise in opposition votes, but the Liberal Democratic majority was still secure at close to 60 percent. Prosperity and a growing understanding of the realities in the world had brought many opposition groups closer to the center of the political spectrum, making eventual consensus with them seem more possible. An opposition take-over seemed more remote than before, because the split between the extremists and moderates in the

Left was widening faster than their votes were increasing. There had also been a steady drop in the size and intensity of political demonstrations in the streets. The more radical leftist leaders still called regularly for mass actions of this sort, but the members of the labor unions and university students simply did not respond as before. Many of the unions showed a marked shift in emphasis from political action to more narrowly focused activities in behalf of their own economic welfare.

Most important, the great mass media—the newspapers, magazines, television and radio—had shown a growing tendency toward moderation and balance, both in reporting and in comment. The riots of 1960 had made them realize that they were not dealing with an all-powerful government, as had once been the case, but that it was the mass media themselves that exercised vast powers of influence over the Japanese public. The obvious conclusion was that the mass media must use their power with caution and responsibility.

The self-confident spirit of the new Japan was epitomized by the Tokyo Olympic Games held in October 1964 just before Ikeda's resignation. The Japanese people had thrown themselves into organizing the Olympics with their characteristic enthusiasm and efficiency, and the results were superb. Everyone agreed that the Tokyo Games were in every way the best ever held. A sense of euphoria swept the nation. Ikeda, who had assumed the Prime Ministership in the dark aftermath of the 1960 riots, left in the warm glow of the Olympics. During his period, the "low posture" tortoise had covered a lot of ground, outpacing the more erratic hare-like progress of some of his predecessors.

III

Ikeda's successor, Eisaku Sato, has faced a more difficult period. The helpful Kennedy image was already tragically gone, and President Johnson simply lacked the appeal that his eloquent young predecessor had had for Japanese young people, intellectuals and the more moderate elements in the opposition. Moreover, before Sato had fully found his political footing, the international situation worsened greatly—at least as seen from Japan. The escalation of the war in Viet Nam in February 1965, through the extension of American bombing to the North, threw the Japanese public into virtual panic. It seemed to them that United States policy was in the hands of blind military adven-

turers, who, like those of Japan three decades earlier, were leading their country into a hopeless conflict with the forces of Asian nationalism. They feared that the United States would soon be involved in a war with Communist China, which would in turn engulf Japan because of the American bases in Japan and Okinawa. As themselves the victims of American bombing only two decades earlier, they naturally identified themselves with the North Vietnamese rather than with us or Saigon.

The result was a sharp rise in criticism of the United States and in fears of the defense relationship with us. Since the debate between neutralism and alignment with the United States was the most central and hottest issue in Japanese politics, this situation heightened old political tensions and widened the basic cleavage in Japanese politics. It also sharply reduced Japanese self-confidence. The outside world seemed more menacing again, and there seemed to be less hope that Japan could remain at peace and play a constructive international role.

Even the economy now gave reason for concern. The unbridled economic growth of the Ikeda period had left some undesirable legacies. Inflationary trends had been set in motion that were proving hard to curb. The rapid rise in consumer prices was threatening to eat up wage increases, and the average citizen as a result felt that his economic position might be worsening. Swift but uneven growth had also produced serious economic imbalances which made 1965 a year of difficult readjustments. Gross National Product grew in real terms only around 3 percent, which was so much lower than the accustomed rate that the Japanese felt they were going through a serious "recession."

Rapid growth had also produced difficult social problems. The concentration of labor in industry and the cities sharply reduced rural population—the percentage of the labor force in agriculture is now probably less than 25 percent—leaving villages without young people and many families without fathers. The sprawling cities were increasingly plagued by traffic congestion, air and water pollution, juvenile delinquency and a sense of alienation on the part of the individual lost in the complexities of city life.

The first year of Sato's Prime Ministership thus witnessed an apparent reversal of the current that had flowed slowly but steadily under Ikeda. But this proved only a temporary eddy in the stream. When the Viet Nam War did not escalate further into a Sino-American conflict, when the United States showed its

ability to use its great military power with restraint, still more when the United States, by its bombing pause and diplomatic efforts in the early weeks of 1966, demonstrated its eagerness for a negotiated rather than a military settlement, the fears of the Japanese began to subside. They swung back to the hopeful currents of the Ikeda period, which now flowed more strongly than ever before. It became clear in 1966 that Japan had indeed come a long way since 1960.

If the Japanese had had serious fears about their economic future, these were dispelled by a rapid resurgence of the economy after the 1965 doldrums. The government has decided that a growth of 7½ percent in G.N.P. in real terms would be socially more healthy than the old 10 percent average. It is significant that the problem it faces is to hold growth down, rather than to push it up, to 7½ percent.

More significant has been the rebounding of Japanese self-confidence and optimism. Despite the increased political tensions of 1965, Sato pushed through the normalization of relations with South Korea, capping more than a decade of efforts to achieve this difficult but obviously desirable goal. He matched the American contribution to the new Asian Development Bank with an equal commitment of $200,000,000. And in 1966 the Japanese government boldly joined in efforts to develop a stronger sense of regional coöperation in East Asia, calling together a conference of Southeast Asian economic ministers in Tokyo and participating in other regional conferences. Japan this past summer also took the lead among the creditor nations in seeking ways to help Indonesia meet its current needs for aid and to reschedule its crushing debt burden.

Most remarkable has been the development in 1966 of a broad but calm and reasoned debate over the problems that Japan faces. Led by a group of outstanding younger scholars, the Japanese have for the first time since the war begun to look at the problems of defense and their relations with neighboring countries, not in terms of how Japan should react to American or Communist contentions, but in terms of Japan's own interests and goals. The mass media have redoubled their efforts to present a broad and balanced picture of world problems, and some of the major newspapers have organized special groups to study national defense and other controversial issues. The result has been a much more realistic and far less politically heated debate

than before. No subjects have been automatically taboo—not even nuclear problems. Much attention has been given to what Japan itself can do to help lessen world tensions and contribute to the growth of stability in the less developed countries.

IV

It has been in this general context that we have tried since 1961 to deepen our dialogue with the Japanese and lessen the type of misunderstanding that lay behind the unhappy events of 1960. In this attempt I, for one, took a cue from Ikeda in adopting the "low posture," trying not so much to persuade the Japanese to agree to American points of view as to broaden the area of discourse in order to find points of common understanding and to seek out the differences in underlying assumptions that brought us to contrasting conclusions. I sought to shift the emphasis from the Japanese assumption that our relationship is one of leader-follower, in which Japan is only free to choose its degree of "alignment" with American policy, to a sense of "partnership," in which Japan and the United States, as the two great industrialized nations of the Pacific, face together the problems of that area on the basis of our respective but actually closely parallel interests and ideals.

Since the leaders of the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, the higher bureaucrats and the top businessmen of Japan are persons who tend to share many of the same premises with us, there has been no particular difficulty in achieving mutual understanding with them, but even here we have made efforts to broaden the dialogue. Prime Minister Ikeda and President Kennedy in 1961 started an annual economic conference between members of the two cabinets and also created joint scientific and cultural committees. These have all met regularly since then with most useful results. Japanese businessmen have led in convening a number of excellent conferences with their counterparts in America, and official and unofficial organs of contact of this sort are continuing to proliferate. Meanwhile the exchange of information and opinion has become a routine operation at every level between the two governments.

The gap in understanding in 1960, however, was not with the government and its backers but with the opposition elements—the parties of the Left, organized labor, intellectuals and students. Many of the people in these groups accepted the Marxist concepts that "capitalism" was the reason for "imperialism," and "imperialism" the source of world tensions: therefore the United States, as the leading "capitalist" country, was the chief threat to peace, while the "socialist" countries, that is Communist China and the Soviet Union, were the "peace camp." Such thinking naturally led to a desire to break the defense relationship with us and achieve a strictly neutral position for Japan, if not one of outright alignment with the Communist nations.

In so far as the Japanese stuck to this outmoded nineteenth-century analysis of world problems, no very useful dialogue could be developed. In fact, there still is none with Communists or with those Socialists who, while rejecting the Communist label, accept the Communist view of the world situation. A large part of the opposition groups, however, never fully accepted this Marxist analysis, and their growing knowledge of the twentieth-century world has further diluted their Marxism. These more moderate elements have responded to our efforts to achieve a better understanding of each other.

Even before 1960 the United States government was engaged in a broad program of cultural and intellectual exchange with Japan through the Fulbright Program and other similar agencies. Professors, students, leaders in the mass media and in many other fields and, perhaps most significantly of all, leaders in the labor unions, went back and forth in large numbers. All these activities have, of course, been continued and, where possible, expanded. Cultural and intellectual exchanges under private auspices have increased even more rapidly. All this, as I have noted, has had a growing cumulative influence on Japanese understanding of us and of world problems and has contributed greatly to mutual understanding.

Exchange activities of this sort are not easy to summarize because each individual case is unique, depending on the person involved and the circumstances surrounding him. Instead of characterizing the effort as a whole, I might briefly describe my own activities as an example, since the Japanese public accepted me not only as the American Ambassador but also as a sort of permanent exchange professor.

The dialogue I engaged in with Japanese scholars, political leaders, writers and the general public, through private discussions, public lectures and numerous magazine articles, was largely dictated by their interests. Much of it naturally concerned

Japanese-American relations—trade disputes, problems concerning American bases and their use, our future defense relationship, our respective attitudes toward the China problem and, most of all in recent years, the Viet Nam War.

At the same time my dialogue with the Japanese embraced certain more basic problems. We started with a consideration of recent Japanese history and the process of modernization in Japan. Many Japanese historians have tried to force the story into a Marxist historical pattern. "Modernization" is defined as progress toward a better society, which in turn is assumed to be complete "socialism." Since Japan is not a fully "socialist" society and modern Japan has experienced totalitarian tendencies and imperialistic ventures, these scholars assume that Japan has proved a miserable failure at "modernization." The inevitable conclusion is that it must now seek a new pattern for "modernization" in the Soviet Union or China. This interpretation entirely misses the main point in modern Japanese history, which is that Japan, despite some terrible mistakes, has modernized far more successfully than any other major Asian country.

The "modernization" debate naturally led to a discussion of just how important Japan was as a nation that had been reasonably successful in modernization, what it might have to offer in this regard to the less modernized countries of the world, and finally, what Japan's role in world affairs might be. Thus it paralleled the general trends of Japanese thinking and perhaps contributed in a small peripheral way to these trends. In any case, it did lead to some better understanding on both sides of the differences in our points of view, and definitely contributed to the habit of discussing these differences fully and frankly.

V

In all these ways, a broader and deeper dialogue, both official and private, has been developed over the past several years between Japanese and Americans. It might be appropriate, therefore, to assess where we stand today in this dialogue and in our relations with Japan. The progress we have made in these respects is of course largely the product of broad developments in Japan and in Japanese attitudes toward the outside world, as described earlier in this article. At the same time, I believe it is safe to conclude that the deepening of the dialogue has had at least some small reciprocal influence on these more basic developments.

Japan's great economic growth has been the main reason for a sharp decline in the number and intensity of our bilateral economic problems. In 1961 these still loomed large. The Japanese, apprehensive about their economic future and obsessed with the feeling of dependence on American markets, viewed with grave alarm every disagreement or fluctuation in our economic relationship.

Now with Japanese-American trade nearing $5 billion and the Japanese economy one of the strongest in the world, our bilateral trade problems seem to have shriveled in relative importance. They are seen to occupy only a small fringe of an otherwise vastly successful economic relationship. Some American industrialists worry about Japanese imports in certain specific fields—such as wool textiles—and their Japanese counterparts worry about American efforts to restrict Japanese exports in these fields. American businessmen remain dissatisfied with stiff Japanese restrictions on the import of certain American commodities and the sharp limitation placed on the inflow of American investment. Disputes over North Pacific fisheries—most notably over salmon in Bristol Bay in Alaska—are hot issues for the small groups directly involved on both sides. On the whole, however, bilateral economic problems today generate only a fraction of the concern and political excitement they produced a mere five years ago.

The Japanese-American defense relationship has all along been the focus of major political debate within Japan and our most serious bilateral problem, but even in this area there has been a sharp reduction of friction. The inevitable local irritants resulting from the presence of foreign bases are no longer blown up into major political issues but are seen as the essentially minor matters that they are. In recent years the only "base" problem which has received major public attention and caused relatively large, though only localized, street demonstrations was the decision by the Japanese government to allow the United States to exercise its treaty prerogative of bringing nuclear-propelled naval vessels into our bases in Japan.

At a more basic level, there seems to be a growing realization that the defense relationship with us is not just a convenience for the United States, forced on Japan in behalf of a dubious American Far Eastern policy, but is very much in Japan's own interests. Even certain elements of the opposition are beginning to talk about the modification, rather than the abolition, of the defense

ties with the United States. The government and its supporters, who once simply tried to dodge leftist attacks on the Security Treaty, are now publicly discussing how best to continue the Treaty after 1970—whether by a specific extension for ten years or by simply letting it go on automatically, as was no doubt the original intention. There is growing general interest in the problem of whether Japan should take on a larger share of its own defense and a rising assumption that, whatever the Left may try to do in 1970 to break the defense relationship, common sense dictates that it must go on.

The Viet Nam War has, of course, lent some new strength to the argument that military association with the United States may be dangerous for Japan, but it has also helped to develop an awareness of Japan's own interests in peace and stability in Southeast Asia. As a trading area, Southeast Asia is far more important to the Japanese economy than to ours, and Japan's dependence for close to half of its energy resources on the Middle Eastern and Soviet oil that passes through the Straits of Malacca has made some Japanese realize the great strategic stake Japan has in the narrow sea-lanes of Southeast Asia.

While the first general emotional reaction in Japan in 1965 to the escalation of the war and its risks was a strong desire that the United States would simply withdraw from Viet Nam, the Japanese public has increasingly come to appreciate the complexities of the situation and to hope for a negotiated settlement that might give more promise of stability in the region than would an American withdrawal. Thus, while the pervasive pacificism that has dominated Japan ever since the end of the war precludes any overseas military role for Japan, the public has become much more conscious than before of the need for political stability and military security for the less developed countries of Asia.

There is one problem in our defense relationship with Japan, however, that has become more serious over the last few years. This is the problem of Okinawa, or the Ryukyus. The more that Japanese self-confidence has recovered, the greater has become the problem of American military administration over the million Japanese inhabitants of these islands. This situation, 21 years after the end of the war, is clearly an historical anomaly, to be explained only by the necessity for having in that area American bases that are free of the restrictions on weapons and movement imposed by the Security Treaty on the American

bases in Japan proper. The Japanese government recognizes this need in Japan's own interests. It is for this reason that it has tolerated the situation and coöperated closely with us in programs of economic betterment designed to help the Okinawans catch up to the other Japanese.

The demand for full reversion of Okinawa to Japanese administration, however, will inevitably keep growing. Formerly only the leftists paid much attention to this issue, motivated largely by a desire to break the Japanese-American defense relationship. Now conservatives too are equally concerned about the return of Okinawa to the homeland. Today this constitutes perhaps the gravest single problem in Japanese-American relations. A happy solution probably depends on one of three developments: a decline in the need for the Okinawan bases because of reduced dangers in the area, a decline in their necessity because of progress in technology that makes them no longer essential, or a change in popular Japanese attitudes toward defense that would permit the Japanese government to agree to the existence of bases of this kind on Okinawa even after it had reverted to Japan.

VI

Perhaps the greatest change in Japanese-American relations over the past few years has not been the decline in the number and intensity of specific problems so much as the shift in the whole mood. In 1960 most Japanese assumed that their country was a helpless follower of a more or less suspect American foreign policy. The Japanese-American defense relationship was commonly considered to be a disagreeably high price Japan paid for the close economic relations it had with the United States, on which it was pathetically dependent. It was widely assumed that the Japanese government did not dare speak up frankly to the United States, and, if it did, it would not be listened to.

No one can deny that many of these attitudes still persist in certain quarters in Japan. And the problem of disparity in size, which plagues us in all our international relationships, will no doubt continue. We are, after all, roughly twice Japan's size in population and ten times its size in productive power. This makes it hard for the Japanese (just like our European and Canadian friends) to feel fully equal. In addition, the Japanese have clear memories of the war, in which we defeated them so thoroughly,

and of the Occupation, in which we controlled them completely.

There is, nonetheless, a great change in prevailing attitudes in Japan. The change is most marked in the younger generation, which is free from the psychological burden of the war and the Occupation. Now that the Japanese have come to have a better appreciation of the strength of Japan and its potential for exerting an influence on world affairs, they increasingly see Japan's foreign policy as a matter for Japanese choice on the basis of Japan's own interests. When viewed in this light, a close partnership with the United States, including a defense relationship, is seen to be greatly in Japan's interests, and not an undesirable situation forced on Japan by American might or historical accident. As some young scholars have put it, nothing is more important to Japan than American friendship.

This change in viewpoint also puts a new light on Japan's relations with its neighbors. It becomes clear that Japan has a strong interest in playing a positive role in furthering the stability and economic growth of the countries of Southeast Asia. Formerly the Japanese tended to look at the problems of that area as American concerns and sat back in critical judgment on our apparent ineptness in handling them. Now that the Japanese see the future of Southeast Asia as of vital concern to their own country, they think more about what they themselves can usefully do. In grappling with the problems in this way, they become more sympathetic with the difficulties we have encountered and more appreciative of the value of the American partnership in facing the situation in Southeast Asia.

The Japanese are beginning to see even the key issue of relations with China in a new light. One of the most serious and long-standing strains in the Japanese-American relationship has resulted from the popular feeling in Japan that, because of geographic propinquity to China, long and close cultural association, and economic interests, Japanese have much more reason than Americans to seek fuller and friendlier ties with Communist China, but are prevented from doing so by their close association with a stubborn and shortsighted America.

Recently, however, Japanese have begun to realize that it is their own strong economic, political and emotional bonds with Taiwan that stand as the major obstacle to the rapprochement they hope for with Peking. Beyond that, the Chinese nuclear explosions, the growing intransigence of the statements of the

Peking leaders, and, most of all, the distressing excesses of the Cultural Purge and Red Guard movement have led to increasing disenchantment with Communist China. Japanese are beginning to see that the China problem they face stems more from Peking, Taiwan and Southeast Asia than from Washington.

Perhaps the greatest change in the tone of Japanese-American relations has been the growing feeling that the Japanese can and do speak fully and frankly to Americans and that their voices are heard. At the time that my impending resignation was announced last July, every major newspaper, remembering the earlier talk of our "broken dialogue with Japan," took the occasion to comment editorially that the dialogue between the United States and Japan was now a frank and equal one. This attitude, together with the fact that, as two modernized, industrialized and democratic countries, we do share basic interests and ideals, makes me confident that our bilateral problems will continue to decline and our partnership in facing other problems will continue to grow. In fact, I feel that, despite the admittedly high barriers between us of sharply different languages, differing cultural traditions and contrasting historical experiences, we shall move steadily forward toward the kind of easy and full partnership that the United States already has with the United Kingdom.

Morning Star.
May 10, 1964

Over Exposed Sovereignty

Okinawa has been exposed oftener than Gipsy Rose Lee.

The latest series of articles exposing the American military stewardship of the Ryukyus appears in a Washington D.C. newspaper under the by-line of Rafel Steinberg, a free lance writer who has spent 14 years in the Far East. Approximately two weeks of this time were spent in the Ryukyus.

As the result of Steinberg's brousing through the bosky dells and rifle ranges of Okinawa he has compiled a lengthy list of complaints against the military. The major complaint acknowledges that the U.S. has done a great deal to assist the Ryukyus but deplores that the Americans have performed their good deeds in a high handed way that has grated upon the sensibilities of the Ryukyuans.

Okinawa Is Subject Of Another Exposing

In bestowing their benefits upon the Ryukyuans Steinberg says, the Americans failed to observe Ryukyuan ways and thus detracted from the value of their gifts.

The high commissioner, Steinberg writes, should permit the Ryukyuans to make their own laws. If the Ryukyuans make laws that are dangerous to the American posture in the Ryukyus the high commissioner can veto the laws. In telling the Ryukyuans in advance what kind of laws he will permit them to pass the high commissioner is acting in a high-handed manner, Steinberg says he learned during his two-week stay here.

If the high commissioner vetoes a law, a politician explained to Steinberg, the legislature gets to complain about the veto afterward. When the high commissioner warns them in advance what laws to pass the legislators are deprived of a valuable opportunity to complain, Steinberg quotes a Ryukyuan politician as having said. To Steinberg this apparently sounds like dirty pool. To others it sounds like smart politics.

The high commissidner should not concern himself with the details of running the islands such as the ownership and management of co-operative sugar mills and who shall be permitted visas to tour the military base, Steinberg quotes the Ryukyuans as having complained.

Apparently during Steinberg's two-week fact finding tour of the Ryukyus he interviewed some of the members of a sugar cooperative who have recently been indicted by the prosecutor for the embezzlement of sugar cooperative funds. These officials have been particularly critical of the high commissioner and his habit of prying into musty corners in search of inefficiency and corruption.

Mainly Steinberg is wounded by the fact that the U.S. is not trying hard enough to make Japanese out of the Ryukyuans. Steinberg interprets the statement "residual sovereignty" to mean that the U.S. should spend more time in tutoring Okinawans in things Japanese. Residual sovereignty is many things to many people. Mostly its meaning is a mystery.

An attorney on Okinawa who has given considerable thought to the subject interprets residual in the following manner:

"If your Uncle John dies and wills a vacant lot to the church to be used for religious purposes he may also bequeath residual rights of the lot to you. Then, if the church ever goes out of business you may be next in line to inherit whatever is left of the lot."

Attorneys can debate the meaning of residual sovereignty: the State department and the Department of Defense can debate one another over protocol; and the communists can debate the socialists over the atom bomb.

There is one subject upon which all but the communists and socialists agree. It is agreed by both Japan and the U.S. that the American military base must stay on Okinawa. Steinberg admits this also.

Residual sovereignty and whether or not the Okinawans should be instructed in flower arranging or advanced calculus are some of the side issues to this question. These side issues are likely to remain for some time just as will the main issue of the American military base on Okinawa.

Churches and military bases are both rather permanent installations and residual sovereignty is likely to be the least important part of the arrangement.

Because of the vague meaning of residual sovereignty it is likely that Okinawa and the Americans here will continue to be exposed from time to time as crusaders become entrigued with the term and its application. That's the trouble with those hard to define terms. Sometimes they cause all sorts of double exposures.

Morning Star
May 11, 1964

The Tragedy of the Time Table

In one of the most tragic political-military blunders of our time, presidential candidate Dwight Eisenhower promised the mothers of America that if elected he would go to Korea and stop the war.

Eisenhower didn't promise victory, an end to slaughter or to stop communist aggressions. He simply set a time table for the Americans to cease resisting communist pressure. The communists were quick to take advantage of this American indecision. The communists exploited America's desire to end the war by doubling their efforts, by killing more Americans and, by making it obvious that the Americans and not the communists were suing for peace. It is possible that there would be fewer communist aggressions in Asia today if the U.S. and its allies had maintained the initiative in Korea. Certainly few if any American lives were saved as the result of Eisenhower's campaign promise to end the war.

Korea Was Expensive Lesson for the U.S.

Today the U.S. is the victim of another campaign not unlike that which faced the Americans in Korea. Reactions, do-gooders and a generous sprinkling of enemies are urging that the U.S. announce a time table for withdrawal from Okinawa.

The U.S. has made it abundantly clear by treaty and official announcement that it is America's duty to itself and the free world to remain on Okinawa for as long as tensions exist in the Far East. Assuming that the U.S. had intentions to withdraw from Okinawa it would hardly serve the best interests of the free world to announce its military plans a year or a decade ahead so that the communists could adjust their aggressions to match.

Just as politics were responsible for Eisenhower's sacrifice of Korea so are politics involved in campaigns which urge the U.S. to announce to the world its plans for withdrawing from Okinawa. Many of these political currents have their origin in the murky depth of election year activities in Washington. Whatever their origin they confer no benefit upon the U.S. and its allies nor do they make the world a safer or happier place.

American possession and administration of Okinawa is a military necessity and in cases of military necessity certain ground rules prevail. These include the necessity of keeping politics out of military programs and refusing to be stampeded into actions which are not in your own best interest.

米紙の沖縄返還要望に エールズ陸軍長官が見解

米ワシントン・ポスト紙は五日の社説で「沖縄の五政はつねに不人気で、沖縄住民は日本復帰を望んでいる。米国は情勢が悪化しないうちに手を打たねばならない」と論じた（サンケイ新聞八日付け朝刊既報）が、エールズ米陸軍長官は十日の同紙紙上で、米政府の見解をつぎのようにのべた。

十日＝ワシントン・ポスト

侵略への即応態勢

まず第一に、なぜわれわれが沖縄に駐留しているのかを考えてみよう。われわれは沖縄を戦利品として手にいれて、米国の一部に併合しなかったし、永久にここにとどまるつもりもない。米国は同島を管理し、ここに駐留しているのに過ぎない」とのべた。また、戦略的に有利な位置にある沖縄は、極東での侵略に即応できる自由と手段を提供している。

侵略への即応態勢がとのべた。

必要かによって、沖縄での米軍駐留の性格と存続期間がきまる。沖縄以外の現地では、われわれは、アジアでの侵略をはたらく必要な戦力、施設、兵器、通信施設を無条件で維持することはできない。

平和条約が調印され、米国が日本にある米軍事施設の削減に同意したとき、日本政府は大規模な防衛基地の必要を認めた。日本は、沖縄での米軍駐留により与えられる保護を喜び、この保護がこの当分必要であることを了解している。一方米政府は先月日本に覚え書きを送り、「米国は、自由世界の安全保障の観点からみて、琉球諸島への日本の主権を全面的に回復させてもよい日のくることを期待している」と再確認した。

米軍が沖縄に駐留してきたのはこうした理由からである。日本は沖縄にたいし、故グレン元国務長官のいう「潜在主権」を保持している。しかし、われわれは現在実際上の権力を行使しなければならない。現在の極東情勢ではこうした主権しか与えられないと思う。

経済援助にも全力

米国は、琉球諸島に年間約三億ドル提供しているが、それはさておき、同島では、労働力が主要輸出品で、貧困が沖縄にたいし、故グレン元国務長官のいう「潜在主権」を保持している。しかし、われわれは現在実際上の権力を行使しなければならない。現在の極東情勢ではこうした主権しか与えられないと思う。

住民の権限も増大

わたくしは、沖縄住民が自分たちの自治政府の権限を拡大したいと考えていることを忘れていないことは思わない。自分たちの社会を管理するため沖縄住民に与えられた権限の範囲が徐々に拡大してきたことをあげたい。

防衛上いまはムリ

いずれは日本の一県に

エールズ陸軍長官

米国の沖縄管理に帰突末かわるものといえば日本政府の管理であることに留意してもらいたい。長い目でみれば、沖縄の将来は独立国ではなく、おそらく日本の一県になることである。もしわれわれが、同島の管理について、適切な責任をとらなければ、管理にたいする非難はつぎつぎなると思う。

米国による沖縄管理は、防衛上きわめて重要な地域にふさわしく簡単として公正なものである。

あらゆる人々は自分たちが終極的に帰属する国家の政治的支配下におかれることを望んでいる。だから、沖縄を日本に復帰させようとする願望が琉球に存在することは疑いない。しかし、日本復帰が現在の米軍施設の撤去をもたらすものならば、復帰を求める感情はほとんどないものとわたくしは個人的に信じている。

主管課長へ

本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課係関班に連絡こう

電信写

(配布先○印)

官房長	官房長	官房次官	官房次官
厚生大臣	厚生大臣	厚生省	厚生省
文部大臣	文部大臣	文部省	文部省
通産大臣	通産大臣	通産省	通産省
東京都知事	東京都知事	東京都	東京都
北海道庁	北海道庁	北海道庁	北海道庁
自治省	自治省	自治省	自治省
経済企画庁	経済企画庁	経済企画庁	経済企画庁
総理府	総理府	総理府	総理府
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外務大臣殿

ワシントン 武内 大使 総領事 領事

件名 ワシントン・ポストのオキナハに関する記事の件

第1196号 平

往電第1173号に関し

10日付ワシントンポストはOur Okinawa Rule Firm and Fairと題するエールズ陸軍長官の署名入りの一文を掲げているが、これはさきにワシントン・ポストに掲げられたスタインバーグ記者のオキナハに関する一連の記事の論旨を反論するものであり、要旨次の通り。

米国がオキナハにとどまつているのは極東における侵略をそしするためやむをえず留つているのであり、日本政府もこの点りよう承している。最近日米間に交換された対

外務省

アジア局 39.5.12 総務室

主管課長へ

本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課係関班に連絡こう

電信写

キナハ援助に関する交換公文においても、米国としては「自由世界の安全保障上の利益がリュウキュウ諸島の日本への完全な復帰を許す日を待望している」と記されている。

それでは米国がオキナハでし政権を行使するにあたり、果してオキナハ住民のふくし増進のため十分努力しているであろうか、また、米国がし政権を今後も行使することについてオキナハ住民のある程度の支持を得ているであろうか、自分は何れについても然りと答えたい。

オキナハは経済的に自立できたことはなく、戦前は日本の県の中で最も経済的に遅れていた。

米国は援助、現地支出等をひつくるめて年間約1億ドル近くの金をオキナハに落しており、オキナハの経済開発が進められている結果、国民所得はいちじるしく改善されている。米国は日本とオキナハとの文化的、感情的じゆう着が強いことを認めており、日本とオキナハとの貿易、人的交流等も盛んである。今回成立した日本との合意の結果、日本のオキナハ向け援助拡大への道が開かう。

オキナハ住民の自治拡大も着々進められており、米軍当局が政治にかい入したのは島民のふくしを確保するためやむを得なかつた場合であり、オキナハが日本の県であつたとしても日本政府は同じようにかい入したであろう。オキ

外務省

主管課長へ

電信写　本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課検閲班に連絡こう

ナハ側に大はばな自治を与えればかれ等は次第に責任ある政治を身につけようという論があるが、軍事的な要請上、余り思い切つたぼう険を行い得ない。いずれにせよ、米国のオキナハ統治に代るものはオキナハの独立ではなくて、日本のオキナハ統治である、ということをわすれてはならない。

近くたい役するキヤラウエー高等弁務官は在任中オキナワ住民のためけんしん的な働きをしており、現地で多くの人に感謝されている。オキナワの日本復帰えの願望が強いことを否定するものではないが、米軍基地の即時はい止を要求するような形における日本復帰を望む空気は少ないと思う。

ポストの記事がオキナワ駐留の米軍人が住民のひんきゅうをしり目にぜいたくの生活を送つているかにえがいていることは最も遺かんであつた。

オキナワの米軍人はそ国をとおく離れてたいぼう生活を送るのみならず、余かを利用してオキナワ住民のふくしのためほうしし、とう民に感謝されている。

（了）

アジア局長
~~参事官~~ 5/12
~~参事官~~ (正)
~~総務参事官~~

北米課長

送付公信

政 第 3236 号	昭和 39 年 5 月 12 日
引用公・電信番号	往電第 1196 号に関し
送付資料及び備考	沖縄に関するエールズ陸軍長官のクミントン、ポスト寄稿文送付の件 別紙添付紙同着

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WASHINGTON POST
MAY 10 1964

Our Okinawa Rule 'Firm and Fair'

Secretary of Army Ailes Believes U.S. Is Meeting Its Goal of Advancing The Welfare of Ryukyuans

By Stephen Ailes
Secretary of the Army

A RECENT SERIES OF articles in The Washington Post described Okinawa as "our unhappy Asia bastion." It was said that "the people of Okinawa today are convinced that the United States has let them down."

If this account of life in Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands is accurate, then we have indeed let the Okinawans down. Because the Army is responsible for the administration of the Ryukyus, I offer the following as necessary to a balanced view.

First, consider why we are there at all. We did not annex Okinawa as war booty; we did not incorporate it as part of the United States; we do not expect to remain there permanently. The United States administers the islands, and stations on them great numbers of men and quantities of materiel, because that expensive task is absolutely vital to the defense of the fre world.

"Our bases in the Ryukyu Islands," President Kennedy said, "help us assure our allies in the great arc from Japan through Southeast Asia not only of our willingness but also of our ability to come to their assistance in case of need." Strategically situated, Okinawa also provides us with the freedom and the means to respond appropriately to aggression in the Far East.

It is the necessity to respond adequately to aggression which determines both the nature and the tenure of our stay there. Nowhere else but in Okinawa can we maintain without restriction the forces, the installations, the weapons and the communication systems we need to meet our responsibilities in Asia.

The government of Japan recognized our requirement for a great defense base in 1952, when the Peace Treaty was signed, and again when we agreed to limit the U.S. military establishment in Japan. Japan enjoys the protection afforded by our presence on Okinawa and understands that this protection will be required for some time to come. On the other hand, only last month an American note to the Japanes reaffirmed that the United States "looks forward to the day when the security interests of the free world will permit the restoration of the islands to full Japanese sovereignty."

So much for the reasons why we have remained in Okinawa. Conditions of threat and tension in the Far East require us to be there. Recognizing that, in the words of Secretary Dulles, "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa remains in Japan, we must nevertheless exercise the effective powers of sovereignty today. This I regard as the "given" in the situation.

Beyond this, however, there lies the question of our performance in the islands. Have we carried out Congress's instructions to "improve the welfare of the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands and to promote their economic and cultural advancement"? Do we enjoy the reasonable acquiescence of the people of the Ryukyus in the continued administration of the Islands by the United States? I believe that the answer to both questions is "Yes."

Okinawa is not now, and has never been, self-sufficient. Before the war, the Islands by every economic standard ranked last among Japanese prefectures—considerably beneath the others. Their principal export was labor; poverty was endemic and almost universal. Today the two basic products, sugar and pineapples, could scarcely support half the population of the islands.

A Helping Hand

AS A CONSEQUENCE, Okinawa requires assistance from without to support her people. The United States—through local employment, through military expenditures, through grants-in-aid—contributes almost $100 million to the Ryukyuan economy every year. We established a development loan corporation to provide millions for investment in housing and business. We created modern road, water and electric power systems, built thousands of classrooms, established the first university ever to be opened in the Ryukyus—with a student body of more than 2500—and put up health clinics where there were none before. We have provided training and breeding stock which has much improved Okinawa's agricultural production.

These developments have brought about substantial changes in Ryukyuan life, in great part for the better. The per capita income in Okinawa today is about $314—among the highest in Asia.

The United States has consistently recognized the profound cultural and emotional ties between Japan and Okinawa. Japan remains by far Okinawa's greatest trading partner, travel between them is extremely heavy and Japanese cultural influence in Okinawa is predominant. Our new aid agreement with Japan provides the channel for substantial Japanese assistance to the islands.

I shall not gainsay the desire of Okinawans to broaden the range of their self-government or the propriety of this desire. I shall only say that there has been a steady increase in the range of responsibility which Okinawans have assumed for managing their society. The government of the Ryukyu Islands, conceived in the democratic form by the United States and inaugurated in 1952, accepts and exercises increasing responsibilities for the local affairs of the islands each year. While it is true that the U.S. High Commissioner's role with respect to Ryukyu government is inconsistent with complete autonomy for the Ryukyus, I believe that he has exercised his responsibilities so as to keep the economy moving forward, to keep income taxes from being disastrously reduced, to provide electric power to the local population at reasonable rates and to correct banking abuses. I am satisfied that if Okinawa were being administered as a prefecture of Japan, the Japanese government would exercise a similar responsibility for the welfare of the Islands.

The GRI, left to its own devices, would perhaps have learned the art of government and acquired responsibility in any event. But, in this unique situation, where military and civilian interests are deeply interwoven, the costs and risks involved in such a course have seemed excessive.

The Alternative

ONE SHOULD RECALL that the real alternative to U.S. administration of Okinawa is Japanese government. The long-range prospect for Okinawa is not the status of an independent nation but rather of a Japanese prefecture.

If we had not exercised our proper responsibility with respect to the administration of the islands, I am certain that complaints against the U.S. administration would be far more vociferous.

The American administration on Okinawa is firm and fair, as is appropriate for an area of critical defense importance. The present High Commissioner, Lt. Gen. Paul Caraway, who retires from the Army this summer, has given the Okinawan people able and devoted service during his term. Hundreds of Ryukyuans have written to me expressing their respect and appreciation of his work in the islands.

All peoples everywhere prefer to be under the political administration of the nation to which they ultimately belong. Accordingly, a strong reversionary attitude undoubtedly exists in the Ryukyus. But it is my personal conviction that there is little sentiment for reversion now if it entails the present removal of the American military establishment.

My greatest complaint against these articles concerns the injustice which has been done to the American serviceman on Okinawa. There are thousands of soldiers, airmen, marines and sailors on Okinawa, and their life, contrary to its portrayal in these accounts, is not one of luxury. Not many of us, I suspect, would choose voluntarily to live on an island thousands of miles from home.

But, more important in the larger sense, these servicemen of ours have given thousands of hours, and tens of thousands of dollars, toward improving school facilities, orphanages, community centers and the like for the Okinawans. They manifest in the clearest way our concern for the people of the Ryukus.

These activities include the teaching of English in Ryukyuan schools by some 150 volunteers, many of whom are service wives, mercy air flights in emergency medical cases and assistance by United States forces, mostly in off-duty hours, providing technical skills and using engineering equipment in small community projects running at the rate of 300 projects a year.

Let me quote from an article in an Okinawan paper by the Ryukyuan principal of a school for the deaf and blind:

"In April, 1960, the construction of a playground of our school was completed by the servicemen of the Machinato Post Engineer District. It took about 50 days for them to construct the playground by leveling more than 2000 tsubo (about 2 acres) of land near the dormitory.

"I was especially moved by the U.S. servicemen who worked hard. Sometimes they worked in the moonlight, besmeared with mud and bathed in perspiration. The teachers and pupils of our schools were overjoyed when the playground was completed. Those who took part in the ground-leveling work of our school probably returned to the United States, but their contribution to the improvement of our school facilities will be remembered by our teachers and pupils for a long time to come."

The Washington Post articles sought to assess Ryukyuan opinion, a process which is difficult to accomplish in any land in a short period of time. There, as elsewhere, all ranges of individual opinion undoubtedly exist; some viewpoints are objective, others are colored by the particular interests or experience of the individual involved. While I cannot pose as an expert on the subject, I, too, have talked with a fair number of Ryukyuans, some in far-away places like the Islands of Miyako, Ishigaki and Iriomote, 150 to 200 miles south of Okinawa. The Ryukyuans are hard working, honest, forthright and friendly people. I know that the American is well received by them and I feel satisfied that the majority of the population is appreciative of the advances which have been made in the standard of living and in health and education under the present administration of the Ryukyus. And I know, too, that we shall continue our efforts to improve the welfare of the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands and to promote their economic and cultural advancement."

ワシントンポスト紙の沖縄に関する報道・社説及びこれに対する陸軍長官の反論の要旨

1. 「ワシントン・ポスト」紙は、5月3日から7日まで同紙の特派員スタインバーグ記者「不幸なアアシアのとりで—沖縄」と題する記事を連載して沖縄の現状改革について異例ともいえるキャンペンを行うとともに、社説で沖縄の日本反還について論議した。連載記事の要旨は次の通りである。

(1) アメリカの治下におかれ、日本と正常な貿易も往来も出来ない状態におかれた沖縄には失望と不平が充満しているが、島を統治しているアメリカの将軍は、島民の利益は、沖縄人よりも自分がよく知つていると自負しており、民政当局は、沖縄住民の不平に対し、沖縄の経済的繁栄、道路、水道等の各種の建設をアメリカの功績として誇示する。然しながら沖縄島民は、自治はお

ろか、祖国との接触すら出来ない点で米国の新政策は前進していないと信じている。アメリカは沖縄の場合に限らず、海外軍事基地を維持して行くに必要な現地人の善意の保持につき兎角遅れ勝ちである。

(2) 沖縄が重視される所以は、その施設が大きく戦略位置の重要さもあるが、緊急事態に際し、自由に兵器、兵力を動かしうることである。

然し高等弁務官は軍事上の安全保障の問題とは凡そかけ離れた砂糖筆場の統合問題、渡航問題、医薬品の取締り等無数のこまごました問題に関係しており、民政府も米国議会も琉球住民に、日本と同じ程度の経済発展をもたらしていない。

(3) 琉球についての気がかりな結論は次のとおりである。

(イ) 琉球には真のデモクラシーはない。キャラウェイの意見だけが重要であり、すべてが彼の意見に従つて決定されている。

(ロ) 軍の支出や将兵の消費が琉球の繁栄をもたらしていることは事実であるが、島民は基地収入よりも日本の繁栄の分け前を望んでいる。日本政府の沖縄県程度の国内の低開発県に対する援助は、アメリカの対沖縄経済援助の2倍、3倍にのぼるとのことである。

(ハ) 日本と沖縄との往来も問題となつている。沖縄に居るアメリカ人のほとんどは、沖縄住民の願望や伝統に理解を示さない。ある者は、彼等に必要な自治はすべて与えている、と考えており、キャラウェイも沖縄人はこれ以上の責任を持つことを欲していない、と述べている。アメリカ

人は、沖縄人の出来るのは日本のまねと言いながら、アメリカ的な生き方を教えようと懸命である、と沖縄人は感じている。

(ニ) 高等弁務官は、アメリカの重大な利益を守るため、琉球政府の意向とは無関係に、法律と同様の効力を有する布令を発布することができ、またアメリカ又はアメリカ人の利益を害すると判断すれば、沖縄の法案を拒否し、あるいは法律の無効を宣言することができる。

(ホ) 沖縄の法案は、立法院に上提される前に、民政府と「事前調整」をすることとなつており、民政府によつて修正あるいは反対された場合は、琉球政府はその意見どおりに法案を修正しなければならない。また、法案が立法院を通過し、主席がこれに最終的に署名する前に、その法案はさらに民政府の点検を受けねばなら

ない。

(ヘ) 沖縄住民はケネディ声明の、沖縄援助に関する日米間の取極締結と、アメリカが保有するを必要としない行政権の琉球政府への移譲の2点を重視している。しかしキャラウェイは、つねに日本の沖縄援助を歓迎しない態度であり、この2年間自治権の拡大は何一つ行なわれなかつた。キャラウェイは、琉球人の自治は「神話」であると述べて沖縄の一般大衆に衝撃を与えた。

(ト) 沖縄に居る軍人、軍属は、本国より高い俸給を貰い、本国よりも安く必需品、ぜい沢品を入手できて、アメリカ本国では味えない高い生活を楽しみ、沖縄の低賃銀労働力を使用している。白人兵、黒人兵の紛争も頻発している。

(チ) 統治権、法律の制定権、法律の拒否権、法廷の支配権を持つものには、世論は問題でないかも知れないが、沖縄の指導者は、民政府は甚しく専横であると感じている

(リ) 高等弁務官は、本年3月始め、薬品統制に関する法律の制定を1カ月の期限付で琉球政府に指示したが、民政府と琉球政府の見解が一致しなかつたため、4月3日麻酔薬、睡眠薬、トランキライザー等の統制に関する弁務官布令を公布した。

若い兵隊や沖縄青少年のために、何等かの規制が必要であつたろうが、この条例が余りに広範囲にわたり、風邪薬や胃散まで含まれて混乱をきたし、高等弁務官の専横が非難されている。

(ヌ) 人の起用についても、高等弁務官はゴールデン・ゲート・クラブ会員（アメリカに留学した人の会）を偏重している。

彼等の中に優秀な人物がいることは事実である。キヤラウエイは特定のグループの偏重を否認しているが、沖縄人は、伝統的なルートで昇進した沖縄人ほどに尊敬していない。

(ハ) この2年間沖縄の経済は発展した。2年間に国民総生産は31%、個人所得は23%増大して1人当り所得は292ドルとなつた。

しかし貿易赤字は1億1千800万ドルに達しこの赤字は軍の支出9100万ドル、米国の直接援助700万ドル、その他のアメリカの援助500万ドル、日本の援助500万ドルによつて賄われている。大部分の食糧は日本本土から輸入されるから消費物価は高く、全般的生活水準は本土の最も貧しい県の80%にすぎない。また、本土では大規模な社会福祉施策が実施されているが、沖縄では労

働者の受ける恩典は微々たるものである。

(ヲ) 沖縄の底に横たわる動かすことのできない政治的事実は、住民が再び日本の一部になりたいと願つていることである。この願望は政党、政派を超え、じばしば経済的利益をさえ超越している。

この感情は、毎年琉球立法院が沖縄の日本への即時復帰を求める決議を、全会一致で採択することで表明されている。アメリカにとつて当惑だつたことは、今年の決議が、東京とワシントンだけでなく、対日平和条約の全調印国に送られたことだ。

(ワ) アメリカの法律家たちは、アメリカが沖縄を統治しているのに、アメリカの法律も憲法も適用されないことに不満である。

なかには、沖縄をはつきり香港のごとくアメリカの属領にすることを希望して

いる者もいる。

軍の一部にはこの考えを支持するものもあるが、対日関係を考える国務省とホワイトハウス及び公式の米国の政策は、琉球が日本の一部であることを堅く誓約している。

(4) 沖縄問題をめぐる国務省と軍との対立が余りに甚しいため高等弁務官はときに東京の米大使館へ重要情報を流さず、また大使館は軍の独裁支配についての報告を極端に誇張している。

(5) 緊張緩和及び一部の不満を解消するために如何なる方法があるか。以下の措置をとるにしても、祖国復帰の願望が解消するものではないが、米国の占領を沖縄住民に耐えやすくすることは、基地の保持に役立つものと思われる。

(1) 議会における援助額を毎年数百万ドルの増額承認。

(2) 講和発効前の損害補償2200万ドルの支払の承認。

本法案は高等弁務官と国防省間で意見の一致をみたものである。

(3) ワトソン新高等弁務官は交代を機会に立法院に自主立法を許せ

(4) 民政府は、日本の援助を制限したり、厳重管理することなく、日本をして自由に沖縄の経済開発に参加せしめよ

(5) 旅行の制限を緩和し、手続を簡素化せよ、旅行の禁止は、現実にスパイや破壊活動を行うものに限れ、

2. 社説の要旨

沖縄住民は、自分達の政府と日本との古くからの結び付きを回復することを希望している。

一方米国は沖縄が自由世界の防衛に大きな役割を果すことを期待している。双方の異つた目的を調和させることは至難であるが、もし米国の軍人、文官が沖縄を植民地行政官の目で見るならばいつの日にか沖縄でパナマ事件以上の危機が起るかも知れない。

よつて、米国は沖縄統治上次の3点を目標とすべきである。(イ)米軍の存在をできるだけ攻撃的でなく小規模なものとすること、(ロ)住民に対し軍事目的に反しない限り自治を与えること、(ハ)最後に沖縄の日本返還について適切な計画を樹てねばならない。

3. ワシントン・ポスト紙の上記論評に対しエールズ陸軍長官は5月10日の同紙紙上で反論を発表した。その要旨は次のとおり。

米国が沖縄管理、駐留しているのは、自由世界の防衛上に死活的重要性をもつものであり、侵略への即応態勢がどの程度必要かによつて米軍駐留の性格も存続期間が決まる沖縄以外の地域では、アジアの義務を果たす必要は戦力施設、兵器通信施設を無条件で維持することはできない。平和条約が調印され、米国が日本にある米軍事施設の削減に同意した日本政府は大規模な防衛基地の必要を認めるとともにその保護が当分必要であることを了解している。次いで米国の沖縄住民の福祉及び経済開発に関し、米国は積極的援助を行なつており、最近新日米援助協定の締結をみた。沖縄は究極的には独立国でなく日本の一県となるであろうが、日本復帰が現在の米軍施設の撤去を伴うものならば復帰を求める感情はほとんどないものと自分は個人的に確心する。

〔禁無断転載〕

国際情勢資料

昭和39年6月12日（金）　特集　第1006号

《目　次》

確固不抜で公正な統治

＝沖縄施政批判に答える＝

スチーブン・エイルズ米陸軍長官

〔ワシントン・ポスト紙（米）五月十日号〕

監　修　内閣調査室・委託編集　内外情勢調査会

まえがき

アメリカの有力新聞ワシントン・ポスト紙が五月初旬に、沖縄におけるアメリカの軍事統治を手ひどく批判したステインバーグ記者の現地視察記事を連載したり、同じく批判的だが比較的物やわらかい調子のジェイムソン記者の見聞記をシカゴ・トリビュン紙が連載したりして、このところ沖縄の軍政と旧沖縄県人の祖国復帰運動の現状に対する関心が、アメリカ本国でも日本でも高まってきている。ポスト紙の記事は、すでに「特集」一〇〇一号をもって全文紹介したが、これに対してアメリカ陸軍長官スチーブン・エイルズ氏が、五月十日のポスト紙上に反論を書いて、沖縄高等弁務官キャラウェー中将と米民政府の立ち場を全面的に支持する態度を明らかにした。当然のこととはいえ、現職の陸軍長官が軍政施策の問題について、新聞にこのような正面切った反ばく論文を発表するのは、米国ではきわめて異例のこととされる。

さきのステインバーグ論文が発表されたさい、沖縄の人たちは、これをアメリカ国民の沖縄に対する認識が高まった結果だと受けとり、地元紙でも、「われわれの不満を代弁してくれたものだ」と好感をもって迎えられたといわれる。

ところがエイルズ陸軍長官は、ステインバーグ記者の探訪記事を「ひどく一方的な見方に基づくもの」として、激しく反発するとともに、アメリカがここ当分は、いかなることがあろうとも沖縄の施政権と基地を手放す意図のないことを、これまでになく明確化した。

エイルズ長官は「われわれが沖縄にいるのは、自由世界防衛のため必要だからであり、日本政府も平和条約でこれを了承している。軍隊や軍事施設、通信組織などを制約なしに自由に設置できる地点は、アジアでは沖縄以外に

ない。沖縄にもいろいろな意見はあるが、大部分の沖縄人は、アメリカ軍の行政下における数々の民生発展を喜び感謝している」という。したがって、ポスト紙の記者は「住民の不平不満だけを書くために来島したとしか考えられない」という長官の不満はうなずける。

また、沖縄住民の生活向上と自治権拡大を促す各種の施策に米民政当局者が誠意をもって尽力していることを疑ってはいないともいう。

いまのところはアメリカという異民族の強い力の支配を受けているので、同じ民族の日本の治政下におかれるのと同じようにいかないのは当然だ、とエイルズ長官は述べているが、現実問題としては、「私個人の信ずるところでは、日本復帰ということがアメリカ軍事施設の撤去を伴うものだとすれば、沖縄人の間に復帰を望む気持ちはほとんどないといえる」といい切っている。

スティンバーグ記者やジェイムソン記者の批判に対する反発は、沖縄現地の米民政府当局や軍当局の間からも起こっているに違いない。それを非公式に代弁しているようにみえる英字紙オキナワ・モーニング・スター紙の五月十三日の社説も、ここに紹介しておいた。題して「情緒のみせ場」という主張によると、「祖国復帰」をさわぎ立てるのは沖縄人の思い過ごしではないかというのである。戦前の旧沖縄県時代から日本政府の重荷とみられ、厄介者扱いを受けていたものが、アメリカの世話を受けるのがいやで、日本に泣きついたとしても、日本にとってはありがた迷惑なのではなかろうか、というのが、スター紙の論旨である。末尾にワシントン・ポスト紙の社説（五月五日）を載せておいた。

確固不抜で公正な統治

＝沖縄施政批判に答える＝

スチーブン・エイルズ米陸軍長官

〔ワシントン・ポスト紙（米）五月十日号〕

このほど「ワシントン・ポスト」紙に連載された現地報告記事は、沖縄を「アジアにおけるわれわれの不幸なとりで」と形容した。同記事はまた「沖縄の住民は今日、アメリカに裏切られたと信じている」と述べた。

もしこの論文が、沖縄およびその他の琉球諸島の実情を正しく伝えているとすれば、もちろんわれわれは沖縄住民を裏切ったことになろう。琉球諸島の施政が陸軍当局にゆだねられている関係から、私はこの件について均衡のとれた見解を示すために、この一文を草することにした。

まず第一に、いったいなぜわれわれが沖縄に駐留しているか考えてもらいたい。われわれは沖縄を戦利品として併合したわけではなく、またアメリカの一部として編入したわけでもないし、永久に駐留するつもりもない。アメリカは沖縄を統治し、多数の兵士と大量の資材を置いているが、これはこの膨大な費用を要する仕事が、自由世界の防衛のため絶対に必要だからである。

故ケネディ大統領は次のように述べた。「琉球列島にわれわれの基地が存在することは、日本から東南アジアを通り大きな弧を描いて連なっているわれわれの同盟国に対し危急の際にはわれわれが進んで彼らの救援におもむく決意と能力をもっていることを納得させるのに役立っている。」また戦略的要衝である沖縄は、極東における侵略に適切な対抗措置をとるための行動の自由と手段を保証してくれる。

侵略に対してはじゅうぶんな対応措置をとる必要がありこれこそ沖縄におけるわれわれの駐留の性格と期間を決定づける要因である。われわれがアジアにおける責任を遂行するために必要とする軍隊、施設、武器および通信手段を

制限なく維持することができるのは、沖縄をおいてほかにはない。

日本政府は、一九五二年平和条約が調印されたさい、そしてまたわれわれが日本駐留アメリカ軍の規模を制限することに同意したさいに、われわれが大きな防衛基地を必要としていることを認めた。日本はわれわれの沖縄駐留によってもたらされる保護を享受しており、この保護がなおしばらくの間必要なことを理解している。一方アメリカ政府は、先月日本政府に手交したばかりの書簡の中で、アメリカは「将来自由世界の安全保障上の利益が、沖縄を完全な日本の主権下に戻すことを可能にするよう期待している」と述べた。

われわれが沖縄にとどまるにいたった理由を説明するのはこれぐらいにしよう。極東における脅威と緊張状態は、われわれが沖縄に残ることを必要としている。故ダレス国務長官のことばをかりれば、われわれは沖縄に対する「潜在主権」がいぜんとして日本側にあることを認めたうえで、しかも現在事実上の主権を行使しなければならない。私はこれを現状における「既定の事実」とみなす。

しかしそれはそれとしてこのほかに、沖縄におけるわれわれの治政の実績はどうかという問題がある。はたしてわれわれは、「琉球列島住民の福祉を増進し、彼らの経済的文化的向上を促進する」ことを求めた議会の訓令を遂行してきたであろうか。アメリカが引き続き琉球列島で施政権を持つことについて、われわれは島民の妥当な黙認を得ているであろうか。私はこの二つの質問に対する答えが「イエス」であると信ずる。

沖縄経済はこれまで一度も自給自足の域に達したことはなかったし、これは現在でも同じである。戦争前沖縄の経済水準は、あらゆる点で日本の県の中で最低であり、しかも他の諸県にくらべ相当立ち遅れていた。沖縄の主要な輸出は労働力であり、貧困は根深く、ほとんど普遍的とさえいえるくらいであった。現在砂糖とパイナップルが二つの主要な生産物であるが、これらからの収入では、島民の半数を養うことさえおぼつかない。

援助の手をのべる

したがって沖縄住民の生活をささえるためには、外部からの援助が必要である。アメリカは毎年琉球経済に一億ドル近くを——現地人雇用、軍事支出および無償援助によって——投入している。われわれは住宅と事業に膨大な投資をするため開発金融公社を設立した。われわれは近代的道路、水道および発電施設を建設し、何十もの教室をつくり、琉球における最初の大学——学生数二千五百人以上——を設立し、今まで一つもなかった公衆保健所を各所に開設した。われわれが提供した技術と品種改良用家畜は、沖縄の農業生産を大幅に改善した。

この結果琉球における生活は、大幅に——主として良い方に——変化した。現在沖縄の一人当たり所得は約三百十四ドルであり、アジアでも最高の部類に属している。

アメリカは一貫して、日本と沖縄間の深い文化的、感情的結びつきを認識してきた。日本はいぜんとして沖縄にとって、他と比較にならないほど大きな貿易相手であり、沖縄と日本との間の交流はきわめてひんぱんであり、沖縄における日本の文化的影響は圧倒的である。われわれがこのほど沖縄援助に関して日本と結んだ取り決めは、同諸島に対して日本が大幅な援助を行なうことを可能にする。

私は自治の範囲を拡大したいどの沖縄人の望みや、このような望みの正当性を否定しようとは思わない。私はただ沖縄人が彼らの社会を運営するための責任の幅は、着実に拡大されてきたことを指摘したい。アメリカが民主的な形で構想し、一九五二年に設立された琉球政府は、年々拡大される現地の行政責任を引き受け行使している。確かに琉球統治に関するアメリカ高等弁務官の役割りは、琉球の完全な自治とは相いれないものであるが、彼は自己の責任遂行にあたり、沖縄経済の発展を維持し、所得税が不当に引き下げられるのを防ぎ、島民に妥当な料金で電力を供給し金融制度の悪弊を矯正するため努めてきたと信じている。私はもし沖縄が現在日本の県であり、日本の行政権下にあるとしても、日本政府は島民の福祉のため同様な責任を遂行するであろうと確信している。

琉球政府はたとえ完全な自由を与えられても、おそらく結局行政技術を身につけ、責任を引き受けることができたであろう。しかし軍事的利益と民間の利益とが深くからみ合っており、特異な状態にある沖縄で、このような方法をとることには極端な出費と危険が伴うように思われた。

将兵の献身

アメリカの沖縄統治に代わるものがあるとすれば、それは日本政府による施政以外にないことをわれわれは忘れてはならない。沖縄はゆくゆく独立国としての沖縄でなく、日本の一県として考えるべきである。

われわれがこの島の行政上の責任を果たしていなかったならば、アメリカの施政に対する苦情は、いまよりも、もっと激しいものであったにちがいない。

沖縄におけるアメリカの行政は、防衛上きわめて重要な地域にふさわしく、確固としてゆるぎない、しかも公正なものである。現高等弁務官ポール・キャラウェー陸軍中将は、今夏退役の予定であるが、任期中は沖縄の人びとに対して献身的に奉仕した。同中将のりっぱな業績に対しては沖縄の人びとから私のもとに何百という感謝の手紙が寄せられた。

世界のいかなる国民も、結局は自分と同じ民族の政治行政下におかれるのを望むものである。琉球の場合も強い祖国復帰の願望があって少しも不思議ではない。しかし、私自身の考えでは、祖国復帰が直ちにアメリカ軍事施設の撤去につながるということであれば、そうした意味での復帰を望む感情はほとんどない。

これらの記事に対する私の最大の不満は、現在沖縄に駐留しているアメリカ軍将兵が記事の筆者から不当な扱いを受けている点にある。沖縄には多数の陸海空将兵がいる。しかし彼らの日常生活は、あの記事に描かれているようなぜいたくざんまいな生活ではない。みずからすすんで祖国から何千マイルも離れた異郷の地で生活したいなどと思う者は数あるまい。

しかし広い意味で、いっそう重要なのは、これらのアメリカ将兵が、延べ何千時間という奉仕と何十万ドルという

寄金を沖縄の学校施設、孤児院、福祉センターなどの社会施設のために提供してきたことである。これらのことは、琉球の人びとに対するわれわれの関心のあり方を、何よりも如実に示すものであろう。

このほかにも沖縄における社会奉仕活動の一部として、沖縄人学校に将兵やその妻たちが英語を教えるために常時約百五十名ほど出張しているし、非番の空軍将兵や衛生兵が緊急救護班に参加している。また一年間に平均三百件といわれる各地の建設工事にも技術上の援助をするために多くの将兵が労力を提供している。

ここに、沖縄の盲唖学校の校長が、ある沖縄の新聞に書いた記事の一部を紹介しよう。

「一九六〇年の四月にマチナト・ポスト・エンジニア区域の将兵の手で、われわれの学校の運動場が完成した。彼らは学校の寄宿舎に近い約二千坪の敷き地を地ならしして五十日間もかかってこの運動場を作ってくれたのだ。私は骨身惜しまず働いていたアメリカ軍将兵の姿に感激した。彼らは月の出ている夜も、泥にまみれ、滝のような汗をもいとわず働いた。運動場が完成したときの学校職員と生徒たちの喜びようは大変なものであった。最初の地ならし工事を手伝ってくれた兵隊さんたちは、もう本国に帰ってしまっていることだろう。しかし、わたしたちの学校を整備改善してくれた人びとのご恩は、われわれ職員と生徒にとって今後長く忘れることのできないものとなるであろう。」

ワシントン・ポスト紙は琉球の人びとの考えを聞こうとしたわけだが、それはいかなる土地のことであっても、短期間にはなしがたいむずかしい仕事なのだ。どこでもそうであるように、この沖縄でも個人の意見に千差万別のあることは事実である。ある者の見解は客観的でもあろうが、別の者は個々人の利害関係あるいは個人的経験の違いからして色のついた見解をもっているかもしれない。私はその道の専門家らしいポーズをとるつもりはない。しかし、私がこれまでにことばをかわしたことのある球球の人びとの数は決して少なくない。宮古島や石垣島、西表島など沖縄本島から百五十マイルも二百マイルも離れたところに住んでいる人びととも話したことがある。琉球の人びとは勤勉で

正直で素直であり、また親しみやすい。私の知るかぎり、これらの人びとの間でのアメリカ人は受けがよい。また、現在のアメリカ民政府のもとでの生活水準の向上、衛生状態の改善、教育の普及などに、島の大部分の人びとが感謝していることについて、私は満足を感じている。私は「琉球諸島の住民の福祉を向上させ、その経済的・文化的発展を促進するため」に、アメリカがいっそう努力を続けるものと確信している。

情緒主義のみせ場

＝モーニング・スター紙（沖縄・那覇）五月十三日　社説＝

新聞が一つの記事にさく紙面の大きさが、その記事の内容に対する世間の関心の大きさを物語るものだとすれば、沖縄の日本復帰という問題に対する関心のほどは、日本人よりもアメリカ人のほうが上である。

ここ数週来、アメリカ本国の幾つかの新聞は、デモクラシーのショーケースとしての沖縄に焦点をおき、琉球では何から何までまずいことずくめだといいだした。本国の新聞は現在の琉球住民が、物質的には歴史に前例のないほど恵まれていることを認めながら、彼らが精神的には日本的な伝統を奪われていることを嘆いている。沖縄の日本的伝統というものの歴史は新しく、部分的にしか同化されていないという事実を指摘するものはない。

アメリカ本国の諸新聞のこのような態度とは対照的に奇妙なのは日本政府指導層の態度である。本国の新聞が沖縄を日本へ返還しなければならないという確信を強く示すようになればなるほど、日本側はますますよそよそしい態度をとろうとする。日本人は、沖縄人が本土復帰を口にするたびに、ひどくはずかしげに目をそらす。最近、日本政府指導者は沖縄人に対し、日本がアメリカの軍事的保護に依存しているあいだは、あえて琉球の日本への返還を求める意図はない、と語ったといわれる。

日本の人びとは、琉球を保持し、なおかつ沖縄基地の軍事

的保護を受けることが無理であることを認めている。どちらか一方をとれというと、彼らはきまって軍事的保護を受ける方を選ぶと答える。

施政という観点からも、日本はアメリカ側と沖縄人だけで問題を処理してもらいたい腹づもりだ。日本が琉球を統治していたころも、だいたいにおいていまのアメリカ人がやっているのと、似たりよったりのことをしていた。これは当時の日本が、沖縄人の施政能力にあまり信をおいていなかったからで、実際には那覇に対し、遠く離れていながらも確固とした支配力を維持していた。

その結果、沖縄人は日本の命ずるままになる習性を身につけてしまい、命令されもしない日本の命令にいまもって易々として従う素振りを示すのである。日本人以外のいうことには、耳をかそうともしない。それにもかかわらず日本人は沖縄人をとくにかわいがることはせず、むしろ内心では沖縄人に対してもっと国際的な視野を広げてもらいたいものだと思っている。少なくとも沖縄が日本の財政的扶養国となる前に、沖縄自身ができるだけ多くの経済上の問題を解決しておいてほしいというのが日本の本心なのであろう。

戦前の沖縄が日本帝国の中で最も貧しい県であったのは偶然でなく、それなりの理由があったからだ。資源と名のつくものは人間以外に何もない琉球は、戦前も日本からの施し物で露命をつないでいた。日本に復帰したいという沖縄人は、いとも気軽な口調で、復帰後の沖縄には日本から援助を受ける権利があるのだとか、日本はこれまでのアメリカ以上に贈与や経済援助の形で沖縄のめんどうをみてくれるにちがいない、などという。

このように沖縄の人びとが、日本からの施し物に無邪気な期待をかけているからこそ、日本人は沖縄人が少しでも具体性のある本土復帰の話を持ちだすと、必ず話題を変えようとするのである。

日本人がアメリカ人と同じくらい琉球を真のショーケースにしようという意向をもっていることは疑いない。しかし、問題は、そのショーケースで何を見せるかということである。琉球が適切な経済基礎を持たないかぎり、いわゆ

るデモクラシーのショーケースにはなり得ない。なんとなれば、いかなる国家も、永久に隣邦に物ごいしていて民主主義の国だと称するわけにいかないからだ。

赤貧洗うがごとき社会にデモクラシーの看板をかかげてみても、それは運営の財源もないのに福祉国家を建設するための法律をつくるのと同じく、全く無意味である。

日本は琉球が共産中国と目と鼻の先にあり、台湾征服の野望を燃やす北京にとって絶好の位置にあることを知り抜いている。もしアメリカ軍が駐留していなければ、琉球は中共に奪われ、台湾と日本に対する中共の軍事的支配の道を開く絶好の機会を与えることになろう。この点だけをみても、日本が予見できる将来に沖縄の地位を変えることを熱望しているとは考えられない。

こうした各種の事情を総合すると、琉球を日本とその憲法（軍事基地を禁止している）の下において危険にさらすより、むしろ米国の行政統治下におく方が得策だという結論がでてくるわけで、沖縄人もこのことを認識している。沖縄人はまた、日本復帰を求める気持ちが、主として情緒本位のものであることを知っている。

このような主情主義がアメリカの一部の新聞論説員に影響を及ぼしてきている節がみられる。いまや沖縄は、情緒のみせ場となり、現地の情勢にうとい「不在」戦略家たちのもてあそぶ政治的純粋主義運動の犠牲になろうとしているのである。

沖　縄

＝ワシントン・ポスト紙（米）

五月五日　社説＝

自分自身がボストンの軍事占領とともに独立国家の道をあゆみ始めた国民は、われわれが押しつけた軍事統治下にある沖縄人の不愉快さを理解することができるはずである。この軍事統治は沖縄人から自治を奪い去ると同時に、沖縄と日本との歴史的関係をも断ち切ってしまったので、かれらのあいだに地域的ならびに国家的な憤りの感情を植

え付けた。

アメリカ政府の政策を弁護するために、アメリカの軍事占領は報復とか懲罰といった衝動から生まれ出てきたものでなく、植民主義の欲望を基盤とするものでもなく、また沖縄人に対するいかなる悪感情からも出発したものでないことを断わっておく必要がある。それはアメリカが課された責任を果たそうとするときに、たまたま偶発的に生まれてきた占領である。アメリカがその責任を果たすことによって、沖縄の人びとはもちろんのこと、日本全体もその利益を受ける。それにはかれらの防衛問題も含まれているからである。したがって沖縄人は、報復や憤怒を背景とした占領の下におかれている国民の持つような苦情は持っていない。

にもかかわらず沖縄の人びとは、ひしひしと身に感ずる苦情を持っているのであり、その苦情はいかに慈悲ぶかい占領行政をもってしても、軽減できないような性質のものである。アメリカ軍の司令官たちがどんなにじょうずに沖縄問題を処理しようとも、かれらの努力が沖縄人の好意によって報われることはまずあるまい。少しでも民主主義を経験したことのある人びとの大部分は、よい軍政よりも悪い自治のほうを選ぶ。どんなに能力が限られていようとも自分たちが選んだ指導者によって統治されるか、それともまことに有能な外国の将軍によって統治されるかの二者択一の立ち場に立たされたとき、後者のほうを選んだ国民はほとんどなかったことを歴史が教えてくれる。

沖縄人が欲しているものは自分自身の政府と、日本との古い関係の復活である。われわれが欲しているものは、非共産世界の安全をささえる防衛の基礎をなす基地である。これらの目的は妥協させることができるのだろうか。

本紙は有能な極東特派員レイフェル・ステインバーグの論文を連載してきた。これらの論文は二つの利害関係を妥協させるうえで、われわれがどれほどの失敗を演じたかを示している。

いかに先見の明があっても、またいかに施政の妙を発揮しようとも、外国の非軍人社会のまっただなかに駐留する巨大な守備隊が直面する困難を駆逐し去ることはできな

い。風俗も習慣も考え方も異なっているうえ、ぜいたくな生活をみせつけるアメリカの軍隊が駐留していること自身が、沖縄人の毎日のしゃくの種になっている。このしゃくの種を完全になくすことはできない。しかしこれを少なくすることを第一の目的とする政策がとられるならば、それは不可能ではあるまい。

アメリカの文官や軍人が植民地の統治者のような目で沖縄人を見るならば、われわれはいつかはパナマの事態でさえとるに足りないと思われるほどの危機を、沖縄で迎えることになるかもしれない。国家のために外国に勤務しているアメリカ人の状態を改善することは少しも差しつかえない。しかしわれわれの文化のあまり自慢できない一部の面を、外国の基地に持ち込むことは全く別の問題である。

沖縄におけるアメリカのねらいは三つなければならぬ。われわれはアメリカ軍の駐留が、実行できるかぎり、また安全保障を脅かさないかぎり、できるだけ沖縄人を刺激しないと同時に、その兵力もできるだけ少なくしなければならない。われわれは軍事目的に抵触しないかぎり、あらゆる自治権を沖縄市民に与えなければならない。われわれは沖縄を日本に返還する適切な予定表を用意しておかなければならない。

われわれは沖縄人の正当な願望に節度ある敬意を払いつつ、またアメリカの将兵の防衛をも節度ある態度で重視しつつ、これらのことをしなければならない。沖縄のアメリカ軍の軍事目的だけにしがみつくならば、せっかくのその目的が百万にも近い沖縄島民の敵意によって妨げられることとなろう。アメリカの太平洋防衛というもっと大きな計画のうちで、いかなる軍事基地よりも比較にならぬほど重要な日米両国の関係も、沖縄人の不満が今後も日本の政治をいらだたせる要因になっているならば、おそかれ早かれそこなわれることとなろう。

危機が到来する前に、これらすべての問題を処理しておくほうが、危機が起こったあとでこれに取り組むよりも容易であろう。

――了――

以印刷代謄写・非売品

s.39

主管課長へ
本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課検閲班に連絡こう

電信写

(配布先○印)

大臣	政務次官	事務次官	審	官房長
総務	人・会	文・電	営	
亜長	参・	北・	東・西	
米長	参・	保・南		
欧長	参・西	英・東		
近ア長	近・ア			
国資長	参・資	調・資		
経長	次・経	統・亜	南欧・国	米・ラス・近カ
経協長	参・政・経	技協・賠調	賠業・賠経	
条長	参・条	協・規		
国長	参・政	社・科	専・経	
情長	参・道	内・外	オ	
文長	文一	文二		
移長	参・総	振・旅		

T A 22755 米北

年 月 日 時
64 07 31 1730 発
年 月 日 時
64 08 01 0640 着

外務大臣殿

ワシントン 武内 大使
総領事
領事

件名 イケダ総理とワトソン新オキナワ高等弁務官との会談に関するニューヨーク・タイムズの記事

第1973号 平

30日付ニューヨーク・タイムズは「リュウキュウに対する自治せい約」という見出しでイケダ総理及びシイナ外相とワトソン新オキナワ高等弁務官との会談に関し要旨次の通り在京特派員電をキャリーしている。

30日イケダ総理及びシイナ外相はワトソン新高等弁務官との会談でリュウキュウ人の自治拡大を要望したのに対し、ワトソンは今後リュウキュウ人の自治拡大を助長するとともにリュウキュウ行政につき日本側とより密接に協議する旨約した。

イケダ総理は同会談後リュウキュウ人は日本への復帰につき強い願望を有しているが日本としては平和に対する重要

外務省

主管課長へ
本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課検閲班に連絡こう

電信写

性にかんがみ米国の軍事基地保持に対し異議を有しないと述べ、ワトソンは記者会見で今回の日本側指導者との会談で相互理解が促進されたが、今後も外交チャネル、技術及び協議委員会ならびに人事交流の増大を通じ密接な協議が行なわれるであろうと述べた。 (了)

外務省

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米課長

政第4866号
昭和39年7月31日

外務大臣殿

在米 武内大使

沖縄問題に関する池田総理・ワトソン弁務官との会談についてのニューヨーク・タイムズの記事

往電第1973号をもって要旨報告済みの沖縄に関する池田総理のワトソン弁務官との会談についてのニューヨーク・タイムズの記事切抜きを別添送付する。

別紙添付

別紙同着

要処理	要連絡
要研究	至急
課長	
斎藤	吉田
有馬	
渡辺	平川
大島	吉津

書課受信班
39.8.-3
488

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外務省

4244

VOW ON AUTONOMY GIVEN TO RYUKYUS

Japan Encouraged by Stand of New U.S. Commander

By EMERSON CHAPIN
Special to The New York Times

TOKYO, July 30 — Lieut. Gen. Albert H. Watson Jr., new High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, pledged today to encourage greater autonomy for the people of the strategic island chain and to hold closer consultations with the Japanese on Ryukyu administration.

General Watson gave the pledges at a news conference here after meeting with the Japanese Premier, Hayato Ikeda, and Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shiina. The meeting with Mr. Ikeda, which attracted much attention, was the first that a High Commissioner for the Ryukyus has held with a Japanese Premier.

Mr. Ikeda and Mr. Shiina urged General Watson to implement United States policies calling for transfer of greater self-rule to the Ryukyuans, who have been under United States control since World War II under the terms of the peace with Japan.

General Watson leaves Tokyo Saturday for Okinawa, where he will replace Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, who has been in charge of the Ryukyus for more than three years. General Caraway's administration, though credited with significant achievements in economic development, has irritated many Ryukyuans as well as the Japanese, who charge that he has been excessively autocratic.

Chief Executive Resigned

The majority Okinawa Liberal Democratic party has been split in a dispute over demands for greater self-rule and 11 of its 18 members in the Ryuyuan Assembly announced today that they planned to form a dissident party whose basic platform would be "to reject blind acceptance of United States policy."

The islands' Chief Executive, Seisaku Ohta, handed in his resignation last month but it has not been accepted. The Chief Executive's powers and those of the Assembly are severely circumscribed by the statutes governing administration of the islands, which constitute the major United States military base in the Western Pacific.

General Caraway and other United States military men have asserted that Okinawa must remain firmly under United States administration as long as Communist aggression threatens peace in Asia.

In his 40-minute meeting with General Watson, Premier Ikeda declared that the Ryukyans had a strong desire for reversion to Japanese rule but said that Japan had no objection to the United States's retention of bases because these are important to peace.

However, Mr. Ikeda recalled the policy statements made by President Kennedy in March, 1962, in which the United States recognized that the Ryukyuans were part of the Japanese homeland and looked forward to their ultimate reversion to Japanese rule which dated from 1874.



U.S. Army

PROMISES AUTONOMY: Lieut. Gen. Albert H. Watson Jr., new High Commissioner for Ryukyu Islands.

Former Berlin Commandant

At his news conference attended by a large number of Japanese newsmen at the Hotel Okura here, General Watson said that his talks with Japanese leaders had produced "greater mutual understanding." He said that closer consultations would be carried on through diplomatic channels, through technical and consultative committees recently established in Tokyo and Naha, the Okinawa capital, and through an increase in reciprocal visits.

The tall, white-haired general, who served from 1961 to 1963 as United States commandant in West Berlin, stressed the military importance of Okinawa and the other islands and observed that they probably would assume greater significance if the fight against Communism in Southeast Asia was intensified.

He declared that he intended to "encourage continuation of the development of responsible government in the Ryukyus."

The new High Commissioner, seated next to the United States Ambassador to Japan, Edwin O. Reischauer, replied cautiously, with occasional faint smiles, to specific questions about projected policies. At one time he declared that "I do not expect the Okinawan people to desire that I make any hasty decisions until I find out the facts," he remarked.

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米課長

1964

政才5163号
昭和39年8月13日

外務大臣　殿

在米
武内大使

沖縄問題に関する米紙論評

8月11日付ニュー・ヨーク・タイムズは、最近におけるヴィエトナム危機と関連して沖縄問題を論じたエマーソン・チャピン在日特派員の報告を掲載しているところ、その要旨下記のとおり報告するとともに、同記事別添送付する。

記

最近のヴィエトナム危機は、沖縄基地の重要さを、あらためて印象づけることとなつた。

ヴィエトナム危機の続いた数日間における沖縄基地の活動状況は秘密とされているが、それ

要処理　要連絡
要研究　至急
課長
斎藤吉田
有馬
渡辺平川
大崎吉津

文書課受信班
39.8.17
407

在外公館

別紙同着

4537

以来、同基地がさらに強化されたことは間違いない。

現在、沖縄では、日本復帰の要望が高まつているが、これが沖縄住民の世論を正確に反映しているか否か、何人も断定しえない。

米国および同盟諸国防衛のための沖縄の軍事的重要性にかんがみ、米国は、自国から5,000マイルも離れた島嶼の90万住民を統治するという不利は忍ばねばならないというのが、米国政府の沖縄政策の前提であり、キャラウエイ前高等弁務官も含めて、在沖縄米軍最高当局の意見も、沖縄基地の有効性を確保するためには、米国は同地に対する行政権を完全に維持せねばならないということである。

米国が沖縄で落す金は、同地年間所得の半分の約3億ドルといわれ、もつとも強硬な自治権要求論者でも、米軍基地が徹去された後はどうなるとの間いに対しては不安気に首を振るのみ

在外公館

である。

アジアにおける緊張が激化しつつある折から、米軍の沖縄駐留は長期にわたるであろう。科学技術の発展にともない、究極的には、ハワイ、小笠原諸島その他の基地からの徹退も可能となろうが、現在の段階では沖縄基地はむしろ強化されつつある。

別紙添付

NEW YORK TIMES

AUG 11 1964

Asian Crisis Believed to Underscore Strategic Importance of Okinawa Base

By EMERSON CHAPIN

NAHA, Okinawa, Aug. 10—The latest crisis in Southeast Asia has dramatized once again the vital importance of the Okinawan military base to Asian and Western security, military men here say.

Huge military installations on this semitropical island, 400 miles from the Chinese coast, not only provide logistical support for military operations in Southeast Asia but house combat-ready troops, weapons and aircraft for rapid retaliation against any Communist challenge.

Activity at these installations in the last few days has been a closely guarded secret, but there is no question that it was intensified after the North Vietnamese attacks on United States warships last week.

The Asian crisis came at a time of political uncertainty here. Demands for greater autonomy for the Ryukyuan people have mounted and Seisaku Ohta, Chief Executive of Ryukyuan Government, has submitted his resignation.

New Party Established

The Conservative party has split and a sizable splinter group has set up a new political organization rejecting "blind acceptance" of United States policy. Nineteen years after World War II, the United States still occupies these former enemy islands out of what it considers military necessity.

Although it recognizes the "residual sovereignty" of Japan, the United States officials say, nust retain absolute authority ıere as long as the Communists ;ause tension in Asia. As many ther countries less advanced ıan Okinawa have attained ıdependence, charges of colo-lalism have heightened and emands for reversion to Jap-ıese rule have mounted. hether such demands accu-tely mirror public opinion re no one can say for sure.

Does the military importance Okinawa, not only to the ıited States but for the pro-ction of allies as well, out-ıigh the political liability of ling 900,000 Asians 5,000 les from the continental ited States?

hough some responsible ders have doubts, United tes policy is based on the mise that this is so. The highest authorities here have recently reiterated that American officials must retain full administrative control to be free of political harassment that could negate the effectiveness of the base.

The New York Times. Aug. 11, 1964

United States forces on Okinawa (1) are prepared to help guard Southeast Asia (2) or meet any Communist challenge.

Caraway Supports Policy

Lieut. Gen. Paul W. Caraway, who retired recently as High Commissioner after three and a half years, explained this in a speech in which he said the United States did not have such freedom of action at any other base outside of its own territory.

"If the Japanese regained administration of these islands," he asserted, "the Ryukyus would again be a prefecture of Japan.

The United States would be required to consult and reach agreement with the Government of Japan on bringing troops into the islands, shipping them out and storing equipment, weapons and ammunition here. The effectiveness would be reduced, costs would go up."

General Caraway contended that strong leftist and neutralist elements in Japan could in such circumstances, block military moves based on Okinawa "even when the United States security interest or its treaty obligations with other nations required action."

To the Okinawans, a people without their own flag, citizenship or national entity, the return to Japanese administration has a strong emotional appeal. Their culture, language and orientation are Japanese. "Reversion" is a potent political slogan but at present there seems no prospect of it.

More Autonomy Sought

Under General Caraway significant gains were made in public works, rural developments, reducing corruption and raising living standards.

However, critics charged that his method of making all decisions personally, overriding the Ryukyu Legislature, violated pledges given by President Kennedy in 1962 that the autonomy of Ryukyuans should be advanced. Leading political parties charge that there has been a retrogression in the field of self-rule. Okinawans, whose island was devastated in the war, now have a higher living standard than several of Japan's poorer prefectures and one of the highest in Asia.

Official United States spending and outlays by 85,000 Americans living on the island are said to total nearly $300 million annually — half the island's income. Even those who most strongly call for greater autonomy only shake their heads dubiously when asked what would happen if the bases were removed.

Yet the presence of Americans with golf courses, swimming pools and other comforts on a densely populated island with people whose per capita income is about $312 annually is an irritant propagandists easily exploit. Extensive community service efforts by Americans have bridged some of the gap.

Long Stay Is Foreseen

With tension in Asia growing, it seems likely that the Americans will be in Okinawa a long time. Technological developments may eventually make it possible to pull back to bases in the Bonin Islands or Hawaii, but present indications are that Okinawa is being strengthened militarily.

The utility of the base could be nullified by a resolutely hostile populace. Many thousands of Okinawans help keep military installations functioning.

No one cares to predict a solution, but many are hopeful that the new High Commissioner, Lieut. Gen. Albert H. Watson Jr., will begin an era of closer cooperation that will ease strains.

主管課長へ

本電主管、配付先等に関し御意見あれば直ちに電信課検閲班に連絡こう

電信写

(配布先○印)

大臣	政務次官	事務次官	外務審議官	官房長
総儀	人会	文電	営業	
国資長	参調資			
亜長	参総	北中	東西	
米長	参北	南		
欧長	西	東		
近ア長	近ア			
経長	次参総	統調亜	商国	欧通	ラス米	近カ
経協長	参	技	培	賠業	賠経
条長	参条	協			
国長	参政	経社	科専		
情長	参道	内外			
文長	文一	文二			
移長	参総	振旅			

TA 37462 米北

年 月 日 時

64 12 15 1400 発

年 月 日 時

64 12 16 0717 着

外務大臣殿

ワシントン 武内 大使 総領事 領事

件名 オキナワ問題（総理訪米議題新聞報道）

第3204号 平

15日ニューヨーク。タイムズは14日付東京発としてサトウ総理は来たるべきジョンソン大統領との会談の議題中、オキナワの地位の問題が特に重要なる旨、またオキナワにおける住民自治の拡大が現地人の対米協力向上に資すべき旨報道じんに述べたとの簡単な記事を掲載している（切りぬき空送）。

ニューヨークに転報した。

（了）

外務省

アメリカ局長

参事官

北米課長

政第7479号

昭和39年12月15日

外務大臣殿

在米 武内大使

沖縄問題に関する総理発言（紀事切抜空送）

往電第3204号に関し

12月15日付 ニューヨーク・タイムズ紙切抜（様紀に関するもの）別添送付する。

別紙添付

要処理	要連絡
要研究	至急
課	土村
枝村	河内
斉藤	吉田
有[illegible]	山田
渡辺	平川
大崎	吉津
中田	藤田
後藤	

39.12.18

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外務省

NEW YORK TIMES

1964

SATO TO SEEK TALKS ON RYUKYUS' STATUS

Special to The New York Times

TOKYO, Dec. 14 — Premier Eisaku Sato said today that the status of Okinawa figured prominently among the topics he wished to discuss with President Johnson in Washington next month.

Okinawa and its neighboring islands in the Ryukyu chain were retained by the United States for an indefinite period under the 1951 peace treaty with Japan. A major United States air base, Okinawa is administered under a form of military government. Washington has acknowledged Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the territory.

Mr. Sato met today with the United States Ambassador, Edwin D. Reischauer, and the United States military commander in the Ryukyus, Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson.

News men were told that Mr. Sato had urged the importance to the United States of Okinawan cooperation in carrying out American policies on the island. Okinawan leftists have frequently instigated demonstrations against American rule. The expansion of autonomy would be one way to encourage a better political climate for the American effort on Okinawa, Mr. Sato said.