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北米局長
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南東アジア課長
安保課長

防第7712号
昭和40年11月12日

外務大臣殿

在米武内大使

米軍基地沖縄の紹介記事送付

11月8日付ニューヨーク・タイムズ紙は、沖縄はいまや米国の対ヴィエトナム戦遂行上の中核基地となりつつある旨のハンスン・ボールドウィン記者の現地取材記事を掲げているので同記事何等ご参考まで別添送付する。

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NEW YORK TIMES
Nov. 8, 1965

Okinawa Is a Keystone of the Vietnam War Effort

By HANSON W. BALDWIN
Special to The New York Times

NAHA, Okinawa, Nov. 5—Okinawa, which many American military men consider the "keystone of the Pacific," has become a keystone of the Unit States war effort in Vietnam.

This small island, scene of the final and perhaps bloodiest battle of World War II, is bulging with the stuff of war. Kadena Air Force Base has become in the last two months the busiest overseas air base in the world. The port of Naha is jammed with shipping. Vessels lie outside in the open stead, sometimes for several days, awaiting their turn to unload.

Ammunition ships unload day and night at White Beach Pier in Buckner Bay while others wait. The warehouses are full of trucks and amphibious tractors. Wire and fuel drums are stored in the open.

A Marine service regiment, originally a supporting element of the Third Marine Division, now in Vietnam, is being expanded to take care of the rear-area echelon and supply needs of all Marine units in the Western Pacific region. The Army has just activated here the Second Logistical Comman originally at Fort Lee, Va., to support the war effort in Vietnam, to provide for the Army's supply needs in the Ryukyus, the Philippines, Taiwan and elsewhere in Southeast Asia an to concentrate under one command many varied supply activities.

The Second Log, as it is known, is also aiding another logistical command, the Ninth, now established in Thailand.

The armed services already occupy about 28 per cent of Okinawa's total acreage. There are about 40,000 to 45,000 uniformed personnel here, with dependents and civilian employes perhaps 100,000 Amzricans in all, in addition to the island's population of 738,000. Okinawa is bursting at the seams and the build-up is far from finishe

Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson 2d, who was station in Berlin during the Berlin crisis, is in command. He is the High Commissioner, the commanding general of the United States Army in the Ryukyu Islands, the commander of the IX Corps and the representative of the Commander in Chief, Pacific.

The IX corps is essentially a planning outfit with a few attached supporting units but no assigned combat troops. However, there are plenty of combat troops in great variety here.

The Longest Front

There are large elements of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and of the First Marine Division, which boasts that it holds the longest front in history. Its units are scattered all the way from Camp Pendleton, Calif., through Hawaii and Okinawa to Vietnam. The Marines, in addition to utilizing Okinawa as rear-echelon maintenance base for Vietnam and as a supply base, have established tough guerrilla and counter-guerrilla training courses in the jungled northern part of this island.

The Army's First Special Forces Group (airborne), which has rotated many of its men to Vietnam and has recommended one of its officers for the Medal of Honor, has combined with other across-the-board Army units to establish a Special Action Force, Asia, comprising selected skills in many fields tailored to meet any requirement. It, too, utilizes the rugged terrain of Okinawa for hard training.

Another major Army unit, which musters what its commander calls "one of the highest concentrations of ready air defense missiles in the world," helps to protect the island. This unit, the 30th Artillery Brigade (antiaircraft), has two battalions of Nike-Hercules long-range missiles and two battalions of Hawk missiles on constant alert. Okinawa is only about 400 miles from Shanghai in Communist China, but the missile and air defense is so concentrated that there are not many worries as yet about the vulnerability of the base area.

The United States Army Medical Center, with a fine modern hospital, is caring for many of the wounded and sick from Vietnam and more are coming.

The Air Force has so many aircraft at the Kadena and Naha air bases that planes have have had to be parked on taxiing strips. The aircraft range from a Strategic Air Command wing of KC-135 jet tanker aircraft, which support the B-52's at Guam or other Air Force planes in the area, to McDonnell F4C's, F-105's, McDonnell RF-101's and miscellaneous transport aircraft. Most of the fighter-bomber and reconnaissance pilots have been rotated to Vietnam and have flown numerous missions.

The increased number of personnel here has severely taxed billeting facilities. No one is yet living in tents, but the officers' quarters are 300 per cent above normal capacity and the enlisted men's barracks about 180 per cent. Many men are crowded into rooms intended for one or two.

The Navy, which has the smallest permanently assigned units here, utilizes Okinawa as a servicing base for aircraft and to support the Seventh Fleet.

(王筑 深用)

北米局長

送　付　公　参　書　官

北米課長

政才 8823 号	昭和40年12月28日
外務大臣殿	在米武内大使
引用公・電信番号	往電才3492号

送付資料　米国の沖縄施政に関するもの

添付なし

1. Washington Post　　Dec. 26, 1965

"Okinawa adjusts to U. S. Rule"
By: Rafael Steinberg
Naha, Okinawa

2. Washington Post　　Dec. 27, 1965

"Washington resists direct Ryukyu vote"
By: Rafael Steinberg
Naha

3. Washington Post　　Dec. 28, 1965

"U. S. opposing Isles' return to Tokyo rule"
By: Rafael Steinberg
Naha

本信写送付先：＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿＿（別添省略）

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Old Bitterness Fades

Okinawa Adjusts to U.S. Rule

This is the first of three articles written by Rafael Steinberg during a recent trip to Okinawa. A series of articles on Okinawa by Mr. Steinberg appeared in The Washington Post in May, 1964.

By Rafael Steinberg
Special to the Washington Post

NAHA, Okinawa — An alien military occupation can never taste sweet but it can become palatable, and that is what is happening at last to the U.S. Army's administration of Okinawa.

A series of common-sense reforms by a commander who has become known for his "flexibility" has given the Ryukyuan people a greater voice in running their affairs and has enabled them to strengthen their ties with Japan, which all regard as their homeland.

As a result, irritating grievances that bred bitterness and frustration in the past have all but vanished.

This does not mean that the Okinawans are satisfied with their lot. Their unanimous, passionate desire for "reversion" to Japan is undiminished. And a campaign now under way for the direct election of the Ryukyuan Chief Executive will probably generate considerable heat and even some violence in the coming weeks.

The increased pace of the war in Vietnam and a corresponding set-up in military activity on Okinawa has made it clear to most Okinawans

HEADQUARTERS—An aerial view of the Government Plaza on the beautiful island of Okinawa, site of the government of the Ryukyu Island and the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands.

WASHINGTON POST
DEC 26 1965

that it is likely to be years before the United States relinquishes administrative control over their island and lets them become once more a prefecture of Japan.

And Americans here are now beginning to recognize the fact that the Ryukyuan people will never be content until that happens. But U.S. military commanders insist, with considerable logic, that the value of the bases would be seriously impaired if administration of the island chain were turned back to Japan.

On a visit here a year and a half ago, this correspondent found Okinawans in despair, convinced that they were making no progress toward self-government and that their lives and economic development were being needlessly sacrificed by a disinterested authority in Washington and its uncompromising, meddling and unapproachable proconsul on the scene.

At that time, the Okinawan grievances were almost all concerned with practical issues, such as economic aid and wages, court jurisdiction, welfare, buying medicines, writing laws, publishing magazines, travelling to the Japanese main islands, and getting educated.

These were complaints directly related to the lives and pocketbooks of many thousands of individual Okinawans, and had they been much longer ignored the clamor for reversion — which Okinawans believe would solve all their problems — could easily have reached fever pitch just at the moment of the Vietnam build-up.

But they were not ignored. It is significant that when Okinawans are asked today what their biggest problems are, almost no one mentions the concrete problems relating to economics of daily life. Okinawans now have the luxury of thinking about such abstract and idealistic matters as the method of selecting their Chief Executive.

However just may be the islanders' claim that they be permitted to elect the Chief Executive directly, and however eloquently politicians, journalists and professors expound on it, this is not an issue which is likely to get large masses of Okinawans emotionally worked up — although noisy organized demonstrations are expected.

Even the harshest critics of the American presence in Okinawa now admit to a man that "the situation is much, much better since General Watson came."

Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson II became U.S. High Commissioner in August, 1964, and his sweeping changes have gone far toward making the alien occupation tolerable for the Okinawan people.

Instead of insisting that Ryukyuan laws conform to American standards in every detail, as did his predecessor, Watson lets the elected Ryukyuan legislature write and pass its own laws. He and the staff of the U.S. Civil Administration (USCAR) give advice, but even if unsatisfied with a bill they do not step in to block it, Watson says, "unless it hampers our military mission," which has not happened yet.

The affable and level-headed general has rescinded about 40 unnecessary and unpopular military ordinances, simplified and relaxed travel procedures between Okinawa and the Japanese mainland, and given the Ryukyuan Chief Executive the power to choose his own department heads.

He has abolished the requirement that all publications be licensed, and has given Ryukyuan courts broader jurisdiction over crimes by Ryukyuans.

In addition, he has transferred to the Ryukyuan Government a wide range of functions formerly the responsibility of U.S. authorities, including the control of drugs and the licensing of foreign investments.

Just last week President Johnson granted the Ryukyuan legislature the right to elect the chief executive. Up to now the legislature nominated a man for the post but the high commissioner was the one to make the appointment.

Just as important as these specific reforms is Watson's attitude to the Ryukyuans and their predicament. "Watson understands what we want and takes quiet action," says Ryukyuan Chief Executive Seiho Matsuoka. "He gets more respect and trust from the people of Okinawa because he tries hard to adjust our differences."

Matsuoka, who was nominated by the legislature and appointed by Watson just a little over a year ago, gets more respect, in turn from the legislature and the people because it is known that "he stands up to the Americans and argues with them."

In the past, American administrators of Okinawa made themselves ridiculous in Ryukyuan eyes by trying to foster the idea that Okinawa is not really a part of Japan. They based their arguments on history of a century ago, and ignored the fact that the Okinawans consider themselves Japanese. Many of the problems of the past stemmed from the Army's attempt to thwart Japanese influence in the islands.

In Watson's administration, the Army has caught up with other branches of the U.S. Government which believe that U.S.-Japan cooperation is the key to stability in the Far East, and Watson is not worried about Japanese influence in the islands. "How could you try to stop it?" he asks. "These people are Japanese, like the others. In everything I have said, I have not let any word creep in that they are anything other than Japanese."

Since Watson took over, Okinawa has been plugged into Japan's microwave television network, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato has visited the islands, and Japanese economic aid to the Ryukyus—largely for education—has risen by 100 per cent, to a total of $16 million for next year. Japan had indicated willingness to give more aid sooner, but Watson's predecessor had deliberately delayed the arrangements.

In the schools, says Watson, "we are trying to educate all these little kids to be good Japanese, law-abiding Japanese."

Furthermore, Watson has moved to make sure these attitudes filter down through his entire command. His headquarters takes swift action against GIs who maliciously or in fun desecrate the Japanese flag, and in one such instance an apology was received in Tokyo before the official report of the incident itself.

A recent troop information circular warns servicemen against tampering with the Japanese flag and declares: "There is an outmoded belief prevalent among some American personnel in the Ryukyu Islands that because we invaded these islands in 1945, we are here by right of conquest. That may have been true at one time, but . . . it has not been true since 1952. The U.S. is in the Ryukyu Islands by virtue of the Treaty of Peace with Japan. . . . The cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Far East is cooperation between the United States and Japan. . . ."

While Watson has been patching up U.S.-Ryukyuan relations in Okinawa, Congress was moving in the same direction. A few months ago, more than two years after the measure was approved by the Pentagon, Congress authorized the payment of $22 million to Okinawans whose land was taken over or whose property was damaged by U.S. forces between the end of the war and 1952.

Congress is expected to appropriate the funds in the next session and about half the population of Okinawa will benefit.

The same session of Congress will also be asked to raise the current $12 million ceiling on annual economic assistance to the Ryukyuan government. If it fails to act, the United States will be put in the embarrassing position of granting Okinawa less direct aid than Japan, although most of the $196 million the U.S. Government and troops spend in Okinawa assists the local economy in some way.

Not long ago, Watson's number two man, Civil Administrator Gerald Warner, told USCAR staffers that "our mission is to maintain in these islands a climate in which the United States military forces can operate, with maximum efficiency and effectiveness, in defense of the Free World."

At present, that mission is being accomplished, but how long the climate can be maintained is the problem for U.S. planners. Despite Watson's reforms, the conservative Democratic Party (which generally supports the United States although it also asks for reversion) won a disappointingly-narrow majority of 19 out of 32 seats in legislative elections in November.

And in Naha, a candidate of the opposition Socialist Masses Party polled 48 per cent of the vote to come within 3000 votes of being elected mayor of the Okinawan capital city.

Neither rising living standards nor increased military spending nor the obvious expansion of self-government nor even the anti-Communist opinions of the majority can convince the Okinawans that it is better to be ruled by an authority whose primary aim is military efficiency than by a government responsive to their own needs and aspirations.

NEXT: Okinawan pressure for direct elections of the Chief Executive.

WASHINGTON POST
DEC 27 1965

Okinawans' Role Grows

Washington Resists Direct Ryukyu Vote

Second of Three Articles

By Rafael Steinberg
Special to The Washington Post

NAHA — After 20 years of occupying the Ryukyu Islands the United States cannot permit the people to choose their own chief executive through direct elections lest the winning candidate be a "hostile" leader who would not cooperate with the United States.

The demand for such direct elections has been growing in recent months, and to reach a compromise with that demand the United States announced last week that from now on the chief executive will be elected by the legislature instead of being appointed by the High Commissioner "on the basis of" a nomination by the legislature.

In announcing the change, President Johnson called it "another forward step in the continuing policy of the United States to afford the Ryukyuan people as great a voice in managing their own affairs as is compatible with the essential role of the Ryukyus in maintaining the security of Japan and the Far East."

Obviously, direct popular election of the chief executive—which all Okinawan parties had demanded—was not considered compatible with the Ryukyuan role.

Tsumichiyo Asato, the handsome, eloquent chairman of the opposition Socialist Masses Party, declares that the United States refusal to grant direct elections "proves the failure of American rule over Okinawa."

Asato, who would be a leading candidate if such elections were held, is only partly right. The United States has contributed substantially to Okinawan economic and political development, but it has never tried to make the Okinawans loyal to the United States.

The fact that most Okinawans might vote "against America" is not so much proof of failure as it is proof that Okinawans are free to think, speak and vote as they please.

Nevertheless, United States fears of direct election do indicate that the United States has not won the full trust and confidence of the Ryukyuan people.

Though the Okinawans' most pressing grievances have recently been redressed by Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson II, the U.S. High Commissioner, the islanders would still rather be administered by Japan and regain their Japanese citizenship.

It is this desire for what is called "reversion" that makes direct election "dangerous" from the American military point of view.

American officials and Okinawan leaders agree that reversion would be the key issue in such an election campaign. The leftist opposition parties, who already command about 40% of the vote in legislative elections, might win a majority if they were to agree on a single candidate, who could campaign harder on the reversion issue than his conservative and "pro-American" opponent.

Lost Opportunity

"Years ago," sighs a veteran American official, "we could have attempted to build up the Ryukyuan economy to a point where reversion to Japan would have meant an actual financial loss for the people. But the opportunity is gone."

Although the Ryukyuan economy is growing, Japan's is too. And although the Okinawans are no longer the poorest Japanese, as they were before the war, the relative improvement in their standard of living is not enough to offset their emotional longing to rejoin the motherland.

One political adviser to the High Commissioner is even worried that the local communist party, the Okinawan Peoples Party, might win a chief executive election "because their candidate could make wild, irresponsible promises about reversion that even the other opposition parties would not dare to make."

Other observers, both American and Okinawan, tend to laugh at this fear. They point out that a communist could never get the support of the other opposition parties and that the Okinawan electorate which gave the Peoples Party only 12% of the vote in the last legislative election, "is too conservative and too sophisticated to fall for that kind of nonsense."

But these observers are quick to concede that a more moderate leftist, such as Asato, would stand a good chance of winning. The conservative strength in the legislature, some of them feel, comes from voters who believe the conservatives can get more for their districts from the Americans than can the opposition. This "bread and butter vote" could swing (the other way in an emotional "reversion vote" for chief executive.

As it is, the office of chief executive will remain in hands friendly to the United States as the Democratic Party commands an absolute majority of the Ryukyuan legislature. The Democrats naturally accepted the change as "progress" and went ahead with plans to elect Seiho Matsuoka, the current appointed holder of the position, as chief executive.

Likewise the Japanese government welcomed last week's announcement as "an answer to the longstanding wish of the Okinawan people."

But even Matsuoka himself, although accepting the decision, expressed disappointment that direct popular election was not granted. He promised to work toward that goal in the future.

Political Difference

Legislature Speaker Akio Nagamine points out that, "although election by the legislature would result in no administrative change, it would make quite a political difference. Instead of being responsible to the High Commissioner who appointed him, the chief executive would feel more responsible to the people and the legislature which elected him."

The opposition parties have served notice they will settle for nothing less than direct popular election. Asato warns that his party will boycott any proceeding connected with electing a chief executive in the legislature. He threatens to "move the struggle outside," that is, to the streets, if popular election is not granted.

Asato points out that years ago, during the occupation of Japan, the U.S. Military Government permitted the residents of each of the three Guntos (island groups) in the Ryukyus to elect their respective governors directly.

"This was a good example of democracy, and it impressed us deeply . . . The basic principles of democracy which America has brought here cannot be twisted . . . Why does the U.S. want to suppress the will of the people now?"

The appointment system was started in 1952 when the government of the Ryukyu Islands was inaugurated and the three separate gunto governments abolished. At that time Gen. Mathew B. Ridgway, who, as U.S. Far East Commander, became Governor of the Ryukyus, declared that "the structure of self-government will be completed with the election of the chief executive."

According to Asato, who had been the elected governor of Yaeyama Gunto, Ridgway's promise was made more explicit by other American officers who assured the former gunto governors in an open meeting that the appointment method was only temporary.

Another Okinawan who remembers the promise is Chobyo Yara, the influential chairman of the Okinawan Teachers' Association. Yara's name is also mentioned frequently as a possible united opposition candidate.

According to Yara, the 1952 promise was considered so firm that the new legislature actually wrote a bill setting up the direct election machinery.

"We insist on direct elections," Yara says. "It's not unreasonable. The Americans taught us to want elections as the ABC of democracy."

Watson Opposes

To these arguments, Gen. Watson says "I don't blame people who want to select their chief executive. It's very natural." He declines to give his reasons for opposing popular election, and adds: "Direct election is a dream." The Okinawans should "put off their dreams," he suggests, and concentrate on making a better life for themselves today.

Another American in Okinawa points out that a Democratic Party legislature and a chief executive from one of the leftist parties would not be able to work together.

"Besides," he adds, "as long as the situation here remains a special one, we have to be able to count on someone friendly in that job."

Immediately after the announcement that the legislature would elect the chief executive, the Okinawa opposition parties and labor unions and other organizations which support them started planning mass demonstrations to protest the refusal of popular election.

There were also fears that the opposition party would resort to roughhouse tactics on the floor of the legislature itself when the election of chief executive comes to a vote.

In Tokyo, a commentator in the Asahi Shimbun wrote, "the progress shown in the amendment is not small," but concluded that the amendment was made "not to enlarge the autonomy of the citizens but to increase the power of the government party."

NEXT: Why the U.S. military needs Okinawa base.



OKINAWA PORT—Tomari Port, expanded in 1953 from a tiny fishing cove, handles bulk of shipping between the Ryukyus and mainland Japan by small freighters, passenger ships and others up to 2000 tons each.

No Ryukyu Reversion Near

U.S. Opposing Isles' Return To Tokyo Rule

Last of Three Articles

By Rafael Steinberg

Special to The Washington Post

WASHINGTON POST

DEC 28 1965

NAHA—Why does the U.S. stubbornly insist on maintaining administrative and political control over Okinawa?

Why can't the Pentagon "give the Ryukyu Islands back to Japan," as all the inhabitants passionately desire, and continue to maintain military bases on Okinawa as it does elsewhere in Japan?

The reasons are military. And if the assumption that the U.S. needs to keep military power in the Far East is granted, then the arguments for continued control of Okinawa carry considerable weight.

First of all, if Okinawa were to re-join Japan, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty would presumably apply to the Okinawan bases. In practice, this would prevent the U.S. from keeping nuclear weapons on the island, and forbid the dispatch of troops or equipment from Okinawa into combat without the permission of the Japanese government.

No Consultation Needed

As things stand now, the U.S. can use the Okinawa bases any way it pleases, without consulting any other government, and this is a freedom the U.S. enjoys on no other foreign base anywhere.

The Marines and airborne troops who poured into Vietnam earlier this year came directly from Okinawa, and there is a constant two-way flow of men between the Vietnam jungles and the training camps — and hospitals — of Okinawa.

The importance of Okinawa as a staging area for the Vietnam war can be deduced merely by looking at the thousands of military vehicles lined up in the supply areas along Okinawa highways, or at the tanks unloading at Naha port, or the mountains of oil drums and the bulldozers on new military construction sites.



The Washington Post Dec. 28, 1965

This visible activity is many, many times greater than last year. If Okinawa were part of Japan proper, it would not be possible to use the bases in this way in direct support of combat operations.

Compromise Proposed

Recognizing this point, but still striving to achieve "reversion," some Okinawans and Japanese have tried to work out a formula that would return the administrative rights to Japan but leave the U.S. the operational freedom it now has.

The most comprehensive of these plans is that put forward a few months ago by Tokuji Tokonami, a conservative member of the Japanese Diet.

In brief, Tokonami proposes that American jurisdiction over the base, and Ryukyuan Government jurisdiction over the inhabitants, be "separated," that Japan be given "administering authority" over the Government of the Ryukyus, and that a special treaty between the U.S. and Japan guarantee the U.S. "special military rights" in Okinawa, presumably the rights to deploy to combat and to stockpile nuclear weapons.

Under the Tokonami plan, Okinawa would become a special administrative unit of Japan, and "special regulations would be established for the maintenance of military security, for peace and order during an emergency . . . etc."

These regulations would be necessary because Japan has no laws against espionage, for example.

The most obvious flaw in Tokonami's idealistic scheme is the political difficulty such a special treaty would face in getting through the Japanese Diet. Even the current U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which curtails U.S. rights, stirred months of riotous demonstrations in 1960, and forced the resignation of a prime minister.

In the view of High Commissioner Lieut. Gen. Albert Watson II, such a special treaty would be "impossible" to ratify. "The leftists in Japan would not let the government do it," he says, "even though the Okinawans might be willing to accept it in exchange for reversion."

Tokonomi's "special regulations" would also come under fire. Many Japanese, not only leftists, would regard them as unconstitutional.

No serious observer of the Japanese political scene considers the Tokonami plan politically practical. "Even if such a treaty were written and passed," says one Ryukyu University professor, "it would not work, because the people would demand their rights under the Constitution of Japan."

Facilities Intermingled

American officers see still other reasons why the plan would fail, and a few hours drive around Okinawa tends to lend support to their views.

The entire island is such a checkerboard hodge-podge of military property, civilian towns and villages, and sugarcane fields, all nestling cheek by jowl with one another, that no simple "separation of jurisdictions," as Tokonami suggests, is physically possible.

The military and civilians share a common electric power grid, and one unified water system, as well as Naha Air Base, roads, harbors and part of the phone system.

Even many Okinawans who are critical of U.S. policies on their island reluctantly agree that because of all these factors the "separation" formula is, as one of them said, "just nonsense."

That their hopes more are unrealistic does not stop them from hoping for and agitating for reversion to Japan.

Some seem to be thinking in terms of a U.S. decision to move the bases elsewhere.

Others indicate they would be satisfied at present if the U.S. were to set up a timetable for reversion.

But it seems clear that for a long time to come the U.S. will remain in command on Okinawa, whether the inhabitants like it or not. And they don't.