

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 外紙報道（在米その他公館関係）(1)

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ロスアンゼルス總

アジア局長
参事官
参事官

「ロス」政第 419 号

昭和 39 年 5 月 13 日

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Steinberg 記者の沖繩取材に
関する報道の件

本年 2 月 Washington Post の主筆 Wiggins
が Steinberg 記者とともに東京で池田総理に
会見した当時、本官は全紙側から一度記者を
沖繩に派遣して種々の問題をかかえている全
紙地区をカウチングさせてはどうかとアドバイスを
いたし、聖書があるところ、今般 Los Angeles Times
は 5 月 10 日付及び 11 日付をもつて別添の如
く Steinberg 記者の現地における取材の
結果を報道しているのを、なから持参考まで

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外務省

に報告する。

別紙添附

GA-6

外務省

Okinawans Restless Under U.S. Military Government

Islanders Feel Let Down, Want Ties With Japan

By RAFAEL STEINBERG
Exclusive to The Times from The Washington Post

NAHA, Okinawa—America's mightiest military base in the Far East, a bristling, billion-dollar complex of battle-primed troops and atom-armed planes and missiles, is an island of frustration and discontent.

Ruled by an American general who makes plain his feeling that he knows better than they what is good for them, unprotected by any constitution, and unable to

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carry on normal commerce and travel with Japan—which all of them consider their homeland—the people of Okinawa today are convinced that the United States has let them down.

Almost every Okinawan complaint is earnestly countered by the American Army administrators of this base, who point to economic growth, the roads and harbors and waterworks, and the settlement of many vexing land claims as examples of progress.

Clamor Increases

But what cannot be denied is that Okinawans of all political faths are convinced they are making no real advance toward self rule, and little real advance toward greater contact with the homeland. The clamor for both is increasing.

U.S. concessions often have come too late, and consisted of too little, to prevent a steady erosion of the good will necessary to the maintenance of this or any foreign base.

For example, a bill for \$22 million, covering land and damage claims between 1945 and 1950, has been languishing unpaid in Washington for a year and a half, although both the high commissioner and the Department of the Army have approved it.

Vital to Security

Okinawa is considered vital to American military security, not only because of its extensive installations and strategic location, but because Army, Air Force and Navy can freely deploy here—or to here—whatever weapons and forces they may need in any emergency, without any other government's permission.

On no other plot of foreign soil does the United States exercise such authority, and this one is just 400 miles from Red China.

This freedom of action is something Americans may be thankful for, but its corollary—the strict, uncompromising rule over an alien people, 12 years after the state for war with them ended—is something unique in American experience.

Bloody Campaign

(U.S. forces took the island in the spring of 1945, in one of the bloodiest and most decisive battles of World War II. Fourteen hundred U.S. ships were involved in the sea campaign, many falling victim to kamikaze suicide air attacks. It took 82 days of ground fighting, and 79,500 American casualties, to secure the island.)

The tight U.S. administration of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands is usually defended on military grounds, and it is certainly true that civilian and military areas are so closely intertwined on this narrow isle that the loss of physical control could cripple the bases.

It is also clear that the bases would lose most of their value as a "forward deterrent" to Communist aggression if Okinawa were to "revert" to Japan, as all Okinawans passionately desire. For in that case, the U.S.-Japan security treaty, and Japanese public opinion, would make it impossible to keep nuclear weapons here, or to use the island as a jumping-off point for Vietnam or other "brush-fire" wars.

But intensive interviews with scores of Okinawans

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OKINAWANS IRKED BY FIRM U.S. RULE

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and Americans here also make clear that the U.S. civil administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) and High Commissioner Lt. Gen. Paul Caraway, who is scheduled to leave in August, concern themselves with hundreds of detailed issues far removed from military security, and that they and Congress have failed to give the Ryukyuan people—and there are more of them than there are Hawaiians and Alaskans combined—economic development equal to Japan's.

Head Man Complains


Even Seisaku Ota, the mild Ryukyuan government chief executive who is appointed to his post by the high commissioner and who is widely regarded as an American yes-man, declares that "our hearts are afflicted" because "we are so far behind the rest of Japan in such things as social welfare."

Other unsettling but inescapable conclusions emerge from these conversations:

Democracy in the Ryukyus is a sham, and from Ota on down the people resent it. Only one man's opinion really counts and that is Gen. Caraway's.

Akio Nagamine, speaker of the Ryukyuan legislature, describes him this way:

"The high commissioner studies hard. He goes around and talks to people.



RESTIVE — Map locates Okinawa, believed to be most important U.S. nuclear base in the Far East.

This is good. But because he knows so much, he acts in a straightforward way, without discussing things. He says, "I am right, even if you are not satisfied, even if it makes you unhappy. My way is right so do it my way." That's how he is. Everything is decided according to his opinion.

Although the 32,000 jobs the bases provide, armed forces construction and off-base spending of troops have brought a considerable measure of prosperity to the islands, many Okinawans believe they would have been better off sharing Japan's phenomenal economic growth. They admit, however, that any sudden shutting of the bases now would cause serious economic dislocation.

They point out that the Japanese government pours into underdeveloped prefectures comparable to Okinawa financial subsidies running roughly two to three times as high as the total of U.S. economic aid.

Most Americans here have little sympathy for or understanding of Okinawan traditions and desires. For the Americans life can be beautiful on Okinawa.

The island has three military golf courses, about a dozen bowling establishments, two yacht clubs, bathing beaches artfully landscaped, and surrounded by high wire fences to keep out "unauthorized personnel" (Okinawans).

If you are in the armed forces, or an American working for them, you and your dependents can shop at any of the 67 post exchanges on the island. At prices far below those offered by the most daring stateside discount house, you can purchase just about everything you need, or think you need, from a mink stole to skin-diving equipment.

The military also operates 27 snack bars, six mobile canteens, three "custard cups," nine restaurants and 15 theater stands. And beauty consultants from stateside cosmetic manufacturers are always on hand to give advice at one PX or another.

If you care for liquid refreshment, and don't mind the clatter of the slot machines, there are 50 military clubs on the island (to say nothing of the thousand or so bars and cabarets off-base). Fourteen are for officers, five for civilians, 31 for enlisted men.

Okinawan Staffers

All these facilities are of course staffed with Okinawans. Minimum wage for employees of the U.S.: 16 cents per hour.

"I'm making more money than I ever did before," an American observed over his beer at the yacht club. He came out as a GI and took his discharge here.

"I've got a housing allowance, too," he added, "and that little sloop you see there, the fourth one in the line. And look at the price of liquor; look at the price of food, and maids."

Monday: Is "efficiency" an adequate reason?

Okinawa Anxious to Gain Self-Rule

Leaders Impatient at U.S. Delay on Economic Aid, Local Control

BY RAFAEL STEINBERG

Exclusive to The Times from the Washington Post

NAHA, Okinawa — When an administrator holds the power to rule by decree, can veto laws or administer them, and also controls the economy and the courts, then public opinion may not seem very important.

Yet Okinawans think that many of the problems faced by the American rulers of Okinawa—and much of the grumbling and dissatisfaction of the population—might fade away if Lt. Gen. Paul Caraway, the high commissioner paid as much attention to local desires as he does to pure efficiency, and spent as much time educating local leaders as he does in telling them how irresponsible and incompetent they are.

Guidance Urged

The high commissioner and USCAR, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus, are regarded as so autocratic, so convinced that they have a monopoly on common sense, that even when they are embarked on worthy projects they manage to antagonize the very people who should be cooperating with them.

This, in essence, is the view of many responsible and influential Okinawan leaders, including some of those most friendly to the United States.

"Even where we are weak," says the pro-U.S. speaker of the Ryukyuan legislature, Akio Nagamine, "they should take us by the hand and lead us, guide us, advise us, show us why their way is better, instead of just giving orders."

Veto Avoided

"Sometimes, what USCAR could do today, the Ryukyuan government, could do tomorrow if USCAR helped. So on things that are not so urgent they should be patient, and help us."

According to the terms of a Presidential executive order, the U.S. commission can issue ordinances which

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have the full effect of law without reference to any Ryukyuan official. And he can veto any bill or annul any law that he thinks threatens "the interests of the United States or nationals thereof."

But Caraway has artfully avoided the use of the veto.

"If he vetoes a bill," the chief of the leading opposition party points out, "he has to explain why in a letter to Washington, and this could lead to a public debate in which our views would be heard. Besides, the reasons for wielding the veto are restricted."

Draft Revised

There seem to be no restrictions, however, on the degree to which Caraway and his aides participate in the legislative process. All draft bills are "pre-adjusted" with USCAR before going to the legislature and, according to standing USCAR instructions, "if a modification or objection is advanced by USCAR, the department concerned revises the draft as suggested."

And before a bill gets to the chief executive's desk for final signature, after being passed by the legislature, it must be cleared again by USCAR officials.

This "pre-adjustment" system irks Okinawan political leaders more than any other aspect of American rule.

"It would cause more of a furor if I vetoed a bill," the general explains. "They could pass any kind of a law knowing the United States would not let it go through."

Presidential executive order, the U.S. commission can issue ordinances which

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L. A. TIMES

MAY 11 1964

U.S. Rule on Okinawa Stirs Anger of Natives

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... this is just a matter of practical administration."

To many Okinawans, it is also a violation of at least the spirit of President Kennedy's 1962 executive order.

It was after a special Presidential commission headed by Prof. Carl Kayser had studied the Okinawan situation, and after Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy visited here and Japan in early 1962, that President Kennedy on March 19, 1962, proclaimed what was hailed in this part of the world as a "new policy" for Okinawa.

The new policy included a substantial increase in economic aid authorization (Congress granted less than half of what Mr. Kennedy requested) and a statement by the President that "I recognize the Ryukyus to be part of the Japanese homeland."

But it also emphasized "the military imperative" for continued U.S. administration.

Two provisions of the new policy the islanders considered vital. The first called for discussions with Japan to work out "precise arrangements" for coordinating Japanese and U.S. aid to the Ryukyus. These discussions have been going on in Tokyo for a year and a half. Only this month has agreement finally been reached to set up two committees, one in Tokyo and one here.

Added to Delay

Caraway, who has continually given the impression that he is not anxious to see Japanese aid to the Ryukyus expand, makes clear that he did not consider the formation of the committees urgent, and his lack of enthusiasm contributed to the delay. Another obstacle was the demand by some Japanese politicians that the committees be empowered to talk about "reversion" of the Ryukyus to Japan as well as economic aid.

The second vital provision was Mr. Kennedy's ordering a continuous review of governmental functions to determine when and under what circumstances additional functions that need not be reserved to the

United States ... can be delegated to the government of the Ryukyu Islands."

No such delegation of function has in fact taken place in these two years.

Series of Problems

A year ago Caraway shocked the Okinawan public by declaring in a speech that autonomy for the Ryukyus is a "myth" because the United States must retain final authority for the time being. Meanwhile, he says, he has not been able to delegate authority because the Ryukyus won't accept responsibility.

In recent months Caraway has concerned himself with a series of problems far removed from base security. He has urged the consolidation of sugar mills and passed on the applications of Japanese wishing to visit the islands. He has insisted that the school board give free books to all children through the sixth grade, although the

board wanted to have parents pay for books after the third grade, as is done in Japan, and use the public funds for other worthy projects.

Caraway recently has considered the tax structure, the amount of dollars the government changes for yen on a given date, and the appointment of officials to banks and public corporations. He also controls the central bank, the water system and the electric power corporation.

All of this draws sharp criticism from Okinawans.

Two Things Wrong

On the other hand, Okinawa has made economic progress over the past two years. The Gross National Product has gone up 31% and per capita income is up to \$292, a 23% increase, while consumer prices have increased only about 5%.

The minimum wage is still only nine cents an hour, but the general wage level is rising and the 32,000 Ryukyus who work on the military bases make an average of 43 cents an hour, compared with 26 cents four years ago.

From the Okinawan

viewpoint, however, there are two things wrong with this rosy view. First, for all their progress, they say they are not improving living standards as fast as Japan is.

Secondly, the prosperity they do have represents little more than a steady increase in U.S. military spending and Okinawans don't like to rely on that.

"What we cannot endure," says Koichi Taira, a legislator and member of the moderate opposition Okinawa Social Masses Party, "is that we have given up, have lost, all these things which we would have as part of Japan—development of industry, a sense of nationality, freedom of travel, welfare benefits—just in order for the bases to be here, to safeguard the peace and so forth."