

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 外紙報道（在米その他公館関係）(1)

メタデータ	言語: 出版者: 公開日: 2019-02-13 キーワード (Ja): キーワード (En): 作成者: - メールアドレス: 所属:
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/43804

ロス・アンゼルス 系

調査済

報告長
北米局長
参事官

安全性確保
北米課長
第788号
昭和42年7月21日

外務大臣殿

在ロス・アンゼルス
総領事
高木

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「日米関係に対する脅威」と題する加州大学教授の
論評について
国際政治学の权威として敬る著者と去している
ロス・アンゼルス加州大学 Brodie 教授は 7月20日 Los
Angeles Times 紙上に最近同教授が日本における
国際会議場に出発した印象として「日本国民はアメリカの
いかなる戦争介入に深い関心を持っており極端な
批判的であるが、日米関係を冷却させる一番大敵

GA-4 外務省

2032

問題は「いかなる問題にもむしろ沖縄問題である
と見えられ、このことは今後の日本訪問で更に強く印象
づけられる。私が会った米関係の指導者も個人別に
面会すると私に対し「米國に帰ったら沖縄問題が日本
国民にとり如何に重要であるか」と米政府関係
者や有力者に話しもたれたいと語っている。公開の討論の
節上では「いかなる問題が盛に論じられ沖縄問題は
対照的に弱く持ち出されなかった。これは同じ米政策
も米政策が国民意識も十分リスライクであるという
象を見せるためと持ち出されたのは明らかである。
沖縄をアメリカが保持している理由は核兵器の持ち
出し可能であるとか、日本の政変に左右される基地を
保有し得るといふ理由があげられる。一般のアメリカ
人観望者は日本につくと思いがけない親善と接近
を望む。米國が25年先にはアメリカと大戦争の

GA-4 外務省

存の在りし原爆の洗脱を交け右側かと疑いなく
 作である。之は種々の理由がある、第一に現在の
 日本国民の大半を形成している ~~若年達~~ ^{人口の} 若年達 ^の 経験がなく、戦時中は日本が真珠湾攻撃と
 して始りたものであり、日本を戦場に迫る人々の軍部に
 責任ありとしている。またアメリカの借債にまつて
 衆議院自衛隊も ^{Chilian?} (民間人) がコントロールしている。
 日本人はアメリカが戦時中 京都、奈良、日光といった
 古い都市を爆撃したことが非常に感謝しているしまた
 アメリカの占領政策が日本に与り非常に寛大であつた
 ことに感謝している。戦後の日本の経済成長は脅威の
 であり、此の年因はアメリカの貿易障害除去の努力も
 である、日本人特有の工業技術の競争性と努力
 によること大である。此の様な事情から沖縄問題と
 しては日本がアメリカに沖縄の施政権を保持する正当

在理由がある。基地の使用が必須としても施政権と
 は別物と考へられるべきである。核兵器保持が保
 存には航空機艦隊に艦隊自内口保持する必要がある。
 日本が中立化する可能性をおかして施政権を保
 持し固執することは意味のない。又、核兵器は
 此は最早の沖縄は基地としての意味を失うからである。
 尚、此の戦争の後に施政権返還が主であるならば
 将来は必ず返還するとの約束は少くとも出来ておらう。
 日本政府は公式には沖縄問題をプシしてはいるが
 又、核兵器の確約は日米安保条約が1970年にも改定
 する可能性の在りことと相まつて日本側にも最も温
 かく歓迎されることである。』と述べた。この
 報告です。
 本信寫送付先 米大
 別紙添附

TOPICAL COMMENT: OKINAWA DILEMMA

Threat to U.S.-Japan Relations

BY BERNARD BRODIE

The Japanese people are deeply concerned with, and generally opposed to, the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. But it may well be that the issue which most seriously threatens to diminish their very real affection for the United States is not the war, but continuing American control of Okinawa, the island base 500 miles southwest of the Japanese home islands.

This fact was once again impressed upon me last month in Japan.

A leader of the Socialist Party, the main opposition to the governing Liberal Democratic Party, asked to speak to me on "a matter of some importance." When we met alone he came to the point. "Please," he said, "when you get home and speak to members of your government and to other influential people, let them know how important to the Japanese people is the settlement of the Okinawa question."

I was startled by this, not because I lacked awareness that the Japanese were unhappy about our retaining the administration of this island base, but because he, a Socialist, could give the matter such over-riding and indeed exclusive priority.

Rather Than Vietnam?

I would have understood if he had spoken thus of Vietnam, but in fact our involvement there was scarcely mentioned that evening. No doubt he felt I had already been sufficiently immersed in Japanese feelings on that subject. In my public meetings Vietnam had been much discussed—in contrast to Okinawa, which was hardly brought up at all. It was obvious that neither Mr. X nor his party could stress the matter publicly, because Socialists could hardly wish to appear more *nationalistic* than the LDP.

Okinawa, an island about 80 miles long and 20 wide, is inhabited by over a million Japanese, a large proportion of whom work on the U.S. air and naval bases there. There are other American bases elsewhere in Japan, which together may be operationally more important than Okinawa. This whole island, however, we insist on keeping under our own "residual" sovereignty.

One reason, if not the chief one, presumably is that we are enabled to store nuclear weapons there, which Japanese law prohibits elsewhere. There are other, more political reasons sometimes mentioned by American military officers: to the effect that the base is more reliable in our hands if we retain control of it—even if there should be a change in the political climate in Japan.

Dims Regard for U.S.


No doubt my Japanese friend's special concern with Okinawa was due precisely to his worry that it tended to cloud the extraordinary infatuation with which his countrymen view the United States.

To be sure, the Socialist Party's position on the Mutual Security Treaty made it appear on the surface somewhat anti-American—and was doubtless costing it votes in the net—but it was much more a matter of being uninvolved in the military operations of even the most friendly superpower. His party also shared with the more moderate wing of the ruling party a feeling of kinship with the

UCLA Prof. Brodie, a widely recognized authority on international power politics, has written such definitive books as "Association and the Nuclear Option" and "Strategy in the Missile Age." With his biographer-wife, Fawn, he also co-authored "From Cross-Bow to H-Bomb." Brodie attended a series of conferences in Japan last month.

mainland Chinese and of despair at what we Americans are trying to accomplish, hopelessly and perhaps dangerously in their view, in Vietnam. Yet what bothered him most was an issue that could really reach down to the whole Japanese people (as Vietnam apparently did not) and disturb their almost unbelievable affection, which he clearly shared, for America and all things American.

Even the most casual American tourist to Japan must notice that he is greeted by Japanese of all classes and age groups with a warmth and open admiration that clearly exceeds (if it does not entirely differ from) anything he has known elsewhere. How is this possible in a people upon whom only a



Times map

quarter century ago we inflicted a terrible defeat, which ended a war in which our devastation of almost all their major cities culminated in the horrendous fire-storm destruction of Tokyo and the two atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

The answer is naturally complex, but its salient features can be covered in a few words. Every schoolchild in Japan (and by now a large majority of the population are people who cannot remember the war) learns that it was Japan that started the war by its attack at Pearl Harbor. The insistence of pressing this home seems to be partly an expiation of guilt and partly a continuing condemnation of the militaristic clique which brought the disaster to Japan.

The degree to which the small "Self Defense Forces" brought into being by our urging are subject to civilian control must astonish American military officers. The post-war National Defense College, for example, has always been headed by a civilian. The Japanese now thank us, through monuments and plaques, for sparing during the war the shrine and temple cities of Kyoto, Nara, and Nikko. Their other cities look now as they probably would have looked anyway from the

fantastic rebuilding and expansion which their furious economic growth would have made inevitable.

At war's end the Japanese expected the worst of the occupation, and it turned out to be unbelievably benign. It gave them the constitution which they still find eminently satisfactory. The emperor was retained and treated with respect, as were also the common people, who were besides succored in their desperate need. Only formerly conquered territories clearly not Japanese were separated from Japan, and these were in the main not annexed by the United States but granted independence (like Korea) or restored to their former owners.

Generosity Triumphs

All this has been communicated to the younger generation by word of mouth from their elders as well as by their schoolbooks. It was a classic case of a victor in war winning the peace as well through generosity to the vanquished.

Then, early in the 1950's the Japanese economy took off in what has been the most fabulous rate of growth in history. Neither the German *Wirtschaftswunder* nor the sharp advance in the American economy since 1960 has come close to matching the Japanese performance. Oddly enough, we get credit for that too. The common explanation in Japan is that the boom started as a result of our involvement in the Korean War, which increased our use of Japanese bases and shipping. No doubt this factor helped, but it certainly does not rate inclusion among the half-dozen major reasons why the Japanese economy has accomplished such miracles.

It would be somewhat more rational to credit the United States with leading the world movement towards reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade. But the credit belongs to the Japanese people themselves, with their amazing energies and to their fantastic dedication to work and to improving their lot. It also has not hurt our image that the boom proved how hollow was the claim of the former militarist leaders that Japanese prosperity depended on territorial expansion.

Real Need Not Apparent

It is within this framework that we must consider the issue of Okinawa. It is hard for this writer to find any real reasons to justify our keeping its jurisdiction out of the hands of the Japanese government. Use of the base does not require administration of the island. If we must have nuclear weapons in the region, and alternative ground depositories are not available, they can be stored in ships, as they already have on aircraft carriers. Holding jurisdiction against the possibility of the Japanese turning neutralist makes no sense either, because with such a drastic change in affairs Okinawa would lose its meaning as a base anyway. If a change in governing status at the present time would be inconvenient because of the Vietnam war, at least a promise could be made now of correction later.

The Japanese government is not pressing the issue officially, but such a promise would be most warmly welcomed—besides advancing the already high likelihood that the Japanese will not in fact seek to abrogate the Mutual Security Treaty after 1970.

北米局長
参事官
北米課長

報道課長
海外伝達課長

「ロス」情 第 931 号
昭和 42 年 8 月 18 日

外務大臣殿

在ロス・アンゼルス
総領事館

要処	連絡
要研	至
課	長
要	可
渡	辺
川	山
森	山
柳	川
中	田
橋	本
黒	須

42.8.21

「日米関係に対する脅威」と題する加州大学教授
の論評に対する反対意見と同教授の反論について
7月21日付絶信「ロス」情第958号の南
神縄の施政権を日本に返還すべきとす UCLA Brodie
教授の論評に対し別紙甲のとおり 当地在住の K. L.
Klopp Kloepfer 氏ら若し 7月29日 L.A. Times 紙上
返還すべきに非ず」として 反対意見がのせられた
之に対し Brodie 教授は 此の反対意見につき 大要

3049

下記のとおり 「日本と友好的であることは他にありと
ある」として 8月5日付 L.A. Times 紙に 別紙乙のとおり
反論していること報告す。

記

1. 太平洋を相手として戦争をした時の日本と
現在の様な 太平洋の 領土を 準備を持つ 米国の
同盟国 である 現在の日本との相違は、現在の日本の
国民の 態度を 表明し 之を 適当な 行動に 表わすとい
日本の 支配 勢力の 態度の 相違にあると云える。此の
日本国民の 態度は 大に 重要と 捉えらるべきである。
日本は 現在 東洋に おいて 最大の 力を 持つ 国であり
同盟国 として 日本が 再度 危険な 敵国 になるとは
思は ないが 日本を 反邦国 として 維持 しようとする
勢力は 依然として 大に 存在している。

2. 「核兵器と船舶の保持する」という 報の 意見は 甚だ

高橋につくづく適当でない」との Kloepfer の意見に対し
これは既に P.M.I. は 41 隻の潜水艦と持
つており、また航空母艦にも核兵器を積込出来るもの
がある。且、一般船舶にも核兵器を積込出来るもの
がある。今日論議の対象とはならない。
3. 不平等に引取の論議の一部が若くは
あるが、日本にも英国が沖縄の主権を保持して居る
に非ざれば、この論議は反対の理由が正しく
4. 「沖縄の主権は将来の権利として日本に返還し
は」との Kloepfer の意見は節外である。英国は日本と主権
国家として承認しており、日本の領土を無視して日本の領土
に英国基地を保有する可能性を考へることは第三者
は如何に P.M.I. が沖縄に基地を必要とするか、用意する
であろう。現在 P.M.I. は沖縄の保持の理由を沖縄の
の自治能力を助けるためとの理由で正しくしている。

5. Y 連が日本固有の領土の一部を保有しているから
英国も同様の Y を持つべきであるという理由は理由に非ざらん
本信寫送付先 〇〇〇〇
別紙添附

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305
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DISSENTING VIEW

U.S. Should Hold Okinawa

It seems strange that UCLA's Bernard Brodie, (July 20) "a widely recognized authority on power politics," can seriously advocate that the United States should gratuitously promise a reversion of the sovereignty of Okinawa to the Japanese.

Brodie's simplified thesis is that Uncle Sam receives an over-adulation from his Japanese nephew for the post-war good fortune of the Japanese society and economy. The people of Japan are exemplarily deserving, having "amazing energies and...fantastic dedication to work and to improving their lot"; they still find their U.S. given constitution "eminently satisfactory." Japan has forgiven Uncle Sam for the World War II conquest, greeting "even the most casual American tourist...with a warmth and open admiration that exceeds...anything he has known elsewhere."

What can we do for such a deserving nephew? Promise him the sovereignty of Okinawa which Brodie implies is the only conquered territory clearly Japanese not under Japanese rule. (If Sakhalin isn't Japanese, Israel belongs to the Arabs).

No realistic answers to the reasons for our keeping the island, i.e., Japan's prohibition of the storage of nuclear weapons on their territory and the use of the bases should Japanese politics go anti-American, are given by Brodie.

He suggests nuclear weapons could be stored on ships, but the cost

of operating a fleet large enough to do the job would be prohibitive; nuclear weapons require periodic monitoring and safety checks which can't be done on board ship; the base at Guam would have to be used, some 2000 miles away.

He claims a change in Japanese attitude toward the United States would destroy the need for the bases; we need them to maintain our ready-alert Marines with on the job training in the area.

Okinawa, strategically located between Red China and Japan, Formosa and Korea would still have obvious value even if relations with Japan soured.

The United States should retain jurisdiction over base territory on the island as we did in Guantanamo Bay. Brodie's moral argument is sound, if oversimplified; perhaps the principle of self-determination should be extended to the civilian population of Okinawa. But his advocacy of a U.S. promise of sovereignty which, until effected, could make us vulnerable to propaganda pressure, is unsound.

If the inherently difficult security problems of our military installations could be worked out, the sovereignty of the civilian portion of the island might be beneficially traded to Japan for future rights under the Mutual Security Treaty after 1970. Such a quid pro quo would be politically advantageous to the governments of both countries.

KENNETH LYNN KLOEFFER
Los Angeles

2/11
3/15
2

Worth Keeping Japan Friendly

In objecting to my article of July 20, which advocated the restoration of the administration of Okinawa to the Japanese, Kenneth Lynn Kloefer scoffs (Letters, July 29) at my description of Japan's friendliness towards the United States. However, it is not clear whether he regards this attribution of friendship as incorrect or simply unimportant. The correctness is a matter of easy verification by experienced observers, so I shall speak only of the latter.

Although the relevance of foreign opinion to a particular issue may indeed be and often is exaggerated, I suggest that the difference between the Japan with which we had to wage a bitter and harsh struggle for four years and the contemporary Japan which is our loyal ally, unwilling to arm herself except at our urging, is a difference in attitudes on the part of the governing groups in Japan — attitudes which express the desires of the people and which are realized in relevant forms of behavior. Surely then, these attitudes, in which the United States is centrally involved, are important.

The present status of Okinawa stems from a victor-vanquished relationship, and we have to remind ourselves that the war ended 22 years ago. Moreover, Japan is in process of displacing Germany as the third greatest industrial nation in the world. If it should ever desire to resume anything like its pre-World War II role, it is potentially (including its potential capability for producing nuclear weapons) far the greatest power in the Orient. I do not wish to suggest that Japan may again become a dangerous enemy, but rather that it is worth more than passing attention to keeping her as a friend.

Kloefer also rejects as an unsound notion my suggestion that nuclear weapons—assuming they must be kept in the area, which is itself questionable—can be stored on ships, calling "prohibitive" the cost of operating "a fleet large enough to do the job." He adds that "nuclear weapons require monitoring and safety checks which can't be done aboard ship."

However, we do have in service 41 Polaris submarines, each carrying 16 missiles with nuclear warheads; aircraft carriers have for many years been storing nuclear weapons as part of their armament; the multilateral-force proposal which the United States was fostering some years ago and for which we were prepared to pay 40% of the cost also involved the storage of nuclear warheads on missiles aboard surface ships; and now the Navy has just proposed the development of shipborne anti-missile missiles, which of course must carry nuclear warheads.

All this is in the public domain. There is no use arguing about relevant facts not in the public domain, though I can assure Kloefer that I have not for 17 years been in a position that permitted me to remain ignorant of them.

Incidentally, because a line of type was inadvertently dropped (as explained in the letters column July 30) my article as published erroneously read as though the United States rather than Japan retained sovereignty over Okinawa. The reverse is of course true.

Kloefer's suggestion that "the sovereignty of the civilian portion of the island might be beneficially traded to Japan for future rights..." is therefore simply irrelevant. We have already acknowledged Japan as sovereign, and for us even to consider the possibility that we might insist on using Japanese territory for military bases against the expressed will of some future Japanese government makes one wonder why we should want an American military presence in that part of the world anyway. So far we have justified it in terms of our desire to help the indigenous nations of that area to protect their competence for self-government.

Finally, the fact that the Soviet Union retains portions of Japanese territory under her rule (a peace treaty not yet having been concluded between that country and Japan) is certainly no reason why the United States should do the same.

BERNARD BRODIE
Professor of Political Science
UCLA

報道課長 北米局長
 参事官
 北米課長

第 944 号
 昭和 42 年 8 月 24 日
 下付 94

外務大臣殿

在口入・アンセルス
 総領事
 藤田 三郎

要	英	河	内
研	吉	津	
究	田	田	
至	森	坂	元
	川	崎	
	中	田	
	藤	本	
	黒	須	

42.8.23

Los Angeles Times 紙東京特派員報道(日本の
 琉球返還要求高まる)
 24日付 Los Angeles Times 紙は同紙 Shannon
 東京特派員の東京からの報道として「日本の琉球返還要求
 高まる」との見出しで「沖縄を含まず琉球列島の返
 還要求が日本では高まっている。この報告として先般行
 った北省一用沖縄問題等懇話会での発言、今年11月迄
 さしている米国のサンタフェ総領との会談の際に沖縄問題

佐藤総領が
 を取上げると断言したこと、昨 松岡琉球首席が上京し
 琉球に対する経済格差の増大とともに佐藤総領が訪米
 大統領と会談の際 琉球の日本返還要求を種々に述べ
 欲しと要求したこと、更に 三木外相、ゴスイグン首相の会談
 により連日 閣議 先と三木外相の返答を示したことから
 米国の琉球の施政権返還は ^{在外} 琉球列島 ^を 返還
 する ~~日本~~ 譲渡する可程性があると希望があること、
 更に 之に対応して佐藤総領は 樺原総領事館を沖縄に
 8月初旬 派遣した こと等あげ 急速に日本の沖縄を
 含む琉球の返還要求が高まっている旨を報告する
 のを報告する。

本信寫送付先 ワシントン

別紙添附

Japanese Demands for Ryukyus Are Growing

Prime Minister Sato Lays Down Warning That He Expects Action in Johnson Talks

BY DON SHANNON
Times Staff Writer

TOKYO — Japanese demands for the return of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands by the United States—a perennial hot weather device to fill newspaper space — grew up into something more like a real issue this summer.

Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who refused to demagog about Okinawa in last January's parliamentary elections, laid down a warning that he will expect action when he takes up the question of the American-held Japanese territory in his talks with President Johnson in November.

"Some 950,000 brethren in Okinawa still find themselves under the administrative control of a foreign power at present — 22 years after the end of the war," Sato told the first meeting of an advisory council on Okinawa in problems he appointed in July.

"If this condition continues for long, it will not only be unfortunate to the Japanese people, but might impair the maintenance of cooperation between Japan and the United States for the security of Japan and the Far East."

Commitment Sought

The premier's reference to security cooperation means the U.S.-Japan defense treaty, eligible for revision after 1970. Sato has been one of the treaty's strongest supporters, defending it against the bitter attacks of Japan's Socialist and Communist parties, but members of his own Liberal Democratic Party are now urging that he get a solid commitment on the return of Okinawa well before 1970.

The conservatives believe, with a feeling evidently now shared by their leader, that the treaty will be increasingly hard to maintain intact unless there is definite movement on the territorial question.

Seiho Matsuoka, the former Azusa orange picker and Hawaiian cane cutter who is chief executive of the civilian government in the Ryukyus, came to Tokyo to add to the pressure. After the national rites for the 22nd anniversary of the war's end, Matsuoka called on the prime minister and asked not only for the usual increase in Japanese economic aid to the southern islands, but also for a vigorous presentation of the case for reversion when Sato meets Mr. Johnson in Washington.

Hold Reservations

Although Matsuoka and his highly conservative Democratic Party hold well-known reservations about the return of the islands to Japan without the \$100 million of annual income from U.S. bases, political pressure has forced the Democrats into a more aggressive public stance, at least. Matsuoka quoted Sato as saying in their interview that nuclear weapons—once the big barrier to Japanese

administration because of the Japanese constitutional ban on nuclear weapons on Japanese soil—may be eliminated from the case by a U.S. switch to Polaris submarines or to other bases in the Western Pacific.

Many Japanese thought the test of the Chinese Communists' hydrogen bomb may have solved the problem by rendering the Okinawa bases untenable, although U.S. experts believe this is as premature as the possibility of finding sea-going or alternative land bases for nuclear missiles now deployed in the Ryukyus by the United States.

Two other developments contributed to the rise of reversion fever. First was the July visit by Foreign Minister Takeo Miki to Moscow where talks with Premier Alexei N. Kosygin produced hints of Soviet willingness to return Kunashiri and Etorofu islands north of Hokkaido, seized in 1945 without any legal justification. Japanese diplomats believe that the Soviet Union may be ready to use the islands to gain favor with Japan since the breakdown of Russian relations with Communist China. They are confident that any Soviet concession will bring matching generosity from Washington—perhaps the return of the almost deserted Bonin Islands if nothing can be done toward giving back sovereignty over the Ryukyus.

AUG 20 1967

L. A. TIMES

Sato Reversal Cited

The second Japanese action showing a reversal of Sato's previous no-hurry attitude toward the southern islands was the dispatch of Director General Toshio Tsukahara of the prime minister's office on a four-day tour of Okinawa at the beginning of August. Tsukahara was reported to have given a sympathetic hearing to a Ryukyuan government plea for 15 billion yen (\$46.6 million) in budget aid next year, more than double the present Japanese contribution. He was unable, however, to present a definite plan for the post-reversion economic support of the islands by Japan when he met with Lt. Gen. Frederick Unger, U.S. high commissioner and real ruler of the Ryukyus.

On his return to Tokyo, Tsukahara emphasized that the key problem is still how to reconcile sentiment for reversion with the U.S. need for the military bases.


The contention of Americans is that the bases are indispensable as long as the Viet war continues, and some believe they must be held as long as China remains a threat to its neighbors.

The military refuse to believe that the bases can function unless the islands themselves remain under U.S. control, although diplomats have been willing to listen to Japanese ideas on how the administration of the islands might be returned to Japan with the bases undisturbed.

北米局
参事官
北米課
「ロス」第1078号
昭和42年9月29日

外務大臣殿

在ロス・アンゼルス
総領事



Los Angeles Times 報東京特派員報道(沖縄問題

について)

9月24日付 L.A. Times 報は同紙 Shannon 東京特

派員が東京からの報道として「沖縄については種々諸

般なためにもやはり難問題である」との見出し

「日本の各新聞と政治家連綿 沖縄問題」

種々論じられており、沖縄問題は今の返還が毎年の村

に端じられているが、いつも同じ返中が AXIB 正リ線

要処理	要連絡
要研究	至
課長	
河内	
吉津	
中吉	
田坂	
森元	
相川	
中田	
橋本	
黒須	



GA-4

外務省

3523

返され本年9月中旬の三木・ラス会談でも同じ結果と
なっている。沖縄の米軍基地は尚ほ戦争が終り限
り、我々中央のプグーマルな状況が長く限り必要で
あり、基地問題を施政権と分離して考えることは非現
実的であり、現在の存在 半軍による支那が实际的なも
のがある。沖縄返還問題については佐藤総理の任命
に於ける沖縄内閣懇話会の種々の榊方式による返還試
み マンフレッド 上院議員の下田発言があつて大いに
端じられているがやはり沖縄問題は難問題である旨
報じているので報告する。

本信寫送付先ワシントン

別紙添附

GA-4

外務省

Despite Talk, Okinawa Issue Still a Puzzle

BY DON SHANNON
Times Staff Writer

TOKYO — Japanese newspapers and politicians have marched up the hill and down again once more with the Okinawa issue.

Despite all their similar experiences in the past decade, the leaders of Japanese opinion let themselves get caught once again in an all-summer debate over the return of the southern islands, only to come up with the same answer from the United States. Foreign Minister Takeo Miki got it directly from Secretary of State Dean Rusk this time during his mid-September mission to Washington.

U.S. bases on the islands are essential as long as the Vietnam war continues and "abnormal" conditions exist in Communist China. Separation of the bases from the administration of the Ryukyu Islands is "impracticable" and only the present U.S. military rule is practicable.

Back Where It Was

The whole question was back exactly where it was a year ago when Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson took his post here and declared that it is not a serious problem between the United States and Japan. At the time, he also ruled out the idea of separating military bases from the rest of an island that is less than a mile wide at its narrow waist, as is Okinawa.

With the peculiar self-hypnosis that is a Japanese national characteristic, committees and conferences were organized this summer, inside and outside the government, with a full press orchestra

of commentaries by experts and surveys of public opinion. The most reassuring thing about the surveys is their constant rediscovery that the average Japanese is not quite sure where the Ryukyu Islands are and is concerned about them proportionately.

Two Meetings

The climax came in mid-September with a pair of meetings. The Okinawa and other Problems Conference, a group appointed by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato last spring, won headlines with a report on seven reversion formulas. These ranged from immediate return to Japan with abolition of the U.S. bases, to a gradual return of Japanese administration without impairing the free use of the bases by the United States. The impression created by a hasty reading was that the 22-year separation of the islands from the homeland was about to end and it was only a question of how the return was to be arranged. It was only in the small print that readers learned the expert conclusion that none of the formulas would satisfy both parties.

A special event was the appearance of Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana at the Japanese-American Assembly in Shimoda at almost the moment Miki was getting the facts from Rusk.

Sweeping Proposal

In a speech that was truly Oriental, Mansfield proposed that all the unfinished business of World War II — the Ryukyus and the Bonins, another U.S.-held group south of Japan's main islands, as well as the northern islands seized by the Soviet Union — be settled in a three-way conference of the U.S., Soviet and Japanese governments.

The chances that such a conference will ever take place are slightly less than a world agreement on total disarmament, but Mansfield was able to remind his professional audience that there are other problems more susceptible of solution than Okinawa.

The Bonins, barren and almost unoccupied except for a small Navy base and a colony of Japanese descendants of American and European castaways, are

strategically useless. Aside from emergency landing and navigation facilities on Iwo Jima, the islands offer possible sites for nuclear storage or secondary missile bases.

U.S. officials' silence with regard to the Bonins, in contrast with their readiness to explain why Okinawa cannot be given up, is leading some Japanese to believe that a move may come in this area. They are speculating that the United States apparently is planning to offer the Bonins in the event the Soviet Union makes a small concession in the north, where the Soviets used their brief part in the war against Japan to seize the entire Kurile chain of islands stretching from Hokkaido to the Kamchatka Peninsula as well as the Japanese half of the formerly shared big island of Sakhalin.

Although there was no basis for Russian claim to most of the islands, the Soviets have offered only to return two small islands closest to Hokkaido and have hinted that they might allow fishing rights near two more if Japan will relinquish its claims to everything else in a peace treaty.

The Bonins would be a psychological equivalent of this meager Soviet concession if Japan decides to accept it. Inevitably, of course, a peace treaty with the Soviet Union and return of the Bonins would spotlight the last great reminder of World War II, the occupation of the Ryukyus, where a million Japanese citizens live.

SEP 24 1967

L. A. TIMES