

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 外紙報道（在米その他公館関係）(2)

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ソカ 万
ヒヒ 博

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

大政事外外僑管
務次 典房
官直審審長長
備文会審総
参入電厚計
参折企
参領旅移
参領旅移

総番号(TA) 28537 主管
69年 7月 2日 19時 32分 ニューヨーク 発着
69年 7月 3日 10時 34分 本省 着 米北

外務大臣殿 奈良 大使 臨時代理大使 (総領事) 代理

オキナワ問題 (報道関係対策)

第580号 略

貴電米北 / 合第2410号に関し、
 国頭貴電の(イ)の諸点については早速各方面から情報を
 収集しており、あわせVAN ALYCKにも調査を依頼
 しているところ。来週半ばまでには結果を取りまとめ報告
 出来る予定。
 右取りあえず。
 米、ロス、シスコ、シアトル、ヒューストンに転送した。

ア 参地中東
北 東 西
参北北保
参一二
参西東洋
参東

近ア 参近ア
長 次総経国万
参實統
参政技二
国一理
参条協規
参政経科
参社専
参内内
一二

外務省

秘

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官直審審長長
備文会審総
参入電厚計
参折企
参領旅移
参領旅移

総番号(TA) 29905 主管
69年 7月 10日 19時 25分 ニューヨーク 発着
69年 7月 11日 08時 47分 本省 着 米北

外務大臣殿 橋 大使 臨時代理大使 (総領事) 代理

オキナワ問題 (報道関係対策)

第602号 略 至急

往電第580号に関し、
 1. 本件調査がハースト側に与える微みような関係にかん
 がみ当館が直接先方関係者にアプローチし種々ちよう取す
 る方式を避けVAN SLYCK (同コンサルタントは右
 よく団体と接触のあるGORDON HALLなる人物を
 使つて調査した由。)その他を通じ調査を進め、また当地
 新聞界の事情に明るい人々の意見を徴したところを総合す
 れば次の通り。

(イ) 本件社説をハースト社のだれが書いたかは明らかで
 ないが、ニクソン政権や国防省上層部の示さによりそれが
 書かれたと言うことは考えられない。
 (ロ) むしろこの社説は貴大臣御訪米を機に米国各紙が一
 せいにオキナワ問題を取り上げた中で、偶々日本側にUN
 FAVORABLEな論説として出て来たもので、それ
 は元来反動右派に属するハースト社のカラーが表われたも
 のと見るべきであろう。

ア 参地中東
北 東 西
参北北保
参一二
参西東洋
参東

近ア 参近ア
長 次総経国万
参實統
参政技二
国一理
参条協規
参政経科
参社専
参内内
一二

外務省

秘

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(ハ) この社説に関し注意を払ったのは政府との関係よりもむしろ右よく団体との関係であつた。特に昨年9月の大会でオキナワ保持を求める決議案を採択したAMERICAN LEGIONとの関係如何を重視した。しかし調査の結果同決議は単にオキナワ問題に関するAMERICAN LEGIONの立場を記録に留めるにすぎず、それ以上のACTIONを要求していない。またこの8月の大会ではオキナワに関する決議案の上程も予定されていないのでハースト社説がAMERICAN LEGIONの8月大会をねらつて書かれたものでもないことが判明した。このことはハースト社自体が長期的な意図をもつて同社説を各さん下紙に流したものとは思われず、従つて今後この様な動きをくり返すことは意図されていないものと考えられる。

その他例えばJOHN BIRCH SOCIETY等いくつかの右よく団体の動きについても調査したところでは、オキナワ問題について組織的な運動を計画しているものはないことが判つた。

(ニ) ハースト社は反動右派の立場を執り軍事外交問題ではヘッドラインを主張しておりBLUE-COLLARの教育程度の低い読者に対しあい国心、共産主義のきょうい等を強調してアピールする単純な論議を蓄いている。

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電信写

ハースト系の影響力は今世き初頭数十年間は大きかつたが今日では民主、共和のいずれの党に対しても比較的小きな政治的影響力を持つに過ぎず、1936年以来多くの問題で少数派の意見を代表しているものである。従つて地方の大衆にある程度の影響力はあつても米国の世論指導層に訴える力は限られていると考えられる。

2. 上述の通りハースト社が今後本件社説掲載と同種の動きをくり返すことを意図しているとは考えられないが、これに対し何らかの対策を講ずるとしてもVAN SLYCKはハースト系関係者を招待することはかえつて同社の反響を招く可能性があり得策でないとして述べている。

3. なお、本件社説と同様の社説は下記の地方紙にも掲載されている。

ALBANY KNICKERBOCKER NEWS (N. Y.)

ALBANY TIMES UNION (N. Y.)

BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN (MD.)

BOSTON RECORD AMERICAN (MASS.)

BOSTON SUNDAY ADVERTISER (MASS.)

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電信写

米に転電し、ロス・シアトル・ヒューストン・サンフランシスコに転報した。

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アメリカ局長

参事官

北米第一課長


秘 至急

外務大臣
事務官

外務省
1944年7月15日

外務大臣殿

在ニューヨーク
本良総領事



沖縄問題報道関係対策

ウツウ

経度才602号の件

本件ハ、上系社説の意図、背景及び今後
の動向の調査、当館 PR コーディネーター Philip
Van Slyck のメモを別添送付す。

本信を送付先：在米大使、在米参事

此、以、上、の、件、に、関、し、て、サ、ラ、ソ、ウ、に、送、付、す。

要処理
首席事務官
参事官
渉外調査
漁業
郵空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査
力加付
局業務



総領事

PHILIP VAN SLYCK INC.
1041 THIRD AVENUE, NEW YORK 10021
212 759-4361 / CABLE SLYCKVAN NEW YORK

PHILIP VAN SLYCK
PETER W. NICHOLS

July 2, 1969

Mr. Yoshiyasu Sato
Embassy of Japan
2514 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Mr. Sato:

As I have already advised you by telephone, the "Okinawa Surrender?" editorial appeared in all nine Hearst newspapers. Thus it was a "must run" editorial initiated in Hearst headquarters in New York. We do not yet know what individual in the Hearst organization originated the editorial, but we are checking.

In any event, the viewpoint expressed is quite consistent with the Hearst organization's traditional hardline stand on defense and foreign-policy issues. The chain's appeal has long been to the blue-collar, less educated mass audience, and it has expressed this appeal in simplistic editorials that emphasize patriotism, the dangers of appeasing the Communist menace, the unreliability of foreign allies, the ingratitude of recipients of U.S. aid, and the middle-headedness of State Department and other public servants who give away American largesse and fritter away U.S. security because they do not understand the "real dangers" as well as do the Hearst papers and their readers.

The influence of the Hearst chain is drastically reduced from its heyday in the early decades of this century, when the empire was vastly larger and when William Randolph Hearst, Sr. was a national political power. (He broke with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, after warmly supporting him, on issues of "socialism" and "dictatorial" methods.) Today the empire is smaller, William, Jr. is a far weaker executive with relatively little political influence in either party, and the Hearst press speaks to and for a minority. (Politically, it has represented a minority viewpoint on many major issues since 1936, although it supported the successful Presidential candidates in 1952, 1956 and 1964.)

It is also useful to point out that this particular editorial, while indignant in tone, is not hostile to Japan as such, but rather is grudgingly admiring and is critical of Japanese claims in light

Mr. Yoshiyasu Sato/2

July 2, 1969

of Japan's failure to carry its share of the defense burden. There is a possible "out" in the editorial: "Either we keep a strong base under our own unhindered control on Okinawa, or Japan must take over the cost and responsibility of its own defense." Theoretically, in other words, Japan could redeem itself in Hearst's eyes by asserting a significantly larger role for its own self-defense, and possibly by other concessions.

We will be exploring this matter confidentially in the next week or two, to learn (if we can) how much flexibility there may be to the Hearst position.

For your information we are enclosing summary of those newspaper chains and syndicate subscribers that have so far taken an unfavorable stand on some aspect of Japan's Okinawa claims. The other four chains (Copley, Thomson, Chicago TRIBUNE, and Central) are ideologically more conservative than the Hearst chain. Independent papers such as the Atlanta JOURNAL and CONSTITUTION and the Houston POST are better papers and more open-minded editorially than the Hearst papers, although the Post has close ties with the Republican "old guard."

Sincerely,

Philip Van Slyck

PVS:gh
cc: Y. Noguchi

A SAMPLE OF DAILY NEWSPAPERS TAKING EDITORIAL STAND AGAINST FULL
OKINAWA REVERSION

Note: Newspapers marked with an asterisk are known to have printed cited editorial position. Those newspapers owned by a syndicate are not always required to print syndicate's position. These exceptions are noted under each syndicate title.

Copley Newspapers

The Copley Newspapers do not require its newspapers to follow verbatim its editorials although the "sense" of the syndicate's policy is published.

Position: A. U.S. cannot relinquish its bases.

B. While retaining absolute freedom of military action on Okinawa, including storage of nuclear weapons, U.S. should be willing to make some administrative concessions to protect U.S.-American alliance.

C. "Thinking" Okinawans do not want U.S. to leave.

1. *Alhambra (Calif.) Post-Advocate
2. *Aurora (Ill.) Beacon-News
3. Burbank (Calif.) Daily Review
4. Culver City (Calif.) Evening Star-News
5. Elgin (Ill.) Daily Courier-News
6. Glendale (Calif.) News-Press
7. Illinois State Journal, Illinois State Register
8. Joliet (Ill.) Herald-News
9. Monrovia (Calif.) Daily News-Post
10. *The Sacramento (Calif.) Union
11. *The San Diego (Calif.) Union and Evening Tribune

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12. *San Pedro (Calif.) News-Pilot
13. *(Torrance) South Bay Daily Breeze
14. Venice (Calif.) Evening Vanguard
15. Westchester (Calif.) Star-News

Independent newspapers printing Copley Positions in Editorials

(Probably taking Copley Press News Service)

1. *Albuquerque (N. Mex.) Journal
2. *Amarillo (Texas) News
3. *Everett (Wash.) Herald
4. *Greensboro (N.C.) Record
5. *Norfolk (Va.) Virginian Pilot
6. *Portland (Maine) Express
7. *Scranton (Pa.) Tribune
8. *Warren (Ohio) Tribune Chronicle
9. *Wilkes Barre (Pa.) Record

Hearst Newspapers

Hearst Newspapers are required to print verbatim Hearst editorials.

Position: A. U.S. must keep unhindered control over Okinawa.

B. If U.S. does not have unhindered control, Japan must take full responsibility for its own defense.

1. *Albany (N.Y.) Knickerbocker News
- ✓ 2. *Albany (N.Y.) Times Union
- ✓ 3. *Baltimore (Md.) News American
- ✓ 4. *Boston (mass.) Record American
- ✓ 5. *Boston (Mass.) Sunday Advertiser
6. *Los Angeles (Calif.) Herald-Examiner
7. *San Antonio (Texas) Light
8. *San Francisco (Calif.) Examiner
9. *Seattle (Wash.) Post-Intelligencer

Thomson Newspapers (Brush-Moore Group)

- Position :
- A. Admits U.S. recognition of Japan's "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa and its eventual return to Japan but implies return must not be now.)
 - B. Compares Russian's failure to return Kurile Islands to Japanese with U.S. willingness to talk about Ryukyu's return.

1. *East Liverpool (Ohio) Review
2. *Marion (Ohio) Star
3. *Postsmouth (Ohio) Times
4. *Steubenville (Ohio) Herald Star

(Chicago) Tribune Company-Owned Newspapers

- Position:
- A. U.S. should maintain complete military control over Ryukyus with some limitations at a later time.
 - B. Administrative control of the Ryukus handed over to Japan.
 - C. U.S. willing to discuss limitations on nuclear arms in the Ryukyus but restrictions to come at a later date.
 - D. Japan to agree to rearm substantially and rapidly.
 - E. Japan to agree to join the U.S. and Taiwan in a mutual defense agreement aimed at containing Red China.

1. Chicago's (Ill.) American
2. Chicago (Ill.) Tribune
3. *(N.Y.) Daily News
4. Fort Lauderdale (Fla.) News
5. Orlando (Fla.) Sentinel and Star
6. Pompano Beach (Fla.) Sun Sentinel

Independent Papers following Sen. Harry Byrd's Line and Similar to Chicago Tribune Position.

- Position:
- A. Japan must begin to share cost of its defense.
 - B. U.S. has no obligation to discuss reversion.
 - C. Reversion cannot take place as long as Vietnam War continues.
 - D. Reversion at this time would impair military security.

1. *Arlington North Virginia Sun
2. *Birmingham (Ala.) News
3. *Lynchburg (Va.) News
4. *Shreveport (La.) Journal
5. *Yakima (Wash.) Herald Republic

Central Newspapers

Position: A. Agrees with Byrd position that Japan must begin to share cost of defense and that reversion at present time would destroy U.S. military security.

1. Arizona Gazette
2. *Arizona Republic
3. Indianapolis Star
4. Indianapolis News
5. Muncie (Ind.) Star
6. Muncie (Ind.) Press
7. Vincennes (Ind.) Sun-Commercial

Editorial stands from other Independent Newspapers

*Atlanta (Ga.) Journal and Constitution

Position: A. Reversion of Okinawa is negotiable.
B. No limitation on nuclear weapons.
C. U.S. must have full control over military installations.

*Bakersfield Californian

Position: A. Japan has no legitimate claim to the Ryukyus.
B. The U.S. should not give up the Ryukyus because it would be a moral sellout to those who died in WW II and islands are for the defense of the "Free World" in Asia.

*Charleston (S.C.) News and Courier

Position: A. Reversion possible but U.S. should have right to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa after Japanese takeover.
B. U.S. should retain use of airfields and other installations on Okinawa.
C. Japan should become more active partner in defense of the Pacific, if U.S. is to give up control of the Ryukyus.

*Columbus (Ga.) Enquirer

Position: A. Okinawa must not be relinquished.
B. Move to return Ryukyus to Japan is attempt by the U.S. left, of Russia, and Red China to force U.S. to abandon Japan.

*Houston (Texas) POST

Position: A. U.S. defense of Japan is to the interest of both countries.
B. Negotiations possible but Japan must bear larger share of defense cost.

PHILIP VAN SLYCK INC.
1041 THIRD AVENUE, NEW YORK 10021
212 759-4361 / CABLE SLYCKVAN NEW YORK

PHILIP VAN SLYCK
PETER W. NICHOLS

July 10, 1969

MEMO TO: Vice Consul Yasuo Noguchi

SUBJECT: Hearst Newspapers and Okinawa

In response to your request, we submit the following evaluation of the editorial position on Okinawa of the Hearst newspaper chain, as expressed in editorial appearing June 12-13, 1969, and an estimation of the probable future intentions of the Hearst organization regarding the Okinawa question.

1. Distribution of the Editorial

The identical editorial (with minor changes in headlines) appeared June 12 or 13 in all Hearst markets, in the following seven dailies (copies attached):

Los Angeles, Calif (pop: 3 million) HEARLD-EXAMINER (circ: 540,793)

San Francisco, Calif. (pop: 814,348) EXAMINER (circ: 208,023)

Baltimore, Md. (pop: 915,500) NEWS-AMERICAN (circ: 216,949)

Boston, Mass. (pop: 603,075) RECORD AMERICAN (circ: 433,372)

Albany, N.Y. (pop: 126,872) TIMES-UNION (circ: 71,675)

San Antonio, Tex. (pop: 851,900) LIGHT (circ: 116,829)

Seattle, Wash. (pop: 592,184) POST-INTELLIGENCER (circ: 206,733)

The other Hearst papers, in which the editorial did not appear, are either evening (Albany KNICKERBOCKER NEWS) or Sunday (San Francisco EXAMINER & CHRONICLE, Boston SUNDAY ADVERTISER) editions of the principal local Hearst publication.

The combined circulation of the dailies in which the editorials appeared is 179,437. The combined population (1969 estimates) of the cities where Hearst dailies are published is 6,907,879. In two of these cities (Baltimore and San Antonio) the Hearst paper is the larger of two dailies: in one (Boston) it is the largest of four; in another (Albany) it is the only daily: in the remaining three markets (Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle) the Hearst

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DRAFT

Memo: Vice Consul Noguchi/2

July 10, 1969

paper is second of two dailies.

2. Viewpoint of the Editorial

The editorial assumes that the Administration has already decided to "yield to the pressures" of Japan's nationalistic far right and its anti-American left" and, "anxious to maintain good relations with Japan's pro-American government," will "return the territories - probably effective in 1972."

The editorial also assumes that the Administration - in its "conciliatory" and "amazingly benevolent attitude" - is also prepared to accept mainland restrictions on postreversion use of the bases.

The editorial argues, "There is absolutely no legal reason why we should do this," since the status of Okinawa is governed by the 1952 Treaty of Peace and has no connection with the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty, under which the United States guarantees Japan's "freedom and safety." Complaining that "a threat not to renew [the MST] is one of the pressures being exerted on Washington for the return of Okinawa," the editorial accuses Japan of taking "a free ride in defense matters," and calls full reversion "an absurd proposition from any viewpoint but Japan's."

Acknowledging the importance of maintaining "friendly relations," the editorial suggests, "Either we keep a strong base under our own unhindered control on Okinawa, or Japan must take over the cost and responsibility of its own defense."

The following points should be noted in any analysis of this editorial viewpoint:

- a. The editorial is not anti-Japanese per se, nor does it oppose political reversion of Okinawa.
- b. It acknowledges that the Japanese Government is "pro-American," and blames Tokyo's terms on "explosive" internal political pressures.
- c. It blames the U.S. Government's presumed "conciliatory" position on a softheadedness which the Hearst papers consider to be normal for U.S. bureaucrats and politicians.

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- d. The editorial is piqued with the one-sided benefits Japan has presumably enjoyed under the MST.
- e. The editorial implies that all would be well if Japan were to pay the costs and accept responsibilities for its own defense, although it is not clear whether this is considered a realistic possibility.

In short, the editorial is a petulant complaint about an "absurd" settlement it assumes will be reached, rather than a determined call for a different settlement. This is the voice of resignation, rather than a campaign to influence the negotiations. As such, it is an appeal to the prejudices of the leadership, rather than to White House and State Department negotiators.

3. Estimate of Hearst Probable Future Intentions

Partly on the basis of the above analysis, we do not consider this editorial to be the forerunner in a serious Hearst campaign to influence the terms of the Okinawa settlement. It is perhaps to be expected that the Hearst chain may run another editorial on the subject, when negotiations are again in the news. If so, it seems likely that the base-use issue and the issue of Japan's self-defense effort would again be featured. Possibly, as the negotiations continue, the Hearst organization will call for a compromise such as reversion with or without nuclear withdrawal, but with the United States retaining unrestricted rights in use of the bases. This would be a logical follow up to its recent editorial.

The tone of the recent editorial suggests, however, that the Hearst organization is already resigned to what it considers an "absurd" settlement. If so, it may not bother to speak out again on the subject, unless the negotiations become, at some future date, major news, with widespread discussion of alternative settlement formulas. We should guess the odds to be about 50-50.

The important point is that, even though this was a "must run" editorial from Hearst's New York headquarters, there is no internal evidence that the Okinawa question has any significant priority in the publisher's mind. It is not, in fact, the kind of issue that the current Hearst management usually seizes for a sustained editorial

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campaign. These high-priority issues are, for the most part, more "popular" lower-middle-class issues - morality, crime-control, restoring prayers in the schools, reducing taxes, respect for the flag, respect for private property, etc.

Finally, the contemporary Hearst organization has virtually abandoned the tactics of the late William Randolph Hearst, Sr. who regularly seized on (and at times even invented) emotional public issues for circulation-building editorial crusades and news exposés.

4. The "Conspiracy" Theory

We have been concerned, however, that a conservative "conspiracy" might be forming which would use the Okinawa question for its own attention-getting purposes - the modern right wing's equivalent of old Mr. Hearst's circulation-building crusades. Our concern was based on The American Legion's antireversion resolution adopted at its national convention last September and the rumor that a similar resolution would be introduced at the next national convention, in August; on the considerable publicity and editorial approval given to Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Jr.'s antireversion speech in the Senate; and on evidence that the Naha MORNING STAR had contributed to Sen. Byrd's "research."

This evidence suggested the possibility of a tie-in of right-wing and veterans organizations with conservative politicians such as Mr. Byrd, and conceivably with conservative publications such as the Hearst organization and other papers that have recently taken an editorial stand opposing reversion or, at a minimum, urging unrestricted base use following reversion.

We are now satisfied that no "conspiracy" of this kind has yet been formed. Our reasons are the following"

- a. We have confirmation from the National Adjutant that the American Legion considers its 1968 resolution to be a matter of record, and has no plans to revive the issue at its next convention.
- b. Although the Byrd speech was widely publicized, and received favorable editorial notice in a number of papers, the commentary was diversified, appeared on widely separated dates, and provides no

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internal evidence that it was inspired by anything but the text of the speech as reported by the wire services or, possibly, as distributed by the Senator's own office.

- c. There is no persuasive evidence so far that the editorial views of the Naha MORNING STAR are being picked up directly by any U.S. papers. (It would be useful to discover, if this is possible through Japanese Government channels, whether the MORNING STAR conducts any large and regular mailing to American newspapers, Congressmen or citizens organizations.)
- d. We have so far found absolutely no evidence that any of the conservative organizations normally in league with each other (the John Birch Society constellation) is concerned with the Okinawa question.

On this matter, our confidential informant, Gordon Hall, made an extensive check of the literature, the 68 booths of participating organizations, and the conference agenda of the Birch-sponsored "New England Rally for God, Family and Country" conducted last week in Boston. He found no reference at the Rally to the Okinawa question. (An article by Mr. Hall on the rally is scheduled to appear sometime next week on the editorial page of the WASHINGTON POST.)

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

- a. There is so far no evidence of an organized campaign of citizens organizations or publications to influence the Okinawa negotiations in a direction unfavorable to Japan's interests.
- b. Such a campaign could get under way, either on an organized or a spontaneous basis, if the negotiations should receive significant and sustained publicity, including wide public discussion of alternative settlement formulas.
- c. It would be very much contrary to Japan's interests for news coverage of the negotiations to emphasize any bickering over details of the settlement, or

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for Japan to appear in the news to be inflexible, unwilling to accommodate the United States on related issues (including economic issues), or unwilling to provide adequate reassurances on, for example, postreversion security of the bases and viability of the "prior consultation" formula.

- d. No public relations campaign should be mounted in an effort to influence U.S. media in support of Japan's objectives on this issue.
- e. In encounters with members of the U.S. press, Japanese diplomats should (1) avoid a rigid or argumentative line, (2) display an honest if concerned hope that the issue will be resolved to mutual benefit and satisfaction, (3) be willing to provide detailed analysis of various reversion problems and full information on the Japanese Government's views, and (4) avoid hypothetical discussion of alternative settlement formulas and their possible implications or consequences.
- f. Japanese diplomats should, at the same time, encourage free, friendly and natural encounters with a widening circle of both news media representatives and political leaders.

Okinawa Surrender?

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Japan now is pressing for return of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands. Intense campaigns both by its nationalistic far right and its anti-American left have made such return an explosive political issue. And the Nixon Administration, anxious to maintain good relations with Japan's pro-American government, has indicated it will yield to the pressures and return the territories—probably effective in 1972.

This conciliatory attitude is the latest demonstration of Uncle Sam's amazingly benevolent attitude toward defeated former enemies. Surrender of our control over Okinawa will not mean dismantling of our 91 military installations there. But it would mean we could no longer use the island for storing nuclear weapons, or as an operating base for our B-52 bombers. Furthermore we would have to get Japan's permission for launching any military operation, as we do now at the 148 bases we maintain in Japan itself.

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Under that treaty, Japan, in effect, has been given a free ride in defense matters. Because we are its protectors, only one per cent of its budget goes for defense. As a result it has been able to develop an annual gross national product of over \$120 billion—third in the whole world and topped only by the U.S. and Russia.

What the Okinawa situation boils down to, in other words, is a demand that we give Japan a veto over future U.S. military operations on the island. At the same time, the Japanese would continue to enjoy the benefit of the hundreds of millions of dollars we spend there every year.

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SEATTLE
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
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アメリカ局長
参事官
北米第一課長

函情外号
昭和44年8月1日

外務大臣殿

在ニューヨーク
奈良総領事



沖縄核抜き返還問題
NYタイムズ記事について

経電第616号について

7月22日7時タイムズに掲載された本政

府の沖縄核抜き返還決定について SMITH

記事について、同紙 CHAPIN記者より SMITH

記者宛 TOPPING 外報部長宛及び内々

要処理
首席参事官
渉外調査
航空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査
力子夕
局庶務



入手した別添送付す。

本信送付先: 在米大使、同運大使、
在印公使

添付なし

TOPPING

EX RICK SMITH:

EYE HAVE CHECKED INTO THE OKINAWA NEGOTIATIONS AND THINK THE NEXT MOST LOGICAL PEG FOR A STORY WILL BE WHEN ROGERS GOES TO JAPAN. HE WILL TALK THERE WITH THE JAPANESE ABOUT THE BASIC OKINAWA ISSUE. EYE AM ASSURED OUR STORY ON THE NIXON DECISION TO REMOVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS REMAINS SOLID. BUT IT HAS COMPLICATED THE U.S. NEGOTIATING TACTICS. THE BIG ISSUES--NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND U.S. SPECIAL BASE OPERATING RIGHTS--ARE TECHNICALLY NOT RESOLVED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPANESE, REGARDLESS OF THE NYTIMES STORY. NONETHELESS, THE JAPANESE REGARD OUR STORY AS RIGHT AND, IN EFFECT, HAVE POCKETED THAT GAIN. DICK SNYDER IS BEING SENT OUT TO TOKYO PERMANENTLY TO STICK WITH THE OKINAWA NEGOTIATIONS, POSSIBLY FOR AS LONG AS TWO YEARS. HE WILL HAVE TO CHASE THROUGH ALL THE GRUBBY DETAILS, FROM WHAT TO DO WITH THE U.S. FINANCIAL BACKING OF THE OKINAWA CURRENCY, HOW TO GET OUT THE CAPITAL OF AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN, JUST WHAT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS WE WILL KEEP AND WHICH OTHERS TURN OVER, ETC. ETC., ETC. BUT SNYDER IS NOT DUE TO GO TO WORK OUT THERE UNTIL ROGERS ARRIVES. SO THE PROPER OPENING IS WHEN ROGERS AND THE JAPANESE TRY TO ADDRESS THE BASIC MILITARY ISSUES IN TOKYO, AND GIVEN THE HELP WE HAVE PROVIDED THE JAPANESE THEY OUGHT TO BE WILLING TO HELP US OUT THERE ON INFORMATION. ODDLY PEOPLE HERE SEEM A BIT RETICENT ABOUT DISCUSSING OKINAWA WITH ME RIGHT NOW.

SMITH

WASHINGTON, JULY 11, 1969--702PFC