

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 外紙報道（在米その他公館関係）(2)

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シカゴ
總


アメリカ局長
参事官
北米課長

市才40号

昭和44年1月17日

外務大臣殿

在シカゴ
影井総領事



日米関係に関するライシャワー教授の講演について

往電市才号に关し、

ハーバード・クラブにおけるライシャワー教授の講演のあ

た日の翌1月11日のシカゴ地域各紙は、こぞ同教

授の講演につき要旨下記のとおり報じているところ、な

らご参考までに報告する。

記

1. シカゴ・ヒビュン紙

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2.

「ハトム戦後の著者であるライシャワー教授は、今
日ほど日米~~関係~~^{たどる}関係の重要な時期はないと
し、日米両国の持続的な貿易と経済発展を訴
じた。

2. シカゴ・アメリカン紙

沖縄の日本人の返還をライシャワー教授はあらと主張
してきた。教授はアジアの安定と日本両国の幸福のため
に不可欠な両国の友好関係^{の確立}を呼びかけ、アメリカに對
する日本側の集積された不満の大部分は沖縄返還に
よつて解消されるであろうと述べた。教授は1970年
に日米条約の期限が来るので、次の18ヶ月の間に日米
関係の危機が訪れることを警告し、日本はハトム
戦争の拡大に不満をもっており、もし戦争がオクに終結
しなければ、新しい条約にたいなことも考えられる。
もしそうならば、日本は再軍備が必要となり、核保有口と

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局長務



存することもいかにあり得る。又若くは米口は日本の
基地を失うことにもなる。沖縄はもはや不可欠の軍事
基地ではない。沖縄を返還し、日本人を喜ばせ、ほ
ろかに重要な日本への基地を保持することがバナー
であると述べている。

3. サン・タイムズ紙

ライオン教授は、1970年までにアメリカ側か日本との
関係を改善しなければ東南アジアにおいて重大な問題が生
ずることを予想した。教授は将来のアメリカと東南アジアの
関係の鍵は日本との同盟にあるとし、若しベトナム戦争
が縮小されなければ条約は破棄され、米口は中部太
平洋まで後退しなければならぬ。一方日本も核兵器を
もって再軍備することとなり、日本の再軍備にあびやかされ
ると感じている東南アジアの国々もアメリカにもはや依存し
なくなる。その意味でアメリカ側の措置の timing が

非常に重要である、と述べた。教授は更に、次の施
政者に沖縄の返還、たゞし米軍基地は保持するこ
とを勧めた。

4. シカゴ・テリリー・ニュース紙

ライオン教授は、若しベトナム戦争が今年中に終ら
ない、日米関係は危殆に直面しよう。是れを以てアメリカの
防衛線も中部太平洋まで後退せしめよう、と述べた。
教授は日本を世界中で最も重要な同盟国と呼び、
日本においては、ベトナム戦争における米口の役割がアメリカ
と帝國主義^国がもしめぬという恐れをおこさせ、そのため
にたゞだん多くの日本人をして米口との条約がない方が安
全であるという考えを持た^{させ}ている。日米関係の危殆
は安保条約の改定される1970年6月までに来るであろう。
その前に我々はベトナム戦争の終結を図ると共に沖
縄を日本に返還せねばならぬ。若しそうしなければ

Chicago Tribune Jan. 11



(TRIBUNE Staff Photo)

Charles Daggett Harvey [right] receives Harvard club special award from Marshall Field [left] as Dr. Edwin Reischauer, who addressed group, joins presentation. Award cited Harvey for his work as president of the Lyric Opera.

Harvard Club Lauds Head of Lyric Opera

Charles Daggett Harvey, chairman of Fred Harvey Inc. and president of the Lyric Opera of Chicago, last night was named the recipient of the Harvard club special award for his work with the opera company.

Harvey received the award at the Harvard club dinner attended by 300 in the Sheraton-Blackstone hotel.

Marshall Field, senior vice president of the Chicago Sun-Times, presented the golden replica of the John Harvard statue to Harvey and cited him for "his tireless work in helping settle the labor dispute which forced the Lyric Opera to close for the 1967 season."

Called "Moving Spirit," Field said that Harvey was the "moving spirit" behind the settling of the dispute which darkened the stage of the lyric opera for a year because Lyric officials and representatives

from the Chicago Federation of Musicians could not reach an agreement on a new contract.

"The work he did with the Lyric can certainly be considered outside his normal range of activity, and it is for his own unselfish sacrifice to the city of Chicago in this regard that we have chosen him," Field said.

Report About Japan

Dr. Edwin O. Reischauer, former United States ambassador to Japan and now a professor at Harvard university, spoke to the audience on the United States' relations with Japan.

Reischauer, who is the author of "Beyond Viet Nam: The United States and Asia," said that a peaceful relationship between the two countries is more important now than ever before. He called for continued economic trade and development between the United States and Japan.

Chicago American Jan. 11

REISCHAUER WARNING

U.S.-Japan Crisis by 1970 Predicted

The return of Okinawa to the Japanese has been urged by Dr. Edwin O. Reischauer, former United States ambassador to Japan.

Calling friendly relations between Japan and the United States essential to the stability of Asia and the well-being of both nations, Reischauer said that much of the gathering Japanese discontent with America would be dispelled by returning control of Okinawa to them.

He spoke at last night's dinner meeting of the Harvard club of Chicago in the Sheraton-Blackstone hotel. Reischauer is a professor at Harvard, after serving as envoy to Japan from 1961 to 1966.

Crisis by '70

"The next 18 months will see a crisis in United States-Japanese relations," he told the 50 dinner guests, "because our defense pact with them runs out in 1970."

He noted that the Japanese are already unhappy with the United States for expanding the Viet Nam war, and conceivably could refuse to sign a new

treaty if the war isn't settled soon.

"If that happens, Japan will be without military protection from the United States and will be forced to rearm. They may well become a major nuclear power," Reischauer said.

Could Lose Bases

He noted that the United States would also lose its "vital" army and naval bases in Japan.


"Okinawa is no longer a crucial military base," he observed. "It would be far better to give it back to Japanese and please them, thereby still maintaining the more important bases on the Japanese mainland."

Earlier the Harvard club presented its annual special award to C. Daggett Harvey, chairman of Fred Harvey restaurants and president of the Lyric opera company.

Harvey was cited for his work to reach an agreement with the Chicago FEDERATION OF Musicians, thereby saving opera in Chicago.



E. O. Reischauer



C. Daggett Harvey (left), chairman of the board of Fred Harvey Restaurants and president of the Lyric Opera, receives special award from the Harvard Club for distinguished service to the Chicago community. Presenting it is Marshall Field

(right), senior vice president of Field Enterprises Inc. With them is Edwin O. Reischauer former ambassador to Japan who was the speaker at the club's third Awards Dinner. Harvey is a Yale man. (Photo by Don Bierman)

Harvard Club speaker

End Viet war or face rift with Japan--Reischauer

An expert on the Far East warned here that the United States faces a crisis in its relations with Japan if the Vietnam war is not ended this year.

Edwin O. Reischauer, professor and former ambassador to Japan, told 300 guests at the third annual Harvard Club Awards Dinner that the crisis could push this country's

defensive line back to the mid-Pacific.

C. DAGGETT Harvey, chairman of the board of Fred Harvey Restaurants and president of Lyric Opera, received the club's special award from Marshall Field, senior vice president of Field Enterprises Inc.

Harvey, a Yale University alumnus, was honored at the dinner in the Sheraton-

Blackstone Hotel for distinguished service to the Chicago community.

The Harvard award went to Harvey especially for his roles in labor negotiations with Lyric Opera musicians and in producing a recent report on the Chicago Commission on Human Relations, said Field, who headed the awards committee.

IN HIS after-dinner talk, Reischauer called Japan "our single most important ally in the world."

This country's role in the Vietnam War has strengthened Japanese fears of possible U.S. imperialism, he said, and led growing numbers of Japanese to "the unsound line of reasoning" that their nation would be safer without U.S. defense ties.

The crisis with Japan will arrive by June, 1970, when its mutual assistance pact with the United States comes up for renewal, Reischauer, a Howard professor, told his audience.

THIS COUNTRY must return Okinawa to Japanese control before then, along with ending the Vietnam War, he argued.

If the U.S. doesn't, he said, the Japanese government might be forced by public pressure to break its defense relationship with us.

This would "throw the United States into frustration and might force us to pull back to the mid-Pacific," he said.

It would leave Japan "militarily naked" and result in a Japanese defense buildup, including nuclear forces.

Eventually Japan will play a larger role than the United States in the development of Southeast Asia, he forecast.

THE AWARD to Harvey was the fourth special accolade given by the club, whose members are Harvard University alumni in the Chicago area.

The club honored Herman Dunlap Smith in 1967 for bringing the Silver Collection of rare books to the Newberry Library.

Last year's awards went to William E. Hartmann, who persuaded Pablo Picasso to do the design for the Civic Center sculpture, and Mrs. John V. Spachner, for her major role in the restoration of the Auditorium Theatre.

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Reischauer Tells Harvard Club Of Need To Mend Japan Ties

By James Campbell

Edwin O. Reischauer, former U.S. ambassador to Japan, Friday predicted grave troubles in Southeast Asia unless the United States mends its relations with Japan by 1970.

"The key to our future relations with Southeast Asia is our alliance with Japan. If the (Vietnam) war is not de-escalated, the treaty may be broken. With the Japanese treaty broken, we will move back to the mid-Pacific," Reischauer warned.

Reischauer, a professor and Asian expert at Harvard University, advised at a Chicago press conference, "We should accelerate the (peace) talks in Paris" and turn over the island of Okinawa to Japan.

However, he said, "I am pessimistic about the talks being successful. Saigon is dragging its feet."

The former ambassador made his remarks to newsmen before addressing an annual award dinner given by the Harvard Club of Chicago. Reischauer repeated many of his remarks in the address.

At the dinner, Chicagoan Daggett Harvey was given the club's special award for 1969 for his work in settling a labor dispute at the Lyric Opera in 1967.

Presenting the award statue was Marshall Field, senior vice president of the Newspaper Division of Field Enterprises Inc. Harvey, president of the Lyric, is chairman of Fred Harvey Inc.

Reischauer told newsmen in the Sheraton-Blackstone Hotel, where the dinner was held, that his pessimism about the Paris talks also stemmed from appointments made by President-elect Richard M. Nixon.

"I don't think (Henry Cabot) Lodge is a particularly flexible man. He is usually credited with being a hawk," he said concerning the Nixon appointee as senior U.S. negotiator in Paris.

"I don't think there's any help from his close relations with (Vice President Nguyen

Chau) Ky," who is heading the South Vietnam delegation to the talks.

Of Nixon's Cabinet, Reischauer said: "There isn't anybody in the Cabinet that has any particular knowledge of Asia. They are operators rather than people who set the pace because they know what's going on."

Reischauer, an author of many works on Asia, said the timing of U.S. moves is vital because the U.S.-Japan treaty is up for review in 1970. He warned that if the treaty collapses and the United States moves out of Asia, the Japanese "will find themselves militarily naked and begin to arm, perhaps with nuclear weapons."

Nations of Southeast Asia that felt threatened by any arming by Japan would no longer be able to rely on the closeness of U.S. forces, he said.

Reischauer also counseled future U.S. policymakers to return Okinawa to the Japanese, but to retain control



The Harvard Club of Chicago's special award is presented to Daggett Harvey (2d from left) by Marshall Field. Looking on are Edwin O. Reischauer (left), former U.S. ambassador to Japan, and Christopher Janus, Chicago investment banker. (Sun-Times Photo)

over U.S. bases. He said the U.S. nuclear weapons on the island serve as a deterrent to Red China, but added:

"We've got more than 100 times enough deterrents for Communist China." Field, a 1963 Harvard gra-

duate, praised Harvey, of the 1928 Yale class, for "unselfish sacrifice to the City of Chicago."

Chicago Sun-Times Jan. 11

と情として配布なし
O.K.

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米課長


公信写配付済

市才41号

昭和44年1月17日

外務大臣殿

在シカゴ
影井総領事



日米関係に関する新聞報道(報告)

往電第11号に關し、

1月14日付シカゴ「テリ-ニュース」紙は同紙東京

特派員カイズ・ヒ-4氏の「岐路に立つ日米関係」(新しい外交関係の樹立が必要であり、若しこれを誤れば、

1960年の安保反対騒動以上の悪い事態を引き起こす

可能性があるという副見出しがある) という見出しの論

説を要旨下記のとおり報じていると云ふ。 なるべし参考まで

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情報課
広報課
文書課
印刷課
庶務課



添付なし

2.

に報告する。

記

1. 日米関係は岐路に立しかつてあり、容易に悪化する可能性がある。古い関係は最早役に立たない。時は移っている。協同して受け入れ得る新しい関係を作り出さなければならない。

どういふ delicate な仕事にとりかからねばならない時、両口はひどい食い違いを生じている。いさゝかな理由から、^(来るべき)

2年間ほど危機の時期である。親米の^(日本政府裏)某政界高官は some tense times が来ることを予測している。

しかし両口共、^(密に打ち合わせ) ~~密に打ち合わせ~~ 密に打ち合わせのようではなく、お互いの長所弱点をより正しく認識する希望をもつて、両者の関係を再評価しつつある。よゝから、よゝい、よゝに続く関係の基礎がでてくることが期待される。

2. 近づきつつある危機は過去幾年にもわたり積み重ねられてきたものである。これは日本の経済達成から生じた

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新しい民族主義から^ま生じたものである。

20数年間 経済的、軍事的、心理的に非常にアメリカに依存してきた後、日本の pride は世界の事件の中でより独立した姿勢を要求するにいたっている。その結果東京はワシントンから離れた動きをしているように見られる。

別の意味では、日米間の広がりつつあるみぞは、両国がどうの首に解決すべきであった紛糾した問題について理解しようとしないうちに原因する。日米間の紛糾の[●]原因としては次の5つが挙げられる。

- (1) 日米安保条約
- (2) 沖縄返還問題
- (3) ベトナム戦争... 日本人は道徳上はこの戦争に反対しているが、他方これによりおおいに稼いでおり、戦争の終結を恐れている。しかし戦争の終結は日米関係に資するであろう。

(4) 極東におけるアメリカの平和維持の重荷を軍事的にも政治的にも分擔することを日本が拒否していること

(5) 日米両国内における保護貿易主義... これは容易に最も爆発しやすい問題となりうる。日本が完成品をどんとどんとアメリカに売り込め一方、アメリカの輸入については^{障壁を設けて}貿易障害を拒否していることは、アメリカ国内で憤慨をよんでいる。

ニクソン政権が、これらの問題をどう処理するか不明なことも、これらに影を投げかけており、某外務省職員は「我々は民主党との関係に慣れすぎ、それが当然のことと思ってしまった。今や我々は全く新しく、共和党を教育しなければならぬ」と述べている。

3) 日米安保条約は1970年にはたいした問題もな^{延長}く更新されると予想されている。アメリカの政府職員が更

新の mechanics は 1960年の条約の場合とは違ふと
指摘しているのは正しい。アリの source は「1970年に
おきことは、なにもしないことである」と言っている。

しかし、不幸なことに事態はそう簡単ではない。日本
の左翼は条約の更新に反対する大衆行動を約束しており、
全学連はすでに過激な反米デモを行なっている。又条約
に反対する気持は左翼のみには限られない。多くの日本人
にとり基地にいる 45000人の人々や 45000人の軍人の存
在は占領時代の不愉快な遺産である。又条約は日本
をその意思に拘わらず、又利害に関係なく戦争に巻き
込むという恐れも存在している。

その上この条約については、日米共に反対の感情が両
立っている。両口共若し再び批准が必要となれば、多分
批准はさかぬことを認めざる。この条約はアリの
対し日本の保護を義務づけているが、日本はその領域

外のことについて 日本人の責任も負われていない。他方日本の基
地は日本以上に極東、即ち韓口の防衛のため役に
立っている。更に重要なことは、日本人は安全に対する脅威を
感じていないことである。保守党の指導者でさえ、日本
の安全にとり米軍基地は不可欠ではないと言っている。しかし
彼等はアリのとの経済関係も危くするより、このま
ま続ける方を好んでいる。日本人は減多に任率に感情
をまじえない。

4. 多分最も感情的な問題は沖縄である。白人と
のアリ人は沖縄がどこにあるかさえ知らないが、日本では
旧たりと言えどもその返還の agitation のない日はない。
沖縄の人は最近その意思を明確にした。即ち、沖縄
の即時、無条件、完全返還を主張する Socialist を
主席とに選び、又続いて那覇市長にも Socialist
を選んだ。その結果、沖縄返還の time-table

を作ることを避けられなくなった。

問題はアメリカが引き続き沖縄を自由に使用できるかである。沖縄をハトムでの攻撃のため B-52の核基地として使用する以外には、アメリカは日本の基地からしていないことは、沖縄の基地からも殆んどしていない。日本人の有名な核兵器に対する嫌悪を考えると、アメリカにとり最も簡単な方法は沖縄を核基地として用いる権利を放棄することである。アメリカの海軍の人の話では、核装備の潜水艦のおかげで、沖縄は核基地として使う必要がなくなったということである。アメリカの政府取員は「もっとも大切なことは返還のための time-table の作成を今開始することである」と述べている。

5. 若し沖縄問題で日本人が感情的であるならば、その懸布が脅かされるは、一方感情的となる。

これはアメリカ人についても同じである。3年前までは、日本人は自由産物が売るとアメリカからよけい買っているという主張がなされた。しかし最早それは正しくない。

「日本人がもう少し偽善的でないといけないのだが」とあるアメリカの実業家は言った。彼は、「昨年彼等は輸入自由化のキャンペーンを行なったが、実際には自由化するかわりに現存の規則の抜け穴を締めつけた。今や彼等はすべての輸入品の93%を自由化したと主張している。しかし、もっとも重要な7%について自由化していないとほやけない」と述べている。

このような差別のためだんだん多くの生産者が日本品に対する報復と彼等の製品に対する保護を要求している。更に彼等は議会においても同情者をもっている。

アメリカの外交官は「これは一種の悪循環であり、^(たんにアメリカのせいにして)懸布がある、日本側がアメリカをすべての真の非保護

した1930年代に我々を引寄せたものである。どうか
は、又どこかでお互いに譲り合わねばならない」と
述べている。

6. 両国は非常に共通点も有している。両国共同じ世
界を希望し、日本人ほどアフリカ人を好む口元はない。
本音的にも強く結ばれている。それにも拘わらず
日米間の緊張は増大している。~~その~~条理^上は
問題解決~~すべきことと見做さる~~。若しそれができな
ければ、日米事件において感情が埋り生じうちかつ
(日米戦争)
例を再び繰り返すこととなる。

(~~本音~~関係記事別添)
なお、本件記事は経電予8号報告のライオン教授の講演
に刺戟とれど掲載されず形跡あり。本件記事は当館から同教授
に直接送付しておいた。

本信送付先：在米各公館

Chicago Daily News

Jan. 14

44.1.1752シカゴ通信第91号

U.S., Japan at the crossroads

Search for new diplomatic ties, if it is mishandled, may cause a reaction worse than 1960 anti-treaty riots

By Keyes Beech
Daily News Foreign Service

TOKYO — Japanese-American relations have reached a turning point, and it easily could be for the worse.

The old relationship will no longer do. Times have changed.

The two countries are badly out of phase—and at a time when they must face the delicate business of working out a mutually acceptable new relationship. For a variety of reasons, the next two years will be critical. A high Japanese government official friendly to the United States sees "some tense times" ahead.

Without skillful leadership on both sides of the Pacific, the situation could erupt into something worse than the 1960 riots directed against the U.S.-Japan security treaty.

Both countries are reappraising their relations with each other, not with the idea of getting a divorce—they need each other too much for that—but in hopes of arriving at a

Insight

better appreciation of their respective strengths and weaknesses.

Out of this, it is hoped, will come the basis for a better and more lasting relationship.

THE APPROACHING crisis—if it comes to that—has been building for years. It stems mainly from Japan's assertive new nationalism, born of its economic achievements.


After 20 years of overwhelming economic, military and psychological dependence on the United States, Japanese pride demands a more independent posture in world affairs. The result is that Tokyo seems to be moving away from rather than closer to Washington.

In another sense, the growing rift between Japan and the United States is due to a refusal by both nations to come to grips with knotty issues that should have been resolved long ago.

THE SOURCES of friction between the United States and Japan can be broken down into five major areas:

- The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which is for review in 1970. Unless one side or the other gives notice, the treaty will be automatically extended for another 10 years.
- The return of Okinawa to Japan. Twenty-three years after the United States wrested this island from Japan in the last major battle of the Pacific war, Okinawa still is an American base. The Japanese want it back.
- The Vietnam war. The Japanese morally disapprove of the war. On the other hand, they are making so much money from it in

Turn to Page 4, Column 1



Okinawa: Japan wants it back . . .
And the sooner the better

Insight

U.S.-Japanese relations at the turning point

Continued from Page 3

U.S. war orders that they are afraid it will end. In sum, however, an end to the war would benefit Japanese-American relations.

• Japan's refusal to do anything, military or political, to share the U.S. peacekeeping burden in the Far East.

• Trade "protectionism" in both the United States and Japan. This easily could be the most explosive issue of all. Japan's refusal to lower trade barriers against American imports while selling more and more finished goods to the United States is causing resentment in the United States.

Any of these issues could bring on a full-fledged crisis.


Mood of uncertainty

Overshadowing the picture is a mood of uncertainty as to how the Richard Nixon administration will deal with these and other Asian matters.

Strong indications that American foreign policy emphasis will shift from Asia to Europe under the Nixon administration has created uneasiness among Japanese and other Asian leaders.

"We have become so accustomed to dealing with the Democrats," sighed a foreign ministry official, "that we took them for granted. Now we have to educate an entirely new Republican administration."

FORECASTS ARE that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, key link in the Washington-Tokyo alliance, will be renewed in 1970 without much trouble. U.S. officials correctly point out that the mechanics of renewal are



different from passage of the treaty in 1960, when violent student demonstrations rocked Tokyo, forced cancellation of a visit by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and brought down

Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's government.

"All we have to do in 1970 is do nothing," a U.S. source said. "There will be no negotiations, no discussions. Nothing is reopened. Unless one side or the other moves to abrogate, the treaty automatically extends itself."

This is a pretty picture. Unfortunately, things are never that simple, especially in Japan. Its motley left wing, which includes the same elements that staged the 1960 demonstrations, has promised a massive campaign against extension of the treaty.

For openers, Zengakuren, the militant student movement, already has staged violent anti-U.S. demonstrations as curtainraisers for 1970.

Nor is feeling against the treaty limited to the political left. To many Japanese, the continued presence of 40,000 Americans at installations, plus 45,000 servicemen, is an unpleasant legacy of the "occupation years." There, also is the ever-present fear that somehow the treaty will involve Japan in a war not of its choosing or self-interest.

Treaty reappraised

Moreover, both the United States and Japan are curiously ambivalent about the treaty. Both admit privately that if either country had to ratify it over again, it probably wouldn't.

There are solid reasons to doubt whether the treaty is in either country's interest. It binds the United States to come to Japan's defense in case of attack, but commits Japan to do nothing beyond its own borders. Coupled with this is Japan's refusal to do anything to share the American peacekeeping burden.

If only Japan's security were involved, the Americans might be tempted to quit their bases here.

POLITICALLY, these may be more trouble than they are worth militarily.

The catch is that the Japanese bases—not to mention those on Okinawa—are more for the defense of northeast Asia, namely South Korea, than for Japan.

This fact has not escaped the Japanese. The argument that the defense of northeast Asia is essential to the defense of Japan fails to impress the Japanese.

"To put it bluntly," said a U.S. military man, "the Japanese don't give a damn about the rest of Asia."

MORE IMPORTANT is that the Japanese have no sense of threat to their security. This

is fundamental to the Japanese position. Even Japan's conservative leaders are by no means sold on U.S. bases. They say American bases are not essential to Japan's security.

But they are willing to go along rather than jeopardize their economic relationship with the United States. The Japanese seldom let sentiment interfere with business.

Probably the most emotional issue between the United States and Japan is Okinawa. While a great many Americans may not know where Okinawa is, not a day passes in Japan without agitation for its return.

Okinawa's voice

The Okinawans, Japan's "country cousins," have expressed themselves firmly in recent weeks. By a resounding vote, they elected as their chief executive a left-wing Socialist who campaigned for the "immediate, unconditional and complete" return of Okinawa to Japanese rule.

They followed this by electing as mayor of Naha, the island's largest city, another Socialist who ran on the same platform.

This boost to Japanese nationalism has made it all the more imperative that the United States and Japan get down to business and work out a timetable for Okinawa's return to Japanese rule.

THE PROBLEM is whether the United States will have continued "free use" of its bases on Okinawa—a privilege it does not have in Japan. Implicit in "free use" is the right to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa. The United States is barred from bringing "nukes" into Japan, and must consult the Japanese government before deploying its forces from Japan.

Except for using Okinawa as a base for B-52 attacks in Vietnam, the United States has done little from there that it has not done from Japan.

In view of Japan's well-known aversion to nuclear weapons, the easiest course for the United States might be to surrender its right to use Okinawa as a nuclear base and put it on the same footing as Japan. Nuclear-armed submarines, according to U.S. Navy men, make it unnecessary to use Okinawa as a nuclear base.

"These are important details," said a U.S. official, "but the most important thing is that we get to work now to set a timetable for reversion."

"We can defuse the Okinawa issue if we act promptly. If we don't, then the leftists are going to try to tie Okinawa to extension of the Security Treaty. If that happens, we can be in a mess."

IF THE JAPANESE are emotional about Okinawa, they can get even more emotional when their pocketbooks are threatened. So, for that matter, can the Americans. That is why trade "protectionism" looms as a major threat to Japanese-American relations.

Until three years ago, the Japanese could argue that they bought more from the United States than they sold. That is no longer true. Japan ended 1968 with a balance-of-payments surplus while the United States was \$1 billion in the red.

While Japan floods the United States with television sets, cars, steel and other finished products, it maintains rigid barriers against competing imports.

Japan, now second only to the United States in auto production, sells a Toyopet in the United States for only \$1,870, less than it costs in Japan. But a standard American car of roughly comparable make sells here for \$8,000.

New liberalization?

"It would help if the Japanese were less hypocritical," says an embittered American businessman. "Last year they launched a big campaign to liberalize imports. But instead of liberalizing, they tightened loopholes in existing regulations. Right now they claim they've liberalized 93 per cent of all imports. What they don't say is that it's the 7 per cent they haven't liberalized that counts."

Because of such discrimination, more and more American manufacturers are demanding reprisals against the Japanese and protection for themselves. What's more, they are getting a sympathetic audience in Congress.

"This is the sort of vicious circle," observed an American diplomat, "that could take us back to the 1930s, when the world was hit by a depression and the Japanese blamed everything on the Americans. Somehow, somewhere, both sides have got to give."

THE CURIOUS thing about the growing strain on Japanese-American relations is that it stems from the fact the two countries have so much in common.

Both want essentially the same kind of world. Japan identifies with the United States more than any other country. Japanese like Americans more than any other people.

Economically, the two countries are bound by the fact that each is the other's best customer, or close to it.

All the rules of logic suggest that the two countries ought to resolve their problems. If they don't, it wouldn't be the first time emotion has triumphed over reason in the conduct of international affairs.


アメリカ局長
参事官
北米第一課長
安保課長 11/21/70

市才59号

昭和44年1月23日

外務大臣殿

在シカゴ
影井 総領事



日米関係新聞報道

1月19日付シカゴトリビューン紙は同紙東京特派員

Samuel Jameson氏の要旨下記のとおりの記事を

掲載しているとの事、なほご参考までに報告する。

記

1970年6月23日に日米安保条約の期限が満了

が、日本では労働団体、学生、共産党及び左翼社会主義

者が保守政権に対しその廃棄をせよと主張している。

GA-4

外務省

19737

要項
首長事務
渉外
航空
協力
連絡調整
カネタ
局長事務



これに対し佐藤政権は廃棄の意思は全くないが、
1970年が彼等にとり試練の時であることを認識
している。

佐藤内閣は多数の検察官及び6,700名の警
察官の増員を含む予算案を承認した。同予算に日
6260万ドルにのぼる米軍基地から生ずる nuisances
の緩和のための経費も含まれている。

沖縄では労働組合がB-52の撤廃を要求し、
2月4日にゼネストを予定している。反基地行為を制限
した新しい労働法令に対する抗議は沖縄自民党
の支持まで得ている。佐藤総理は沖縄返還が
最も重要な懸案であることを認め、すでに沖縄返還
のため今秋訪米すると述べている。

(関係記事別添)

本信字送付先：在米、シカゴ

GA-4

外務省

Chicago Tribune Jan. 19

**REPORT
FROM
TOKYO**
By Samuel Jameson
CHIEF OF CHICAGO
TRIBUNE'S TOKYO BUREAU

Japan Looks
Ahead to 1970
on Key Issues

TOKYO, Jan. 18—Altho 1969 had just begun, Japan this week was clearly looking ahead to 1970. The outlook was foreboding.

That 1970 would be a political turning point—for Japan itself and for its relations with the United States—appeared to be a matter on which everyone agreed. The only question was whether the corner would be turned without a major crisis.

On June 23, 1970, the fixed period of the United States-Japan security treaty runs out. The treaty permits the stationing of American service men in Japan. There are 41,400 of them, at 149 installations.

The treaty contains a self-renewing provision, but labor unions, students, Communists, and leftist Socialists have renewed efforts to force the conservative government to abrogate it in 1970.

The pact plays a crucial role not only in Japan's own security but in American efforts to protect other free nations in Asia as well.

Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and his ruling Liberal Democrats have no intention of doing so, but they showed this week that they recognized 1970 would be a test of their will power.



Jameson

Approves Addition of 6,700 Policemen

SATO'S CABINET approved a draft budget including significant provisions for increasing the number of prosecutors and adding 6,700 policemen to handle anticipated demonstrations. The budget also allocated 62.6 million dollars for alleviating nuisances arising from American bases here.

The atmosphere of "getting ready for 1970," however, was not confined to the ruling party.

Only last month the United States offered to close down or turn over to Japanese authorities 49 of its 149 military installations in Japan. The move came after a year-long series of flareups over the bases last year.

The Clean Government party, political arm of the militant Buddhist laymen's organization Soka Gakkai (value creating society), moved another step to the left by announcing that it would mount a "nation-wide movement" to eliminate all American bases from Japan by June, 1970.

The Buddhists did not say whether such a "movement" would include street demonstrations, from which they have so far refrained, but they did nothing to play down the possibility that the militant, regimentalized ranks of the Soka Gakkai might join the forces of the left.

Protests Backed by Pro-U. S. Elements

IN AMERICAN CONTROLLED Okinawa, where 75,000 troops maintain a billion-dollar base crucial to United States defense strategy thruout the Pacific, labor unions scheduled a general strike Feb. 4 to demand the removal of American B-52 bombers from the island.

Protests against a new American-imposed labor ordinance, which restricts anti-base activities, gained support from even traditionally pro-American elements, such as the Okinawa Liberal Democratic party.

The trouble in Okinawa added a new dimension to the controversial territorial issue. Sato pledged last November that winning back control of the former Japanese prefecture would be the focal point of his third and last two-year term.

He already said he will visit Washington this fall to seek a schedule for returning the island chain, and both his brother, former Premier Nobusuke Kishi, and his foreign minister, Kiichi Aichi were planning trips before summer to lay the groundwork for a Sato-Nixon agreement.

情報文化局長
 参事官
 北米第一課長

市才67号
 昭和44年1月24日

外務大臣殿

在シカゴ
 伊藤 総領事代理

沖縄問題に関する新聞報道

1月24日付シカゴトリビューン紙は同紙東京特派員 Samuel Jameson 氏の沖縄に関する要旨下記のとおりの記事を報じていると、ならびに参事まで報告する。

記

沖縄と日本政府の圧力により、アメリカは沖縄における労働布令実施の延期を今日発表した。この

- 要処理
- 首席事務官
- 南支調査
- 漁業
- 航空
- 学協力
- 連絡調整
- 調査
- 府下
- 局業務



ように法令の実施が予定どおり行なえなかったということ
 はアメリカの23年半にわたる統治においてはいじめて
 のことである。

藤山情文局長は日本が同布令の延期を要求した
 ということ~~を~~否定したが、42個条中20個条についての
 説明を要求したと述べた。

同布令はデモ等を規制するもので、今月はいじめその他
 発生した時、沖縄では親米派の沖縄自民党をも含
 め強い抗議がでた。しかし、同布令は長い休
 暇、多いボーナス、高い最低賃金の規定をも
 含むものである。

沖縄労働組合は、同布令が2月4日行なわれる
 予定のB52爆撃機の沖縄駐留に対する抗議
 のデモを抑圧するものと非難した。他に文札
 カンパニー民政官は、3月1日以降まで延期することを

5) このような誤解を解くことかできるであろうと期待す

(関係記事別添)

本信子送付先：在米 三三三

Chicago Tribune Jan. 24.

U. S. Delays Labor Order for Okinawa

BY SAMUEL JAMESON
[Chief of Tokyo Bureau]

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)
TOKYO, Jan. 23—

Under pressure from Okinawans and the Japanese government, the United States today announced it was postponing implementation of a controversial labor ordinance on American-controlled Okinawa.

The decision marked the first time in 23½ years of American rule that the United States has failed to implement an ordinance on schedule. It underscored a dramatic erosion of American authority in the island chain.

Stanley Carpenter, civil administrator of Okinawa, said implementation of the ordinance, scheduled to go into effect Saturday, was postponed at the request of Chohyo Yara, newly elected chief executive [governor] of the Okinawan government. Carpenter said the action was taken "after consultations with the government of Japan," according to a statement released in Tokyo by the American embassy.

Naraichi Fujiyama, foreign ministry spokesman, denied

that Japan had asked a delay on the ordinance but said his government did seek "clarification" of 20 of the 42 clauses.

A public outcry, which included even the normally pro-American Okinawa Liberal Democratic party, swept Okinawa when the ordinance was announced earlier this month. It set controversial restrictions on demonstrations and political contributions.

However, it contained provisions for more vacation time, bigger annual bonuses, and a higher minimum wage for employes of contractors working for United States armed forces.

Okinawa labor unions charged the ordinance was designed to suppress a general strike—which is to include base workers—planned Feb. 4 to protest against the stationing of American B-52 bombers in Okinawa. Carpenter said today's postponement until sometime after March 1 "will now remove this source of misunderstanding."

Axelbank: Back to Okinawa, do you anticipate any problems on February 4?

- A. As you know, the enforcement of the labor ordinance has been postponed as of this noon. Mr. Yara is reported to have said that this action on the part of the U.S. will have some positive effect on the planned February 4 strike. But he also noted that the enforcement of this ordinance has been only temporarily postponed and it may be enforced at some time later; so we are going to check each article in more detail. Mr. Yara is saying that the B-52's should be removed from Okinawa and he is coming to Tokyo again soon. Then there will be talks between Mr. Sato and Mr. Yara again.

Jameson: Could you tell us how it came about that the Japanese government made two approaches to the U.S. concerning this ordinance? Was it postponed because of the Japanese government approaches?

- A. I thought you knew about this. You said two approaches, but actually on January 15 we received the full text of this new ordinance. So we started to study the whole text and found some 20 questionable points. So on January 19 we asked the U.S. side to clarify these points. We made this request in writing. That time, the U.S. made some clarifications orally but this was a sort of intermediary answer and they promised to give us a final answer after consulting with the people concerned. Yesterday, Mr. Osborn, Charge d'affaires of the U.S. Embassy, came to see Vice Minister Ushiba and told him the U.S. side will try to respond to the Japanese request in some form. He also informally told Mr. Ushiba that the U.S. side is considering postponing the enforcement of this new ordinance. Meanwhile, talks continued in Okinawa between the American Civil Administrator Mr. Carpenter, and Mr. Yara. Around this noon, Mr. Carpenter publicly announced that the ordinance will be postponed. Mr. Carpenter made a long statement. You can get the text from the U.S. Embassy. The gist of this statement to the press was that since the U.S. side had no time to attach

the

- 6 -

the full Japanese translation of this new ordinance, he thought it has caused the misunderstanding among the Okinawa people. So he will try to furnish the full Japanese translation of the text within a few days and if the Okinawa people concerned want to present their opinions in regard to this ordinance, they can do so before March 1 and, further, he said that after taking into consideration any opinions presented by the local people, the decision as to when to enforce this ordinance will be made. For your information, I will give you the rough translation of what Mr. Hori, our Chief Cabinet Secretary said in regard to this point.

"The postponement of this new labor law ordinance which has been decided by the U.S. government today, Mr. Hori believes, reflects the opinions of the Japanese government transmitted to the U.S. government. However, as to the contents of this new ordinance, there are still some doubtful points. So the Japanese government will further study those points and if necessary the Japanese government will convey such opinions to the U.S. government. Further, Mr. Hori strongly hoped that the U.S. government will take into consideration the desires on the part of the Ryukyuan Government and also of the Okinawan people and that the U.S. government will make efforts so that this new ordinance will contribute to the promotion of the welfare of the laborers connected with the U.S. bases."

Stokes: On the Todai riots, is there any truth to rumors that the students received substantial financial support from outside?

- A. No official information or report yet. Whether true or not, those students in Todai are said to have been found with a lot of money in their pockets and people wonder where it came from. We have no concrete information.

Jameson:

第2部

1. アメリカ局参事官ブリーフィング

○ 沖縄労働布令の施行延期

(1) わが方は、布令のテキストを1月15日に入手したが、同布令が治安立法的内容を有する問題点の多い布令であるとの現地の反響にも鑑み、政府としては直ちに全文42カ条中デモ、ピケ等に関する第10条、政治資金の規制に関する第11条等を中心に検討を開始し、その結果出て来た疑問点20数項目について1月17日米側に文書で質問した。これに対し、米側は1月20日文書で回答してきたが、それによつても、例えばスト権の解釈、デモ規制の対象等なお十分に説明されなかつた点があつたので、重ねて米側に説明を求めたところ、米側は口答で取敢えず一応の回答をするとともに、現地と協議の上で回答する旨伝えて来た。

(2) 1月22日、オズボーン米代理大使が牛場次官を訪れ、本件に関する日本側の問題点の指摘等にかかんがみ米側は全般

的に慎重に検討しているが、施行期日の延期の可能性についても考慮している旨明らかにした。他方現地でも、民政官が屋良主席と話し合つた結果、23日昼頃、同民政官が、施行期日の延期を発表したのである。同発表の中心は、同布令の充分な日本語訳を現地関係者に渡せなかつたため、若干の点につき誤解を生んだので、日本語訳を準備するとともに、3月1日までに現地関係者の意見を文書で求め、これを検討した上で、あらためて施行期日を決めるというものである。

(3) 政府としては、今後とも、なお残されている疑問点等を充分検討した上、必要に応じてわが方の考えを米側に伝えるつもりであるが関係者の意見に対して充分な考慮が払われることを期待している。

2. 23日の夕刊から

○ 第22回自民党大会

大会は23日、日比谷公会堂で開かれ、田中幹事長の党情報告に続き、佐藤総裁が大学問題、安保問題などを中心にあいさつを述べた。また副総裁には川島正次郎氏が選任された。引き続き党運動方針、党婦人憲章などを議決、さらに大会宣言、決議を決め散会した。

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米第一課長

市才199号

昭和44年3月14日

外務大臣殿

在シカゴ領事
シカゴ領事館

マンハッタン上院議員の在東問題演説(報告)

3月10日付当地デリーニクス紙は、10日マンハッタン上院議員がマンハッタン市、マンハッタン大学において、在日米軍基地の縮小と沖縄返還問題、および米国の対中共貿易と米国人の中共旅行について下記要旨の演説を行なったと報じていると、何ら抑揚なくここに報告す(野間印授別添)

GA-4

外務省

要理
首席事務官
渉外調査
産業
航空
学協力
各調整
調査
力子夕
局庶務



記

マンハッタン上院議員は10日、マンハッタンマンハッタン大学において、米國政府は、従く、在日米軍基地を削減し、沖縄を日本に返還すべきである。また、非敵視物資について中共との貿易を促進し、米国人の中共国内旅行の自由を実現せしむべきである、等の演説を行なった。すなわち、

日本においては、米軍基地を日本から完全に撤退せよという要望もあるが、この完全撤退の要求は決して支配的輿論とはいえず、むしろ一般の意見は、基地の数を現在の数より削減すべき減らしに傾いているとある。米軍基地の数を削減するということは、米國政府に与るべき軍事費の削減となる

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外務省

のみならず、基地を原因として惹起せられてくる
 戦多の月末日の摩擦ととれたい知らげること
 女古来り女合の利益がある。
 沖縄の通運については全く同様のことが
 い得よう。中華人民共和国は、何十年も爆
 用のB52の基地として沖縄を維持するに
 国執心を持っていない。中華政府は沖縄
 と日本政府に通運するたのほつきしを計画
 と作成することをある。
 註、中華政府のいつまでもその孤立自衛
 的政策を堅持するとは思われない。いつかは
 その内産を開放するとも来ること必定であるが、
 米国のいつ女ら、その将来に備えておくべきである。
 中華国内旅行の制限、北朝鮮物資の禁止する
 貿易制限の理由は全く理解に苦しむ。

Mansfield asks limited China trade

MANHATTAN, Kan. (UPI) — Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield said Monday the United States should cut back its military bases in Japan and give Okinawa back to the Japanese.

Mansfield also called for trade in nonstrategic goods between the United States and Red China and said Americans should be allowed to travel to China if Mao Tze-tung's government will let them in. "It seems to me there is a need for great alertness to changing Japanese attitudes respecting our military activities," the Montana Democrat said in a speech prepared for delivery at Kansas State University.

"While some sentiment already exists in Japan for the removal of all U.S. military bases, I do not think that that is the dominant view. There is, rather, a general desire to see a reduction in the number of U.S. bases in Japan."

MANSFIELD said cutting back bases would save money and reduce "mounting friction between this nation and the Japanese populace."

He said the same is true on returning Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands to Japanese control. Mansfield said the United States should "try to arrive at a fixed time schedule" for return of control.

He also said the United States should not insist on keeping military bases on Okinawa, which has been used as a home for B-52 bombers that raid Vietnam.

MANSFIELD said Red China "will not remain forever . . . in substantial isolation" and the

United States should prepare for the future. "I see no purpose in impos-

ing any special restrictions on the travel of Americans to China," he said. "Nor do I see

any reason not to place trade with China in nonstrategic goods on the same basis as

trade with the Soviet Union, Poland and other Communist countries."

アメリカ局長

参事官


北米才一課長

市才222号

昭和44年3月20日

外務大臣殿

在シカゴ
勲井 総領事



沖縄問題新聞報道(報告)

3月16日 日曜日の「エコノミスト」紙は

カレ特派員が「中近東便り」、バーリー・ヒンツ

の「ラテンアメリカ便り」とともに、サエウ

ヒンソンの「東京便り」として「疲れた

国民的自尊心」と題して、わが国における

沖縄問題について大要下記のとおり

報道しているが、何ら御参考までに報告

GA-4

外務省

465

要理
首領 務官
参事官
渉外 調査
空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査
カナダ
局庶務



抄

記

1. 10年ほど前までは、日本は外部からの侵略と脅かされて自衛を止めることと同様として、その防衛政策を策定してきたのである。ところが、いまや、日本特有のハード・パワー、その基幹的政策的変更はいつも静かにしかも徐々に行なわれ、ハードな国民的自尊心の高揚によつて勃発していきようとする新しいハードの一番はつきりした証拠として、先進表面に浮かび上がった。それは14名の学者、軍事外交専門家の報告書である。総理の諮問委員会による「シカゴレポート」は表面的には、日本が沖縄返還についていかに交渉したかを検討するものである。

GA-4

外務省

しかし乍ら、この委員会が本来の研究目的よりもさらに深い契に踏み込んでいると云えよう。即ち、報告者は冒頭に「沖縄司政権の過遷に関する日米両国政府の決定は、両国の友好関係と安全保障に重大な影響を齎すものである」と述べている。

2. 日本の学者が政府に対する勧告が米國に与える最大の影響は、米國が過去24年に亘つて自由に使用してきた沖縄の基地が、今後は自由にならない、という点である。すなわち、勧告の内容はつぎのとおりである。

(1) 沖縄過遷の目途を1972年中とすることを今年中に決めること。

(2) 沖縄からの核兵器の撤去と軍事行動に関する非核協定の義務付け。

(3) 基地の削減と統合

一年にわたる討議の結果、今回初めて総理は日本国民は、その国土に核兵器がふたはざることにくよくよ反対する。特に沖縄の過遷は国民の悲願である、と言明した。

3. 総理の諮問委員会が軍事面において、アメリカのいかなる影響をうけるかについては何ら具体的に述べていない。一方、学者連は沖縄問題の帰趨は、日米関係のみならず、日本の防衛政策の根本的改訂という問題にもつながる、大きな目に見えない影響を齎すであろうと進言している。

同諮問委員の一人、毎日野閣論議委員三好氏は、ニクソン大統領はかつて北太平洋軍の機構を強化する意向を記者会見

において言明した。アメリカは日米関係について
 もこれを強化すべきである、と述べている。
 学者たちは、日本が沖縄を取るか島の陸海
 空の防衛についても引継ぐことを提案している。
 共. 諮問委員会 は日本が米国の援助に頼る
 ことなく、本土の防衛に対する主責任を執るべき
 である、と述べている。

別紙添付

本信守送付先

米大、二二・三・一

**REPORT
FROM
TOKYO**

By Samuel Jameson
CHIEF OF CHICAGO
TRIBUNE'S TOKYO BUREAU

Nationalistic
Pride Stirrs
Japanese

TOKYO, MARCH 15—For more than 10 years Japan has followed a defense policy designed to enable the nation to withstand an invasion for only 30 days without outside help.


Now, rumblings of nationalistic pride have stirred one of those uniquely Japanese "moods" which, often lead to quiet, gradual changes in fundamental policy.

Last week, the clearest manifestation to date of the new mood came to the surface.

It was a report by a group of 14 scholars and military-foreign affairs experts. Ostensibly, the group—serving as a semi-official advisory panel to the prime minister—was concerned with how Japan should negotiate for the return of American-controlled Okinawa.

The panel, however, went much deeper than that.

"The decision by the governments of Japan and the United States regarding the return of administrative rights of Okinawa will have serious repercussions on relations between the two nations and the national security policies of both," the advisory panel wrote in a preface to the report.



Jameson

U. S. Would Lose Free Hand on Bases

FOR THE UNITED STATES, the biggest repercussion of the scholars' recommendations would be the loss of the free hand it has enjoyed for the last 24 years in using the vast chain of military bases in Okinawa as it sees fit.

In their recommendations to Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, the scholars called for:

1. A decision this year to set a date for reversion of Okinawa to Japan's control no later than 1972.
2. Removal of American nuclear weapons from Okinawa and requiring the United States to consult Japan before using its Okinawa bases to stage war sorties.
3. Reduction and amalgamation of American military facilities in Okinawa to eliminate the present mixture of bases and civilian areas.

For the first time in a year of debate, Prime Minister Sato said he recognized that the Japanese public was firmly opposed to the stationing of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. He added that giving the Americans a free hand in Okinawa would be virtually impossible.

Scholars Propose Intangible Compensations

SATO'S ADVISORY panel offered little concrete compensation for the military inconveniences to which it proposed to subject the United States.

The scholars, however, proposed large intangible compensations involving a fundamental revision not only of Japan's relations with the United States but also of Japan's own defense policy.

"The reversion of Okinawa can be a starting point for more dynamic and positive cooperation between Japan and the United States," the advisory panel said.

Osamu Miyoshi, an editorial writer for the influential *Mainichi Shinbun* [newspaper] who served on the advisory panel, recalled in a press conference that President Nixon had said that the United States intended to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty organization by listening to the opinions of its European allies. Miyoshi said the same thinking should be applied to the American-Japanese alliance.

The scholars also recommended that Japan take over the land, sea, and air defense of the island chain surrounding Okinawa. Japan should assume the prime responsibility for the conventional defense of its four main islands instead of counting upon the United States to rush to its aid, the advisory panel said.

**REPORT
FROM LATIN
AMERICA**

By Barry Bishop

CHICAGO TRIBUNE'S
LATIN AMERICA CORRESPONDENT

Latin Nations
Follow Suit
with Alacrity

PANAMA, March 15—One of the difficulties in maintaining political and economic stability in many Latin American countries is that these nations often seem to follow bad examples with too much alacrity.

Peru's military powers kicked civilian President Fernando Belaunde out of the country so fast last October he was not even given time to put on his shoes before he was shoved onto an airplane for Argentina. Panama followed suit earlier this year and overthrew newly-elected President Arnulfo Arias after he had been in office only 11 days.

Almost the first official act of Peru's military junta was to expropriate the American-owned International Petroleum company. They contended Belaunde and his predecessors had made bad decisions dating back to the early 1920s on the petroleum question. So, they declared them void and took over Peru's largest taxpayer with their own laws.



Bishop

Equador Leader Follows Peru

AND NOW, in Peru's neighbor, Ecuador, President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra is reported to have decided to "follow the Peruvian example" and move against foreign oil companies.

Several years ago, Ecuador made agreements for Texaco and Gulf Oil companies to explore for petroleum over a vast area, mostly involving forbidding mountainous and jungle land near the Colombian border. The concerns have spent some 80 million dollars for deposits that will require another 200 million dollars for development.

But now Velasco Ibarra has served notice that he wants much of the land back, plus a revision of contracts to provide Ecuador with more favorable terms. Otherwise, he threatens to dispossess the American companies. The only promise is that "eventual compensation" will be made to cover the company expenses.

Attack U. S. Fishing Boats

ON IT GOES. Another recent example of how Latin American neighbors can follow one another: Ecuador and most recently Peru attacked American fishing boats in international waters with—believe it or not—gunboats on loan from the United States.

President Nixon's new assistant secretary of state for Latin American affairs, Charles A. Meyer, formerly of Sears, Roebuck & Co., already has a portfolio of troubles awaiting him. But, he and Nelson Rockefeller, whom he probably will join for a special fact-finding tour of Latin America next month, are both old hands in the area.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE, SUNDAY, MARCH 16, 1969

30 • Section I

REPORT
FROM
THE MID-EAST

By Arthur Veysey


CHIEF OF CHICAGO TRIBUNE'S
LONDON BUREAU

Must Look Hard
to Find Cairo
War Signs

CAIRO, Egypt, March 15—If you look hard, you can see lots of signs of preparation for war in Cairo these days. A big pit for an air raid shelter has been dug in the gardens of Liberation Square. Many windows are crossed with strips of paper or cloth or smeared with bright blue blackout paint. Brick walls or piles of sandbags block doorways to protect residents from the blast of bombs bursting in the streets.

But on closer look the preparations seem fainthearted. Workmen have abandoned the pit, and children play on the ramps. The window strips peel; the blackout paint is wearing thin; sand seeps from rotting bags. The war spirit just isn't here.

But that doesn't mean Egyptians want peace with Israel. Far from it. Egyptians and Israelis have been mortal enemies ever since the days of the Pharaohs, and the state of war seems a natural fact of life, like flies.



Veysey

Tourists Afraid to Visit Cairo

In faraway capitals like London, Paris, or Washington, big thinkers cite many reasons why Egyptians should seek peace with Israel. Look at the empty hotels, they say. Tourists are afraid to come here and Egypt is losing 100 million dollars a year. The Suez canal is closed, costing Egypt another 250 millions annually. Ever since President Gamal Abdel Nasser accepted arms from Russia, Egyptian cotton has gone for guns. As a result, shops are running out of about everything made abroad.

But foreign money and foreign goods play a very small part in the lives of most of the 33 million Egyptians, and economic arguments so important elsewhere carry little weight here. The Egyptian government no longer talks about driving Israelis into the sea. It talks instead of Arab honor and justice, but the Egyptian goal is unchanged—the disappearance of Israel.

The arguments range only over how best to bring this about. Some hot-headed young army officers, blinded by the glitter from the new Soviet arms, favor invasion of Israel. An ounce of common sense is sufficient to predict such an invasion would end in another Arab defeat.

Guerrilla War More Promising

Guerrilla war is more promising, Israel admits to about 150 "incidents" each month now. And a few more are minor—a few shots over a border—Arabs are growing bolder and more deadly. Israelis know the potential power of terror. Jewish bombs helped break the British will to stay in Palestine. Israelis yearn for peace, but Arab terror has very little chance of breaking Israeli will.

In other parts of the world, a government unable to win a war by invasion or by guerrilla tactics might negotiate. But not Egypt.

In the short term, Israel won the six-day war, just as it defeated Arabs in 1948 and 1956. But in the long run, the most important fact of June, 1967, might turn out to be the inability of victorious Israel to draw the million Jews it needs to consolidate the victory, to hold the new lands.

In the past, Israel had come and gone, come and gone. Egyptians think it will go away again, not this year or next, probably not in their own lifetimes. But in this ancient land, what is a lifetime? Egyptians can afford to wait.

左翼のみにとどまらない。

昨年12月に行なわれた新衛研の世論調査では20%
がこの条約を支持し、60%以上の人は即座に、又は
段階的にこの条約の終ることを希望している。

更に多くの日本人は沖縄や日本本土にある米軍基地は
侵略に対する脅威と効果より、核攻撃目標となる
と考えていることが明らかである。

日本において米軍基地を維持する政治的メカニズムは、その
戦略的価値により相殺することはできない。

軍事技術の発達により日本に基地を持つことが、もはや
米と日本を守り、又西太平洋諸国を守るという州々の
コミットメントに不可欠な要素ではなくなった。したが
我々は沖縄や日本にある米軍を他の基地に移転
するよう勧告する。(記率別添)

転送先：米、三三コク

Return Okinawa, say 12 scholars

Within the next twelve months American-Japanese relations will reach a crucial turning point. The Japanese desire to have Okinawa returned to their administrative jurisdiction has now become so widespread that it can no longer be ignored without severely jeopardizing continued good relations between Japan and the United States. In 1970, the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, permitting the stationing of American troops on Japanese soil, will become subject to review for the first time in 10 years.

As American specialists on Japan, we are agreed that it is in America's best interest to retain close ties with her strongest political and economic partner in the Western Pacific. But we are also convinced that this will be difficult to do unless the United

States immediately returns Okinawa to Japanese jurisdiction and is prepared to remove all American military facilities from both Okinawa and the other Japanese islands.

The desire for the return of Okinawa to Japan permeates the entire Japanese political spectrum, and opposition to the Mutual Security Treaty as it presently stands is not confined to the left wing.

A public opinion survey by Japan's largest newspaper last December revealed that only 20 per cent of those questioned favor the treaty in its present form, and over 50 per cent favor ending the treaty either immediately or in gradual stages.

Moreover, it is also clear that many Japanese regard American bases both in Okinawa and on the main islands as an inviting target for nuclear attack rather than as an

effective shield against outside aggression.

The baneful political consequences of maintaining American military installations in Japan are not counterbalanced by the military value of these installations.

With advances in the military technology now available to the United States, base sites in Japan are no longer essential to defend the United States, to protect Japan against nuclear attack, or to support American commitments to other Western Pacific nations. Hence, we urge that American military forces in Okinawa and Japan be removed to other available base sites in the area.

CONRAD TOTMAN
Northwestern University
RICHARD YASKO
University of Chicago
AND 10 OTHERS

アメリカ局長
参 官
北米科一課長

市才402号

昭和44年5月16日

外務大臣殿

在 シカゴ
影井 総領事

沖繩問題に関する新聞報道

5月6日付 The Kansas City Starは沖繩問題
について "Half an Ally Is Better Than None"
という見出しの下(要旨下記のとおり)の記事を掲載
している。なんらご参考までに報告する。

記

- 要処理
- 首席事務官
- 南方
- 渉外調査
- 漁業
- 航空
- 科学協力
- 連絡調整
- 調査
- カナダ
- 局庶務

44.5.20

米国の極東政策が直面するものも重要な
として長期にわたる問題は "Half an Ally"
は "None" よりもましかどうかという事であり、
その答は "Yes" である。
東京政府は米当局者の沖繩問題に關し
て、意外に無関心なのにおどろいている。
沖繩の返還は沖繩にある米軍基地が本土
にある他の米軍基地と同じ地位になること
を意味し安保条約の固定したワケ内にお
かれることを意味する。
これは核~~兵器~~の貯蔵と、日本以外の
地区における大規模な米軍力とその
関係雇用者の移動を、東京政府との共
同討議による合意なしに、やることを不
可能にする。

それは、明らかに米国のアジアにおける戦略
的立場を変えるだろう。沖縄は今まで、原爆
や、ベトナム爆撃や、朝鮮地区の軍備支
援の基地であった。これらの活動は、沖縄の
返還後、許されないうえである。

ワシントン政府は愚かにも沖縄問題を引き
延ばして来た。だから今、ベトナム戦争がまだ
活気がついていて、北朝鮮との状態が悪化
して、しかも、明年の安保条約がまさに改定さ
れるというその直前になって、この問題に直面
しなければならぬ。

日本はアメリカを防衛できる訳ではなく、
日本の自衛すらおぼつかないが、これも
我々自身が平和憲法をおしつけた結
果である。こういう決定的時局にあつては、

"Half an Ally" は "None" よりも悪いといふ
事は全く明らかなことである。

(記事別添)

本信送付先：米、ニューヨーク

THE KANSAS CITY STAR

Founded September 18, 1880, by William Rockhill Nelson.
The Kansas City Star Company, Owner and Publisher.

MEMBER OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

The Associated Press exclusively is entitled to use for republication of all local news published herein as well as all AP dispatches.

Half an Ally Is Better Than None

By C. L. Sulzberger

© 1969, New York Times News Service
Tokyo—The most important long-range question facing the U. S. Eastern policy is whether half an ally is better than no ally and the answer is obviously yes.

The question is posed in connection with the combined issues of Okinawa and next year's review of the Japanese-American security treaty.

TOKYO is immensely puzzled by President Nixon's failure to recognize Okinawa as a political obsession here that is attaining crisis level. Kiichi Aichi, foreign minister, will raise the matter in Washington this spring and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato this autumn.

Nevertheless, during peripheral discussions when he recently attended General Eisenhower's funeral, former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi was perplexed to find that no administration officials with whom he spoke had any conception of the urgency of the problem. The Japanese resent this and link it to the puzzling slowness showed in naming a U. S. ambassador here.

The U. S. has steadfastly promised reversion of Okinawa to Japan under Dulles's formula of "residual sovereignty" a kind of post-dated check. Tokyo is now resolved that payment should come in 1969 and that transferral of sovereignty shall be completed within three years.

If this time schedule is not honored it could gravely weaken the pro-American Sato government while also producing violent anti-U. S. riots in the four main islands as well as Okinawa.

Our Tokyo embassy staff has been reporting this to the State department but its cautionary words seem to sink without trace in Foggy Bottom.

YET the return of Okinawa means that American military bases there must assume the same status as other American military bases in the main islands, placing them within the fixed limitations of the security treaty.

This prevents storage of nuclear warheads, shifting of sizable U. S. forces or their employment outside the area of Japan except by agreement with Tokyo under a system of joint consultation set forth by executive agreement.

That would obviously change the American strategic position in Asia. Okinawa has provided a base for atomic weapons, ferrying of troops bound elsewhere, bombing raids on Vietnam and military back-up around Korea. None of these activities would be permitted when the island reverts to Japan.

This is to say that any such moves would have to be subjected to prior consultation with Japan. To date there has been no single instance of such consultation but it is unlikely, un-

der existing circumstances, that permission for extra-Japanese actions would be authorized by Tokyo.

NATURALLY U. S. generals and admirals charged with defending our Asian commitments are restive, but most are intelligent enough to realize it would be even worse for their responsibility if relations blew up and the Okinawa bases were ringed by bloody race riots.

Washington kept deferring the Okinawa problem foolishly so now it must be faced while the Vietnam war still bubbles briskly, when the situation in North Korea is steadily deteriorating and on the eve of a review of the security treaty scheduled next year.

Obviously the crucial issue of U. S. arrangements with Japan cannot be tampered with and a full-scale Okinawa crisis must be averted. Tokyo is not prepared to accord special rights within a prescribed part of the island.

Japan is not bound to defend America and in this sense is only half an ally. Furthermore, its self-defense forces are far from the kind of military establishment a dynamic, rich nation should have. Yet that is a situation we ourselves imposed on the Japanese through their postwar constitution and, looking at the situation as it is, it is perfectly obvious that in this crucial instance half an ally is better than none.

ソカ
ヒ

万
博

注 意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

大政通外外官 電信写

事務次官
大臣官舎
文書会
総人電厚計
調査課
参領旅移

総番号(TA) 22800
 69年 5月 28日 18時 35分
 69年 5月 29日 09時 00分
 本 省 着 米北

外務大臣 慶 野村 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

対日論調(オキナワ)

第80号 平

26日付(オハイオ州首府)ニロンパス・ディスプレイ紙社説の要旨次のとおり。

日本は経済的実力が強まるにつれて米国依存から脱却することを試みオキナワの核ぬき返かんを求めているが。米国にとってオキナワはベトナム戦争遂行及び韓国防衛のための要しようであり。核兵器を備えて身構えている地点である。ベトナム戦争終結の見通しが立たない現在は軍事的考慮がゆう先する。ベトナム戦争がかたづいたあかつきには。米国にもまして日本がアジアの平和のため大きな役割を果たすこととしてもらいたい。

米。ニューヨークに転電した

(3)

参北東経
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参北北保
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西東洋
西東
参参近ア
次総経国
参貿統
参政技二
国一理
参条協規
参政経科
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
アメリカ局長
参事官
北米第一課長

市才448号

昭和44年6月2日

外務大臣殿

在 シカゴ
野井 総領事



愛知外相訪米に関する新聞報道

6月1日付 シカゴトリビューン紙は同紙東京特派員

サミュエル・シムスン記者の愛知外相訪米に関する報道

要旨下記のとおり報じていると云う、なほ参考までに
報告する。

記

要処理
首席事務官
南
渉外
漁業
空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査
カナダ
局庶務



GA-4

外務省

2

月曜日には愛知外相はアメリカ政府に対し沖縄の返還
を正式に提示する。外相はマクソンに対しアメリカの沖縄統
治を終結させることについての初の日本側の正式提案を
説明するとともに、ロッキースロ務長官 及びシャードロ防
務長官に対し返還の条件を提示しよう。

これらの条件とは信頼おぼきソースによれば次のとおりである。

1. 1972年又はそれ以後できるだけ早い時期に沖縄の行政
権を日本に返還する。
 2. 25000人の通常軍隊による米軍作戦は現状とあり
継続する。
 3. 日本は、米軍基地が十分な戦闘活動がなされるへ
まかについての決定に参加する。
 4. 米側は返還前に核兵器を除去する。
- 以上の条件につき米議員及び軍人は(取引の対象とはならない)
が愛知氏はどうかなと説得に努めよう。

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愛知外相はワシントンの高官に対し、若し沖縄が返還されなければ、95万人の沖縄県民は基地使用を可能にするであろう。

又核兵器の除去がでなければ、日本政府は困難に陥らねばならず、戦争行為に日本が発言できなければ、日米間に信頼と平等を保つことはできないと語るであろう。戦争行為について日本が拒否権を持つ事については日本は常に「no」と言うわけではないと答えるであろう。

核兵器の除去が中共の侵略^{又は北朝鮮}を拒否できないかという事について、~~これは~~ real deterrent は全軍力に構成されるものであり、その実米軍は明らかに復位にあると述べよう。

愛知外相はロシアス~~事務~~口務長官やレイド口防長官に対しは、日本は中共や北朝鮮が限定ケリウ戦を起した攻撃には出ないと信ずるし、又、沖縄の防衛には日本の責任をもち、更に対外援助を増加し、アジアの安全にもっと

重要な役割を果たすと語る。

両口とも愛知氏の訪米では沖縄問題での合意はないこと一致している。これは総理訪米まで残すであろう。

(読事別添)

本信送付先：米、三、ヨーク

REPORT FROM TOKYO

By Samuel Jameson
CHIEF OF CHICAGO TRIBUNE'S TOKYO BUREAU

Japan to Give
Proposals on
Okinawa to U. S.

TOKYO, May 31—On Monday, Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi will formally present the United States with its newest problem in Asia—Okinawa.

Aichi will meet President Nixon briefly to outline the first official Japanese proposal that the United States end 24 years of rule over what was a Japanese prefecture [state] until a World War II battle in 1945.

In later meetings beginning Tuesday with Secretary of State William Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, the Japanese foreign minister will propose terms for the turnover.

Those terms, which would deprive American military forces of the free hand they have enjoyed under United States rule, were described by reliable sources here as:

1. The United States should turn over administrative control of Okinawa by 1972—or, if this date is too early, as quickly as possible after that.
2. Ordinary American military operations by the 75,000 troops stationed on Okinawa would continue as at present.
3. Japan would be given a voice in deciding what combat actions should be conducted from American bases.
4. The United States should remove any nuclear weapons it has on Okinawa before reversion.

Many American congressmen and military officers have indicated they don't think these terms constitute much of a bargain for the United States. Aichi, however, will try to convince them otherwise.

Mounting Discontent Among Japanese

HE WILL TELL Washington officials that mounting discontent among the 950,000 Japanese on Okinawa threatens to make American bases there untenable if Okinawa is not given back to Japan.

He will state that Japanese public opinion would not agree to nuclear weapons on Okinawa and that failure to remove them would burden the Japanese government with an unmanageable political problem.

Also he will point out that only by Japan having a voice in

deciding what combat actions should be staged from Okinawa could a relationship of trust and equality be built between the United States and Japan.

Congressmen and military leaders have expressed concern that giving Japan a possible veto over combat actions would injure the American ability to defend such other nations, as Formosa and South Korea.

Aichi, however, will answer this criticism by telling Rogers and Laird that Japan will not always say "no" when consulted by the United States. Both Aichi and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato already have made statements in the diet [parliament] to that effect.

To the military argument that withdrawing nuclear weapons from Okinawa would invite aggression by communist China or North Korea, Aichi will say that the real deterrent consists of total military strength—in which the United States is clearly superior.

Will Carry Burden of Defense

AICHI ALSO WILL tell Rogers and Laird that Japan does not believe either Pyongyang or Peking is in a position to engage in aggression beyond support of localized guerrilla wars.

He will state that Japan will shoulder the burden for the defense of Okinawa itself and assume more responsibility for Asian stability by boosting foreign aid. Direct military contributions, either in the form of aid or troops, however, will be out of the question because of constitutional reasons, Aichi will say.

Both nations already have agreed that Aichi's visit will not produce an agreement on Okinawa. That will be left for Sato and Nixon to settle when they meet in Washington in November.

Another major problem likely to be postponed involves the United States' financial interests in Okinawa.

The Japanese finance ministry has estimated American post-war investment in Okinawa at two billion dollars. Of this at least 400 million was spent on nonmilitary facilities, which presumably would be transferred to Japan.

In addition, the finance ministry estimated that at least 70 million dollars worth of American currency is in circulation on Okinawa—all of which would have to be replaced with Japanese yen currency.



Aichi

軍縮課 米信 米


アメリカ局長
参事官
北米第一課長

市才647号

昭和44年7月25日

外務大臣殿

在 シカゴ
影井 総領事



沖縄の米軍基地にある神経ガス

に関する新聞報道

7月19~21日における当地各紙は一斉に沖縄の米軍
基地に貯蔵された神経ガスに関する記事を掲載している

と3. ほんら参考までに報告する。

記

「日本の各紙は伝えられたところの沖縄の神経ガスの貯蔵
に対し一斉に攻撃を開始した」 「反対党は奪って神経ガス

要 里
首席事務官
南 方
渉外 調査
漁 業
航 空
科学協力
連絡調整
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の貯蔵を非難し、口会でこれを取上げようとしている」
 (Chicago Tribune 7/21)、「沖縄の米軍基地
 における神経ガスのテストの報道は、同島の核兵器問題
 に対し^対に~~敏感~~に^{敏感}な~~反応~~となっている日本において又一つの~~騒動~~^{騒動}を起
 させた」 「日本の新聞は神経ガスに^対する怒りの記事
 でうめられている」 (Kansas City Star 7/20)、「アメリカ
 が沖縄に致死的な神経ガスを貯蔵しているという報道
 は日米関係に新たな刺激を与えた」 (Chicago Sun
 Times 7/19) とし、各紙とも沖縄における神経ガスの
 貯蔵が日本において大きな問題となっている旨紙面をかな
 り大きく書いて報じている。

又一部の新聞の中には「この事件は米議会の神経に
 直接ふれるものであり、多くの議員は米の化学、細菌兵器の
 強化に腹を冷している」 (Chicago Sun Times 7/19) 、
 「ペンタゴンは議会と文官指導者をますます困難にまき

GA-4

外務省

こんでいる。……連のペンタゴンの失敗は、今や議会の
中に軍の指導者を議会のより厳しいコントロールの下に置く
という動きをもたらしに至った。(Chicago ^{Today} ~~Tribune~~ 7/21)として
本件に関する米議会の反応に言及しているものもある。
なお、本件につき 7月21日は Kansas City Star 及び
7月22日は Cleveland Plain Dealer は ^{米政府の}日本における
化学兵器の配置を否定した報道を行なった。
更に 7月23日は Chicago Tribune 及び Cleveland
Plain Dealer は、国防省が数年前に於て沖縄において
致死的神経ガスを貯蔵していたことを認め、その除去
が進行中であると述べた旨報じている。
以上によつて見ゆるように本回の沖縄における毒ガス貯蔵
の報道は当館管轄区域内においても大きな話題として取
上げられていることが注される。(記事別添)
本信字送付先：米、三、コ、ク

JAPAN PAPERS CRITICIZE U.S. ON NERVE GAS

Demand Details About Okinawa Incident

BY SAMUEL JAMESON
[Chief of Tokyo Bureau]
[Chicago Tribune Press Service]

TOKYO, July 20 — Japan's newspapers launched an all-out attack against the reported presence of deadly nerve gas on Okinawa today as the United States continued to maintain silence about the incident.

More than 48 hours after the foreign ministry asked the American embassy to provide details on an American newspaper report that deadly VX nerve gas was stored on Okinawa, no reply had been made.

Claims Confirmation

The Asahi Shinbun, Japan's largest nationally circulated newspaper, claimed in an editorial that the embassy here already had confirmed that the

American newspaper reports were true.

Robert Kays, press attaché, said the embassy could make no comment on the report by the Asahi, which gave no source for its claim.

As opposition parties prepared to take up the issue in parliament, newspapers today, without exception, condemned the reported presence of nerve gas on Okinawa. More than 950,000 Japanese live in the former Japanese prefecture [state], which Japan has asked the United States to return.

Negotiations aimed at setting the terms for reversion are under way.

Ask Ban in Japan

Editorials in today's newspapers also urged the Japanese government to begin negotiations with the United States to specify a prohibition against storing chemical and biological weapons at American bases in Japan.

Even the conservative Nihon Keizai Shinbun [Japan Journal of Commerce] said in an editorial: "It is only natural that the people of Okinawa react with rage to such an insult. . . .

A foreign army which spreads uneasiness and danger in an area where its troops are stationed will inevitably lose the greater part of the utility of its bases."

ANGER OVER NERVE GAS

Japanese Are Aroused by Reports of American Testing of Deadly Chemical Weapons at Base on Okinawa

WANT DETAILS

Party Leader Calls on Government to Demand Withdrawal

Tokyo (AP)—Reports of nerve gas testing at a U. S. base on Okinawa have caused an uproar in Japan, a nation already touchy about the issue of nuclear weapons on the Pacific island.

Susumu Nikaido, deputy secretary-general of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party, said yesterday the government must demand withdrawal of U. S. chemical weapons from Okinawa, if they are stored there.

Allegedly on Ukibaru

In a dispatch from Naha, capital of Okinawa, Kyodo news service reported that officials of the Okinawan Council Against Atomic and Nuclear Weapons said U. S. forces in Okinawa are believed to have been experimenting with chemical weapons since 1963. It said the experiments are believed to have been conducted on uninhabited Ukibaru island and three other places with rabbits, rats and goats.

Japanese newspapers were filled yesterday with stories and angry articles on nerve gas. One major paper called nerve gas "barbarous and inhuman" and said last week's Okinawa incident was an "indescribable anger for Japanese and an insult to humanity."

Talk about the presence of nerve gas on the island came after the Wall Street Journal reported Friday that 24 Americans were hospitalized July 8 after an accident connected with nerve gas on Okinawa. The U. S. Army reported none of the men was injured severely and all returned to duty within hours of the accident. The Defense department refers to the incident as a "mishap."

The Japanese government has asked the United States for full details on the incident, which came at a critical time, with negotiations between Japan and the United States on the return of Okinawa at a crucial phase.

The incident also was a reminder of the already delicate issue of nuclear weapons on the island.

Belongs to Japan

Although Okinawa has been administered by the United States since U. S. forces captured it in World War II, Japan and the United States agree it is Japanese territory. Japan wants the island back by 1972, and after that wants nuclear weapons banned and other restrictions placed on U. S. bases there.

The National Movement for Return of Okinawa made an appeal to the United Nations from Tokyo calling on U Thant, the secretary general, and the president of the Geneva disarmament conference to use their influence to persuade the United States to remove chemical weapons from Okinawa.

Japan's Communist party sent a telegram to President Nixon urging immediate withdrawal of such weapons.

Chohyo Yara, the chief executive of Okinawa's limited self-government, said that if nerve gas is stored on the island, he will demand that it be removed.

The mass circulation Tokyo newspaper Asahi, demanded "immediate withdrawal and destruction of poison gas weapons not only in Okinawa but in Japan proper if such are deployed

at U. S. bases in mainland Japan." There has been no indication that the United States has any nerve gases on the mainland.

An Okinawa Mishap Fuels Opposition

(New York Times News Service) Tokyo—Opposition parties in Japan—the Socialists, the Communists, the Democratic Socialists and the Buddhist-affiliated Komeito—are reaping an unexpected windfall from the disclosure that 24 Americans on Okinawa had been briefly hospitalized because of a mishap apparently involving nerve gas.

The pro-American conservative government led by Premier Eisaku Sato has been severely embarrassed by the incident, a source close to the premier admitted.

"The government is agonizing over the possibility that it will be used to fan anti-American feelings," the source said.

Sato himself was said to be deeply concerned over the affair.

沖繩米軍カス彈保有

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Japan smarting over Okinawa lethal-gas reports

By Bernard Nossiter
Washington Post Special

WASHINGTON — Reports that the United States is storing fatal nerve gas on Okinawa injected a fresh irritant in Japanese-American relations Friday.

The Foreign Office in Tokyo summoned the American minister, David Osborn, for questioning about the story, first reported in the Wall Street Journal. The newspaper's account, by Robert Keatley, said that a container of the gas broke open last week and 25 persons were injured.

U.S. State Department and Pentagon officials maintained an all but impenetrable silence about the affair. However, Japanese Foreign Minister Kishi Aichi told a press conference

Friday night that the United States should "not cause uneasiness among the people of Okinawa" by storing chemical agents there.

Touchy time for news
Disclosure that the United States may have stored poison gas comes at a particularly sensitive time.

Just last month, Japan and the United States opened the first round of negotiations aimed at restoring Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands, seized in World War II, to Japanese rule. A key issue is Washington's desire not only to retain its huge complex of military bases on Okinawa, but also continue storing nuclear weapons there.

The affair also touches a raw nerve in Congress, where many members are appalled at the build-up in American

chemical and biological weapons.

Tough committee action
The Senate Armed Services Committee, traditionally a close friend of the Pentagon, has just voted to strip the military of any funds for research and development into offensive agents of this stripe.

At the Pentagon, Jerry W. Friedheim, deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, would acknowledge only the following:

"As a result of a mishap on Okinawa which occurred July 8 while they were working on a maintenance operation, 23 U.S. military personnel and one U.S. civilian employe were placed under medical observation."

Surprise at location
All were released and returned to full duty within

about six hours." Experts in chemical and biological weapons expressed surprise that any should be stored on Okinawa. They observed that the present implicit rules in Vietnam limit the United States to a high-powered form of CS or tear gas.

Other reactions were:
Rep. Richard D. McCarthy

(D-N.Y.), the congressman who has done most to alert legislators to the problem, also called for an explanation. He tartly noted that the Nazi government in World War II never permitted nerve gas, of which it had a monopoly, to leave German soil.

Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) called for a congressional inquiry.

SUN TIMES
July 19, 1969

TODAY
July 21, 1969



James Reston
U. S. nerve gas
on Okinawa

THE PENTAGON is getting in more and more trouble with the Congress and the civilian leaders of the United States. The trouble is not that the Pentagon is wicked but that it seems to be clumsy: It is constantly being caught doing things that embarrass the government and complicate the conduct of foreign and even internal policy.

The latest incident is the discovery that it has sent operational weapons containing nerve gas to Okinawa. This was disclosed by the Wall Street Journal just before Secretary of State William Rogers was going to Japan and President Nixon was going to Asia. The Journal discovered an "accident" to one of the Pentagon's nerve gas weapons hospitalized 25 persons. Earlier, another accident with military

nerve gas had killed 6,400 sheep in Utah, and there also was a row in Congress when it discovered that the army proposed to transport 27,000 tons of "surplus" chemical and bacteriological weapons all the way across the United States and dump them into the Atlantic.

THE CONGRESS recognizes that the executive branch of the government has to engage in all kinds of secret operations, but over the last few years the fiasco of its military intervention in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, the disclosure that it had been caught spying on the Soviet Union from U-2 planes, the embarrassment of getting caught unprepared in the Pueblo spy incident off North Korea—and had then repeated the blunder in a spy plane which also was destroyed—all

this plus the military miscalculations in Viet Nam finally has produced a determined movement in the Congress to bring the military leaders under stricter congressional control.

This is what is really back of the savage opposition in the Senate to the administration's Safeguard anti-ballistic missile program. It is not only that the opponents of Safeguard honestly believe that this system is not "safe" and won't "guard" the nation, or even that they believe it is a waste of billions of dollars needed elsewhere. For the first time since the Pentagon began to dominate the national economy with its fabulous budgets, and has exercised sometimes even decisive influence over the nation's foreign policy, the Congress has decided to debate, if not to assert thru the budget, the constitutional right of civilian control.

It is not at all sure that this congressional revolt will succeed.

The Pentagon has funds that key congressional leaders want for industrial projects in their districts. And it is hard for civilians to win arguments about complicated weapons systems like the Safeguard anti-ballistic

missile. Even if it is proved to be a lemon or an Edsel.

THE ACCIDENTS, blunders, and misjudgments of the Pentagon at critical points in recent years, however, have put the military leaders on the spot. They are not responsible for the major decisions in the Viet Nam war—that is the ultimate responsibility of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon—but their advice was a critical factor, and, while it was not always followed with as much power as they wanted, they are now being questioned and challenged more than at any time.

So great was their power that even the Secretary of State and the President—they probably will deny it—didn't really know what the military was doing with nerve gas in Utah and Okinawa, or with the spy ships and planes around North Korea.

But now the President and Secretary Rogers will have to deal with the political consequences of the nerve gas incident, as President Kennedy had to deal with the military stupidities of the Bay of Pigs, and President Johnson had to deal with the military miscalculations in Viet Nam—and this will not be very pleasant.

[Copyright 1969, New York Times]

WILL REMOVE NERVE GAS ON OKINAWA; U. S.

Presence Admitted for First Time

BY JAMES YUENGER
(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

Washington, July 22—the defense department today acknowledged that lethal nerve gas has been stored on Okinawa for several years and said that preparations are under way to remove it.

The announcement did not say how much of the gas is stored on the island or when it will be removed. A Pentagon spokesman refused to say whether the United States has stored nerve gas elsewhere overseas.

However, the spokesman, Daniel Z. Henkin, assistant defense secretary, stated unequivocally that no biological weapons—for use in germ warfare—are stockpiled abroad by this nation.

Gas Called GB

The gas in question is called GB, described as a "toxic, nonpersistent, quick-acting chemical nerve agent" which can cause injury when it is inhaled or penetrates the skin. The Pentagon said a small dose will incapacitate a man and a large dose will kill him unless he is treated properly and quickly.

On July 8, 23 American soldiers and one American civilian on Okinawa were exposed briefly to GB when its container sprang a small leak as paint was being removed from it. The Pentagon said today that four of the soldiers were hospitalized briefly after the exposure and that all 24 were returned to full duty within six hours.

Henkin said that information on the mishap was not made public before now pending notification of the government of Japan, which is negotiating with the United States to regain control of Okinawa.

Matter Discussed Twice

The state department said that David L. Osborn, No. 2 man in the American embassy in Tokyo, discussed the matter twice last week-end with Fumihiko Togo, director general of American affairs in the Japanese foreign ministry.

The department said Osborn told Togo that the United States does not store lethal chemical weapons in Japan and does not intend to. On Okinawa, which the department said is under Japan's "residual sovereignty," only trained Americans are permitted to handle the gas or go near it.

Earlier today, Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi told the Japanese parliament in Tokyo that Japan had already asked the United States to remove the GB gas from Okinawa. He said it is still essential for Japan to know all the facts about the July 8 accident.

Report Is Denied

Contrary to published reports, Aichi said, the United States had denied that the gas stored on Okinawa was the more potent VX nerve gas.

Henkin recalled that at Defense Secretary Melvin Laird's request President Nixon ordered the national security council last spring to review all chemical and biological warfare matters, including stockpiling of weapons overseas.

The defense department said it has been working on plans for some time to remove the gas from Okinawa. Henkin said studies have been drafted up but not acted on. He said that the date for removal of the gas is being pushed up because of the July 8 accident and in connection with the NSC study.

1961, 1963 Decisions

The Pentagon said "certain chemical munitions, including some toxic agents" were moved to Okinawa several years ago as a result of decisions made in 1961 and 1963.

"In all activities related to the disposition, storage, and maintenance of the agents on Okinawa, strict safety precautions have been employed at all times," the Pentagon said. "As a result of these precautions, there have been no accidents which have caused any serious injury to a single individual on Okinawa."

THE PLAIN DEALER, SATURDAY, JULY 19, 1969
Japanese Quiz Yanks on Gas

L.A. Times/Washington Post Service
 WASHINGTON — Reports that the United States is storing fatal nerve gas on Okinawa injected a fresh irritant yesterday into Japanese-American relations.

The foreign office in Tokyo summoned the American minister, David Osborn, for questioning about the story, first reported in The Wall Street Journal. The account said that a container of the gas broke open last week and 25 persons were injured.

American officials at both the State Department and the Pentagon maintained an all but impenetrable silence about the affair.

THE DISCLOSURE that

the United States may have stored poison gas outside the continental limits comes at a particularly sensitive time.

Just last month, Japan and the United States opened the first round of negotiations aimed at restoring Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands, seized in World War II, to Japanese rule. A key issue is Washington's desire not only to retain its huge complex of military bases on Okinawa but also to continue storing nuclear weapons there. The Japanese, the world's only victims of nuclear bombing, have raised such a storm over the weapons question that the conservative and

pro-Washington Japanese government has been compelled to demand their removal.

The nerve gas incident, if true, will play into the hands of those insisting on the withdrawal of the nuclear arms.

The affair also touches a raw nerve in the Congress where many members are appalled at the buildup in American chemical and biological weapons.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, traditionally a close friend of the Pentagon, has just voted to strip the military of any funds for research and development into offensive agents of this stripe.

沖繩の毒ガス事件問題化

U. S. ASSURES JAPAN

No Lethal Chemicals There, Officials Are Told

Tokyo (AP)—The United States has told Japan it has no fatal chemical weapons in Japan and pledged utmost care in handling the material which caused a recent "mishap" on Okinawa, the foreign ministry said today.

The ministry said the United States did not specify what material caused the mishap, after which the U. S. Defense department said 24 Americans were hospitalized for up to six hours.

Indications are that the Japanese government will seek removal of any lethal chemical weapons at U. S. bases on Okinawa even before the United States returns the island to Japan. The Japanese want the transfer accomplished by 1972.

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PROTEST ON NERVE GAS

Japan's Labor Organization Asks for Removal

Tokyo (AP)—Japan's largest labor organization passed a resolution yesterday urging immediate removal of nerve gas from Okinawa, the U. S.-administered island which Japan is trying to get back by 1972.

Deployment of nerve gas endangers the lives of the Okinawan people, said the resolution adopted by the 4.2-million-member General Council of Trade Unions of Japan at its 38th regular convention.

U. S. authorities have refused to confirm that U. S. bases on Okinawa have nerve gas, but many Japanese assume they do. Published reports that 24 persons were hospitalized after a nerve gas container broke open at one of the bases earlier this month touched off a furor in Japan.

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No Chemical Arms in Japan, U.S. Says

From Wire Reports

TOKYO — The United States has informed Japan that American forces do not have chemical weapons in this country "at present," a foreign ministry spokesman said yesterday.

Reliable sources indicated that the assurance was given by David L. Osborn, minister-counselor of the U.S. embassy. It was not immediately clear whether Japan had asked for an assurance that chemical weapons would be governed in the future by the "prior consultation" clause of the Japan-U.S. security treaty. But Osborn reportedly said that the United States had "no intention" of storing chemical weapons in Japan.

The United States has not yet formally replied to a Japanese request made last Friday for information concerning a reported incident of nerve gas leakage at an American base in Okinawa. The incident has touched off a major storm in both Japan and Okinawa.

CHOBYO YARA, chief executive of the Ryukyu Islands, met yesterday at Naha, the Okinawan capital, with Stanley S. Carpenter, the U.S. civilian administrator, to demand removal of all poisonous gas from Okinawa.

Yara said later that Carpenter could not say whether chemical weapons were being stored at U.S. military bases on the island.

The whole incident is being investigated "by Washington," Carpenter told Yara.

However, the U.S. administrator promised "we will make every effort to insure that there will be no more such accidents."

来日本、於此化學兵器配置否定

War Gas on Okinawa

Admitted

L.A. Times/Washington Post Service
By TED SELL

WASHINGTON—The Pentagon acknowledged yesterday for the first time that poison gas had been stockpiled on Okinawa. It blamed the Kennedy administration for the stockpiling and said the weapons would be removed from the island.

At the same time, a Defense Department spokesman said he could state "unequivocally that there are no U.S. biological (germ warfare) weapons stored overseas."

Confirmation that was gas had been stored on Okinawa came after news reports of an accidental leak of lethal nerve gas which resulted in treatment of 23 U.S. soldiers and one Army civilian employe last July 8.

THE ACCIDENT CAUSED GREAT alarm in Japan, which wants Okinawa returned to Japanese rule. The reversion issue will be a major topic when the U.S.-Japanese security treaty comes up for review and renewal next year.

The Defense Department identified the nerve gas involved in the July 8 incident as GB.

The United States has produced it since the early 1950s. It is considered one of the earlier nerve gases and the Army has since developed even more potent ones.

IN WHAT APPEARED TO be an effort to downgrade the effects of the accidental release of GB, the Pentagon said that all 24 victims were treated and that only four were hospitalized—for less than six hours.

Daniel Z. Henkin, assistant defense secretary for public affairs, said yesterday decisions to stockpile poison gas on Okinawa were "made in 1961 and 1963." Then he added:

"No toxic chemical agents have been deployed overseas since Secretary (of Defense Melvin R.) Laird took office."

Henkin refused to say whether gas is stored in other countries.

THE PENTAGON STATEMENT on the Okinawa accident described the GB gas accidentally released as a "toxic, non-persistent, quick-acting chemical nerve agent," which "can cause injury by inhalation or penetrating the skin."

The announcement, made in Laird's name, said that GB "in low dosage rates . . . acts as an incapacitant. In high dosage, it can be nonlethal with prompt and proper medication."

In military terms, an incapacitant is an agent which is not fatal but renders an opponent unable to fight. Some such agents cause overpowering sickness and are specifically designed not to cause fatalities. But GB, based on formulas captured from the Germans after World War II, is specifically intended to kill an enemy.

HENKIN SAID he could not identify what kind of weapon caused the Okinawa accident. But he said that only one item of "chemical munitions" was involved and that the leak occurred "adjacent to the plug" during routine maintenance operation involving removal of paint.

The leak, the Defense Department statement said, was small. The 24 persons involved "experienced minor symptoms of toxic exposure." These resulted in immediate resort to "standard safety procedures, including the use of protective masks."

来軍当局、沖縄に於て毒ガス配備を承認

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米第一課長

市才662号

昭和44年7月31日

外務大臣殿

在シカゴ
影井総領事

沖縄米軍基地問題新聞報道(報告)
シカゴトリビューン紙は27日、日曜版に、神経
ガスの撤去と在日米軍基地の問題にフエ、同紙
東京特派員 サミエル・ワ-アリンの「東京より」を
報じているので、その要旨つぎのとおり報告する。

記

1. 日米貿易経済合同委員会に出席するため、27日
夜来日予定の口取一、國務長官は、先週22日に

要処理
首席事務官
南
渉外調査
漁業
航空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査
カナダ
局庶務



国防府当局が沖縄基地に貯蔵する神経ガス
の撤去を発表したこと、日本側の冷たい^{待遇}_{歓迎}
は受けずに済みそうと、同長官の来日の目的
は貿易経済合同会議に出席するためとは
いふ。事実、その日本滞在の多くは、沖縄
返還問題に関する日本側関係者との間の協議
に費やすことにならう。

2. 沖縄基地の神経ガス貯蔵事件は日本国民、
特に沖縄住民の反米感情を悪化させ、
沖縄議会の親米保守派の優勢を逆転させ、
反対派の議席を倍増させた結果を齎した。
日本の本土においても、この事件によって、従来から
いわれがた「基地公害」の非難に一層拍車を
かけたことになつた。

これに対し、米軍当局は沈黙を守っているが

と云ふは、日本の批評家に対して、米國は日本の
の公共の安全を無視しているという印象を与えて
いる。

3. 今回の国防省の毒ガス撤去の即時
決定は、一般に好感をもつて迎えられる
いるが、在日米軍基地の~~持主~~、アリアにおけ
る米軍戦略上の重要性から考えれば、正確に
閣僚長官は今回の会談において、沖縄問題に
重要をおくべきになる。

在日米軍としても在日米軍基地に対する日本の与論
にたいして深い関心を抱いており、一方、毒ガスと沖縄
から撤去するという決定は、僅か4日間でなされた
という事は、ワシントンにも同様の関心を有して
いることの証と云えよう。

本信写送付先 米ニヨコウ (別紙添付)

**REPORT
FROM
TOKYO**
By Samuel Jameson
CHIEF OF CHICAGO
TRIBUNE'S TOKYO BUREAU

Better Reception
Awaits Rogers
on Japan Visit

TOKYO, July 26—Secretary of State William Rogers, who will arrive in Japan Monday night, can look forward to a better welcome here than was in store for him a few days ago.

A hostile atmosphere was building up, even in governmental circles, when an American newspaper exposed the fact that lethal nerve gas was being stored on Okinawa. More than 950,000 Japanese live in the island chain, which Japan has asked the United States to return.

Rogers will head a cabinet delegation to an annual economic conference with Japan but will be spending much of his time talking about Okinawa. The secretary is expected to present the American reply to Japanese proposals on the conditions under which Okinawa is to be returned to Japan.

Had the Pentagon not announced last Tuesday that it would remove nerve gas and other lethal chemical weapons from Okinawa, Rogers would have been given a hard time on this issue.

Even before the initial report was confirmed, the nerve gas incident spurred some of the most vicious anti-American editorials which have been seen here since 1965, when the Japanese press went on an emotional rampage against American policy in Viet Nam.

The chief executive of the Okinawa government branded American bases there as "the worst in the world." Resolutions were submitted to the Japanese parliament and one was passed in the Okinawa legislature. Even the vice chairman of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's ruling party spoke out against storing nerve gas on Okinawa.

With the Pentagon's statement, the Japanese foreign ministry said it considered the incident closed.



Rogers

Nerve Gas Incident Leaves Mark

SERIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL scars lingered, tho. One of these showed up in Okinawa as voters in the capital, Naha, elected a new municipal assembly.

Conservative forces who have cooperated with the 24-year American rule on Okinawa lost control of the assembly. They dropped from 20 to 13 seats. Opposition parties critical of the United States doubled their holdings from 6 to 12. That gave the deciding vote in the 30-man assembly to the Buddhist-backed Clean Government party, which won 5 seats.

In Japan proper, the nerve gas incident added another example of what some newspaper editorials called the danger of letting the United States station armed forces on Japanese territory.

Last year virtually every activity of American armed forces in Japan was subjected to scathing criticism in the nation's press. Even Sato began to make statements critical of American bases here.

The American reaction was to adopt a policy of silence. It gave critics a clear field in which to create the impression that the United States runs its bases in Japan without regard to the safety and welfare of the Japanese public.

A new phrase, "Kichi Kogai" [roughly translated, "dangers of the bases"], entered daily usage.

Pentagon Admission Refreshing

COMPARED WITH the United States' refusal to defend itself in 1968, the defense department's frank admission of the facts on the Okinawa nerve gas incident created a fresh breath of air here. It did not, however, counteract the aftermath of 1968.

Altho Japan gets a defense guarantee, which it does not reciprocate in its security treaty with the United States, the bases Japan provides free rent to American forces here play a key role in American military strategy thruout Asia. Bases in Okinawa—the importance of which Rogers will be stressing in his talks here—play a crucial role.

Paying attention to Japanese public opinion concerning these bases is high on the list of priorities of American military officers in Japan. The commander of United States forces here, for example, receives a personal report of every major traffic accident involving American military personnel and Japanese.

The decision, made in only four days, to remove lethal chemical weapons from Okinawa indicated that similar attention is being paid in Washington.

シカゴ

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

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電信写

大政事外外儀官

務務典房
次次典房
臣官官審審長長
儀書文会營給

総番号(TA) 48117 主管
69年10月10日10時10分 シカゴ 発着
69年10月25日00時26分 本省 着

外務大臣殿 影印 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ開門新聞論評

第216号 平

24日シカゴ・サン・タイムズのGIVE OKINAWA BACK TO JAPANと題する社説は、11月のサトウ総理訪米によりオキナワ返かんが討論される際に核兵器の処理ぶりが問題となろうが、このサトウ・エクソン会談には、オキナワとか貿易とかの当面の問題より以上に、日米両国がFIRM FRIENDS AND ALLIESであり得るかという根本問題がかかっている。この際米國はヴィエトナム戦争が終つた時には、オキナワの施政権を日本に返かんし、該地を基地を継続使用することに同意するのが米國にとつても最大の利益であろうと論じている。要綱公債。

米。= ニューヨークに転電し、在米他公債に転報した。

(3)

外務省

参入電厚計
参関折企
参領旅移

参地中東
参北北保
参一
参西東洋

参寄近ア
次総経国万
参貿統国
参政技一理
参政技二
参協規
参政経科
参社專
参道内外
一二

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- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

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電信写

大政事外外儀官

務務典房
次次典房
臣官官審審長長
儀書文会營給

総番号(TA) 58579 主管
71年11月11日18時30分 シカゴ 発着
71年11月12日10時18分 本省 着

外務大臣殿 影印 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん協定等(新聞報道ぶり)

第127号 平

- 1. 上院本会議による承認に関し、
 - 11日トリビューンは第一面にワシントンAP電記事を、サン・タイムズは26ページにワシントン・ポストによる記事を掲載したが社説では取り上げていない。
 - 2. トリビューンは、ナヘで暴動化したデモ隊が警官隊としよう突中及びさつ害された警官の死体がえん上中の大きな写真(UPI)を掲げたが、後者はざんこくでめをおおわしめるものがある。
 - 3. なお、ミスタ・CONNALLY会談に関し、トリビューンは、日本のてい抗がん強との見出しを付している。
- 米に転電した。

(了)

外務省

参企折調
参領旅査移

参地中東
参北北保
参一
参西東洋

参寄近ア
次総経国資源
参貿統国
参政技一理
参政技二
参協規
参政経科
参社專
参道内外
一二

北洋一府領
海外事務所
昭和46年11月19日

情報文化局長

報道課長

秘密標記(赤色)

第 887 号

昭和 46 年 11 月 19 日

外務大臣殿

在シカゴ
影井 総領事



(件名)

沖縄返還協定の履行承認に関する諮談(報告)

引用公・電信
日付・番号

11月16日付三〇五三一九一三〇二水 沖縄返還に米日協力の必要

(米日平和の日米米国の経済的関係の改善と社会の発展)

付属添付 付属空便(行) 付属空便(DP) 付属船便(貨) 付属船便(郵)

本信送付先: 不届

本信写送付先: 米 22-3-7, 02, 222

配付先:

GA-3-1

在外公館

記

米口上陸は沖縄返還を可快し。この返還協定は日本に行政権を付与し日本の主権を認められた。米口は「不動産」より米と大切と見做す。日本は完全に平等な同盟国として受入られべきである。米は世界第二次大戦の大主権道義的問題は、撤去条項の但し書き付きで元の「米」に納付した。

同協定は現実を認め、未来を見つめようとするものである。

即ち、日本は太平洋に雄然と君臨し、今後は、東洋の産業全盛大国と世界貿易の指導者となる。絶好の機会である。この機会を逃せば日本は米口との経済利益と衝突し、米口が圧力と輸入税^税の底上げを行なう。これは米口に配するに過ぎない。これは、両国共善良と精神と互いの利益の討合を可能にする。両者が勝つ。戦争^{戦争}の2つ。強力な警察と平和の日本は

GA-4

外務省

