

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 外紙報道（在米その他公館関係）(2)

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アメリカ局長
参事官
北米課長

第6号

昭和44年1月2日

外務大臣殿

在ヒューストン
太田総領事

在日米軍基地と沖縄に関する社説(報告)

在日米軍基地と沖縄問題に関する関心が、
当地方においても最近新聞の社説等を通じて
みられるようになつたことは一応注意に値するとい
3、これらの社説は米軍問題の解説を主要内容
としており、全体の論調としては早急な^{基地}返還を
求めているものが多い。

例えば、12月21日付 デリー・オラハマン紙社説

首務事務官
南の方
渉外調査
漁業
航空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査



GA-1

10494

外務省

2

は、「日本及び沖縄における米軍基地の減少は、
中共の侵略を誘発する危険性がある。日本も沖縄も
米国の貿易相手は米軍駐留で利益を受けているでは
ないか」(別添1)と論じおり、また12月28日付同紙
社説は、「現時点では、ここしばらく沖縄の戦略基地
を放棄するわけにはゆかない」(別添2)と論じ
さらにまた12月28日付ヒューストン・ポスト紙は、
「今回の米政府による在日軍事基地の一部返還は、
米国の友人佐藤首相の立場をよくすることに資する。
沖縄を念めなお維持される米軍基地は、決して
米国自身のためだけではない。日米両国は基本的
には友人関係にあり、この関係を続けることは、
日米双方にとって有益である」(別添3)と論じている。

本信字送付先 米国

付添添付

GA-1

外務省

沖繩問題

11

別添
1

Tensions Just Off Stage

EVEN when there are friendly surface relations between the United States and Japan, there is an angry undercurrent that only reasonable actions by both sides can prevent becoming a strong tide.

The major trouble concerns reversion of the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese sovereignty. For 23 years the United States has been in control of the island chain, of which Okinawa is the principal entity, under a post-war mandate. Our principal officer there is, by title, the high commissioner.

Election of a leftist oriented "chief executive" for the islands under a lessening of complete American control has altered the situation some. Chobyo Yara campaigned for the executive's post, which is an operational position still responsive to the high commissioner, on a program of getting the islands back under Japan's rule.

Yara did not stop there. He also is asking that the Okinawans have a voting delegation, rather than mere observers, in the Japanese diet or parliament. He also protests stationing of B-52 bombers on Okinawa and visits to Naha harbor of United States nuclear submarines. This also has stirred up leftist protests in Japan proper.

Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato has promised in an official interview with Yara, that he will "co-operate" in Okinawa's problems. He made no promise of immediate action by the Japanese government. In a state visit with President Johnson a year ago Sato did get the Bonin Islands, including Iwo Jima, returned

to Japanese control.

Sato has to cater to his own electorate but also is aware of the present need for the United States to use its large base on Okinawa for the Vietnamese war. He knows also that since Japan is forbidden by treaty to have a large military force of its own, it must of necessity have protection of the United States defensive umbrella.

Under that umbrella, Japan has not had to spend much of its funds for defense while becoming the third largest industrial nation. Yet some Japanese political organizations are demanding a reduction of the 90 United States military installations in the four Japanese home islands.

Involved as we are in Korea, where there is a practical limit to the impact of combat and supporting troops, a backup depot system in Japan is doubly important, for both Korea and Japan. Any serious reduction in Korea would be an invitation for another invasion from the north. There is a speculative possibility that a major reduction of our forces either in Japan or Okinawa would stimulate other aggressive moves from Red China.

No country likes an alien presence when the danger of actual invasion is lessened by years of at least semi-security. Trade relations between the United States and Japan, are beneficial economically. So is the Okinawan economy since those people never have had it so good as they have under United States military spending. Yet tension can be built up. This is another future headache for the next administration.

Daily Oklahoman

基地返還と沖繩問題

沖繩はオキナワ

11

別添
2

Japanese Relations

REACTING to demands made upon the Japanese government by some of its own internal critics and leftist groups, the United States will return about 50 of its more than 100 military installations to direct Japanese control, or share them with that country's own defense forces.

This takes quite a bit of heat off the Japanese government and certainly should improve relations in addition to putting a slight damper

on dissension within Japan. The installations vary in size and, it would appear from our willingness to give them up or share them, that they are not viewed as important now as in earlier years.

This may soften but certainly will not still the demands of Okinawans for return of the Ryuku Islands to Japanese sovereignty. At this point

in time we cannot abandon the strategically important airfields, depots and harbor installations there, although final solution is but delayed.

DAILY OKLAHOMAN

DEC. 28, 1968

(在日美军基地)
安全问题

3

Bases in Japan Reduced

A decision by the United States to return to Japan 50 military bases and areas in that country now used for mutual defense should help to ease the political strain in which Premier Eisaku Sato, a good friend of this country, now finds himself.

While trying to be friendly with the United States, he has had to contend with left-wing demands that American military forces be withdrawn completely.

Any nationalistic or jingoistic proposal promoted by the political opposition can be counted upon to have a certain amount of popular appeal and therefore a trouble potential.

Even some Japanese businessmen and members of Sato's own political party, the Liberal Democrats, are disposed toward close trade and other relations with Communist China, and the prime goal of the Communists, whether of the Peking or Moscow variety, is to alienate Japan from the United States and ultimately drive the United States out of the Far East.

THE MUTUAL DEFENSE agreement between the United States and Japan under which this country assumed the principal burden for the military defense of Japan and that country's armed forces are limited comes up for renewal in 1970, and it is generally predicted that the American military presence in Japan will become an increasingly explosive issue during the next year.

The situation is aggravated by Japanese demands for return of the Ryukyu Islands to full Japanese control. The United States has administered the islands since World War II while recognizing Japan's residual sovereignty. The largest of the islands is Okinawa, where the United States has extensive military facilities, including the Kadena Air Force Base for B-52 bombers which are used in Vietnam military operations. This use of Okinawa has been exploited by the leftists for anti-American propaganda purposes.

The 50 bases and facilities in Japan to be relinquished by the United States are about one-third of the number now being used by American forces.

AMERICAN POLICY was explained by United States Ambassador Alexis Johnson in these words: "We don't desire keeping military bases in Japan for our own sake. The United States has been reducing them over the years, and we try to keep them to the minimum for the commitments we have in Japan."

This policy is, of course, proper for this country to pursue. It has enabled Premier Sato to argue that Japan can accomplish more through co-operation with the United States than through an antagonistic course of action. The fact is that Japan and the United States are both friends and partners, and it is to the benefit of both to continue this relationship.

Houston Post.

Dec. 28, '68

清道長

アメリカ局長

参事官

十一課長

第51号

昭和44年2月7日

外務大臣殿

在ヒューストン領事
太田 総領事

沖縄問題ト併せて当地敵社送付。

2月5日付当地ヒューストン敵社は "okinawa

Problem" と題して社説をのみけ、佐藤首相

は、沖縄が比較的短年月の間に日本の統

治下に返還されるであろうとす点に、その政

治的生命を賭けているよ。首相は議会の

の演説で、返還期日に閣議談するが本年

要録
百部事務
地方
海外調査
法務
航空
協力
連絡調整
調査
その他
事務

44.2.12

GA-4

10932 外務省

2

中にはニクソン大統領を訪問する考えである旨を
を發表しているが、日本の新聞はその用心深い
発言を目して同首相は正式返還後も米軍の
同長基地保有継続を認めるつもりで、
のではないかと解釈しているよ。である。

従来同首相及びその政府は、政權交替の
問題を除き米軍側と十分に協調してきた
ことでもあり、我々としては、ニクソン政府が日本の立場
を好意的にみることを望むものである。
何事と考へまことに右記事が抜別添の
り御送付する。

本信送付は米軍。

GA-4

外務省

The Okinawa Problem

Japan's prime minister, Eisaku Sato, has pretty well staked his political life on the proposition that Okinawa will be returned to Japanese rule in a fairly short time. In a policy speech before the Diet, the prime minister said he planned to visit President Nixon in the United States later on this year to arrange the reversion date.

He told the Japanese legislators that his aim would be to set the reversion date "in a context of mutual understanding, friendship and cooperation between the governments and peoples" of Japan and the United States.

"I WISH TO SEEK a type of solution that will win the understanding of the people, taking cognizance, first and foremost, of the important role which United States bases in Okinawa are playing in ensuring not only the security of our country but also the security of the Far East," he said.

Japanese newsmen interpret this guarded language as meaning that Sato might be willing to see the United States retain its military bases on Okinawa after the formal reversion back to Japan. No one disputes that the island rightfully belongs to Japan.

Pressures on the prime minister were eased somewhat recently by a decision by this country to close down about one-third of its military bases on the main Japanese islands, allowing the bases to revert to Japan.

Prime Minister Sato is being pressured by leftist groups, many of them at the vociferous student level, to rid Japan of all traces of America. The same groups are opposed to the mutual defense agreement, under which the United States protects Japan militarily, and which comes up for renewal next year.

As a consequence of this protection, Japan's economy has boomed. Having to spend hardly any money on her defenses, Japan has forged an industrial and financial empire that competes on equal terms with us and the West Germans.

BECAUSE OF HER prosperity, Japan is uniquely in a position among Asian nations to bring a measure of stability to that troubled part of the world. We hope that the Nixon administration will look sympathetically at Sato's problem on Okinawa. He and his government have co-operated well with us in many areas, certain tariffs excepted, and a friendly and helpful Japan is a necessity to our stake in Asia.

It may be that Okinawa is indispensable to our war effort in Vietnam and to the defense of Taiwan, which we also underwrite. But in these days of guided missiles and far-ranging aircraft carriers, perhaps Okinawa is not as important to us as it was a few years ago. In any event, we hope that Japan's claims are given thoughtful consideration. Japan is an ally of great promise for the future.

Houston Post

Feb. 5, 1969

THE HOUSTON POST

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

PAGE 2, SECTION 3 TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 1969

Okinawa's Return Opposed

When Japanese politicians, yielding to pressure groups at home, start talking about the return of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands to Japanese control, the matter is presented as strictly a matter between the United States and Japan.

But, since Okinawa is a keystone of the defense system erected against Communist aggression in the Far East, every other free country in the Asian-Pacific area has a very vital interest in the matter of who controls the islands.

Their concern is increased by other pressures in Japan aimed at forcing abandonment by the United States of its military bases in Japan when the current Japanese-American mutual defense agreement expires.

Nor are they forgetful of what happened to them and other countries before and during World War II, when the Land of the Rising Sun was pursuing its imperialistic ambitions.

THREE OF THESE third-party countries—South Korea, Nationalist China and Thailand—have expressed doubts about the wisdom of turning control of Okinawa and the neighboring islands back to Japan. And a question has been raised also about the legality of any such move since 50 nations participated in the signing of the peace treaty with Japan which gave the United States the power to administer the island.

The South Korean foreign minister recently told the Japanese that his country would not overlook any move that would deny to South Korea the protection that the United States military base on Okinawa now provides it.

THE NATIONALIST CHINESE government on Formosa, which is in sight physically of the most southern of the Ryukyu Islands, has

taken the position that the return of Okinawa to Japan would impair the security system of the entire Far East and create a threat to the safety of other free nations as well as to that of Nationalist China.

Thailand, an active participant in the Vietnam war, where the Communists are trying to break through the defense line of the free nations, has questioned the legality of treating the deal with respect to Okinawa as a private arrangement between the United States and Japan.

The Thai foreign minister remarked that if Japan wants to replace the United States on Okinawa it should be willing to pick up the military as well as the administrative responsibilities.

If Japan wants the United States out of the Ryukyus, he said, then Japan should be prepared to finance and maintain its own defense umbrella.

UNDER THE PEACE treaty with Japan, the United States assumed the responsibility for providing a protective umbrella for Japan as well as other Far East countries. As a result Japan has been able to get by with spending practically nothing for its own defense. This has been an important factor in enabling it to stage its remarkable economic comeback and enjoy unprecedented prosperity.

The fact is that most of the agitation for the return of Okinawa to Japan, as well as abandonment of American bases in Japan itself, comes from leftist groups that do not want Japan and the other free countries to spend anything on military defense. These elements do not want them to be able to defend themselves against Communist aggression.

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米第一課長

第152号

昭和44年5月20日

外務大臣殿

在ヒューストン
太田

沖縄問題等に関する当地方紙の
報道あり (記事送付)

5月に入り、当地方紙に沖縄をいし安保問題
等政治に関する記事が急に掲載され始め
たり、これはいずれもUPI, New York Times
News Service等が東京通信社に解説があるか、日本に
めぐる国際政治的関心が高まっている現象として
何等の参考まで、これら記事切抜きを別添送付申しあげ

本信送付先 米国、ニューヨーク

要処理
首席事務官
南
渉外調査
漁業
航空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査
カナダ
局庶務



The San Antonio Light
May 1, 1969

沖繩返還
問題
日本人への注意

Japanese Factions Becoming Restless for Return of Okinawa

By PHIL NEWSOM
UPI Foreign News Analyst
A note of desperation is creeping into Japan's increasingly insistent demands for the return of Okinawa.

And in the U.S. State Department, over the wishes of the Pentagon, there is a growing belief the United States cannot much longer delay return of the \$1.2-billion Pacific base to the Japanese—agreed to before the summer of 1970 and physical turnover in 1973. No single other issue presses the government of Premier Eisaku Sato quite so hard.

VIVID EXPRESSION
Thousands of left-wing Japanese students and labor union members gave it vivid expression when on April 28 they took to the streets in violent anti-American demonstrations marking the 17th anniversary of the Japanese peace treaty.

The Japanese observe the date as "Okinawa Day."

SEEKS FIRM DATE
Less violently but with similar emotion Sato declares "it has ceased to be just a political problem. It has become a humanitarian issue." The longer the delay in arriving at a solution to the Okinawa question, the greater will be the difficulties that face our two countries in the political field. Sato is scheduled to visit the United States in November and is pledged to obtain at that time a firm date for the island's return.

The life of his government depends upon his success.

For the Japanese the emotional issue is the fact of some one million citizens of Japan still living under foreign domination on Okinawa more than 20 years after the war.

For the United States the issue is more complex.

U.S. BASES
On Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyu chain the United States maintains 124 bases, most of them on Okinawa.

There it stores nuclear weapons for emergency use in Korea, China and other Pacific areas.

B52's take off from Okinawa for raids on Vietnam. It is a transit point for troops on their way to Vietnam. Submarines armed with nuclear-tipped Polaris missiles are serviced there.

If the islands were returned to Japan under the same conditions by which the United States maintains its Japanese bases, the right to store nuclear weapons would be taken away as would the right to take off from Okinawa on offensive missions without prior consultation.

The Beaumont Enterprise
May 3, 1969

東洋日報

Japan Learns Lesson Of Profit in Loss

BY C. L. SULZBERGER
New York Times News Service

TOKYO — Japan has done everything right to make sure it inherits the future. First of all it lost the war. It was not only squashed in 1945 but yielded 46 per cent of its territory (not including Manchuria) and all its overseas empire. It was bombed to rubble and occupied by a conquering army.

As with European powers defeated in either world war or both and thereby deprived of colonies, Japan found it could concentrate dynamic energy more profitably within its limited confines. The Japanese experience resembles the German, Italian, Dutch, French or Belgian experience. Each either temporarily or finally lost a global conflict and an empire; each consequently prospered.

BEFORE atomic bombs blasted Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan's steel mills were flattened by conventional explosives. As a result, with industry rebuilt by U.S. aid, Japanese steel is produced more efficiently and economically than American steel.

An industrial system that had reached its apogee before mid-century was smashed and, when rebuilt, created modern miracles. While American railroads declined into stultification, new high-speed Japanese expresses raced along at 120 miles an hour.

Today Japan is the world's third manufacturing power—following America and Russia. Its highly disciplined and brilliantly managed economy builds more than 50 per cent of all merchant ships on earth and more automobiles than any country save the U.S. Modern technical laboratories flourish. Per capita income is soon scheduled to become the world's 10th highest. Herman Kahn forecasts that Japan will enter the 21st Century far ahead of any other Asian land and that, before the century ends, its living standards may surpass America's.

APART from the Japanese people's genius and energy this miracle has been stimulated by two abnormal events. The first was wartime defeat, ending the waste of national energy on colonial policies and resulting in an industrial restoration of modern plant. The second was the accident that Gen. MacArthur, the American shogun, imposed a constitution for-

bidden any Japanese military establishment. Even today, when Japan does maintain a small "self defense force," it spends less than one per cent of its gross national product on security—far less than any other major nation. Instead, it gets a free ride from the United States and invests on peacetime enterprises that might otherwise be spent on armaments.

Under a bilateral treaty (subject to review next year) which guarantees protection without Japanese reciprocal obligations, Tokyo grants American base rights and has no say on Okinawa with its nuclear storage facilities. The status of Okinawa, politically recognized as Japanese, will surely change soon.

JAPAN'S strange destiny was improved by the Korean war. MacArthur's dream of a neutralized Asian Switzerland might have been Utopian but the Communist attack accelerated changes in U.S. policy. Washington encouraged the self defense forces and bilateral treaty just as it decided to rearm West Germany.

Having thereby been assured safety, Japan watched a split develop between its two potential enemies, Russia and China. Instead of being threatened by both, Tokyo found itself courted by each. China began to dangle trade offers while Russia invited Japanese participation in exploiting Siberia.

The Japanese have been remarkably shrewd about making the most of opportunities thrust upon them in the wake of disaster. They are now profoundly peace-minded and imply quiet satisfaction with the formula of maximum security at minimum cost even if details like Okinawa rankle and must be ironed out.

THEIR GNP (up 13 per cent each year) and self-esteem boom. Washington keeps imagining agreeable schemes for Asia-first alliances including Japan but Tokyo modestly explains it is constitutionally forbidden to have armed forces capable of helping anyone else.

Japan indeed plays an increasing world role, forced upon it by ever-mounting trade, not diplomatic pressure. It pays as much as the U.S. into the Asian Development Bank because it must prime expanding markets and now that Japan's reserves exceed \$3 billion it must speak louder on currency questions.

The Japanese miracle far transcends all European miracles of the post-war period. Those Western miracles also derived from military disaster and consequent readjustment—renovation and the end of a colonial energy drain. But Japan exploited its disaster more wisely and effectively and possesses a vital advantage—its security umbrella barely costs a yen.

敗戦
日本
経済
の
大

The Brownsville Herald
May 7, 1969

War The Best To Happen To Japan And Germany Last Hundred Years

By PHIL NEWSOM
UPI Foreign News Analyst

David E. Lillenthal, a man of impressive credentials, once remarked that in terms of health-producing capacity war was the best thing that had happened to Germany and Japan in 100 years.

Although both had suffered almost 100 per cent destruction of their industrial capacities during World War II, the reconstruction gave them the world's most modern equipment and enabled them in a few years to become the giants of Europe and Asia, far ahead of France and Britain which had suffered far less war damage.

Lillenthal, former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and a veteran of development planning in Iran, Colombia and elsewhere, now is at work on post-war rehabilitation for South Vietnam.

A report prepared jointly with South Vietnamese planners now on President Nguyen Van Thieu's desk estimates that South Vietnam with \$2.5 billion in economic aid can become economically independent within 10 years after war's end.

The report, considered by some to be optimistic, places heavy emphasis on development and reclamation of vast areas of the rice-producing Mekong Delta.

Two of the more exciting international projects which will bolster the South Vietnamese economy are the Trans-Asian highway which eventually will link Istanbul and Saigon and the \$1 billion U.S. investment program offered by former President Johnson in a speech at Johns Hopkins in 1965.

This the Mekong River development plan benefiting South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand upon which work already is far advanced.

Lillenthal, however, believes that South Vietnam's own development need not await these projects, nor does it need to await the end of the fighting.

South Vietnam's pressing wartime needs for improved transport facilities, warehousing and roads already have resulted in impressive groundwork for a peacetime economy. Thousands of skilled Vietnamese workers have been the outgrowth of a new port at Cam Ranh Bay, highway construction and related jobs in a \$1.8 billion military construction program.

敗戦は日本、
両国に比べて
最後の出来事

The Austin American
May 9, 1969

Japanese National Purpose Hunt Centers on Okinawa

再興日本
沖繩に
国心を
集中

By HANS J. MORGENTHAU
Los Angeles Times

Returning to Japan after an interval of four years, the American observer is struck by the change that has come over the mood of this nation.

The ingredients of the old mood are still clearly noticeable: guilt feelings, inferiority complexes, pacifism. But upon them has been superimposed a new awareness of Japan's qualities and accomplishments and a yearning for a role commensurate with this newly found self-esteem and strength.

This nation, so amply endowed with vigor, industry, discipline, adaptability, and a subtle intelligence, is no longer satisfied with the subordinate and dependent place which the victor of World War II assigned it and which it accepted almost with alacrity.

Japan has surpassed West Germany as the third industrial power of the world, outranked only by the United States and the Soviet Union. It produces more steel than France, Great Britain and Italy combined, and only the United States exceeds its production of motor vehicles. It is first in ship-building and the production of cameras and transistors. Its per capita income of \$955 million exceeds that of Italy, and the average annual increase in its gross national product during the 1960s has been more than 10 per cent.

Japan, with such extraordinary accomplishments to its credit, has begun to take the affluent society for granted and to search for a worthy purpose on behalf of which its new strength could be used.

Thus the debate on the national purpose, which diverted the Americans a decade ago as an intellectual pastime, is taken in earnest by Japan's intellectuals.

The members of a nation, so hallowed by uninterrupted tradition and favored by ethnic homogeneity and a common way of life, raise in formal public debate the question, which younger and less homogeneous nations, such as Germany and the United States, have asked themselves with obvious justification, as to whether theirs is a real nation at all. Many have accepted the answer that Japan is a nation only in the formal sense but not in substance, since it lacks a sense of identity and purpose essential for real nationhood.

Meaningful search for that national identity and purpose is of course predicated upon national independence. It is at this point that the drama which is being played out in the soul of Japan becomes directly relevant for the United States.

For Japanese dependence on the United States for military defense and the occupation of Okinawa, considered by all Japanese an integral part of Japan, are the most tangible stumbling blocks on Japan's road to national self-understanding and self-fulfillment. In consequence, all Japanese are in different degrees uneasy about that dependence, groping for an arrangement which would combine the advantages of such dependence with national self-respect, while minimizing its risks. They all insist upon the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control.

Okinawa has indeed become the focus of national discontent. It has almost become what Alsace-Lorraine was for France after 1871: the touchstone of the country's worth as a nation.

I was taken aback by the strength of feeling and the directness — unusual for Japanese — with which this issue was posed not only by the man in the street, especially on

its left side where this attitude has always been strong, but by the prime minister in a speech to a mixed group of Americans and Japanese, by the foreign minister and some of his principal aides in private conversations, by members of the diet, prominent businessmen, professors, and journalists.

It is idle to argue the merits of the case with the Japanese. Their emotions have focused upon this issue, and not by accident. Upon the overall issue of their relations with the United States, formulated in their military aspects by the security treaty of 1960, the Japanese are utterly confused.

On the one hand, they find American responsibility for their defense most convenient; the United States bears all the political, military, and financial burdens, and Japan enjoys the military and economic advantages. On the other hand, the arrangement is a continuous and visible insult to Japanese pride and can expose Japan to serious military risks unwarranted by Japanese national interests, since it has transformed Japan into a far-flung staging area for American military operations.

In other words, the military arrangement with the United States may not contribute to Japanese security but actually jeopardize it. Japanese uneasiness on this count has been greatly increased by American involvement in Vietnam and with North Korea.

The Austin American Statesman
May 13, 1969

US-Japan Treaty Arbogation Seen

Pressures from other countries and from rioting in Japan may cause the Japanese not to renew the Japanese-American Security Treaty with the United States, Dr. Edwin O. Reischauer, former ambassador to Japan, said Friday.

The treaty expires after 10 years in June, 1970.

Speaking as a visiting fellow at The University of Texas, the Harvard professor in Oriental studies said, "Many Japanese have known for years that 1970 will be a crisis year." He also said he believes the US will be out of the Vietnam war by 1970. Japan is endangered "because it may get involved in our war. No one likes foreign bases in their country," he said.

Reischauer said the United States will not give up its right to use the Okinawa bases without consultation with Japan. "We must insist that Japan shares the responsibility for the bases with us."

If we want to see China move out and have better relations with the rest of the world, they will have to see Japan move first, he said. "The Chinese look upon the Japanese as more civilized human beings," he added.

"The Chinese built nuclear weapons for prestige," Reischauer said, but "they can't do anything with them."

Author of "Beyond Vietnam: The US and Asia," Reischauer said the Chinese would not use their nuclear power knowing attacks would come from the US and the Soviet Union.

The only danger of Chinese aggression is found on the

western frontier of the Soviet Union, Reischauer said.

Stating that defense should be subordinate with long-range development rather than the other way around, he said that when the US gets out of Vietnam it may also leave Thailand.

"They don't want us except in giving aid," the professor said.

He thinks the US should keep its military forces in South Korea — or there would be a serious war that would endanger Japan and the peace in that part of the world.

Speaking on "The Crisis in Our Relations with Asia," Reischauer cited the four crises of our time as: the crisis with Japan — a crisis in part because Americans don't know of the nearing crisis there, "what we should do with that one-fifth of humanity called the Chinese nation," ending the Vietnam War and assuming we get out, adjusting to a new role with this portion of the world.

"We have paid horrendous costs in the Vietnam War with lives, relations with other countries and divisions in our own nation. The reason for it is ignorance. We made bad decisions all the way down the line. We got involved without a single expert on Vietnam," he said.

"If we cannot control one small part of Asia how can anyone else externally control this land. The real problem is internal stability."

"I think we will be out of the Vietnam War by 1970. Campuses and enlisted men may really blow up if the war is not near an end by next fall," he said.

日本
安保協約

日本は安保協約を
更新しない
のではない

— 3月27日
— 3月27日
— 3月27日
— 3月27日
— 3月27日

アメリカ局長

参事官

北米一課長

悟道
傍外長

送付

局長用
フセ

第201号

昭和44年6月19日

外務大臣殿

在ヒューストン
太田総領事

ヒューストン・ポスト紙のオキナワ問題

社説に対する反響

6月18日付往信第190号に関し

1. 冒頭往信にてご報告の当地社説のうち、ヒューストン

ポストの "Why Not a Bill for Japan" の内容につき

本官が目撃つきあっている米人の若干のものに

その感想を聞いてみる限りでは、いずれも

その唐突の感じのする感情的論調に反響

GA-4

外務省

1356

を示し、これは決して当地一般アメリカ人の見方を

代表するものではないと述べているが、彼ら

のうち一人は、さつと社説を反駁する投書

を同紙に送ったところ、数日経ち6月14日付にて

別添1のとおり、さらに同反駁に同意し得ない

する同紙編集者のコメントとともに掲載された。

2. 当館としては、同紙社説そのものもさること

ながら、これに対する一般読者の反響に注目

して見ると、引き続き6月18日付にて、さらに

別添2のとおり、同社説に組するか否き

ものと、これに反対するものとか、それぞれ

一通ずつ掲載された。ポスト紙とて同紙

社説を積極的に支持する投書がめれば、

善人かこれを掲載するはずであるところ、

現在まで、社説同論の投書はみられず

GA-4

外務省

要理
首席事務官
南 ^方
渉外調査
漁業
航空
科学協力
調整
調査
ナダ
局庶務



ゆかり
添付なし

~~また、~~ ^{別添} ~~表紙~~のごとき論旨必ずしも明かでない

ものが社説支持例として投書欄のトップに

掲げられただけで、この点からみると反響は

すこぶる低調であったと想像される。

本信字送付先 米大、=ユ-コ-ス、=ユ-オルリス

• Pravda Outdone,
Says W. B. Dazey

Shades of Imperial Communism! Your editorial ("Why Not Bill Japan?"—Post June 9) outdoes Pravda. Let's let Russia bill the Czechs for saving them and we'll bill the Japanese, right? How about central billing? From Peking, maybe?

At a time when the ugliness of our mistakes in the Orient is becoming more and more apparent, it is sobering to consider the possibility that the usually responsible Houston Post may have been suborned.

WILLIAM B. DAZEY

1029 Teresa

The editorial asked: "Why . . . should not the Japanese be presented with a bill each year to cover a fair share of the cost of the defense of Japan which the United States is forced to provide?" Your response is not an answer, but more questions. Our answer to your questions is no.—Editor.

June 14, 1969

Houston Post

Sound-Off

C. R. Barron Agrees on Japan,
But Tony Butler Jr Doesn't

Congratulations for your editorial on Japan and debt ("Why Not a Bill for Japan?" Post June 9). We of the Western World are conditioned to "love" our enemies. It can't be done without sacrificing part of our integrity. . . . We "loved" them when we did not reduce their land with its innocent millions to cinders. We "loved" them by helping them to come back. Now they are strong, real strong, and make demands. I do not advocate hating anybody, just facing the facts.



June 18, 1969
Houston Post

I know an ex-POW who walks sort of one-sided

TOKYO TEEN AGER?
Too Much Love?

and his shoulder sags because he was on the losing end in the fight with those people.

Again, let us not hate, brothers . . . Let them alone but watch them closely. So with the, industrious, intelligent, and crafty Germans. We owe both a lot. We use their talents. They are amply compensated at the international exchanges . . .

C. R. BARRON

203 North Blackwell, Pasadena

• Tony Butler Jr
Mentions Czechs

"Why . . . should not the Japanese be presented with a bill each year to cover a fair share of the cost of the defense of Japan which the United States is forced to provide?" you say.

May I suggest that maybe you have been listening to too many Russian generals who want to force Czechoslovakia to pay a "fair share" of the cost of the "defense" of Czechoslovakia which Russian occupation troops are being "forced" to provide.

Why not let both the big occupiers and protectors, Russia and the U.S., pay their own . . . bills?

TONY BUTLER JR

242 1/2 Portland

① 情送長
播外長 送致

アメリカ局長
参事 官生原
北米第一課長


206号

第206号

昭和44年6月19日

外務大臣殿

在ヒューストン
大田総領



サン・アントニオ・ライト社のオキナワ
問題社説等について(報告)

6月13日付往信第190号に因り

1. その後当世方社上に現われた本件問題に関する社説、記事等の字を別添1のとおり送付する。

2. 冒頭往信において、ヒューストン・ポスト社の社説のみが、日本に対し著しく批判的である

GA-4

外務省

1357

あるについては、同社経営者の背景が如何の形でニクソン政権とつながりがあるのかわいかなどの臆測を申上げたが、別添1の3枚A P、NYタイムス、カンサス・シティ・スター等からの転載文が冷静であるに反し、6月にロサンゼルス・タイムズの代表紙 "The Light" 社のみが、かなり、上記ポスト紙論調に類似した、こわめの社説をかかげている(要旨別添2)点、同じような意味で、一応注目しておく必要があると思われる。尚 the Light 社もニクソン政権との関係は詳かでないが、同社はハースト系の保守的世方紙であり、現在は William Randolph Hearst, Jr. が同系諸社の Editor-in-chief である。本信送付先、米田、ニユー・オールズ、ニユー・ヨーク。

GA-4

外務省

要処理
首席事務官
南一
渉外調査
漁業
空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査
カナダ
局庶務



Surrender Okinawa?

TWENTY-FOUR years ago, 12,500 United States fighting men died to capture Japan's 72-island Ryukyu chain and its strategic big prize, the 60-mile-long island of Okinawa in the East China Sea.

Since then, under continuing American control, Okinawa has been developed as our single most important military base complex in the Far East — a vital, multi-billion-dollar staging area for operations from Korea to Vietnam.

Japan now is pressing for return of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands.

Intense campaigns both by its nationalistic far right and its anti-American left have made such return an explosive political issue. And the Nixon administration, anxious to maintain good relations with Japan's pro-American government, has indicated it will yield to the pressures and return the territories — probably effective in 1972.

This conciliatory attitude is the latest demonstration of Uncle Sam's amazingly benevolent attitude toward defeated former enemies.

Surrender of our control over Okinawa will not mean dismantling of our 91 military installations there. But it would mean we could no longer use the island for storing nuclear weapons, or as an operating base for our B-52 bombers.

Furthermore we would have to get Japan's permission for launching any military operations, as we do now at the 148 bases we maintain in Japan itself.

There is absolutely no legal reason why we should do this. The status of

Okinawa and the other Ryukyus was fixed by the treaty of peace signed by Japan in 1952. Nor does their status have anything to do with the U.S.-Japanese mutual security treaty of 1960, under which the U.S. guarantees the freedom and safety of Japan.

Yet a threat not to renew that 10-year treaty in 1970, ironically, is one of the pressures being exerted on Washington for the return of Okinawa.

Under that treaty Japan, in effect, has been given a free ride in defense matters. Because we are its protectors, only 1 per cent of its budget goes for defense. As a result, it has been able to develop an annual gross national product of over \$120 billion — third in the whole world and topped only by the U.S. and Russia.


What the Okinawa situation boils down to, in other words, is a demand that we give Japan a veto over future U.S. military operations on the island.

At the same time, the Japanese would continue to enjoy the benefit of the hundreds of millions of dollars we spend there every year, plus the immense saving afforded by our continuing protection.

It is an absurd proposition from any viewpoint but Japan's. Naturally we want to maintain friendly relations, but a clear choice must be made. Either we keep a strong base under our own unhindered control on Okinawa, or Japan must take over the cost and responsibility of its own defense.

Anything else would be a foolish, dangerous, inexcusable betrayal of the ultimate sacrifice made by 12,500 American men in the bloody battles of 1945.

沖繩
✓



沖繩
The Austin American
Jun. 12, 1969

Ravaged Okinawa Now Negotiated

Associated Press Okinawa, a land often ravaged by nature's typhoons, was hit by a more appalling human storm in 1945. It was the scene of the last desperate battle of World War II, a battle that left 250,000 Okinawans and 10,000 Americans dead on the Pacific island.

With that allied military victory, the United States took over Okinawa after the war, at first uncertain what to do with the prize.

In 1949, communism was emerging on the Chinese mainland and Okinawa was struck by a typhoon from the sea which left \$80 million damage. The combination stirred American thinking about the island and Okinawa became a US military base — the key American military bastion in the Western Pacific — from which, it was hoped, communism could be contained in Asia.

Now, both the islanders and the Japanese have been increasingly insistent on the restoration of Okinawa to Japan. This politically potent force in favor of reversion in Japan is set against the desire of US military planners to maintain a strong military presence on the strategically-placed island.

In recent talks in Washington, Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi formally presented Tokyo's demand that Okinawa

and the rest of the Ryukyu islands captured by World War II American forces, be returned to Japanese political control no later than 1972.

Washington...has agreed in principle...the policy of reversion, provided the two governments can agree on how American bases on Okinawa will operate. Japan has told the United States it was willing to permit US military bases on Okinawa after the island reverts to Japanese rule, but wanted to restrict their use to the same standard as other American bases in Japan.

AP Newsfeatures

沖縄
問題

The Beaumont Enterprise
Jun. 12, 1969
→ 知外相
会議

KANSAS CITY STAR

JAPAN is crowding the United States hard on the Okinawa issue and the U. S. apparently is giving ground. It was inevitable considering the importance of American-Japanese relations coupled with Tokyo's insistence on a change in the status of Okinawa. The new development is a reported decision by President Nixon to remove nuclear weapons from the large island dominating the Ryukyu chain 300 miles southwest of Japan. No such transfer would occur, however, until there was over-all agreement on returning Okinawa to Japanese rule.

This report has come simultaneously with the Washington visit of the Japanese foreign minister, Kuchi Aichi. His indicated mission was to lay the groundwork for a trip by William P. Rogers, secretary of State, to Tokyo in July and a Washington summit meeting next November between President Nixon and Premier Eisaku Sato of Japan.

THE principal stake in these sessions is the future of the U. S.-Japanese mutual security pact which will be up for renewal or revision next year. It is generally recognized that the agreement will be in extreme jeopardy unless Okinawa's fate is settled to the satisfaction of Japan before the treaty deadline of June 30, 1970.

During the past four years the Okinawa issue has gradually become the overriding factor in Japanese politics. The trend became evident in August of 1965 when Premier Sato declared that the "postwar period" would not be over for Japan until the United States terminated its occupation of the captured island.

THE peace treaty signed by the U.S. with Japan in 1951 recognizes that the former enemy nation has "residual" sovereignty over

Okinawa and the other Ryukyus. Yet the United States retains administrative control over the islands, while permitting a large degree of home rule.

Okinawa, with its air bases and other installations built at a cost of more than \$2 billion, is the keystone of America's defense system in the Far East. It is also a storage place for nuclear weapons which Japan does not permit to be stockpiled at U. S. bases on Japanese soil. The loss of Okinawa for this purpose would mean shifting nuclear arms at great expense to other Pacific sites that are not as well located.

APPARENTLY the United States is getting ready to revamp its Far Eastern strategy to accommodate the Japanese. In turn Japan should be expected to assume a much heavier proportion of its own defense burden. The Tokyo government is reluctant to do so, however. The Japanese prefer the present arrangement with the U. S. taking care of their defense requirements while they concentrate on economic growth.

Hard bargaining lies ahead. Having won Okinawa from the Japanese aggressor in 1945 at a cost of 45,000 American casualties, the United States could reasonably insist on maintaining its control of the island for many more years.

INSTEAD a timetable for relinquishment of power appears to be in the making. As a minimum return the renewal of the security pact with Japan should be guaranteed. Moreover, the fairest way would be to revise the agreement with the Japanese providing more than limited-use American bases as their part of the defense arrangement.

Settlement of the Okinawan issue, if worked out equitably for all concerned, could lead to strengthening of the U. S.-Japan alliance which clearly is in need of repair.

知外相
会議
→ 知外相
会議

(6月12日付サマアホオ Light)

“ 沖縄返還か ”。

24年前、沖縄を占領するため、12,500名の米国軍人が戦死した。

その後米国の支配下において、沖縄は、極東地域における数億ドルの価値を有する、重要な行動拠点として、この地域において米国が有する最も強力な、軍事的な大根拠地となった。

しかし今や日本の国粹的極右、なびびに反米左翼の両者は、激しい感情的運動でこの返還問題を、爆発的政治係争事件にしてしまった。そしてニクソン政府は、日本の親米的政府友好関係維持を望があまり、その圧力に屈服して、多分1972年には、その返還も実現

するであることも踏示した。この無機動的態度は、最近米国政府が、かつて敗北せしめた昔の敵国に対して示した驚くべき慈善的態度であつて、米国が示した態度をとらねばならぬ、法的理由は全然存在しないのである。

沖縄の地位は、日本との平和条約によって確定されておるのであつて、1960年の日米安保条約は沖縄の地位については、何等の関係をも有するものではない。しかも、皮肉にも、この無関係の安保条約の更新拒否という威嚇が、沖縄返還を目的として、ワシントン政府にかけらる、ある圧力の一つなのである。

安保条約によって、米国は日本の保護者となつており、これがため日本はその予算の1%を、国防費として支出しておるに過ぎず、その結果日本

は、世界第^二位の国民総生産額をあげた
てに発展し得たのである。

現在の沖縄問題は、換言すれば、日本は
米軍が将来沖縄において、とるべき軍事
行動に對する、拒否権をあたえよと強要
しているといふことは、疑義なく、これは同時に、
日本は今後とも引續き米軍が、毎年同様に投入
する数億ドルの恩典に加え、わが保護によ
つてたらされる、莫大な額による節制をも享受
する事となるであろう。かかる成行は、日本
の主場以外の、いかなる観点からしても馬鹿
げた話である。もちろん我々としても、友好関係
の維持は望むところであるが、併しこの際、米
軍の完全な支配下における沖縄に、幾大な基
地を維持するか、または日本が自国防衛の

至貴と責任を負担するかの何れかを明白に
決定すべきであつて、然らざるものはすべて、愚考
かの危険であり、1945年の流血の戦闘におい
て、12,500名の軍人によっておかれた最大の
犠牲に對する許すべからざる裏切りである。

ソカ 万
ヒヒ 博

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

大政 外外機電
務務 典房
次次 審審長長
臣官 保保長長
係係 文会管給

① 人電厚計
② 領移長

総番号 (T A) 2708 / 主管
 69年 月 26 日 12 時 00 分 キューストン 発 米北 /
 69年 6 月 27 日 04 時 40 分 本省 着

外務大臣殿 太田 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ問題関係論調のはい景調査

208号 ワシントンにて

第4号 略

大臣発米あて電報米北 / 第 1239号に関し
 /。大臣あて往信第 206号にて報告済みのおり。サン
 アントニオの Light は、ハースト・ジュニアの経営で
 あり。シアトルの Post Intelligence r
 もハースト系の由。ただ、ロスの Herard Exam
 iner 紙の性格は承知しないが、その名称からして、ハ
 ースト係と推察される。そうだとすれば、少くとも三紙に
 同一内容の社説が出たことは、ハースト系紙に何らか共通
 の論説方針に基づくものではないかと推察される。この点
 を確かめるためには、他のハースト系社説の動きを調べる
 必要がある。

2. それにしても、(ロス社説の内容は承知しないが) Lig
 ht と P. I. の社説は一言一く同一であり、あまりに統
 一がとれすぎているので、冒頭往信および 6月 23日付往
 信第 208号にて本官おく測を申し述べたように、さら

ア 参地中東
長 北東西
米長 参北北保
中南 参一二
参西東洋
長 一三

近ア 参書近ア
長 次総経国万
長 参質統国
参政技二
国一理
参協規
参政経科
電社専
参道内外
文長 一二

秘

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

に、そのはい後に、何らかの形でニクソン政府が、レン
 タソンの地方紙にたいし、与論指導とまではゆかなくても
 アドバルーンをかかげさせているのではないかと疑いたく
 なる。この点は、地方所在公館では調査し難いワシント
 ン、ニューヨークないし本省で念のため留意される必要が
 あると思われる。
 以上ご参考まで。
 大臣、ニューヨーク、ロスアンゼルス、シアトルへ転電し
 た。

13

秘

(回覧番号 1388) 外務省電信案 (分類)

秘密表示 (極秘・秘の朱印)	符号表示	※ 総第	号
秘	暗 (略) 平	29663	
無期限	※ 第	1239	号
	※ 昭和	6.26	日 10 55 分
	大至急・至急	普通・LTF	※ 発電係
			在

大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官房長	主管 アメリカ局長 参事官 北米才一課長	主管局部課(室)名 アメリカ局北米才一課 起案 昭和44年6月26日 起案者 有地 電話番号 446
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協議先
赤松 参事官
報道課長
海外広報課長

大使 臨時代理大使
在米 下田 総領事 代理
あて 愛知大臣 宛

電報 在 大阪 高杉 大使 臨時代理大使
電報 在 大阪 大田 総領事 代理
電報 在 大阪 林岡

件名
沖縄問題関係論調の背景調査
(三ツ川通信 317号)
大阪通信 552号 及び 電二通信 206
予に1案し
6月12日付 Herald Examiner 紙
(口2) 社説 "Okinawa Surrender"
同日付 The Light 紙 (サン・アト=オ)

26 111
字 濟

及同日付 POST (Inquirer) ...
社説 "Okinawa Surrender?" と

の社説 "Surrender Okinawa?" は殆んど
同一内容であるところ。其社説の相
関関係、その背景等につき 背景調査
の上 結果回答ありぬ。
口2 / 電二通信に 転電した。
(3)

御台所
 稍とヒヤ
 アメリカ局長
 参事官
 北米一課長
 秘

① 第208号
 4年6月23日
 外務大臣殿
 在ヒューストン
 太田 然
 オキナワ問題に関する并日批判的社説
 (報告 観察)
 前出
 往信6月13日付第190号及び6月19日付第206号に關し
 1. 当地ニ大紙の一方 Houston Post 紙、後いサン
 アントニオの地方紙、Light の社説が、愛知并相の
 オキナワ返還問題をとりえ、日頃の節度ある
 論調からみて唐突に思われるほどはげしい并日
 批判の社説を掲げたこと、および、単なる本官

要処理
首席事務官
南方
渉外調査
漁業
航空
科学協力
経済調整
調査
力子夕
局業務



の臆測の域を脱しないが、このことは、日本側にとつて「すべり出し好調」といわれるオキナワ返還問題に關し、未だ何ら守の内を見せていないニクソン政権が、何らか背後でかかる厳しい線に沿つたと論指導に類することを企てている何らかのあらわれでないか、しかしもし、アメリカの地方都市における親共知党的新聞に、何らか類似の兆候が現われたとしたら留意すべきであるかとの卑見を申し述べたが、その後本省、在ワシントン及びニューヨーク各公館より関連の情報を得ていないところ、たまたま本官が6月22日にシアトルに出張し、林田総領事とオキナワについてわかちPR方法等について雑談していた際冒頭往信にて「報告のサンアントニオの Light 紙社説 "Surrender Okinawa?" と一字一句異ならぬ社説

シアトルのPost-Intelligencer 紙の6月13日付社説に
 掲載されていることを発見した。(同社説については
 シアトルより大臣〔字ワシントン〕にて報告済みゆ)

2. 同総領事のお話によれば、同紙はハースト系
 であり、当地方サン・アントニオのLight 紙も冒頭往信
 にてご報告のとおり、はっきりとハースト系である。
 したがって、^{論調の} ~~一致~~ (かかると一致) は上記のニクソン政権の主張
 指導云々とは全く無関係に、ハースト系各紙の
 単なる内部的現象と考えられぬこともないが、
 ハースト系両紙のほか、冒頭往信にてご報告の
 ヒューストン・ポスト 紙が突然上記のような厳しい
 批判を掲げたこと、これら各紙がいずれもニクソン
 に対し共産党に近いことと推測せられ、いせん
 臆測の域を脱しないが、単なる偶然を越える
 何かの背後にあるように思われざるを得ない。

少なくとも、ニクソン政府 ^{新しい共産党前} が地方上層の動向を知る
 よすがとして、アドバルーンをかがざせているので
 はないかと疑いたくなる。

3. しかし、当館のごとき、アメリカの一地方都市所在
 公館としては、^{中央の動向を} 全国的な情報を採らうべくも
 ないわけで、ワシントン、ニューヨークをはじめ各地からの
 本件関係報告を集収分析しておられるはずの
 本省において、念のためこの点はぜひご検討
 いたされたく、もしかりに何らかの背後関係が
 ありと察知されるなら、わかちの対アメリカ P.R. (特
 にはオキナワ、安保問題について) の方法について
 は、それこそより ^{きめ細かい} ~~きめ細かい~~ 方法をとらなければ
 勞多くして、的はずれの、効果薄いものに終る
 おそれがあり、特に ニューヨーク 総領事館の
 P.R. エージェント Van Slyck をして行きわたせて

いる P.R. 活動の方法について、種々の示唆が与えられるのではないかと思考する。

4. なお、かりにニクソン政府が上記推測のごとく、何かアドバルーンをかがげさせる意図があつたとするならば、これら社説に対する読者の反応如何は、わが方にとつても大いに関心を寄せる必要があるところ、ヒューストン・ポスト社説に対しては、6月19日付往信第201号にてご報告のとおり賛成1、反対2の投書が同紙にかがげられたのみで、その賛成投書の趣旨も、必ずしもはっきりしたものでなく、^{また}シアトルにおいては長文の反対投書が一通にかがげられたのみ^{の趣}である。(シアトル榮大臣あて公信第329号) したがって、現在のところアドバルーンのみからみる限り、反響は低調であつたといいえようが、いずれにせよ反響如何

はわが方にとつても本件問題 P.R. 作戦上、参考とし得るのではないかと考える。

本信字送件先 在米各公館(除く田連)

ソカ
ヒレ 万博

大蔵省
事務次長
典房
長官
審議長
長
文書
長

総務
長
参事
長
参事
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長

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

274

総番号(TA) 28244 主管
 69年7月1日13時30分 ヒューストン 発 米北
 69年7月2日09時00分 本省 着

外務大臣殿 太田大使 臨時代理大使 (総領事) 代理

オキナワ問題 (報道関係対策)

ヤ99号 ロス電(3)

合第50号 略

大臣発米、ニューヨークあて電報米北一合第2410号に
関し

1. ワシントン発大臣あて電報第1959号及びロス発大臣あて電報第98号は、同様の社説がハースト系各紙に現われたのは、同社の編しゅう方針が、ナショナル・イシューの社説についてはニューヨークの論説委員の手によつて書かれ、それが各紙に流されるためであると報告されているところ、今回の社説がほとんど同時期に地方紙のみに掲げられながら、その後上記ロス電(3)の他のハースト系紙(いずれも東部)には、類々の社説が現われていないとするなら、これは単にぐうぜんとみるべきでなく、今回の動きは、中央政界からはなれた地方都市のみをねらつて意識的に行なわれたものでないか、そうだとすると、上記各電に指てきされるような単なるハースト社の内部事情によるということではすまされないはい後事情があるのではないかと、一応疑いたくなる。(シアトル 発大臣あて

秘

注意

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電信写

電報第60号は、この点なんらかの示きとなる。) 2. 上記ひ見はあくまで本官のおくそくであるが、冒頭往電による調査等の際、何らか参考のたしになれば、と考える。なお、本件おくそくの根拠については、米大あて電報第4号、本省あて往信第208号等をもつてしばしば申し述べたとおりである。

大臣、ロスアンゼルス、サンフランシスコ、シアトルへ
転電した。

-2- (3)

秘

(回覧番号) 1447 外務省電信案 (分類)

機密表示 (機密・秘の朱印)	符号表示 暗 略 平	※ 総第 3965 号 3063 号
漢	第 2410 号	昭和 44 年 7 月 1 日
	大至急 (至急・普通・LTF)	※ 20 55 発電係

大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官房長	主管 アメリカ局長 参事官 堀中 北米才一課	主管局部長 (室) 名 米北一 起案 昭和 44 年 7 月 1 日 有田 下 起案者 佐藤 電話番号 445 426
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協議先

- 情報文化局長
- 参事官 堀中
- 報道課長
- 海外広報課長

田中大作

米 下田 大使 臨時代理大使
在 東京 総領事 代理
あて 愛知 大臣 発

電 報
在 フィンランド, エアトル, ヒューストン
大使 臨時代理大使
総領事 代理 あて

件名
沖繩問題 (報道関係対策)
米米電才 1959 号に因り
今回のハースト系各社の社説は、その自体は
悪影響も与へるが、今後、
同種の動きは、米国内では、米国内世論対策上
好まらざることは、
好まらざることは、

1 166 済 192

を検討する必要がある。(1) 先ず = 3 - 3 - 7 社説
に於いて、ハースト系今回の社説を出力に至った
意図、背景及び今後の動きについて調査回電
ありたい。次に (2) 在米大及び = 3 - 3 - 7 社説の
協議の上、対策 (ハースト系の動きの4社が
反日的報道及び所説全般について) につき意見
を回電ありたい。(行方、当方としては、必要に応じて
往電情外才 840 号の報道関係者招待計画
にハースト系 (ハースト系人物を含む) 道を開いて
おこなうことと検討中につき、御参考まで。))
ワシントン、サンフランシスコ、シアトル、ローストン
に転電した。

(回覧番号 1388) 外務省電信案 (分類)

機密表示 (極秘・秘の朱印)	符号表示 暗 (略) 平	※ 総第 29663 号
秘 無期限	※ 第 1239 号	※ 昭和 44 年 6 月 26 日 10 時 55 分 発
	大至急・至急・普通・LTF	※ 発電係 極

大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官一房一長	主管 アメリカ局長 参事官 北米才一課長	主管局部課(室)名 アメリカ局北米才一課 起案 昭和44年6月26日 起案者 有地 電話番号 446
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協賛先
赤松 報告書
報道課長
海外広報課長

大使 臨時代理大使
在米 下田 総領事 代理
あて 愛知大臣 発

電報 在 大阪
D2-アジエス 高杉 大使 臨時代理大使
ヒ2-ストル 大田 総領事 代理
記事 田村

件名
沖縄問題関係論議の背景調査
(記事に付添資料317号)

口外通信 552号 及び ヒ2-ストル 通信 206
号に参照し。

6月12日付 Herald Examiner 紙
(D2) 社説 "Okinawa Surrender"
同日付 The Light 紙 (サン・アト=オ)

26 111
字 済

及6"同日付 POST Intelligencer
社説 "Okinawa Surrender?" と

2

の社説 "Surrender Okinawa?" は殆ど
同一内容であるところ、
その背景等については、
調査の結果回答あり。 (3)

D2/ヒ2-ストル 転電した。
シブキ

秘

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

かまえて議会議事録に載せるとの発言をして行くことは十分予想されることである。

ヒューストン、ロスアンゼルス、シアトルへ転電した。

(了)

高送長 痛外長 米保長 北米一課長

アメリカ局長

参事官

北米一課長


第237号

昭和44年7月8日

外務大臣殿

file
「沖+ワ」

在ビュ
太田 総領事



沖縄問題に関連する

当地方敵社談(報告)

6月30日付当地方敵 The Austin

American は、"The Question of Overseas Bases" と題して米国軍事基地保有の是非との関連で、沖縄返還問題を論じているのでその社談の要旨につき、参考までに

要処理
首席事務官
南力
渉外調査
公業
航空
種協力
連絡調整
調査
カナダ
局庶務



報告する。

記

沖縄は早晩日本に返還されるであろうが、その際同島基地は、核抜き条件で、引継ぎ米軍基地として残るようになるという種々のことは、大体日米両政府間の合意があるように、沖縄問題はワシントンにとっては、より根本的な課題を提起している。

今日が果して米軍海外基地の撤去を開始すべき時機であるかどうか？ あるいはワシントンに圧力をかけているか？ なくとも、範囲にわたる海外基地網を維持してゆくことが、米国にとって、最はや必要でなくなったか、もしくは不利にさえなつたためなのであるか。

米国は多数の海外基地を維持するに

年間約40ないし50億ドルと、その要員とし
 て百万の軍隊を必要とするが、かかる膨大な
 基地網の維持は、果して今日においても、三、三
 十年前と同様な實質的重要性を有するのである
 か？ 基地協定の改訂交渉の時期を待
 つよりは、政府は沖縄論争を契機として、全
 海外基地の全般的再吟味を行うことが可
 能であり、米国の安全上絶対必要にあらずと
 認められるものは、一刻も早くこれを解消せし
 むべきである。各基地の要不要をすみやかに
 決定せず、紛争の起るのを待つていても何
 等益するところはない。

本信を送付す米国。