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沖縄関係 外紙報道（在アジア、欧州等公館関係）

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ホンハイ総

報告書

アメリカ局長

参事官

北米第一課長


南西下課長

ボ第 401 号

昭和 44 年 6 月 5 日

外務大臣殿

在ボ人見総領



Weekly (経済・政治)誌の "Okinawa between Japan and US" と題する論評 (報道)

(要旨) 当地発行の 4 月 24 日付 Weekly (経済・政治)誌は、カバーに "Okinawa between Japan and the US" と題し、"米國は、軍事上の目的で沖縄の開發を進めた。日本は長い間、沖

要処理
首席事務官
南カ
渉外調査
洋業空
科学協力
通関調整
調査
加手
庶務



なわにおける米國の動きに対し寛容な態度を保持している。日米取極めの改定問題は、密接に基地の存続問題に関連してくる。米國は、取極めの全面的な改定は沖縄人を "ポットとほだし" にすると主張する。安保条約は、沖縄人の特別な要望に添えよう修正されなければならぬ。今後いろいろな逃げ口上や論争があろうが、米國がリュウキウをめぐり島から撤退する用意をしていないことは事実である。との論評を掲げている。御参考まで。

(本文) 本件の概要について本誌の一部添付の上、別紙のとおり報告申し上げます。なお 6 月 4 日付当地発行 the times

of India は、同紙フロン特派員電として、"ニフロン大統領の核武器抜きの中を返置決定"と題する記事を掲げているので、御参考まで同記事切抜き1葉添付申し上げる。

別紙添付

本信写送付先 付 (別添 weekly 誌略)

別紙

沖本

改米一課 仰中
貴課管ホニベイ報
401号 (旧管号1202)
a別添. 報進得ハシ
腹は万川ヲ以テハ 万進
ハハハ. 万平致ニハ
中. 深取リセ人.
情報文化局

沖本には、他
はない。

法的地位上、沖本人は日本人でもな
れば米国人でもないため、そこに微妙な愛
憎を生ずる。

共産主義を制しようとする米国のポリシー
メーカーとペンタゴンは、軍事上の目的で沖
本を巧みに使用する方法を推進した。

沖本は、米軍部隊のベテランとして開発
され、北越爆撃と同時に"枢軸"の役
割りを演ずることになった。クサンの戦
闘が最高時に達した時、B-52の24時
間定期出撃が行われ、基地の機装備

化が進展した。

米軍戦略家は、西太平洋におけるミサイル
 装備地帯の一環として沖永良に主要な役
 目を与えた。

沖永良におけるミサイル防衛装備化に対す
 る島民の政治的反応はどうだろうか？

極く最近まで、~~三~~島民の^(勢)姿勢~~に~~対する
 米國ホリシーメーカー達の考へ方は、極めて
 的はずれなものであつたし、また、不幸にも
 日本も同様であつた。長い間、日本は米
 國の動ミに対し、寛容な態度を保持し
 ている。日本政府は、島民の圧力に直面
 し、便宜的な“改善”策をとつた。それは
 基地周辺に在住島民の生活状態を
 正常化^{する}~~する~~というものであつた。

2. 日米取極の改定問題は、密接に基
 地の存続問題に関連してくる。日本自民
 党は、基地存続を希つてゐるが、反対
 党は、核抜きおよび基地撤廃を呼びか
 けてゐる。何等かの^(修正の)形で、基地の存続を
 希つてゐる自民党は、取極の全面的な
 改定は沖永良人を“ホテトとはなし”
 にさせることだ”と主張する米國のうしろ楯
 を演じた。佐藤政権は、島民のB-52
 の撤退要求およびストライキに対し、これを
 皮ふもでしぼりつけることを決めた。一方、
 在京オズボーン公使は、“沖永良にB-52
 を永久に駐めおくのはワシントン政策に
 はない”と確言するとともに“日本は撤退
 要求を行なう立場にはない”と附言した。

3. 基地の存続、撤退如何は、沖在わの
 経済に影響する問題である。自民党支持
 者の多くは、米軍駐留が島に利益をもた
 らず莫を指摘する。米國はバラ色の経済
 をえがき、沖在わのGNPは644百^(米)ドル、
 一人あたり国民所得は~~580~~580米ドルで高水準
 だと述べる。事実、米軍よりの収入は多
 が、この基地経済は、現在、危機に
 直面している。それは建設工事の完成
 ジェトナム調達の低下、最近のドル防衛
 に伴う米軍人^兵市民の個人支出の著減
 によるものである。

米國は、ある明白な理由で、限られた
 地域に集中的に道路、水道、電力
 等の建設工事を行なっているが、産業

拡張とか二次的産業の問題についての
 関心は極めて小さい。日本政府は、最近、
 "本土、沖在わの統合政策"の概要を発
 表した。それは基地依存経済の転換、
 経済構造の合理化および金融機構の
 統合である。

4. 核兵器保有の憲法上の問題に関し、
 佐藤首相は、憲法は"国民の保全"を
 維持するため、核兵器を禁止するもの
 であると述べ、かつ、政府はポアースマンは
 "日本は核兵器に対し何等の命令、統轄
 力を有せず、これと戦争放棄についての
 憲法第9条とは関係ないものである"と述
 べている。このJanusの如き政府の態度は、
~~憲法~~ ^{憲法} ~~第9条~~ ^{第9条} ~~を~~ ^を ~~無視~~ ^{無視}
 しているように見え、また、政府が沖在わ

6.

の核兵器の結局) ~~引き渡す~~ (に在る立場を沖本軍に移) ~~こと~~ ~~手に入~~ こと) 大うに見える。

これは、佐藤政権が米國の要求に賛同するものであつた。このような状態での返還なら、沖本軍の米軍基地の核兵器持込み、日本に事前協議をすることなく直接の戦闘行為のための基地利用に何んの影響も与へないであらう。

明らかに、安保条約は沖本軍の特別希望に在らうよう修正されなければならぬ。今後、いろいろを逃がし口上や論争があつても、米國が核攻撃をためて島が撤退する用意をしていふことは事實である。

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4-6-69

Times of India

U.S. WANTS TO TAKE NUCLEAR ARMS OUT OF OKINAWA

By M. V. KAMATH

"The Times of India" News Service

WASHINGTON, June 3.

PRESIDENT Nixon has decided to move the U. S. nuclear weapons out of Okinawa once an overall scheme for turning the island over to the Japanese has been agreed upon. "The New York Times" reported today.

The actual timing of their removal to other sites in the Pacific area, possibly Guam, would be subject to the terms of the plan, it added.

Japan wants the nuclear weapons removed from Okinawa and both that and the Ryukyu chain of islands returned to her by 1972.

The request was formally conveyed to Mr. Nixon yesterday by Japan's Foreign Minister, Mr. Kiichi Aichi, in a 40 minute talk with the President at the White House.

Mr. Aichi told the President that Japan would like American bases in Okinawa to function after 1972, but on the same basis as other U.S. bases in mainland Japan without, however, the present privilege of storing nuclear weapons on the islands.

HEAVY PRESSURE

This is not surprising considering that in 1968 alone American direct and indirect expenditure in the Ryukyu islands was 267 million dollars which becomes Japan's invisible income.

Under Article three of the 1952 Treaty of Peace, the U.S. has complete administrative authority over Okinawa.

But in 1962, President Kennedy proclaimed that he looked forward to the island's reversion to Japan "when the security interest of the free world will permit."

This was reaffirmed in 1967 by President Johnson, who agreed with the

Continued on Page 9 Column 5

Pentagon against Japanese demand

Continued from Page 1 Column 5

Japanese Prime Minister that both countries should keep the status of Ryukyu Islands under review, "guided by the aim of returning the rights of these islands to Japan."

Japan believes that the time has come to ask for Ryukyu Islands and to get the nuclear weapons out of them. If she fails, then the pro-American Sato Government is likely to fall and Japanese-U.S. relations themselves might be jeopardised.

Mr. Nixon is under heavy pressure from the Pentagon not to give in to Japan, but "The New York Times" reported that the President believes that sound long-term relations with Japan are more important than the military preference for retaining complete freedom of operation in Okinawa.

But Mr. Nixon has to win over the Senate to his side and here he may stumble against some trip wires. There is a strong feeling among some leading Senators that Japan cannot get its way and get free American protection as well in the bargain.

Their thinking is summed up by Virginia's Senator, Mr. Byrd, who told the Senate: "Our role as the defender of the East Asia has enabled Japan to avoid the burden of armament and concentrate on expanding and modernising its economy."

"If, by the act of granting Japan administrative control over Okinawa the U.S. can insure a multi-national defence structure in East Asia with increased participation by Japan and consequent relief to our heavy international responsibilities, I would support the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control. But this is not the case."

America, incidentally, has about one million armed forces in the Pacific area.

physical targets and achievements. Surely, a Press hand-out need not devote four of its five pages to administrative matters. What one expects is meaningful interpretation of statistics and an attempt to assess the impact of the plan schemes on the economic life of the division.

Four of the six districts in the division—Poona, Sangli, Sholapur and Kolhapur—are fairly industrialised. But official statistics throw little light on the changing pattern of industry and the role of the official machinery in bringing about this change; nor is there any inkling of the interrelation and interaction between agricultural and industrial activities.

The need for strengthening the economic departments both at the divisional and the district levels should be

JAPAN

Okinawa and the Homeland

BETWEEN Taiwan and the southernmost tip of Japan, there lies a cluster of islands called the Ryukyu Islands. The most important of these islands is Okinawa. Seen from the air, the water around the island is a bright blue-green and high cliffs reflect the gleaming sun. As one alights at Naha, the capital, one is faced with a sight familiar enough to East Asia: big hoardings advertise American products and the buildings stretch out like pill-boxes in a drab, uniform, grey whiteness. The air is hazy and one feels rather than hears the ominous shrill of distant jet engines, if one doesn't actually start at the whining shriek of an F-105 crashing through the sound barrier.

Okinawa is no quiet same-as-any-other island in the Pacific. Even as the mind is drawn back to contemplate the vicissitudes of its history over the past century, the eye is focused on the contemporary scenario: the controversy over its immediate political future.

Before the seventeenth century, the Ryukyu Islands were under the Sho dynasty and were virtually independent except for nominal vassalage to the Chinese. The king sent an annual tribute to the ruler of the Middle Kingdom and received an emissary at Shuri (then the capital city). Traditionally, on the installation of a new ruler, a written authorisation (*hosaku*) was obtained from the Chinese Emperor but apart from that, Chinese suzerainty was a polite formality.

evident from this. Without some awareness of the economic features of their areas the district administrations can hardly hope to influence their economic transformation. The Fourth Plan envisages a more advanced form of district planning in which all agencies, Governmental, co-operative, etc., as well as different departments of Government are expected to tackle the problem of district development in an integrated manner. The first step in this direction is obviously to get a clear idea of the economy of the respective districts. But the official authorities' performance in small savings and in recovery of Government dues mentioned above shows that integration is required as much in the basic approach of the authorities as in the administration of particular programmes.

In 1609, the Daimyo Shimazu of the Satsuma clan in Japan turned his eyes on this sleepy region and in a swift encounter subdued the Sho ruler, directly annexing the northern portion of the island cluster (Amami Gunto) but leaving the rest under the existing regime. Though Shimazu could well have incorporated the whole region under his direct control, he was afraid to provoke the Manchus, who had only recently poured their wrath on Hidéyoshi in Korea. The Satsuma Daimyo was ill-prepared to disturb the long record of vassalage to China and was, in any case, content merely to establish a sort of 'protectorate' over the area. There was an additional economic motivation for such an arrangement; under the newly promulgated laws of the Shogunate, issued as a result of the total ban on missionary activity in Japan, no direct trade with the foreign devils was permitted and for the Satsuma Shimazu the fact that Ryukyu was an independent kingdom served as a convenient cover for establishing indirect trade relations with the maritime powers.

With the Meiji restoration, all pretence of accepting Chinese overlordship over the islands was shed and the Ryukyu Islands were incorporated directly into the Japanese state as the Okinawa Prefecture (Okinawa-ken). The Nipponisation of the willing local population proceeded apace as the latter with alacrity adopted Japanese

styles of dress and other outward tokens of culture. Formal acceptance of this arrangement was also obtained from China in 1881 and Okinawa merged into the Japanese state, living in comparative anonymity right until the end of the Second World War.

The strategic significance of Okinawa for the Allied counter-offensive has been laboured upon by every writer of recent history. In 1945, the islands, rechristened the Ryukyu Islands, were put under a military government with a Governor, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the US Far-Eastern Forces, and a Deputy Governor (the actual ruler) who was the Commander of the US Ryukyu Forces. This set-up was modified in 1951, when the US Civil Administration for the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR) was set up. In 1957, by a US Presidential Order, the office of the Governor was abolished and that of a High Commissioner created in its place. For the rest, there was little change and this set-up, with some modifications, continues to the present. Below the High Commissioner, who is the overall authority, there is a legislature elected by universal suffrage, a Chief Executive who until last November was appointed by the High Commissioner and a judiciary. The rituals of government were performed by these three organs, but the substance of power rested with the USCAR, which had the right "to abrogate any law, regulation or order, it deems suitable", thereby giving it blanket powers over the elected bodies and the judiciary. The personification of USCAR was, of course, the High Commissioner who was personally appointed by the US Secretary of Defence and was generally a serving member of the US Armed Forces.

The above-mentioned blanket right is apparently drawn from Article 3 of the Peace Treaty between Japan and the US wherein it was agreed, *inter alia*, that "Japan will concur in any proposal of the US to the UN to place under its trusteeship with the US as sole authority, the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands" and that, pending this arrangement, the US had "any or all power" in the area. Clearly, the original intention was to place the whole area under the trusteeship system, but once Japan entered the UN as a sovereign nation, this became impossible as, under the Charter, no nation itself a member of the organisation could allow a part of its territory to be placed under the trusteeship of another member-nation. That the islands belonged to Japan do not seem to have been disputed. No

transfer of territorial sovereignty was made in Article 3. In the same Chapter (Chapter II) of the Treaty, Japan renounced all territorial claims to Korea, Taiwan, Kurile and Sakhalin (but the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands were specifically omitted).

And yet, strangely enough, within the islands, a curious situation developed. The political status of the Okinawan was peculiarly ambivalent, for he was neither a Japanese nor a US citizen, needing as he did, a USCAR permit to visit Japan and yet not having the freedom to migrate to the US. For the Japanese who had a 'yen' to get to Okinawa, there applied the curiously ironical procedure of applying for a visa to the US Embassy in Tokyo for entry into Okinawa. The question of legal appeals was similarly confused, no appeals could be preferred to the US Supreme Court, nor could Tokyo be approached.

INGENUOUS MILITARY PURPOSES

Having managed to keep the Okinawans so firmly within their grasp, the US promptly proceeded to use it for the ingenious military purposes devised by the policy-makers and the Pentagon to 'contain' communism. Starting off as a forwarding base, with somewhat rudimentary hostelry facilities, Okinawa has developed as the bearer of the largest troop contingent in the area outside Vietnam. As part of the earlier "flexible response" approach, all the four arms of the armed forces (army, navy, airforce and marines) were based in Okinawa with further special guerilla warfare training camps in the mountainous terrain at Kunigami and on the island of Iromote. One-half of the coral island of Ie Jima is currently requisitioned as airport, bombing ground, paratroop base and radar station. In 1965, the first B-52 strategic fighter-bomber was flown into Okinawa from Guam (ostensibly for fear of typhoon damage in Guam). By 1967, more than 35 of them had roosted on the islands. With the bombing of North Vietnam, Okinawa came to play a pivotal role and at the height of the Khe Sanh battle, B-52s made regular twelve-hour sorties, zooming over the island day in and day out. In addition, at Kadema, there was a squadron of F-105 fighters.

The progressive nuclearisation of the base has created additional tensions. From being merely a forwarding base, US military strategists have given Okinawa a role as a major link in the

chain of guided missile installations in the Western Pacific. US strategists like to talk of a "post-Vietnam, post-deterrent military strategy" whereby a single missile network will link the Aleutians, South Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines in one massive "defensive screen".

MISSILE DEFENCE

By a contemporary reckoning, there are 32 medium-range surface-to-surface Mace-B missiles with nuclear warheads, sited in four underground launch shelters in Okinawa; eight Nike-Hercules and several battalions of Hawk surface-to-air missiles. The newly improved Spartan class missile system is sought to be introduced into the islands and will supercede the Mace-Bs. These are being built in conjunction with long-range radar apparatus. The calculations, it is reiterated, are purely defensive. The Spartan missiles, it is maintained, will intercept any attacking missile at a great height in the atmosphere and are designed as an advance guard against missiles aimed at California or targets further inside the American continent. (Apparently, such advance interception in the event of a surprise attack will obviate the need for Californians to depend on its Sprint missiles which operate at lower altitudes and consequently pose radioactive hazards. The radioactivity resulting from the use of the Spartan missiles in the Okinawa area is considered minimal.)

To consider some of the effects of the US military presence on the island. At present, 15 per cent of the island's total land area has been appropriated for a network of organically linked bases. The biggest of these at Kadema is in the centre of the island and is built on choice farmland. Okinawans complain that this affects their main crop - sugarcane. The establishment of a base gives, in effect if not formally, US military and civil personnel extra-territorial rights. Crimes and even traffic offences and accidents are dealt with by the military authorities separately. An oft-quoted incident relates to the driver of a US army vehicle who ran over a girl and without stopping rushed to the base where he reported the accident. The driver of the vehicle was let off and his action condoned as being "in the line of duty". A far more important issue and one which causes the most critical concern today relates to radioactivity hazards. In May 1967 radioactive cobalt 60 was detected

in the waters around Naha after the visit of the US nuclear ship 'Swordfish'. The recent explosion (in November last) of a B-52 at Kadema touched off a wave of protests and demonstrations which have been a source of acute embarrassment both to Japan and to the US.

What have been the political reactions of the Okinawans themselves? Until quite recently, it was considered quite irrelevant by policy-makers in the US and, unfortunately, in Japan as well, to concern themselves with the attitudes of the Okinawans. The Japanese government had, for a long time, remained tolerant of US activities. When faced with excessive pressure from the islanders, or in Japan, they very conveniently adopted the policy of 'amelioration', which meant primarily normalisation of the life-situations of the people who lived near the bases (e.g. sound-proof school rooms to prevent too much disturbance by the sonic booms of planes). Indigenous opinion has been vehement but, until recently, quite infructuous. It was the prospect of the revision of the US-Japan Treaty which has put the whole issue of Okinawa into the melting pot and has given the required impetus to the indigenous movement for political change and the reversion of the island to Japan. The backbone of the reversion movement has been the Okinawa Teachers' Association.

DESIRE FOR UNION

That the Okinawans broadly favour political union with Japan is obvious. This is so, in spite of discernible differences in the culture and language of the two peoples. (The Japanese claim that the Okinawan tongue bears the closest grammatical and etymological relation to Japanese.) Almost every public opinion poll conducted reflects this desire for union. But how close is this prospect of political union? The American position was for a long time reflected in the attitude of the former High Commissioner, General F T Unger, who is reported to have said in private that Okinawa would be returned to Japan only over his dead body. Significantly, he was replaced not long afterwards.

The problem of reversion was closely connected with the question of the continuance of military bases. The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan was willing to allow the maintenance of bases but opposition parties have called for a "nuclear-free, base-free" re-

version. This is largely the Socialist and Communist programme for 1970. The Democratic and Komeito (Buddhist Clean Government) parties favour abolition of the bases in stages but are generally associated with the opposition viewpoint.

Prime Minister Sato's own position has been extremely ambivalent, if not deliberately equivocal. He has often been criticised for his continued acquiescence in the US presence. Even the concession (never quite clarified and not yet accepted by the US) that "US bases in Okinawa will be of the same status as bases in Japan" is considered a sop. Sato is professedly "staking his political life" on "grappling with the Okinawa return problem and our nation's security". In the face of continued agitation against the stationing of US B-52 bombers at Kadema, the Japanese government has said: "Although we believe that the purpose is their deterrent power, it is a fact that the movement of the B-52s is arousing anxieties among the Okinawan people". It is not without justification that the *Asahi Evening News* says "... the Prime Minister has stuck to his political stand of not saying things frankly to the US but taking a strong stand towards the people".

TRIAL OF STRENGTH.

A trial of strength between the LDP and the opposition parties came last November when Sato and Aichi as well as opposition party leaders staked their prestige on the elections to the office of the Chief Executive in Okinawa. In fact the leader of the Socialist Party, Tomoni Narita, considered the November election a "test case". The LDP campaigning for the continuance of the bases in some modified form played up the economic advantage of US military presence saying that a full reversion of the island would result in Okinawans "living on potato and walking barefoot". The opposition parties, however, called for the "abolition of 23 years of control by a foreign race and by conservatives". The LDP candidate Junji Nishime, the then Mayor of Naha, was pitted against a widely respected school teacher, Chobyu Yara, who was President of the Okinawa Teachers' Association and received the broad support of the leftist and 'progressive' groups.

In the voting, out of a total electorate of around 500,000, Yara was able to win by a comfortable margin of 30,000 votes. That the election result

was a stinging defeat for the LDP was undeniable. It was inevitable that Sato would have to reconsider his "wait and see" policy over Okinawa.

Early in December last year, Yara visited Tokyo to discuss with Prime Minister Sato steps for the implementation of his basic policy. The time was not unpropitious for a through-going review by Sato of his Okinawa policy. Politically he had recovered from the November upset in Okinawa, and he had firmly re-established his hold within the LDP by being re-elected president of the party. Yet he seemed at best to be quibbling when he announced a break from his previous stand and his acceptance of the policy of "no nuclear weapons but their free use" which was to be the burden of his position when he met the US President in the fall of 1969. Okinawans wanted "immediate, unconditional and complete" return to Japan.

As if to reassure the more vocal elements in Okinawa of his commitment to eventual absorption, late in December last year Sato sent a request to the Diet asking that necessary legislative steps be drawn up in order to permit Okinawan participation in the Diet. The party was asked to draft a suitable bill. On his side Yara called for a clearer definition of what the Prime Minister meant by "same status" in his references to US military presence in Okinawa and Japan. It was not clear whether the size and number of bases in Okinawa would be reduced or maintained at the existing level.

RETENTION OF B-52s

Hostility towards US military installations remained at a high pitch. The most persistent target recently has been the continued retention in Okinawa of the B-52s. Matters reached a head in January and a Joint Struggle Committee consisting of various 'progressive' elements decided to launch a massive general strike on February 4 to demand the withdrawal of B-52s from the island and the suspension of calls in Okinawa ports by US nuclear submarines. The Sato government was determined to put a leash upon such drastic activities and in a series of parleys got Yara to talk to the JSC leaders and to have the strike called off. For a while it looked as if the militants within the JSC would carry the day. On their part the US, through Minister David Osborne in Tokyo, affirmed "Washington's policy of not stationing B-52s permanently in Okinawa".

But Osborne went on to say: "Japan is not in a position to demand their withdrawal". An outright clash was prevented as Yara's moderate counsel was heeded, albeit unwillingly, and in place of a general strike, a huge rally and sit-down demonstration was staged at Kadema. As a *quid pro quo*, Yara sought guarantees from Sato and Aichi of an early withdrawal of the bombers. The latter promised "successive diplomatic efforts toward the solution of this problem". Sato declared "I have gained the impression that the B-52s may be withdrawn around June or July".

While Yara's own acquiescence in the face of pressure has come in for much criticism from the more militant quarters in Okinawa, it is realised that if the strike had been held, it would have been used as a pretext to shift the blame for US unresponsiveness to Yara. The LDP would however be wrong to suppose that the Chief Executive has lost his hold with his supporters.

DEPENDENCE ON US SPENDING

It seems almost inevitable that before the year is out the future of Okinawa will be decided and its eventual union with Japan settled, if not actually consummated. But the questions which remain relate to the continued existence of the US military bases there and to the effects upon the economy of their withdrawal. Most LDP supporters point out to the beneficial effects of the US presence in the island. US itself paints a somewhat rosy picture of the economic situation and says that the GNP is \$644 million and the per capita income \$580, one of the highest in the area. The Planning Department of the Ryukyu government has maintained that right from 1961 through to 1968 the economy has been growing at a steady annual rate of 15.3 per cent, though forecasts for fiscal year 1969 are decidedly gloomy (the rate of growth not being expected to exceed 8.5 per cent). How much the economy depends on US spending can be gauged from the fact that foreign trade figures for 1968 show imports of \$325 million against exports of \$87 million. The funds which fill the gap are receipts by enterprises connected with US forces. By a rough reckoning, the number of people who depend on the "base economy" including businesses which depend on money spent by US personnel (services, wholesale and retail stores and construction) comes to more

han 100,000 which is 25 per cent of the population and their income amounts to over \$200 million, which is 60 per cent of total internal revenue. Okinawa does not have a central bank (due to its dollar economy), and there is no way of getting the funds it requires for development outside of a favourable balance of trade. Even this 'base economy' now faces a crisis. The reasons for this are: the completion of construction works, the drop in spot procurement for Vietnam and the drastic reduction in personal spending by US military and civil personnel as a result of the recent dollar defence measures.

The US has, for obvious reasons, concentrated on selected infrastructural areas: roads, waterways and power, with very little emphasis on industrial expansion or secondary industry. The Japanese government has only recently outlined a "policy for the integration of the Homeland and Okinawa" which envisages the replacement of the base-dependent economy, rationalisation of the structure of the economy and the integration of the financial system. Labour relations provide yet another

bone of contention. The comprehensive Labour Relations Ordinance provides for the indirect hiring of labour for military purposes and the application of military law to these persons permitting the apprehension of persons for any action which contains the "danger of creating misunderstanding". There are certain blanket bans which extend to members of the public too. The Okinawans want a complete retraction of the Ordinance while the Japanese government has stuck to the more realistic objective of obtaining its substantial revision.

US NOT READY TO LEAVE

As to the constitutional problem of the retention of nuclear weapons of the Maco-B or Spartan variety, Sato maintains that the Constitution does not prohibit nuclear weapons for maintaining "the existence and safety of the people". On another hand, a government spokesman states that "weapons over which Japan has no command and control have nothing to do with the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Constitution". This Janus-like official position seems intriguing and hardly

clarifies the position which government would eventually take on Okinawa's nuclear role. It would seem, however, that Sato may give in to US demands and while the handing over of the island to Japan will be effected, such transfer will not affect either the induction of nuclear weapons into the US bases in Okinawa or the utilisation of these bases for direct combat action without prior consultations with Japan. Obviously, the Security Treaty will have to be modified to suit the peculiar requirements in respect of Okinawa. (Bases in Okinawa will not, therefore, be on par with those in Japan.)


Indications of such an outcome seem to be coming. In April, after the first deep probing talks by Foreign Minister Aichi and Defence Agency Director-General Arita, it was admitted that "Even after the return of Okinawa, the US Air Force will handle the greater part of the air defence of the island chain". Undoubtedly, there will be more quibbling and disputation, but the fact is that the US is not yet ready to pack up its rucksack and leave the island for good.

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