

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

## 沖縄関係 外紙報道（在アジア、欧州等公館関係）

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英国大

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ロンドン 3月7日 118発  
本 有 3月9日 2031着  
小坂大佐 大野大佐

デーリー・エクスプレス紙記事題会の件  
才233号 (至急)  
貴府才159号に有し。

5月デーリー・エクスプレス社誌<sup>該</sup>部  
分全文次の通りである。なおこの種論文は  
同紙特有の英國第一主義の現れであり、他  
にこれを支持するものは現れていない。

TRY OKINAWA

THE AMERICANS ARE RIGHT TO RESUME TESTS OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS. THEY DARE NOT LAG BEHIND RUSSIA WHEN THE

PEACE OF THE WORLD DEPENDS ON THE BALANCE OF POWER.

BUT WHY SHOULD THEY BE ALLOWED THE USE OF BRITISH\*

OWNED CHRISTMAS ISLAND? THE AMERICANS HAVE PLENTY

次  
川

OF BASES OF THEIR OWN IN THE PACIFIC. WHAT ABOUT  
WAKE OR MIDWAY OR OKINAWA? WHY DON'T THEY USE  
OF THESE? BRITISH TERRITORY SHOULD ONLY BE USED  
FOR BRITISH PURPOSES.

(了)

配布先 次長外務省長 米政国情 局長  
軍務参謀 参謀 参謀 参謀 参謀 参謀  
国政科 指道

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

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|-------------|--|---------------------|
| 大政事外外官      | 総番号 (I A) 8979   | 主管                  |
| 務務房         | 67年12月7日17時40分   | 発着                  |
| 次次          | 67年12月8日03時40分   | 本省                  |
| 臣官官審審長      | 外務大臣殿  | 島(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理 |
| (人) 計会 便    | わが国の核武装に関する新聞報道  |                     |
| (文) 電領 放    | 第1633号 平   |                     |
| (国) 参 給 厚   | 7日付タイムズ、デーリーテレグラフ両紙はオキナワ返かんにともなうわが国の国防問題につき要旨次の通り報道している。御参考まで(記事空送)  |                     |
| (ア) 北東      | 1. 「日本は核つきのオキナワを手に入れるか」(ストック特派員)   |                     |
| (長) 総中 西    | この2週間来サト一総理は国民に国防意識の高ようをよびかける発言をくり返し行なっているが、同総理のねらいは核兵器問題について世論と対決せんとするにある。より具体的にいえば、サト一総理とジョンソン大統領との間にオキナワを核つきで、しかも米国の核管理のもとで返かんする計画につき1970年央に合意するというラインで極秘または暗もくの了解ができていて、総理はこれを實現しよう政治的空気を変えんとしているのである。 |                     |
| (北) 米 北     | 2. 「日本核武装の水ぎわに」(カリソン通信員)   |                     |
| (中) 参 南     | 中共の核ミサイルの開発とこれによるアジア諸国きよう迫の可能性に関するきびしい認識が基礎となつて、サト一総理とジョンソン大統領の間に、オキナワ返かんの際にも米   |                     |
| (長) 中 住     |  |                     |
| (欣) 参 委     |  |                     |
| (長) 西 原     |  |                     |
| (近) 近       |  |                     |
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電信写

国はオキナワに核基地を保有し、しかも核の引きがねは米側だけが持つという暗もくの了解が成立した。オガサワラ返かんからオキナワ返かんまでのタイムテーブルはサト一総理が国民に再軍備を売りとむまでの時間かせぎの一つの方法である。米側にしても、弱い東京を中共の原子力のきょういにさらしたくなければ、いずれは日本を核保有国になるよう推し進めるほかないであろう。

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| 大臣    | 主管                  | 起案      | 昭和42年12月18日  |
| 政務次官  | 北米局長                |         |              |
| 事務次官  | 参事官                 |         |              |
| 外務審議官 | 北米課長                | 起案者     | 吉川 電話番号 445  |
| 官房長   | 主任                  |         |              |
| 受信者   | 総理府特別地域連絡局長         | 発信者     | 北米局長         |
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| 外務省北米局長  |
| 北米国の核武装に関する新聞報道について<br>本件に関し、下記来信写2部を別添のとおり送付します。<br>なお、別添のうちの1部は、在那覇南方連絡事務所あて転送ねがいます。 |
| 記<br>12月8日付在英大使館外務大臣米2公信第3566号   |
| 付属添付   |

GA 6 外務省

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北米局長

森 市 官

北米局長


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第3566号

昭和42年12月8日

外務大臣殿

在 英 大 使 館



中加國の核武装に關する

新聞報道(記事送付)

[Redacted]

12月7日付の夕報に、于て「一、七、三、七」因

紙の、本件關係記事、別添送付申上り了。

付録送付

公 信 案  
商 標 案

在外公館

# Japan on Nuclear Brink

By A. E. CULLISON

**B**ECAUSE of the distinct possibility that China eventually will use her modest but growing nuclear power to blackmail all Asia, Japan opposes the proposed nuclear non-proliferation treaty, as a rigid agreement which might prohibit her from ever becoming a nuclear Power.

This is also why, according to informed sources here, the Japanese Government agreed with President Johnson in Washington in mid-November that Japan will take no steps to limit the capability of America's powerful nuclear base on Okinawa, which must remain an effective deterrent.

Authoritative Intelligence reports in Tokyo disclose that China already has intermediate-range ballistic missiles with ranges up to 950 miles and is well on her way to developing inter-continental ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads able to strike any target in the Far East.

It is expected that she will test her first ICBMs some time in the next four to six months, bringing the day when Peking can be considered a full-fledged nuclear Power much closer.

This grim realisation, it is pointed out, was the basis for the tacit understanding between the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Sato, and President Johnson last month that, even when Okinawa is returned to Japan (probably in the mid-1970s), the United States will retain the controversial bases intact and maintain her "single finger" on the nuclear trigger.

Both Japanese and American Governments realise that Japan—

too long neglecting her armaments—must soon assume larger responsibilities for the defence of North-East Asia, relieving American forces of the burdens entailed. But it is generally acknowledged here and in Washington that Mr. Sato needs much more time to prepare his nation to accept full rearmament, and that 1970, when the present Japan-United States security treaty must be reconsidered, is a key year.

The American President has promised to return the Bonin islands and to set a date for the return of Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands within the next three years, mainly as a way of buying time for Mr. Sato to sell rearmament to his people. He faces the problem of convincing his many critics that China is not rushing to build nuclear capability for any other purpose than to upset the balance of power in Asia.

Japan is no longer standing still. The new five-year defence programme now under way calls for expenditure of £2,340 million and includes manufacture of Nike and Hawk missiles to be placed around the nation's major cities and industrial areas, plus construction of a fleet which will make Japan the third strongest naval Power in Asia today.

How does this new policy of encouraging the Japanese to rebuild their military power—based on eventual nuclear capability—now strike Washington planners? "Unfortunately," said informed sources here, "the United States has no other alternative but to push Japan toward eventually becoming a thermo-nuclear Power. The alternative is to expose a weak Tokyo to Chinese atomic blackmail."



Sato and Johnson in Washington: tacit understanding on the basis of grim facts about Chinese nuclear power.

# Will Japanese secure a nuclear Okinawa?

FROM HENRY STOKES

TOKYO, DEC. 6

A series of unprecedented statements have been made on defence policy by Japanese leaders in the past two weeks, vague as they may sound.

Since his return from the United States, where he had talks with President Johnson, Mr. Eisaku Sato, the Prime Minister, has repeatedly called for a greater consciousness of defence issues in Japan. At the opening of a new session of Parliament he called on the people to show "determination and pride to defend their nation".

## Educating public

One senior Japanese minister recently put it to me like this: "The Prime Minister is basically trying to educate public opinion." This Minister's implied attitude was that there was a great gulf between the Government and public opinion on defence issues, with the right-wing leaders of Japan now doing their utmost to bring home to the people the idea that Japan cannot indefinitely rely on the United States deterrent to protect her from, for example, China.

Japan's basic dilemma is this. In the past ten years she has built up an unexpectedly strong economic position, and is now rated the third industrial nation in the world, after the United States and Russia. But her power is barely commensurate with this success. At least one of the main reasons for this has been the deliberate restriction of defence

spending to a mere one per cent of national income, roughly one-fifth of the British level.

Now the question is: should Japan attempt to elevate her status in the world by going at least part of the way toward matching her economic strength with a military counterpart? On the one hand this would be a logical move, liable to strengthen Japanese bargaining power in Washington (which has consistently pressed for more Japanese defence spending). But, at the same time, bigger defence efforts might rouse fears in south-east Asia.

## Military strength

There are great difficulties at home, too. Hitherto the Japanese public has been strongly opposed to defence spending. Only last year an opinion poll showed that roughly half the people thought, or suspected, that establishment of the Japanese defence forces (now numbering over 250,000 men) constituted some kind of breach of the famous Article Nine of the Japanese constitution—which includes the statement "Land, sea and air forces will never be maintained". Public opinion is changing, it is true, and the press is much less radical than in the past. But will the Japanese public accept a really big change in defence policy?

Thus the question comes back again: what specific shifts of policy is Mr. Sato aiming at? The major foreign policy issue for Japan this year has been the future of Okinawa, and it is here that one may find a clue to Mr. Sato's aims. Okinawa, perhaps the chief United States base in the Far East, is still administered by the United States military,

although it is agreed that Japan has "residual sovereignty" over the island. Mr. Sato has staked his political life on obtaining United States agreement on a timetable for the return of Okinawa within "two to three years".

The snag is that there are important nuclear installations on Okinawa. They constitute the most potent "free world" deterrent to China. But Japan has so far been very reluctant—in spite of China's acquisition of nuclear weapons—to have anything to do with United States nuclear arms. Memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are still very much alive. To such an extent has Japanese feeling on this issue prevailed that, even until very recently, visits by United States nuclear powered submarines to Japan were a first-class political issue.

## Bases intact

Mr. Sato's specific aim, it has very recently become apparent, is to meet public opinion head on regarding the issue of nuclear weapons. He intends in fact to create a change in political opinion here sufficient to permit the return of Okinawa with the United States nuclear bases intact. There is now evidence to show that President Johnson and Mr. Sato reached a secret or "tacit" agreement that the timetable for the return of Okinawa to Japan would be fixed by about mid-1970, provided that the nuclear bases could stay—and remain under sole American control.

This tacit understanding, then, is the key to the present debate on defence policy in Japan.

Daily Telegraph

Dec. 7, 1967

The Times

Dec. 7, 1967

報告書  
 報道  
 海外  
 アメリカ局長  
 参事官  
 北米一課長

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
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第916号

昭和44年3月18日

外務大臣殿

在 湯 英 川 大 使



沖縄に関するBBC番組  
 の様子を添付

2月10日 BBC 第1夜ニュース"シリーズ"  
 番組 Panorama の中で、クソノ米大統領  
 演説が画面に映る際、防衛外交問題として  
 欧州防衛問題と併せて、沖縄問題  
 として上げ放映された。今度の

- 頭処理
- 首席事務官
- 南
- 海外調査
- 浄業
- 飛空
- 科学協力
- 建調
- 調査
- 力夕夕
- 局庶務

44.3.22  
 44.3.22

三才を入手して、何事か資料  
 に整理送付申上げます。

本番組は BBC が時事問題  
 解説のため、毎週一回放送しているもの  
 であり、沖縄問題について、これを各観  
 衆の解説、問題点を紹介していることである  
 が、この中で、Lampert 米高年事務官が、  
 米側は、沖縄~~軍~~に対して、極東の安全  
 保障という観点から、一義的~~な~~責任を  
 負っており、それにあわせて住民の  
 生活発展、社会福祉を回るとして責任  
 として負っている旨、明言していることが  
 注目される。

付属 添付



PANORAMA 10.2.69:

-8-

HEALEY: I'm afraid any Defence Minister in any country comes under pressure to cut expenditure on defence and it makes it a very painful job and not a very popular one to be a Defence Minister but I've been very encouraged by what I've read of Mr. Nixon's views on this. He has said he intends to give a greater priority to NATO than the previous administration did and I think he's demonstrated that he's serious by going to NATO first when he starts his tour of the European countries so that although I've no doubt he'll come under pressure I think that there's a good chance he will try to control it and I think if the European countries show they're prepared to work together in this area they can help him to control it.

CHARLTON: On the other hand, with the likelihood that, as the super powers have a dialogue that's meaningful only to each other in terms of their relative strength and the pressures Mr. Nixon faces, do you feel it's wise for Europe to base its future policies on the assumption that American troops will stay in the same numbers in future?

HEALEY: Well I think it's a very much more sensible way of basing policy than your assumption that one of the European statesman has that America should be persuaded to get out as fast as possible, because this would both enormously reduce our security and involve us in great increases in defence expenditure and I don't think there's much sense in that.

CHARLTON: Mr. Healey, can I ask you finally, there's been a good deal of speculation about your personal position recently in the Government and some of that speculation says that Mr. Wilson may have to replace you as Minister of Defence.

HEALEY: I suppose you're referring to these stories that I might be going, as THE DAILY EXPRESS said, to Oxford or, as other papers have said to be Secretary General of NATO. Well let me tell you that I'm a pretty active British politician. I like politics and I intend to stay in it and, as far as the NATO job's concerned, there is a very good Secretary-General of NATO now called Signor Brosio and I hope he stays Secretary-General for a very long time.

CHARLTON: Do you rule out the possibility that you might become Secretary-General of NATO?

HEALEY: I do for the reason I have given.

CHARLTON: Mr. Healey, thank you.

HEALEY: Thank you.

D&Y: And now to the Far East, to another question of defence and diplomacy which confronts the new President of the United States. It concerns the island of Okinawa, the key American base which lies south of Japan within easy reach of Communist China. It's an operational centre for America's Far Eastern and Vietnam strategy. Legally, Okinawa is Japanese territory but ever since the war the Americans have had control of it, under a Treaty, and have built it into a major American base, reportedly with nuclear weapons. Now in Japan and in Okinawa itself, pressure for the return of the island to the Japanese has been mounting. How long can America resist this pressure. Julian Pettifer reports from Okinawa. (BACKGROUND)

BBB

PANORAMA 10.2.69:

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PETTIFER: Heavy with bombs, a huge US Air Force B.52 Strato Fortress lumbers into the stormy skies over Okinawa. For American servicemen it's the visible evidence of the direct support they're giving to their comrades in Vietnam. But for the native islanders of Okinawa, the departure of that aircraft is an outrage. Beyond the airport gates, they've gathered in the rain to protest the stationing of B.52s on their island. For them, the eight-engined bombers have become a symbol, a reminder that since US Marines captured Okinawa from the Japanese at the end of World War Two, they've been to all intents and purposes under American Colonial rule, that for twenty-three years their homeland has been not only a colony but a staging post for war. (BACKGROUND)

The sprawling military airport is just part of a huge complex of Okinawan bases that now support the half-million American troops in Vietnam. Every day of the year, one-hundred transport planes take off and land. Every month, seventy-thousand Servicemen disembark en route between the United States and the battlefields of Vietnam. (BACKGROUND) But these are only the transients, the week-end guests on Okinawa. Permanently based on the island are a further eighty-thousand Servicemen manning the top secret radar installations, the docks and harbours and fighter squadrons and guarding the nuclear weapons that no-one admits but everyone believes are stored here. For Okinawa is regarded by the Pentagon as the key-stone, not only to the Vietnam campaign but to the long-term Asian strategy, the containment of Communist China.

In a couple of days, the Marines have shed the dust of battle and soon, back home, they'll have little but their medals to remind them of the distant war. In Okinawa, the conflict is less easily forgotten. Apart from its garrison, this island is the US military storeroom of the Pacific. From headquarters Second Logistical Command, millions of tons of supplies are routed onwards to Vietnam, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. On the same five-thousand acre base, is the vehicle graveyard -- last resting place for thousands of Vietnam casualties. Each truck carries a printed sign, a certificate that it's been inspected and found free of gasoline, explosives and putrefied flesh. A comfort no doubt for the Okinawans who work here, dismembering the remains.

The war business has become the foundation of the Okinawan economy. More than fifty thousand local people are employed on the US bases, to mind the military machine and to clear up the wreckage it so unflinchingly produces. As if the Okinawans hadn't reminders enough of the fruits of war. Their whole island is a graveyard. Locally this is known as "Suicide Leap". From this rock in June 1945, two Japanese Generals fell to their death. Their suicide was an acknowledgment that after eighty days of bitter fighting US Marines had finally captured Okinawa, the most strongly fortified of all the islands of Japan. (BACKGROUND) The price of the US victory was staggering. Forty memorials scattered throughout the island honour the dead. Fifty-thousand Americans, one-hundred-and-ten-thousand Japanese defenders and two-hundred-thousand Okinawan civilians killed. The local population -- one in eight -- died and the island was utterly devastated. And yet, since that grizzly battle, Okinawans have had to live with the fact of war. To see their homeland turned once again into an armed stronghold. (BACKGROUND) For twenty-three years they have quietly acquiesced, until the B.52s arrived, following the Pueblo crisis twelve months ago, the nuclear bombers were flown in and the United

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PANORAMA 10.2.69:

-10-

States will fix no date for their departure. That was the final straw. The protest began. (BACKGROUND) But this particular demonstration is not against the United States, but against their own Government. Last year, for the first time since the occupation, Okinawans were allowed to choose their own political leaders. The victorious candidate was elected on a platform that promised to press for the immediate departure of the B.52s, dismantling of US bases and reversion to Japanese rule. (BACKGROUND)

The students sitting in outside the Government building, feel they've been betrayed. The general strike called to protest the B52s was cancelled when pressures were applied to the Okinawans in power because the truth is that Okinawans elected though they may have no real power. (BACKGROUND) This is the man who rules Okinawa -- General James B. Lampert, the United States High Commissioner. He governs on behalf of the Pentagon, and he's the latest in the long line of Colonial-style military Governors, with the ultimate power over civilians and military alike. General Lampert has only been here a week but he's demonstrated his sense of priorities by visiting every military installation on the island. To-day it's the turn of the special forces -- that somehow sinister body of men whose duties often involve a special relationship with the CIA. To-day, they're out to impress General Lampert with their special skill of searching a Viet Cong village. (BACKGROUND)

Okinawans have long complained that the barrack-room types sent to rule them always put military interests first, that civilian affairs always take second place. It seems that the new High Commissioner shares that sense of priorities.

JEN. LAMPERT: We are here, the United States military are here on Okinawa with our military bases because of our security commitments to the free nations in this part of the world and most specifically because of our commitments to Japan which is our ally. We have here military forces which are related to those security commitments. The military importance of Okinawa is obvious to people who give consideration to it. From here, we can deploy military forces quickly and effectively to meet whatever requirements may be placed upon us. Okinawa possesses unique geographical advantages from the military standpoint and gives us a particularly fine location to honour and to maintain our readiness to meet these security commitments to which I have referred, along with of course our military posture here goes the other side of our responsibilities and particularly of my responsibility in the position of High Commissioner and that is to work in every way we can to contribute to the continued progress in the economic fields, in the social fields, of the people ..... this progress which is dramatically evident to us who arrive here and look around.

PETTIFER: The new High Commissioner has said that his responsibility here is first of all to retain the bases as effective bases and secondly he says he has a responsibility for the welfare of Okinawans. Now do you think that these two aims are compatible?

DR. MIKIO HIGA: No I think the majority or predominant majority of Okinawan people believe they are not ... these two missions are expounded by the High Commissioner are not compatible, they are like oil and water and Okinawans believe that the US military authorities have always placed priority on security interests rather than welfare of the Okinawan people and the welfare of the Okinawan people are considered a secondary to the first objective.

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PANORAMA 10.2.69;

-11-

PETTIFER: The United States has agreed in principle that Okinawa should revert to Japan eventually. The question is -- when? How urgent is it do you think that this matter should be settled quickly?

HIGA: Yes I think it's a very urgent problem because the Okinawans believe that the longer they are under US occupation the more difficult it would be to readjust or to become to establish identity as a Japanese.

PETTIFER: The United States Government still feels that Okinawa is vitally important in its Pacific defence system, would Okinawans agree that sovereignty should be returned to Japan but United States should retain the bases here?

HIGA: From the standpoint of Okinawans, they would insist that the administrative rights over Okinawa should be returned to Japan immediately and the bases in Okinawa should be like those existing in a Japan proper. In other words, Okinawans would not accept nuclear bases here in Okinawa. (BACKGROUND)

PETTIFER: Running the length of Okinawa is Highway Number One, a constant reminder that on this island military interests certainly come first. Built and maintained by the United States to connect the military bases, it's the only main road on the island and consequently jammed with traffic. Flanking this monument to twenty years of American rule is an urban wasteland, a seedy, unplanned jungle of concrete and clapboard and unmade roads. This is the booming economy Americans boast of. It's true that the scores of cabarets and pawn shops have helped to quadruple the islander's income in the past fifteen years, but, despite the GI dollars, they remain much poorer than their cousins in Japan and bars and bottles are hardly a firm foundation for any economy. But, for most Okinawans, money is not the issue. It's not by chance that their resentment has fastened on the B.52.

Every Okinawan child is indoctrinated against the American bombers. This lesson is a recent addition to regular peace courses, modelled on those used in Japanese schools. Every child is taught that Okinawa was part of Japan and if there's to be peace it must become so again. Reversion is the gut issue. American attempts to foster an Okinawan Independence Movement have utterly failed. Those children speak Japanese, think Japanese and are being taught to share post-war Japanese pacifism. (BACKGROUND)

Can you ask him if he knows what a B52 is?

TEACHER: Yes sir. (JAPANESE) He said a B52 is a plane, American plane that was built for the purpose of war. He thinks that these B52s should not be on the island.

PETTIFER: Ask him if he's afraid of the B52s.

TEACHER: (JAPANESE) He says yes.

PETTIFER: Why is he afraid of them?

TEACHER: (JAPANESE) He said the B52 is a bomber which seems to be loading nuclear weapons. So there is a great possibility of getting an explosion. That's why he is afraid of B.52s.

BBB

PETTIFER:

Ask him if he saw the demonstration yesterday.

TEACHER:

(IN JAPANESE) He says yes.

PETTIFER:

Did he know what it was about?

TEACHER:

(IN JAPANESE) The demonstration was staged to unite every people on this island to protect the Allies.

PETTIFER:

Ask him what nationality he is.

TEACHER:

That's right. (BACKGROUND) (IN JAPANESE) He says he thinks himself Japanese

PETTIFER:

The United States agrees in principle that Okinawa is part of Japan and that reunification should take place some time. These Okinawans are tired of waiting and so are their supporters in Japan. This recent protest march was backed up by similar demonstrations in thirty-four Japanese cities. (BACKGROUND) Bending to public pressure, the Japanese Government has announced that later this year President Nixon will be asked to set a firm date for unification. (BACKGROUND) But what of the US bases? The Pentagon wants to retain full freedom of operation as well as the nuclear role. But both in Okinawa and Japan, this huge cry is designed precisely to bring the bases under the same security restrictions the government US installations in Japan. And that means no nuclear weapons and no support operation for Vietnam. Under those conditions, the United States might just pull out altogether and the Japanese Government which for twenty years has nestled under the US defence umbrella, would have to decide whether or not to rearm and start defending itself. What happens in Okinawa will have a profound effect on future defence postures in Asia. (BACKGROUND)

DA Julian Pettifer reporting from the American base on the island of Okinawa. And that ends PANORAMA for this evening. We'll be with you at the same time next week. Goodnight.

BBB

(MUSIC)

ソカヒ 万博  
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電信写

総番号(TA) 21653  
 69年5月21日18時45分 英国 発着  
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 外務大臣殿 湯川(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

安保、オキナワ関係記事

第67/号 平

2/日付 DAILY TELEGRAPH 紙は、JAPAN COUNTS THE COST OF ALLIANCE と題し、A. E. CULLISON の署名記事を掲載しおるところ、その要旨次のとおり。

1. 日本では1970年に左右同よくの激とつが起ることがゆう慮されている。これは安保条約延長問題、オキナワ返かん問題がその時期にちよう点に達すると見られていることによるが、最近の米スパイ機墜つい事件は、日本が米国のアジアにおける行動の結果、中国との武力しようとつにまき込まれる危険があるというゆう慮を増大させた。また、本事件後に日本政府が抗議したことは、米国の将来の同種の活動の基地を短期間にしても韓国ないしオキナワに移さざるを得なくした。

2. 安保及びオキナワ問題に関する日米交渉は既にワシントンで始まっている。米国のオキナワ返かんの時期は未詳であるが、日本の保守党に多数を引続き確保させるためには米国は//月にはサトウ総理にその時期を通報せねばな

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るまい。  
 また、自民党も米国側に妥協してもらうために(1)事前協議のわく内における基地自由使用、(2) SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS (核弾頭の秘密保持も含み得る) (3) 韓国防衛のための協力についての日本側の不干涉等の対案を用意していることが知られている。交渉自体も微みようとなり、アイチ外相は、米側に対し、合意されたすべての点が明確に規定されるべきでないこときにおわしている。

(3)


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第1674号

昭和44年5月23日

外務大臣殿

在 英 大 使  
湯 川



テリ-テレグラフ紙に掲載された  
日米安保條約改定<sup>問題</sup>に関する解説  
記事送付

往電平671号に際し、

5月21日付テリ-テレグラフ紙の

"Japan counts the cost of alliance"

要処理  
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公 信 案 (乙)  
高 裁 案

在 外 公 館

1072

No. 2

2題し、A. E. Cullison の日米安  
保條約改定問題に関する解説記事  
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別添送付申上げます。

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公 信 案 (乙)  
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在 外 公 館

21 5 68  
The American-Japanese Treaty comes up for review next year. Our Tokyo Correspondent predicts trouble

## Japan counts the cost of alliance

By A. E. CULLISON

JAPAN is worried about 1970. A cross-current of change, with an undertow of intrigue, is pulling the Japanese toward a confrontation between Right and Left over ties with the Americans.

Even the pro-American Liberal-Democratic Government recognises that the country is at best a reluctant ally of the United States and may never again allow itself to serve Washington as a bridgehead for ventures in Asia.

There are signs that large numbers of Japanese students, workers and Opposition supporters will take to the streets during 1970 in an attempt to bring down the Government.

One of the main objectives of the Prime Minister, Mr. Sato, and his party is reaffirmation of the 10-year-old and highly controversial Japan-United States Security Treaty, which comes up for review next year. The Socialist-Communist alliance is largely determined to terminate the trans-Pacific pact. They threaten to paralyse the Diet (Parliament) by a mass walkout.

Leaders of the major Opposition parties, led by the Japan Socialist party, are by no means averse to periods of terror and anarchy if this polarises public opinion against the treaty with the Americans. The Marxist and Maoist actions of the extremist Zengakuren student organisation will doubtless be more than willing to oblige.

### Return of Okinawa

Unlike the university students, the relatively moderate Communist party activists can be expected to mount the barricades only when they are convinced of the possibility of success. If the Japanese Government mismanages the anti-treaty situation there is reason to believe that the Sato Government could fall, the Japanese-American alliance could explode in President Nixon's face.

The potential importance of 1970 is also underlined by growing demands from the Japanese Left and Centre for the return of Okinawa by the Americans, the realisation that American military bases in Japan would again play an important role if the Korean war should start anew, and the belief that sooner or later Washington's adventures in Asia might threaten to drag Japan into a destructive clash with China.

The ties with the United States are considered by many Japanese as the only general factor which could wreck their economic "miracle" and the achievements of the past 20 years. The capture of the Pueblo and the shooting down by North Korea of the EC-121 spy plane caused concern. Moreover, the treaty, which is considered more favourable to the Americans than to the Japanese, weighs heavy on the nation's pride.

Evidence of this anxiety over the treaty and Okinawa can be seen in the frequent appeals to Washington recently for a continued "cool" attitude in the face of increased tension with the North Koreans over the Pueblo and EC-121 incidents.

Tokyo kept Washington informed about feelings in Japan, providing well-intentioned reports as well as intelligence information which noted that, while Pyongyang's belligerency would probably continue at present levels, it was unlikely that North Korea was seriously considering military moves of any major size as long as a Chinese or Russian veto was a certainty.

Japan's leaders see Pyongyang essentially unhappy over the peace which is being precariously maintained across the 38th parallel while the South rapidly strengthens its economy. At the same time, the Japanese feel sure that the North Koreans welcome every opportunity to escalate tensions in the Korean area in the belief that each incident moves the armistice one step closer to resumption of a shooting war. But at present neither the Chinese nor the Russians seem prepared to back another attempt to unify the country by force.

Japan's information network in North Korea is weak. This is why the Sato Government has not hesitated to support American electronic surveillance vessels and aircraft based in Japan. Nevertheless Tokyo's objections following the recent destruction of the EC-121 caused Washington to switch future operations of that kind to South Korean and Okinawan bases, though this could be a temporary expedient.

Japan's Ambassador in Washington, Takeso Shimoda, has already started negotiations over the treaty and Okinawa. Talks are necessary for briefing the Foreign Minister, Kiichi Aichi, when he visits the United States in June on a mission to convince the Nixon Administration of the critical importance of these two issues for America's friends in Japan.

Not surprisingly, the Japanese do not approve of President Nixon's announced intention to keep South Korea informed of the progress of Japan-United States negotiations. It still appears to be a toss-up whether Washington will carry out this promise—but the Seoul Government would, by most rules, have every right to know what is likely to happen to the irreplaceable 46 out of 145 American support bases in Japan and Okinawa in the 1970s.

No one knows quite when the Americans will set a date for returning Okinawa. Yet if the Americans want the conservatives in Japan to maintain their strong majority it would be best to give Mr. Sato a date in November.

In any case, the Liberal-Democrats are known to have several stratagems available to help Presi-

dent Nixon to agree to their requests. These include a private understanding that the American Forces will be permitted to use Okinawan bases fairly freely under the prior consultation provisions of the Japan-United States Security Treaty and the base agreements, certain "special arrangements" (which could include secret stockpiling of a few nuclear warheads), and co-operation with South Korean defence requirements without interference from Japan.

The Japanese Government has learned some subtlety in dealing with these delicate problems. Mr. Aichi has reminded the Americans that while talks are continuing they should take into account the fact that issues will be discussed "within the scope of the treaty" and against the "backdrop of Japanese public opinion." Washington would have to be somewhat dense to miss this hint that not everything agreed on should be spelled out.

### Lessons of Vietnam

Mr. Sato appears quite willing to sacrifice himself as did his brother, a former Prime Minister, Nobusuke Kishi, in an attempt to maintain ties with America and retain the defence treaty.

Embarrassing though it might be for Japan's conservatives to permit the Americans to stay on in strength in camps and bases throughout the main islands and Okinawa, it is based to a considerable extent on recognition that America's aura of invincibility has long since disappeared.

Japan's leaders have been understandably concerned at the failure of the Americans to protect their own defence operations, but it was not a great surprise. Lack of the ability to subdue Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces despite an overwhelming superiority in men and equipment had prepared the Japanese for subsequent developments.

The irony of the situation lies in the fact that under Gen. MacArthur's occupation era "peace constitution," the Japanese must depend on American forces for their defence. For this reason there is little possibility that major American bases on Okinawa or in Japan proper will be completely eliminated for a long time.

If Japan is eventually able to change the constitution and willing to assume the financial burden of maintaining its own military establishment, the question of American bases will presumably rise again. By then a budget-minded Washington may be ready to encourage such a key requirement for resurgent Japanese nationalism.

カレ 万報

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総番号(1) 24/54 英 国 発 着 米 比 1  
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ニクソン大統領の外交政策(タイムズ社説)

第742号 平

5日付タイムズの"THE NEW ISOLATIONISTS"と題する社説の要旨次の通り。

1. ニクソン大統領は、就任後4ヶ月の現在、まだ外交政策の独自のスタイル、方針を打ち出すには至っていないが、これは重大な政策決定はじっくり時間をかけてしん重に行なおうという姿勢の表れとも考えられる。

2. ニクソンは4日の演説で、「新孤立主義者」に対して警告を発したが、実際に米国は新孤立主義のたい頭に直面している。過去数年間のベトナム他世界各地における米国のかい入のながい経験のために、国内世論は、米国の利害に直接の影響を持ち、現地において米国の干渉が強く望まれている地域にかい入することについてさえも、非常にかい疑的になっている。

3. もしニクソンがベトナム問題を満足に解決し得ず、世論が人命及び米国のい信の多大なぎせいをともなう対外コミットメントにますますげんめつを感じるような事態にな

外務省

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れば、欧州は重大な打撃をこうむることになる。欧州としては、米国内の新孤立主義のふうちようのために米国の対欧コミットメントが縮小されるという可能性を十分に認識して、欧州自身による安全保障の将来について早急に決意を固める必要がある。  
 米に転電した。

(3)

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