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(1) OPENING REMARKS

(2) 8月12日付 N.Y. SUN 記事

(3) " BALTIMORE SUN 記事

(4) 8月13日付 WASHINGTON POST - OPENING  
 REMARKS + 全文掲載

(5) " " 記事

Opening Remarks by  
H.E. NOBUHIKO USHIBA  
Ambassador of Japan to the United States

at the  
"Newsmaker"  
National Press Club  
Washington, D.C.  
August 11, 1971

EMBARGO: 8:00 p.m.  
Wednesday, August 11, 1971

So many things have come up between the United States and Japan recently. Here I will make comments on four points in which I think you are most interested: China, defense, including Japanese nuclear rearmament, Okinawa and U.S.-Japan economic relations.

First, about China. I have to admit that the President's announcement to visit Mainland China gave really a substantial impact on Japanese politics. The China question is a very emotional as well as acutely political question in Japan. Once it is taken up, the entire spectrum of Japanese foreign policy, including the U.S.-Japan relationship, Japan's security policy and its Asian policy, will come up all at the same time. Most of the political forces which have been urging immediate recognition of Communist China on the Chinese condition, that is, at the expense of Taiwan, have labeled our government policy on China and security as a symbol of subservience to the United States and lack of an independent Asian policy. To them the fact that the United States decided to make a state visit to China, ahead of Japan and without prior consultation with Japan, signifies a bankruptcy of the whole Japanese foreign policy. Obviously, they are wrong. Things have been getting clearer in succeeding U.S. explanations. The United

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States would not sacrifice Taiwan, the coming state visit is only a beginning, not a concluding phase of U.S.-Chinese dialogue, and the United States is willing to consult more closely with Japan concerning the substance of the coming U.S.-China dialogue. In the prevailing atmosphere in Japan, however, even these explanations will not be easily accepted by the press and public. Most of them cast doubt on the sincerity of the U.S. explanations and are afraid that the U.S. might be contemplating to advance further in the U.S.-China relationship without notifying Japan. Thus, as its policy implication, they are pressing the Japanese Government to go ahead with a formal relationship with Communist China even at the expense of Taiwan, "before Japan will be again forestalled by the United States."

Under such circumstances I want to make two points. First, the Japanese Government welcomes the President's visit to China. For many years both Japan and the United States have been in a complete agreement to open the gate of Mainland China to the rest of the world by increasing contacts and dialogue - as I stated in my speech at Georgetown University, a dialogue not preconditioning change of the political reality of the existing world. It appears that Mainland China is now prepared to welcome the Presidential visit, apparently without preconditions. Of course, there will be a long way to go before a genuine mutual understanding and effective arrangement will be achieved between the United States and China, but if it is to be achieved, it will no doubt contribute to the peace and stability of Asia.

Secondly, in dealing with any communist country, the first and the most important thing to bear in mind is the coordination of policies among Western nations. It would certainly be against our mutual

interest if our two countries, in lack of mutual confidence, were to compete with each other for a gain in respective domestic politics in regard to a China policy. The only remedy for the prevailing Japanese atmosphere of uneasiness is to show how closely and effectively the two nations coordinate their policies and cooperate with each other in the course of coming events.

Next, about defense. Here again I want to make it very clear that Japan will not go nuclear, and that Japan's armed forces will not be sent to any part of Asia. All informed observers of Japanese affairs will agree with this conclusion after a careful analysis of the political trends and the tendency of the public opinion in Japan. At least they would agree that the change in this fundamental policy of Japan will not take place unless there is a very radical change in the political atmosphere in Japan, which would be desirable neither for the Japanese people nor the American people. Above all, it is vitally important that the Japanese people will not feel themselves isolated in this world. I have no apprehension about such eventualities, since I firmly believe that the U.S.-Japan friendship and cooperation will continue to be the pillar of Japanese foreign policy for a very long time to come.

The reversion of Okinawa is really an epoch-making event. The very fact that the administrative rights, transferred as the result of the war, be returned peacefully is rarely preceded in history. It goes without saying that this unprecedented achievement could be brought about only as the result of a deep friendship and mutual trust which our two nations have cultivated since the end of the war.

The reversion of Okinawa will mark the end of the postwar period in the relationship between our two countries, and, I am convinced,

this will mark the opening of a new era in which Japan will more positively share the burden for the development and stability in Asia.

Therefore, I strongly hope that the treaty will be ratified smoothly and expeditiously by the legislative bodies of our two countries.

Lastly, about economic affairs. Unfortunately, in recent years there have been heard in America many criticisms of Japanese economic and trade policies. Some criticisms are valid, but most of them are either false or exaggerated. For instance, some believe that the Japanese tariff rate is much higher than American or European tariff rates. That is obviously not correct. Some believe that Japan has more import quotas and other restrictive practices than other countries. They are most outdated now. Some ascribe the present difficulties faced by some of the American industries to the "flood" of Japanese goods. In many cases, imports from Japan are not the cause but the result of changes in American economic life. I must also refer to the contributions we are making to U.S. customers in supplying good products at better prices. Some complain that the liberalization of foreign investment in Japan is very slow. On that I agree, but I must stress, at the same time, that our backgrounds are so different that a gradual approach is essential. In the field of movement of capital, either short-term or long-term, abrupt movements of massive capital may disrupt the economies of all the countries concerned. In any case, the Japanese Government and industries are fully aware that the future of Japan lies with more liberalization and internationalization. We are making swift and irreversible progress in this direction. What is needed for both of us is to identify what are the best long-term interests of our two

countries and move as quickly as possible to eliminate stumbling blocks in our way.

I will stop my initial statement here and welcome any questions. No questions can be too straightforward or too direct.

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## CHINA DISCUSSED BY TOKYO'S ENVOY

Ushiba Urges U.S. to Act in  
Consultation With Allies

By RICHARD HALLORAN  
Special to The New York Times  
WASHINGTON, Aug. 11 —  
The Japanese Ambassador to  
the United States, Nobuhiko  
Ushiba, praised President Nixon's  
initiatives in China policy  
tonight but cautioned against  
making additional similar  
moves without consultation  
with Tokyo.

Mr. Ushiba, speaking at the  
National Press Club here, said  
that Mr. Nixon's proposed trip  
to Peking had been welcomed  
by the Japanese Government.

But he said that "in dealing  
with any Communist country,  
the first and most important  
thing to bear in mind is the  
coordination of policies among  
Western nations." He included  
Japan as a Western nation.

Japanese diplomats here said  
today that their Government  
was particularly worried by  
what they saw as efforts by  
the Chinese Communists to split  
the United States and Japan,  
the major American ally in East  
Asia. They referred to state-  
ments critical of Japan made  
by Premier Chou En-lai of  
China in an interview with  
James Reston of The New York  
Times in Peking earlier this  
week.

### Bids U.S. 'Be Careful'

"We are asking you [the  
United States] to proceed cau-  
tiously," said one diplomat.  
"The initiative is all right, but  
be careful."

Mr. Ushiba, in his prepared  
remarks covering Japanese dip-  
lomatic and economic relations  
with the United States, recalled  
that the President's announce-  
ment of his trip four weeks ago  
had had "a substantial impact  
on Japanese politics."

The Japanese Government,  
according to reports from  
Tokyo at the time, was upset  
by the short notice it had been  
given and by the secret sur-  
rounding the trip to Peking by  
Henry A. Kissinger on July  
9-11.

The ambassador, who has  
been making more of an effort  
to explain Japanese viewpoints  
directly to the American public  
than his predecessors of recent  
years, said that "the China  
question is a very emotional  
as well as actually political  
question in Japan."

### U. S. Sincerity doubted

"Once it is taken up," he  
said, "the entire spectrum of  
Japanese foreign policy, includ-  
ing the U.S.-Japan relationship,  
Japan's security and its Asian  
policy, will come up all at the  
same time."

He said that recent explana-  
tions by the Nixon Adminis-  
tration of American policy to-  
ward China "will not be easily  
accepted by the press and pub-  
lic" in Japan. "Most of them  
cast doubt on the sincerity of  
the United States explanations  
and are afraid that the United  
States might be contemplating  
to advance further in the  
United States-China relation-  
ship without notifying Japan."

NEW YORK TIMES

AUG 12 1971

## Envoy Relates Japan's Unease

By PHILIP POTTER

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Japan's ambassa-  
dor, Nobuhiko Ushiba spoke last  
night of the "atmosphere of un-  
easiness" produced in his coun-  
try by President Nixon's accept-  
ance of an invitation to visit  
Peking and said: "It is vitally  
important that the Japanese  
people will not feel themselves  
isolated in this world."

He said he had no apprehen-  
sions of his own on this score,  
"since I firmly believe that the  
U.S.—Japan friendship and co-  
operation will continue to be the  
pillar of Japanese foreign policy  
for a very long time to come."

### "So Many Things"

But in remarks at the Nation-  
al Press Club, he lamented that  
"so many things have come up  
between the U.S. and Japan re-  
cently," involving China, fears  
of Japan's arming itself with  
nuclear weapons, the pending  
ratification of the Okinawa re-  
version treaty, and trade prob-  
lems.

News of Mr. Nixon's forth-  
coming Peking visit, Mr. Ushiba  
said, had "substantial impact"  
emotionally and politically in  
his country because it affected  
"the entire spectrum" of Japa-  
nese foreign policy, including  
the U.S.—Japan relationship;  
Japan's security policy and  
Asian policy.

The ambassador noted that

the government of Prime Minis-  
ter Eisaku Sato had long been  
assailed for alleged "subservi-  
ence" to the U.S. by political  
opponents who have urged im-  
mediate recognition of Commu-  
nist China at the expense of the  
Nationalist government of Tai-  
wan.

### "Bankruptcy" Claimed

"To them, the fact that the  
United States decided to make a  
state visit to China, ahead of  
Japan, and without prior con-  
sultation with Japan, signifies a  
bankruptcy of the whole Japa-  
nese foreign policy," he said,  
adding:

"Obviously, they are wrong.  
Things have been getting clear-  
er in succeeding U.S. explana-  
tions. The U.S. would not sacri-  
fice Taiwan, the coming state  
visit is only a beginning, not a  
concluding phase of U.S.—Chi-  
nese dialogue and the U.S. is  
willing to consult more closely  
with Japan concerning the sub-  
stance of the coming U.S.—China  
dialogue."

"In the prevailing atmosphere  
in Japan, however, even these  
explanations will not be easily  
accepted by the press and pub-  
lic. Most of them cast doubt on  
the sincerity of the U.S. explana-  
tions and are afraid that the  
U.S. might be contemplating to  
advance further in the U.S.—  
China relationship without noti-  
fying Japan."

### Japan Held Pressed

In consequence, he said, the  
Japanese government is being  
pressed to rush into formal rela-  
tions with China before the Uni-  
ted States does so.

In Tokyo yesterday, a spokes-  
man said the Japanese govern-  
ment is considering asking Mr.  
Nixon to visit Japan before he  
goes to Peking, but no decision  
will be made until Mr. Ushiba  
goes home for consultations next  
week.

The ambassador said his gov-  
ernment welcomes the Presi-  
dent's visit to China and concurs  
in the aim of drawing the Pe-  
king regime into increased con-  
tacts and dialogue—"dialogue  
not preconditioning change of  
the political reality of the exist-  
ing world."

It was "most important," the  
ambassador said, that in dealing  
with any Communist country  
there be coordination of the poli-  
cies among free nations.

### "The Only Remedy"

"It would certainly be against  
our mutual interest if our two  
countries, in lack of mutual con-  
fidence, were to compete with  
each other for a gain in respec-  
tive domestic politics in regard  
to a China policy," he said.

"The only remedy for the pre-  
vailing Japanese atmosphere of  
uneasiness is to show how close-  
ly and effectively the nations  
coordinate their policies and co-  
operate with each other in the  
course of coming events."

He portrayed Japanese public  
opinion as a bar to nuclear arm-  
ament or to the sending of  
forces anywhere in Asia, adding

that all informed observers  
would "agree that change in this  
fundamental policy will not  
take place unless there is a very  
radical change in the political  
atmosphere in Japan, which  
would be desirable neither for  
the Japanese or American peo-  
ple."

### "An Epochal Event"

He hailed the American deci-  
sion to turn Okinawa back to  
Japan as an epochal event that  
will spur Japan to "more posi-  
tively share the burden of the  
development and stability in  
Asia," and expressed hope for  
its quick ratification by the U.S.  
Senate and Japanese Diet.

As for trade problems, he said  
much American criticism of  
Japanese policies is false, exag-  
gerated or outdated by correc-  
tive moves.

Liberalization of foreign in-  
vestment in Japan had been  
slow, he said, but his govern-  
ment and Japanese industry are  
fully aware of the need for  
"more liberalization and inter-  
nationalization" and are swiftly  
and irreversibly moving that  
way.

BALTIMORE SUN

AUG 12 1971



Washington Post  
AUG 13 1971

## The Ambassador on Some U.S.-Japanese Relationships

The following is from remarks of Nobuhiko Ushiba, Japanese Ambassador to the United States, at the National Press Club Wednesday night.

FIRST, about China. I have to admit that the President's announcement to visit mainland China gave really a substantial impact on Japanese politics. The China question is a very emotional as well as acutely political question in Japan. Once it is taken up, the entire spectrum of Japanese foreign policy, including the U.S.-Japan relationship, Japan's security policy and its Asian policy, will come up all at the same time.

Most of the political forces which have been urging immediate recognition of Communist China on the Chinese condition, that is, at the expense of Taiwan, have labeled our government policy on China and security as a symbol of subservience to the United States and lack of an independent Asian policy. To them the fact that the United States decided to make a state visit to China, ahead of Japan and without prior consultation with Japan, signifies a bankruptcy of the whole Japanese foreign policy.

Obviously, they are wrong. Things have been getting clearer in succeeding U.S. explanations. The United States would not sacrifice Taiwan, the coming state visit is only a beginning, not a concluding phase of U.S.-Chinese dialogue, and the United States is willing to consult more closely with Japan concerning the substance of the coming U.S.-China dialogue.

In the prevailing atmosphere in Japan, however, even these explanations will not be easily accepted by the press and public. Most of them cast doubt on the sincerity of the U.S. explanations and are afraid that the United States might be contemplating to advance further in the U.S.-China relationship without notifying Japan. Thus, as its policy implication, they are pressing the Japanese government to go ahead with a formal relationship with Communist China even at the expense of Taiwan, "before Japan will be again forestalled by the United States."

UNDER such circumstances I want to make two points. First, the Japanese government welcomes the President's visit to China. For many years both Japan and the United States have been in a complete agreement to open the gate of mainland China to the rest of the world by increasing contacts and dialogue, a dialogue not preconditioning change of the political reality of the existing world. It appears that mainland China is now prepared to welcome the

presidential visit, apparently without preconditions. Of course, there will be a long way to go before a genuine mutual understanding and effective arrangement will be achieved between the United States and China, but if it is to be achieved, it will no doubt contribute to the peace and stability of Asia.

Secondly, in dealing with any Communist country, the first and the most important thing to bear in mind is the coordination of policies among Western nations. It would certainly be against our mutual interest if our two countries, in lack of mutual confidence, were to compete with each other for a gain in respective domestic politics in regard to a China policy. The only remedy for the prevailing Japanese atmosphere of uneasiness is to show how closely and effectively the two nations coordinate their policies and cooperate with each other in the course of coming events.

Next, about defense. Here again I want to make it very clear that Japan will not go nuclear, and that Japan's armed forces will not be sent to any part of Asia. All informed observers of Japanese affairs will agree with this conclusion after a careful analysis of the political trends and the tendency of the public opinion in Japan. At least they would agree that the change in this fundamental policy of Japan will not take place unless there is a very radical change in the political atmosphere in Japan, which would be desirable neither for the Japanese people nor the American people. Above all, it is vitally important that the Japanese people will not feel themselves isolated in this world. I have no apprehension about such eventualities, since I firmly believe that the U.S.-Japan friendship and cooperation will continue to be the pillar of Japanese foreign policy for a very long time to come.

THE reversion of Okinawa is really an epoch-making event. The very fact that the administrative rights, transferred as the result of the war, are being returned peacefully is rarely preceded in history. It goes without saying that this unprecedented achievement could be brought about only as the result of a deep friendship and mutual trust which our two nations have cultivated since the end of the war.

The reversion of Okinawa will mark the end of the postwar period in the relationship between our two countries and, I am convinced, this will mark the opening of a new era in which Japan will more positively share the burden for the development and stability in Asia. Therefore, I strongly hope that the treaty will be ratified smoothly and

expeditiously by the legislative bodies of our two countries.

Lastly, about economic affairs. Unfortunately, in recent years there have been heard in America many criticisms of Japanese economic and trade policies. Some criticisms are valid, but most of them are either false or exaggerated. For instance, some believe that the Japanese tariff rate is much higher than American or European tariff rates. That is obviously not correct. Some believe that Japan has more import quotas and other restrictive practices than other countries. They are most outdated now. Some ascribe the present difficulties faced by some of the American industries to the "flood" of Japanese goods. In many cases, imports from Japan are not the cause but the result of changes in American economic life. I must also refer to the contributions we are making to U.S. customers in supplying good products at better prices.

Some complain that the liberalization of foreign investment in Japan is very slow. On that I agree, but I must stress, at the same time, that our backgrounds are so different that a gradual approach is essential. In the field of movement of capital, either short-term or long-term, abrupt movements of massive capital may disrupt the economies of all the countries concerned. In any case, the Japanese government and industries are fully aware that the future of Japan lies with more liberalization and internationalization. We are making swift and irreversible progress in this direction. What is needed for both of us is to identify what are the best long-term interests of our two countries and move as quickly as possible to eliminate stumbling blocks in our way.

## Japan Warned By U.S. to Lift Trade Curbs

By Bernard D. Nossiter  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States has warned Japan that Washington will exercise its rights to penalize Japanese imports unless Tokyo moves faster to abolish its remaining barriers against American trade.

The warning, diplomats disclosed yesterday, was issued several weeks ago by Secretary of State William P. Rogers to Kijichi Aichi, then Japan's foreign minister. It was renewed in recent days by State Department officials in talks with Japan's ambassador to Washington, Nobuhiko Ushiba.

The move reflects mounting pressures from Congress, industry and trade unions against import competition from Japan. The second warning comes when Japanese-American relations have been strained by Washington's failure to give Tokyo any advance warning of President Nixon's planned trip to Peking.

At issue are Japan's quotas or physical limits on imports of about 40 agricultural and industrial products. These quotas, like those the United States sets on foreign oil, protect domestic producers from price competition.

Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the postwar pact setting trade rules for most non-Communist countries, oil is specifically excluded from the prohibition against quotas. Other quotas are generally prohibited except for nations experiencing deep difficulties with their balance of payments.

Japan entered the postwar world with a wide array of quotas to protect its reviving economy. Several years ago, the United States contended that Japan, now prosperous and running payments surpluses, should abandon quotas like its other trading partners.

The Japanese have made considerable progress toward this end, American officials acknowledge. About two-thirds of the quotas, it is estimated, have been removed.

The State Department is concerned about those remaining, particularly quotas curbing imports of computers, integrated circuits, light aircraft and some farm products.

Imports into Japan of products on which quotas have been removed have jumped sharply. This increases the pressure on Tokyo from its producers to go slow on the abolition of the remaining curbs.

Under the GATT rules, the United States and Japan are first required to consult about the quotas. These consultations have been going on. If they are not satisfactorily completed, the United States, with the assent of other GATT members, can then raise tariffs on goods Japan sells abroad to compensate for the loss of trade created by the quotas.

It is this second and compensating step that Tokyo has been told the United States

will take unless the remaining quotas are abolished more rapidly.

As far as is known, the United States has not spelled out a timetable of deadlines and products that would satisfy Washington.

Ambassador Ushiba alluded to the problem in a speech at the National Press Club Wednesday. He said, "The Japanese government and industries are fully aware that the future of Japan lies with more liberalization and internationalization. We are making swift and irreversible progress in this direction."

Washington's anxiety is heightened by the current speculation against the dollar on international exchange markets. Some officials here have indicated that they think the yen should be upvalued, or made more expensive, in terms of dollars. That would cheapen American exports and make Japanese imports more expensive.

Washington Post

AUG 13 1971