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アメリカ局長
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石原

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Dean Rusk, by Mr. Hiroshi Ishihara of the YOMIURI
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July 31, 1968

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

No. 178

INTERVIEW WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE
HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, BY MR. HIROSHI ISHIHARA
OF THE YOMIURI NEWSPAPER, OF TOKYO, JAPAN
JULY 29, 1968

Q. What can you report on the progress and status of the official conversations in Paris, although there has been little, if any, progress during the past two months? Is there any measure to break the deadlock?

A. A process has been started in Paris which hopefully will lead to peace in Viet-Nam. This process had its origin in a bold initiative launched by the President when he announced the limitation of the bombing. This was a unilateral step, taken, as the President said, "in the hope that this action will lead to early talks"--as it did.

We sent our representatives to Paris prepared to negotiate in good faith and we did not expect that it would be a quick or easy task. You may recall that the President in his announcement in May concerning the opening of official conversations warned that "there are many hazards and difficulties ahead."

Ambassadors Harriman and Vance have advanced numerous proposals during the official conversations in an effort to move the talks along into more substantive areas. So far the Vietnamese have refused to move along these lines; and they continue to use these talks more as a propaganda forum.

We continue to look for some act of restraint on their part which would enable us to halt all the bombing of North Viet-Nam and hopefully allow for more serious discussions in Paris. We have asked what North Viet-Nam will do to reduce the level of violence if our bombing were stopped, and have received no response. We have said we are prepared to discuss the circumstances under which we could stop the bombing, but the North Vietnamese have refused to engage in such a discussion.

Nevertheless, we are not discouraged, and we will continue our earnest efforts. Other countries could make a contribution to further progress towards peace by demonstrating to the North Vietnamese that their present adamant posture does not enjoy the wide international support they claim.

Q. There still remains some concern about possible modifications of the U.S. commitments toward Asia in general and South Viet-Nam in particular, since President Johnson's statement on March 31. Can you elaborate a little on your repeated clarification and also on the problem of "continuity of commitment" in view of the forthcoming presidential election?

A. There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that the United States will honor its commitments in Asia. As a matter of fact, the President's March 31 speech made this quite clear. Our goal in South Viet-Nam remains an honorable settlement, and we will accept nothing less. This position was restated in the recent Honolulu communique.

American commitments in Asia are the result of policies based on the national interests of the United States, especially our abiding interest in a reliable peace, and our belief in the right of nations to develop their own institutions free from outside aggression. They are in accord with Purposes and Principles set forth in Chapter I of the United Nations Charter. These policies were developed under four American Presidents of both our political parties, and I am confident that they have the support of the American people. It is significant, for example, that in a statement on Asia last December by 14 leading American scholars, the first conclusion was that "developments in the Asia-Pacific region are of vital importance to the future of the United States."

Q. Ambassador Goldberg, in his speech immediately before his resignation, said U.S. Foreign Policy must follow a course that lies between isolationism and interventionism. We feel he meant to say something like selective interventionism, which is neither indiscriminate interventionism as Professor Morgenthau criticizes nor neoisolationism as some cassandras are increasingly afraid of. Would you expand on his statement?

A. Perhaps it is unavoidable that terms like "interventionism" and "isolationism" are sometimes used in discussions. But any attempt to abbreviate important and complex policy matters into convenient labels can often be misleading, particularly when the labels take on different meanings for different people.

But I understand the thrust of the question, and I would start, an answer to it this way: Even while the fires of the Second World War still raged, we joined with others in writing the United Nations Charter "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war...." The first obligation of all members of the United Nations is "to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace..."

Unhappily, it quickly became evident that some members were unwilling to honor their basic commitments under Chapter I of the Charter. Aggressions and ominous threats caused the United States to join with other nations in forming various mutual security treaties, some bilateral, others multilateral. These are all in accord with the provisions of the Charter. None arose from any desire on our part to "intervene" in the affairs of other nations. They are obligations which we assumed jointly with others in the common interest of preserving peace by deterring aggression--or, if aggression occurs, by collective action to repel it. These defensive alliances have been the backbone of world peace for twenty years.

We have carried a very large share of the burden of defending the Free World. But we do not seek to impose a Pax Americana by acting as the "world's policeman." We think settling disputes and preserving and strengthening the peace should be a cooperative endeavor. We have in fact become directly involved in only a few of the scores of international disputes since the Second World War.

Similarly, our economic assistance is not "intervention." It is a response to needs and requests. We respond because we think our own interests are served by economic, social, and political progress in the developing countries--and also because the American people are humanitarian.

I think a large majority of the American people recognize the dangers of trying to withdraw from the world. But most of them feel that other nations and groupings of nations should, in their own interests, shoulder more of the task of preserving peace and assisting the less developed nations to move forward. As other nations do more, the relative importance of our role will diminish. That is as it should be.

Q. Thus far Communist China has failed to reciprocate a series of U.S. overtures such as the issuance of passports to private citizens and the offer of exchanging foodstuff. Moreover they postponed the next U.S.-China talk in Warsaw until well after the Presidential election. In the meantime a number of high-ranking American officials have spoken of their willingness to work for improvement of the U.S.-China relations. Are there any further unilateral actions for rapprochement under active consideration in spite of Chinese reluctance to follow the suit? Or do we have to wait and see for a while until the dust settles down on the mainland?

A. We are very much interested in a reduction of tensions between mainland China and the United States, and to that end we have taken a number of specific steps. These have included a steady relaxation of travel restrictions, a suggestion in 1961 that we might be prepared to arrange for the export of food at a time when there was a food shortage on the Chinese mainland, and a decision last spring to permit the licensing of the sale of certain drugs helpful in fighting epidemic diseases which were spreading in parts of the mainland. We also proposed visits of scholars, medical men, and journalists. These approaches by the United States were all rejected.

Unfortunately, Peking continues its posture of hostility, particularly towards the United States, its self-isolation, and its dedication to the violent revolutionary overthrow of other governments.

Nevertheless, we still maintain our hope that mainland China will abandon these policies and that there will be a reconciliation between the people of mainland China and the world community. As President Johnson has stated, we have no intention of trying to deny Communist China's legitimate needs for security and friendly relations with her neighboring countries. We also recognize that lasting stability and peace in Asia cannot be achieved without Communist China's participation.

I think there is a limit to what can be achieved by unilateral actions by the United States, but we will continue to search for ways that would contribute to some lessening of tensions between our country and Communist China.

Q. Will the United States be agreeable to the so-called automatic extension of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as now the Government Party, the Liberal Democratic Party proposes or will the United States insist on the definite, let's say, 10-year extension of the treaty? Have you anything recent to say on the return to Japan of the Ryukyus?

A. The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan is of great importance for the security of Japan and the peace and security of the Far East. This was most recently emphasized by President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato following their talks here in Washington in November, 1967, when they declared it to be the fundamental policy of both countries to maintain firmly this treaty. In 1970 the treaty becomes subject to abrogation or amendment by either party upon one year's notice. We do not plan to seek any changes in the terms of the treaty.

The question of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands was discussed fully and frankly by President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato during their November meeting. As a direct result of their talks agreement was reached to return the Bonin Islands to Japan, and this was done on June 26. We fully appreciate the desire of the people of Japan for the restoration of administrative rights in the Ryukyus. At the same time, the leaders of our two countries have recognized the important role that U.S. bases in these islands continue to play in assuring the security not only of Japan but of other free nations in East Asia and the Pacific. We also understand Prime Minister Sato's desire to reach an agreement within a few years on a satisfactory date for reversion. Therefore our governments have agreed to keep this question under joint and continuous review. In the meantime, we have established an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands in recognition of the need to take further steps to promote the economic and social welfare of the people of the Ryukyus and to foster their identification with Japan proper, thus reducing the stresses which will come when administrative rights are restored to Japan.

Q. What do you foresee beyond Viet-Nam in terms of U.S.-Japan, U.S.-China and U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations?

A. The achievement of peace in Viet-Nam will open the way for greater efforts to promote economic growth and social progress in East Asia. The United States will play its full role in this task. The contribution now being made by Japan in Asian regional development is substantial, and we look forward to her even greater participation with ourselves and others in the job that will lie ahead when we have peace.

I foresee the continuation of the United States-Japan Pacific Partnership. We do have some problems, and it would be too much to expect that we will not have some in the future. But I am confident that we can work together to overcome any difficulties and that our common goals and mutual respect will ensure that Japan and America will remain good friends and close allies.

It is difficult to make predictions about the future course of relations between Mainland China and the United States, since so much depends upon a change in Peking's intransigent attitude. But we hope that at some time in the future the way will open for better understanding and reduced tensions.

Our relations with the Soviet Union will continue to be directed toward finding areas of mutual interest and cooperation.

The war in Viet-Nam has not prevented the Soviet Union and United States from reaching various agreements, some bilateral, others multilateral, including treaties on nuclear non-proliferation and the law of outer space. The Soviet Union has accepted President Johnson's proposal to discuss limitations on strategic missiles, both offensive and defensive. We are also very much interested in Soviet cooperation in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in exploring a mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe, as the members of NATO proposed at their Ministerial meeting in June. I don't know whether an honorable settlement in Viet-Nam would contribute to the solution of other differences between the Soviet Union and the West, but I would hope so.

安保、基本線明確に

ラスタグ言「沖繩」でも佐藤政権援護

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