

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

日米関係（沖縄返還）34

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バーネット
国務次官補代理

(回覧番号) 外務省電信案 (分類)

機密表示 (極秘・秘の未印) 平	符号表示 暗 略 平	※ 総第 12708号
	※ 第 500号	※ 昭和 44年 3月 20日 19時 23分
	大至急 (至急) 普通・LTF	※ 発電係 研

大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官房長	主管 アメリカ局長 参事官 北米才一課長	主管局部課(室)名 米北一 起案 昭和43年3月20日 起案者 研 電話番号 446
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協設先

大使 臨時代理大使
在 米下田 あて 愛知 大臣 発
総領事 代理

電 在 大使 臨時代理大使
報 総領事 代理 あて

件名 ~~米北一に送る資料送付依頼~~
バーネット国務次官補代理の

当地紙は18日 バーネット国務次官

補がニューズで日米関係につき演説

11日の同日付貴地発AP電を報じ

ていところ同演説内容入手の上

その背景等とともに回電ありたい。

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(※印欄内は電信課記入)

(昭和四二・七二改正)

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注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
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大蔵省
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大臣官舎審判長
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参西東
近ア長経
参寄近ア
次総経国万
参實統
参政技二
参一型
参政経科
参社専
参道内外

電信写

総番号(TA) 11727
 69年3月20日 22時25分 ヤシントン 発着
 69年3月21日 12時28分 本省

外務大臣殿 下田(大) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

パーネット 國務次官補代理の演説

第370号 略 至急

貴電米北/第500号に関し

1. 本件演説は婦人政治団体 LEAGUE OF WOMEN'S VOTERS OF CONNECTICUT 主催の講演、討論会 "JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES - A TIME OF CRISIS" において行なわれたものであり、右会合にはナラ、ニューヨーク総領事が招待を受け、野口領事が代りに出席したとの経緯がある。

2. 野口領事によれば本件会合では、18日午前にパーネット、ヴォス(カルテックス社長、ニューヨークの日米協会理事)およびライシャワー教授の3名が講演し、午後上記3名に國連政治部明石氏、モンピア大学大学院留学中のオカ島氏等数名が加わつてパネル・ディスカッションを行ない、更にちよう衆との間で質疑応答が行なわれた由。

3. パーネットの演説(テキスト20日発行のうで送付し

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た)は主としてわが国の経済発展と日米経済関係を論じたものであり、種々数字を挙げてFACTUALな説明を行なつており、中共貿易、対ソ経済関係、対ビルマ、カンボディア援助等日米両国の行き方の異なる点はあるが、北および東南アジアにおける新たな経済発展の可能性を支持するとの目標で一致していると述べている点が注目される程度で、特に目新しい点はない。政治問題については日米両国の防衛費がGNPに占める比率を比較して防衛に対する日本の態度を説明し、安保とオキナワの問題の所在を明らかにし、米は日本がこれにより利益を得ているから、日本はその代償を支払うべきと考えているのに対し、日本側にはむしろ米が利益を得ているのだから駐留継続を望むなら日本の主権に対するSENSITIVITYをもつてそん重すべきであるとするものが相当いるが、かかる考えを持つている者は全体としておそらく過半数にも及ぶまいと語り、またオキナワ返かんにつき米としては米が西太平洋で果さねばならないと考える役割の作戦的及び戦略的要件をじゆう足する能力を最も害さない取極めを求めようと述べている。

4. 野口領事によれば、ライシャワー教授は日米友好関係重視の立場よりオキナワの核ぬき返かん等従来からの諸説

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を閉ぢんしたが、米に立主義的傾向が強まり米軍がアジアから全面的に撤退すれば日本としては力のしん空をうめるため再軍備を余ぎなくされ第2次大戦前の如く軍部が力を得る可能性も全くはいじよすることは出来ない旨述べたことが注目された由。

よ。その他討議。質疑応答の内容には特に目立つた点はなかつた由であり、冒頭貴電の次第はあるも当地紙には本件会合に関する報道は見当らない。

ニューヨークへ転電した。

(3)

アメリカ局長

参事官


北米才一課長

政 第 2320号

昭和44年3月20日

外務大臣殿

在 米 下 田 大 使



日米関係に関するハーネット國務

次官補の演説テキスト送付

貴電米北/才500号及川往電才870号

に關し、標記演説テキスト^{下記のとおり}別添2部送付す

記

"THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN:
A TIME OF CRISIS"

付属添付

要理
首席参事官
南
北米才一課
漁業
航
科
連絡調整
調査
力子夕
局庶務



League of Women's Voters of Connecticut
New Haven, Connecticut
March 18, 1969

The United States and Japan: A Time of Crisis

REMARKS BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
ROBERT W. BARNETT

United States-Japanese Relations

○ For Washington this is a time of transition. Japan
○ knows the United States, and may assume -- and, I believe,
○ rightly -- that its stance and intentions towards Japan are
not likely to change greatly. But on many matters, the new
United States Administration has not yet declared itself, and
in any case, it can be expected to have a different style.
For clarification on matters of detail, we must wait a while.

○ Uncertainties and possible ambiguities on such matters
○ are not, however, all on our side. I recall that several
years ago some of us were talking with Mr. Shigeharu Matsumoto
at Arden House about how difficult it was to identify "Japanese
opinion". The difficulty was even more profound than we
supposed. Matsumoto told us that there are in the Japanese
language twenty-six words that signify the English pronoun "I".

At a Conference in England last September, Japanese,
American, British and Australian participants agreed quite

easily to a Conference report on Japan in the world economy,
but had to abandon effort to agree on its political/security
counterpart. The Japanese participants could not agree among
themselves on where it was proper to use the term "Japanese"
in referring to opinion and attitudes in their own country.
Ever since, I have used "Japanese" with hesitation.

I was particularly struck by two observations that I
○ heard made last September... Of all countries in the world
○ -- it was said -- Japan was most likely to have surpassed
what will be the United States per capita GNP in 2000 A.D...
Coal -- we were told -- can be shipped today at no greater
cost from West Virginia to Yokohama than to Chicago. Consider
what this achievement of containerization and mammoth water
transport means to calculation of the economic geographer
○ concerned with competitive advantage of location.

○ Technology and its effect on our notions of time, place,
and cost may be advancing so fast that what we regard as
political realities can well be obsolete as soon as we believe
them to be properly formulated. And it is not just technology
that affects reality. A very perceptive Japanese friend of
mine, trying to identify probable future leadership in Japan,
asserts that three distinct concepts of the world occupy the

minds of his countrymen -- those over sixty, under forty, and under twenty. This may not be true only of Japan.

The central difference between the United States and Japan is not, I believe, race, location, or annual per capita GNP -- about \$4000:\$1300. It is, I propose, the fact that we spend about 9 percent of our GNP on defense: Japan, about 1 percent. Put in dollars -- some \$70 billion compared to about \$1 billion.

These are fascinating figures to reflect on. Implicit in them, I believe, is explanation of what is largely involved in the several preoccupations of United States and Japanese government negotiators these days:

Extension of the Security Treaty.

The future of the Ryukyus.

Current imbalance in the bilateral United States/Japanese trade account.

The United States balance of payments.

The United States appropriates and spends some \$70 billion -- equal to half of Japan's total GNP -- to maintain world-wide deterrent military capabilities, to fight a war in Viet-Nam, and to discharge otherwise what we consider to

be our responsibilities as a super power. The reach and impact of United States power on the world is total, and pervasive.

Japan, though now third among world powers in GNP, has no pretensions as super power, is constitutionally denying itself a military role apart from defense, and relies wholly on the United States for safety from strategic threat. Japan's outward thrust is economic, not political, or military.

In this situation some troubles can, and do arise from a United States calculation that because Japan benefits from our security investment in Japanese and Ryukyu bases, it should pay something for it, while many Japanese calculate that because we benefit, at great cost to Japan's amour-propre, from the bases they let us use, we should, if we wish to stay on, pay greater heed to Japan's sovereign sensitivities.

Not all Japanese, perhaps not even a majority, share in this somewhat resentful attitude towards the United States military apparatus on Japanese soil.

However, 1969 will be a time of delicate consultation between our governments -- To arrange:

Extension of a Security Treaty, according to the United States certain limited base rights, which many Japanese regard as a vital contribution to Japan's own safety, and which we regard as essential for efficient United States performance on United States security commitments throughout the entire Western Pacific area;

Some, perhaps substantial, change in arrangements on the Ryukyus, where, at present, we, while recognizing Japan's residual sovereignty, have exercised total administrative control and have made free use of the base facilities located there. The Japanese will want assurance of early reversion to Tokyo of administrative authority over the islands. We will want arrangements that cause least loss in our ability to meet the operational and strategic requirements of the role we believe we must play in the Western Pacific.

1969 will see us talking security -- Japan's and our's -- but also economics.

During 1968 Japan ran a \$1 billion plus trade surplus

with the United States. It did so at a time when we suffered a dollar outflow attributable to spending for East Asian security requirements of, perhaps, \$2.5 billion, and to military spending in Japan itself of about \$600 million. We will ask Japan to help neutralize some part of this heavy charge on our balance of payments, and the Japanese, while wanting to help us defend the dollar, will avoid doing things that might be construed as blank check endorsement of United States foreign policy. Foreign and financial policy, the differing responsibilities of surplus and deficit countries, the scope and limitations of bilateral mutual assistance will be involved in these consultations.

Both Washington and Tokyo will, in addition, be forced to look hard at the problem of trade protectionism, as a present problem, and as a future possibility.

We will want much greater access to the growing Japanese market -- both on trade account and for direct investment. We will press hard to get it. The Japanese may be slow and grudging in giving it. Talk of a United States border tax in 1968 threw them into near panic. Talk these days of moves to restrain their exports of textiles, steel, and still other products alarms them. Their automobile industry, seeming not

to recognize its great strength, fears American investment in Japan. Japan wants to have margins of safety against risks of United States and world trade protectionism and, I believe, very mistakenly is nervous about the thing Servan-Schreiber has warned them about.

Lying behind these anxieties are major abnormalities in the world trade and financial situation which do not lend themselves to effective solution by bilateral measures -- the high costs of the United States war in Viet-Nam and continuing price inflation in the United States which sucks in high levels of imports from all sources.

Japan is keenly aware that its future depends vitally on the dollar. It would, I believe, gladly sacrifice some exports in return for price stability in the United States and improvement of the United States balance of payments. Important as is the United States market to Japan, a world-wide, non-discriminatory trade system and the sanctity of the doctrine which should guide it are even more important. To appear viable to Japan, solutions of trade and payments difficulties must affect jointly and reciprocally all of the OECD countries -- Pacific Area and Atlantic Area alike. And

if there be choice between resort to trade restricting or trade liberalizing means to help along the adjustment process, Japan would, I am sure, prefer liberalizing; it is mortally fearful of the contagion of protectionism.

Happily our current economic and strategic preoccupations with Japan arise from Japan's wish to be firmly enmeshed in a world system, not set apart and treated as something different and special, and from the mere exercise of great strength by us and by them.

I have hinted here and earlier at how strong Japan is, and may be expected to become. Let me elaborate with some figures:

I have beside me here a table estimating Japan's GNP at about \$140 billion compared to our \$825 billion. West Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy are all shown to have less. Perhaps more significant, however, is that between 1967 and 1968 Japan was growing at a real rate of 9 percent compared to 5 percent for the United States and less than that for West Germany, the United Kingdom and France.

In the Kahn/Wiener book, The Year 2000, appears a chart giving estimates of GNP in 1985. The high variant for the United States shows a GNP of \$2020 billion; for Japan \$471 billion. I am startled to see that the figure for Japan is

higher than that for West Germany and Italy combined.

The dynamism of the Japanese economic system shows at the worker level. Our Department of Commerce estimates that the growth rate of output per employee for Japan from 1960 to 1965 was 9.8 percent. This compared with 3.1 percent for the United States and about 4.3 percent for West Germany and France.

Well trained brains harness the energies of Japan's work force. The Economist and Fortune have compared Japan to its American and Western European competitors in the field of education. Japan was devoting about 7.1 percent of national income, in the mid-1960s, to public expenditures for education -- compared to 6.3 percent in the United States and Italy, 5.8 percent in the United Kingdom, 4.6 percent in France and 4.2 percent in West Germany.

The United States stands in a class by itself when you count up the parts of our GNP spent for research and development. In the United States about 70 people out of 10,000 are engaged in research and development activities. Looking at the rest of the competition, however, Japan does well. In Japan about 19 out of every 10,000 are so employed, compared to 16 in the United Kingdom, 10.5 in West Germany, 8.5 in

France and 3 in Italy.

It is fair to say, I think, that Japan stands in a class by itself in the very high levels of private investment it maintains. In Japan fixed capital formation as a percentage of GNP in 1966 amounted to 31 percent, compared to 25 percent in West Germany, 22 percent in France, 18 percent in the United Kingdom and Italy and 17 percent in the United States.

There will be people who regard Japan as occupying a dominant and pervasive position in today's world trading community. This is a mistaken notion. The United States exports three times as much as Japan, West Germany, twice as much, and both France and the United Kingdom export substantially more than does Japan.

Almost everyone is surprised when I point out, as I often must do, that Japan is substantially less trade dependent than its principal Western European competitors -- if trade dependency is measurable in terms of exports of goods and services as a percentage of GNP. By this measurement Japan's degree of dependence is 12 percent, compared to 19 percent for Italy, 21 percent for West Germany, and 25 percent for the United Kingdom. In the United States, incidentally, exports amount to only 6 percent of GNP.

These statistical indicators add up, I believe, to a portrait of a very strong Japan, somewhat less vulnerable to minor fluctuations in world trade activity, perhaps, than either the Japanese or the world in general supposes it to be.

It is good to have a strong Japan for pursuit of what is common in our interest in East Asia, both its non-Communist and Communist parts: economic and social development, and exploration of paths towards peaceful coexistence.

We do not ask Tokyo to do as we do. We believe there are different paths to the ultimate goals we think we seek alike.

Japan trades with Communist China; we do not.

Japan explores investment and greater trade possibilities in the USSR; we do not.

Japan offers substantial aid to Burma and Cambodia; we do not.

However, we do merge our resources in common support of new economic development possibilities in both North and Southeast Asia.

Japanese aid and investment in South Korea and Taiwan, coming after and on top of ours goes far to explain recent economic triumphs there -- and recent tendencies towards integration.

Japan pledged \$110 million of aid to Indonesia in 1968; so did we.

Japan contributed \$200 million to the capital of the Asian Development Bank as did we, and has pledged a substantial contribution to its Special Funds; as we may soon do too.

For different and compatible reasons, we and Japan favor progression to greater and greater reliance upon multinational agencies in the growth processes of aid developing countries. We both find ways to encourage regional cooperation in economic, and other undertakings, and Japan has become an active participant.

Japan is enjoying a truly remarkable expansion of economic links with Australia. This, no doubt, encourages Japan to explore possibilities for creating a Five Power Pacific Basin Community made up of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States.

The United States-Japan relationship has proved to be mutually advantageous beyond anything foreseeable 20 years ago. Our problems arise, largely, from capabilities and achievements that are good for our two countries -- and the Pacific neighborhood which we share. As must be the case

between true partners, attempts to reform or improve the other can succeed only with greater awareness of the need to reform or improve ourselves.