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ジョージ・ケチン博士

ジョージ・ケナンの論文
「日本の安全保障と米国の政策」について

昭和39. 9.24
アメリカ局北米課

ジョージ・ケナンが「フォーリン・アフェアーズ」誌10月号に寄稿した「日本の安全保障と米国の政策」と題する論文の全文を入手したので、とりあえず原文のまま配布する。

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北米課長

米北資料(64)
外政 168
昭和39年10月1日

P.19~27
神
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の
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抽出

日本の安全保障と米国の政策

1964年10月号「フォーリン・アフェアーズ」誌所載
ジョージ・ケナン論文仮訳

米北
64
(外政)
8

アメリカ局北米課

は し が き

1964年10月号の「フォーリン・アフェアーズ」誌に、ジョージ・ケナンが寄稿した「日本の安全保障と米国の政策」と題する論文を、とりあえず訳出したので、配布する。

昭和39年10月1日

アメリカ局北米課長

日本の安全保障と米国の政策

(仮訳)

日本の国策遂行の手段として、戦争に訴えることを禁止し、従つて結果的には、日本が大規模な兵力を保持しないことを公約したことになつてゐる日本国憲法の規定は、従来から現在なお国際紛争の絶えない世界において、いかにして日本の安全を保証するかという問題を提起してゐる。1948年位までのマックファーサー元帥の見解は、本稿筆者がマックファーサー元帥を正しく理解してゐるとすれば、日本に米国自身の安全保障、あるいは日本の安全保障のために、恒久的にあるいは長期的に米軍を駐留せしめることは必ずしも必要ではないというものであつた。すなわち、同元帥の見解によれば、国際連合、あるいは友好国としての米国の関心により保障される一般的な保護の下における永世非武装と中立の立場が、日本にとつて最も適したステータスであろうというのであつた。同元帥は、筆者と同様、当時ソ連の同意の下で、かかるステータスを設けうるならば、ソ

兵器の問題について、日本国内に行きわたつて
いる強い感情を反映している。それらは、また
一国の領土に他国の軍事施設が保持されている
ことに対するきわめて自然な怒りと、屈辱感を
反映している。それらはさらに沖縄における事
態について、日本に伝えられる不利な報道を強
く反映している。すなわち、沖縄の米軍事施設
の大きさ、それが現地住民におわせている負担、
米軍が進んで認めたと称する自治権の範囲の気
の滅入るほどの狭さ、沖縄の将来についての不
安定さといつたことである。これらの意見はま
た、朝鮮や南東アジアにおける米国の政策の成
功の見とおしについての悲観論を反映している。
なかんずく、それらは中国に対するアメリカの
政策に対する不安感を反映している。中共が今
や、日本の世論の対外的視野をどの程度支配し
ているか、また日本が中国本土とのよりよき国
交を、どれほど望んでいるかを十分認識するた
めには、日本を訪れなくてはならない。きわめ

にするだけでは、達成できない。アメリカ政府
が、このことを認めるに至つたということは、
対日関係の進展にとつて、最近の最も積極的な
貢献であり、また米国内において、適切な支持
が与えられれば、一層の成果を生むべきもので
ある。

目下、改善のチャンスのもっと大きい特筆すべ
き問題は、恐らく沖縄問題であろう。ここで希
望されることは沖縄住民の運命に対し、日本の
世論がきわめて敏感であることを、現地米軍当
局が、心に銘記すべきだということである。8
月、沖縄の新高等弁務官の任命に伴つて、次のような新
しい認識が生れてきたようである。即ちアメリ
カの軍事施設は現地住民に依存しているので、
たとえその措置の結果が軍事的理想には反する
ものであつても、日本の世論を尊重するため
は、かかる軍事施設の重要度をある程度、減少
するような措置を取ることもしやむを得ないとい
う認識がそれである。

JAPANESE SECURITY
AND AMERICAN POLICY

By George F. Kennan

The provisions of the Japanese Constitution barring the resort to war as an instrument of Japanese policy, and effectively committing Japan not to maintain armed forces on a major scale, has long raised the question how Japan's security is to be assured in a world still replete with sources of international conflict. As late as 1948 it was still General MacArthur's view, if the writer of these lines understood him correctly, that it would not be essential for the United States to maintain armed forces on the Japanese archipelago permanently for a protracted time either for its own security or for that of Japan; in his view, the most suitable status for Japan would be one of permanent demilitarization and neutralization under such general protection as might be afforded by the United Nations and by the friendly interest of the United States. He appeared to believe, as did this writer, that if such a status could be arranged with the concurrence of the Soviet Government, the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Japan would be minimal; and it was not easy to see from what other quarter Japan could be seriously threatened. This concept assumed, of course, an eventual agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States and other interested parties, on the terms of a Japanese peace settlement.

In the following year — 1949 — however, the decision was taken in Washington, for reasons still not fully clear, to proceed at once to the negotiation of a separate United States-Japanese treaty, one which would envisage virtually a bilateral alliance between the two countries and the retention for an indefinite period of American bases and defense facilities on the Japanese islands. Preparatory talks on such a treaty were well advanced when the Korean War broke out. To what extent these discussions, and the American disposition they reflected, were a factor in the Communist decision to launch the attack in Korea is a question which still awaits exhaustive historical scrutiny. Certainly, they were not the only factor; but it would be surprising if they had had no effect at all on this decision.

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The reasons for this division run very deep. They are at least as much emotional as intellectual. They involve internal political problems as well as problems of foreign policy. They reflect the whole great schizophrenia of thought and feeling induced in the Japanese people by the shock of defeat, the destruction of old values, and the introduction by the victors of concepts at odds with the traditional premises of political and social thought. The United States Government has a measure of responsibility for this conflict of conscience by virtue of the abruptness with which it altered its own concepts of international security in the years following the Second World War. Americans will have to recognize that if they are to indulge themselves in such violent fluctuations of outlook as those that affected their view of world Communism in the years from 1943 to 1953, they must not expect others, however well-inclined, to follow them in such inconsistency.

On the liberal and Socialist-intellectual side, the negative attitudes toward the present security arrangements embrace many varieties and shades of opinion. These range all the way from a Marxism so radical as to place itself to the left of both Soviet and Chinese régimes, at the one extreme, to outlooks founded mainly on an uneasiness about American policy in Asia generally and a desire for minor modifications in the security arrangements that would give Japan greater influence and freedom of action in shaping them to the needs of the future. They reflect the strong feelings that prevail in Japan on the subject of nuclear weapons. They reflect the resentments and sense of humiliation that so naturally surround any maintenance of foreign military establishments on a country's territory. They reflect even more intensely the unfavorable reports received in Japan about the state of affairs in Okinawa: the size of the American military establishment there, the burden it imposes on the local population, the depressingly narrow limits in which it has been allegedly willing to concede the rights of self-government, the uncertainty concerning the future of this island. They reflect pessimism about the prospects for success of American policies in Korea and South-east Asia. Above all, they reflect an uneasiness about American policy toward China.

One has to visit Japan to appreciate the extent to which Communist China now dominates the external horizon of Japanese opinion and the depth of the desire there for better relations

with

detonating a nuclear device, however limited its real military significance in the light of advances elsewhere in the development of such weaponry, may be expected to throw into Japanese opinion a shock which will take the most varied, partly contradictory, forms, and will put Japanese-American relations to a severe test.

For the present, if there are any changes that are needed in the Japanese-American security arrangements, they would seem to be small ones, and ones of degree—designed merely to eliminate rough edges and to achieve better understanding. Commendable progress has already been made in reducing the number of the American forces stationed in Japan and in limiting the inconvenience and annoyance they bring to their Japanese hosts. The presence in Tokyo of an American Ambassador sensitive to all shades and sectors of Japanese opinion, conversant with the Japanese language, culture and history, and supported by a highly trained and competent staff, has already done much to dissipate the misunderstandings which American diplomacy, as well as the military presence, have encountered. The tasks of intellectual mediation between these two countries, where the technical difficulties of communication are truly formidable, is one for specialists. It is not accomplished, as many Americans like to believe, merely by thrusting ordinary people together and "letting them get to know each other." That the United States Government has recognized this represents the most positive contribution it has made in recent times to the development of relations with Japan, and one which—if properly supported at home—may be expected to bear further fruit.

The specific point at which, for the moment, there is greatest opportunity for improvement is probably Okinawa. Here, all one could ask is that the American military authorities bear in mind that the fate of the Okinawans is something to which Japanese opinion is extremely sensitive. With the appointment in August of a new High Commissioner to the Ryukyus, there has seemed to be a new recognition that there can be instances where measures to curtail the weight of the American military establishment, as it rests on the local population, are warranted by regard for Japanese opinion even if they constitute something less than the military ideal.

The longer future is a different matter. It presents both greater dangers and greater possibilities. The present Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security has a ten-year term. It does not

automatically

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

秘

大務外 務次官 臣官審長	総番号(TA) 2/003 67年6月1日20時20分 67年6月2日09時43分	主管 北 本省着
電管 儀文会厚 国参 長	外務大臣殿	須部大使 総領事 臨時代理
北東 長総中西	小がさわら問題	
北 長	第1423号 略	
南旅 長	マンスフィールド上院議員は / 日ほう邦人記者 (往電第 404号と係別人) に対し、オキナワ問題はベトナム戦争 との関係上 / 1970年までに解決されると思えないが、 。小がさわら問題の方は、はるかに容いてあるから日本 としてはこちらを先に取上げた方が得策かも知れず、先ず がさわら、次いでオキナワというTWO-STAGE方式 も考えられるのではないかと思う旨述べた趣。同記者が 員に語つたところ何ら御参考まで。	
西東 長		(3)
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経陪 協政技 長		
協 長		
経科 長		
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