

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

## 日米関係（沖縄返還）34

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ライシャワー  
教授

(回覧番号) 外務省電信案 (分類)

機密表示 (極秘・秘の朱印) 電信課 機 平	符号表示 略 平	※ 総第 55195 号
	※ 第 2211 号	※ 昭和 43 年 11 月 29 日 21 時 17 分 発
	大至急 (至急) 普通・LTF	※ 発電係 七六

(※印刷内は電信課記入)

大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官房長	主管 アメリカ局長 参事官 北米課長	主管局部課(室)名 アメリカ局北米課 起案 昭和43年11月29日 起案者 赤沢 電話番号 672
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協議先

在 下田 (大使) 臨時代理大使  
総領事 代 理 であて 佐藤外務大臣 臨時代理

電 在 大使 臨時代理大使  
報 報 総領事 代 理 であて

件名  
ライオン教授等にF3共同研究報告書発表

外電にF3共同研究報告書発表 (標記の△)

報告書「米口の課題」(12月6日発刊予定)の中

「ライオン教授が沖縄の早期返還を提唱した

こと。同報告書要旨及び本件報告に全経緯等

含め参考として調査の上、電ありたい。

一併が発刊の際、一部署送ありたい。

29 134

写 済

北米課

(昭和四二七一改正)

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電信写

大政事外外	68年11月29日22時35分	72111	密
次次	68年11月30日12時49分	本省	密
駐官官密	外務大臣殿	下田	臨時代理大使 総領事 代理
借入会管	ブリツキング・インステイテューションによる米国の直		
総又通原	する内外諸問題に関する報告書		
領参旅移	第3413号 略 至急		
領参参	貴電米北第2211号に関し		
領参参	1. 本件報告書(12月6日発かん予定)は、ブルツキ		
領参参	グ・インステイテューションが米国の直面する内外の諸問		
領参参	題についてそれぞれ専門分野の学者に依しよくしてとり		
領参参	とめたものであり、18項目(620ページ)から成つ		
領参参	ている。すなわち、内政問題はヴィエトナム戦後の予算、		
領参参	種、住たく問題、犯罪及び法の問題、教育問題、労働及び		
領参参	経済問題等10項目から成り、他方外交問題は対西欧関係		
領参参	、米ソ関係、対太平洋関係、中近東、ドルと世界経済、軍		
領参参	事戦略と軍縮等8項目から成っている。その執びつ者は、		
領参参	一パート・クライン、キツシンガーの如きニクソン側近も		
領参参	含まれているが、他方シニルツ前予算局長、ジェイムズ・		
領参参	トピンはくし、ライシヤワー、ケイセン等いわゆる民主		
領参参	系学者も含まれており、執びつ者はそれぞれの専門分野		
領参参	において米国の直面する政策上の諸問題を判り易く説明し		
領参参	ている。		

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2. 本件報告書の作成はブルツキング・インステイテューションが大統領選挙の年に当り、米国の直面する内政及び外交上の政策問題につき広く一般の理解に資するためかねてから計画していたものであり、前述の如き執びつ者がかねてから判るとおり、ニクソン政権の下でとられると予想される政策的方向付けを提示したものでないことはもとより、分担した専門家の私見もかなり含まれていると見るべきである。もとより、次期政権としてもこれら一流の諸学者による提言に対しそれなりの注目を寄せることは考えられるが、本報告に寄せられている報告の全てが新政権の政策へ導入されてゆくものと見るべきではなからう。

3. ライシヤワー教授は外交問題のうち、アジア政策に関する項を分たんしており(右裏頁別電のとおり)、その論文はヴィエトナム、対中国政策、その他の後進諸国問題、日本の役割と対日政策等9項目から成っている。同教授がかねてからの持論を展開している点では新味はないが、政策MINDで執びつしている点で注目すべく、特に対日関係については、ヴィエトナム戦争後における日本のしめる重要性、特にアジアにおけるポリセントリズムの育成における日本の役割及び世界における勢力均等下での日本の役割を重視し、日米関係において日本が独自性を有することの重要性(短期的にも長期的にも)を指摘し、日本政府



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及び国民の SENSITIVITY を十分に理解し、日米関係の IRRITATION を MINIMIZE するべく注意深く政策を展開することが必要であると強調している。すなわち、オキナワについてはこれを 70 年までに核ぬきへんかんすべきであり、右が困難ならば 70 年以内に早期へんかんのメドをつけるべきであると指摘している。

4. 本件報告書に関する 29 日現在の当地紙報道に関する限り、米国の財政、経済、人種及び住たぐ問題に関する部分はかなり大きく取り上げられているが、外交問題の取扱いはむしろひかえ目であり、その意味でも同教授の諸提言が次期政権の対日政策の重要なドキュメントたるよりは、そこに間接的効果を見出せる程度のペーパーに止まるのではないかと考えられる。

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68 年 11 月 29 日 24 時 00 分 ワシントン 発  
 68 年 11 月 30 日 14 時 36 分 本省 着

外務大臣 閣下 田 次郎 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

ブルッキング・インスティテュションによる米国の直面する内外の諸題に関する報告書（アジア問題部分）

第 3454 号 平 至急

往電第 3443 号別電

ライオン・教授のオキナワ問題及び日米関係に関する部分の要旨次のとおり。

(イ) 西太平洋における主要な米軍基地であるオキナワをめぐる問題は、日米間における最大の問題である。米國がアジアの主要な同盟国の約百万にもなる市民をアジアに占領し続けることはだれが見てもとうてい健全なすがたとは言えない。オキナワの支配は、これまでは日本の不安定な政情とも関連付けて種々理由付けがなされてきたが、それらは何れも問題を後向きにとらえてきた。米國に与えられた OROIC 等は日本と友好な防衛体制を維持し続け、基地が必要ならば日本本土及びオキナワの両方に基地を保存するか、あるいは両者の何れにも有効な基地をもち得ず、かつ、徹底的な日本と対するかの何れかである。今や

- 大政事外務省
- 事務次官
- 官官審長
- 個人会管計
- 文書給
- 参旅移
- 参領
- 参長
- 参副
- 参中
- 参南
- 参東
- 参ア
- 参近
- 参南
- 参調
- 参結
- 参通
- 参経
- 参協
- 参枝
- 参国
- 参協
- 参至
- 参軍
- 参政
- 参内
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（イ）オキナワは日本に返かんすべきであり、少なくとも同様に返かんについての明確、かつ、早期の期日が決まるべきである。

（ロ）オキナワ基地における核兵器の存在は問題を一層複雑にし、核付き返かんでは日本国民は満足しそでない。日本の一部保守的有識者の中には日本の核アレルギー克服の手段として米國が返かん後も核配置の権利を主張することを希望する向きもあるが、これは米國の利益に合らぬ。オキナワの核配置は最早必要でなく、望ましくもない。この点はオキナワ問題解決の努力において、同問題が解決におえなくなつてどうしようもなくなり、日米関係全般がBERKADOWNに至る前に米國が懸歩すべき点なのである。

（ハ）日本本土における基地問題と日米間の相互防衛体制を重要な制限を加えることなく、日本国内にせん在するIRRAWADDIを最小限にするため、防衛関係及びその問題について真けんに再検討する時期にきている。問題を軍事的側面よりは政治的側面より理解するならば、防衛能力を大きく損失することなく、多くの危険な要素を除去できるであろう。

（ニ）日米関係に影響を与える要素として、中共問題及び台湾問題がある。日中関係の現状は米國の対中国政策の如何より、中華民国、韓国等日本の近隣諸国との

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関係も大いにあり得るとみられる。それにしても、米國が対中国政策についていくらかでも変更するならば日本の対米世論は変わってくるであろう。しかし、米國がとる対中国政策については前迄に日本政府と協議することが必要であり、米國の積置について通報しない場合には日本政府をいたくEMBASSYさせることとなる。

経済問題については、所せん利益のしよう突が起るのは当然であるが、米國は、日本の特別のSENSITIVITYを十分認識すべきであり、特に西欧工業国に対しては通常適用されない差別待遇は日本に対しても適用しないように注意すべきである。

（ホ）米國がアジアのLESS CRUCIAL AREAに対する政策に悩まされてきたがため、もつとVITALな日米関係が危機にさらされてきた。今や米國は、対太平洋地域政策の主要な、そしておそらく最も重要な要素は日本と共に相互に利益をもたらす関係を維持、強化する努力をすべき立場にあることをとる要がある。

2. 以上同教授の論旨はヴェトナム戦争終結の態様如何を前提としている。すなわち、ヴェトナムについては、不確定要素が多く見通し困難であるが、おおむねに言つて、

（イ）戦争継続ないしは拡大（ロ）米軍の突然の一方的撤退及び（ハ）米軍は撤退するが米國は依然としてアジアと



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及び(ロ)の場合は日本を含めアジア諸國で危険な対米不信が生じ、政策転換が行なわれるとともに、米國が極端な自立主義の方向にはしるおそれがあるので政策目標たり得ず、(ハ)の場合を前提として米國のアジア政策を考えるしかない旨主張している。

アイシャワーは(ハ)のような事態を表現する方法として、交渉による解決または段階的撤兵及び兩者を組み合わせた形をあげ、その実現には時間的要素が決定的重要性を持つとして、1、2年のうちにこれが実現しない場合は(イ)または(ロ)の段階的事態を迎える可能性が強いと述べ、早期和平実現の重要性を主張している。そして、1970年までにウイトナム戦争が終結しないかあるいは終結へのはつきりした見通しがみえない場合には、日米安保条約は重大な危険にさらされるかもしれないと指摘している。

3. ウイトナム問題につぐ点として中国情勢及び対中国政策転換(CHANGE OF AMERICAN POLICY ON CHINA)をとらうとも、中共側はこれを容れに受け入れようとはしないであろうが、米側のかかる措置は中共に対する心理的圧力を少くし、将来におけるより積極的な和解への道を開くことになり、あるいは米國との平和共存政策をしようとする指針を台頭させること

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とになると期待される旨指摘している。他方、台湾政府の取扱いについては、台湾島民(PEOPLE OF TAIWAN)の大多数が中共の支配をほつしていない以上は、米中和解が遅れることとなつてもやむを得ず、米國の対台湾コミットにつき断力的であつてはならないと指摘している。

4. 次に同教授はアジアの低開発諸國の問題をとりあげ、その主たる問題は外敵の攻撃よりも国内的事情に基づく不安定であると規定した上、米國のとるべき政策方向として(イ)経済援助、(ロ)軍事的、政治的支援、(ハ)内政不かい入の3原則をあげ、(a.)以上3者のうち経済援助に最重点を置き、あわせてこれがずると軍事援助、かい入に拡大せぬよう留意する(ロ)軍事的支援については中共等の核攻撃のきよういに対し全ての諸國に核保証を与え、あわせて西太平洋に十分な軍事力を置き米國のOPTIONにより必要に応じこれら諸國を支援できる体制を維持する。ただし、その基地はグアム、ハワイ、米本土を主体とし、日本との軍事的協力も維持を要しようが低開発諸國の基地はむしろ原則として撤去の方向で考えるべきである。(c.)かかる政策転換に必要なのはコミットメントの変更よりもむしろ態度の変更であり、露、N. Z.、韓国については従来通りでよい。台湾、フィリピンも同様であるが特に此の場合には国内的不安定の問題があり、場合に

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よつては在比基地の撤退を含めその国内問題にまき込まれないようにする必要がある。従来のアジア諸国との関係の基本的方向を示すのはタイとの関係であり。経済援助と軍事面での支援は続けるが、基地は撤去し、国内の紛争への介入は回避するとの方向で考えるべきである。(d) アジア諸国の中立化傾向はむしろ歓迎すべきであり、また長期的観点より地域協力を支援すべきである旨論じている

(テキスト發送済み)

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寫

送 付 公 信

政 第 8907 号	昭和 43 年 11 月 29 日	
外 務 大 臣 殿	在 米 下 田 大 使	
引用公信・電信番号 <u>貴電米北才3443号</u>		
送 付 資 料 <u>往</u>		
<p>ブルックリン研究所による米国の内外 諸問題に関する報告書抜萃(ライナー 論文)の送付 (18部)</p> <p>"TRANS PACIFIC RELATIONS" BY: EDWIN O. REISCHAUER</p>		
付属添付 <input type="checkbox"/>	付属空便(行) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	付属空便(D.P.) <input type="checkbox"/>
本信写送付先:		(別添省略)

昭 43.11.29付 政第 8907号

付展 (ライブラリー論文)

外 務 省

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EDWIN O. REISCHAUER

## TRANSPACIFIC RELATIONS

When we look across the Atlantic, we may find elements of uncertainty and change in our foreign policies, but when we look across the Pacific, everything seems in doubt. The outcome of the Vietnam war is still unknown; the reaction of the American people to this outcome is even less clear; developments within China are an enigma, and China's role abroad is uncertain; our chief alliance—with Japan—seems more threatened than our European ties; and the future of the 850 million people in the Indian subcontinent and the other noncommunist lands of South and East Asia is quite incalculable. Worst of all, we are not agreed on the underlying concepts for our transpacific policies. While the conceptual basis for our transatlantic relations needs some refining, our whole approach to Asia must be rethought and reconstructed almost *de novo*.

### *General Perspectives*

Americans have come to assume that, as a nation, we have immediate, vital interests in the transpacific area, and in the past three decades we have fought three major wars in defense of these interests as we saw them. It is accepted as a truism that we are a Pacific as well as an Atlantic power. For most of our history, however, we saw no interests sufficient to justify large-scale wars in Asia. For a century and a half we were interested in our share of the trade with the noncolonial parts of Asia; we sought opportunities and protection for our missionaries; we came to champion the "open door" and territorial integrity of China as a way of keeping open this vast sector of humanity to private American trade, missionary activity, and at times investment; we inadvertently acquired a colony in the Philippines and perceived a strategic vulnerability resulting from this piece of transpacific

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territory; but none of these interests or involvements were seen by most Americans as a matter of vital national concern.

It was not until the early 1940s, when a rapidly modernizing, industrialized Japan threatened to establish hegemony over the whole of East Asia and this possibility became coupled with a threat of Nazi German hegemony over Western Europe, that we saw our vital interests menaced and became engaged in our first major transpacific war. We came out of that war with the dream that continued cooperation with the Soviet Union and the emergence of a friendly China as the dominant transpacific power would give East Asia stability. We soon awoke to the unreality of this concept and saw ourselves facing instead the threat of a new hostile hegemony in Asia. First we saw this as hegemony by an expanding, Moscow-dominated, international communist movement, which, by gaining control over the vast "third world," might tip the balance of world power decisively against the "free world." The victory of the Chinese Communists over the Nationalists was seen as part of this threat, and the Korean war fitted the pattern. Seen in this light, the stopping of a clear, conventional aggression in Korea was necessary to the defense of vital American interests.

The Vietnam war, despite its origin as an anticolonial, nationalist revolution, was also seen as part of the threat of communist hegemony in Asia, though carried out by subtler techniques of subversion and proxy warfare. Our involvement was based on this view and on the assumption that, unless this wave of indirect aggression were stopped at the dike we were manning in Vietnam, it would spread widely over Asia. In the course of the war, our concept of the source of the threat has shifted from a supposedly unified communist movement to a resurgent, neo-imperialist China; but the fear of hegemony by a hostile power over the half of the world's population that lives in East and South Asia is unchanged.

Today this whole conceptual basis for our transpacific policies is in serious doubt. If the threat of hegemony is real, then we probably cannot stop it by the methods we have adopted. We have found ourselves less able to suppress internal subversion and fight a guerrilla war in an Asian country than we had assumed. Far from preventing the flood waters of communism or Chinese domination from spreading by manning the dikes in Vietnam, we have become so deeply mired there that we could not meet similar challenges elsewhere in Asia without first extricating ourselves from Vietnam. The war has also proved far more costly to our world-wide position

than we had ever imagined, and the divisiveness it has caused within our body politic much more disruptive. The early ending of the war has become a national imperative. Even if we are able to achieve this on terms satisfactory to us, the popular reaction against the war at home and abroad would probably preclude similar involvements in other Asian countries in the foreseeable future.

The threat of hegemony by any power over Asia, however, is empty, as the Vietnam war has shown. Vietnam may be a less-developed country, but it is no power vacuum. An Asian people, inspired by nationalism and armed with the techniques of guerrilla warfare, is no longer weakly susceptible to domination by foreign military forces. The Japanese army discovered this truth in the late 1930s in China. We and the French and Dutch had to relearn the lesson after the war.

The old imperialism is dead, and there is no room for new forms of imperialism. Asian countries cannot be controlled from abroad, even through communism or any other ideology. The postwar history of Asia, particularly the determined stand of communist Asians—Chinese, Koreans, and Vietnamese—against any foreign domination, shows that nationalism runs much deeper than political ideologies. There is no reason to believe that neo-imperialists, whether they be international communists or Chinese, can dominate other Asian nations any more successfully than we, the Japanese, or the French.

Nor would control over the less-developed nations of Asia, even if possible, give the controller increased power. These countries are for the most part deficit areas economically, draining rather than enriching a nation that tries to dominate them. Even though they are capable of generating great military strength within their own borders, this strength cannot be marshaled by outsiders. Nor do they have the industrial capacity to permit them or their dominators to project what power they have far afield. External control over less-developed nations in Asia would tend to weaken rather than strengthen the controller.

Thus we find the major objective of our past policies toward Asia, as epitomized by our involvement in Vietnam, impossible to achieve and unnecessary in any case. It may be true that the development of a hostile hegemony over Asia would be against our interests, but in this age of rampant nationalism this threat is only a remote one and therefore should not dominate our policies. We are in need of a new conceptual basis for our transpacific relations.

A multilateral balance of forces in Asia seems far more probable than any sort of hegemony and is fully compatible with our own interests. The achievement of this positive objective should be the major thrust of our efforts rather than the negative policy of preventing hegemony. We can perhaps best contribute to this outcome by consciously avoiding the polarization of power in Asia between ourselves and China and by helping to strengthen the other elements of a multilateral balance of forces.

We need also to distinguish clearly between immediate and long-range interests. Our frantic efforts to stop the supposed threat of hegemony made all problems in Asia seem to be matters of immediate concern. With this threat properly downgraded, our interests in the less-developed countries of Asia, including China, will be seen to be for the most part long range. Their trade and products are not vital to us; nor could they individually or collectively constitute any grave threat to our national interests in the near future.

Over the long run, however, the situation is very different. These countries hold half the population of the world. As distances shrink, and relations between all countries become closer and more fully integrated, and technical skills, including nuclear capabilities, spread, as inevitably will happen, this vast mass of people will come to have increasing impact on our own well-being. If the present great gaps in living standards and opportunities between them and us persist, producing growing resentments on their part, a time may come when a world divided between privileged and underprivileged nations will be in as serious trouble as is a city or country to which permits great discrepancies of opportunity between its citizens. Our chief interest in the less-developed countries of Asia, thus, is in their long-range growth into more prosperous, stable, and satisfied members of a world community.

By contrast we have immediate, vital interests in Japan. It is the third largest industrial unit in the world. Its 100 million people produce two-thirds as great a gross national product as the billion and a half other people of East and South Asia combined. It is growing economically far more rapidly than the rest of Asia as a whole—indeed, roughly twice as fast. As a consequence, our relations of mutual benefit with Japan are far greater than with the rest of Asia and will continue to be so well into the future. For example, Japan follows Canada as our second largest trading partner, accounting for roughly a tenth of our foreign trade. Its industrial power makes it a potential major weight in a world balance of power. It

also gives it a capacity no other Asian country has to influence, through economic power and technological skills, the future of the rest of Asia, in ways either favorable or adverse to our interests. And because of geography and Japan's great potentialities, our relationships, both military and political, with most of the rest of the transpacific area are heavily dependent on the nature of our relationship with Japan. Friendship and close cooperation with Japan, as with Western Europe, are therefore matters of immediate, as well as long-term, concern to the United States.

#### A Vietnam Settlement

Such general principles may be easy to outline, but their translation into specific policies depends on what actually happens in the next few years in a number of highly uncertain and fast-changing situations in Asia. A discussion of the relative merits of specific policies must be subordinated to a consideration of the wide spectrum of possibilities in Asia and an estimation of the probabilities among these various possibilities.

To start with the Vietnam war, an early end may be imperative for the United States, but as of the present writing, the precise nature and timing of a settlement are far from clear. It is perfectly possible that the war will continue for some time on its present or on an expanded scale, that it will be settled through negotiation, or that the United States will in time withdraw unilaterally.

It is hard to believe that a continued or expanded war could lead to either a complete military victory or a complete military defeat for the United States. Much more likely would be a continued stalemate, which because of domestic and world-wide pressures on the United States would probably not be maintainable over the long run, thus producing at a later time one of the two other solutions—a negotiated settlement or withdrawal. The only other possible outcomes of a continued war would be war with China (which neither side could win) or, perhaps less likely, a nuclear holocaust with the Soviet Union.

A negotiated settlement would almost certainly entail the withdrawal of American military power from South Vietnam. What it produces for the South Vietnamese might be a noncommunist but more or less neutral South Vietnamese regime, a communist-leaning country, a chaotic disintegration of all central government, or a thinly disguised communist take-

over. All of these seem perfectly possible end results, and it would be hard to assign degrees of probability among them.

American withdrawal might come suddenly because of the collapse of the Saigon government—we would have no other choice, since a puppet or colonial regime would not be a viable alternative today—or because of the collapse of the American home front as a result of violent antiwar sentiment. More probable would be a gradual American withdrawal if a negotiated settlement proves unachievable and domestic and international pressures make it impossible to prosecute the war indefinitely. Such a withdrawal would probably be achieved through a phased transfer of military and other responsibilities from the American forces to the South Vietnamese and a corresponding, step-by-step withdrawal of American and allied forces. This "de-Americanization" of the war is a relatively likely outcome and could produce either a collapse of Saigon or a settlement by Saigon with the Vietnamese Communists somewhere along the spectrum of possible negotiated outcomes outlined above.

What the result of the war proves to be within Vietnam is not in itself of vital importance to the United States. In hindsight, it now seems probable that, if we had never become involved in Vietnam, it would have developed into a unified communist state which would have served as a more effective bar to the expansion of Chinese power than the present war-torn country and, because of fears of Chinese domination, might have been relatively friendly toward the United States, in the Yugoslav style. Because of the war, such a favorable outcome now seems less likely, but in any case, the intense nationalism of the Vietnamese will probably keep Vietnam free of Chinese control or exploitation, and even a unified communist Vietnam, being after all only a relatively small and less-developed country, is not itself likely to prove much of a threat to crucial American interests.

Even though the actual outcome of the war in Vietnam itself may not be of vital concern to us, its impact on us and the rest of the world is of major importance. A humiliating, precipitate withdrawal by the United States or a negotiated settlement that was perceived by the American public as a "sellout" would probably produce a popular revulsion that could lead to dangerous rigidities in our foreign policies in general and might carry this country into a mood of isolationist unconcern for the less-developed nations of Asia and an unwillingness to make significant contributions through economic aid to their future development. (The current downtrend in economic aid appropriations is a clear sign of this

danger.) The longer the war lasts and the higher its costs, the greater is the likelihood of these reactions of frustration.

A humiliating, precipitate withdrawal or a sellout would also have adverse repercussions throughout most of Asia, and these would be strengthened by any signs of isolationism in the United States. The communist countries of Asia and subversive elements in the noncommunist states might well be inclined to accept the Maoist doctrine that the United States is, after all, nothing but a "paper tiger" and might, therefore, be encouraged in their efforts to carry out subversion and revolutions throughout Asia, thus making the communist or Chinese ambitions of hegemony a little more plausible and the healthy development of the area somewhat less probable. Neighboring countries, such as Thailand, which depend on American defense commitments, would seriously doubt the continued value of these commitments and would look desperately for other roads to security. India would probably be encouraged to develop its own nuclear weapons, and the Japanese, too, would feel that they must put more emphasis on their own defense, possibly including a nuclear capacity.

Curiously enough, the same result would probably be produced in Japan by a long continuation of the war or its escalation. The argument would gain strength that American military adventurism endangers an allied Japan more than the alliance with the United States provides security, and as a result the mutual security treaty might be broken. This in turn could force the United States to withdraw from mid-Pacific, regardless of how the Vietnam war came out, and might induce the Japanese to go in heavily for rearmament, including the development of nuclear weapons. The result could be the reemergence of the historical and still perhaps most plausible of all possible threats of hegemony in East Asia.

To summarize the conceivable outcomes in Vietnam, we have three broad possibilities: The war may continue indefinitely or even escalate; but this course is likely to lead to a bigger and more dangerous war, a breakdown of our relations with Japan (and possibly with some of our European allies, too), or eventually a massive repudiation of the war at home—or probably some combination of these disasters. A second possibility is a forced, precipitate withdrawal or an obvious sellout, which would be such a humiliation for the United States as to undermine the confidence of Asian countries in us and to produce in the American public a sullen isolationist mood toward Asia, leaving us with little leverage to

influence future developments in the transpacific part of the world. Both of these two categories of possibilities would be so disadvantageous to the United States as to be unacceptable as policy objectives.

This leaves us with a third, middle category of possibilities as the only acceptable outcome and the one that our government must do its best to achieve. The rest of this chapter presupposes this outcome, since the other two would so change the situation as to make further speculation at this time about American transpacific policies quite pointless. This middle category would be an ending of the war within a year or so, but in such a way as to leave Americans, despite a complete military withdrawal from Vietnam, still broadly concerned in the future of Asia and Asians still looking to the United States for a continuing, even if less conspicuous, role in their part of the world.

This general result preferably would be the product of a negotiated settlement which, whatever the ultimate outcome in South Vietnam, was not considered by Americans or Asians to be simply a sellout. A negotiated settlement might encompass an agreement between the United States and North Vietnam for mutual military withdrawal from South Vietnam, an agreement made largely between the Saigon government and the Vietcong for a cease-fire and steps toward the achievement of a mutually acceptable political system for South Vietnam, and, it is to be hoped, some international guarantees regarding these agreements and the security of neighboring countries, specifically Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand.

Failing such a negotiated settlement, the acceptable middle outcome would probably have to be achieved through a phased de-Americanization of the war—that is, a gradual unilateral withdrawal. To the extent that de-Americanization could be combined with a successful buildup of the Saigon government, both politically and militarily, and a resultant strengthening of Saigon's bargaining power, it presents perhaps the most realistic road to a middle-range settlement. Possibly such an outcome will be reached through a combination of the de-Americanization process and negotiations. It might even result from a precipitate pullout if, for example, a collapse of the Saigon government was seen as wiping out American commitments.

In any case, however, the matter of timing is crucial. In view of the repercussions of the war both within the United States and abroad, a middle-range outcome will have to be achieved within a year or at the most two, or else one of the other less desirable endings is likely to be unavoidable.



*The Prospects for China*

Assuming an ending to the Vietnam war of this general type, we should next look at the spectrum of possibilities among the other major variables in Asia. Of these China is probably the biggest and most puzzling. Its huge population—close to a quarter of humanity—combined with a rapid rate of economic growth in the first decade after the Communists took over in 1949 made it seem an incipient third superpower, or to more traditional minds a revived "Golden Horde" or "yellow peril." But in more recent years, the follies of the Great Leap Forward and the disruptions caused by the Cultural Revolution and Red Guard excesses have greatly slowed economic growth—at times to a standstill—and have even threatened centralized control. The country seems to be riven by a deep ideological struggle between Maoist fundamentalists, who stress the importance of right ideas (one hears clear overtones of the ancient Confucian belief in the innate goodness or, at least, perfectibility through education of human nature as the key to all social order), and more pragmatic men, who lay emphasis on technical knowledge and skills. In the course of this conflict, the command structures of both the government and the Communist party have been seriously damaged, and a new command system, apparently based in large part on the army, is still only in the process of development.

This situation gives rise to a wide range of estimates as to China's future stability and growth. Some, influenced by the century of disruption, warlordism, and civil war that preceded the Communist victory, predict the dissolution of China into warlord satrapies. In the light of Chinese success for over two millennia in holding together the world's largest political unit and the general cohesiveness and remarkable political skills shown by the Communist leadership in the past two decades, this outcome seems improbable despite the present disorders. It may be that, in such a huge country, it will prove necessary to develop patterns of greater decentralization and increased local autonomy, but it is unlikely that such a relaxation of central control would proceed to the point where it seriously limits Chinese foreign policy or endangers, rather than enhances, the chances for economic growth.

But even granted the probability of continued unity, rapid economic growth seems unlikely in China in the near future. The damage done to

the command structure must be restored before this would be possible. The reconstruction of the political system will at best require a year or two, and unless the struggle in Peking over basic approaches is resolved soon, the economic slowdown might continue much longer. It would probably take a clear victory by the pragmatists (who would be inclined to place more stress on technical education and skills and on sources of external aid in the Soviet Union or noncommunist nations) before a rapid growth rate could be restored. In our present state of ignorance, however, it would be useless to speculate as to how likely this is.

Thus political uncertainties in China preclude firm estimates regarding its economic prospects. A reasonable guess, however, would be that Chinese growth rates will stay below the average for the less-developed countries of Asia during the next five years. Compared with Japan, China will undoubtedly lose ground as an economic power. Its gross national product is only about two-thirds that of Japan at present, and over the next five years its growth rate is likely to be only a half or a third as high. The discrepancy in economic power between China and the United States or the Soviet Union is even greater—perhaps one-eighth of ours and one-fourth of the Soviets'—and these great gaps are not likely to shrink in the next few years. Thus, relative to the outside world, China is likely to become weaker economically during the next five years rather than stronger.

China's domestic political and economic prospects are of interest to us largely for their possible influence on its foreign policies. There can be no doubt about China's hostility toward the United States or, for that matter, toward most of the outside world. In part, this is the product of a fundamentalist belief in the Marxist-Leninist premises that capitalism produces imperialism and imperialism leads to war and that the only cure for this menacing situation is world-wide communist revolution. The United States, as the largest "capitalist" nation, is seen as the chief enemy—the major threat to China's safety and world peace; any country that cooperates with us is regarded as an accomplice; and the Soviet Union and other communists who tolerate "peaceful coexistence" are scorned as traitors to the cause.

Communist dogma, however, is not the sole source of Chinese hostility toward us and the rest of the world. It springs more deeply from a sense of national humiliation at the hands of outsiders—particularly the West. For long, Chinese thought of themselves as constituting the only nation of true civilization, the Central Country, surrounded only by barbarians. For

most, if not all, of China's twenty-two centuries of existence as a more or less unified political system, it has been the largest political unit in the world, and for a thousand years (roughly 600 to 1600) it was the most advanced in most measurable terms. Deep Chinese assumptions of superiority have been rudely challenged during the past century by crude domination, exploitation, and constant humiliation at the hands of outside powers, mostly Western. The Chinese have a great hungering, not just for communist revolution throughout the world, but for the restoration of their country to the position of a great world leader—perhaps the greatest world leader, as the nation that sets the pace toward the promised land of the true faith.

The combination of communist belief and Chinese pride—the exact mix is debatable—helps explain China's hostility toward almost all of the outside world. It also underlies China's extreme sensitivity to the supposed American menace and its determined efforts to undermine the United States and most other nations through world-wide revolution. Maoists see this—in terms of their own revolutionary experience—as the mobilization of the world peasantry (the masses of the less-developed nations) against the landlords and city bourgeoisie of the world (the former colonial powers and the advanced nations in general). The question, however, is to what extent China is willing to translate these attitudes and hopes into action abroad and how successful it will be in its efforts.

First comes the question of China's will and capacity for military aggressiveness. Its traditional tendency to look inward rather than outward and its constant emphasis on revolution rather than military conquest suggest that conventional military aggression does not figure prominently in Chinese strategy. The very violence of China's rhetoric tends to strengthen (and perhaps purposely so) China's isolation and actual inward-looking stance. Nor have past military involvements on the part of the Chinese Communists been, at least in their own eyes, aggressive. Their participation in the Korean war was to fend off an American military threat to their Manchurian industrial base. As they remembered all too well, the Japanese road to imperialist domination had led from South Korea through North Korea into Manchuria. The Tibetan campaign was to bring back under control an errant province China had ruled, albeit loosely, for some centuries. The war on the Indian frontier, as the Chinese saw it, was to clarify a border line which the Indians, like their British rulers before them, had refused to respect. The provision of weapons and construction battalions

to North Vietnam has been to help a fraternal country keep the American threat away from another of China's menaced borders. Thus the Chinese, for all their bellicose verbiage, have not in fact proved military expansionists.

China's capacity for military aggression also seems to be as limited as its will. Its huge populations, xenophobic nationalism, and experience in mass organization and guerrilla warfare make it an unbeatable adversary on its own terrain. It is very formidable in directly contiguous areas, as we discovered in North Korea and would probably again in North Vietnam if we pushed close to the Chinese frontiers there. But China does not possess the sea and air power or the logistic capacities to extend its military power far from home. The Chinese, with their massive land armies, could probably overrun nearby countries like Burma, Vietnam, or Thailand, but they probably could not hold them, much less exploit them successfully, if strong pressure were put on their lines of communication and there were, as seems predictable, determined nationalistic opposition within these countries. In fact, the weak Chinese economy might collapse under the strain of even such modest conquests. Successful occupation of a huge and much more distant country like India would be out of the question and conquest of overseas countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan a mere pipe dream—unless all naval power disappeared from the western Pacific.

The development by China of nuclear weapons does not change the military equation greatly. Peking will probably have a modest deliverable capacity within the next five years, and this in theory will give it a chance to play the game of nuclear blackmail against its nonnuclear neighbors. It seems very doubtful, however, that a Chinese nuclear threat will be credible enough to have much blackmail value. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could afford to let such a threat go unchallenged, and it seems altogether likely that they would see their interests in the matter coinciding in opposition to China's. Under these circumstances and in view of China's tiny nuclear capacity as compared with that of either the United States or the Soviet Union, it seems inconceivable that China would wish to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, and it is improbable therefore that its neighbors would feel themselves greatly menaced by them.

The reason why the Chinese have expended so much of their meager technical skills and resources on developing a nuclear capacity probably



lies in their hope of enhancing thereby their claim to be a superpower and of deterring, even a little, what they regard as the American threat to China. They could not have hoped that their feeble nuclear arsenal, in the face of vastly greater ones, would give them much leverage over their neighbors. The impact of a Chinese nuclear capacity is much more psychological than military—in strengthening their own self-esteem and in stimulating desires among their neighbors, particularly Indians but also Japanese to some extent, to develop nuclear weapons, too. This double psychological influence has in large part already had its effect. The further development of nuclear weapons by China is therefore not likely to have a great added impact of any sort.

In this connection, the proposed development by the United States of a "thin" ABM (antiballistic missile) defense against China seems particularly unwise. It is obviously not needed to deter a Chinese nuclear attack against us and might therefore be interpreted by the Chinese as making an American nuclear attack on them more likely and by other Asians as insulating the United States from the Chinese nuclear problem. Thus, while not doing anything useful for the United States in terms of defense, it could increase Chinese fear and hostility and might help undermine the confidence of other Asian countries in our concern for their security.

China's economic capacity to extend its control over other countries is even more limited than its military ability. The almost exclusively Chinese population of Hong Kong and the largely Chinese population of Singapore make trade with China important to these two "city-states" (Hong Kong in addition is entirely defenseless against Chinese military power), but otherwise no Asian country has any important trade with China. Japan is China's chief trading partner, but a flow that amounted to about 13 percent of China's foreign trade in 1967 accounted for about 2.5 percent of Japan's. That Japan's trade should be about five times that of China's shows how small China's economic leverage is on the outside world. By careful concentration and manipulation, it can use its economic resources for political influence in some parts of the world (its efforts so far have been more in terms of promises than performance), but its capacities for wide and sustained economic influence are very meager when compared with those of the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, or the major European countries.

This leaves political influence and subversion as China's chief means of acquiring influence or possibly control over other Asian countries. There

can be no doubt about China's enthusiastic determination to spread subversion and revolution throughout the world, and it has considerable capacity to do so. During the past two decades, it has demonstrated its ability to exercise political influence, instigate subversion, train revolutionaries, and feed subversive and guerrilla movements with arms and supplies, not only in Asian countries, but as far afield as Africa.

China's record in these efforts, however, has been spotty. In the first heady decade of Communist rule, China's prestige and influence were high throughout much of the less-developed world, but both have dropped sharply in recent years. In part this has been a reflection of the troubles within China, in part the natural resentment of people everywhere to outside meddling. Each national group wants to march to its own drums. Appreciation for Chinese aid in starting a revolution can easily turn to fear of Chinese domination or resentment of Chinese arrogance, which is as great as that of any of the former colonial masters.

The large populations of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are considered by some to be a help to China in its subversive activities or in its more legitimate efforts to extend political influence. The influence of the overseas Chinese, however, is counterproductive to Chinese interests in some cases. In countries where the Chinese population runs high, such as Singapore (74 percent) and Malaysia (37 percent), direct Chinese influence or Chinese-backed subversion could be a very real threat. In areas with smaller Chinese populations, such as Indonesia (about 3 percent), popular resentments against the Chinese minority tend to offset China's influence and discredit Chinese-backed movements.

The threat of the spread of Chinese domination in Asia through political influence or subversion, while more real than the military and economic threats, is not very great and has its built-in limitations. To date no Chinese-instigated or supported subversion has succeeded, and some, as in Indonesia, have failed catastrophically. (Vietnam is not a case in point, since the revolution there has been from the first basically a native movement, and Chinese support has been significant only after it turned into a war between North Vietnam and the United States.) Nor is there any reason to believe that if a Chinese-backed subversive movement were successful it would remain for long under Chinese domination. The whole postwar history of communism points in the opposite direction. Thus subversion may prove a more feasible means than military aggression or economic pressure for China to bring down regimes in Asia that it dislikes, but it is not likely to be a way by which it can extend hegemony over Asia.

### China Policy

All this suggests that the containment of Chinese expansionism is not as serious a problem as has been assumed and that a China policy which centers on this concept is largely misdirected. This is particularly true since close-in military containment and the effort to keep China politically and economically isolated (which has usually accompanied this policy) tend to increase and perpetuate the psychological pressures that have helped produce Chinese hostility toward us. They heighten Chinese fears of America's supposed aggressiveness and exacerbate the old resentments of Western failure to perceive China's greatness and accord it true equality. At the same time, they have no appreciable curbing effect on the chief area of the Chinese threat, which is subversive activities.

The reasonable choices in China policy are relatively narrow, lying in the spectrum between continuing our present stance and an effort at reconciliation and the relaxation of tensions. The choice should not be difficult. Our present stance heightens Chinese hostility but otherwise is unproductive. An effort at reconciliation might produce no specific results, but it would at least lessen the psychological pressures which help generate Chinese intransigence and at the same time reduce the heavy costs we pay in much of the world for what is generally considered to be an unwise China policy.

To be specific, we should drop our sham that China exists only in the form of the small, rump Nationalist regime on Taiwan and admit clearly that continental China ruled from Peking is the true, historical China. We should drop our use of the word "containment" as applying specifically to China and subsume it under our world-wide stand against aggression. We should drop our pretense that our embargo on trade helps limit China's capacity to be an aggressor and should make clear our readiness to trade with China in nonstrategic goods. The truth of the matter is that China does all the trade of which it is capable, principally with our closest allies—Japan, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Canada, and Australia. We should drop our effort to keep China out of the United Nations. The moral judgment implied in the blackballing of the largest nonwhite nation by the most powerful white nation is deeply insulting to Chinese and irritating to many other people in the world. Communist China would probably be a disruptive force if it entered the United Nations, but this

would be less costly to us than our present blackball. In the long run, moreover, the educational value of China's presence in the United Nations in what it learned about the outside world and in what other U.N. members learned about China would probably more than outweigh its disruptive activities in the organization.

Such changes in American policies toward China should be accompanied by a relaxation of our close-in military containment. For example, we might remove our nuclear weapons from Okinawa, which are targeted on China but have been made obsolescent by Polaris submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). We also might eliminate all American bases in continental Southeast Asia in connection with the termination of the Vietnam war. This might not entail any curtailment of our capacity to stop Chinese aggression, because advances in technology are increasing our military mobility, but even if it did, this reduction in capacity would probably be more than offset by a decline in the likelihood of Chinese military action abroad. We should also favor, rather than oppose, an attitude of discreet respect and circumspect neutrality toward China on the part of its smaller neighbors. This is only natural and wise for small neighbors of big countries (for example, the attitude of Finland toward the Soviet Union), since by reducing tensions it would give these countries greater security than would open hostility.

China's responses to a changed American stance would probably not be great at least at first. It would probably not be prepared to let de facto recognition grow into diplomatic recognition. It probably would prefer not to trade with us—it has its economic hands full with our allies. It probably would not choose to enter the United Nations. But such a change of stance on our part would reduce the psychological pressures on China and open the way to a more positive reconciliation at some time in the future. It might even facilitate the emergence of a leadership in Peking that would be more inclined to adopt a policy of peaceful coexistence with us. Incidentally, we should bear in mind that the Vietnam negotiations may offer opportunities for progress toward reconciliation with China and its engagement in a wider world order, through participation in an international settlement of the war, through arrangements for U.N. membership as a part of the settlement, or in other ways.

Peking, of course, has said that the only real way for the United States to relax tensions with China is to stop our "imperialist occupation" of Taiwan and hand it back. This probably is a correct description of its

attitude. But this is not a point on which we can show much flexibility. The thirteen million people of Taiwan seem almost unanimous in their desire to remain free of Chinese Communist control. They have every right to self-determination, and Taiwan in fact has had a political experience distinct from that of continental China for almost three-quarters of a century. Given these facts, our historic relations with the Nationalist regime on Taiwan, and our firm belief in the right of self-determination, we could scarcely try to force Taiwan to rejoin China or acquiesce in its conquest by Peking, even though Taiwan's separateness does delay our reconciliation with China.

We should, however, clearly divorce our support of self-determination in Taiwan from Nationalist claims to be the only China or even one of "two Chinas." Our stand should be that we recognize the existence of two separate political entities, whatever their names; that both merit representation in the United Nations (Taiwan is among the top third of the members of the United Nations in population); that we would not oppose reconciliation between Taiwan and the mainland if it should come; but that in the meantime the unit ruled from Peking is obviously the country assigned the permanent seat in the Security Council. We should be ready to accept any names and theories the two Chinese entities and the United Nations devise, so long as they fit these facts. An independent Taiwan should be acceptable to us or a Taiwan which theoretically is part of China but has full autonomy and, on analogy with the spuriously labeled autonomous Ukraine and Byelorussia, a separate U.N. seat. If representation for the two Chinese entities does not prove feasible, we should recognize that the loss of Taiwan's membership in the United Nations would probably be less costly to overall American interests than the continuation of our blackball of Peking.

Since Taiwan is an island, we can at no great risk continue to guarantee its security from Peking, so long as the people and government on Taiwan really want this. But the Nationalist occupation and garrisoning of Quemoy and Matsu, two small island clusters close to the mainland, are another matter. They do not contribute to the defense of Taiwan but rather weaken it by isolating a large part of the Nationalist forces from the real task of defense. The chief role of these islands is as a symbol of the Nationalists' determination to continue the civil war and of their empty dream of reconquering the mainland. The United States should make it clear that it will not participate in the defense of these islands. It should

also use what leverage it has to try to persuade the Nationalists to evacuate them as military and political liabilities.

Some people feel that an American refusal to continue the pretense that Taiwan is China might so anger the Nationalist regime that it would submit Peking in an act of political suicide. Another not uncommon view is that when Chiang Kai-shek dies (he is now 81), his successor, quite possibly his Russian-trained son Chiang Ching-kuo, may "make a deal" with Peking. Either of these possibilities would result in a grave injustice to the inhabitants of Taiwan, 85 percent of whom are native Taiwanese who have no desire to be merged with continental China. But neither of these possible developments is at all probable, and in any case they are matters over which we have little control.

The inhabitants of Taiwan are a relatively affluent and well-educated people who are thoroughly capable of developing a prosperous and eventually democratic society. This obviously would be to American interests, somewhat offsetting the brake on reconciliation with China that an independent Taiwan constitutes. The pretense of the Nationalist government that Taiwan is only one of many provinces over which it has authority and its basically dictatorial nature stand in the way of this favorable development. The United States should look with sympathy on the growth of full democracy in Taiwan and the resultant preponderance of the native Taiwanese majority in the political life of the island. But there is little specific we can do to insure such developments. We should be clear in our own minds that the future of Taiwan lies primarily in the hands of the government and people on Taiwan to decide and that we can accommodate ourselves to almost any outcome without great menace to our own vital national interests.

To summarize the range of possibilities with regard to China, they run from a Chinese political breakup or a sudden shift by China to a policy of peaceful coexistence, at one end of the spectrum, to war with the United States or a massive Chinese impact on surrounding Asian areas, at the other end. If either of these extremes materializes, it would so change the situation in Asia as to require careful rethinking of American policies, but neither is at all likely, short of major escalation of the Vietnam war or an American pullout from all Asia. Much more probable is a general continuation of present conditions, with China slowly setting its house in order but playing a declining role for the time being in the rest of Asia and the United States relaxing military and psychological pressures on China in preparation for eventual reconciliation.

*The Situation in the Less-developed Countries*

Shifting to the other less-developed countries of East and South Asia, we find a very broad spectrum of possibilities. If the war in Vietnam escalates greatly, or if the United States as a result of the outcome in Vietnam withdraws its interest in and aid to other Asian countries, or if China proves to have a much greater capacity to extend its influence over these countries than the discussion in this chapter has implied, serious disruptions throughout Asia would probably result, and future developments would be quite unpredictable at this stage. If we assume, however, a tolerable outcome in Vietnam and developments in China in the middle range described above, the spectrum of possibilities becomes narrower and American policies more definable.

It would be impossible in the confines of this chapter to outline the economic and political prospects for all of the nations of the region. Each is a unique case with its own specific conditions that will largely shape its future: size, geographic location, ethnic and religious makeup, regional differences, cultural heritage, political and social traditions, colonial experience, and the present political and social situation. It would not be practical to attempt to list and analyze all these factors country by country, but a few generalizations may be of help.

Most of the countries of Asia are slowly solidifying as national units and therefore are becoming less susceptible to disintegrative forces. Where food deficits have existed, they are beginning to be overcome, and most countries show a promising trend toward economic growth, commonly at rates double or triple the rate of population increase. The development of educational and political institutions on the whole shows promise of bringing even more widespread and rapid development in the future. But almost all of these countries remain relatively unstable and susceptible to political upheaval, to subversion, and if there were a powerful attacker, to military aggression. Thus the long-run prospects for economic and institutional development are fair to good, but the short-term prospects for political stability are dubious.

A common view has been that either international communism or a neo-imperialist China might achieve hegemony over Asia by toppling one country after another in geographic succession in a falling-domino effect. Prolonged political instability, whatever its cause, could also so disrupt Asia

that its long-range, healthy development would become impossible. Widespread disorders or upheavals would obviously be upsetting to all the countries in the area. Local wars, such as those between Indonesia and Malaysia and between Pakistan and India, have scarcely been helpful to either party. Efforts to stir up subversion from abroad could be a menace to almost any of the countries of the area, though we should remember that the Indonesian Communist coup backfired and that Chinese and North Vietnamese efforts in northeast Thailand and recent Chinese interest in the long-standing communist movements in Burma and in the Naga disturbance in India have not produced major results.

Some particularly weak countries are relatively open to domination or disruption by their neighbors. Thus North Vietnamese support for the Pathet Lao has for years threatened Laos, which has only a light population of two and a half million people, divided almost evenly between ethnically alien Montagnard groups and the Laos themselves, who are not ethnically distinct from the northeastern Thai. All of the long, thin, and extremely backward country of Laos lies completely in the shadow of the much more populous, better organized, more advanced, and far more aggressive Vietnamese state. It seems probable, therefore, that regardless of the outcome of the Vietnam war the Vietnamese will have a major influence over the future of Laos.

Most other Asian countries, however, are not very susceptible to domination or even subversion by their neighbors. Practically all are far more populous and historically and geographically more consolidated entities than Laos. For some, such as India because of its size or the Philippines because of its geographic isolation as an island group, domination or disruption by a neighbor is all but impossible.

On the whole, the countries of Asia have relatively little contact with one another and no great capacity to stir up trouble for each other. Pressures from other Asian countries are in most cases very minor compared with the influence of purely domestic conditions, such as regional, ethnic, or religious tensions, economic conditions, the efficiency of the government, and the people's attitude toward it. Political upheavals and revolutions resulting from such internal factors are much more likely than disruptions from external causes.

While it is in our interests to do what we can to discourage conflict and subversion between Asian lands, particularly when such disturbances threaten to involve the great powers, there is very little chance that a falling-domino process of disruption or subversion will occur on a large



scale and even less that it will lead to any effective, exploitable control by a hostile power over much of Asia. The major military question we face in the less-developed countries of Asia is our role in cases of internal instability within those countries.

As we have seen in Vietnam, our capacity to control internal instability at a reasonable cost to ourselves or the country we seek to help is very limited. Our technological and economic aid may be important, but our efforts to help directly through military action are not very effective in cases of guerrilla warfare and may even be counterproductive. Our racial and cultural background is reminiscent of the erstwhile colonial masters and thus makes our opponents seem like better nationalists than the side we support. Our large-scale mode of operation and its economic consequences are likely to disrupt the local society, distorting the natural economy and spreading corruption. Our very participation may relieve the regime in power of the necessity of trying to correct the economic, social, or political ills that may in large part be responsible for the insurgency.

One general rule of thumb might be that, if an Asian regime is not able to control internal instability even with our economic and technological aid, it probably could not be saved by us through military intervention and, beyond that, is not likely to be worth trying to save. A more general rule would be that less-developed countries in Asia and elsewhere will probably experience frequent revolutionary upheavals, and many of these will be necessary stages in the development process, because these countries are going through rapid changes in their efforts to modernize but, for the most part, lack highly developed democratic institutions through which to effect political change without revolution. Coups d'etat and revolutions are the only way some societies have to get rid of undesirable governments and ineffective leadership. Thus the United States not only cannot suppress most internal instabilities in less-developed countries but, in its own interests and those of the countries concerned, should not try to do so even if it could.

Actually, political instability in the less-developed countries of Asia need be of no great concern to us. We do not even need to be particularly worried lest some of them adopt communist or other dictatorial forms of government, so long as their nationalistic ardor prevents effective prolonged external control over them. Freer economic and political institutions would probably be preferable, as being more conducive over the long run to healthy growth, and we should give what encouragement we can to the development of such free institutions, but we must realize that

most Asian countries do not have the prerequisites in wealth, skills, education, or experience for efficient democratic government and that we do not have the capacity or, for that matter, the right to determine their institutions for them. Political instability will probably continue for some time in most of Asia, and economic and political systems, no doubt, will continue to change in response largely to internal forces. Under these circumstances, we should be careful not to tie ourselves to any specific regime in a less-developed country.

*Policy toward the Less-developed Countries*

As already indicated, America's only vital immediate interest in the area is the prevention of hegemony by a hostile power over most of Asia, and its only vital long-range interest is the economic and institutional development of these nations as healthy units in a world community. In the lack of any real threat of hegemony, the major policy questions the United States faces concern the means by which it can best aid the economic growth and political and social development of the nations of the area.

The various considerations discussed above suggest three basic principles for the elaboration of American policy toward the less-developed countries of East and South Asia. We should do our best, through economic and technological aid, to assist them in their long-range development; we should use our military power and political influence to give them as stable an external environment as possible for their internal development, attempting to minimize the threat to them of domination or disruption by an outside force; but we should at the same time try to avoid commitments to or direct involvement in the maintenance of stability within each country.

Of these three principles, the constructive one of providing economic and technological aid should undoubtedly be the central focus of American policy toward the less-developed countries, not only of Asia, but of the whole world. The problem of aid is dealt with more fully by Max Millikan in his paper on "The United States and the Low-Income Countries." It will be sufficient here to say that, in addition to increasing our efforts and improving our own methods for giving aid, we should do our best to encourage an increased participation in this activity by other advanced countries, such as Japan, the countries of Western Europe, and even the Soviet Union.

There is a tendency today to disparage aid programs, but despite considerable ineptitude in the past and some misdirection of effort, our achievements in this field in Asia have been promising and our skills have greatly improved. Taiwan is a brilliant success story; South Korea is not far behind; and Thailand is well on its way to sustained economic growth. India, with a half billion people, and Pakistan, with more than a hundred million, have made considerable progress but present particular problems of size that call for continuing, large-scale aid. Indonesia, another giant with more than a hundred million people, is an especially critical case, because the deterioration of the economy brought on by Sukarno's irresponsible policies has still not been fully stemmed. The Philippines has achieved only a disappointingly uneven record in both economic and institutional growth, and Burma, because of its political rigidities and self-imposed economic isolation, has gone steadily downhill. Vietnam, as well as Laos and Cambodia, will be in great need of constructive external aid when the war ends. Thus the needs are great and the problems many, but there is good reason to believe that a concerted effort by the United States, Japan, and the other advanced nations to help the economic and institutional development of the lower income countries of Asia can contribute greatly to the achievement of our long-range objectives in that part of the world.

We should be extremely careful, however, to draw clear lines that will prevent our future aid from growing into military involvement. The general perspectives of our problems in Asia, as discussed above, suggest that we should put much less emphasis on military aid, in contrast to strictly economic aid, than we have in the past. There may be cases, however, when it would be wise to provide arms or even military training to an Asian government. The more efficient, forward-looking, or democratic a regime is, the more it might merit aid of this sort. Further, the greater the external threat it faces or the more widespread the external support for an insurgency underway, the more reason there would be to provide such help. But there should be clear cutoff points and a periodic check to be sure that these are not being exceeded. In most countries, our aid efforts probably should stay entirely out of the military field. In the others to which we do give arms, a sharp line should be drawn either against providing constabulary or military training or at least against providing combat advisers.

Our military and political role in helping to provide a stable external environment without becoming involved in maintaining internal stability

also needs careful definition. One element of this policy would be a nuclear guarantee (possibly joined in by the Soviets) of all countries against nuclear blackmail by the Chinese or any other nuclear power. Such a guarantee could be explicit or tacit, but in either case China and other nuclear powers should be made to understand that a nuclear attack by them would elicit a nuclear response by us that would destroy their nuclear capability and possibly inflict other damage as well.

Another element would be the maintenance of sufficient military power in the western Pacific to give us the option, though not the commitment, to stop aggression by China or between other Asian countries if the attempt seemed feasible and worthwhile in terms of the specific situation. The existence of such an option would have a strong inhibiting effect on all would-be aggressors and particularly on those whose aggression would be most likely to prompt an American response, such as a North Korean attack on South Korea or an open Chinese attack on one of its neighbors. Some uncertainty as to American responses actually might be more advantageous than too clear a distinction between situations in which the United States would or would not respond.

Because of increasing military mobility, a credible military option of this sort could be maintained in the western Pacific in large part through bases in Guam, Hawaii, and the continental United States, but the continuance of American bases in Japan or at least close defense cooperation with that country would also probably be necessary, as is discussed below. It would be best, however, not to have this military option depend on bases in less-developed countries. The inevitable instability of such countries makes bases in them less secure over the long run, and the presence of American bases is more likely to involve the United States in problems of internal instability. Cases in point, besides Vietnam, would be the airfields in Thailand and in time possibly Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines and the bases in South Korea.

The extension of this military option into the Indian Ocean area on a truly credible scale would probably require broader international participation, particularly if the United States were to give up its Southeast Asian bases. Bases in Western Australia and Australian naval participation might help toward this end, but ultimately, a truly international force is the only real answer. Similarly, the inhibitory role of military power in the western Pacific, too, might best be entrusted some day to international forces and eventually the United Nations itself. But all this would depend



on long-range developments in the United Nations and elsewhere that are quite beyond prediction today.

Minimizing American military commitments to Asian countries would require relatively few changes in actual commitments, but a considerable change in attitudes. Our commitment through the Anzus treaty to the defense of Australia and New Zealand presents no problem, because both, as advanced, stable, and remote island countries, are easily defended. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, with which we have bilateral treaties, are all special cases, best considered individually. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), organized in 1954, presents the greatest problems, having given us commitments to the continental countries of Thailand, Pakistan, and through considerable extension, South Vietnam and Laos.

We have no military commitments to the other South and Southeast Asian countries, only implicit concern in their future. When India was attacked by China in 1962, we quickly responded with offers of arms and supplies. When Indonesia underwent its upheavals in 1965, we stood aside and offered no comment, though the presence of our Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific no doubt insured that the Chinese Communists or other outsiders would not attempt to intervene. These are the patterns of non-commitment but helpful influence we should attempt to follow.

It would be best if the countries of this whole area were not involved in the broader world rivalries, such as those between the United States and the Soviet Union or China. In other words, an attitude of neutrality on their part should not only be tolerated by us but welcomed. So also should the present trend toward regional organizations. It must be admitted that such groupings are not likely to contribute much to internal stability or regional security within the next few years. But they can develop useful organs of economic and technological cooperation and a valuable sense of regional political solidarity that could give strength to all the participants. Over the long run these regional groupings can prove immensely significant.

The military commitments we already have to Asian countries must be handled on a case-by-case basis. Our relationship with Japan is treated in a later section. Since the Philippines and Taiwan are island states which we can easily defend from external aggression and since we have had particularly close historic ties with both, we can safely and properly continue our defense commitments to them, but we should be careful that we do not

get involved in trying to maintain internal stability. The situation is particularly critical in the Philippines. Unsatisfactory economic growth, mounting corruption, increasing lawlessness, and declining morale all spell trouble. Our bases in the Philippines, our long emotional involvement in the islands, and the tendency of the Filipinos to resent our influence in their country but to rely on us to solve their problems are all likely to involve us in any revolutionary breakdown. We should take resolute steps—including possibly the relinquishment of our Philippine bases—to disengage ourselves from the internal instabilities of the Philippines, so that the local leaders will be forced to face their problems themselves and, if they fail to do so, a more competent leadership will replace them.

In the case of South Korea, the dangers of aggression are greater, but the risks of internal instability are less and the stakes are higher, because past history gives a world-wide significance to the communist-"free" balance in Korea and its geography involves it in the security of Japan. South Korea's recent spectacular success in both economic and institutional development has made the North Koreans extremely anxious to stop this growth before the North is completely overshadowed by the more populous South, in the manner East Germany is overshadowed by West Germany. Under these circumstances, we should continue our clear commitment to the security of South Korea so as to minimize the danger of aggression by the North. We should also probably continue our military presence in South Korea until there is less tension in the area than there is now.

Turning to continental South Asia, we should note that our military commitment to Pakistan has long since eroded away because of Pakistan's disinterest in SEATO. As we have seen, the settlement of the Vietnam war will probably entail the withdrawal of our military forces from and commitments to Vietnam and possibly our commitments to Laos, too. It is also likely to lead to a withdrawal from our bases in Thailand, which have been used exclusively for the bombing of Vietnam, and an understanding that we will not become directly involved in combatting insurgency movements in Thailand. The Thais have already made it clear that, while they appreciate our support, they do not want our direct participation in the small insurgency movements in the northeast or elsewhere in Thailand. Thus our post-Vietnam relationship with Thailand is likely to approximate our relationship with the other South and Southeast Asian countries: we would give aid, including arms and military training when appropriate, to a government deserving such support; we would maintain

the option of coming to its aid militarily in the case of blatant aggression, if this seemed feasible and worthwhile; but we would not ourselves become involved in the suppression of internal subversion or revolution.

In summary, no clear prognosis can be given for the South and East Asian area as a whole, except to say that continued internal instabilities are probable, but wide hegemony by any power is highly unlikely, and long-range development for most of the area seems predictable. The United States should attempt to stay uninvolved in internal instabilities while contributing as much as it safely can through its military presence in the western Pacific to an external environment of stability and as much as it can afford through economic and technological aid to long-range development of the various countries of the region. Other advanced nations should be encouraged to participate, not only in aiding the development of this area, but in providing it an external environment of stability. But, basically, developments in this area should be left to natural local forces, especially since the greatest of these forces is nationalism, which works strongly against the spread of any hegemony over the region and for the development of each nation as an independent unit.

#### *Japan's Role in Asia*

Our relations with Japan, as we have seen, are of a different kind and on a different time scale from those with the rest of Asia. In fact, they bear more resemblance to our relations with Western Europe than with Japan's neighbors. As our second largest trading partner, Japan is of great and immediate economic importance to us. As our chief ally in Asia, in whose territory are located the bases that serve as the keystone for our military posture in the western Pacific, Japan is crucial to our whole military position in East Asia. Most important, as the third largest industrial unit in the world and the fastest growing major country, Japan is potentially a significant element in a world balance of power and an even larger factor in the future development of all of East and South Asia.

Japan is already the largest trading partner of many of the countries of Southeast Asia, and it shows signs of becoming a major source of economic and technological aid to the whole region. In other words, it is developing into our chief partner in the task of providing aid to the countries of Asia in their long-term development. The activities of both countries in this

field increasingly complement each other, and each of us by our presence could help offset the fears of the countries of the region of domination by one or the other, if it alone were influential in the area.

Japan can also contribute to the multilateral balance of forces in Asia that is a feasible and desirable alternative to hegemony by any one nation of the present polarization of forces. As the one large, modernized and industrialized nation in the area, it lends a great deal of strength to regional groupings by its membership in them. The same is true of Australia and New Zealand, though on a lesser scale because of their smaller populations and less convincing geographic, cultural, or racial ties with the rest of the area. The three together could play a useful pivotal role between the other advanced nations and the less-developed countries of Asia. From this point of view, there is merit in Japanese suggestions that the advanced Pacific nations—that is, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—should form a "Pacific Community" of donors with special interest in the less-developed countries of Asia but that Japan, Australia, and New Zealand should also continue as members of regional Asian groupings.

Japan could play an even more important pivotal role with regard to China. There is danger that a détente between the Soviet Union and the United States, however beneficial in the rest of the world, might in effect produce a sort of alliance against China, further isolating that great country and increasing the psychological pressures which help produce its hostility toward the rest of the world. A Japan nestled quietly under the protection of a Soviet-American "alliance" would contribute further to this political polarization in Asia. But a Japan that is a more independent influence might in time help bridge the gap to China and thus aid in the development of a multilateral balance of forces between China, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union, under which India and the other nations of South and East Asia would be freer from external pressure for their own internal development. The fact that the Chinese are very much more responsive to Japanese attitudes than to American or Soviet ones and are apparently more eager for Japanese friendship suggests the possible role of Japan in reducing political polarization and tensions between China and the outside world.

On the other hand, a Japan that sees its interests in terms at variance with ours could have an immediately dangerous impact on American interests. In relative terms it is essentially a stronger country today than it was when it threatened to establish hegemony over East Asia in the 1940s.

Its close alignment with the Soviet Union or China against us could produce a dangerous shift in the world balance of power.

Such a development is highly improbable, but there is a possibility that the Japanese might refuse us further cooperation in mutual defense and force a withdrawal of our bases from Japan. If this were to happen, the United States might not be able to continue to guarantee the defense of South Korea or maintain enough of a military presence in the western Pacific to inhibit aggressors. There would, of course, be strong pressures in favor of continuing our military posture through our relationship with South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, but it would be much more costly, difficult, and dangerous to do so if Japan were uncooperative. Japan's technology and industrial capacity, its fundamental stability, and in some ways its geographic position, all make American bases in Japan more valuable than bases elsewhere in Asia, and, if Japan were uncooperative or hostile, it would in a sense lie athwart our routes to other potential bases in the area. In any case, if Japan, which benefits more directly from American efforts to maintain an environment of external stability in East Asia than we do ourselves, were to refuse its cooperation, it would probably not seem worthwhile to Americans to continue such efforts at increased costs to themselves. The United States, regardless of how the war came out in Vietnam, might in that case withdraw its military power to mid-Pacific and, because of the resultant lessening of popular interest in Asia, might further reduce or entirely eliminate its role as a provider of economic aid to Asia.

If this were to happen, the Japanese, forced themselves to provide fully for the defense of their country and its maritime life lines, would probably throw off their present strong pacifistic inhibitions and devote their energies to large-scale rearmament, probably developing in the process their own nuclear umbrella and a substitute for our Seventh Fleet. (Japan's present "self-defense forces" of some 240,000 men would be adequate only against a limited attack and are thought by most Japanese to be barred by their constitution from the defense of Japanese interests abroad.) The result would probably be some slowing down of Japan's own economic growth, a serious check on its efforts in the field of economic aid, growing hostility toward Japan on the part of its neighbors, less economic growth and probably greater turmoil among the other countries of Asia as a consequence of lessened aid from both the United States and Japan, and possibly even military rivalry between the United States and this one Asian nation really capable of being a military threat to our interests.

The road Japan takes over the next few years could thus have a profound impact on our interests and on the future of Asia as a whole. Fortunately, there is one very strong reason for believing that its choice of roads will be compatible with our interests. This is the fact that most Japanese actually have the same basic interests we do. All Japanese hope ardently for world peace, and most of them see this as best achieved in a multi-national world of independent nation states living under some system of international law, as symbolized by the United Nations. Most of them believe strongly in maximizing world trade. Most of them also favor a society with the greatest feasible room for individual freedom, organized politically along democratic lines. Their own government is a variant of the English type of parliamentary democracy.

At the same time, there are reasons why the Japanese may choose less favorable roads from our point of view. Many of them strongly resent the United States and are deeply suspicious of our policies. They are still not entirely free of the attitudes developed during the nineteenth century in their mad scramble for security from a technologically superior West and for equality with it. More recently our defeat of Japan, our occupation of the country for seven years, our continuing predominance in its foreign trade, and our military dominance in the western Pacific, all have made the Japanese feel, if not directly threatened by us, at least overshadowed and uncomfortably dependent.

The strongly Marxist tenor of much of Japanese intellectual life further softens Japanese attitudes toward the United States. While only a few Japanese are Communists, a great number of Socialists and less ideological Japanese join the Communists in believing that American capitalism produces irresistible imperialistic urges in us, which in turn menace world peace. Association with the United States through the mutual security treaty seems to these people to threaten Japan's security more than it protects it. The overwhelmingly unpopular war in Vietnam strengthens this concept and raises the specter of a Sino-American war in which the Japanese become involved because of our bases in their country. The bases themselves, of course, are a source of endless friction, as foreign bases are everywhere, and a constant reminder of the supposed danger of too close an association with the United States. It is small wonder that the security treaty is the most hotly debated issue in Japanese politics and the Vietnam war and American bases the chief targets of a wave of demonstrations that has mounted greatly in size and violence during the past year.

The mutual security treaty, which was renegotiated in 1960 amid mas-

sive demonstrations in Japan and a near breakdown of parliamentary government, runs for ten years, until June 1970, after which either side can terminate it on one year's notice. The opposition parties in Japan, therefore, have all along aimed at 1970 as the year to end or drastically reduce the defense relationship with the United States; the Socialists, the largest opposition party, unrealistically advocate "unarmed neutrality" in its place. Few Japanese seem to have considered seriously what the breaking of the treaty would mean for Japan. Instead, they appear to assume that the United States, driven by its supposed imperialist urges, would continue to maintain its military power around Japan in the western Pacific, thus permitting the Japanese to eliminate the irritations and supposed risks of the security treaty, while still benefiting from the American defense shield. They do not seem to have contemplated the possibility that the United States might withdraw to mid-Pacific, forcing Japan into a massive rearmament that would be extremely costly both in economic and political terms. The Japanese government seems to have a better understanding of the problem, but it has shown little skill or even will in educating the public.

In the early 1960's, dissatisfaction with the security treaty seemed to be waning, but during the past two years the escalation of the Vietnam war has reversed this trend, and the attack on the treaty has mounted greatly in intensity. Unless the war is ended by 1970 or shows clear signs of ending, the treaty may be seriously endangered.

Another factor is the growing nationalistic urge in Japan to get out from under America's shadow. This shadow today may in large part be only the psychological creation of the Japanese themselves, but it is nonetheless real to them. Some conservative Japanese would like to see Japan rearm fully in order to be less dependent on the United States for its defense. A few are even beginning to think that Japan, as the emerging third largest power in the world, must have the dignity of its own nuclear force. Some Japanese of both the left and right would like to see Japan go it alone in the French style, not realizing that American withdrawal to mid-Pacific would leave Japan militarily naked, with nothing like the surrounding North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cloak. Most Japanese would like to see their country cut loose from what they feel has been American dominance over their foreign policy. An ending to the Vietnam war that suggested a complete American withdrawal from Asia would, of course, greatly strengthen some of these tendencies. Thus there is a great ground swell of feeling, both on the right and left of Japanese politics, for

less dependence on American military defense and greater independence of American foreign policy.

#### Policy toward Japan

American policies toward Japan must be formulated in the light of Japan's potential role in Asia and the sensitivities in Japanese-American relations. There is no reason for the United States to oppose either of the ground swells in Japan toward lessened dependence on American military defense and greater independence of American foreign policy. Only a Japan that feels independent of American domination in foreign policy will be able to see clearly the basic identity of Japanese and American interests or will be able to be an effective element in a multiple balance of forces in Asia. If a lessening of dependence on American military defense helps the Japanese gain this sense of independence of American foreign policy, this would be a helpful step. The danger is that in moving toward less dependence on American military defense and independence of American foreign policy, various misunderstandings of American intentions and irritations over the present situation might lead the Japanese to break the whole of the mutual security relationship, with the dire consequences for both countries outlined above. For this reason, it is vitally important that the United States clarify its attitudes toward Asian problems and also minimize existing irritants in its relations with Japan.

The most important thing we can do is to improve our own policies, extricating ourselves from the Vietnam war with the least possible damage, revising our stance on China, and putting our relations with the rest of Asia on a sounder, less military basis. Beyond that we should show understanding of Japan's desire for independence of our policies and sympathy for its initiatives. We cannot force continued cooperation on Japan or a larger role in Asia. Perhaps the less we say to try to convince the Japanese, the better. But by proper actions—that is, by reducing the reasons for their doubts about our policies and minimizing the frictions in our relations—we can make it easier for Japanese to see the general identity of Japanese and American interests, the great value to Japan of the defense relationship with us, and the importance of a greater Japanese role in seeking a balance of forces in Asia and aiding in the long-range development of the area.

Among the dangerous irritants in Japanese-American relations, those



over China policy need special explanation. Most Japanese are deeply dissatisfied with their present lack of full, normal relations with China and blame this situation largely on the United States. This is not entirely fair. Whatever our historic role in helping produce the present relationship between Japan and China, the continuation or alteration of Japan's policy of recognizing the Nationalist government and trading with both China and Taiwan, under the slogan of "the separation of politics and economics," is, in fact, entirely in Japanese hands. What inhibits Japan from recognizing Peking is not the attitude of the United States but rather the attitudes of the Nationalist government on Taiwan and of South Korea and some of Japan's other important trading partners. However, if we were to shift our own stance on China, as described above, we would bring it more in line with popular Japanese sentiments, thus relaxing somewhat this particular strain on Japanese-American relations. We should be careful, though, to consult fully with the Japanese government well in advance of any steps we take, because China policy is a matter of the utmost sensitivity in Japan, and the Japanese government could be seriously embarrassed if it appeared to be either uninformed of our moves or left out on a limb in its own position toward Peking.

An even more serious irritant for both leftist and conservative Japanese is the friction surrounding our bases in Japan. A series of incidents in 1968, determinedly exploited by the left, has greatly exacerbated these feelings. The time has come for a serious restudy of the whole American base structure in Japan and other aspects of the defense relationship to see how potential irritations can best be minimized without seriously limiting the value of the mutual defense relationship to both Japan and the United States. If the problem were properly understood as being more political than military, the bulk of the dangerous irritants could probably be eliminated without significant loss in defense capabilities.

The greatest of the irritations is Okinawa (or the Ryukyu Islands). Okinawa contains one of the major American defense complexes in the western Pacific. It is also inhabited by 960,000 Japanese who were once resentful of their treatment by other Japanese as second-class citizens but are now the most unambiguously patriotic of all Japanese because of twenty-three years under American military rule. One can hardly imagine a more unsound situation than for the United States to be ruling almost one million citizens of its major Asian ally in the only "semicolonial" territory created in Asia since the war. This situation is intensely irritating to Japanese of both the left and the right.

For long the Okinawan situation was justified on the grounds that an uncertain political climate in Japan endangered the future of our bases there and that, therefore, a firmer grip was necessary on our Okinawan bases, just in case we lost our bases in Japan. But this is to state the problem backwards. If we were to lose our bases in Japan, our "colonialist" grip on Okinawa would be one of the major reasons for this disaster, and if the mutual security treaty were broken, the 960,000 Japanese living in and around our bases in Okinawa would soon make them quite ineffective, if not untenable. We shall either continue to have a friendly defense relationship with Japan and bases in both Japan proper and Okinawa, if these are needed, or we shall have effective bases in neither and a hostile Japan to boot. It is high time that we solved the Okinawan problem. The islands must be returned to Japan by 1970, or at least a clear, early date for their return must be fixed by that time.

One problem complicating such a solution is the presence of nuclear weapons in our Okinawan bases. Nuclear weapons cannot be introduced into our bases in Japan proper without specific agreement by the Japanese government, and the Japanese public, which has been understandably sensitive to the nuclear problem since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and has become greatly aroused over the whole military relationship with the United States since the escalation of the Vietnam war, is not likely to tolerate an agreement which permits retention of nuclear weapons in the Okinawan bases after the islands have reverted to Japan. On the other hand, some conservative elements in Japan seem to hope that we will insist on our retention of nuclear rights in Okinawa even after reversion, as a step toward overcoming the nuclear "allergy" of the Japanese public, so that some day Japan itself can develop nuclear weapons. This, of course, is not in American interests. Nor do nuclear weapons on Okinawa seem necessary or even desirable, as we have seen in our discussion of China. This is a point we should concede to the Japanese in an effort to eliminate the Okinawan problem before it gets out of hand and contributes to a general breakdown in Japanese-American relations.

Economic matters also figure among the irritants in Japanese-American relations, though basically they are elements of strength. Close to 30 percent of Japan's trade is with the United States, which is a figure commensurate with our economic position in the world but is so large as to make Japanese particularly sensitive to and apprehensive about our trade policies. After several years of intensive efforts by the Japanese to expand their trade with the Soviet Union and China, Japan's trade with the whole

of the communist world is hardly more than a quarter of its trade with us, and these proportions are not likely to change greatly in the foreseeable future.

The Japanese maintain "voluntary restrictions" on their exports to the United States in a number of fields for fear that a sudden flooding of the American market by them might result in stiffer restrictions on our part. These self-imposed restrictions, they realize, constitute orderly marketing procedures, but they chafe at the situation and worry about it. On the other hand, American businessmen resent the extremely stiff quantitative restrictions Japan places on imports in many fields and the even narrower limits it has placed on the introduction of investment capital. Japanese promises of liberalization in both fields have so far produced irritatingly few actual changes. There are numerous other frictions over economic matters. For example, Japanese fishing in Alaskan waters and for "American" salmon in the North Pacific lead to annual bickering and negotiations. In the long run, the salmon problem can probably only be solved by a rational division of the fish in the manner of the Convention for the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals.

Frictions over economic matters are only to be expected between such great trading partners, and in fact, the trade between the two countries has grown steadily and spectacularly to the benefit of both. In dealing with economic matters, however, the United States should realize the special Japanese sensitivities and should be particularly careful not to discriminate against Japan in ways not used against the industrialized nations of the West.

In summary, the chief problem in Japanese-American relations is that each side tends to take the other for granted. We have let our preoccupation with policies toward far less crucial areas in Asia endanger our much more vital relations with Japan. The Japanese have so taken us for granted that they have not even envisioned a situation in which we do not continue to be overwhelmingly their chief trading partner and do not tacitly provide a large portion of their military security. Neither side, in its own interests, can safely go on in this way. We, for our part, must realize that a major element in America's transpacific policies, perhaps the most important element, should be efforts to maintain and strengthen our mutually beneficial relationship with Japan. At the same time we should recognize and welcome Japanese desires for independence of our foreign policies and lessened dependence on our military defense.

### Conclusions

We can draw from this survey of our transpacific relations five broad conclusions. The first is that an early but tolerable ending of the Vietnam war is absolutely essential. The second is that the maintenance of a friendly, cooperative relationship with Japan underlies the achievement of all our other transpacific objectives. The third is that, in place of the present political confrontation between ourselves and China, we should seek a relaxation of tensions, the development of live-and-let-live attitudes, and the emergence of a multilateral balance of power in the area. The fourth is that, once we have successfully extricated ourselves from Vietnam, we have no other vital, immediate interests in the less-developed nations of Asia, only a long-range interest in their development over time as healthy, independent states, and that therefore we should be more relaxed and much more patient in our attitudes toward Asia. The final conclusion is that we have less control than we once imagined over developments in the transpacific area. Our role there can be no more than marginal—to try to help desirable trends and inhibit undesirable ones. There can be no American Master Plan for Asia. Outside of the field of economic aid, a lessened American role actually may be more helpful than an increased one.

China's relationship with the outside world will be determined fundamentally by the attitudes of the Chinese themselves, their success in handling their domestic problems, and the attitudes other Asians develop toward them. Our efforts at building an encircling alliance against China and maintaining a close-in line of containment have probably done more to stimulate Chinese aggressiveness than to contain it. The chief contributions we can make toward inducing China to move in a desirable direction are to relax our psychological and military pressures, reduce the political polarization in Asia between China and the United States, open doors for reconciliation so that the Chinese can come through them when they are ready, and in the meantime, encourage the Japanese and others to establish such contacts with the Chinese as will help them adjust to the outside world and find their place in a multilateral Asian balance of power.

In the other less-developed countries of East and South Asia, it is primarily their own nationalism and skills in meeting their domestic problems that will determine their success in avoiding external domination and



developing the strong economies and healthy societies they all yearn for. Our economic and technological aid and that of Japan and other advanced nations can, of course, be of help. In most cases, however, military alignment with us, by increasing strains in a country's relations with China, may threaten its security more than it aids it. In no country can we ourselves maintain internal stability, nor in most cases would it be in our interests to do so if we could. Our military role can be only marginal—to preserve the freedom of the seas, to maintain insofar as possible an external environment of stability, and to serve as a reserve force to discourage blatant aggression.

Our defense relationship with Japan, our huge trade with it, and the budding partnership between us in facing the problems of Asia are all matters of immediate, vital concern to us, but their future will be determined in large part by Japanese attitudes over which we have, at best, only an indirect influence. All we can do is minimize the specific strains in our relationship, particularly those in the touchy defense field, modify our own transpacific policies in ways which reduce Japanese doubts about them, and show understanding of Japanese sensitivities toward what they feel is our undue influence over their country. A fruitful partnership can only be between nations that feel themselves equal. Since the discrepancies in size between the United States and Japan have been greatly magnified in Japanese minds by recent history, we must make conscious efforts to redress the balance in our relationship.

Our overall transpacific objective should be to reduce the political polarization that has involved us in a disastrous war, keeps alive mutual fears of hegemony between us and the Chinese, and contributes to unhealthy tensions throughout the whole area. To help achieve a multilateral balance of power, we should strive to increase the relative influence of other powers in the area and in this sense reduce our own. A larger Japanese role would be one essential element. The further development of India and the other countries of the area as healthy independent entities, some of them perhaps banded together regionally for added influence, would be important. A greater Soviet and Western European presence would be desirable. If these other elements of a multilateral balance emerge, the alleged threat of Chinese hegemony would recede even further, and the political polarization of the area between China and the United States would gradually fade away.

All of these policies suggest the desirability of a lower profile in the American transpacific presence than has been characteristic of the past

two decades. A better term might be the Japanese phrase "low posture." We cannot control the vast forces of Asia; we can only seek to understand them and then, when necessary, attempt to redirect their thrust. We must move with the dominant forces, such as nationalism, not against them. Again to adopt a Japanese metaphor, we should approach the problems of Asia in judo style, not trading blow for blow with the forces of Asia, but so adjusting our stance as to let these forces work for us.

秘  
無期限

タイプ指示	発信用	執務用	計
主 信	2	1	
付			
附属検査渡り		添付	

発送 昭和43年12月10日  
 発信 1 タイプ 検査

文書課 公 信 案 (分類)

公 信 番 号 米工合第 3586 号 公 信 日 付 昭和43年12月 9 日

大 臣	主 管	起 案 昭和43年12月 9 日
政 務 次 官	アメリカ局長	
事 務 次 官	参 事 官	
外 務 審 議 官	北米課長	
答 房 長	主 任	起 案 者 東 原 電 話 番 号 671

受信者  
 在米日米経済諮問委員会  
 日本政府代表  
 在米日米経済諮問委員会  
 日本政府代表

発信者  
 外務大臣

発送先  
 (希望発送日)  
 12月9日

件 名  
 電信転報(フックキング・インステーションに於ける  
 米国の直面する内外諸問題に関する報告書)

GA-2 9 256 外務省 回覧番号

米北合第3586号

昭和43年12月 9日

外 務 大 臣

電信転報(フックキング・インステーションに於ける

米国の直面する内外諸問題に関する報告書)

本件に関する下記電信(2)通り転報する。

言

43年11月29日在米下田大使宛 本大臣宛 来電第3443号

同 上 来電第3454号

(は本件報告書1部併せて添付する。)

附属添付

GA-4

外務省

本信送付先

日米琉語問委員会  
日本政府代表

日本政府沖縄事務所長

1968 DEC 11 13. 26

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BOOTOO TYUUSHAKUNO TOORIDE ARUNODE SONO TORIATUKAI  
SIKARUBEKU KIKATYOONI ONEGA ISRURU

IJOO



外字一印既存せず

注意

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- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

大政事外外官  
務務 房  
次次  
臣官官審審長

簡人会計

文電厚給

領参旅移

領領

国参長

調折

北東

中面

参例中参

北南南

欧参英

近参

近参

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総番号(イ) 50402  
68年12月10日22時05分 フリントン 発 米北  
68年12月11日13時25分 本省 着 米北

外務大臣殿 下田(大使)臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ問題に関する国防次官補内話

第3559号 極秘 至急

最近ライシャワー前大使のヴィエトナム、オキナワ問題に対する発言(るい次往電、往信御参照)が度々新聞紙上をにぎわしている。10日ヨシノが国防省オンキ一次官補及びステッドマン次官補代理と他用をもつて会談の際、念のためこれについての意見を求めたところ、両人が全く個人的見解なりと前おきして交々内話するところ次の通りの趣である(アサオ同席)。なお、両人とも共和党政権更替の際は辞任する由であり、かつあくまでも国防省内のCIVILIANの立場での発言であるので念のため。

1. (当方よりライシャワーは1970年には安保問題があるので、ヴィエトナム和平が早急に目はながつくことを前提として1969年中にオキナワを日本に返かんすることが日米関係上好ましく、少なくとも同年中に返かん時期につき日米両国間で合意に達すべきこと、及び基地は日本本土なみとすべきことを述べているがと質問したのに対し)、オキナワ問題の緊急性については異論はないが、ラ教授の希望の如くヴィエトナム戦争をそれ程早く解決しうる

ライシャワー前大使の発言に関連

極秘

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との保証はなく、また、たとえ一応の解決をみても同地域において紛争が再発して米軍が再びこれにかい入させられ、オキナワ基地を使用せざるを得なくなる可能性も全く排除しえないので同基地を本土なみとしてしかも短期間にオキナワを日本に返かんし得るか否かは疑問である。

2. (ラ教授はアジアの将来にとり中共は危険でないと主張しているがと述べたのに対し)米軍がアジアにとどまり、またアジアに対するコミットメントを米軍が守る限り、中共はしゆうへん諸国に手を出すことはないと思うが、米軍のアジアにおける抑止力が減退した場合にも中共進出の危険性がないと判断することはできないと思う。少なくとも一つのリスクとして常にこれを考慮しておく必要がある。

3. (ラ教授は核基地としてのオキナワの重要性は低いと指摘しているがとの問に対し)、戦略核に限ってみればオキナワの価値は減退しつつあるが、戦術核についてはそうはいえず、まして在来兵器の極東における基地としてその代替を他に見出すことも容易ではない。更に一層大切なことは日本国民が引続き核問題につき感情的立場をとり、抑止力としての核につき現実的評価をなすことをおこたれば将来中共の核武装の進展とも関連し、日本国民が中共の核のきよう迫(BLACKMAIL)にくつつせざるをえなくなるおそれもある危険を排除し得ない。また、米国民の中にはせつかに米軍が核の力を日本にさしかけている

極秘

極秘

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のに、日本国民自身がこれを正当に評価しないのならば米  
 国はあえて核戦争をもとして日本防衛の公約を果す責務は  
 ないのではないかととの与論が将来米国内におきないとも限  
 らない。米側の政府当局者は日本国内政治上の事情を承知  
 しているのて、かかる米国民一般の考え方に同調するよう  
 な心配はないが、前記のような考え方が米議会方面にも拡  
 がつてくると米行政府としても非常に困難な立場に立たせ  
 られる。

4. (ラ教授は、また、オキナワ基地を本土なみとした場  
 合も戦闘作戦行動のため同基地を使用することを必要とす  
 るような緊急事態においては、日本は米国と同じちん営に  
 たつているのであるから、基地の使用につき日本の同意を  
 得ることはさして困難でないと考えているようであるがと  
 の間に対し)、B52のオキナワよりヴィエトナムへの出  
 撃に対する日本国内与論の現状及びかつての日本政府の態  
 度を考慮にいれると、ラ教授の如く必ずしも日本側の将来  
 の態度につきらつ綱的になり得ないふしもある。

5. 前記の諸点、ことに、アジアの情勢がどうなるのか見  
 通しのたてにくい状況において、1969年中にオキナワ  
 を日本に返かんするとの確約はなかなか与えがたく、結局  
 返かんのTARGET DATEのみを設定し、基地の態  
 様については返かんされる日までの間にあらためて両国間

極秘

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電信写

で合意するとの方式も一案ではないかと思われる。  
 (当方の再質問に対し) 基地の態様をきめることなく、返  
 かんのTARGET DATEのみにつき合意に達するこ  
 とは必しも不可能ではないと思う。  
 (両人の立場もあり、本電のお取扱い御注意たまりたい

(了)

-4-



大政事外外管 務務 房  
 次次 房  
 長官審察長  
 調査文会管給  
 参入電厚計  
 参調  
 参領長  
 参領旅移  
  
 参北  
 参西  
 参中  
 参南  
 参西東  
 参西  
  
 参近ア  
 参経国万  
 参留統  
 参政技二  
 参国一理  
 参条協規  
 参政経科  
 参社専  
 参道内外

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電信写  
 総番号(TA) 2707  
 69年1月25日00時00分 ワシントン 発 米北  
 69年1月25日14時06分 本省 着  
 外務大臣殿 下田 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

邦人記者団との会見 (報告)

第190号 略 至急

24日本使バンディ次官補の会談予定は、国務省テイウカ一に掲載されたが、後刻当地邦人記者団の要請に応じ、会見を行い本使より要旨次の通り述べておいたので御りよう承をこう。

1. 本日は一時帰国中の政府との打合せに基き、1/月以降の総理訪米及び夏期の外相訪米に関する日本側の希望を伝え、これが実現方につき配慮を要請するとともに、帰国中にえたオキナワ問題に関する日本国内のふん囲気を説明の上意見の交かんを行なった。

2. なお、オキナワ問題の外、時節がらヴィエトナム及び中共問題についても意見の交かんを行なった。

(3)

秘

大政事外外管 務務 房  
 次次 房  
 長官審察長  
 調査文会管給  
 参入電厚計  
 参調  
 参領長  
 参領旅移  
  
 参北東  
 参西  
 参北保  
 参中  
 参南  
 参西東  
 参西  
  
 参近ア  
 参経国万  
 参留統  
 参政技二  
 参国一理  
 参条協規  
 参政経科  
 参社専  
 参道内外

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電信写  
 総番号(TA) 2743  
 69年2月6日21時40分 ワシントン 発 米北  
 69年02月07日11時36分 本省 着  
 外務大臣殿 下田 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ問題 (ケース議員の声明)

第540号 平 至急

日米議員こん談より帰国したケース上院議員 (共和。ニュー。ジャ。州外交及び歳出委員会委員) は26日午後今次訪日のはい景。日本側議員との談等について述べたプレス。リリスを発表したが、オキナワ問題に関する部分次の通り。(テキスト空送する)

1. 日本における討論の主要問題はオキナワ、日米安保条約、日米の対中国政策、アジアにおける平和と安全の問題等であつた。

2. オキナワ返かんは今や日本のすべての政党の共通の目的であり、意見の異なるのは返かんの条件のみである。

3. 議論の核心はオキナワ返かん後における同島の米軍は日米安保条約上の事前協議事項の適用を受けず、行動の自由を与えらるべきか否かであり、そのはい景には返かんを得た後において日本は何らかの米国の核の存在を認めること

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電信写

とに同意すべきか否かという問題がある。

4. 東京においてマスキー上院議員は個人的見解として米  
国は本年中に返かんの(日)期について合意すべきであると述  
べたが、自分の判断ではニクソン政府の意向も多分右のよ  
うなものであると思う。

5. 基地の態様については、日米両国夫々の利益及び両国  
の西太平洋における共通の安全保障上の利益を考慮に入れ  
て解決されなければならないであろう。

6. 来るべき日米間の交渉を注目している。今回の訪日に  
おいて日本との友好関係を維持することは米国の将来の利  
益に最もよく合致するものであると感じた。

外務省

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電信写

総番号(TA) 9235  
 69年3月10日22時30分 7シント  
 69年3月11日12時53分 本省 菅 若 北

外務大臣 閣下 田 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ問題 (マンズフィールド議員の演説)

第7/7号 平

10日マンズフィールド上院議員は「A-PACIFIC  
 PERSPECTIVE」と題しカンサス州立大学にお  
 いて演説した。冒頭同議員は米国のアジア政策はこれまで  
 の政策と異なつたものでなければならず、米国が認識する  
 と否にかかわらず、第2次大戦後の世界は終つており、  
 西太平洋諸国との関係は転換期にあると前置きし、日本と  
 の関係は正にかかる場面に直面しているのであると述べた  
 が、日本関係をオキナワ問題と基地問題の2点にしばつて  
 とらえている点で注目される。以下日本の部分に関する要  
 旨次のとおり。(テキスト空送する。)

1. 1970年が近くなるにつれ日本における安保条約に  
 ついての論議は日ましにそのはげしさをましている。論点  
 は2つある。第1は在日米軍基地問題であり、第2はオキ  
 ナワ問題である。

2. オキナワ問題については米国は、日本が同島に対し  
 在主权を有するということを歴々述べてきたが、同島をき  
 大な軍事基地としてしまったのである。オキナワの米軍

大政事外務省

事務次官 審議官 秘書官

参事官

参事官

参事官

参事官

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外務省



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電信写

基地は日本本土の基地が受けている制限には服さない。現行安保条約により本土の基地は「軍事作戦」には使用されないが、オキナワにはかかる合意はない。基本的相違は米國は本土基地には核をちよ蔵しない旨約束したが、オキナワにはかかる合意はないということである。

3. 軍事基地の問題は日本の太平洋における軍事的役割という大問題とも関連する。問題は日本及び西太平洋諸国防衛の主たる責任は米國にあるという状況の継続如何ということである。米國はこれまで数/0億ドルを費やしてきたが、戦後4分の/世きを経た今日においてかかる政策を続けることは時代遅れとなつてきたように思われる。日本は今や世界第3の工業國である。

日本国内には米軍の存在について不安をいだく者もいるが、他方、米國の軍事的保護がなくなりほしないかという慮する向きのあることも事実である。

4. 日米関係には経済問題もあるが、主たるフリクションは軍事問題についての意見の不一致にある。日米関係の将来は、米國が西太平洋における軍事上の便宜を基礎としてこれを推進するならば非常に不安定なものとなるであろう。

5. 米軍の活動に対する日本の態度が変化していることについては大いに注目する必要があると思う。基地の全面撤廃の主張が日本の世論の大勢を制しているとは思わないが

注意

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電信写

その削減を望む声は一般の希望であろう。かかる希望に対し直ちに反応を示すことは日本の希望に即応するばかりでなく米國の利益にも合致する。自分はこれにより日米協調関係が維持されることになると考える。若し米國が基地についての日本の希望に應ずる用意があると冒明しさえすれば、大きくなりつつある日本との論議のほとんどは解消すると信じている。

在日米軍施設は日本の安全保障、従つて間接的に米國の安全保障にとうげんするとの理由できよ大な経費をかけて維持されているが、最早そのような機能を果さなくなつていると日本が考えているのであれば、米國にとって有用なものであり得るだろうか。

6. オキナワ問題は日米間に不気味な影を投げかけている問題である。日本国内及びオキナワにおける返かんを求め、る世論は強力であり、米國はこのセンシティブな問題をと、りあげるについて余りに遅すぎたと思われる。

施政権のぜん進的かつ早急なる返かんのためにはつきりした期日について合意に到達すること以外に正当なる解決方法はないと思う。施政権返かんをめぐり、基地の態様につき日本國民の受だくし得ない基地使用を認める「取引」に反対する議論も強いように思われる。

米側としてみればオキナワ基地の無制限使用権が重大にそ、こなわれることについてはたえられないむきもあると思う

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電信写

が、かかる重大な問題について一部の者の利益が決定的な要因とされてはならない。オキナワはきよ大な軍事施設であるが、なくてはならないものでは決してない。ミサイル等の技術の進歩がある。

(3)  
-4-

注意

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電信写

総番号(TA) 1078 主管  
 69年3月18日10時15分 ワシントン 発着 米地  
 69年3月18日15時45分 本省 着

外務大臣殿 下田 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ問題 (テレビ放送)

第823号 平 至急

17日第26チャンネル(教育番組専門のテレビチャンネル)は、「もし米国大統領であつたならば」番組において「オキナワの軍事基地を撤去すべきと考えるか」と題するオキナワ問題に関する放送(30分間)を行った。本番組はライシャワー教授及びマツクブライドはくし(ジョージタウン大学戦略研究所)がパネリストとなり、3分間の冒頭ちん述の後質疑応答を行い、司会はカークパトリック教授(ブラウン大学)、ジェローム・コーエン教授(ハーヴァード大学)が質問者となつた。本件の如きスペインフィツクな問題について当地テレビ放送がとりあげたことは初めてであり、議論もへんかん時期及び基地の態様の2点にしばられていたことが注目された。ライシャワー教授及びマツクブライドはくしの発言要旨次のとおり。

1. ライシャワー教授  
 (1) 自分が大統領であつたならば、在オキナワ米軍基地を撤去しないであらう。この様な設問は問題の核心をつい

ライシャワー教授の発言

- 参北南経
- 参北西
- 参北北保
- 参一
- 参西東
- 参西東
- 参近ア
- 次総経国万
- 参領統
- 参政技二
- 参政協
- 参政経
- 参社專
- 参道内外



注意

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電信写

ていないと思う。問題は施政権のへんかんと在オキナワ米軍基地の態様についてである。前者については、両国政府は可及的速やかに合意に到達すべきであり、本年末までにかかる合意に達すべきことを強く主張する。後者については、「本土なみ」とすべきである。

(2) オキナワ問題は日米間の SHEPHERD ISLAND であり、米国の大部分の人がそのように認識していないことは非常に残念である。100万に近い島民が米国の行政権下におかれていることは極めて UNSOUNDなことである。本件は日本における最大の政治問題であり、米政府の主要政策問題となることは回避しがたく、米政府が今この問題についてはつきりした認識をもたないならば日米関係は大きな政治的危機に直面することとなるべく、その結果米国は日本本土の米軍基地をも失うことになりかねない。

(3) 1970年は安保条約更新の年であり、この年は日米関係において非常に重大な年であり、米国政府はかかる情勢に直面する前に、へんかんについての DEFINITIVE DECISIONをなすべきであり、ここ数カ月の間にかかる決定がなされねばならないと考える。

(4) 基地の態様については、核付すべきでないことはもら論のこと、自由使用を認められた基地をおくことも禁

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電信写

策でない。

米国はぼう大な核兵力を有しており、この一部をオキナワに配置する必要はなく、グアム島等に核をちよぞうすることが出来る。

B-52の配置は核付きてなければ問題はないわけであるが、日本国民にとってはB-52は核付きてのイメージを与えるので米側としてはしん重な考慮を払うべきである。

(5) 朝鮮半島の防衛と本土なみのオキナワ基地との関係については、米側としては、朝鮮半島において戦闘行動に入ること自体日本政府及び国民の支持なしには有刺な展開をなし得ることでないということを認識すべきである。「本土なみ」へんかんとなつても、米国の防衛体制に基本的な変化が起るとは思わない。

(6) 日本に対し、より大きな防衛義務の役割を期待することは UNSOUNDであり、日本の平和主義をそん重すべきである。日本に対しては(イ)経済援助の増大(ロ)世界第3の工業国たる日本が自ら政治的選択をすることを期待するのが特策である。オキナワへんかんは日本がこの様な方向へむかうけい機ともなり得よう。

(7) オキナワへんかんが他のアジア諸国の基地問題には及するか否かについては、は及論として考えるべきではない。

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電信写

い。フィリピンの基地にしても所せん米國が同國に基地をおいておくべきではないのであるが、これはオキナワ問題とは関係のない米比関係の問題である。

2. マツタプライドはくし

(1) オキナワは西太平洋における最も重要な基地であり、日本、韓国及び中華民国さらには豪州、ニュージーランド、フィリピン、タイの防衛と大きな関係を有する。平和条約第3条によりオキナワは日本の施政権外とされたが、米國は同地域に対する日本のせん在主權を認めている。

(2) 自分はオキナワの基地は撤去されるべきではないと考える。その代替地がほかにないこともあわせ考えるべきである。施政権へんかんの時期については出来るだけ早く日米兩國政府間において合意すべきであり、強い希望としては本年末までに、遅くとも1970年初頭までには合意に達する必要があると考える。

(3) 基地の態様については、本土なみとすべきであるが、実際の運用については、GUID PROQUO例えば有事の際の使用の態様について何らかの合意をみることは可能だと思ふ。米側としては今後の計画をもつと早期に検討しておくべきであつたのに国防省も國務省もいまだ何らの具体的検討もしておらずただ空論をむき出すており國家

注意

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電信写

安全保障會議のスタッフもほかの問題にぼうさつされている。

(4) 米側はアジアにおける今後のFORCE POSTUREについてあらゆるALTERNATIVEを検討すべきであり、地域的抑止力は職術的なもので十分足りるのである。

(3)

-5-



ソカ  
カ  
方  
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注意

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電信写

大務外務  
務次房  
次官審長  
領事文會管給  
人電厚計  
参調  
参領移  
参領移

総番号(TA) / 1074  
 69年3月18日 15時55分 7分  
 69年3月18日 15時22分  
 主管 北  
 参 北  
 外務大臣殿 下田(大) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ問題 (テレビ放送)

第824号 極秘 至急

往電第823号に関し

本件テレビ対談録音に先立ち、マックブライドは当館館員  
 に対し、ライシャワー教授のオキナワ問題に関する意見、  
 日本政府あるいは国民の同教授に対する評価等を照会越し  
 。知日派である同教授との対談において同はかせの意見を  
 述べることに多少しんけい質になっていたふしがあると認  
 められた経緯がある。

同はかせの見解についてはるい次電報のとおりであるが、  
 本件対談に関する限りにおいては多少留保つきではあるが  
 本土なみ早期返かんを主張した点において、同はかせの考  
 え方は従来にくらべ変化しているやの印象を与えている。  
 しかしながら、本対談の空気は、プレゼンテーションのう  
 まくない同はかせにくらべ、短とう直入に問題点を指摘す  
 るライシャワー教授の論議がブレイクエイルし、同はかせも  
 ライシャワー教授に多少えん慮して発言していたものの如  
 くである。

(3)

参北  
参北  
参北  
参一  
参西  
参西  
参近ア  
次総経団万  
参国  
参政支二  
国一理  
参協規  
参政経科  
参道内外

外務省

極秘

6. エドワード・マスケー 上院議員  
(Edmund S. Muskie)  
民主元 大い川 進出  
新所 伊部年 2 歳  
日本議員 衆議 白 上 等 各

1.  
車年 2012 25 2012 43  
(2月11日 上院 演説 (男))  
(沖繩 関係 部分 抜萃)

44.4.1 和

(1) 沖繩問題は日本人にとり非常に重要な問題  
である。尤もこの問題や国内的危機に

目と専らしてゐる米国人の中で、この問題に對し  
日本人の強い気持を理解してゐる者は、現在の

ところあまり多くはない。しかし最近、返還に  
對する深い要望を新選の日本政府、日本国民

及び沖縄住民の聲に耳を傾ける米国人は増加  
増進してゐる。我々(日本評議員委員会主席の

ため来日した米評議員)もこの問題の緊急性に  
注目し、このことと本口に位置すると考へてゐる。

(2) 我々米国人には、外交政策に對する  
超黨派的な700-9という原則がある。

GA-6

外務省

2  
自身も新政权、外交問題に對する態度  
を前もて判断したり。複雑な沖繩

返還問題に對するありゆる<sup>回答</sup>を同意してゐる  
経271FTFの<sup>両</sup>、責任ある米国人に

代へて、我々米国人は<sup>沖繩</sup>地球の植民地的領有を  
続ける原因と有るべきではないと考へる

ことではある。全く個人的に之はあり  
(3) 我々は、返還700-9の開始時期に對し

今年中に日本が<sup>両</sup>同意するべきであると確信してゐる  
私の判断では、~~日本~~沖繩の地位は

日本人の要望する方向へと疑い打ちを變せ  
るであろうし、その271FTF、感謝の

理性に打ち克つて、両口の間に長いつけ  
を打ちつけようとする。

GA-6

外務省

(4) 多くの複雑な問題が、この返還問題  
に伴って、単純な（？）一筆に於

日本への返還は不可能<sup>である</sup>といは  
れる。勿論、最も困難な問題は

<sup>沖繩</sup>琉球諸島が日本完全な主権の下に  
返還される時に、米軍の基地を如何に

取り扱うか問題である。私は、これに  
対する合理的な回答に到達するに足

る十分な善悪及び知性がある。両国に於ける  
この考えは、持ちあわせである。

(5) <sup>この警告</sup> ~~警告~~ に対する <sup>警告</sup> 感情や混乱は、  
賢明な解決を妨げず、好ましく

ある。日本は、米軍に耳を傾けさせれば  
好ましく、<sup>米軍</sup> 米軍の信念を、米軍に

アフリカ-4 が必要である。この問題に  
関し、米軍人は、友人として、日本人に耳を

傾け、日本の、この事に對する理解  
が、強くなれば、米軍人は、これを

敵対心の証左と解釈し、その結果として  
複雑に受け取り、それにより、遂に

更に、大仲断撤退をせよといふ米軍に  
引き留めるとして、米軍人も、  
しん。

万博

注意

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大政外外官 電信写

事務次官  
大臣官舎警備長  
儀禮文会事務

参入係厚計

参入係厚計

参入係厚計

参入係厚計

参北東経

参中西経

参北北係

参中南係

参西東洋

参西東洋

参書近ア

参総経国万

参質統

参政技二

参政技二

参政技二

参政技二

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参政技二

総番号(TA) 22715  
 69年5月27日22時30分 米 15 発  
 69年5月28日11時43分 本省 着 米北1

外務大臣 下田 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ問題に関するヴァン・スライク報告書(意見)

第1627号 略 至急  
 往信情第4/33号及び同第422/号に関し  
 本件利用、取扱い方法等については既に御検討中と存ぜられるところ。当館気付きの点次のとおり。  
 1. ヴァン・スライク提出の客年1/1月より本年4月までのオキナワ関係論調はまとまった形になっているため執務上、情報整理上参考となろう。また予想以上に多数の地方紙が関心をよせていることがかん取され(一部/5ページ)たことも注目される。しかしながら、各地方により、あるいは各紙により、また、執びつ者によつて如何なる特徴的流れ、傾向があるか。その結果如何なる情報対策を講ずべきかの点についてはオキナワ問題の如く比較的長期的な試みとしては初のケースでもあるため、依頼者たる当方としても確たる成案なく、また、これを受託したV.Sとしても十分にそのハンドリングにつき習じゆくするに至つて

外務省

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電信写

いない側面もあり、今後ともV.Sと常時緊密な連絡をとり、当方の意図を十分にはあくせしめる必要がある。したがつて現段階で直ちにV.Sに依頼したプロジェクト2の実効を期待することは若干しう早であるが、今後、1、2カ月の間により適確な全ぼうをつかみ得るに至るものと期待している。  
 2. 冒頭往信をもつて送付申し上げた対日重要関係者リストには特に重要ならざるものでも過去ないしは現在の日米関係にかんがみて掲上を余ぎなくされている者を真に重要視されるべき者との2種類の者が列挙されているが、後者についてはたとえば共和党のスコット上院議員が脱落している等一層改善を要すべき点があり、目下、V.Sと協議中である。  
 3. 同リストの利用方法としては例えば客年日米政策委に提出した日米関係に関するペーパーをリストに列挙されているものに配布すること原則的に適当と認められるのでその可否については既に本省において御検討中と存ぜられるところ。結果、回報わずらわしい。  
 問題は、V.Sの示さずる如く、配布し放してはなく、そのフォロー・アップを如何に有効に行なうかであるが、V.Sの示さずる方式で取り遅れるかどうか疑問もあるので、目下その扱いについて当館においても検討中である。

外務省

秘



秘

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- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

4. なお、キウチをしてV. Sと協議をしめたところ、上述の諸点のほか、プロジェクト2の資料にてん付のオヴエリング・レタ→末段のV. Sの意見については、いずれも当方既に承知済み<sup>3</sup>の事がらで目新しい点はないが、そのうちで次の諸点が一応留意に値いすると認められた趣である。すなわち。(a)交渉が緊迫化しても日本としてはきょう迫的ないしは最後通ちよ的の態度をとるべきでないとしている点、これは表をかえしていえば、日本の国内事情が手におえないからよろしく頼むという態度(OVER RELIANCE TO "OUT OF MY HAND")は最早ゆるされざることを意味する。(b)日米関係では政経分離のアプローチは交渉建前上はともかくとして、実際問題としては最早通用しないのではないか。問題を限定的に摘出してそれだけをかた付けることは今日の外交では事実上不可能になっているのではないか。政治問題一つとつても、オキナワ問題はヴェトナムから韓国に至る広はんな問題をカヴァーすべく、多少の飛やくはあつても同じことが政経両分野にまたがって指摘されるのではないかと述べていたことである由。

-3- (3)

- 大政事外務省
- 事務 房
- 次次 長
- 臣官宣察警長
- 傍及会警給
- 参入官厚計
- 参調初
- 参領旅移
- 参北波経
- 参中函経
- 参北北銀
- 参一
- 参西東洋
- 参西東
- 参書近ア
- 参次総経国万
- 参官統国
- 参政技二
- 参一選
- 参条協規
- 参政経科
- 参社財
- 参道内外
- 参文書

注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

総番号(TA) 14355 主管  
 69年4月7日19時45分 米国 発 米地1  
 69年4月8日09時50分 本省 着

外務大臣 殿 下田 (大) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

ロジャース長官の記者会見(沖縄部分)

文1048号 平 至急

往電文1047号に關し

サンケイ特派員の「岸元総理と会談されたいこと」に鑑み、沖縄問題に關する貴見と承知したい」との須同に対し、國務長官は次のとおり答えた。

A VERY SERIOUS QUESTION. WE RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. WE RECOGNIZE THAT CHANGES HAVE TO BE MADE WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME. WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH OFFICIALS OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER, AND AS YOU KNOW, PRIME MINISTER SATO IS GOING TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES IN THE FALL AND WE HOPE THAT WE CAN WORK SOMETHING OUT ON OKINAWA THAT WILL BE MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY.