

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

日米関係（沖縄返還）34

メタデータ	言語: 出版者: 公開日: 2019-02-14 キーワード (Ja): キーワード (En): 作成者: - メールアドレス: 所属:
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/43833

44
6
16

ライシャワー教授

(注) 録音テープ添付なし

アメリカ局長

参事官


北米第一課長

市才638号

昭和44年7月18日

外務大臣殿

在 シカゴ



ライシャワー教授講演テープの送付について

6月20日付往信才530号に关し、

去^る6月16日 シカゴのコンラッド・ヒルトン・ホテルにおいて

開催された American Association of University Women の全口大会でライシャワー教授の行なつた講演全部を収録したテープを2本入手したので、ご参考までに別添送付する。

なお、上記講演の趣旨大綱は、本年1月に同教授

が当地のハーバート・クラブで行なつたもの(往電才8号御参照)と同様であるが、今次講演の最後の部分で沖繩の施政権も返還の日時及び返還後に米軍が留保すべき権利(日本全体に及ぶもの)に关し、具体的提案がなされている点が目新しい。

本信字送付先: 米、ニューヨーク (テープ省略)

要処理
首席事務官
意(カ)
渉外調査
漁業
航空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査
カナダ
局庶務



西人宛

送付先
PVA局長
名手官
北米局長
付付 公

別添
回覽中
信

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米一課長

政第 6414 号	昭和44年 8 月 5 日	
外務大臣 殿	在米吉野 臨時代理大使	
引用公信・電信番号		
送付資料		
<p>米国のアジア政策 (NBCのテレビ番組 "Meet the Press" に於けるライオン - 元駐日大使の質疑応答記録)</p> <p>備考: 本記録末尾に於いて、「ラ」氏は質問に答へ、沖縄問題等由米関係をめぐり諸問題につき簡筆の意見を附録している。</p>		
<p>(希望配付先:)</p>		
付属添付 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	付属空便(行) <input type="checkbox"/>	付属空便(D.P) <input type="checkbox"/>
本信写送付先:		(別添省略)

- 要処理
- 首席事務官
- 渉外調査
- 海業
- 航空
- 科学協力
- 連絡調整
- 調査
- 力夕
- 局庶務



PLEASE CREDIT ANY QUOTES OR EXCERPTS FROM THIS NBC RADIO AND TELEVISION PROGRAM TO "NBC'S MEET THE PRESS."

MEET THE PRESS

Produced by Lawrence E. Spivak

Sunday, August 3, 1969

GUEST:

PROFESSOR EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, Harvard University,
(Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan)

MODERATOR:

Lawrence E. Spivak

PANEL:

Richard Halloran - New York Times

Philip Geyelin - Washington Post

R. H. Shackford - Scripps-Howard Newspapers

John Chancellor - NBC News

: This is a rush transcript pro- :
: vided for the information and :
: convenience of the press. Accu- :
: racy is not guaranteed. In case :
: of doubt please check with MEET :
: THE PRESS. :

1 MR. SPIVAK: Our guest today on MEET THE PRESS is
2 Edwin O. Reischauer, who is widely recognized as a specialist
3 on Japan and the Far East. He was the ~~first~~ United States
4 Ambassador to Japan for five years and is now Professor at
5 Harvard University.

6 We will have the first questions from John Chancellor of
7 NBC News.

8 MR. CHANCELLOR: Mr. Reischauer, the President seems to
9 have enunciated a new Asian policy and I wonder if you would
10 be kind enough to summarize for us what you see as the basic
11 parts of that policy and tell us what promises and perils you
12 see in them.

13 MR. REISCHAUER: I think you are quite right in saying
14 that it is a new Asian policy. He is describing what he
15 thinks the post-Vietnam situation should be and, obviously, it
16 should be one in which we have a lower profile, as they put
17 it, on military matters. We are going to stay out of involve-
18 ment in the internal instabilities of the nations of Asia
19 and I think that is quite right because we have shown in
20 Vietnam that we can't do much about internal instabilities.
21 But, at the same time, he is trying to reassure Asians that
22 we will remain concerned in their future and we should be
23 because the future of this part of the world that has so much
24 of the total population of the world is very important to us,
25 and we will do our best on the economic side and maintain an

1 option on the military side in case there is some type of
2 situation like a blatant aggression that we might be able to
3 do something about but we are going to be less committed, even
4 though he did use the word "commitment" pretty much in Thai-
5 land. Still, it is basically a policy of less military commit-
6 ment and that is quite correct.

7 MR. CHANCELLOR: Is it fair to say no more Vietnams?

8 MR. REISCHAUER: Yes, that is basically it. Not getting
9 involved in something that is fundamentally an internal dis-
10 turbance, where our participation in a sense almost worsens
11 it rather than helps it.

12 MR. CHANCELLOR: Well, sir, however popular no more
13 Vietnams as a slogan may be here in the United States, how
14 helpful is that going to be in certain countries overseas
15 with their own internal security problems in countries in
16 Asia?

17 MR. REISCHAUER: Well, in a way it is helpful to make them
18 realize they have to handle it themselves and that the only
19 fundamental way to handle it is through economic and institu-
20 tional reform and that we will help them in doing this and in
21 providing some of the materials, but they will have to do it
22 themselves. As long as they think they can lean on us no
23 matter how bad their administration is, then they aren't
24 facing these problems. I think that is a step forward too.

25 MR. CHANCELLOR: Do you also see the President's new
policy as a background against which he can play out a

1 withdrawal from Vietnam? Is the timing important for that
2 reason?

3 MR. REISCHAUER: I think the timing is vastly important
4 and I am much encouraged that he wanted to do it right now.
5 Of course, there is this accidental thing of the Apollo shot
6 that brought him out to that part of the world that helped
7 time it in that way, but I think he has a deeper timing concept
8 behind it. He has to, over the next few months, and probably
9 fairly soon, make much more determined steps towards getting us
10 out of Vietnam.

11 Now, if he were to do this without having talked with the
12 Asians that would be most worried about that, it would be some-
13 thing of a bolt from the blue. He talks with them first,
14 reassures them about our continued interest in them and I think
15 he does something else very important in connection with this
16 possible withdrawal from Vietnam. He tells the American public
17 again that even though we are pulling out of Vietnam we do have
18 deep continuing interest in that part of the world so I think
19 the timing does count.

20 (Announcements)

21 * * * * *

22 MR. SHACKFORD: Mr. Reischauer, during his discussion of
23 Asian policy in Guam, President Nixon said that he thought that
24 Asia constitutes the greatest danger for world peace in the
25 years ahead. Do you agree with that estimate and, if so, where

1 do you see the major danger spots in Asia?

2 MR. REISCHAUER: I would agree with it basically. Asia,
3 after all, has half the world's population. Just East Asia
4 has a good third of the world's population and, therefore, the
5 future of the human race is very much dependent upon what this
6 vast mass of people do.

7 The fundamental danger in the world, as I see it, is the
8 growing gap between the advanced industrialized nations and
9 the less advanced nations. Now, to a large extent, this is a
10 gap between us and Asia, the two largest units involved. This
11 can build all sorts of great frictions in the future. If
12 you are thinking of a shorter time span -- I am talking about
13 a 20, 30, 40 time span there, the shorter one I would say
14 the two greatest danger spots in the world today are the Arab-
15 Israeli confrontation -- that is in West Asia in a sense --
16 and the other is the Korean situation where you have two very
17 dangerous, hostile regimes eyeing each other across a rather
18 unstable frontier.

19 MR. SHACKFORD: I suspect that maybe China is in the
20 back of his mind too. American foreign policy still seems
21 pretty much to be based upon the fear that China is a militarily
22 aggressive country and likely to threaten its neighbors and
23 even ourselves, out of the argument that the ABMs, the possi-
24 bility of their using it against us. Do you think that the
25 Chinese military action outside of its borders is the kind of a

1 threat that we have to worry about at this stage?

2 MR. REISCHAUER: Well, I know a lot of people have thought
3 in those terms. This has been probably the great mistake
4 of our past policies towards Asia, gearing it all towards the
5 danger of an aggressive China, which hasn't really materialized.
6 I think it has been a greatly exaggerated concept and I think
7 the President has really spoken much less about it on this
8 trip showing that maybe he has had some change of thought on
9 this matter.

10 China is muscle-bound in a sense by its people. It has so
11 many people it is really not a strong country at all. Just to
12 feed them and clothe them is a tremendous task and this
13 economy of China is not doing well. Beyond that, the Chinese
14 have always tended to be an inward-looking people. They have
15 talked a great deal about world revolution and all that. If
16 other people will have revolutions, they will help out, but they
17 have shown very little real aggressiveness and I think this
18 has been a basic misconception and has put all of our policies
19 in that part of the world on the concept of/an aggressive
20 China which has been a serious mistake.

21 MR. SHACKFORD: Another familiar
22 American thesis that the Chinese are irrational and un-
23 predictable. How rational or how unrational do you think the
24 Chinese people are?

25 MR. REISCHAUER: That is pure racism and we have a lot

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

the assumption 7
of racism in this country towards Asians, that somehow the
Chinese will be less rational than Russians or whatever else you
may have. This just doesn't make sense. They have been very
cautious and very careful. We have shown this kind of racism in
lots of other ways. Take the bombing of North Vietnam. The
assumption that the North Vietnamese would crumble if we bombed.
Everybody knew perfectly well Londoners and Berliners had not
crumbled through bombings. That was racism too.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. HALLORAN: Dr. Reischauer, in your book "Beyond
Vietnam," you wrote that the United States might have avoided
some of these conflicts in Asia such as Korea and Vietnam
with a bit of foresight, or as you said, "If we had only
bothered to study the problems we faced carefully in historical
depth."

Do you think the new Nixon policy the President is
beginning to enunciate now is a sign that he is moving
towards avoiding what you call a distressingly repetitive
pattern in our blunders in Asia?

MR. REISCHAUER: Yes, I think that is absolutely true.
We seem to be learning a little bit. If we can't learn, then
of course everything is hopeless, but I think we are bit by
bit learning some of these facts that some of us tried to
point out a long time ago. I tried to point them out in the
mid-fifties, using French Indochina, as we called it then,
as an example of a place where we would not do well if
we got involved, the way we got involved in Korea. I was
for the Korean war. I still think it was something we had
to do, but I warned way back then against getting involved in
Vietnam. Well, we had to learn the hard way. But I think we
have learned and we aren't going to do it again.

MR. HALLORAN: Dr. Reischauer, if we have learned this
question, do you think the United States over the period of
the next, say, five years, should withdraw all of its

1 forces from Asia? Are you an advocate of the pulback to what is
2 known as the mid-Pacific defense line?

3 MR. RE ISCHAUER: No, I am very much not an advocate of
4 that. In fact, I think that is the greatest danger for the
5 future that we face, that we are likely to overdo this
6 and swing back into a kind of isolationism. We have a
7 lot of frustation over Vietnam so it is awfully easy to
8 just turn our backs on all that mess and let those people
9 bother about it themselves. This we should not do.
10 We obviously have a very important economic role, but you are
11 speaking about the military.

12 I think it is very important that we maintain the
13 Seventh Fleet and an option for military action in the
14 Western Pacific. For one thing, it is important that we
15 do this for Japan's sake, because if we don't do it, Japan
16 is going to have to rearm in a major way which is going to
17 be very dangerous for them and that whole area.

18 We ought to do it also to discourage adventuristic
19 attacks between countries over there. Remember, when
20 Sukarno was in Indonesia, he tried to have a confrontation
21 with Malasia. Well this was discouraged by the presence of
22 external force. I think the fact that we have an option
23 there means that a Korean war will not break out, but if we
24 had no option, there would be a Korean war with all the
25 dangers that would bring to the world.

3 1 MR. GEYELIN: Professor Reischauer, you said
2 that you were much encouraged by the fact that the President
3 toured Asia at this time, that there were much more
4 determined steps, I think you said, to get us out of
5 Vietnam that he ought to take in the next few months. What
6 are they?

7 MR. REISCHAUER: Well, I think he has to begin announcing
8 further withdrawals on a much larger scale than 25,000 men in
9 a couple of months.

10 MR. GEYELIN: A much larger scale?

11 MR. REISCHAUER: A much larger scale than that. My
12 point is this: I think he has to be out before
13 he runs for election again in '72, and I think he recognizes
14 this perfectly well. It takes a considerable period of time
15 to get out. We are not likely to get a negotiated
16 settlement and I think he has to make it clear to Saigon
17 that there is a limit of time to our participation there,
18 and that Saigon will therefore have to shape up if it wants
19 to survive, and also find some way to negotiate a settlement
20 with the National Liberation Front and Hanoi.

21 MR. GEYELIN: Now, he hasn't given the election in 1970
22 as one of his criteria. He has said either there should be
23 progress in Paris or some reduction in the level of
24 hostilities, or that the South Vietnamese Army should
25 develop an increased capability. Are you saying that that -- are

1 you assuming that that capability will be there, or do you
2 think that is not important?

3 MR. REISCHAUER: I think it is highly desirable. I didn't
4 say the election in '70, I said the election in '72.

5 MR. GEYELIN: I meant '72.

6 MR. REISCHAUER: I think he has until the end of '71
7 to get out. Now that is two and a half years, and it takes
8 a long time for a big logistic move of that sort, and I
9 think we have to do it slowly and steadily so that we do
10 not seem to be pulling the rug out from underneath Saigon.
11 If we are to do that, people would think we went back
12 on all our commitments and everything else.

13 MR. GEYELIN: You don't think then it is reasonable
14 for him to hope, as he expressed, that he could do it by
15 the end of 1970, could meet Clark Clifford's time table by
16 then?

17 MR. REISCHAUER: I think that was rather hastily spoken.
18 I will bet he regrets it now. I'd love it if he could, but that
19 seems like a pretty short time to me.

20 MR. SPIVAK: Professor Reischauer, you have said, and I
21 think you have written, that a humiliating precipital
22 withdrawal or a sell-out would also have adverse
23 repercussions throughout most of Asia.

24 How do we get out if most of these negotiations fail
25 and if the South Vietnamese can't defend themselves, without

1 selling out? Just how do we do that?

2 MR. REISCHAUER: Well, I doubt that the negotiations
3 are going to succeed. I have never felt that they would
4 because there has never been enough reason for Hanoi to
5 really give much away through negotiations. That leaves
6 us with the options of staying forever, or else make
7 a clearcut time limit.

8 Now, if the time limit were very short, if out
9 of frustration we suddenly withdraw, then you would
10 get these very adverse reactions. All the world would
11 doubt us and our maturity and stability of judgment -- I
12 think the American public would be somewhat revolted by this,
13 and we could very easily go back into a tremendously dangerous
14 kind of isolation, if that were to happen.

15 Therefore it is very important that the American
16 President makes clear a long, steady period in which we
17 gradually shift from participation to being completely out.
18 This gives Saigon a chance. Now if it were a two and a half
19 year period, and Saigon could not shape up, why then it
20 would prove that Saigon never could stand on its own feet.
21 Nobody would blame us for not trying to prop them up forever.

22 MR. SPIVAK: Are you saying we ought to get all our
23 troops out within two and a half years or so.

24 MR. REISCHAUER: That would be just my time table. I
25 think that would be a reasonable one. That gets the end of
1971.

1 MR. CHANCELLOR: Mr. Reischauer, you have gone from
2 Mister to Doctor to Professor, so I will try "Ambassador," if
3 I may, this time.

4 Aren't we really talking about bugging out? If the
5 difference in Vietnam is two and a half years, or five years
6 to go from Point A, which is a heavy involvement, to Point B,
7 which is no involvement at all, isn't that really a form of
8 bugging out and won't this have a serious effect on the future
9 of the Saigon Government? Aren't we, by what we are saying
10 now, inviting a coup?

11 MR. REISCHAUER: Well, this could be true. You have
12 to see what the options are. The option is not to be out
13 within two and a half years. Frankly, I don't think the
14 American public will stand for that. I think you will have
15 very serious problems here. We have built up tremendous
16 problems for ourselves around the world, in Japan, in Europe,
17 everywhere else, because of the Vietnam policy. I don't
18 think the international situation will stand our being there
19 more than two and a half years.

20 All right. You have got the lesser of two evils which is
21 obviously the one of getting out within two and a half years.
22 The main thing is how this is interpreted. Is it interpreted as
23 bugging out or is it interpreted as giving Saigon an honest
24 chance to show whether or not it had it.

25 I think it will be taken in the latter form.

1 MR. CHANCELLOR: Let me ask you a technical question.
2 If there were a right wing or left wing coup within Saigon
3 within the next few months, would you think that the United
4 States would be legally committed, obliged to support that
5 regime?

6 MR. REISCHAUER: No, not at all.

7 MR. CHANCELLOR: What would we do then, get out --

8 MR. REISCHAUER: We would probably come out much more
9 rapidly. One of the more hopeful endings of the Vietnam War
10 might be a complete collapse of Saigon suddenly, in which case
11 everybody would realize there is nothing we can do and then we
12 would be quite justified in coming home and nobody would blame
13 us.

14 MR. CHANCELLOR: Isn't it true as you observed the
15 situation that the American troops in South Vietnam are
16 supporting the regime in Saigon? Aren't we deeply involved
17 in the perpetuation of that government?

18 MR. REISCHAUER: We are deeply involved in supporting
19 this particular government. It is a historical one that has
20 come down through our support. We have to terminate that
21 some day obviously. I am just suggesting a time for terminat-
22 ing. If something terminated it before that time, it suddenly
23 disappeared, then obviously our commitments would be wiped out
24 too.

25 MR. SHACKFORD: Mr. Ambassador, about a year ago you said

1 that we should not antagonize Asian nationalism or "smother
2 it with our eager mother hen activities;" we should withdraw
3 gradually from the role of leadership and become the out-
4 side supporter of Asian initiatives.

5 What kinds of things were you talking about when you
6 talked about "mother hen activities" in Asia?

7 MR. REISCHAUER: Well, I think in Vietnam, in South Korea,
8 in Taiwan, we very definitely had mother hen activities.
9 Perhaps in the Philippines is another case of that sort. I
10 think it is more dignified for them to realize they are standing
11 on their own feet and we are an outside supporter rather than
12 a sponsor and so on. They aren't client states of ours.

13 MR. SHACKFORD: After exercising this kind of leadership
14 though for so long, ever since the end of World War II, how do
15 we go about it in addition to the role in Vietnam, to
16 pass from this position of leadership to sort of the outside
17 supporter _____.

18 MR. REISCHAUER: We are in the process of this transition.
19 I take the President's visit to be an effort to show that we are
20 going to go on having a concern and interest. Now, of course,
21 part of this has to be the American public. We have to be
22 willing to vote aid and right now you know aid is going down
23 rather than up. It should be going up at this time when we are
24 beginning to try to draw back on the military side. So it
25 depends on whether or not we can see the importance of our

1 support of these people as an outside friend.

2 MR. HALLORAN: I will try a new title. Reischauer
3 Sensei.

4 The Nixon Administration has recently taken a number of
5 small steps in an effort to improve relations with Communist
6 China. Have you seen any evidence on the part of the
7 Chinese to reciprocate? Isn't it true before anything can
8 really happen in terms of improving relations between the United
9 States and China that the main initiative has to come from the
10 other side?

11 MR. REISCHAUER: Oh, it has to come from both sides. You
12 can't have good relations with only one side doing something
13 about it.

14 I don't think these steps we have taken will bring any
15 response from their side. It will be a long time before we
16 have a response, but that doesn't mean these aren't the right
17 things to do.

18 The whole China policy we have had has been a heavy
19 burden. We have paid a big political price for it and gotten
20 absolutely nothing for it and therefore we should jettison it
21 and get rid of it and have a more reasonable policy. These are
22 the first steps in that direction.

23 MR. HALLORAN: In recent months we have seen the Sino-
24 Soviet dispute heat up to the point of open clashes up on the
25 Manchurian border and so forth. Some observers have even

1 begun to speculate that the Chinese and the Russians are close
2 to open war. What do you think the United States should do in
3 this matter? Is there anything the United States can do to
4 take advantage of this, to serve its own national interests?

5 MR. REISCHAUER: No, I think that would be the action of
6 the small man, to put it in Chinese philosophical terms. I
7 think we should be much bigger than that. When we try to take
8 advantage of something of that sort, we usually fall flat on
9 our face in the process. Of course, it is advantageous in a
10 way for us to have them so very much against each other. At
11 the same time, it is terribly dangerous. It could lead to a
12 world war again if they really went into some sort of fighting.

13 I don't think they are likely to fight. I think they are
14 both too rational to do that. Remember, the Japanese and the
15 Russians fought very big battles in the late thirties and no
16 one thought this was going to grow into war and I think the Red
17 Chinese and the Russians might very well do the same thing.
18 So I would be all opposed to trying to take advantage of it.

19 On the other hand, you can argue we should have more or
20 less an equal attitude towards the two sides. This puts us in
21 a better position for dealing with both.

22 MR. GEYELIN: Just for the record, Professor, you were
23 consulted, I believe, by the Johnson Administration. Have
24 you been consulted by the Nixon Administration?

25 MR. REISCHAUER: Yes, I have been.

1 MR. GEYELIN: So you have some inside knowledge of what
2 this new Asian policy intends to do?

3 MR. REISCHAUER: No, I couldn't claim that at all because
4 they weren't going to tell em what they were thinking and they
5 shouldn't tell me that because I want to be able to speak
6 absolutely freely. I can sense things and that is why I
7 spoke as strongly as I did.

8 MR. GEYELIN: Well, what is the evidence that the policy
9 really is new? It has been stated as new, that we are going to
10 try to stay out of entanglements, that we are going to lean on
11 economic aid and try to avoid the military. Isn't that where we
12 started in Vietnam until there was a heavier effort made by the
13 enemy, in which case we came and made a heavier effort
14 ourselves? How do you avoid that?

15 MR. REISCHAUER: Well, maybe we are coming back to some
16 attitudes that existed in the late forties actually, and we are
17 coming very much back to the situation we had at that time, and
18 it changes a lot of small, little steps. This is one of the
19 more significant ones, I think, the President's trip, and the
20 speeches he has made.

21 MR. GEYELIN: Aren't you really saying that it really
22 doesn't matter if a country in this area falls under Communist
23 control as long as they seem to have had a decent opportunity
24 to save themselves?

25 MR. REISCHAUER: The latter part is only if we are

1 involved some way in it as we are in Vietnam. Actually, it
 2 doesn't make too much difference if one of these countries is
 3 Communist or not. They have a long way to go before they
 4 become modernized nations with any real power. The truth of
 5 it is I don't think any of them will fall under foreign control.
 6 Nationalism is just so strong. Nobody is going to take them over.
 7 We couldn't take over Viet Nam., and the Chinese can't, either.

8 MR. SPIVAK: Gentlemen, we have less than three minutes.

9 Professor, you were recently reported as saying that the
 10 United States and Japan may be approaching the big bust
 11 of 1970. What did you mean by that?

12 MR. REISCHAUER: Well, 1970 has always been a crisis year
 13 in Japanese minds because their defense treaty with us, which
 14 was renegotiated in 1960, runs automatically until 1970,
 15 after which either country can ask for it to be dropped so all
 16 opposition elements have aimed at 1970 for what I call the big
 17 bust. On top of that, we have this problem of Okinawa where we
 18 have a colony of one million Japanese. Think that one over.
 19 Here is another little bit of racism. We wouldn't have a
 20 colony of one million Englishmen or one million Italians,

21 I can assure you, today. But we think we can of one million
 22 Japanese and the Japanese have finally gotten terribly ex-
 23 cited about that. They are also very much worried over our
 24 involvement in Viet Nam. These three things have come
 25 together to make the next eighteen months a real crisis in
 American-Japanese relations.

1
 2 MR. CHANCELLOR: Out of that crisis in the next 18 months
 3 could any of us look forward, or do you look forward to a re-
 4 armed Japan or a Japan bent on acquiring nuclear weapons?

5 MR. REISCHAUER: Well, that could be the catastrophe
 6 that could come out of it. If we do break with the Japanese
 7 because of excitement over all these things, then they will
 8 be forced into rearmament and with rearmament they will become
 9 a nuclear power again.

10 MR. CHANCELLOR: Could they become an allied nuclear
 11 power?

12 MR. REISCHAUER: Probably an allied power, but it is not
 13 good for them or us for this to happen. I don't think it is
 14 going to happen. If we have any sense, we are going to
 15 go on and strengthen our relationship with Japan.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. SHACKFORD: Professor Reischauer, what about, looking ahead, the growing relationship, or what kind of a relationship do you see between China and Japan? After all, China, the big, great, colossus on the Mainland, and Japan, the great industrial, economic power in that part of the world?

MR. REISCHAUER: I think if any country helps China get out of its isolation it will be Japan that has more contact with it, but it won't come very fast.

MR. SPIVAK: I am afraid that on that note we must end. I am sorry to interrupt, but our time is up.

Thank you, Professor Reischauer, for being with us today on MEET THE PRESS.

* * * *

(Next week: Daniel P. Moynihan, Assistant to the President for Urban Affairs)


アメリカ局長
参事官
北米第一課長

清第 7997 号

昭和 44 年 9 月 29 日

外務大臣殿

在 米 下 田 大 使



ライオン教授の Meet the Press での会見録の送付

- 要処理
- 首席事務官
- (南)
- 渉外調査
- 漁業
- 航空
- 租協力
- 連絡調整
- 調査
- 力手
- 局庶務

この度、NBC (National Broadcasting Company) より要旨ありま下記通りの Edwin O Reischauer 教授の Meet the Press (NBC 毎日曜番組) での記者会見録を送付越したので別添送付する。

記

新アジア政策について、Nixon はアジア政策として、post-Vietnam に終止符を打ち、アジア諸国の国内的不安定に介入せず、しかもその人口からみれば



GA-4

外務省

3265

要性に鑑み併来も北米アジア諸国に関心をもち続け、経済援助に重点をおきつつ同時に軍事的側面では不慮の aggression に対して行動すべき option の余地を保持しうる体制をもつと述べたが、この政策は新アジア政策といえし納得のいくべき方である。

軍事的 option について、その艦隊の維持は西太平洋での軍事行動の選択肢の余地を残しておくのに重要である。これは一つには日本の為で、もしなければ日本は危険な再軍備の道をとらざるをえなくなるだろうし、一つには北米の軍事的存在によりアジア諸国間の冒険心に起因する衝突 (例としてスカム川の起ったレーブとの衝突) をなくす為である。

ヴェトナム撤兵について、ヴェトナム撤兵は 72 年の

GA-4

外務省

大統領選挙を勘案して、1971年末迄に撤兵完了されるだろう。これは又^{自分}のtime table である。もちろん撤兵には交渉の春の間、timingが必要だが、先ず行き2年半ありとの向にサイゴンに撤退を与える機会はある。

日米関係について、^{1970年は}~~1970年~~ crisis year であり、それには3つの要因がある。

- 1) 1970年に "big bust" を目撃してある反社派の存在。
- 2) 沖縄問題：百万²日本人の植民地はそのことだけで大変な問題である。米国人は百万^{は24を}の植民地、あるいは伊人の植民地^{は24を}と見做さないだろう。
- 3) 安保を通じウエトナム戦争に巻き込まれると、老いる日本人の懸念

このCrisisにおいて日米関係が断絶した場合、日本は再軍備を余儀なくされ、核保有国となるだろう。

付属添付

✓
4412
The National Broadcasting Company Presents



MEET THE PRESS

America's Press Conference of the Air

Produced by LAWRENCE E. SPIVAK

Guest: PROFESSOR EDWIN O. REISCHAUER
Harvard University
Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan

VOLUME 13 SUNDAY, AUGUST 3, 1969 NUMBER 30

Menkle Press Inc. Printers and Periodical Publishers
Division of Publishers Co. Inc.
Box 2111, Washington, D. C. 20013

10 cents per copy

Q

Panel: RICHARD HALLORAN, *New York Times*
PHILIP GEYELIN, *Washington Post*
R. H. SHACKFORD, *Scripps-Howard Newspapers*
JOHN CHANCELLOR, *NBC News*

Q

Moderator: LAWRENCE E. SPIVAK

Permission is hereby granted to news media and magazines to reproduce in whole or in part. Credit to NBC's MEET THE PRESS will be appreciated.

M E E T T H E P R E S S

MR. SPIVAK: Our guest today on MEET THE PRESS is Edwin O. Reischauer, who is widely recognized as a specialist on Japan and the Far East. He was the United States Ambassador to Japan for five years and is now a Professor at Harvard University.

We will have the first questions from John Chancellor of NBC News.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Mr. Reischauer, the President seems to have enunciated a new Asian policy, and I wonder if you would be kind enough to summarize for us what you see as the basic points of that policy and tell us what promises and perils you see in them.

MR. REISCHAUER: I think you are quite right in saying that it is a new Asian policy. He is describing what he thinks the post-Vietnam situation should be and, obviously, it should be one in which we have a lower profile, as they put it, on military matters. We are going to stay out of involvement in the internal instabilities of the nations of Asia, and I think that is quite right, because we have shown in Vietnam that we can't do much about internal instabilities. But, at the same time, he is trying to reassure Asians that we will remain concerned in their future, and we should be, because the future of this part of the world that has so much of the total population of the world is very important to us. And that we will do our best on the economic side and maintain an option on the military side in case there is some type of situation like a blatant aggression that we might be able to do something about. But we are going to be less committed, even though he did use the word "commitment" pretty much in Thailand. Still, it is basically a policy of less military commitment and that is quite correct.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Is it fair to say, no more Vietnams?

MR. REISCHAUER: Yes, that is basically it. Not getting involved in something that is fundamentally an internal disturb-

ance, where our participation in a sense almost worsens it rather than helps it.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Well, sir, however popular no more Vietnams as a slogan may be here in the United States, how helpful is that going to be in certain countries overseas with their own internal security problems, countries in Asia?

MR. REISCHAUER: In a way it is helpful to make them realize they have to handle it themselves and that the only fundamental way to handle it is through economic and institutional reform, that we will help them in doing this and in providing some of the materials, but they will have to do it themselves. As long as they think they can lean on us no matter how bad their administration is, then they aren't facing these problems. I think that is a step forward too.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Do you also see the President's new policy as a background against which he can play out a withdrawal from Vietnam? Is the timing important for that reason?

MR. REISCHAUER: I think the timing is vastly important, and I am much encouraged that he wanted to do it right now. Of course, there is this accidental thing of the Apollo shot that brought him out to that part of the world that helped time it in that way, but I think he has a deeper timing concept behind. He has to, over the next few months and probably fairly soon, make much more determined steps towards getting us out of Vietnam.

If he were to do this without having talked with the Asians, they would be most worried about it; it would be something of a bolt from the blue. He talks with them first, reassures them about our continued interest in them, and I think he does something else very important in connection with this possible withdrawal from Vietnam. He tells the American public again that even though we are pulling out of Vietnam we do have deep continuing interest in that part of the world. So I think the timing does count.

(Announcements)

MR. SHACKFORD: Mr. Reischauer, during his discussion of Asian policy in Guam, President Nixon said that he thought that Asia constitutes the greatest danger for world peace in the years ahead. Do you agree with that estimate and, if so, where do you see the major danger spots in Asia?

MR. REISCHAUER: I would agree with it basically. Asia, after all, has half the world's population. Just East Asia has a good third of the world's population and, therefore, the future of the human race is very much dependent upon what this vast mass of people do.

The fundamental danger in the world, as I see it, is the growing gap between the advanced industrialized nations and the less advanced nations. Now, to a large extent, this is a gap between us and Asia, the two largest units involved. This can build all sorts of great frictions in the future. If you are thinking of a shorter time span—I am talking about a 20, 30, 40-year time span there. In the shorter one, I would say the two greatest danger spots in the world today are the Arab-Israeli confrontation—that is in West Asia in a sense—and the other is the Korean situation, where you have two very dangerous, hostile regimes eyeing each other across a rather unstable frontier.

MR. SHACKFORD: I suspect that maybe China is in the back of his mind too. American foreign policy still seems pretty much to be based upon the fear that China is a militarily aggressive country and likely to threaten its neighbors and even ourselves out of—the argument over the ABM's the possibility of their using it against us. Do you think that the Chinese military action outside of its borders is the kind of a threat that we have to worry about at this stage?

MR. REISCHAUER: I know a lot of people have thought in those terms. This has been probably the great mistake of our past policies towards Asia, gearing it all towards the danger of aggressive China, which hasn't really materialized. I think it has been a greatly exaggerated concept, and I think the President has really spoken much less about it on this trip, showing that maybe he has had some change of thought on this matter.

China is muscle-bound in a sense by its people. It has so many people it is really not a strong country at all. Just to feed them and clothe them is a tremendous task, and this economy of China is not doing well. Beyond that, the Chinese have always tended to be an inward-looking people. They have talked a great deal about world revolution and all that. If other people will have revolutions, they will help out, but they have shown very little real aggressiveness. I think this has been a basic misconception and has put all of our policies in that part of the world on the concept of containing an aggressive China, which has been a serious mistake.

MR. SHACKFORD: Another familiar American thesis is that the Chinese are irrational and unpredictable. How rational or how irrational do you think the Chinese people are?

MR. REISCHAUER: That is pure racism, and we have a lot of racism still in this country toward Asians, the assumption that somehow the Chinese will be less rational than Russians or whatever else you may have. This just doesn't make sense. They have been very cautious and very careful. We have shown this kind of racism in lots of other ways. Take the bombing of North

Vietnam—the assumption that the North Vietnamese would crumble if we bombed. Everybody knew perfectly well London and Berliners had not crumbled through bombings. That was racism too.

MR. HALLORAN: Dr. Reischauer, in your book "Beyond Vietnam," you wrote that the United States might have avoided some of these conflicts in Asia, such as Korea and Vietnam, with a bit of foresight, or as you said, "If we had only bothered to study the problems we faced carefully in historical depth."

Do you think the new Nixon policy the President is beginning to enunciate now is a sign that he is moving towards avoiding what you call a distressingly repetitive pattern in our blunders in Asia?

MR. REISCHAUER: Yes, I think that is absolutely true. We seem to be learning a little bit. If we can't learn, then of course everything is hopeless, but I think we are bit by bit learning some of these facts that some of us tried to point out a long time ago. I tried to point them out in the mid-fifties, using French Indochina, as we called it then, as an example of a place where we would not do well if we got involved, the way we got involved in Korea. I was for the Korean war. I still think it was something we had to do, but I warned way back then against getting involved in Vietnam. Well, we had to learn the hard way. But I think we have learned, and we aren't going to do it again.

MR. HALLORAN: Dr. Reischauer, if we have learned this question, do you think the United States over the period of the next, say, five years, should withdraw all of its forces from Asia? Are you an advocate of the pullback to what is known as the mid-Pacific defense line?

MR. REISCHAUER: No, I am very much not an advocate of that. In fact, I think that is the greatest danger for the future that we face, that we are likely to overdo this and swing back into a kind of isolationism. We have a lot of frustration over Vietnam, so it is awfully easy to just turn our backs on all that mess and let those people bother about it themselves. This we should not do. We obviously have a very important economic role, but you are speaking about the military.

I think it is very important that we maintain the Seventh Fleet and an option for military action in the Western Pacific. For one thing, it is important that we do this for Japan's sake, because if we don't do it, Japan is going to have to rearm in a major way, which is going to be very dangerous for them and that whole area.

We ought to do it also to discourage adventurist attacks between countries over there. Remember, when Sukarno was in

Indonesia, he tried to have a confrontation with Malaysia. This was discouraged by the presence of external force. I think the fact that we have an option there means that a Korean war will not break out, but if we had no option, there would be a Korean war with all the dangers that would bring to the world.

MR. GEYELIN: Professor Reischauer, you said that you were much encouraged by the fact that the President toured Asia at this time, but that there were much more determined steps, I think you said, to get us out of Vietnam that he ought to take in the next few months. What are they?

MR. REISCHAUER: I think he has to begin announcing further withdrawals on a much larger scale than 25,000 men in a couple of months.

MR. GEYELIN: A much larger scale?

MR. REISCHAUER: A much larger scale than that. My point is this: I think he has to be out before he runs for election again in '72, and I think he recognizes this perfectly well. It takes a considerable period of time to get out. We are not likely to get a negotiated settlement, and I think he has to make it clear to Saigon that there is a limit of time to our participation there and that Saigon will therefore have to shape up if it wants to survive and also find some way to negotiate a settlement with the National Liberation Front and Hanoi.

MR. GEYELIN: He hasn't given the election in 1970 as one of his criteria. He said either there should be progress in Paris or some reduction in the level of hostilities or that the South Vietnamese Army should develop an increased capability. Are you saying that that—are you assuming that that capability will be there, or do you think that is not important?

MR. REISCHAUER: I think it is highly desirable. I didn't say the election in '70, I said the election in '72.

MR. GEYELIN: I meant '72.

MR. REISCHAUER: I think he has until the end of '71 to get out. That is two and a half years, and it takes a long time for a big logistic move of that sort. I think we have to do it slowly and steadily, so that we do not seem to be pulling the rug out from underneath Saigon. If we are to do that, people would think we went back on all our commitments and everything else.

MR. GEYELIN: You don't think then it is reasonable for him to hope, as he expressed, that he could do it by the end of 1970, could meet Clark Clifford's time table by then?

MR. REISCHAUER: I think that was rather hastily spoken. I will bet he regrets it now. I'd love it if he could, but that seems like a pretty short time to me.

MR. SPIVAK: Professor Reischauer, you have said, and I think you have written, that "a humiliating precipitous withdrawal or a sell-out would also have adverse repercussions throughout most of Asia."

How do we get out if most of these negotiations fail and if the South Vietnamese can't defend themselves without selling out? Just how do we do that?

MR. REISCHAUER: I doubt that the negotiations are going to succeed. I have never felt that they would because there has never been enough reason for Hanoi to really give much away through negotiations. That leaves us with the options of staying forever or else make a clearcut time limit.

If the time limit were very short, if out of frustration we suddenly withdraw, then you would get these very adverse reactions. All the world would doubt us and our maturity and stability of judgment. I think the American public would be somewhat revolted by this, and we could very easily go back into a tremendously dangerous kind of isolation, if that were to happen.

Therefore it is very important that the American President makes clear a long, steady period in which we gradually shift from participation to being completely out. This gives Saigon a chance. If it were a two and a half year period and Saigon could not shape up, why then it would prove that Saigon never could stand on its own feet. Nobody would blame us for not trying to prop them up forever.

MR. SPIVAK: Are you saying we ought to get all our troops out within two and a half years or so.

MR. REISCHAUER: That would be just my timetable. I think that would be a reasonable one. That gets the end of 1971.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Mr. Reischauer, you have gone from "Mr." to "Doctor" to "Professor", so I will try "Ambassador," if I may, this time.

Aren't we really talking about bugging out? If the difference in Vietnam is two and a half years, or five years, to go from Point A, which is a heavy involvement, to Point B, which is no involvement at all, isn't that really a form of bugging out, and won't this have a serious effect on the future of the Saigon government? Aren't we, by what we are saying now, inviting a coup?

MR. REISCHAUER: This could be true. You have to see what the options are. The option is not to be out within two and a half years. Frankly, I don't think the American public will stand

for that. I think you will have very serious problems here. We have built up tremendous problems for ourselves around the world, in Japan, in Europe, everywhere else, because of the Vietnam policy. I don't think the international situation will stand our being there more than two and a half years.

All right. You have got the lesser of two evils which is obviously the one of getting out within two and a half years. The main thing is how this is interpreted. Is it interpreted as bugging out or is it interpreted as giving Saigon an honest chance to show whether or not it had it? I think it will be taken in the latter form.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Let me ask you a technical question. If there were a right wing or left wing coup within Saigon within the next few months, would you think that the United States would be legally committed, obliged to support that regime?

MR. REISCHAUER: No, not at all.

MR. CHANCELLOR: What would we do then, get out sooner?

MR. REISCHAUER: We would probably come out much more rapidly. One of the more hopeful endings of the Vietnam War might be a complete collapse of Saigon, suddenly, in which case everybody would realize there is nothing we can do. Then we would be quite justified in coming home, and nobody would blame us.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Isn't it true, as you observed the situation, that the American troops in South Vietnam are supporting the regime in Saigon? Aren't we deeply involved in the perpetration of that government?

MR. REISCHAUER: We are deeply involved in supporting this particular government. It is a historical one that has come down through our support. We have to terminate that some day obviously. I am just suggesting a time for terminating. If something terminated it before that time—it suddenly disappeared—then obviously our commitments would be wiped out too.

MR. SHACKFORD: Mr. Ambassador, about a year ago you said that we should not antagonize Asian nationalism or "smother it with our eager mother hen activities," we should withdraw gradually from the role of leadership and become the outside supporter of Asian initiatives.

What kinds of things were you talking about when you talked about "mother hen activities" in Asia?

MR. REISCHAUER: I think in Vietnam, in South Korea, in Taiwan, we very definitely had mother hen activities. Perhaps in the Philippines is another case of that sort. I think it is more

dignified for them to realize they are standing on their own feet and we are an outside supporter rather than a sponsor and on. They aren't client states of ours.

MR. SHACKFORD: After exercising this kind of leadership though for so long, ever since the end of World War II, how do we go about it in addition to the role in Vietnam, to pass from this position of leadership to sort of the outside supporter?

MR. REISCHAUER: We are in the process of this transition. I take the President's visit to be an effort to show that we are going to go on having a concern and interest. Of course, part of this has to be the American public. We have to be willing to vote aid, and right now, you know, aid is going down rather than up. It should be going up at this time when we are beginning to try to draw back on the military side. So it depends on whether or not we can see the importance of our support of these people as an outside friend.

MR. HALLORAN: I will try a new title, *Reischauer Sensei*. The Nixon Administration has recently taken a number of small steps in an effort to improve relations with Communist China. Have you seen any evidence on the part of the Chinese to reciprocate? Isn't it true before anything can really happen in terms of improving relations between the United States and China that the main initiative has to come from the other side?

MR. REISCHAUER: Oh, it has to come from both sides. You can't have good relations with only one side doing something about it.

I don't think these steps we have taken will bring any response from their side. It will be a long time before we have a response, but that doesn't mean these aren't the right things to do.

The whole China policy we have had has been a heavy burden. We have paid a big political price for it and gotten absolutely nothing for it. Therefore we should jettison it and get rid of it and have a more reasonable policy. These are the first steps in that direction.

MR. HALLORAN: In recent months we have seen the Sino-Soviet dispute heat up to the point of open clashes up on the Manchurian border and so forth. Some observers have even begun to speculate that the Chinese and the Russians are close to open war. What do you think the United States should do in this matter? Is there anything the United States can do to take advantage of this, to serve its own national interests?

MR. REISCHAUER: No, I think that would be the action of the small man, to put it in Chinese philosophical terms. I think we should be much bigger than that. When we try to take ad-

vantage of something of that sort, we usually fall flat on our face in the process. Of course, it is advantageous in a way for us to have them so very much against each other. At the same time, it is terribly dangerous. It could lead to a world war again if they really went into some sort of fighting.

I don't think they are likely to fight. I think they are both too rational to do that. Remember, the Japanese and the Russians fought very big battles in the late thirties, and no one thought this was going to grow into war. I think the Red Chinese and the Russians might very well do the same thing. So I would be all opposed to trying to take advantage of it.

On the other hand, you can argue we should have more or less an equal attitude towards the two sides. This puts us in a better position for dealing with both.

MR. GEYELIN: Just for the record, Professor, you were consulted, I believe, by the Johnson Administration. Have you been consulted by the Nixon Administration?

MR. REISCHAUER: Yes, I have been.

MR. GEYELIN: So you have some inside knowledge of what this new Asian policy intends to do?

MR. REISCHAUER: No, I couldn't claim that at all, because they weren't going to tell me what they were thinking, and they shouldn't tell me that, because I want to be able to speak absolutely freely. I can sense things, and that is why I spoke as strongly as I did.

MR. GEYELIN: What is the evidence that the policy really is new? It has been stated as new, that we are going to try to stay out of entanglements, that we are going to lean on economic aid and try to avoid military. Isn't that where we started in Vietnam until there was a heavier effort made by the enemy, in which case we came and made a heavier effort ourselves? How do you avoid that?

MR. REISCHAUER: Maybe we are coming back to some attitudes that existed in the late forties actually. I think we are coming very much back to the situation we had at that time, and this changes a lot of small, little steps. This is one of the more significant ones, I think, the President's trip, and the speeches he has made.

MR. GEYELIN: Aren't you really saying that it really doesn't matter if a country in this area falls under Communist control as long as they seem to have had a decent opportunity to save themselves?

MR. REISCHAUER: The latter part is only if we are involved some way in it, as we are in Vietnam. Actually, it doesn't make

too much difference if one of these countries is Communist or not. They have a long way to go before they become modernized nations with any real power. The truth of it is, I don't think any of them will fall under foreign control. Nationalism is just so strong. Nobody is going to take them over. We couldn't take over Viet Nam, and the Chinese can't either.

MR. SPIVAK: Gentlemen, we have less than three minutes. Professor, you were recently reported as saying that the United States and Japan may be approaching "the big bust of 1970." What did you mean by that?

MR. REISCHAUER: 1970 has always been a crisis year in Japanese minds because their defense treaty with us, which was renegotiated in 1960, runs automatically until 1970, after which either country can ask for it to be dropped, so all opposition elements have aimed at 1970 for what I call the big bust. On top of that, we have this problem of Okinawa where we have a colony of one million Japanese. Think that one over. Here is another little bit of racism. We wouldn't have a colony of one million Englishmen or one million Italians, I can assure you today. But we think we can of one million Japanese, and the Japanese have finally gotten terribly excited about that. They are also very much worried over our involvement in Vietnam. These three things have come together to make the next eighteen months a real crisis in American-Japanese relations.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Out of that crisis in the next 18 months, could any of us look forward, or do you look forward, to a re-armed Japan or a Japan bent on acquiring nuclear weapons?

MR. REISCHAUER: That could be the catastrophe that could come out of it. If we do break with the Japanese because of excitement over all these things, then they will be forced into rearmament and with rearmament they will become a nuclear power.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Could they become an allied nuclear power?

MR. REISCHAUER: Probably an allied power, but it is not good for them or us for this to happen. I don't think it is going to happen. If we have any sense, we are going to go on and strengthen our relationship with Japan.

MR. SHACKFORD: Professor Reischauer, what about, looking ahead at the growing relationship—or what kind of a relationship do you see between China and Japan? After all, China, the big, great, colossus on the mainland, and Japan, the great industrial, economic power in that part of the world?

MR. REISCHAUER: I think if any country helps China get out of its isolation, it will be Japan, which has more contact with it, but it won't come very fast.

MR. SPIVAK: I am afraid that on that note we must end. I am sorry to interrupt, but our time is up. Thank you, Professor Reischauer, for being with us today on MEET THE PRESS.

The Proceedings of

MEET THE PRESS

as broadcast nationwide by the National Broadcasting Company, Inc., are printed and made available to the public to further interest in impartial discussions of questions affecting the public welfare. Transcripts may be obtained by sending a stamped, self-addressed envelope and ten cents for each copy to:

Merkle Press Inc. Box 2111, Washington, D. C. 20013
(Division Publishers Co., Inc.)

MEET THE PRESS is telecast every Sunday over the NBC Television Network. This program originated from NBC in Washington, D.C.

Television Broadcast 1:00-1:30 P.M. EDT
Radio Broadcast 6:30-7:00 P.M. EDT

