

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 米国関係
（議員等発言(2)（講演、記者会見等）

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① マスキー上院議員 演説 (昭四四、二、十一)

Senator Muskie's Speech
at the Press Club on Feb. 11, 1969.
(.....introductory remarks.....)

Well, this may not be a time of wrong policies or wrong directions but certainly it's a time when Japanese and Americans have a great deal of doubt about the rightness of our policies and the directions which our respective countries are taking not only in this part of the world but around the globe general. It's a time of ferment, as a consequence, in Japan and in America, because of the failures or shortcomings of past policies, domestic and foreign.

Young people in both our countries are skeptical and cynical, they go beyond that, and on many, many instances protest the consequences of bad policies, as they see it, the failure to correct injustice and wrong here in year 1968.

And [..... in] the field of foreign policy, this is a time of ferment in America and in Japan. And discussions that have taken place in the few days since our arrival in Japan make amply clear that Japan is giving much thought to the role it should play in Asia in the decade of the 70's. In this process the Japanese are obviously looking for a way to mesh their policies with future realities in so far as they can anticipate them and see them, in the context of their remarkable economic progress and the resurgence of national pride. We, Americans, like the Japanese, are trying to make sense out of our Post-Vietnam era to which we are, perhaps

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overly, hopefully looking forward, we are beginning to re-examine our political, economic and military role in Asia. And the mood of the American people, as we press for an end to the tragic war in Vietnam, is a mood of sharp questioning. It is time we have a new Administration, and it is only natural that there would be a full scale reassessment of our policies and our commitments. The questioning to which I refer is more than that. This reassessment takes its roots in a national consensus which says quite clear that while we may cooperate with others in the future as we had in the past we will not attempt to undertake the role of policeman in the world.

Mood which is so important to understanding Japan is also important particularly at this time to understanding the United States. Given the present mood of the American people, all options involving a reduction of American are open, and when I say all options, I mean that to include even withdraw from the Western Pacific, even though I personally do not agree that that would be wise nor do I think would many Japanese. What I am getting at is just as Americans have a deep interest in the outcome of the Japanese reassessment of its relationship with the nations bordering the Pacific. So in like measure Japanese have a deep interest in and they are specially sensitive to ^{the} outcome of the American reassessment. What the Japanese decide will surely have a profound effect on the

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role America plays in the Pacific in the coming decade. And what Americans decide will have a profound effect on Japan's role in Asia. I don't forget the enigma of China, Communist China, but nevertheless, I think it is clear that Japan and the U.S. are the two leading Pacific Powers. By the end of this century we may well be the world's two leading economic Powers.

Everything we do affects each other for better or for worse. I hope I have said enough to show that equality between our two nations must be the first principle of our relationship. Political and economic reality dictates this sort of recognition as does a decent respect for the opinions of each other.

The post-war era in so far as Japan is concerned has ended, and no intelligent American would think any lasting relationship could be constructed other than on the basis of equality, having said this, it follows; that the Japanese people will decide for themselves what they want by way of a relationship with the rest of the world in the decade to come. If the Japanese do not want us here, ^{we will withdraw,} even though this action might be against the best interests of both our nations, and so in defining our new relationships in Asia, we'll have to keep in mind first of all the relations between our two countries.

At this point, I am going to depart from the hollowed
tradition

tradition that has public officials present all the answering. And I am going to try to raise questions that we might ponder together in working out our new relationship, because there will be a new relationship.

The right place to start with is the most fundamental question of all. Will ^a an alliance between America and Japan be necessary in the Post-Vietnam era in Asia, and if so what kind of an alliance?

There are some on both sides of the Pacific who argue that "No" is the answer, that such an alliance is neither necessary nor desirable. There are Japanese contend for illogical or nationalistic reasons that the Yankee should go home. Japan, they say, should retreat into neutrality or take an entirely independent course such as France has in Europe. There are Americans who maintain that we must retire or withdraw from the world in a new form of isolation, or at least to pull out of Asia, and put our reliance for security on our allies in Western Europe. The Japanese as a free people will make their own judgements on these questions. I personally can't agree that retreating into isolationism could benefit either Japan or the United States.

The time has passed when the United States could rationally ignore as it did in the isolationist 19th century almost everything that happened on the other side of the Pacific, and
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the time has also passed when Japan could withdraw into its own shell as it did in the reign of Tokugawa's.

For more than a century America and Japan have been tied together. Once unhappily locked in a terrible war but more often fortunately enmeshed into peaceful pursuits that become civilized nations.

We are bound together by geography, for the shores of Japan and America are washed by the Pacific Ocean. Our well-being is even more closely intertwined by the need, the mutual need for the vast trade that flows between us and we are caught up together in a ceaseless search for the peace, security, and prosperity.

America must remain a Pacific Power for its own well-being and security. The well-being of Japan, the most important power on the other side of the Pacific, requires on-going growth and stability in the region. So it is evident to me that an alliance, a strong and continuing working relationship between America and Japan, is vitally necessary for our mutual prosperity and the maintenance of peace in Asia.

Well, that's not a difficult conclusion to reach, but now let us begin raising questions about how we should conduct our fundamental relationship.

Do Japanese and Americans, all of them, recognize that without our great two-way-trade both nations would be poorer, and

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that our consumer citizens would be denied many of products that all of us prize?

Have we done what we could to work out trade adjustment problems and to eliminate unnecessary restrictions? Do Japanese and Americans recognize that, despite their distinct cultural history, both nations, in their consumer-oriented society, in their fidelity to their democratic process, in their growing urbanization, in their mass-higher-education, and in their emphasis on rapid technological discoveries, have much, much in common?

Do they realize that we profit, or can profit, everyday each other's successes and that we can if we wish ~~learn~~^{learn} from each other's failure? We might even exchange experiences on unrest in our university campuses.

Another question increasing importance has to do with Japan's role vis-à-vis the developing nations in Asia. The Japanese, of course, will have to decide for themselves, for the poverty in other nations in Asia affects Japan, her well-being and her security. Upon the answer the answer to this question depends, I would think, the Japanese political and economic role in Asia in the decade of the 70's.

America is not likely to engage indefinitely in lovely efforts to assist economic development. If Japan participates and exercises leadership in regional development, we will

continue

continue to cooperate in this endeavor. If Japan will undertake economic assistance, I mean economic assistance beyond the simple promotion of her own commercial interests, to other nations in proportion to her economic ability, America would continue her economic contributions to Asia. To do so will not be an easy decision for us or for the Japanese who like ourselves have domestic needs to cope with. But if the leading Pacific Powers, and they are the two of us, do not work together, cannot find the way to work together, in a common effort to help their fellowmen help themselves, the result will be predictable, increasing chaos, instability and [.....] warfare in the regions. We cannot allow our respective increases in affluence to blind us to this immutable fact.

So far as Communist China is concerned I sense that we both agree we have to find the way to bring Communist China into the family of nations. Success in this effort will require a positive response from ~~the~~ China and the process would be gradual rather than sudden. Any honest solution must not ignore Taiwan, its people and government. They have, in terms of offering a better life for their people, come much further down the road than the mainland has today and it would be unjust and unwise to abandon, in our efforts, them to promote a dialogue with Peking. The United States and Japan should seek to act in concert, continue close consultation, on this issue which has characterized our efforts thus far and perhaps propose comments and issues. Our stakes in this matter are

equally

equally great, as is the stake of the world, in the impact which mainland China has on the problem of world peace. So cooperation here is just as vital as assisting the developing nations of Asia.

Let me move then to the question of security. It is quite clear from our talks that the Japanese are reassessing, sharply reassessing, the security relationship with the United States. And we on our side will be doing the same and the answers we come up with will inevitably affect our future. Do we have a need for a security relationship? The easiest thing to do, given the present mood in the United States, would be for us to make things easy for those Japanese who suggest that there is no need for a security relationship. This would not be difficult to sell to the American electorate and it is obvious it would not be difficult to sell to the Japanese people. But if we do get out of Japan, from that action may follow consequences that both sides might have cause to regret. Japan and the United States have an inescapable responsibility, each has an inescapable responsibility, to take a good hard look at what is in the best interests of each in security terms. In so doing, we can not think only of what is necessary for the defense of Japan, but in terms of the security structure that affects other parts of the Far East including, for example, Korea. In assessing our security relationship we must keep in mind the need to anticipate situations that we cannot fully predict

predict at this moment in history. I think our present mutual security treaty, the principal channel of our security relationship, is flexible enough to provide wide latitude in coming to any new assessments that we may believe to be in the best interests of our respective countries. The Japanese should understand, if it were necessary to seek revision of the Security Treaty, any proposed revision might come in for extremely close scrutiny in the Senate of the United States.

Assuming for the moment that we each decide in our own interest to continue our security relationship in some form, there is still another question to consider; how much responsibility, for the defense of Japan, will the United States bear in the new relationship. The Self-Defense Forces of Japan have, of course, come to take more and more responsibility for the conventional defense of Japan proper. In the 1970's, will both conventional and nuclear protection continue to be necessary? And who can be sure of that? Or, will the American role be limited to the nuclear umbrella and the protective screen of the 7th Fleet? Will an American commitment to defend Japan be feasible without the presence of American forces? We know that in the future the process of slimming down U.S. military installation will continue. How far should it go?

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Let us consider for a moment the vital question of Okinawa, which is very much on Japanese minds now. Not many Americans, it must be admitted, are as yet aware of the full intensity of Japanese feelings on the Okinawa issue. Our attention has been taken with Vietnam and domestic crisis, but Americans have in greater number begun to listen to the Japanese Government and to the Japanese and Okinawan people as they tell us the depth of their desire for reversion. The urgency of Okinawa has come to my attention, to that of my colleagues in this conference and we will take that message back home.

If I may remind you I am not a part of the new Administration but despite November, and because there are many Novembers, we will as Americans preserve the principle of bipartisan approach to foreign policy. In respect for this principle I am not going to prejudge the new Administration's intensive review of foreign policy questions that includes Okinawa, and frankly I do not have all the answers to the complex question of how to go about reversion. But I know I can speak for responsible Americans of both parties, when I say that we have no intention of maintaining a colonial possession in the Ryukyus. And speaking very personally I am convinced the United States and Japan must agree this year on a date for beginning the reversion process.

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In my judgement there will undoubtedly be a change of status of Okinawa in the direction desired by the Japanese and, if not, in my judgement, emotion is likely to out-race reason to the lasting regret of our two nations. Having said this I recognize that many complex problems attend the reversion process making it impossible to return Okinawa to Japan with a simple stroke of the pen. The most difficult of these is of course the question of how to treat American bases once the islands have returned to full Japanese sovereignty. I reject the thought that there is not enough good will and intelligence on both sides to come up with a rational answer. I'd like to say a word of caution to my Japanese friends. Emotions and panic do not make the sensible solution. There is no need to approach Americans on Okinawa in a mood of confrontation and in the mistaken belief that Japan has to force America to listen about Okinawa. Americans will listen to Japanese as friends on this issue but if their receptiveness on this point is mistaken, Americans may tend to compound the mistake by interpreting it as evidence of hostility which in return could trigger even greater American tendencies toward withdrawal that are now evident.

I can see three consequences of creating an emotional or panic-ridden atmosphere on this issue. In terms of the new American mood of which I spoke earlier, the first might well

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be to convince the American people that they are not wanted in Japan and create pressures for us to pull back despite the evident fact that our destinies are bound up together. The second, given the atmosphere of suspicion, might be to accentuate economic differences that are now soluble through rational efforts, thus damaging the commercial ties which are so important to our two countries. And thirdly a coding of Japan-U.S. relations would affect in ways we cannot fully predict the actions of other nations in this region some of which who hold attitudes hostile or potentially hostile to our common purposes.

So I urge the rational, calm approach to what I think is inevitable process of reversion. The atmosphere which I think is possible between our two countries. In this approach each nation should hesitate to run in the face of public emotion, each nation should analyse from the standpoint of its own interests the question of the conditions for reversion. As good friends we should then try to reconcile these interests with each side's views and with the state of public opinion which we as citizens of democratic societies respect.

In my judgement the following elements represent reasonable basis for negotiations and agreement on Okinawa. First, a mood of rationality that permits us to avoid the consequences of panic and emotion. Secondly, recognition that in our common interests we must reach agreement by the end of this year on specific date in the future by which the process of reversion of administrative rights to Japan will have been completed. Thirdly, acceptance by the Japanese of responsibility for local defense of the Ryukyus. And fourthly, American respect for Japan's feelings about the stationing of nuclear weapons on the Japanese soil. Now these four points can't cover all of the points which need to be resolved and do not eliminate all of the ambiguities. It is my intention simply to indicate a receptiveness to the points of view which have been urged upon us in Japan this week and the sympathetic understanding for the public opinion which underlies those points of view. And I think in addition that these points are based on what are in my judgement two realistic assumptions. First, the security interests of both Japan and the United States involve more than just the defense of home islands of Japan. Second, and related to the first, the constitutional limitations in Japan's use of Self Defense Forces, limitations which we respect, provide reasons for the presence of the U.S. bases here in order to make viable the concept of regional security.

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I recognize of course that the new arrangements we come to with regard to Okinawa and our security relationship will not last for all time; neither did the arrangements of 1951 and probably the arrangements of 1960. Just as our security relationships have changed in the past they will change in the future.

Let me say one final thing about the Okinawa base question as I think this needs to be pointed out in addition. We, and I mean the United States, do not want an outmoded "Model T" base structure that might needlessly serve to trigger emotions on, say, the nuclear question. I think Americans in general would agree that our bases on Okinawa have relevance and must have relevance to not only Japan's security but that of neighboring countries. Beyond that, pending the hard look which I have already referred to, I see no consensus in the United States on exactly what kind of bases we should have on Okinawa after reversion. Just as we are studying this question, I hope the Japanese after making their own analysis, will not hold back from expressing their views in the belief that we are not interested. Because the American use of Okinawan bases in my judgement after reversion must be consistent with the Japanese views of their own national interest. Any other bases simply will not be viable, nor realistic, nor possible, but I would hope that public opinion in both countries on this issue would be an enlightened, realistic public opinion.

opinion, made so by the frank discussion of this issue on the part of the leaders of both countries with their people.

Now having posed many questions and given few views of my own I'd like to end with one observation. I think we've reached the point, indeed passed the point, when either Japanese or Americans ever have to look upon any reassessment of our common policies as an exercise in confrontation. We have much in common, and nothing will serve our two nations better than the assumption that we can workout questions like this in a spirit of friendship. Over the past quarter of a century, we have moved forward together in a remarkable evolutionary process, from war^{time} confrontation as adversaries, to an adjustment ^{period} of occupation, to our present mutually beneficial relationship. Our relationship from now on must be that of two sovereign powers sharing common interests and prospering from our contacts with each other, and hopefully contributing out of growing wisdom and strength to improvement in the affairs of all mankind. That I think is the ultimate bond that binds us and that can continue to bind us in partnership across the Pacific Ocean into the distant future. As I consider the points of friction which could separate us as the result of our relationships with each other over a quarter of a century, I think it is remarkable that for differences of opinion should center on the relatively few which I discussed today.

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Well may I thank you again for inviting an unknown Senator from the far distant state of Maine to address you here this afternoon. I still find it difficult to understand why so much of what I believe is listened to today when it wasn't three or four month ago but its a good solid feeling at least until the press conferences and questions open up. Thank you very much.

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協 議 先

受 信 者 在 米 下 田 大 使	発 信 者 野 田 大 臣
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写 送 付 先 (希 望 発 送 日) 月 日

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マスキー上院議員の演説記録送付
 2月11日 外人記者クラブにおいて行われた
 マスキー上院議員(日米議員懇談会出席のため
 来日)の 沖縄及び日米関係に関する演説
 を録音テープより聴取したため、御参考までに
 当該演説記録を別添送付可。

付 属 添 付

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協 議 先		
受 信 者 左 那 霸 日 本 琉 球 交 渉 員 課 長 考 査 課 事 務 所 長	発 信 者 愛 知 縣 大 臣	
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字調査用ファイル

マスキー上院議員の演説^{記録}送付

2月11日 外人記者クラブにおいて行われた
 マスキー上院議員 (日米議員懇談会出席のため
 演説及び日米関係に関する)
 来日)の演説を録音テープより聴取したため
 御参考までに、当該演説記録を別添送付す。

~~併せて一部取次国連行前送付~~

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