琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 米国関係 係(議員等発言(2)(講演、記者会見等)

メタデータ	言語:
	出版者:
	公開日: 2019-02-14
	キーワード (Ja):
	キーワード (En):
	作成者: -
	メールアドレス:
	所属:
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12000/43840

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外務大臣殿

臨時代理大使 総領事 代理 大使

オキナワ返かん問題 (パード上院議員の演説)

第1160号

パード上院議員(ヴァージニア州還出民主党)は。 23日の上院本会談でオキナワ返かん問題につき演説しい 協定につき上院の助言と同意を求めるとの3月/0日付の ロジャース国務長官発フルフライト外交委員長あて書簡及 ひ。オキナワ返かんは行政協定によるべしとのニューヨー クッタイムズ記事(往電第1050号参照)のに言及の上 るオキナワ返かんには。 (イ) この時点で。オキナワを 日本に返すことが米国の国益に最もそくしたものか否かと いう問題と (ロ)返かん実施の形式の問題と二つあると 指摘し。(イ)は鬱動の余地のある(DEBATABLE)問題なるも。同日は議論しないとしつつ。(ロ)につい ては。対日平和条約のいかなる変更も上院の同意を得て行 なうのが当然なる冒鹼じている。(テキスト空港)

2 なお、バード上院議員の要請により返かん協定の上院

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。

2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に 連絡ありたい。

ース長官あて書簡。 (ロ) 3月/0日付ロジャース長 官発フルプライト委員長あて書筒及び(ハ)/969年以 来のバード農員のオキナワに関する演説を農事像に掲載し

(T)

外務省

	アメリカ局を上も	
	多事 官员 11米十一课	,
	政第 3328 号 昭和46年 4 月130 日	
·	外務大臣殿在米牛場大使)、	
	引用(来)(往)公信·電信番号 4月28日付往電力1160号	
	种能区是問題1日的方3八一个上院議員,	
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	本信写送付先 (別添とも)	
	1203	

the United States District Court for the Dis-trict of North Dakota to hear, determine, and fender Judgment upon any claim filed by Arthur Rike against the United States for compensation for personal injury, medical expenses, and property damage sustained by him arising out of an accident which occurred on December 24, 1964, allegedly as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an employee of the United States ng within the scope of his Federal

Sec. 2. Suit upon any such claim may be suc. 4. Sut upon any such claim may be instituted at any time within one year after the date of the enactment of this Act Nothing in this Act shall be construed as an infering in this Act shall be construed as an infer-ence of liability on the part of the United-States: Except as otherwise provided herein, proceedings for the determination of such claim, and review and payment of any judg-ment or judgments thereon, shall be had in the same manner as in the case of claims over high such court has jurisdiction under secion 1346(b) of title 28. United States Code.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Prope an excernt from the report (No. 92-63), explaining the purpose of the measure.

There being no objection, the excerpt was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The purpose of the bill is to confer juris-The purpose of the bill is to confer jurisdiction upon the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota to hear, determine, and render judgment upon a claim Arthur Rike: The bill would also wall the defenses of the United States to such claim based on the statute of limitations, l time, laches, or any previous proce

STATEMENT

A similar bill for this claimant in th Congress was approved by the committed passed by the Senate, but no action taken on it in the House of Represen In its report to the committee, the Office Department stated the facts in t secommendations as follows:

On Pebruary 5, 1968, the Departmen sub-mitted a report on S. 2214 to this come littee. The present report amends and supe sedes the February 5 report in order to reflect cor-rectly the final disposition of the civil tort action which is discussed below.

Our records disclosed that on February 23, 1937, Arthur Rike filed a civil tort action in the District Court, First Judicial District, Grand Forks, N. Dak., against David John ersy, a postal employee. The suit de-nuded damages of \$37,905 for alleged inmanded damages of \$37,905 for alleged in-juries sustained by Mr. Rike as a result of a collision on December 24, 1964, between Mr. Rike's automobile and that of Mr. Mersy, who was acting within the scope of his Fed-eral employment. At the request of the as-sistant US, attorney the action was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota pursuant to 28 U.S.O. 2679 (d), and the United States was substituted as

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the bill was considered ordered to be engrossed for a standard passed, as follows:

S. 157.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of time, or bars of lackers or any proceeding heretofore had in the United States District Court for the District Court for the District Court for the United States District Court for the D

that there is no objection to the submission of this report to the committee from the Standpoint of the administration's program.

The sponsor of the bill, Hon. Quentin N.
Burdick, has advised the committee as fol-

Iows: It has come to my attention that the Post Office Department's opposition to S. 2214, a bill for the relief of Arthur Rike, is that there is no showing of a "good cause" for extending the statute of limitations.

extending the statute of limitations.

I feel that I must take exception to this.

Mr. Rike was lulted into believing that the
U.S. Government was not a party to claims arising out of an automobile accident in which he and David John Mersy were the drivers. The only reason an action was not filed within the statute of limitations is a belief on the part of Mr. Rike and his attorbelief on the part of Mr. Rike and his attor-ney, supported by statements made by repre-sentatives of the insurance company and the U.S. Post Office, that the Government was not a party to this suit. In a deposition taken by Mr. Rike's attorney, the postal in-spector did not deny that he had made such I firmly believe that this is a good and

I firmly believe that this is a good and sufficient cause for the Judiciary Committee to favorably report S. 2214. The only thing this bill would do is give Arthur Rike the day in court which he has so far been denied. The committee believes that the bill is

meritorious and recommends it favorably.

ORDER BUSINESS

A ING PRESIDENT pro tem-The ider the previous order, the disinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr. Byrd) is now recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

RETURN OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN

Mr. BYRD of Virginia, Mr. President, the Nixon administration has formally agreed to regard the return of Okinawa to Japan as a treaty issue requiring two-Linus Senate approval.

This was made clear in public statements by the Department of State, and with Japan, without the advice and consent also in an official letter from the Secretary of State to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

For this action, the administration has been severely condemned by such news-papers as the New York Times, which contends that Okinawa should be returned to Japan by Executive agreement rather than by the advice and consent of the Senate.

Most certainly I do not agree with the Times' assessment-and I am indeed amazed that a newspaper which has been urging the Senate to reassert its prerogatives in foreign policy, now wants it to Prime Minister Sato, after an exchange be bypassed because it fears the Senate

The Bureau of the Budget has advised Senate, is, to my mind, clear cut. The United States obtained control of Okinawa by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, which treaty was ratified by the Senate of the United States.

I submit that it is logical and proper that any change in the Treaty of Peace with Japan can be made only with the approval of the Senate.

I am not concerned today with the question of whether Okinawa should or should not revert to the administrative

control of Japan.

I am concerned today as to just how the matter should be handled if and when the executive department reaches an agreement with the Japanese Govern-

It is appropriate at this point, I think, to give some background on this vitally important issue.
On May 29, 1969, just prior to the visit

of the Japanese Foreign Minister to the United States, I addressed the Senate on the future status of Okinawa

Treaty of Peace with Japan, the United States was granted the unrestricted use of the island of Okinawa in the far Pacific On this island we have our greatest Pacific military base complex

I expressed the view that any change in the status of Okinawa should be through action by the President and the Senate together rather than by the

President unilateraly. That was May 29, 1969.

On November 4, 1969, 2 weeks before Prime Minister Sato of Japan was scheduled to arrive in Washington for further discussions regarding the reversion of Okinawa, I introduced in the Senate the following resolution:

It is the sense of the Congress that the President shall not enter into any agreement or understanding, the effect of which would be to change the status of any territory re-ferred to in Article III of the Treaty of Peace

On November 5 1969, I discussed this resolution at some length on the floor of the Senate During the course of my remarks, I urged the Department of State and the President to make clear to the Prime Minister of Japan that any change in the treaty between the United States and Janan must be submitted to the Senate for approval.

When the vote was taken on the Byrd resolution, it was approved overwhelm-

ingly by 63 yeas and 14 nays.

On November 21, President Nixon and of views November 19, 20, and 21, issued a will not do what the Times wants it to do. joint communique stating, among other

April 23, 1971

The Senator from Virginia took this replied stating that to mean that the executive branch would comply with the Senate resolution and reach a situation which permits meaning that any change in the Treaty of Peace ful discussions, we will wish to begin control to President Nixon and President Nixon's reply.

There being no objection, the material with Japan would be submitted to the Senate for approval or disapproval.

In the Senate, I commended President Nixon.

for Senator from South Carolina (Mr. Hollings), expressed the fear that I had RECORD. not accurately interpreted the communi

que's meaning.
On November 25, 1969, Senator Hol-LINGS addressed a letter to the President. in which he asserted:

Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia has just-commended the language of the communi-que of the Prime Minister and yourself, and Senator. Byrd commended you for recogniz-ing this role of the legislative branch.

And then the able Senator from South Carolina went on to say in his letter to the President that he had just returned from Japan and a conference with the Prime Minister, and that the Prime Min-Ister discounted the necessity for ratification of any agreement affecting Oki-

President Nixon replied to Senator Hollings in a letter dated January 9, 1970. That letter contained this sen-

with regard to Congressional action on with Japan on Okinawa, I any agreement with Japan on Okinawa, I want to say that I am fully cognizant—as is Secretary Rogers—of the implications of the Senate vote on Senator Byrd's Resolution of

From the beginning, I had confidence that President Nixon would honor the resolution adopted by the Senate on No-1969. I have known Mr. Nixon for more than 20 years and had no reason to doubt that he would take the only appropriate course and submit to the Senate for ratification any change in the Treaty of Peace with Japan.

This is a part of the constitutional process—even though other presidents have breached the process, particularly President Johnson when he returned the Bonin Islands to Japan by Executive agreement. In fact, it was this action by President Johnson that prompted my resolution of November 5, 1969.

Many Senators have expressed concern at the erosion of Senate authority in regard to foreign policy. I myself feel very strongly in that regard, and I feel that the fault lies at least to some extent with the Senate for not asserting its con-

eign Relations Committee, Mr. Ful-BRIGHT. Who was so helpful in the Senate enactment of my resolution of No- 1969. vember 5, 1969.

BRIGHT addressed a letter to the Secretary of State calling attention to the ate adopted resolution and request-

sultations . . . on steps for obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate. Our hope will be to obtain Senate action this year. I ask unanimous consent that at this

Simultaneously, the distinguished jun- point Chairman Fulbricht's letter and Secretary Rogers' reply be printed in the There being no objection, the letters

were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

· FEBRUARY 25, 1971.

Hon. WILLIAM P. ROGERS,

Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I would appreciate DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I would appreciate your providing the Committee with a status report on the negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa, along with your-estimate of when a formal agreement may be reached with Japan.

As you know, on November 5, 1969, the Senate adopted, by a vote of 63 to 14, an amendment offered by Senator Byrd of Virginia priving within expressed the sense of the Senate.

ginia which expressed the sense of the Senate that any agreement changing the status of Okinawa "shall not take effect without the Okinawa "shall not take effect without the advice and consent of the Senate." In view of this expression of the Senate's views, I hope that any reversion agreement will be submitted in the form of a treaty. I would appreciate your advising the Committee concerning the Administration's plans for seeking Congressional approval for any agreement on reversion of Okinawa. ersion of Okuman, Sincerely yours, J. W. Fulbricht, Chairn

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

Washington, D.C., March 10, 1971.

Hon. J. W. Fulbricht,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,

U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am answering your letter of February 25 concerning Okinawa

reversion. Negotiations on specific reversion arrange-Negotiations on specific reversion arrangements have been in progress now for nearly one year. Substantial progress has been made, but several issues remain unresolved. We expect to complete the negotiations sometime this spring, hopefully, by May, has soon as the negotiations reach a stage which will permit meaningful discussion we will wish to begin consultations with you and the Foreign Relations Committee the substance of the reversion agreem the substance of the reversion agreement and on steps for obtaining the advice and consent of the Senate. Our hope will be to obtain Senate action this year to permit both governments to go ahead with preparations for reversion sometime in 1972.

Sincerely, WILLIAM P. ROGERS.

None feels more keenly about this than

None feels more keenly about this than

I think it worthwhile, too, to have printed in the Record the background chromatopic in the Record the packground chromatopic in the Packground chromatopic in the Packground chromatopic in the Packground nology of the Okinawa question beginning with my Senate speech of May 29,

I ask unanimous consent to have On February 25, 1971, Chairman Ful-printed at this point in the Excorp my RIGHT addressed a letter to the Secre-June 23, 1969, captioned "Future Status of Okinawa"; my statement to the Senate ing that the Foreign Relations Commit- in presenting the resolution of November tee be advised "concerning the adminis-tration's plans for seeking congressional vember 5, 1969, including the rollcall vote

things, that any agreements between the approval for any agreement on reversion on the Byrd resolution; my Senate speech on November 25, 1969; and the two governments would be subject to of Okinawa." speech on November 25, 1969; and the "the necessary legislative support." On March 10, 1971, Secretary Rogers Senate statement by Senator Hollings of February 25, 1970, along with his letter

reply.

There being no objection, the materials was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Congressional Record, May 29, 19691

OKINAWA

OKINAWA

Mr. Byan of Virginia. Mr. President, the Foreign Minister of Japan will arrive in Washington Saturday, May 31.

He will be in the United States to discuss the future status of the island of Okinawa, and in fact the whole U.S. position in the Far East is part of the healten.

Oklnawa, and in fact the whole U.S. posi-tion in the Far East, is part of the heritage of World War II, which ended 24 years ago. During the past quarter century, the United States has entered into mutual defense agreements with 44 nations—and has been involved in three major wars, count-

been involved in three major wars, counting World War II.

I doubt that any other nation in history, during such a short period of time, has engaged in three different major wars.

The U.S. Senate, under the Constitution has a responsibility for foreign policy.

Too often during the past 25 years, the Senate has abdicated its responsibility in the field of foreign affairs, relying instead on the Department of State. Now I know that within that Department the overwhelming majority are dedicated, conscientious individuals; I know, too, that many of them are men of great ability.

them are men of great ability.

But I know also that whatever the reason, or wherever the responsibility may lie, the fact is that our Nation in this year of 1969 finds itself in a most unenviable posi-

on. We are the dominant party in the North We are the dominant party in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the purpose of which is to guarantee the freedom of Europe; we are the dominant party of ANZUS—the treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States; we are the military head of CENTO—Central Treaty Organization—Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan; we are the dominant partner in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization one of the east Asia Treaty Organization, one of the prime reasons, according to former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, that the United States became involved in the war in Vietnam; we have guaranteed the security of Free China, and we have guaranteed the security of

Japan.
As a practical matter, we have become the

policeman of the world. Can we logically continue in this role? Should we even if we could?

Should we, even if we could?
Twenty-four years after the defeat of Germany, we have 225,000 troops in Europe.
mostly in West Germany.
Twenty-four years after the defeat of Japan, we have nearly I million military personnel in the far Pacific, on land and see

sea.

The question of Oklnawa, which the Japanese Foreign Minister is coming here to discuss, is of great significance to our position in the Pacific.

The status of the Island has become the The status of the Island has become the most inflammatory political issue in Japan: a clamor is rising among Japanese and Oktnawans for the reversion of the Ryukru Islands to Japanese administration.

There are many factors behind this move

by Japan to regain administrative control of Okinawa, one of which is the political fate of the administration of Prime Minister

In Japan, leftist elements, including the Socialist and Communist Parties and radica student groups, have vowed to wage a mas

was consummated in 1980. Either party has the right to reopen it after 10 years, otherwise it remains in effect.

But, the status of Okinawa was determined by the 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan.

There is no legal obligation to discuss reversion of the island to Japan at this time or

any other time.

The United States has complete administrative authority over the Ryukyu Islands, the largest of which is Okinawa, under the provisions of article 3 of the 1952 Treaty of provisions of article 3 of the 1952 Treaty of Peace: This peace treaty is entirely sepa-rate—and I want to emphasize that—from the 1960 Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan.

The Japanese Government recognizes the important contribution of our Okinawa bases, to Japanese and Asian security and is not likely to seek the removal of our bases. The Japanese Government does, however, want administrative control of the island which supports our major military base comch supports our major military hase com-

plex in the West Pacific.

To state it another way, the Japanese Government wants the United States to continue to guarantee the safety of Japan; to continue to guarantee the safety of Okinawa; to continue to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on Okinawa—\$260 million last year.

Jut it seeks to put restrictions on what the inited States can do nited States can do.

Japan wants a veto over any U.S. action Japan wants a veto over any U.S. action affecting Okinawa. It specifically wants the right to deny to the United States the authority to store niglear waspens on Okinawa and would require prior consultation before our military forces based there could be

In other words, the United States no longer would have unrestricted use of Okinowa would have unrestricted use of Okinawa.
Our role as the defender of the Far East
has enabled Japan to avoid the burden of
rearmament—less than I percent of her
gross national product is spent on defense—
and thus concentrate on expanding and
modernizing its domestic economy.

In defense matters, the Japanese have
gotten a free ride as a direct result.

gotten a free ride. As a direct result, Japan's present gross national product is over \$120 billion and ranks third in the world, hehind only the United States and the Soviet

While the peace treaty with Japan gives the United States unrestricted rights on Ok-nawa, the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty pro-vides that our military forces based in Japan cannot be used without prior consultation the Japanese Government.

sive campaign of confriontation with the Government in 1970 to force the dissolution of the United States—angular of Security Treaty. In addition. These angular of Security Treaty. In addition. These angular of Security Treaty in which the United States and could not be sent to the Pueblo was and approval first must be obtained from the president from bringing the Issue to a vote.

Okinawa is our most important single milltary base complex in the Far East—and is strategically located.

The United States has had unrestricted use of the Island since world war II.

The United States has had unrestricted use of the Island since world war II.

Attention of the Color of the Island since world war II.

The United States has had unrestricted use of the Island since world war II.

Sometimes the future status of Okinawa is vital if the United States is to continue to have obligations in the Far East—and is since the United States is to continue to have obligations in the Far East—and is store on the United States in the Color of States is to continue to have obligations in the Far East—and is strategically located.

Sometimes the future status of Okinawa is vital if the United States is to continue to have obligations in the Far East—and is inchment the United States in the Color of Okinawa is vital if the United States is to continue to have obligations in the Far East—and is inchment the United States of the Indiana inchment the United States

mit."

President Johnson reaffirmed this statement, and, in 1967, he and the Japanese Prime Minister agreed that the United States and Japan should keep the status of the Ryukyu Islands under review, "guided by the aim of returning administrative rights of these islands to Japan."

aim of returning administrative rights of these islands to Japan."

While I agree that eventually the Ryukyu Islands will be returned to Japan, I think it unfortunate that public statements by past Presidents, not binding on the U.S. Senate, have aroused the hopes of the Japanese that it coud be accomplished at an early date.

It would be foolhardy, in my judgment, to commit the United States to defend most of the Far East and then to give away this country's unrestricted right to use its military hases on Okinawa.

For 4 long years, we have fought the Vietnam war with one hand thed behind our back. As a result, the war has been prolonged and the casualties increased.

Let us not he so foolish as to get into a

similar position by giving someone else control over our principal military complex. It is vitally important that public attention be focused on this issue of unrestricted use of our bases on Okinawa.

I speak as one who is not sympathetic to

our deep involvement in Southeast Asia, one who from the beginning regarded it as an arror of judgment to become involved in a ground was these

ground war there.

I speak as one who questions the wisdom of our country's committing itself to mutual defense agreements with 44 different nations.

I speak as one who feels that we can not logically he the world's policeman.

If hy the act of granting Japan administrative control over Oktoner with the state of th

trative control over Okinawa, the United States could insure a multinational defense structure in the Far East, with increased participation by Japan—if this action would relieve our country of a measure of its heavy international responsibilities—then, I would support a reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control

control.

But this is not the case.

Quite the contrary. Surrender of control over Okinawa would only make more difficult

The issue must be decided by the Senate; it was the Senate which ratified the treaty of peace in 1952, which gave to the United States the unrestricted use of Okinawa.

of the Asian nations—and our Government has not advocated reducing these commitments—then it seems only logical, sound, and responsible that the United States continue to have the unrestricted use of its greatest base in the west Pacific; namely, Okinawa.

It would be foolhardy, in my judgment, to commit the United States to defend most

It would be foolhardy, in my judgment, to commit the United States to defend most of the Far East and then to give away this country's unrestricted right to use its mill-tary bases on Okinawa.

For 4 years we have fought the war in Vietnam with one hand tied behind our back Let us not be seeffely.

back. Let us not he so foolish now as to get into a similar position by giving someone else control over our principal military com-

My Senate speech on Oklnawa was pub-lished throughout Asia. Such newspapers as Asahi in Tokyo published the full text.

Asahi in Tokyo published the full text.

The Japanese newspapers, of course, do not agree with my view. It was given full coverage, however, by such papers as the Japanese Times and Yomiurl, which ran it in both its Japanese and English editions.

The future status of Okinawa is the most burning political issue in Japan.

The purpose of my speech was to focus public attention on what I consider to be a matter of great importance—assuming our

a matter of great importance-accurate Nation plans to continue to play a major role in the far Pacific.

Even the New York Times said in discussing the Japanese Reviews.

Even the New York Times said in discussing the Japanese Foreign Minister's visit to Washington that—
"The Japanese must recognize that they cannot continue to enjoy the luxury of American protection without making some sacrifices on their own on hehalf of mutual

security."

While my speech received a cool reception in Japan, it appears to have helped focus attention on an important problem. It received support from the Shreveport, La., Journal; the Birmingham, Ala., News; the Journal; the Birmingham, Ala., News; the Lynchburg, Va., News; the Northerr Virginia Daily, Strashurg, Va.; the Hartford, Conn., Courant; the Phoenix, Ariz., Republic; and the Nashville, Tenn., Banner, as well as from Chicago Tribune columnist, Walter Trohan.

I received the following telegram from the Chamber of Commerce of the United States in Okinawe.

States in Okinawa:

States in Okinawa:

"Applaud your speech in the Senate 29
May stop Please air mail copy complete text."

April 23, 1971

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

From the Shreveport (La.) Journal, May 30, 19691

OKINAWA VITAL TO U.S. SECURITY

OKINAWA VITAL TO U.S. SECURITY
So long as the United States maintains itsrole as the defender of the Far East, the
continued unrestricted use of this nation's
military bases on Okinawa is vital and funterestrial to the security of America and the tal to the security of America and the

damental to the security of America and the rest of the free world.

This is the warning sounded by U.S. Sen. Harry P. Byrd Jr. of Virginia on the eve of a visit to Washington by the Foreign Minister of Japan, who will be in the United States to discuss the future status of the Island of Okinawa.

Island of Okinawa.

Senator Byrd, in a speech to his colleagues
Thursday, and the U.S. Senate, under the Thursday, and the U.S. Senate, under the Constitution, has a responsibility for foreign policy, but that too often during the past 25 years the Senate has abdicated this responsibility and relied instead on the Department of State.

Today the United States has become the the constitution of the world healing entered into

Today the United States has become the policeman of the world, having entered into mutual defense agreements with 44 nations. Senator Byrd asks, "Can we logically consenator Byrd asks, can we logically con-tinue in this role? Should we, even if we could?

"Twenty-four years after the defeat of Germany we have 225,000 troops in Europe,

mostly in West Germany.
"Twenty-four years after the defeat of

"Twenty-four years after the defeat of Japan, we have nearly 1,000,000 military personnel in the Far Pacific, on land and sea." Behind Japan's efforts to regain administrative control of Okinawa are many factors, one of which is the political fate of Prime Minister Sato. Lettist elements including the Socialist and Communist parties and radical student groups, have demanded that the United States withdraw completely from Okinawa.

from Okinawa.
The United States has had unrestricted use The United States has had unrestricted use of Okinawa since World War II. The status of the Island was determined by the 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan. There is no legal obligation on the part of the United States to discuss reversion of the island to Japan at this time or any other time. As analyzed by Senator Byrd, "The Japanese Government wants the United States to continue to guarantee the safety of Japan.

to continue to guarantee the safety of Japan; to continue to guarantee the safety of Okimillions of dollars on Okinawa (\$260,000,000 last year). But, it seeks to put restrictions on what the United States can do.

"Japan wants a veto over any U.S. action affecting Okinawa. It specifically wants the right to deny the United States the authority to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa and would require prior consultation before our military forces based there could be used."

In defense matters, the Virginia senator pointed out, the Japanese have heen given a free ride. As a direct result, Japan's present gross national product is more than one hundred and twenty billion dollars a year and ranks third in the world, behind only

Taiso received the following telegram from the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of others, and the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of the Patton Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans for the benefit of the Patton Crosswhite Post 697

ORINAWA: NOT NOW

OKINAWA: NOT NOW
Printed on the opposite page today are excerpts from a speech made in the U.S. Senate yesterday by Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Jr., of Virginia.

The subject of the speech is Okinawa, and it is timely because the Japanese minister arrives in Washington tomorrow for talks on the status of that island.

American forces captured Okinawa in the

talks on the status of that island.
American forces captured Okinawa in the last major land battle against Japan in World War II. Since then the U.S. has administered the affairs of the island. Important military bases are maintained there under the terms

bases are maintained there under the terms of the peace treaty.
Under a separate agreement—the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty—the U.S. maintains troops in Japan itself. But, as Sen. Byrd pointed out yesterday, there are restrictions imposed on the use of U.S. forces based to Inner the control of the co in Japan.

Increasingly in recent years there has been

in Japan.

Increasingly in recent years there has been agitation in Japan against both the Mutual Security Treaty, which will be up for renegotiation next year, and U.S. control of Okinawa. But it is important to keep the two issues separate.

There may be modifications next year in the Mutual Security Treaty binding the two one-time enemies. This is a legitimate subject of negotiation and agreement—or, if the two nations so conclude, of disagreement.

The News helieves that extension of the security treaty is in the national interest of both countries. Scrapping it would force the U.S. to re-think much of its Pacific strategy; it also would impose dramatic new responsibilities on the Japanese government which, under the protection of the U.S. defense umbrella, has achieved a near miraculous economic reconstruction without the nasty necessity of worrying much about its national necessity of worrying much about its national

Rut this newspaper does not believe that But this newspaper does not believe that the U.S., in exchange for renewal of the security agreement—which as we say is of at least as much importance to Japan as to America—need succumb to pressure on the at-this-point extraneous issue of Okinawa.

To repeat: The two things are distinct and separate, despite the efforts of militant Japanese leftists to lump them into one hig anti-American "cause."

with Sen. Byrd we assume that someday administrative control of Okliaawa will revert to Japan. But it would be foolhardy under the present circumstances, when we are deeply involved in a war in Southeast Asia and committed to a horder defense role in alliance with non-Communist nations in the section; to head over or agree to hand, trying region; to hand over or agree to hand-tying restrictions on the use of one of the key American military outposts in the Western

We hope that the talks with the Japanese We nope that the tinks with the deplates foreign minister will be cordial and construc-tive. But the Tokyo government should be given to understand that the question of Okinewa's reversion to Japanese control must Okinewa's reversion to Japanese control must wait more propitious times and meanwhile should not be allowed—by Tokyo or by us—to damage the good and mutually beneficial relations which have existed between the two countries since World War II or to poison the atmosphere in which the important forth-coming negotiations on the Mutual Security Treats, will be conducted and ranks third in the world, behind only those of the United States and the Soviet Union. Japan's expenses for its own national defense are less than one per cent of the value of its gross national product.

For four years the United States has fought the Vietnamese war with one hand tied behind its back. To relinguish control of Okinawa to the Japanese at this time—regardless of our friendship with the counselves of the Sound of the Senate states of the Vietnamese war with one hand tied behind its back. To relinguish control of Okinawa to the Japanese at this time—regardless of our friendship with the counselves of the Sound on the Mutual Security of Okinawa. The should not be allowed—by Tokyo or by us—okinawa.

To damage the good and mutually beneficial relations which have existed between the two countries since World War II or to poison the amount of the Ryukyus was ratified by the Senate, it is may view that any changes in the reaty will be conducted.

As usual, Harry Byrd talked sense in the Security of peace with Japan. What I am suggesting the conduction of the Ryukyus which includes okinawa.

an amendment to the desk and asked that it he stated at this time, and then I wish to address a parliamentary inquiry to the Chair.
The Presiding Officer. The amendment

The assistant legislative clerk read as fol-

lows:
"On page 13, after line 10, insert the fol-

lowing:
"'Sec. 106. It is the sense of the Congress that the President shall not enter into any agreement or understanding, the effect of which would be to change the status of any territory referred to in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, without the advice and consent of the Senate."

Mr. Byrd of Virginia. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.
The Presiding Officer. The Senator from

Virginia will state it.

Mr. Byrn of Virginia. I should like to ask
the Chair whether the amendment which I
have just submitted would be subject to a

point of order.
The Presiding Officer. The Chair is in-

The Presuming Officer. The Chair is informed by the parliamentarian that this is a sense resolution that does not involve legislation.

Mr. Byrd of Virginia. I thank the Chair. I interpret the Chair's ruling to mean that the amendment can be appropriately and approach y researched to the pending legislation. properly presented to the pending legislation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from

Virginia is correct.

Mr. Byrn of Virginia, Mr. President, I should like to address myself briefly to the amendment. I do not seek a vote this after-

Mr. President, later this month, the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Sato, will come to the United States to discuss with the President the future status of the Ryukyu Islands,

dent the future status of the Ryukyu Islands, the principal one being Okinawa.

There will be a difference of views among Members of the Senate as to what the future role of Okinawa shall be. There will be some Members who will oppose any change in the present status, the present status being that the United States has sole and exclusiv

that the United States has sole and exclusive control over Okinawa.

There will be other Members of the Senate who will feel that there should be a change, and that Okinawa should revert to the administrative control of Japan.

Mr. President, my amendment does not suggest what the future status of Okinawa shall be. It does not in any way circumscribe the State Department or the President in negotiating with Prime Minister Sato, or other officials of the Japanese Government. What the amendment provides is that it

What the amendment provides is that it What the amendment provides is that it shall be the sense of Congress that whatever changes the administration concludes to make with the Japanese Government, affecting the treaty of peace with Japan, shall come to the Senate for ratification.

The treaty of peace with Japan was ratified by the Senate in 1952. It was under that the United Stotes was given con-

treaty that the United States was given con-trol over the Ryukyus which includes trol over the Ryukyus which

to the Senate is that whatever changes are deemed desirable by the executive branch not become effective by unliateral action, but that they come before the Senate for its ap-

proval or disapproval.

It was only a few weeks ago—a few months ago, perhaps—that the Senate adopted, I be lieve unanimously, the national commitlieve unanimously, the national commit-ments resolution which was presented to the Senate by the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbarohrt), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The purpose of that national commitments resolution was to attempt to restore to the Senate some of the constitutional prerogatives which are Senate's but which, in my judgment, and ap-parently in the judgment of many Senators, have been taken over in recent years by the

this amendment, which will be presented tomorrow, is, in reality, the first op-portunity that the Senate has had to pass on specific issue coming before the Senate since the national commitments resolution

since the national commitments resolution was adopted by this body.

I want to emphasize again, Mr. President, that the amendment does not in any way circumscribe the State Department or the Chief Executive of our Nation in his negotiations with the government of Japan. But it does are "Whetery death and provided in the commitment of it does say, "Whatever decisions you make must then be submitted to the Senate of must then be submitted to the Senate of the United States for approval or disapproval." That, as I see it, is the constitutional process under which our Government is supposed to work.

I feel that in recent years the executive branch of the Government has assumed too much authority, and I think the Senate of the United States has believed the

much authority, and I think the Senate of the United States has helped the executive branch assume authority by refusing to demand that its own constitutional prerogatives be upheld. I feel that we have given away many of our responsibilities.

Here is an opportunity, on a vitally important issue, to decide whether there shall be a change in the control of the greatest military has complex that the United States.

military base complex that the United States has in the far Pacific—namely, Okinawa—by uninteral executive action, or whether such action taken by the President, to be effective, must be submitted to the Senate for its consideration, advice, and consent.

I shall not detain the Senate longer today. Tomorrow I would like to present a few additional facts in regard to the amendment and mention some other senate the senate and consents.

mention some other aspects of the problem of Okinawa which faces the United States.

I think it will be a very important mission which the premier of Japan will undertake on behalf of his government when he comes to the United States on the 18th of this month I think it is very desirable at this time to focus and the states of the states. time to focus on the question of Okinawa. I think the Japanese Government should understand that, while the negotiations properly will be carried out by the executive branch of the Government, the Senate of the United States will participate in the final decision by having the opportunity to accept or to reject whatever committee are de to that government on behalf of the

[From the Congressional Record, Nov. 5, 19691 OKINAWA

Mr. Byan of Virginia. Mr. President, the pending amendment was laid down yester-

day.

It deals with the treaty of peace signed by the United States with Japan in 1952. The amendment provides that the treaty of peace having been ratified by the Senate of the United States, any changes which are proposed in the treaty shall come back to the U.S. Senate for approval or disapproval. The Prime Minister of Japan will arrive in Washington on Monday, November 17.

He will be in the United States to discuss the future status of the island of coldward.

the future status of the island of Okinawa.

Okinawa, and, in fact, the whole U.S. position in the Far East, is part of the heritage of World War II.

During the past quarter century, the United States has entered into mutual defense agreements with 44 nations—and has been involved in three major wars, counting World War II.

I doubt that any other nation in history, during such a short period of time, has engaged in three different major wars.

The U.S. Senate, under the Constitution, has a responsibility for foreign policy.

Too often during the past 25 years, the Senate has abdicated its responsibility in the field of foreign affairs, relying instead on the field of foreign affairs, relying instead on the longartement of State. Now, I know that within in that Department that overwhelming majority are dedicated, conscientious individuals; I know, too, that many of them are menof great ability.

But I know also that whatever the reason, or wherever the responsibility may lie, the fact is that our Nation in this year of 1969

But I know also that whatever the reason, or wherever the responsibility may lie, the fact is that our Nation in this year of 1969 finds itself in a most unenviable position.

We are the dominant party in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the purpose of which is to guarantee the freedom of Europe; we are the dominant party of ANZUS—the treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States; we are the military head of CENTO—Central Treaty Organization—the states; we are the dominant party of ANZUS—the United States; we are the military head of CENTO—Central Treaty Organization—the prime reasons, according to former Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, that the United States become involved in the war in Vietnam; we have guaranteed the security of Japan.

Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan; we are the dominant parties of the prime reasons, according to former Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, that the United States become involved in the war in Vietnam; we have guaranteed the security of Japan.

The Wear of the dominant party in the North Koreans selected the U.S.S. Pueblo last year, Adm. Frank L. Johnson, commander of naval forces.

Twenty-four years after the defeat of Japan, we have nearly 1 million military personnel in the far Pacific, on land and sea.

The question of Okinawa, which the Japanese Prime Minister is coming here to discuss is of great significance to our position in the

Pacific.
Okinawa is our most important single military base complex in the Far East—and is strategically located.
The United States has had unrestricted use of the Island since World War II.

Beginning with President Eisenhower, each administration since 1951, has firmly maintained that the unrestricted use of U.S. bases on Okinawa is vital if the United States is to continue to have obligations in the Far East.

continue to have congations in the Far East.

Sometimes the future status of Okinawa is
linked to the United States-Japan Mutual
Security Treaty in which the United States
guarantees the freedom and safety of Japan.
Such linkage is not correct. These are two separate issues.

separate issues.

The Mutual Security Treaty with Japan was consummated in 1960. Either party has the right to reopen it after 10 years, otherwise it remains in effect.

But, the status of Okinawa was determined but the 1952 months of Parketting and Parketting

But, the status of Okinawa was determined by the 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan. There is no legal obligation to discuss reversion of the Island to Japan at this or any other time.

The United States has complete administrative authority over the Ryukyu Islands, the largest of which is Okinawa, under the provisions of article 3 of the 1952 Treaty of Peace. This peace treaty is entirely separate—and I want to emphasize that—from the 1960 Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan.

The Japanese Government recognizes the

Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan.

The Japanese Government recognizes the important contribution of our Okinawa bases to Japanese and Asian security and is not likely to seek the removal of our bases. The Japanese Government does, however, want people—and it is of great importance to the people—and it is of great importance to the people of Asia.

has enabled Japan to avoid the burden of rearmament—less than I percent of her gross national product is spent on defense—and thus concentrate on expanding and modern-laing its domestic economy.

In defense matters, the Japanese have gotten a free ride. As a direct result, Japan's present gross national product is over \$120 billion and Japan ranks third in the world, behind only the Hatted States.

we security of free China, and we have guaranteed the security of Japan.

As a practical matter, we have become the polleeman of the world.

Can we logically continue in this role?

Should we, even if we could?

Twenty-four years after the defeat of Germany, we have 225,000 troops in Europe, mostly in West Germany.

Twenty-four years after the defeat of Japan, we have nearly 1 million military personnel in the far Pacific, on land and sea.

The question of Okina...

Whether the United States should continue to guarantee the freedom of Japan, and free China; whether we should continue the mutual defense arrangements covering the eight countries signing the Southeast Asia Treaty; plus the Philippines; plus Australia and New Zealand; plus Thalland, Laos, and Vietnam, is debatable.

But what is clearant appropries to

But what is clear-cut commonsense, in my judgment, is that if we are to continue to guarantee the security of the Aslan na-tions—and our Government has not advocated scrapping these commitments—then I say that it is only logical, sound, and responsible that the United States continue to have the unrestricted use of its greatest base in the West Pacific; namely, Okinawa.

While I agree that eventually the Ryukyu Islands will be returned to Jap Islands will be returned to Japan, it would be foolhardy, in my judgment, to commit the United States to defend most or the Far East and then to give away this country's unrestricted right to use its military bases

on Okinawa.

If by the act of granting Japan administrative control over Okinawa, the United States could insure a multinational defense structure in the Far East, with increased participation by Japan—if this action would relieve our country of a measure of its heavy international responsibilities—then, I would support a reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control.

But this is not the case. Quite the contrary, Surrender of control over Okinawa would only make more difficult

April 23, 1971

Many feel, as do I, that our worldwide commitments must be reduced. This, too, appears to be the view of President Nixon.

But so long as the United States maintains its significant role in the Far East, the continued unrestricted use of our bases on Okinawa is vital and fundamental.

make month's visit to the Uni

s month's visit to the United States by This month's visit to the United States by the Japanese Prime Minister presents a good opportunity for our Government to focus attention on the Far Pacific and the future role there, both of the United States and

The issue of Okinawa and its interest is not alone an executive decision.

It was the U.S. Senate which, in 1952, ratified the Treaty of Peace, which treaty gave to the United States the unrestricted use of a close and friendly relationship between the peace of the United States.

by the Senate on March 20, 1952. The yeas were 66, the nays 10. Two-thirds of the Senwere 66, the nays 10. Two-thirds of the Sen-ators present and voting having voted in the affirmative, the treaty of peace with Japan was agreed to on March 20, 1952. Any change in that treaty must come to the Senate for approval. It would be unwise

and undesirable for the executive branch to make commitments to Japan without the consent of the Senate.

If the Senate is to fulfill its constitutional

responsibility in the field of foreign policy, it must make clear that any change in the Treaty of Peace with Japan must be ratified

by the Senate.

The issue of Okinawa is important on its own: and the Senate may be divided on the

own; and the senate may be divided on the proper course to pursue.

But the Senate, I should think, would be united in its determination to require Senate ratification of any changes which may be made in regard to treaties which have been purished by the Senate.

ratified by the Senate.

For the Senate to concede to the executive For the Senate to concede to the executive branch of Government the right to change treaty commitments without Senate approval would be to make a mockery of the national commitments resolution it adopted unanimously only a few months ago.

On the eve of Prime Minister Sato's visit to the Inited States I sail to the Price of Prime Minister Sato's visit to the Inited States I sail to the Price of Prime Minister Sato's visit to the Inited States I sail to the Price of Prime Minister Sato's visit to the Inited States I sail to the Price of Prime Minister Sato's visit to the Inited States I sail to the Prime Minister Sato's visit to the Inited States I sail to the Prime Minister Sato's visit to the Inited States I sail to the Prime Minister Sato's visit to the Inited States I sail to the Prime Minister Sato's visit to the Inited States I sail to the Inited States

to the United States, I call on the Department of State; and the President to make clear to the Prime Minister that any change in the treaties between the United States and Japan must be submitted to the Senate for

approval.
Mr. Byrd of Virginia. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amend-

The yeas and nays.were ordered. The result was announced—yeas 63, nays

YEAS--63

Allen Allett Anderson, Baker, Bellmon, Bennett, Bible, Burdick, Byrd, Va., Byrd, W. Va., Cannon, Case, Church, Cook, Cotton, Curtis, Dodd, Dole, Eagleton, Eastland, Ellender.

Ervin, Fulbright, Goodell, Gravel, Gurney, Hansen, Hart, Holland, Hruska, Hughes, Jor-dan, Idano, Magnuson, McClellan, McGovern, McIntyre, Miller, Mondale, Montoya, Moss Mundt, Murphy.

Mundt, Murphy.

Nelson, Packwood, Pastore, Pearson, Pell,
Prouty, Proxmire, Randolph, Russell, Schweiker, Smith, Maine, Spong, Stennis, Stevens,
Symington, Talmadge, Tydings, Williams,
N.J., Williams, Del., Young, N. Dak., Young,

NAYS-14

Boggs, Brooke, Harris, Hatfield, Inouye. Javits, Kennedy, Mansfield, Mathias, McCarthy

McGee, Muskie, Percy, Scott.

PRESENT AND ANNOUNCING A LIVE PAIR, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—1 Griffin, against.

NOT VOTING-22

Tower, Yarborough.

SPEECH BY SENATOR HARRY F. BYRD, JR., DEMO-CRAT OF VIRGINIA ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE, Nov. 25, 1969

During the weekend, I had an apportunity apan.
The issue of Okinawa and its future status to study the Communique issued Friday by the President of the United States and the

Japan and the United States.
Prime Minister Sato's visit to the United States, as President Nixon made clear, should

help achieve a better understanding between ne two countries.

The text of the communique is three columns of newspaper type. It is divided into 15

brief sections.

The key section is number 6.

This is the section which deals specifically with Okinawa. In this section, the Prime Minister emphasized his view that the time had come to respond to the strong desire of the people of Japan to return Okinawa to Japanese control. President Nixon expressed appreciation of the Prime Minister's view.

Now we come to the key sentences.

"They (President Nixon and Prime Minlster Sato) therefore agreed that the two
governments would immediately enter into
consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion
of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East, including Japan.

"They further agreed to expedite the con-Now we come to the key sentences.

ity of the Far East, including Japan.

"They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972, subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support."

Now, let's analyze the above language.
Just what agreement was reached by Mr.
Nixon and Mr. Sato?

I They "agreed that the two governments."

Nixon and Mr. Sato?

1. They "agreed that the two governments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa"...

2. Such constulations would be "subject to

the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support."

So, it seems clear that the only agreement made by President Nixon is one of principle, namely, an early reversion of Okinawa. But no details have been agreed to. No specific arrangements have been agreed

The agreement, to cite the text of the communique, is to "enter into consultations re-

garding specific arrangements."
As one who feels that the United States must have the unrestricted use of Okinawa, our greatest military complex in the Far Pacific, if we are to continue our widespread commitments in Asia, I frankly am relieved since reading the text of the communique.

The text does not bear out the newspaper headlines concerning the communique.
The only agreement President Nixon made was to "immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements..."

was to "immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements..."

And then that was followed by the two leaders of government specific arrangement would be subject to legislative support action which, in so far as the United States is concerned, means approval by the Senate.

I am glad to state to the Senate advice and consent of the Senate of the Senate from Virginia (Mr. Byro) offered an amendment to the State Department appropriation bill which stated:

"It is the sense of the Senate that any agreement or understanding entered into by the President to change the status of any territory referred to in Article 3 of the Treatment of the Senate senates and consent of the Senate senates.

proval by the Senate.

I am glad to state to the Senate that I support this communique. It should help Frime Minister Sato in Japan without forfelture by the United States of any control over Okinawa other than agreeing to enter 63–14.

"into consultations regarding specific ar-

NOT VOTING—22 "into consultations regarding specific arrangements..."

Fannin, Fong, Goldwater.
Gore, Hartke, Hollings, Jackson, Jordan, N.C., Long, Metcalf, Ribicoff.
Saxbe, Smith, Till, Sparkman, Thurmond,
Tower, Yarborough.

"into consultations regarding specific arrangements..."

I am especially pleased that the Senate's role in any final arrangements affecting Okinawa is specifically recognized in the text of the communique.

The fact that this is so clearly spelled out

The fact that this is so clearly spelled out in the communique results, I feel, from the action taken by the Senate of the United States on November 5, 1969.

On that date, the Senate, by a recorded vote of 63 to 14, specified that any change in the Treaty of Peace with Japan must come to the Senate for the Senate vote of 63 to 14.

the Treaty of Peace with Japan must come to the Senate for approval or disapproval. In the Nixon/Sato Communique 16 days later, both leaders recognized that any "specific arrangements" affecting Okinawa would be subject to Senate approval.

In my judgment, this establishes a historic precedent and one which is of vital importance both to the Senate and to the nation.

resident Johnson, last year, unliaterally returned to Japan the Bonin Islands, which included Iwo Jima, without submitting his action to the Senate for ratification.

The Senate was not aware of President Johnson's action until the deed had been accomplished.

accomplished.

But the Senate on November 5 of this year

served notice that any changes in treaties previously ratified by the Senate must be submitted to the Senate for approval.

This action of the Senate on November 5, followed by the Nixon/Sato Communique of November 21, makes clear that both the Senate and President Nixon are aware that no change may be made in the present status. no change may be made in the present status of Okinawa without Senate approval.

It is difficult to predict what the Senate will do in regard to Okinawa—and I do not

will do in regard to Okinawa—and I do not intend to try.

The leadership of the Senate favors an early return of Okinawa to Japan, but I have talked with a great many Senators who do

not agree with that viewpoint.

I have the feeling that the United States will be retaining the free and unrestricted use of Okinawa until such time as we reduce our commitments to defend so many Asian nations. It is my hope that we will soon begin to reduce our Asian commitments.

[From the Congressional Record, Feb. 25, 19701

THE DISPOSITION OF OKINAWA

Mr. Hollings. Mr. President, during the last session of Congress. I expressed my concern over the question of the commitment of the United States to Japan regarding the disposition of Okinawa. Since we obtained Okinawa under article 3 of the Peace Treaty of nawa under article 3 of the Peace Treaty of 1954, it was my judgment that any disposi-tion of Okinawa required the advice and con-sent of the U.S. Senate. Although such Sen-ate action would seem to be required, the issue was somewhat clouded in June of 1968 when President Johnson returned the Bonin Islands which were secured under the same article to Japan without benefit of congressional approval. Due to the importance of Okinawa under our present treaty commitments and considering the problems of seeking and maintaining peace in the Far East, it is my feeling that Okinawa, bound by treaty with the adules and consent of the treaty with the advice and consent of the Senate, can only be disposed of with the advice and consent of the Senate.

territory referred to in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, shall not take effect without the advice and consent of the Sen-

This amendment was agreed to by a vote of

Subsequently, President Nixon met with Please tell me whether or not you believe Premier Elsaku Sato of Japan on November that I, as a Senator, have this right on the 19, 20, and 21, 1969, "to exchange views on Okinawa question.

The present International situation and on Most respectfully, I am. the present intermediant studend and on Most respectively. I am other matters of mutual interest to the United States and Japan." On November 21. Mr. Hollings. Mr. President, on January 9, 1969, they issued a joint communique which 1970, the President answered my letter and

(There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as

The White House.

Washington D.C. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I would appreciate your understanding as to the responsibility of the Legislative Branch of government in the disposition of Okinawa.

It appears that Okinawa, bound by a treaty, with the advice and consent of the Senate, could only be disposed of with the advice and consent of the Senate, Accordingly, to reaffirm this requirement, the United States Senate recently enacted the Byrd Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate, to this expressing the sense of the Senate, to this effect. Feeling still that you have adhered to this requirement in your talks with Prime Minister Sato, Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia has just commended the language of the Communique between the Prime Minister and yourself. And Senator Byrd commended you for recognizing this role of the Legisla-tive Branch. However, I have just returned from Japan and a conference with Prime Minister Sato. It is my impression that Prime Minister Sato's view is best expressed in the Japan Times of November II in the article entitled "Sato Tells Opposition U.S. Will-Okay Reversion Under 1972 Formula" in Okay Reversion Under 1972 Formula" in which the Prime Minister discounts the necessity for ratification of any agreement affecting Okinawa. Senator Byrd interprets the language under Section 6 of the Communique". , with necessary legislative support" as recognizing the necessity under the Constitution for actification, but the United stitution for ratification by the United States Senate. On the contrary, the use of, the word "support" rather than "advice and consent". leads me to conclusion that as long as substantial support is obtained you do not vote of the United States Senate is necessary. Specifically, I am sure you would receive substantial support for the return of Okinawa without the uninhibited right of launching combat operations from members of the Democratic leadership and the Foreign Relations Committee. But this does not constitute "determine acceptate" stitute "advice and consent,"

As a result of my discussion with our commanders in the Far East, I do not believe restrictions of the 1972 formula, I believed commitments in the Far East and to world peace transcend the domestic and political problems of Japan, the textile problems here at home and other considerations that have been confused into the "Okinawa question."

I believe in the ultimate return of Okinawa, but not now.

As a result of my talks with the Prime Minister, I am convinced that the arrangements we will make for reversion will not impair our ability to meet our security commitments in Asia. This belief is shared by the Okinawa that we can fulfill our commitments with the restrictions of the 1972 formula. I believe our

Senator Byrd is correct in his understanding.

1969; they issued a joint communique which stated in relation to Okinawa that they agreed to expedite the consultations with the view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of these specific agreements with the necessary legislative support."

In view of the Senate resolution agreed to earlier that month, I was extremely concerned that the word "support" did not necessarily mean "advice and consent" and so stated on the floor of the Senate on November 25, 1969. On that same day I addressed a letter to the President of the United States requesting a clarification. At this point in the RECORD, I ask unanimous consent that the word in the floor of the United States (There being no objection, the letter was Oknawa is vital and I believe the Senate's role in this foreign policy issue is important. Consequently, I am pleased that the President has erased any doubt as to the Senate's participation, which should eliminate any confusion on this point on the part of the people of the United States or Japan.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from the Bendiants.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from the President be printed in the Recom in its entirety. (There being no objection, the letter was

(There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as fol-

THE WHITE House, Washington, January 9, 1970.

Hon. ERNEST F. Hollings, U.S. Senate.

Washington, D.C.

DEAB SEMATOR HOLLINGS: Your thoughtful letter of November 25 has been given careful consideration.

consideration.

With regard to Congressional action on any With regard to Congressional action on any agreement negotiated with Japan on Okinawa. I want to say that I am fully cognizant—as is Secretary Rogers—of the implication of the Senate vote on Senator Byrd's resolution of November 5. We intend to stay in close touch with the Congressional leadership and appropriate committees as our negotiations with Japan go along. As you know, we have already discussed Okinawa reversion with many members of the

you know, we have already discussed Oki-nawa reversion with many members of the Congress and have benefited from your views. It was because of the importance of Con-gressional judgment that we inserted into the Joint Communique of November 21 the statement that consultations with Japan would be expedited with a view to accom-plishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support. with the necessary legislative support.

Let me assure you that the Executive Branch will continue to maintain close contact with the Legislative Branch in order to work out mutually satisfactory arrangements for handling the problem of Okinawa rever-sion, including the appropriate form of Con-gressional participation in this matter.

gressional participation in this matter.

You also expressed concern, as a result of your discussion with our commanders in the Far East, that we could not fulfill our commitments in the Far East with the restrictions of the 1972 formula. I want to assure you that I gave the fullest consideration to this most important aspect of my talks with the Prime Minister. He and I agreed, as the communique stated, that it was important for the peace and security of the Far East that the United States should be in a position to carry out fully its defense treaty obligations in the area and that reversion should not hinder the effective discharge of these obligations.

As a result of my talks with the Prime

mitments in Asia. This belief is shared by pore. The clerk will call the my senior military advisers. I also feel strongly that resolution of the Okinawa proceeded to call the roll.

question is essential to healthy relations over the long term with a most important Asian ally, the Government and people of Japan. I appreciate your writing to me about this

important matter.

Sincerely, RICHARD NIXON.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cler

will call the roll. The second

proceeded to call the roll. Mr. COOK, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

quorum call be rescinded.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cook) is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

(The remarks of Mr. Cook when he introduced Senate Joint Resolution 89 and the ensuing debate are printed in the RECORD under Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the bill (S. 575) entitled "An act to authorize funds to carry out the pur-poses of the Appalachian Region Development Act of 1965, as amended, with amendments in the nature of a substitute.

The message also announced that the House insists upoon its amendments, requests a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. BLATNIK, Mr. Jones of Alabama, Mr. GRAY, Mr. Ed-MONDSTON, Mr. HARSHA, Mr. SCHWENGEL, and Mr. CLEVELAND was appointed managers of the conference on the part of the

The message further announced that, pursuant to the provisions of section 1, Public Law 86-42, the Speaker had appointed Mr. Morse of Massachusetts as a member of the U.S. Delegation of the Canada-U.S. Interparliamentary Group to fill the existing vacancy thereon.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. In accordance with the previous order, there will be a period for the transaction of routine morning business of not to exced 30 minutes, with a limitation of 3 minutes on statements therein

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll

The second assistant legislative clerk

秘密表示 (朱印) m 和**昭和46**年5月 1₉9日 起祭 昭和46年 5-月17日 政務次官 アメリカ局長 安藤 2498 J在沖縄 高瀬大使 爱知 大臣 √公信転報(沖縄返還内題に関す3パード上院) 議員の演説テキスト G A -2 19 198 回覧番号

本代/第 85 号 昭和46年5月/9日

沖縄復帰華構委員会 日本国政府代表 *幾*

外 務 大 臣

公信転報(中縄返還向題 に関するパート") 上院議員の演説テキ2ト

本件に関する下記公信(/)通を転報する。

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4 1/年 ▶月30日 米国 発 本太臣あて 第 3328号

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大政事外外儀官

2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に 連絡ありたい。

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。

省

71年7月29日月時5月分 月子0日 09時年6分

発着 差別 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワに関する米上院議員の演説

第2149号 平

28日ピアソン (共) 29日バード (民) の両上院議員は 本会議でオキナワに関連し要旨下記の通りの演説を行なつ た。(テキスト空送)

/。ピアソン議員

(/) 日米関係は両国の政治家が力りようを発きして両国 の対立を避くべき極めてデリケートな時期差しかかってい る。差し当つては上院のオキナワ返かん協定の審議が問題 であり、一部にこれを貿易問題と結びつける魔きがあるが 。このため批准ができない事態になれば日本の論っナショ ナリズムをよびおこすこととなろう。よろしく日衆関係の 全体としての重要性の中で問題を位置づけるべきである。

(2)日本は予見し得る将来ビルマから朝鮮までのアジ 全域で中国に対抗し得るゆ一国であり 日本との密接な連けいをないがしろにしていいとは考

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。

2、本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に

れない。

(3)日米間の経済問題については、日本の輸出により图 **藁に立たされている一部産業の声にみみを傾けるだけでな** く日本が米国農産物のナンバーワン輸入国であることをわ すれてはならないであろう。

2。パード議員

(/)米国はアジアで広はんな防衛豪務を引きえけている 。この意欲は厳然と存在するものであり、義務を引きうけ ているからにはその遂行能力を米国は保持せねばならない 。 しかるに日本は GNPの / %の防衛費を費しているのみ で西太平洋における防衛パートナーの役割を引受ける能力 を持つに至つていない。

(2)オキナワ返かん協定は現在の米国がオキナワ基地に 対しもつている無制限な権限を制限し日本は米国の行動に 钜 否権をも持つこととなろう。

私はオキナワが究極的には日本に返されることに反対しな いが米国が西太平洋に防衛義務をもちかつ日本の防衛努力 が足りない現在は返かんに適当な時期とは思われない。も し協定を上院が承認するのならばすべからくアジアの防衛 薏麥をけい減すべきである。

(了).

外 務 省

務務 典房 次次 典房 臣官宮審審長長 儀総人電厚計 書文会営給 調 参企析調 長 領 参領旅査移 アージ地中東 北東西 参北北保 西東 長 ()

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沖縄復帰準備委員会 日本国政府代表 殿

外 務 大 臣

沖縄互慶问題に関するパード上院議員 公信転報(の演説テキスト

本件に関する下記公信(/)通を転報する。


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VIRGINIA

SPEECH ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE, THURSDAY, JULY 29, 1971

History is a great teacher, but it teaches nothing to those who will not heed it.

I think that if we will take the time to study the history of the foreign relations of the United States since World War II, it will be possible for this Nation to arrive at a balanced and rational policy toward the rest of the world.

From shortly after the end of World War II to the 1960's, this Nation engaged in a far-flung enterprise of defending freedom everywhere in the world. We built a globe-circling clain of alliances.

As a result, we came to have mutual defense agreements with 44 different nations. And of course, the word "mutual" was merely a diplomatic way of saying that the United States had undertaken the defense of another country.

In fact, if not in name, America became the policeman of the world.

Recently, because of the frustrations of the war in Vietnam, there has been a sharp reaction against the responsibilities of global defense. Some advocate a new brand of isolationism, or drastic reductions on U.S. defense, or both.

In my view, we must maintain a strong defense - but strike a balance between isolationism and over-extension.

What have the last 25 years taught us?

I think we should have learned at least three major lessons from our experiences during the quarter-century since World War II.

First, we cannot afford to put our trust in the good intentions of the Russians. From the Berlin Blockade of 1948 to the Czechoslovakian invasion 20 years later, Moscow's record has been one of hostility and bad faith.

Second, we must maintain a strong defense. Communist leaders respect strength and despise weakness. If we permit ourselves to become weak, we shall invite Communist aggression and domination. It is primarily the threat of Russian aggression which forces the United States to spend billions on defense.

Third, we must set realistic limits on American involvement in the affairs of distant lands. It does not strengthen us, but rather weakens us, if this Nation stretches its forces too thin in an effort to influence the destinies of countries all around the world.

Our foreign and military policy should be governed strictly by the real national interests of the United States, and not by a misguided effort to shape the world in our own image.

But we must recognize that the task of defending our real interests requires an expenditure of resources.

We dare not blindly slash away at the defense budget of this Nation. We must cut the fat, but not the muscle.

I do not for a moment deny that there has been waste and mismanagement in some military programs. And I believe that the Congress
must continue, -- and indeed, increase -- its vigilance over the military budget, to be sure that the huge cost overruns of the past are
mided and are greenment found
the fodget sufficient measurement

We mist correct the inefficiency - but maintain our strength.

they re last was being hailed as promising a more peaceful yera. The SALT talks, the President Nixon's projected visit to Peking; the last was being hailed as promising a more peaceful yera. Taken to be the same of the sam

undergroup I join in the hope for world peace. It is a Cherished dream of mankind. But I also would sound a note of caution we shall be head—ing into serious trouble, if we permit our hopes, rather than our real—Cies.

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Damasta is known awar, the issue to the world situation, to dictate our defense poli—the parties to elective communication. Choc is trying hard to the world situation of the world situation of the world situation.

None of us knows just what are Communist Russia's intentions; we do have evidence, however, as to her capabilities. It is on her capabilities that we must judge our defense needs.

The Senate soon will be facing two decisions that will bear importantly on our defense position.

In one case, we must decide whether or not we can allow ourselves to remain dependent on the Soviet Union for the bulk of our supply of chrome ore, a material vital to defense.

In the second case, we are going to have to approve or disapprove an agreement which would turn over control of the island of Okinawa to Japan.

The chrome issue is of great importance.

Soon the Congress will vote billions of dollars for defense -primarily because of the threat of Russian aggression -- yet this
country is dependent upon Russia for most of its supply of chrome ore.

This situation came about because of an embargo put into effect unilaterally by the United Nations Security Council and former President Johnson. The embargo was imposed on trade with the African country of Rhodesia, after that country declared its independence from Great Britain in 1966.

Rhodesia is the world's richest source of chrome ore; The United States has no chrome, and, cut off from the Rhodesian source, we have had to turn to Russia, the next largest supplier.

To show the importance of chrome, it is essential in the manufacture of jet aircraft, missiles and nuclear submarines. Furthermore, it is vital to many elements in the transportation and communications networks which are essential to defense.

I have introduced legislation designed to end the dependence of the United States upon the Soviet Union for chrome ore. This legislation is cosponsored by Senators Ervin, Fannin, Goldwater and Gurney. My legislation is simple in structure. It would amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to provide that the President could not prohibit imports of a strategic material from a <u>free world</u> country if the importation of the same material is permitted from a <u>Communist-dominated</u> country.

I do not believe that it is logical for the United States to continue to be dependent upon Communist Russia for a material vital to our national defense.

I believe it is imperative that this question come to a vote in the Senate. I shall try to insure that the Senate is given a chance to register its will on this vital question.

The second decision to which I referred -- concerning the reversion of the island of Okinawa -- is also of great consequence.

An agreement has been signed providing for the reversion of the island of Okinawa to Japanese control.

Okinawa is our most strategic base in the Western Pacific.

We now have vast commitments in East Asia and the Far Pacific. We are the principal partner in the SEATO alliance, and we are committed to the defense of South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.

I am not convinced that we ought to have such extensive commitments. As I said earlier, the role of world policeman is not an appropriate one for this Nation.

However, as of July, 1971, these commitments do exist.

And since they do exist, it seems to me only logical that the United States should retain the capability of carrying them out.

The issue of the reversion of Okinawa is an emotional political question in Japan. That is the reason for the haste with which the United States and Japan have proceeded to draw up the pending agreement.

But the Japanese, who are determined to resume control of Okinawa, are spending only about 1 percent of their gross national product on defense. There has been talk of increasing this amount, but not to the extent that Japan could assume the role of a partner in the defense of the Western Pacific.

The United States should retain control of its strategic military base on Okinawa -- especially since Japan is not a real partner in the defense of the area. After all, it is Japan's area and not ours.

The Senate will be called upon to vote on this question in the near future.

The agreement for the reversion of Okinawa modifies the Treaty of Peace with Japan approved after World War II. Under the Treaty of Peace, the United States has the unrestricted right to Okinawa.

Under the agreement recently worked out between President Nixon and Premier Sato of Japan, the United States would relinquish this unrestricted right. Japan would have a veto over our actions.

I am not opposed to the eventual return of Okinawa to Japanese control. But I doubt that the present time -- with vast American commitments in the Western Pacific, and no significant defense effort by Japan -- is the appropriate time for reversion.

If the Senate should approve the treaty, then I think careful consideration should be given to prompt action toward reducing our Asian commitments.

In the long run, these commitments should be reduced anyway. But without Okinawa, I believe the United States would have to move more quickly toward reducing its Asian responsibilities.

The issues which this Nation faces in the field of foreign and military policy are exceedingly complex.

If we are to solve these difficult problems, we must use commonsense.

All of us must work and hope for world peace, but we dare not pin our national security on the belief that we have reached that great goal.

We must maintain a strong national defense - or we shall run great risk of losing our freedom.

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Statement by: Senator James B. Pearson (4, 7, 4) July 28, 1971

US-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Mr. President, relations between the United States and Japan may be entering their most delicate period since the end of the American occupation. The delicacy arises over the juxtaposition of economic and political controversies at a time when long-term relations between the two great democracies are in at a cross roads. Only the greatest sensitivity and statesmanship on both sides of the Pacific will prevent a disasterous confrontation damaging to fundamental interests of both nations.

The United States and Japan have a golden opportunity to firmly establish a mutually beneficial relationship in Asia and the Pacific based upon a concert of political and economic interests, but this relationship could founder in the next few months if politicians and statesmen on both sides of the Pacific do not act with the upmost restraint and responsibility.

The immediate issue which could provoke a dramatic confrontation is Senate consideration of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty signed by the President in June of this year. In this country, some may attempt to link the return of Okinawa and eventual withdrawal of American forces to changes in Japanese export practices and import restrictions. In Japan, for understandable reasons, the return of Okinawa has become a highly nationalistic issue. A failure to ratify the treaty, or to ratify with conditions relating to trade matters, could provoke potent forces of nationalism in Japan -- forces which could shape US-Japanese relations for years to come.

Confrontation now would be doubly tragic as signs of changes in

Japanese policies hold out some promise for settlement of the most difficult trade problems.

At this juncture of US-Japanese relations, it would be wise to place some of the relatively minor disagreements we have with Japan in the perspective of the overall importance of US-Japanese relations. This is not to dismiss the serious individual problems caused by any economic dislocations resulting from Japanese imports, rather, it is to measure those problems against the consequences of disruption of cordial relations with the Japanese.

It is not possible, in a short statement, to adequately examine the strategic importance of US-Japanese relations. In brief, the Japanese will be leaders in Asia for the forseeable future. Japan is the only Asian nation which can balance the power of the Peoples Republic of China on the small nations of Asia from Korea to Burma.

It is not difficult to imagine the leaders of the small nations of the area balancing Chinese influence and pressure against Japanese economic and political power. The independence of these small nations, for which so much American blood and treasure has been expended, is undeniably important to American security.

The Japanese will, however, need American assistance to carry out this important strategic function; and provided cordial relations are maintained, will seek and receive assistance as needed. In short, the Japanese are a key to the successful operation of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia.

Although they may be somewhat concerned about the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking, it is difficult to believe

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that any future rapprochement with the Peoples Republic will supercede the necessity of maintaining close ties with the other Asian power, Japan.

Political and economic relations between Asian policies of the US and Japan could be found in coordinated foreign assistance programs. A large proportion of American foreign assistance has been spent assisting Asian nations maintain political integrity and promote economic development. The continuation of these efforts is important to both the United States and Japan. While the political interests of the two Allies are not identical, they are certainly in enough accord to permit the coordination of aid efforts.

This would have economic and political advantages for both nations.

Economically, an increase in Japanese development loans and grants, as opposed to the export-oriented assistance now rendered, could relieve some of the balance of payments strains American aid now places on our economy. Relief of American balance of payments difficulties has definite benefits for the Japanese.

In addition to the desirability of increased grants and loans from Japan, the Japanese may well be able to operate technical assistance programs more easily than Americans. They should have a better grasp of cultural requirements of technical aid -- problems which all too often limit the effectiveness of American programs -- and should, as Asians, be less conspicuous and objectionable in war-ravaged Southeast Asia than Americans.

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Increased Japanese efforts in the development assistance field could offset some of the American criticisms of low levels of Japanese efforts in defense spending. At this time Japan spends about .8 percent of her GNP on defense while the US spends many times that amount on American forces

A good case can be made for the Japanese assuming a larger portion of development assistance efforts on both political and economic grounds. For reasons stated earlier, they may well be able to operate more effectively in the Asian cultures than Americans, while Americans -- the only power really capable of strategic defense of the Pacific -- are able to supply men and material for defense.

For domestic political reasons in both the US and Japan, this division of labors may well be advantageous. We can all understand the reluctance on the part of many Japanese to develop military forces capable of supporting their Asian allies -- forces which would be considered offensive forces. A number of small Asian nations would also be uncomfortable with such a development.

On the other hand, foreign assistance has not been unpopular in Japan. Although it has been, exclusive of war reparations, mostly on hard terms and tied to export expansion, the Japanese have indicated that they will triple their development assistance efforts in the next years. By contrast, foreign aid founds are extremely hard to come by in the United States. Congress grudgingly votes money each year, and in decreasing amounts at that. Defense funds are, however, somewhat easier to secure, especially when the administration can actually demonstrate a need.

By dividing and coordinating our efforts in aid and defense, the US and Japan could reinforce mutually advantageous policies throughout Asia and the Pacific.

For individual Americans and Japanese, somewhat esoteric international policies do not have the direct personal impact of economic relations between myllions. Two hundred and transmillion Americans and one hundred and

four million Japanese carry on a trade valued at \$10.5 billion 1970. Further-more, this trade has been increasing at a fantastic rate for the last five years and the prospects for continued increases are excellent.

A great deal of verbage has been expended on frade between the United States and Japan. No one denies the fact that the US has run a sizeable deficit in bilateral trade with Japan in the last few years. It is, however, imperative to consider the implications of the return to mercantilism advocated by some as a cure for the increase of Japanese imports.

It is, perhaps, necessary to make the simple economists' point that foreign nations have to sell goods in the United States to earn the dollars to buy American goods. In more specific terms, Japanese must sell radios, cameras, and even textiles, if they are going to be able to continue to buy wheat, corn, grain sorghum, and other commodities from Americans.

Japanese as much as Americans, have a stake in seeking to restore a balance to the trade between the two nations. Japanese mercantilism is as futile as American mercantilism, it does the Japanese little good to continue to hold large foreign currency reserves especially while the dollar continues decrease in value due to inflation. The Japanese, for their part, are evidently beginning to understand the urgent need for changes in their import regulations, export practices, investment regulations and the value of the yen -- perhaps the most important element of all.

Japan is the United States' second largest single market for all export products and it is the largest market of American agricultural exports. The United States is Japan's largest foreign market. The value of US exports of agricultural commodities to Japan rose to a record \$1.2 billion in calendar year

1970, a 30 percent increase over 1969. This trade represented a 110 percent increase over the average value of US agricultural exports to Japan during the 1965-1969 period.

These statistics are cited to indicate the dangers faced by American exporters, especially American farmers, if Japanese-American trade is discrupted because of political or economic disputes. This is not to imply that Japanese import restrictions, export practices and yen value are entirely acceptable; certainly both sides need to negotiate changes in trading practices. I do want to point out the magnitude and delicacy of the problem -- especially for those whose incomes depend on exports to Japan at a time when we hear almost exclusively about those whose incomes may be jeopardized by Japanese imports.

At this time, the interests of a relatively small number of persons adversely affected by imports from Japan cannot be allowed to override the national security and economic well-being of the majority of the American people -- and that is precisely the danger which could arise from attempts to use the Okinawa Reversion treaty as a bargaining device to secure trade concessions from Japan.


We cannot, of course, ignore the serious difficulties encountered by those whose jobs and investments are threatened by foreign competition.


Greater utilization of adjustment assistance benefits for workers and businesses affected by increased imports is the most sensible short-term remedy available to the United States. Adjustment assistance enables the entire society to bear the costs of retraining and reinvestment of resources displaced by imports. This is only fair, as the entire society benefits from the lower costs

of the imported goods. In this way we adjust to competition from abroad internally, and avoid the trade wars and other international dangers of escalating protective tariffs.

I have tried to examine, however briefly, the importance of the maintenance of cordial relations between the United States and Japan and to point out that the next few months may be an extremely critical period for the formation of long-term relations between the two nations. Both nations have too much at stake to allow relatively minor, but soluable, controversies to disrupt political and economic relations in their formative months. Now is a time when statesmen must become politicians and politicians become statesmen if we are to avoid tragic disruption of our close ties with Japan.

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1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。

2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に

電信写

MR. PRESIDENT. ON TUESDAY THE SENATE WILL BE CALLED UPON TO RATIFY OR REJECT THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF JAPAN.

THIS PROPOSED AGREEMENT WOULD BE A CHANGE IN THE TERMS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE OF 1951 BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES.

UNDER TERMS OF THE PEACE TREATY THE UNITED STATES HAS UNRESTRICTED USE OF MILITARY BASES ON OKINAVA.

TWO YEARS AGO, WHEN OFFICIAL DISCUSSION BEGAN CONCERNING THE PROPOSED REVERSION OF OKINAWA, I SPONSORED LEGISLATION THAT CALLED UPON THE PRESIDENT TO SUBMIT ANY AGREEMENT CHANGING THE STATUS OF OKINAWA TO THE SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT. THIS LEGISLATION WAS APPROVED BY THE SENATE, AND NOW THE QUESTION OF RATIFICATION BY THE SENATE MUST BE DECIDED.

AFTER LONG CONSIDERATION, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT I CANNOT SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT FOR REVERSION OF OKINAWA, WHICH PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE JAPAN A VETO OVER THE USE BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS FACILITIES ON OKINAWA.

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に

電信写

IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO ORGANIZE OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENT. I WISH, HOWEVER, TO MAKE MY OWN VIEWS KNOWN .

I SHALL VOTE AGAINST THE PROPOSAL. EVEN IF I BE THE ONLY SENATOR TO CAST SUCH A VOTE.

I AM AMONG THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BECOME OVERCOMMITTED AROUND THE WORLD. WE HAVE MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS WITH 44 DIFFERENT NATIONS.

MORE THAN 25 YEARS AFTER THE END OF WORLD WAR II. THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINS 310,000 MEN IN EUROPE, INCLUDING THE 2ND FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEMI-COLON AND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC. THE UNITED STATES HAS 370,000 TROOPS ON DUTY.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES CAN CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO CARRY SO HEAVY A MILITARY RESPONSI-BILITY. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT OTHER NATIONS MAKE A GREATER CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR OWN SECURITY.

BUT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, OUR MILITARY COMMITMENTS ARE A FACT.

AMONG THE AREAS IN WHICH WE ARE MOST HEAVILY COMMITTED IS ASIA. NOT ONLY IS THE UNITED STATES ENGAGED IN A SHOOTING WAR IN VIETNAM, BUT THE NATION

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IS ALSO COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF SOUTH KOREA. TAIWAN, JAPAN, THE PHILIPPINES, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, PAKISTAN AND THAILAND,

WE MUST VIEW THE OKINAWA PROPOSAL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

FIRST, IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT IS THE 1951 TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN WHICH CONFERS UPON THE UNITED STATES THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF MILITARY BASES ON THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA.

THE TREATY OF PEACE IS ENTIRELY SEPARATE FROM THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY OF 1960 BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. THE TWO AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED.

AGREEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES TO TURN OVER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL)

OF OKINAWA TO THE JAPANESE IS A CHANGE IN THE TREATY OF PEACE. IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY.

THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO THE CONTROL OF JAPAN WOULD INVOLVE SURRENDER BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE OKINAWA BASES. NO ONE DISPUTES THAT STATEMENT.

I THINK THAT IN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT THE REVERSION AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED, MEMBERS OF

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THE SENATE SHOULD GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE EXTENSIVE DEFENSE COMMITMUNTS WHICH WE HAVE IN

WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT ALL OF OUR ASIAN COMMITMENTS WERE UNDERTAKEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT UNRESTRICTED USE OF OKINAWA WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES.

CAN WE AFFORD TO GO ON GUARANTEEING THE DEFENSE OF SO MANY ASIAN NATIONS, IF WE ARE TO SURRENDER AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE FAR EAST?

OUR MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY WITH JAPAN, FOR EXAMPLE, IS SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL ON 1 YEAR'S NOTICE. SHOULD IT BE CONTINUED INDEFINITELY?

THE STATE DEPARTMENT FEELS IT SHOULD. I QUESTION THAT.

WE HAVE COMMITMENTS TO 10 ASIAN NATIONS UNDER THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT OF 1954. THIS TREATY ALSO IS SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL BY ANY PARTY ON 1 YEAR'S NOTICE. CAN WE CONTINUE THESE COMMITMENTS INDEFINITELY?

THE SATO GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN HAS ASSURED THE UNITED STATE THAT IT WILL COOPERATE IN PERMITTING

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THIS NATION TO USE OKINAWA IN ORDER TO FULFILL OUR OBLIGATIONS. THOSE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO FAVOR HAVING OKINAWA REVERT TO JAPAN PUT GREAT STRESS ON THIS.

BUT ONCE REVERSION IS ACCOMPLISHED, THE FINAL DECISION ON THE USE OF OKINAWA IN EACH CONTINGENCY WILL REST NOT WITH THE UNITED STATES, BUT WITH JAPAN - WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE UNDER THE RULE OF THE SATO GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME. IN FACT, SATO VERY LIKELY WILL BE OUT OF OFFICE IN A MATTER OF MONTHS.

THESE, I FEEL, ARE SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS. I WANT TO SEE OUR COMMITMENTS IN ASIA REDUCED. BUT NO PROPOSAL HAS BEEN MADE TO REDUCE OUR COMMITMENTS.

THE ONLY PROPOSAL IS THAT WE VOLUNTARILY GIVE UP THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT TO USE OUR GREATEST MILITARY BASE COMPLEX IN THE FAR PACIFIC.

JAPAN IS SEEKING, AND WOULD BE GETTING, CONTROL OVER OUR MILITARY BASE. AT THE SAME TIME, JAPAN WOULD HAVE A PLEDGE FROM THE UNITED STATES TO GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF JAPAN. . TO STATE IT ANOTHER WAY, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT 注 意

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WANTS THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF JAPAN SEMICOLON TO CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF OKINAWA SEMICOLON TO CONTINUE TO SPEND HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS ON OKINAWA - DORUJIRUSI 260 MILLION LAST YEAR. BUT IT SEEKS TO PUT RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO $_{\circ}$ THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTE 42 PERCENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA. JAPAN WANTS A VETO OVER ANY U.S. ACTION AFFECTING OKINAWA. IT SPECIFICALLY WANTS THE RIGHT TO DENY TO THE UNITED STATES THE AUTHORITY TO STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA AND WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR CONSULTA-TION BEFORE OUR MILITARY FORCES BASED THERE COULD BE

IN OTHER WORDS, THE UNITED STATES NO LONGER WOULD HAVE UNRESTRICTED USE OF OKINAWA.

OUR ROLE AS THE DEFENDER OF THE FAR EAST HAS ENABLED JAPAN TO AVOID THE BURDEN OF REARMAMENT -ONLY ABOUT 1 PERCENT OF HER GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS SPENT ON DEFENSE - AND THUS CONCENTRATE ON EXPANDING AND MODERNIZING ITS DOMESTIC ECONOMY.

IN DEFENSE MATTERS, THE JAPANESE HAVE GOTTEN A FREE RIDE. AS A DIRECT RESULT, JAPAN'S PRESENT

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電信写

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT RANKS THIRD IN THE WORLD,
BEHIND ONLY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

WHILE THE PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN GIVES THE
UNITED STATES UNRESTRICTED RIGHTS ON OKINAWA, THE
1960 MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY PROVIDES THAT OUR
MILITARY FORCES BASED IN JAPAN CANNOT BE USED WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

UNDER THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE SENATE MUST SOON VOTE ON, JAPAN WOULD HAVE A SIMILAR RIGHT OF CONSULTATION WHICH REGARD TO AMERICAN FORCES ON OKINAWA.

WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN AND THE VAST AREAS OF THE WEST PACIFIC AND SOUTHEAST ASIA IS OPEN TO QUESTION.

BUT AT THE MOMENT, THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF THESE REGIONS. AND IT IS ONLY COMMONSENSE, IN MY VIEW, THAT SO LONG AS THESE COMMITMENTS CONTINUE IN FORCE, THEN IT IS ONLY LOGICAL AND RESPONSIBLE THAT THIS COUNTRY RETAIN THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF ITS GREATEST BASE IN THE WEST PACIFIC, NAMELY OKINAWA.

I AGREE THAT EVENTUALLY OKINAWA AND THE RYUKYU

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電信写

ISLANDS WILL REVERT TO CONTROL OF JAPAN. BUT I
THINK IT UNWISE TO TURN OVER SUCH CONTROL AT A TIME
WHEN THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED SO DEEPLY
TO THE DEFENSE OF ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC.

IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY, IN MY OPINION, FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE ITS COMMITMENTS TO THE DEFENSE OF ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC WHILE AT THE SAME TIME GIVING UP THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE MILITARY COMPLEX ON OKINAWA.

IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT PUBLIC ATTENTION BE FOCUSED ON THIS ISSUE OF UNRESTRICTED USE OF OUR BASES ON OKINAWA.

I SPEAK AS ONE WHO IS NOT SYMPATHETIC TO OUR DEEP INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, ONE WHO FROM THE BEGINNING REGARDED IT AS AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A GROUND WAR THERE.

I SPEAK AS ONE WHO QUESTIONS THE WISDOM OF OUR COUNTRY'S COMMITTING ITSELF TO MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS WITH 44 DIFFERENT NATIONS.

I SPEAK AS ONE WHO FEELS THAT WE CANNOT LOGICALLY BE THE WORLD'S POLICEMAN.

IF BY THE ACT OF GRANTING JAPAN ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER OKINAWA, THE UNITED STATES COULD INSURE

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A MULTINATIONAL DEFENSE STRUCTURE IN THE FAR EAST. WITH INCREASED PARTICIPATION BY JAPAN - IF THIS ACTION WOULD RELIEVE OUR COUNTRY OF A MEASURE OF ITS HEAVY INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES - THEN, I WOULD SUPPORT A REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPANESE CONTROL.

BUT THIS IS NOT THE CASE.

QUITE THE CONTRARY. SURRENDER OF CONTROL OVER OKINAWA WOULD ONLY MAKE MORE DIFFICULT OUR ROLE IN THE PACIFIC.

IN FACT, SHOULD THE TREATY FOR REVERSION OF OKINAWA BE APPROVED, THEN I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE ITS COMMITMENTS IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC AREAS.

IF THE UNITED STATES CHOOSES TO GIVE UP THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT OF USE OF ITS BASES ON OKINAWA. THEN I BELIEVE THIS ACTION WILL BE AN APPROPRIATE SIGNAL FOR THE REDUCTION OF COMMITMENTS IN THIS REGION.

SURELY WE CANNOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO CARRY THE CHIEF BURDEN FOR DEFENSE OF ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC WHILE GIVING UP THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF OUR MOST STRATEGIC BASE.

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IN THE LONG RUN, I BELIEVE WE MUST REDUCE OUR ASIAN COMMITMENTS.

WHEN THIS HAS BEEN DONE, THEN IT WOULD BE PROPER TO TURN OVER OKINAWA TO THE CONTROL OF JAPAN.

BUT IN THE SHORT RUN, THE COMMITMENTS OF THIS NATION IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC AREAS REMAIN IN FORCE.

AND SO LONG AS THIS IS THE CASE, I CANNOT SUPPORT AN AGREEMENT WHICH SACRIFICES THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES TO USE ITS BASES ON THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA.

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