

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 米国関係（議員等発言(2)（講演、記者会見等）

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(5) バード上院議員演説 (昭和六、四、二三、同七、二九、同八、十一)

ソカ
ヒビ
大政閣外官務
務務 典房
次次
臣官宣審長
儀總人題厚計
書文会當給
調
参企折調
長
領
移
参領旅移
長

ア 参地中東
北東西
米長 参北郊
中南 参一二
經 参西東洋
長 西東

近ア 参書近ア
長經 次經國資
長經 參貿國萬
經參政二國一理
多參參規

國參政經科
長軍社專
情參道内外
文長

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検問班に連絡ありたい。

電 信 写

総番号(TA) 21649
71年4月28日20時10分 米国
71年4月29日09時26分 本省 主管
米北/

外務大臣殿 牛場大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん問題(ペード上院議員の演説)

第1160号 略 至急

1. ペード上院議員(ヴァージニア州選出民主党)は、23日の上院本会議でオキナワ返かん問題について演説し、協定について上院の助言と同意を求めるとの3月10日付のロジャース国務長官発フルブライト委員長あて書簡及び、オキナワ返かんは行政協定によるべしとのニューヨーク・タイムズ記事(往電第1050号参照)のに言及の上、オキナワ返かんには、(イ)この時点で、オキナワを日本に返すことが米国の国益に最もそくしたものか否かという問題と、(ロ)返かん実施の形式の問題と二つあると指摘し、(イ)は議論の余地のある(DEBATABLE)問題なるも、同日は議論しないとしつつ、(ロ)については、対日平和条約のいかなる変更も上院の同意を得て行なうのが当然なる旨論じている。(テキスト空送)

2. なお、ペード上院議員の要請により返かん協定の上院提出をめぐる、(イ)2月25日付フルブライト委員長発ロ

外務省

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ジャース長官あて書簡。(ロ)3月10日付ロジャース長官発フルブライト委員長あて書簡及び(ハ)1969年以来のペード議員のオキナワに関する演説を議事録に掲載している。

(丁)

外務省

アメリカ局

参 事 官

北米第一課長

公信函

政 第 3328

昭和46年4月30日

外務大臣殿

在米牛場大倅

引用(来)(往)公信・電信番号 4月28日付往電才1160号

送付資料

沖縄返還問題は南北人一下院議員、
演説テキスト。

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(希望配布先

付属添付 付属空便(行) 付属空便(D.P.) 付属船便(貨)
(郵)

本信写送付先

(別添とも)

April 23, 1971

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore, Is there objection to the present
consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the bill was
considered ordered to be engrossed for a
third reading, was read the third time,
and passed, as follows:

S. 157.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That, not-
withstanding any statute of limitations, or
lapse of time, or bars of laches or any pro-
ceeding heretofore had in the United States
District Court for the District of North Da-
kota, jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon
the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of North Dakota to hear, determine, and*

*render judgment upon any claim filed by
Arthur Rike against the United States for
compensation for personal injury, medical
expenses, and property damage sustained by
him arising out of an accident, which oc-
curred on December 24, 1964, allegedly as a
result of the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle by an employee of the United States
while acting within the scope of his Federal
employment.*

Six. 2. Suit upon any such claim may be
instituted at any time within one year after
the date of the enactment of this Act. Not-
hing in this Act shall be construed as an in-
ference of liability on the part of the United
States: Except as otherwise provided herein,
proceedings for the determination of such
claim, and review and payment of any judg-
ment or judgments thereon, shall be had in
the same manner as in the case of claims over
which such court has jurisdiction under sec-
tion 1346(b) of title 28, United States Code.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in the
Record an excerpt from the report
(No. 92-63), explaining the purpose of
the measure.

There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the Record,
as follows:

PURPOSE.

The purpose of the bill is to confer juris-
diction upon the U.S. District Court for the
District of North Dakota to hear, determine,
and render judgment upon a claim by Arthur
Rike. The bill would also waive the
defenses of the United States to such claim
based on the statute of limitations, laches,
or any previous proceeding in
the said district court.

STATEMENT.

A similar bill for this claimant in the 91st
Congress was approved by the committee and
passed by the Senate, but no action was taken
on it in the House of Representatives.

In its report to the committee, the Post
Office Department stated the facts in the case
and its recommendations as follows:

On February 5, 1968, the Department sub-
mitted a report on S. 2214 to this committee.
The present report amends and supersedes
the February 5 report in order to reflect cor-
rectly the final disposition of the civil tort
action which is discussed below.

Our records disclosed that on February 23,
1967, Arthur Rike filed a civil tort action in
the District Court, First Judicial District,
Grand Forks, N. Dak., against David John
Mersy, a postal employee. The suit de-
manded damages of \$37,905 for alleged in-
juries sustained by Mr. Rike as a result of
a collision on December 24, 1964, between
Mr. Rike's automobile and that of Mr. Mersy,
who was acting within the scope of his Fed-
eral employment. At the request of the as-
sistant U.S. attorney the action was removed
to the U.S. District Court for the District of
North Dakota pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2679(d),
and the United States was substituted as

party defendant in place of Mr. Mersy. The
Government then moved to dismiss the suit
on the ground that plaintiff's cause of action
was barred by the 2-year Federal statute of
limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The court
granted the Government's motion, dismiss-
ing the suit on November 29, 1967.

The Department opposes enactment of S.

2214. This bill would, in effect, nullify the
above court proceedings and allow Mr. Rike

an additional year within which to bring

suit. In the 82d Congress this committee, in

its report on Senate Joint Resolution 23,

declared that it "would not relieve a claim-
ant of a statute of limitations except for
good cause shown We see no evi-
dence of 'good cause' in this case to grant
the relief which would be afforded by S. 2214.

The Bureau of the Budget has advised

that there is no objection to the submis-
sion of this report to the committee from the

standpoint of the administration's program.

The sponsor of the bill, Hon. Quentin N.

Burdick, has advised the committee as fol-
lows:

It has come to my attention that the Post

Office Department's opposition to S. 2214, a

bill for the relief of Arthur Rike, is that

there is no showing of a "good cause" for

extending the statute of limitations.

I submit that it is logical and proper
that any change in the Treaty of Peace with
Japan can be made only with the
approval of the Senate.

I am not concerned today with the
question of whether Okinawa should or
should not revert to the administrative
control of Japan.

I am concerned today as to just how
the matter should be handled if and when
the executive department reaches an
agreement with the Japanese Govern-
ment.

It is appropriate at this point, I think,
to give some background on this vitally
important issue.

On May 29, 1969, just prior to the visit
of the Japanese Foreign Minister to the
United States, I addressed the Senate
on the future status of Okinawa.

I pointed out that under the 1952
Treaty of Peace with Japan, the United
States was granted the unrestricted use
of the island of Okinawa in the far
Pacific. On this island we have our
greatest Pacific military base complex.

I expressed the view that any change
in the status of Okinawa should be
through action by the President and the
Senate together, rather than by the
President unilaterally.

That was May 29, 1969.

On November 4, 1969, 2 weeks before
Prime Minister Sato of Japan was sched-
uled to arrive in Washington for further
discussions regarding the reversion of
Okinawa, I introduced in the Senate the
following resolution:

It is the sense of the Congress that the
President shall not enter into any agreement
or understanding, the effect of which would
be to change the status of any territory re-
ferred to in Article III of the Treaty of Peace
with Japan, without the advice and consent
of the Senate.

On November 5, 1969, I discussed this
resolution at some length on the floor of
the Senate. During the course of my re-
marks, I urged the Department of State and
the President to make clear to the Prime
Minister of Japan that any change in
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April 23, 1971

sive campaign of confrontation with the Government in 1970 to force the dissolution of the United States-Japanese Security Treaty. In addition, the same elements have coupled with this demand that the United States withdraw completely from Okinawa.

This reminds one of the effort of elements in Panama to blackmail the United States into giving up the Panama Canal. The administration of President Johnson drew a treaty to meet the demands of the Panamanians, but strong opposition in the Senate kept the President from bringing the issue to a vote.

Okinawa is our most important single military base complex in the Far East—and is strategically located. The United States has had unrestricted use of the island since World War II.

Beginning with President Eisenhower, each administration since 1951, has firmly maintained that the unrestricted use of U.S. bases on Okinawa is vital if the United States is to continue to have obligations in the Far East.

Sometimes the future status of Okinawa is linked to the United States-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty in which the United States guarantees the freedom and safety of Japan.

Such linkage is not correct. These are two separate issues.

The Mutual Security Treaty with Japan was consummated in 1960. Either party has the right to reope it after 10 years, otherwise it remains in effect.

But, the status of Okinawa was determined by the 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan. There is no legal obligation to discuss reversion of the island to Japan at this time or any other time.

President Johnson reaffirmed this statement, and, in 1967, he and the Japanese Prime Minister agreed that the United States and Japan should keep the status of the Ryukyu Islands under review, "guided by the aim of returning administrative rights of these islands to Japan."

White I agree that eventually the Ryukyu Islands will be returned to Japan, I think it is unfortunate that public statements by past Presidents, not binding on the U.S. Senate, have aroused the hopes of the Japanese that it could be accomplished at an early date.

It would be foolhardy, in my judgment, to commit the United States to defend most of the Far East and then to give away this country's unrestricted right to use its military bases on Okinawa.

For 4 years we have fought the war in Vietnam with one hand tied behind our back. As a result, the war has been prolonged and the casualties increased.

Let us not be so foolish as to get into a similar position by giving someone else control over our principal military complex.

It is vitally important that public attention be focused on this issue of unrestricted use of our bases on Okinawa.

Japan wants a veto over any U.S. action affecting Okinawa. It specifically wants the right to deny to the United States the authority to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa and would require prior consultation before our military forces based there could be used.

In other words, the United States no longer would have unrestricted use of Okinawa.

Our role as the defender of the Far East has enabled Japan to avoid the burden of rearmament—less than 1 percent of her gross national product is spent on defense—and thus concentrate on expanding and modernizing its domestic economy.

In defense matters, the Japanese have gotten a free ride. As a direct result, Japan's present gross national product is over \$120 billion and ranks third in the world, behind only the United States and the Soviet Union.

While the peace treaty with Japan gives the United States unrestricted rights on Okinawa, the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty provides that our military forces based in Japan cannot be used without prior consultation with the Japanese Government.

For example, when the North Koreans seized the U.S.S. *Pueblo* last year, Adm. Frank L. Johnson, commander of naval forces in Japan, testified that one reason aid could not be sent to the *Pueblo* was that approval first must be obtained from the Japanese Government to use U.S. aircraft based in Japan, those being the nearest aircraft available.

The Japanese Government now seeks to extend such authority to Okinawa.

Whether the United States should continue to guarantee the freedom of Japan, and Free China; whether we should continue the mutual defense arrangements covering the eight countries signing the Southeast Asia Treaty; plus the Philippines; plus Australia and New Zealand; plus Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, is debatable.

Under the 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan, the United States was granted the unrestricted use of the island of Okinawa in the far Pacific. On this island, we have our greatest Pacific military base complex.

The Japanese Government is seeking administrative control of Okinawa, which is to say that it wants a veto over any U.S. action affecting Okinawa. It specifically wants the right to deny the United States the authority to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa, and would require prior consultation before our military forces based there could be used.

In speaking to the Senate, I expressed the view that it is debatable whether the United States should continue to guarantee the security of much of Asia.

But I expressed the view, too, that if we are to continue to guarantee the security of the Asian nations—and our Government has not advocated reducing these commitments—then it seems only logical, sound, and responsible that the United States continue to have the unrestricted use of its greatest base in the west Pacific; namely, Okinawa.

It would be foolhardy, in my judgment, to commit the United States to defend most of the Far East and then to give away this country's unrestricted right to use its military bases on Okinawa.

Twenty-four years after the defeat of Germany we have 225,000 troops in Europe, mostly in West Germany.

Twenty-four years after the defeat of Japan, we have nearly 1,000,000 military personnel in the Far Pacific, on land and sea.

Behind Japan's efforts to regain administrative control of Okinawa are many factors, one of which is the political fate of Prime Minister Sato. Leftist elements including the Socialist and Communist parties and radical student groups, have demanded that the United States withdraw completely from Okinawa.

The News believes that extension of the security treaty is in the national interest of both countries. Scrapping it would force the U.S. to re-think much of its Pacific strategy; it also would impose dramatic new responsibilities on the Japanese government which, under the protection of the U.S. defense umbrella, has achieved a near miraculous economic reconstruction without the nasty necessity of worrying much about its national defense.

Twenty-four years after the defeat of Germany, we have nearly 1,000,000 military personnel in the Far Pacific, on land and sea.

Even the New York Times said in discussing the Japanese Foreign Minister's visit to Washington that—

"The Japanese must recognize that they cannot continue to enjoy the luxury of American protection without making some sacrifices on their own on behalf of mutual security."

While my speech received a cool reception in Japan, it appears to have helped focus attention on an important problem. It received support from the Shreveport, La., Journal; the Birmingham, Ala., News; the Lynchburg, Va., News; the Northern Virginia Daily, Strasburg, Va.; the Hartford, Conn., Courant; the Phoenix, Ariz., Republic; and the Nashville, Tenn., Banner, as well as from Chicago Tribune columnist, Walter Trohan.

Quite the contrary. Surrender of control over Okinawa would only make more difficult our role in the Pacific.

The issue must be decided by the Senate; it was the Senate which ratified the treaty of peace in 1952, which gave to the United States the unrestricted use of Okinawa.

In my opinion, so long as the United States maintains its significant role in the Far East, the continued unrestricted use of our bases on Okinawa is vital and fundamental.

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 23, 1969]

FUTURE STATUS OF OKINAWA

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, on May 29, just prior to the visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister to the United States, I addressed the Senate on the future status of Okinawa.

Under the 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan, the United States was granted the unrestricted use of the island of Okinawa in the far Pacific. On this island, we have our greatest Pacific military base complex.

The Japanese Government is seeking administrative control of Okinawa, which is to say that it wants a veto over any U.S. action affecting Okinawa. It specifically wants the right to deny the United States the authority to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa, and would require prior consultation before our military forces based there could be used.

In speaking to the Senate, I expressed the view that it is debatable whether the United States should continue to guarantee the security of much of Asia.

But I expressed the view, too, that if we are to continue to guarantee the security of the Asian nations—and our Government has not advocated reducing these commitments—then it seems only logical, sound, and responsible that the United States continue to have the unrestricted use of its greatest base in the west Pacific; namely, Okinawa.

It would be foolhardy, in my judgment, to commit the United States to defend most of the Far East and then to give away this country's unrestricted right to use its military bases on Okinawa.

Twenty-four years after the defeat of Germany we have 225,000 troops in Europe, mostly in West Germany.

Twenty-four years after the defeat of Japan, we have nearly 1,000,000 military personnel in the Far Pacific, on land and sea.

Behind Japan's efforts to regain administrative control of Okinawa are many factors, one of which is the political fate of Prime Minister Sato. Leftist elements including the Socialist and Communist parties and radical student groups, have demanded that the United States withdraw completely from Okinawa.

The News believes that extension of the security treaty is in the national interest of both countries. Scrapping it would force the U.S. to re-think much of its Pacific strategy; it also would impose dramatic new responsibilities on the Japanese government which, under the protection of the U.S. defense umbrella, has achieved a near miraculous economic reconstruction without the nasty necessity of worrying much about its national defense.

Twenty-four years after the defeat of Germany, we have nearly 1,000,000 military personnel in the Far Pacific, on land and sea.

Even the New York Times said in discussing the Japanese Foreign Minister's visit to Washington that—

"The Japanese must recognize that they cannot continue to enjoy the luxury of American protection without making some sacrifices on their own on behalf of mutual security."

While my speech received a cool reception in Japan, it appears to have helped focus attention on an important problem. It received support from the Shreveport, La., Journal; the Birmingham, Ala., News; the Lynchburg, Va., News; the Northern Virginia Daily, Strasburg, Va.; the Hartford, Conn., Courant; the Phoenix, Ariz., Republic; and the Nashville, Tenn., Banner, as well as from Chicago Tribune columnist, Walter Trohan.

Quite the contrary. Surrender of control over Okinawa would only make more difficult our role in the Pacific.

The issue must be decided by the Senate; it was the Senate which ratified the treaty of peace in 1952, which gave to the United States the unrestricted use of Okinawa.

Applaud your speech in the Senate 29 May stop Please air mail copy complete text."

April 23, 1971

I also received the following telegram from the Patriot Crosswhite Post 6975, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Bristol, Va., Tenn.: "Members oppose the return of Okinawa to the Japanese Government."

I ask unanimous consent that the text of various editorials mentioned above be published in the Record at this point.

(There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:)

[From the Birmingham, Ala., News, May 30, 1969]

OKINAWA VITAL TO U.S. SECURITY

OKINAWA

So long as the United States maintains its role as the defender of the Far East, the continued unrestricted use of this nation's military bases on Okinawa is vital and fundamental to the security of America and the rest of the free world.

This is the warning sounded by U.S. Sen. Harry F. Byrd Jr. of Virginia, on the eve of

his visit to Washington by the Foreign Minister of Japan, who will be in the United States to discuss the future status of the Island of Okinawa.

Under a separate agreement—the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty—the U.S. maintains troops in Japan itself. But, as Sen. Byrd pointed out yesterday, there are restrictions imposed on the use of U.S. forces based in Japan.

Increasingly in recent years there has been agitation in Japan against both the Mutual Security Treaty, which will be up for renegotiation next year, and U.S. control of Okinawa. But it is important to keep the two issues separate.

There may be modifications next year in the Mutual Security Treaty binding the two one-time enemies. This is a legitimate subject of negotiation and agreement—or, if the two nations so conclude, of disagreement.

Twenty-four years after the defeat of Japan, we have nearly 1,000,000 military personnel in the Far Pacific, on land and sea.

Behind Japan's efforts to regain administrative control of Okinawa are many factors, one of which is the political fate of Prime Minister Sato. Leftist elements including the Socialist and Communist parties and radical student groups, have demanded that the United States withdraw completely from Okinawa.

The United States has had unrestricted use of Okinawa since World War II. The status of the island was determined by the 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan. There is no legal obligation on the part of the United States to discuss reversion of the island to Japan at this time or any other time.

As analyzed by Senator Byrd, "The Japanese Government wants the United States to continue to guarantee the safety of Japan; to continue to guarantee the safety of Okinawa; to continue to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on Okinawa—\$260 million last year. But it seeks to put restrictions on what the United States can do."

Japan wants a veto over any U.S. action affecting Okinawa. It specifically wants the right to deny to the United States the authority to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa and would require prior consultation before our military forces based there could be used.

In other words, the United States no longer would have unrestricted use of Okinawa.

Our role as the defender of the Far East has enabled Japan to avoid the burden of rearmament—less than 1 percent of her gross national product is spent on defense—and thus concentrate on expanding and modernizing its domestic economy.

In defense matters, the Japanese have gotten a free ride. As a direct result, Japan's present gross national product is over \$120 billion and ranks third in the world, behind only the United States and the Soviet Union.

While the peace treaty with Japan gives the United States unrestricted rights on Okinawa, the 1960 Mutual Security Treaty provides that our military forces based in Japan cannot be used without prior consultation with the Japanese Government.

Quite the contrary. Surrender of control over Okinawa would only make more difficult our role in the Pacific.

The issue must be decided by the Senate; it was the Senate which ratified the treaty of peace in 1952, which gave to the United States the unrestricted use of Okinawa.

Applaud your speech in the Senate 29 May stop Please air mail copy complete text."

try—would be to further cripple ourselves from what we too often hear from some other members of the august body, whose attacks for the benefit of others.

Senator Byrd deserves the gratitude of all Americans for his alertness and for his forthright stand against an action which could destroy the military security achieved for this nation by the men who gave their lives to Okinawa in World War II.

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Nov. 4, 1969]

OKINAWA

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and asked that it be stated at this time, and then I wish to address a parliamentary inquiry to the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

"On page 13, after line 10, insert the following:

"Sec. 106. It is the sense of the Congress that the President shall not enter into any agreement or understanding, the effect of which would be to change the status of any territory referred to in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, without the advice and consent of the Senate."

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia will state it.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I should like to ask the Chair whether the amendment which I have just submitted would be subject to a point of order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is informed by the parliamentarian that this is a sense resolution that does not involve legislative action.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. I thank the Chair.

I interpret the Chair's ruling to mean that the amendment can be appropriately and properly presented to the pending legislation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is correct.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I should like to address myself briefly to the amendment. I do not seek a vote this afternoon.

Mr. President, later this month, the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Sato, will come to the United States to discuss with the President the future status of the Ryukyu Islands, the principal one being Okinawa.

There will be a difference of views among Members of the Senate as to what the future role of Okinawa shall be. There will be some Members who will oppose any change in the present status, the present status being that the United States has sole and exclusive control over Okinawa.

There will be other Members of the Senate who will feel that there should be a change, and that Okinawa should revert to the administrative control of Japan.

Mr. President, my amendment does not suggest what the future status of Okinawa shall be. It does not in any way circumscribe the State Department or the President in negotiating with Prime Minister Sato, or other officials of the Japanese Government.

What the amendment provides is that it shall be the sense of Congress that whatever changes the administration concludes to make with the Japanese Government, affecting the treaty of peace with Japan, shall come to the Senate for ratification.

The treaty of peace with Japan was ratified by the Senate in 1952. It was under that treaty that the United States was given control over the Ryukyus which includes Okinawa.

Because the treaty governing control over the Ryukyus was ratified by the Senate, it is my view that any changes in the treaty should come to the Senate for approval or disapproval.

Mr. President, I do not argue whether it would be wise or unwise to change the treaty of peace with Japan. What I am suggesting is that the Senate yesterday. This is a refreshing change in defense matters, the Virginia senator pointed out, the Japanese have been

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to the Senate is that whatever changes are deemed desirable by the executive branch not become effective by unilateral action, but that they come before the Senate for its approval or disapproval.

It was only a few weeks ago—a few months ago, perhaps—that the Senate adopted, I believe unanimously, the national commitments resolution which was presented to the Senate by the distinguished Senator from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbright), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The purpose of that national commitments resolution was to attempt to restore to the Senate some of the constitutional prerogatives which are Senate's but which, in my judgment, and apparently in the judgment of many Senators, have been taken over in recent years by the executive branch.

So this amendment, which will be presented tomorrow, is, in reality, the first opportunity that the Senate has had to pass on a specific issue coming before the Senate since the national commitments resolution was adopted by this body.

I want to emphasize again, Mr. President, that the amendment does not in any way circumscribe the State Department or the Chief Executive of our Nation in his negotiations with the government of Japan. But it does say, "Whatever decisions you make must then be submitted to the Senate of the United States for approval or disapproval." That, as I see it, is the constitutional process under which our Government is supposed to work.

I feel that in recent years the executive branch of the Government has assumed too much authority, and I think the Senate of the United States has helped the executive branch assume authority by refusing to demand that its own constitutional prerogatives be upheld. I feel that we have given away many of our responsibilities.

Here is an opportunity, on a vitally important issue, to decide whether there shall be a change in the control of the greatest military base complex that the United States has in the far Pacific—namely, Okinawa—by unilateral executive action, or whether such action taken by the President, to be effective, must be submitted to the Senate for its consideration, advice, and consent.

I shall not detain the Senate longer today. Tomorrow I would like to present a few additional facts in regard to the amendment and mention some other aspects of the problem of Okinawa which faces the United States.

I think it will be a very important mission which the premier of Japan will undertake on behalf of his government when he comes to the United States on the 18th of this month. I think it is very desirable at this time to focus on the question of Okinawa. I think the Japanese Government should understand that, while the negotiations properly will be carried out by the executive branch of the Government, the Senate of the United States will participate in the final decision by having the opportunity to accept or to reject Japanese commitments made to that government on behalf of the United States.

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Nov. 5, 1969]

OKINAWA

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, the pending amendment was laid down yesterday.

It deals with the treaty of peace signed by the United States with Japan in 1952. The amendment provides that the treaty of peace having been ratified by the Senate of the United States, any changes which are proposed in the treaty shall come back to the U.S. Senate for approval or disapproval.

The Prime Minister of Japan will arrive in Washington on Monday, November 17.

He will be in the United States to discuss the future status of the island of Okinawa.

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Okinawa, and, in fact, the whole U.S. position in the Far East, is part of the heritage of World War II, which ended 24 years ago.

During the past quarter century, the United States has entered into mutual defense agreements with 44 nations—and has been involved in three major wars, counting World War II.

I doubt that any other nation in history, during such a short period of time, has engaged in three different major wars.

The U.S. Senate, under the Constitution, has a responsibility for foreign policy.

Too often during the past 25 years, the Senate has abdicated its responsibility in the field of foreign affairs, relying instead on the Department of State. Now, I know that with that Department that overwhelming majority are dedicated, conscientious individuals; I know, too, that many of them are men of great ability.

But I know also that whatever the reason, or wherever the responsibility may lie, the fact is that our Nation in this year of 1969 finds itself in a most unenviable position.

We are the dominant party in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the purpose of which is to guarantee the freedom of Europe;

we are the dominant party of ANZUS—the treaty among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States; we are the military head of CENTO—Central Treaty Organization—

Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan; we are the dominant partner in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, one of the prime reasons, according to former Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, that the United States became involved in the war in Vietnam; we have guaranteed the security of free China, and we have guaranteed the security of Japan.

As a practical matter, we have become the policeman of the world.

Can we logically continue in this role? Should we, even if we could?

Twenty-four years after the defeat of Germany, we have 225,000 troops in Europe, mostly in West Germany.

Twenty-four years after the defeat of Japan, we have nearly 1 million military personnel in the far Pacific, on land and sea.

The question of Okinawa, which the Japanese Prime Minister is coming here to discuss of great significance to our position, in the Pacific.

Here is an opportunity, on a vitally important issue, to decide whether there shall be a change in the control of the greatest military base complex that the United States has in the far Pacific—namely, Okinawa—by unilateral executive action, or whether such action taken by the President, to be effective, must be submitted to the Senate for its consideration, advice, and consent.

I shall not detain the Senate longer today. Tomorrow I would like to present a few additional facts in regard to the amendment and mention some other aspects of the problem of Okinawa which faces the United States.

I think it will be a very important mission which the premier of Japan will undertake on behalf of his government when he comes to the United States on the 18th of this month. I think it is very desirable at this time to focus on the question of Okinawa. I think the Japanese Government should understand that, while the negotiations properly will be carried out by the executive branch of the Government, the Senate of the United States will participate in the final decision by having the opportunity to accept or to reject Japanese commitments made to that government on behalf of the United States.

The United States has had unrestricted use of the island since World War II.

Beginning with President Eisenhower, each administration since 1951, has firmly maintained that the unrestricted use of U.S. bases on Okinawa is vital if the United States is to continue to have obligations in the Far East.

Sometimes the future status of Okinawa is linked to the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in which the United States guarantees the freedom and safety of Japan. Such linkage is not correct. These are two separate issues.

The Mutual Security Treaty with Japan was consummated in 1960. Either party has the right to reopen it after 10 years, otherwise it remains in effect.

But, the status of Okinawa was determined by the 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan. There is no legal obligation to discuss reversion of the island to Japan at this or any other time.

The United States has complete administrative authority over the Ryukyu Islands, the largest of which is Okinawa, under the provisions of article 3 of the 1952 Treaty of Peace. This peace treaty is entirely separate.

It is of great importance to the American people—and it is of great importance to the people of Asia.

Administrative control of the island which supports our major military base complex in the West Pacific.

To state it another way, the Japanese Government wants the United States to continue the safety of Japan, to guarantee the safety of Okinawa; to continue to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on Okinawa—\$260 million last year. But it seeks to put restrictions on what the United States can do.

Japan wants a veto over any U.S. action affecting Okinawa. It specifically wants the right to deny to the United States the authority to store nuclear weapons on Okinawa and would require prior consultation before our military forces based there could be used.

In other words, the United States no longer would have restricted use of Okinawa.

Our role as the defender of the Far East has enabled Japan to avoid the burden of rearmament—less than 1 percent of her gross national product is spent on defense—and thus concentrate on expanding and modernizing its domestic economy.

In defense matters, the Japanese have gotten a free ride. As a direct result, Japan's present gross national product is over \$120 billion and Japan ranks third in the world, behind only the United States and the Soviet Union.

While the peace treaty with Japan gives the United States unrestricted rights on Okinawa, the 1960 Mutual Security treaty provides that our military forces based in Japan cannot be used without prior consultation with the Japanese Government.

For example, when the North Koreans seized the U.S.S. *Pueblo* last year, Adm. Frank L. Johnson, commander of naval forces in Japan, testified that one reason aid could not be sent to the *Pueblo* was that approval first must be obtained from the Japanese Government to use U.S. aircraft based in Japan, those being the nearest aircraft available.

The Japanese Government now seeks to extend such authority to Okinawa.

Whether the United States should continue to guarantee the freedom of Japan, and free China; whether we should continue the mutual defense arrangements covering the eight countries signing the Southeast Asia Treaty; plus the Philippines; plus Australia and New Zealand; plus Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, is debatable.

For the Senate to concede to the executive branch of Government the right to change treaty commitments without Senate approval, it must make clear that any change in the Treaty of Peace with Japan must be ratified by the Senate.

The issue of Okinawa is important on its own; and the Senate may be divided on the proper course to pursue.

But the Senate, I should think, would be united in its determination to require Senate ratification of any changes which may be made in regard to treaties which have been ratified by the Senate.

For the Senate to concede to the executive branch of Government the right to change treaty commitments without Senate approval, it must make clear that any change in the Treaty of Peace with Japan must be ratified by the Senate.

Now we come to the key sentences.

"They (President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato) therefore agreed that the two

governments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa without detriment to the security of the Far East, including Japan.

"They further agreed to expedite the consultations with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972, subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support."

"So, it seems clear that the only agreement made by President Nixon is one of principle, namely, an early reversion of Okinawa.

But no details have been agreed to.

No specific arrangements have been agreed to.

The agreement to cite the text of the communique, is to "enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements."

As one who feels that the United States must have the unrestricted use of Okinawa, our greatest military complex in the Far Pacific, if we are to continue our widespread commitments in Asia, I frankly am relieved since reading the text of the communique.

The text does not bear out the newspaper headlines concerning the communique.

The only agreement President Nixon made was to "immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements."

And then that was followed by the two leaders of government specifying that any specific arrangement would be subject to legislative support action which, in so far as the United States is concerned, means approval by the Senate.

It is the sense of the Senate that any agreement or understanding entered into by the President to change the status of any territory referred to in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, shall not take effect without the advice and consent of the Senate.

This amendment was agreed to by a vote of 63-14.

NOT VOTING—22

Aiken, Bayh, Cooper, Cranston, Dominick, Fannin, Fong, Goldwater, Gore, Hartke, Hollings, Jackson, Jordan, N.C. Long, Metcalf, Ribicoff, Saxbe, Smith, III, Sparkman, Thurmond, Tower, Yarborough.

"into consultations regarding specific arrangements . . ."

I am especially pleased that the Senate's role in any final arrangements affecting Okinawa is specifically recognized in the text of the communique.

The fact that this is so clearly spelled out in the communique results, I feel, from the action taken by the Senate of the United States on November 5, 1969.

On that date, the Senate, by a recorded vote of 63 to 14, specified that any change in the Treaty of Peace with Japan must come to the Senate for approval or disapproval.

In the Nixon/Sato Communique 16 days later, both leaders recognized that any "specific arrangements" affecting Okinawa would be subject to Senate approval.

In my judgment, this establishes a historic precedent and one which is of vital importance both to the Senate and to the nation.

President Johnson, last year, unilaterally returned to Japan the Bonin Islands, which included Iwo Jima, without submitting his action to the Senate for ratification.

The text of the communique is three columns of newspaper type. It is divided into 15 brief sections.

The key section is number 6.

This is the section which deals specifically with Okinawa. In this section, the Prime Minister emphasized his view that the time had come to respond to the strong desire of the people of Japan to return Okinawa to Japanese control. President Nixon expressed appreciation of the Prime Minister's view.

The issue of Okinawa is important on its own; and the Senate may be divided on the proper course to pursue.

But the Senate, I should think, would be united in its determination to require Senate ratification of any changes which may be made in regard to treaties which have been ratified by the Senate.

For the Senate to concede to the executive branch of Government the right to change treaty commitments without Senate approval, it must make clear that any change in the Treaty of Peace with Japan must be ratified by the Senate.

Now, let's analyze the above language. Just what agreement was reached by Mr. Nixon and Mr. Sato?

1. They "agreed that the two governments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of Okinawa".

2. Such consultations would be "subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support."

So, it seems clear that the only agreement made by President Nixon is one of principle, namely, an early reversion of Okinawa.

But no details have been agreed to.

No specific arrangements have been agreed to.

The agreement to cite the text of the communique, is to "enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements."

As one who feels that the United States must have the unrestricted use of Okinawa, our greatest military complex in the Far Pacific, if we are to continue our widespread commitments in Asia, I frankly am relieved since reading the text of the communique.

The text does not bear out the newspaper headlines concerning the communique.

The only agreement President Nixon made was to "immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements . . ."

And then that was followed by the two leaders of government specifying that any specific arrangement would be subject to legislative support action which, in so far as the United States is concerned, means approval by the Senate.

It is the sense of the Senate that any agreement or understanding entered into by the President to change the status of any territory referred to in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, shall not take effect without the advice and consent of the Senate.

This amendment was agreed to by a vote of 63-14.

PRESENT AND ANNOUNCING A LIVE PAIR, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—1

Griffin, against.

NAYS—14

Boggs, Brooke, Harris, Hatfield, Inouye.

Javits, Kennedy, Mansfield, Mathias,

McCarthy.

McGee, Muskie, Percy, Scott.

PRESENT AND ANNOUNCING A LIVE PAIR,

AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—1

Griffin, against.

Subsequently, President Nixon met with Premier Eisaku Sato of Japan on November 19, 20, and 21, 1969, "to exchange views on the present international situation and on other matters of mutual interest to the United States and Japan." On November 21, 1969, they issued a joint communiqué which stated in relation to Okinawa that they agreed "to expedite the consultations with the view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of these specific agreements with the necessary legislative support."

In view of the Senate resolution agreed to earlier that month, I was extremely concerned that the word "support" did not necessarily mean "advice and consent" and so stated on the floor of the Senate on November 25, 1969. On that same day I addressed a letter to the President of the United States requesting a clarification. At this point in the Record, I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in its entirety.

(There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:)

NOVEMBER 25, 1969.

Hon. RICHARD M. NIXON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I would appreciate your understanding as to the responsibility of the Legislative Branch of government in the disposition of Okinawa.

It appears that Okinawa, bound by a treaty, with the advice and consent of the Senate, could only be disposed of with the advice and consent of the Senate. Accordingly, to reaffirm this requirement, the United States Senate recently enacted the Byrd Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate, to this effect. Feeling still that you have adhered to this requirement in your talks with Prime Minister Sato, Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia has just commended the language of the Communiqué between the Prime Minister and yourself. And Senator Byrd commended you for recognizing this role of the Legislative Branch. However, I have just returned from Japan and a conference with Prime Minister Sato. It is my impression that Prime Minister Sato's view is best expressed in the *Japan Times* of November 11 in the article entitled "Sato Tells Opposition U.S. Will Okay Reversion Under 1972 Formula" in which the Prime Minister discounts the necessity for ratification of any agreement affecting Okinawa. Senator Byrd interprets the language under Section 6 of the Communiqué "... with necessary legislative support" as recognizing the necessity under the Constitution for ratification by the United States Senate. On the contrary, the use of the word "support" rather than "advice and consent" leads me to conclusion that as long as substantial support is obtained you do not believe that a ratification by a two-thirds vote of the United States Senate is necessary. Specifically, I am sure you would receive substantial support for the return of Okinawa without the uninhibited right of launching combat operations from members of the Democratic leadership and the Foreign Relations Committee. But this does not constitute "advice and consent."

As a result of my discussion with our commanders in the Far East, I do not believe that we can fulfill our commitments with the restrictions of the 1972 formula. I believe our commitments in the Far East and to world peace transcend the domestic and political problems of Japan, the textile problems here at home and other considerations that have been confused into the "Okinawa question." I believe in the ultimate return of Okinawa, but not now.

Accordingly, I would like an opportunity to vote on any agreement or treaty made affecting Okinawa. Please tell me whether or not Senator Byrd is correct in his understanding.

Please tell me whether or not you believe that I, as a Senator, have this right on the Okinawa question.

Most respectfully, I am

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, on January 9, 1970, the President answered my letter and stated in part:

"Let me assure you that the Executive Branch will continue to maintain close contact with the Legislative Branch in order to work out mutually satisfactory arrangements for handling the problems of Okinawa reversion, including the appropriate form of Congressional participation in this matter."

I am reassured by this statement. Obviously, we do not seek to control the land or the people of Okinawa and we are certainly interested in maintaining friendly relations with Japan. However, I do believe in view of our commitments in the Far East the role of Okinawa is vital and I believe the Senate's role in this foreign policy issue is important.

Consequently, I am pleased that the President has erased any doubt as to the Senate's participation which should eliminate any confusion on this point on the part of the people of the United States or Japan.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from the President be printed in the Record in its entirety.

(There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:)

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, January 9, 1970.

Hon. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR HOLLINGS: Your thoughtful letter of November 25 has been given careful consideration.

With regard to Congressional action on any agreement negotiated with Japan on Okinawa, I want to say that I am fully cognizant—as is Secretary Rogers—of the implementation of the Senate vote on Senator Byrd's resolution of November 5. We intend to stay in close touch with the Congressional leadership and appropriate committees as our negotiations with Japan go along. As you know, we have already discussed Okinawa reversion with many members of the Congress and have benefited from your views.

It was because of the importance of Congressional judgment that we inserted into the Joint Communiqué of November 21 the statement that consultations with Japan would be expedited with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support.

Let me assure you that the Executive Branch will continue to maintain close contact with the Legislative Branch in order to work out mutually satisfactory arrangements for handling the problem of Okinawa reversion, including the appropriate form of Congressional participation in this matter.

You also expressed concern, as a result of your discussion with our commanders in the Far East, that we could not fulfill our commitments in the Far East with the restrictions of the 1972 formula. I want to assure you that I gave the fullest consideration to this most important aspect of my talks with the Prime Minister. He and I agreed, as the communiqué stated, that it was important for the peace and security of the Far East that the United States should be in a position to carry out fully its defense treaty obligations in the area and that reversion should not hinder the effective discharge of these obligations.

As a result of my talks with the Prime Minister, I am convinced that the arrangements we will make for reversion will not impair our ability to meet our security commitments in Asia. This belief is shared by my senior military advisers. I also feel strongly that resolution of the Okinawa

question is essential to healthy relations over the long term with a most important Asian ally, the Government and people of Japan.

I appreciate your writing to me about this important matter.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COOK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cook) is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

(The remarks of Mr. Cook when he introduced Senate Joint Resolution 89 and the ensuing debate are printed in the Record under Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the bill (S. 575) entitled "An act to authorize funds to carry out the purposes of the Appalachian Region Development Act of 1965, as amended," with amendments in the nature of a substitute.

The message also announced that the House insists upon its amendments, requests a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. BLATNIK, Mr. JONES of Alabama, Mr. GRAY, Mr. EDMONDSTON, Mr. HARSHA, Mr. SCHWENGEL, and Mr. CLEVELAND was appointed managers of the conference on the part of the House.

The message further announced that, pursuant to the provisions of section 1, Public Law 86-42, the Speaker had appointed Mr. MORSE of Massachusetts as a member of the U.S. Delegation of the Canada-U.S. Interparliamentary Group to fill the existing vacancy thereon.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. In accordance with the previous order, there will be a period for the transaction of routine morning business of not to exceed 30 minutes, with a limitation of 3 minutes on statements therein.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

秘密表示(朱印)

部数指示	発信用	執務用	備考
主 信	1	1	2
付	271		
属			

付属添付
第送日 昭和46年5月20日
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文書課長

公信表 (分類)

公信番号 半比1 第 85 号 | 公信日付 昭和46年5月19日

大臣	主官	起案 昭和46年5月19日
政務次官	アメリカ局長	
事務次官	参事官	
外務審議官	北米第一課長	
外務審議官		
官房長官		
協議先		

起案者 電話番号
安藤 2498

受信者
在沖縄 高瀬大使

発信者
愛知 大臣

写送付先

(希望発送日)

月 日

件名
公信転報(沖縄返還問題に関するパート上院)
議員の演説テキスト

GA-2 1971年5月19日 外務省 国賓書

半比1 第 85 号
昭和46年5月19日

沖縄復帰準備委員会
日本国政府代表 廣瀬

外務大臣

公信転報(沖縄返還問題に関するパート)
上院議員の演説テキスト

本件に関する下記公信(1)通を転報する。

記
71年5月30日米国 発本大臣あて 第 3328号

付属添付

GA-4 外務省

(内部の号)

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀總人電厚計

	書文會營給
調查長	參企析調
領移長	參領旅查移

ア	参地中東二 北東西
長 (メ)	参北北保 二二
中 南 番 欧 長	参一二
	参西東洋 二西東

近ア長	参書近ア
経	次経國資源
長	參貿統三万
経協長	參政技二 国一理
長	參政協規
國	參政經科
長	軍社專
情長	參道内外
文長	一二

71年7月29日19時59分
71年7月30日09時46分
米本省
米本省
発着

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使)臨時代理大使、總領事、代理

オキナワに関する米上院議員の演説

第2149号 平至

28日ピアソン(共)、29日バード(民)の両上院議員は
本会議でオキナワに関連し要旨下記の通りの演説を行なつ
た。(テキスト空送)

ピアンソ譜

(1) 日米関係は両国の政治家が力りようを發さして両国の対立を避くべき極めてデリケートな時期差しかかっている。差し当つては上院のオキナワ返かん協定の審議が問題であり、一部にこれを貿易問題と結びつける匂きがあるが、このため批准ができない事態になれば日本のオキナワナリズムをよびおこすこととなろう。よろしく日米関係の全體としての重要性の中で問題を位置づけるべきであらう。

(2) 日本は予見し得る将来ビルマから朝鮮までのアジア全域で中国に対抗し得るゆ一国であり、アジアにおける一クソン・ドクトリン成功のカギである。今後の米中接近が日本との密接な連けいをないがしろにしていゝとは考

外 務

注 意

- 電信写

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 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

れない

(3) 日米間の経済問題については、日本の輸出により困難に立たされている一部産業の声にのみを傾けるだけでなく日本が米国農産物のナンバーワン輸入国であることをわざとではならないであろう。

卷之二十一

(1) 米国はアジアで広はんな防衛義務を引きえけている。この義務は厳然と存在するものであり、義務を引きうけているからにはその遂行能力を米国は保持せねばならない。しかし日本はG N Pの1%の防衛費を費しているのみで西太平洋における防衛パートナーの役割を引受ける能力を持つに至つてない。

(2) オキナワ返かん協定は現在の米国がオキナワ基地に對しもつてゐる無制限な権限を制限し日本は米国の行動に拒否権をもつこととなろう。

私はオキナワが究極的には日本に返されることに反対しないが、米国が西太平洋に防衛義務をもちかつ日本の防衛努力が足りない現在は返かんに適当な時期とは思われない。もし協定を上院が承認するのならばすべからくアジアの防衛義務をけい減すべきである。

(了)

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外務省

秘密表示(朱印)

部数指示	登信用	執務用	備考
主 付	1 0	1	
副	1		
付属添付			

文書課長 

公信案 (分類)

公信番号	米北1 第 73 号	公信日付	昭和46年5月10日
大臣	主管	起案	昭和46年5月8日
政務次官	アメリカ局長		
事務次官	参事官		
外務審議官	北米第一課長		
外務審議官		起案者	小田野
官房長		電話番号	2498
協議先			
受信者	吉田公義外務大臣	発信者	參知外務大臣
在沖縄 高瀬大使			
写送付先		(希望発送日)	月 日
件名	沖縄返還問題に関するハド上院議員 公信転報 (ウ演説テキスト)		

GA-2 10 129 外務省 回観番号

米北1 第 73 号
昭和46年5月10日

沖縄復帰準備委員会
日本国政府代表 殿

外務大臣

沖縄返還問題に関するハド上院議員
公信転報 (ウ演説テキスト)

本件に関する下記公信(1)通を転報する。
記
46年4月30日在米大発本大臣 あて 政 第3328号
付属添付

GA-4 外務省

2195

SPEECH ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE, THURSDAY, JULY 29, 1971

History is a great teacher, but it teaches nothing to those who will not heed it.

I think that if we will take the time to study the history of the foreign relations of the United States since World War II, it will be possible for this Nation to arrive at a balanced and rational policy toward the rest of the world.

From shortly after the end of World War II to the 1960's, this Nation engaged in a far-flung enterprise of defending freedom everywhere in the world. We built a globe-circling chain of alliances.

As a result, we came to have mutual defense agreements with 44 different nations. And of course, the word "mutual" was merely a diplomatic way of saying that the United States had undertaken the defense of another country.

In fact, if not in name, America became the policeman of the world.

Recently, because of the frustrations of the war in Vietnam, there has been a sharp reaction against the responsibilities of global defense. Some advocate a new brand of isolationism, or drastic reductions on U.S. defense, or both.

In my view, we must maintain a strong defense - but strike a balance between isolationism and over-extension.

What have the last 25 years taught us?

I think we should have learned at least three major lessons from our experiences during the quarter-century since World War II.

First, we cannot afford to put our trust in the good intentions of the Russians. From the Berlin Blockade of 1948 to the Czechoslovakian invasion 20 years later, Moscow's record has been one of hostility and bad faith.

Second, we must maintain a strong defense. Communist leaders respect strength and despise weakness. If we permit ourselves to become weak, we shall invite Communist aggression and domination. It is primarily the threat of Russian aggression which forces the United States to spend billions on defense.

Third, we must set realistic limits on American involvement in the affairs of distant lands. It does not strengthen us, but rather weakens us, if this Nation stretches its forces too thin in an effort to influence the destinies of countries all around the world.

Our foreign and military policy should be governed strictly by the real national interests of the United States, and not by a misguided effort to shape the world in our own image.

But we must recognize that the task of defending our real interests requires an expenditure of resources.

We dare not blindly slash away at the defense budget of this Nation. We must cut the fat, but not the muscle.

I do not for a moment deny that there has been waste and mismanagement in some military programs. And I believe that the Congress must continue -- and indeed, increase -- its vigilance over the military budget, to be sure that the huge cost overruns of the past are ended.

Moreover, the American government found

the following sufficiently inconvenient:

they would

"Well, Hanoi has pro-

mised to stop

mandates

"They argue that we are finished

they're

"The SALT talks, the President Nixon's projected visit to Peking,

last week

both are being hailed as promising a more peaceful era.

They would try to maintain at least an

underground

more, the

I join in the hope for world peace. It is a cherished dream of

mankind. But I also would sound a note of caution. We shall be head

from

ing into serious trouble, if we permit our hopes, rather than our real

istic assessment of the world situation, to dictate our defense poli

cies.

None of us knows just what are Communist Russia's intentions;

we do have evidence, however, as to her capabilities. It is on her

capabilities that we must judge our defense needs.

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My legislation is simple in structure. It would amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to provide that the President could not prohibit imports of a strategic material from a free world country if the importation of the same material is permitted from a Communist-dominated country.

I do not believe that it is logical for the United States to continue to be dependent upon Communist Russia for a material vital to our national defense.

I believe it is imperative that this question come to a vote in the Senate. I shall try to insure that the Senate is given a chance to register its will on this vital question.

The second decision to which I referred -- concerning the reversion of the island of Okinawa -- is also of great consequence.

An agreement has been signed providing for the reversion of the island of Okinawa to Japanese control.

Okinawa is our most strategic base in the Western Pacific.

We now have vast commitments in East Asia and the Far Pacific. We are the principal partner in the SEATO alliance, and we are committed to the defense of South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.

I am not convinced that we ought to have such extensive commitments. As I said earlier, the role of world policeman is not an appropriate one for this Nation.

However, as of July, 1971, these commitments do exist.

And since they do exist, it seems to me only logical that the United States should retain the capability of carrying them out.

The issue of the reversion of Okinawa is an emotional political question in Japan. That is the reason for the haste with which the United States and Japan have proceeded to draw up the pending agreement.

But the Japanese, who are determined to resume control of Okinawa, are spending only about 1 percent of their gross national product on defense. There has been talk of increasing this amount, but not to the extent that Japan could assume the role of a partner in the defense of the Western Pacific.

The United States should retain control of its strategic military base on Okinawa -- especially since Japan is not a real partner in the defense of the area. After all, it is Japan's area and not ours.

The Senate will be called upon to vote on this question in the near future.

The agreement for the reversion of Okinawa modifies the Treaty of Peace with Japan approved after World War II. Under the Treaty of Peace, the United States has the unrestricted right to Okinawa.

Under the agreement recently worked out between President Nixon and Premier Sato of Japan, the United States would relinquish this unrestricted right. Japan would have a veto over our actions.

I am not opposed to the eventual return of Okinawa to Japanese control. But I doubt that the present time -- with vast American commitments in the Western Pacific, and no significant defense effort by Japan -- is the appropriate time for reversion.

If the Senate should approve the treaty, then I think careful consideration should be given to prompt action toward reducing our Asian commitments.

In the long run, these commitments should be reduced anyway. But without Okinawa, I believe the United States would have to move more quickly toward reducing its Asian responsibilities.

The issues which this Nation faces in the field of foreign and military policy are exceedingly complex.

If we are to solve these difficult problems, we must use commonsense.

All of us must work and hope for world peace, but we dare not pin our national security on the belief that we have reached that great goal.

We must maintain a strong national defense -- or we shall run great risk of losing our freedom.

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Statement by:

Senator James B. Pearson (81-88)

July 28, 1971

US-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Mr. President, relations between the United States and Japan may be entering their most delicate period since the end of the American occupation. The delicacy arises over the juxtaposition of economic and political controversies at a time when long-term relations between the two great democracies are in at a cross roads. Only the greatest sensitivity and statesmanship on both sides of the Pacific will prevent a disastrous confrontation damaging to fundamental interests of both nations.

The United States and Japan have a golden opportunity to firmly establish a mutually beneficial relationship in Asia and the Pacific based upon a concert of political and economic interests, but this relationship could founder in the next few months if politicians and statesmen on both sides of the Pacific do not act with the upmost restraint and responsibility.

The immediate issue which could provoke a dramatic confrontation is Senate consideration of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty signed by the President in June of this year. In this country, some may attempt to link the return of Okinawa and eventual withdrawal of American forces to changes in Japanese export practices and import restrictions. In Japan, for understandable reasons, the return of Okinawa has become a highly nationalistic issue. A failure to ratify the treaty, or to ratify with conditions relating to trade matters, could provoke potent forces of nationalism in Japan -- forces which could shape US-Japanese relations for years to come.

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Confrontation now would be doubly tragic as signs of changes in Japanese policies hold out some promise for settlement of the most difficult trade problems.

At this juncture of US-Japanese relations, it would be wise to place some of the relatively minor disagreements we have with Japan in the perspective of the overall importance of US-Japanese relations. This is not to dismiss the serious individual problems caused by any economic dislocations resulting from Japanese imports, rather, it is to measure those problems against the consequences of disruption of cordial relations with the Japanese.

It is not possible, in a short statement, to adequately examine the strategic importance of US-Japanese relations. In brief, the Japanese will be leaders in Asia for the foreseeable future. Japan is the only Asian nation which can balance the power of the Peoples Republic of China on the small nations of Asia from Korea to Burma.

It is not difficult to imagine the leaders of the small nations of the area balancing Chinese influence and pressure against Japanese economic and political power. The independence of these small nations, for which so much American blood and treasure has been expended, is undeniably important to American security.

The Japanese will, however, need American assistance to carry out this important strategic function; and provided cordial relations are maintained, will seek and receive assistance as needed. In short, the Japanese are a key to the successful operation of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia.

Although they may be somewhat concerned about the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking, it is difficult to believe

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that any future rapprochement with the Peoples Republic will supersede the necessity of maintaining close ties with the other Asian power, Japan.

Political and economic relations between Asian policies of the US and Japan could be found in coordinated foreign assistance programs. A large proportion of American foreign assistance has been spent assisting Asian nations maintain political integrity and promote economic development. The continuation of these efforts is important to both the United States and Japan. While the political interests of the two Allies are not identical, they are certainly in enough accord to permit the coordination of aid efforts.

This would have economic and political advantages for both nations.

Economically, an increase in Japanese development loans and grants, as opposed to the export-oriented assistance now rendered, could relieve some of the balance of payments strains American aid now places on our economy. Relief of American balance of payments difficulties has definite benefits for the Japanese.

In addition to the desirability of increased grants and loans from Japan, the Japanese may well be able to operate technical assistance programs more easily than Americans. They should have a better grasp of cultural requirements of technical aid -- problems which all too often limit the effectiveness of American programs -- and should, as Asians, be less conspicuous and objectionable in war-ravaged Southeast Asia than Americans.

Increased Japanese efforts in the development assistance field could offset some of the American criticisms of low levels of Japanese efforts in defense spending. At this time Japan spends about .8 percent of her GNP on defense while the US spends many times that amount on American forces

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A good case can be made for the Japanese assuming a larger portion of development assistance efforts on both political and economic grounds. For reasons stated earlier, they may well be able to operate more effectively in the Asian cultures than Americans, while Americans -- the only power really capable of strategic defense of the Pacific -- are able to supply men and material for defense.

For domestic political reasons in both the US and Japan, this division of labors may well be advantageous. We can all understand the reluctance on the part of many Japanese to develop military forces capable of supporting their Asian allies -- forces which would be considered offensive forces. A number of small Asian nations would also be uncomfortable with such a development.

On the other hand, foreign assistance has not been unpopular in Japan. Although it has been, exclusive of war reparations, mostly on hard terms and tied to export expansion, the Japanese have indicated that they will triple their development assistance efforts in the next years. By contrast, foreign aid funds are extremely hard to come by in the United States. Congress grudgingly votes money each year, and in decreasing amounts at that. Defense funds are, however, somewhat easier to secure, especially when the administration can actually demonstrate a need.

By dividing and coordinating our efforts in aid and defense, the US and Japan could reinforce mutually advantageous policies throughout Asia and the Pacific.

For individual Americans and Japanese, somewhat esoteric international policies do not have the direct personal impact of economic relations between nations. Two hundred and one million Americans and one hundred and

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four million Japanese carry on a trade valued at \$10.5 billion 1970. Furthermore, this trade has been increasing at a fantastic rate for the last five years and the prospects for continued increases are excellent.

A great deal of verbage has been expended on trade between the United States and Japan. No one denies the fact that the US has run a sizeable deficit in bilateral trade with Japan in the last few years. It is, however, imperative to consider the implications of the return to mercantilism advocated by some as a cure for the increase of Japanese imports.

It is, perhaps, necessary to make the simple economists' point that foreign nations have to sell goods in the United States to earn the dollars to buy American goods. In more specific terms, Japanese must sell radios, cameras, and even textiles, if they are going to be able to continue to buy wheat, corn, grain sorghum, and other commodities from Americans.

Japanese as much as Americans, have a stake in seeking to restore a balance to the trade between the two nations. Japanese mercantilism is as futile as American mercantilism; it does the Japanese little good to continue to hold large foreign currency reserves especially while the dollar continues decrease in value due to inflation. The Japanese, for their part, are evidently beginning to understand the urgent need for changes in their import regulations, export practices, investment regulations and the value of the yen -- perhaps the most important element of all.

Japan is the United States' second largest single market for all export products and it is the largest market of American agricultural exports. The United States is Japan's largest foreign market. The value of US exports of agricultural commodities to Japan rose to a record \$1.2 billion in calendar year

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1970, a 30 percent increase over 1969. This trade represented a 110 percent increase over the average value of US agricultural exports to Japan during the 1965-1969 period.

These statistics are cited to indicate the dangers faced by American exporters, especially American farmers, if Japanese-American trade is disrupted because of political or economic disputes. This is not to imply that Japanese import restrictions, export practices and yen value are entirely acceptable; certainly both sides need to negotiate changes in trading practices. I do want to point out the magnitude and delicacy of the problem -- especially for those whose incomes depend on exports to Japan at a time when we hear almost exclusively about those whose incomes may be jeopardized by Japanese imports.

At this time, the interests of a relatively small number of persons adversely affected by imports from Japan cannot be allowed to override the national security and economic well-being of the majority of the American people -- and that is precisely the danger which could arise from attempts to use the Okinawa Reversion treaty as a bargaining device to secure trade concessions from Japan.

We cannot, of course, ignore the serious difficulties encountered by those whose jobs and investments are threatened by foreign competition. Greater utilization of adjustment assistance benefits for workers and businesses affected by increased imports is the most sensible short-term remedy available to the United States. Adjustment assistance enables the entire society to bear the costs of retraining and reinvestment of resources displaced by imports. This is only fair, as the entire society benefits from the lower costs

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of the imported goods. In this way we adjust to competition from abroad internally, and avoid the trade wars and other international dangers of escalating protective tariffs.

I have tried to examine, however briefly, the importance of the maintenance of cordial relations between the United States and Japan and to point out that the next few months may be an extremely critical period for the formation of long-term relations between the two nations.³ Both nations have too much at stake to allow relatively minor, but solvable, controversies to disrupt political and economic relations in their formative months. Now is a time when statesmen must become politicians and politicians become statesmen if we are to avoid tragic disruption of our close ties with Japan.

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検問班に連絡ありたい。

電 信 写 60

大政事外儀官
務務 典房
次次
臣官宣審長長
儀總入電厚計
書文会當給
調査長
外務大臣殿
領移
參領旅查移長

総番号(TA) 58118
71年11月8日17時25分 米国
71年11月9日07時36分 本省 発着米北1

牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ返かん協定(バード議員の演説)

第3632号 平 大至急
往電第3628号に關レ
ハリー・バード上院議員が8日の上院本会議において、オキナワ返かん協定に反対する演説を行なつたところ、右テキスト別電の通り。

(ア)

ア 参地中東
長 東西
米 参北北保
中 南
南 参一二
審 欧 参西東洋
長 西東
三二

近ア長
經 次總經國資
長 參貿統
經協
表 參政技一理
企二
條 參條協規
長 国
國 參政經科
長 軍社專
情員
道內外
文
二

(午葉米北1課長)連絡、9日08:40)

外務省

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電 信 写 1500

大政事外儀官
務務 典房
次次
臣官宣審長長
儀總入電厚計
書文会當給
調査長
外務大臣殿
領移
參領旅查移長

総番号(TA) 58129
71年11月08日17時25分 米国
71年11月09日08時40分 本省 発着米北1

牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄返還協定(バード議員の演説)

第3633号 平 大至急
往電第3632号別電。

(以下別紙英文)

ア 参地中東
長 東北
米 参北北保
中 南
南 参一二
審 欧 参西東洋
長 西東
三二

近ア長
經 次總經國資
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表 參政技一理
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長 軍社專
情員
道內外
文
二

(午葉米北1課長)連絡、9日08:40)

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電 信 写

MR. PRESIDENT, ON TUESDAY THE SENATE WILL BE CALLED UPON TO RATIFY OR REJECT THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF JAPAN.

THIS PROPOSED AGREEMENT WOULD BE A CHANGE IN THE TERMS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE OF 1951 BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES.

UNDER TERMS OF THE PEACE TREATY THE UNITED STATES HAS UNRESTRICTED USE OF MILITARY BASES ON OKINAWA.

TWO YEARS AGO, WHEN OFFICIAL DISCUSSION BEGAN CONCERNING THE PROPOSED REVERSION OF OKINAWA, I SPONSORED LEGISLATION THAT CALLED UPON THE PRESIDENT TO SUBMIT ANY AGREEMENT CHANGING THE STATUS OF OKINAWA TO THE SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT. THIS LEGISLATION WAS APPROVED BY THE SENATE, AND NOW THE QUESTION OF RATIFICATION BY THE SENATE MUST BE DECIDED.

AFTER LONG CONSIDERATION, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT I CANNOT SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT FOR REVERSION OF OKINAWA, WHICH PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE JAPAN A VETO OVER THE USE BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS FACILITIES ON OKINAWA.

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電 信 写

IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO ORGANIZE OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENT. I WISH, HOWEVER, TO MAKE MY OWN VIEWS KNOWN.

I SHALL VOTE AGAINST THE PROPOSAL, EVEN IF I BE THE ONLY SENATOR TO CAST SUCH A VOTE.

I AM AMONG THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BECOME OVERCOMMITTED AROUND THE WORLD. WE HAVE MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS WITH 44 DIFFERENT NATIONS.

MORE THAN 25 YEARS AFTER THE END OF WORLD WAR II, THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINS 310,000 MEN IN EUROPE, INCLUDING THE 2ND FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEMI-COLON AND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC, THE UNITED STATES HAS 370,000 TROOPS ON DUTY.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES CAN CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO CARRY SO HEAVY A MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT OTHER NATIONS MAKE A GREATER CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR OWN SECURITY.

BUT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, OUR MILITARY COMMITMENTS ARE A FACT.

AMONG THE AREAS IN WHICH WE ARE MOST HEAVILY COMMITTED IS ASIA. NOT ONLY IS THE UNITED STATES ENGAGED IN A SHOOTING WAR IN VIETNAM, BUT THE NATION

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電 信 写

IS ALSO COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF SOUTH KOREA, TAIWAN, JAPAN, THE PHILIPPINES, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, PAKISTAN AND THAILAND,.

WE MUST VIEW THE OKINAWA PROPOSAL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

FIRST, IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT IS THE 1951 TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN WHICH CONFERS UPON THE UNITED STATES THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF MILITARY BASES ON THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA.

THE TREATY OF PEACE IS ENTIRELY SEPARATE FROM THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY OF 1960 BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. THE TWO AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED.

AGREEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES TO TURN OVER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL,

OF OKINAWA TO THE JAPANESE IS A CHANGE IN THE TREATY OF PEACE. IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY.

THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO THE CONTROL OF JAPAN WOULD INVOLVE SURRENDER BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE OKINAWA BASES. NO ONE DISPUTES THAT STATEMENT.

I THINK THAT IN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT THE REVERSION AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED, MEMBERS OF

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電 信 写

THE SENATE SHOULD GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE EXTENSIVE DEFENSE COMMITMENTS WHICH WE HAVE IN ASIA.

WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT ALL OF OUR ASIAN COMMITMENTS WERE UNDERTAKEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT UNRESTRICTED USE OF OKINAWA WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES.

CAN WE AFFORD TO GO ON GUARANTEEING THE DEFENSE OF SO MANY ASIAN NATIONS, IF WE ARE TO SURRENDER AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE FAR EAST?

OUR MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY WITH JAPAN, FOR EXAMPLE, IS SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL ON 1 YEAR'S NOTICE. SHOULD IT BE CONTINUED INDEFINITELY?

THE STATE DEPARTMENT FEELS IT SHOULD. I QUESTION THAT.

WE HAVE COMMITMENTS TO 10 ASIAN NATIONS UNDER THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT OF 1954. THIS TREATY ALSO IS SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL BY ANY PARTY ON 1 YEAR'S NOTICE. CAN WE CONTINUE THESE COMMITMENTS INDEFINITELY?

THE SATO GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN HAS ASSURED THE UNITED STATES THAT IT WILL COOPERATE IN PERMITTING

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電 信 写

THIS NATION TO USE OKINAWA IN ORDER TO FULFILL OUR OBLIGATIONS. THOSE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO FAVOR HAVING OKINAWA REVERT TO JAPAN PUT GREAT STRESS ON THIS.

BUT ONCE REVERSION IS ACCOMPLISHED, THE FINAL DECISION ON THE USE OF OKINAWA IN EACH CONTINGENCY WILL REST NOT WITH THE UNITED STATES, BUT WITH JAPAN - WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE UNDER THE RULE OF THE SATO GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME. IN FACT, SATO VERY LIKELY WILL BE OUT OF OFFICE IN A MATTER OF MONTHS.

THESE, I FEEL, ARE SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS. I WANT TO SEE OUR COMMITMENTS IN ASIA REDUCED. BUT NO PROPOSAL HAS BEEN MADE TO REDUCE OUR COMMITMENTS.

THE ONLY PROPOSAL IS THAT WE VOLUNTARILY GIVE UP THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT TO USE OUR GREATEST MILITARY BASE COMPLEX IN THE FAR PACIFIC.

JAPAN IS SEEKING, AND WOULD BE GETTING, CONTROL OVER OUR MILITARY BASE. AT THE SAME TIME, JAPAN WOULD HAVE A PLEDGE FROM THE UNITED STATES TO GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF JAPAN.

TO STATE IT ANOTHER WAY, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

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電 信 写

WANTS THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF JAPAN SEMICOLON TO CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF OKINAWA SEMICOLON TO CONTINUE TO SPEND HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS ON OKINAWA - DORUJIRUSI 260 MILLION LAST YEAR. BUT IT SEEKS TO PUT RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTE 42 PERCENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA.

JAPAN WANTS A VETO OVER ANY U.S. ACTION AFFECTING OKINAWA. IT SPECIFICALLY WANTS THE RIGHT TO DENY TO THE UNITED STATES THE AUTHORITY TO STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA AND WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR CONSULTATION BEFORE OUR MILITARY FORCES BASED THERE COULD BE USED.

IN OTHER WORDS, THE UNITED STATES NO LONGER WOULD HAVE UNRESTRICTED USE OF OKINAWA.

OUR ROLE AS THE DEFENDER OF THE FAR EAST HAS ENABLED JAPAN TO AVOID THE BURDEN OF REARMAMENT - ONLY ABOUT 1 PERCENT OF HER GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS SPENT ON DEFENSE - AND THUS CONCENTRATE ON EXPANDING AND MODERNIZING ITS DOMESTIC ECONOMY.

IN DEFENSE MATTERS, THE JAPANESE HAVE GOTTEN A FREE RIDE. AS A DIRECT RESULT, JAPAN'S PRESENT

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電 信 写

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT RANKS THIRD IN THE WORLD,
BEHIND ONLY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

WHILE THE PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN GIVES THE
UNITED STATES UNRESTRICTED RIGHTS ON OKINAWA, THE
1960 MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY PROVIDES THAT OUR
MILITARY FORCES BASED IN JAPAN CANNOT BE USED WITH-
OUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

UNDER THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE SENATE MUST SOON
VOTE ON, JAPAN WOULD HAVE A SIMILAR RIGHT OF
CONSULTATION WHICH REGARD TO AMERICAN FORCES ON
OKINAWA.

WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO
GUARANTEE THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN AND THE VAST AREAS OF
THE WEST PACIFIC AND SOUTHEAST ASIA IS OPEN TO
QUESTION.

BUT AT THE MOMENT, THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED
TO THE DEFENSE OF THESE REGIONS. AND IT IS ONLY
COMMONSENSE, IN MY VIEW, THAT SO LONG AS THESE
COMMITMENTS CONTINUE IN FORCE, THEN IT IS ONLY
LOGICAL AND RESPONSIBLE THAT THIS COUNTRY RETAIN THE
UNRESTRICTED USE OF ITS GREATEST BASE IN THE WEST
PACIFIC, NAMELY OKINAWA.

I AGREE THAT EVENTUALLY OKINAWA AND THE RYUKYU

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電 信 写

ISLANDS WILL REVERT TO CONTROL OF JAPAN. BUT I
THINK IT UNWISE TO TURN OVER SUCH CONTROL AT A TIME
WHEN THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED SO DEEPLY
TO THE DEFENSE OF ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC.

IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY, IN MY OPINION, FOR THE
UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE ITS COMMITMENTS TO THE
DEFENSE OF ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC WHILE AT THE
SAME TIME GIVING UP THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE
MILITARY COMPLEX ON OKINAWA.

IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT PUBLIC ATTENTION BE
FOCUSED ON THIS ISSUE OF UNRESTRICTED USE OF OUR
BASES ON OKINAWA.

I SPEAK AS ONE WHO IS NOT SYMPATHETIC TO OUR DEEP
INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, ONE WHO FROM THE
BEGINNING REGARDED IT AS AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT TO
BECOME INVOLVED IN A GROUND WAR THERE.

I SPEAK AS ONE WHO QUESTIONS THE WISDOM OF OUR
COUNTRY'S COMMITTING ITSELF TO MUTUAL DEFENSE
AGREEMENTS WITH 44 DIFFERENT NATIONS.

I SPEAK AS ONE WHO FEELS THAT WE CANNOT LOGICALLY
BE THE WORLD'S POLICEMAN.

IF BY THE ACT OF GRANTING JAPAN ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTROL OVER OKINAWA, THE UNITED STATES COULD INSURE

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電 信 写

A MULTINATIONAL DEFENSE STRUCTURE IN THE FAR EAST, WITH INCREASED PARTICIPATION BY JAPAN - IF THIS ACTION WOULD RELIEVE OUR COUNTRY OF A MEASURE OF ITS HEAVY INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES - THEN, I WOULD SUPPORT A REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPANESE CONTROL.

BUT THIS IS NOT THE CASE.

QUITE THE CONTRARY. SURRENDER OF CONTROL OVER OKINAWA WOULD ONLY MAKE MORE DIFFICULT OUR ROLE IN THE PACIFIC.

IN FACT, SHOULD THE TREATY FOR REVERSION OF OKINAWA BE APPROVED, THEN I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE ITS COMMITMENTS IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC AREAS.

IF THE UNITED STATES CHOOSES TO GIVE UP THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT OF USE OF ITS BASES ON OKINAWA, THEN I BELIEVE THIS ACTION WILL BE AN APPROPRIATE SIGNAL FOR THE REDUCTION OF COMMITMENTS IN THIS REGION.

SURELY WE CANNOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO CARRY THE CHIEF BURDEN FOR DEFENSE OF ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC WHILE GIVING UP THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF OUR MOST STRATEGIC BASE.

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IN THE LONG RUN, I BELIEVE WE MUST REDUCE OUR ASIAN COMMITMENTS.

WHEN THIS HAS BEEN DONE, THEN IT WOULD BE PROPER TO TURN OVER OKINAWA TO THE CONTROL OF JAPAN.

BUT IN THE SHORT RUN, THE COMMITMENTS OF THIS NATION IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC AREAS REMAIN IN FORCE.

AND SO LONG AS THIS IS THE CASE, I CANNOT SUPPORT AN AGREEMENT WHICH SACRIFICES THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES TO USE ITS BASES ON THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA.

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