

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 米国関係
（議員等発言(2)（講演、記者会見等）

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(5) バード上院議員演説 (昭四六・四・二三、同七・二九、同十・八)

アメリカ局長

参事官

米通付 公信

北米米一課

政 第 3328 号	昭和46年4月20日
外 務 大 臣 殿	在 米 牛 場 大 使

引用(来)(往)公信・電信番号 4月28日付往電才1160号

送付資料

沖縄返還問題に關するハート上院議員の演説テキスト。

- 郵政
- 航空
- 海陸
- 船舶
- 科学技術
- 連絡
- 謝
- 力
- 局

山本 (Mm) 5/18



(希望配布先)

付属添付 付属空便(行) 付属空便(DP) 付属船便(貨)
 (郵)

本信写送付先 (別添とも)

Subsequently, President Nixon met with Premier Eisaku Sato of Japan on November 19, 20, and 21, 1969, "to exchange views on the present international situation and on other matters of mutual interest to the United States and Japan." On November 21, 1969, they issued a joint communique which stated in relation to Okinawa that they agreed "to expedite the consultations with the view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of these specific agreements with the necessary legislative support."

In view of the Senate resolution agreed to earlier that month, I was extremely concerned that the word "support" did not necessarily mean "advice and consent" and so stated on the floor of the Senate on November 25, 1969. On that same day I addressed a letter to the President of the United States requesting a clarification. At this point in the Record, I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed in its entirety.

(There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:)

NOVEMBER 25, 1969.

HON. RICHARD M. NIXON,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I would appreciate your understanding as to the responsibility of the Legislative Branch of government in the disposition of Okinawa.

It appears that Okinawa, bound by a treaty, with the advice and consent of the Senate, could only be disposed of with the advice and consent of the Senate. Accordingly, to reaffirm this requirement, the United States Senate recently enacted the Byrd Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate, to this effect. Feeling still that you have adhered to this requirement in your talks with Prime Minister Sato, Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia has just commended the language of the Communique between the Prime Minister and yourself. And Senator Byrd commended you for recognizing this role of the Legislative Branch. However, I have just returned from Japan and a conference with Prime Minister Sato. It is my impression that Prime Minister Sato's view is best expressed in the *Japan Times* of November 11 in the article entitled "Sato Tells Opposition U.S. Will Okay Reversion Under 1972 Formula" in which the Prime Minister discounts the necessity for ratification of any agreement affecting Okinawa. Senator Byrd interprets the language under Section 6 of the Communique "with necessary legislative support" as recognizing the necessity under the Constitution for ratification by the United States Senate. On the contrary, the use of the word "support" rather than "advice and consent" leads me to conclusion that as long as substantial support is obtained you do not believe that a ratification by a two-thirds vote of the United States Senate is necessary. Specifically, I am sure you would receive substantial support for the return of Okinawa without the uninhibited right of launching combat operations from members of the Democratic leadership and the Foreign Relations Committee. But this does not constitute "advice and consent."

As a result of my discussion with our commanders in the Far East, I do not believe that we can fulfill our commitments with the restrictions of the 1972 formula. I believe our commitments in the Far East and to world peace transcend the domestic and political problems of Japan, the textile problems here at home and other considerations that have been confused into the "Okinawa question." I believe in the ultimate return of Okinawa, but not now.

Accordingly, I would like an opportunity to vote on any agreement or treaty made affecting Okinawa. Please tell me whether or not Senator Byrd is correct in his understanding.

Please tell me whether or not you believe that I, as a Senator, have this right on the Okinawa question.

Most respectfully, I am

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, on January 9, 1970, the President answered my letter and stated in part:

"Let me assure you that the Executive Branch will continue to maintain close contact with the Legislative Branch in order to work out mutually satisfactory arrangements for handling the problems of Okinawa reversion, including the appropriate form of Congressional participation in this matter."

I am reassured by this statement. Obviously, we do not seek to control the land or the people of Okinawa and we are certainly interested in maintaining friendly relations with Japan. However, I do believe in view of our commitments in the Far East the role of Okinawa is vital and I believe the Senate's role in this foreign policy issue is important. Consequently, I am pleased that the President has erased any doubt as to the Senate's participation which should eliminate any confusion on this point on the part of the people of the United States or Japan.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter from the President be printed in the Record in its entirety.

(There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:)

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, January 9, 1970.

HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR HOLLINGS: Your thoughtful letter of November 25 has been given careful consideration.

With regard to Congressional action on any agreement negotiated with Japan on Okinawa, I want to say that I am fully cognizant—as is Secretary Rogers—of the implication of the Senate vote on Senator Byrd's resolution of November 5. We intend to stay in close touch with the Congressional leadership and appropriate committees as our negotiations with Japan go along. As you know, we have already discussed Okinawa reversion with many members of the Congress and have benefited from your views.

It was because of the importance of Congressional judgment that we inserted into the Joint Communique of November 21 the statement that consultations with Japan would be expedited with a view to accomplishing the reversion during 1972 subject to the conclusion of specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support.

Let me assure you that the Executive Branch will continue to maintain close contact with the Legislative Branch in order to work out mutually satisfactory arrangements for handling the problem of Okinawa reversion, including the appropriate form of Congressional participation in this matter.

You also expressed concern, as a result of your discussion with our commanders in the Far East, that we could not fulfill our commitments in the Far East with the restrictions of the 1972 formula. I want to assure you that I gave the fullest consideration to this most important aspect of my talks with the Prime Minister. He and I agreed, as the communique stated, that it was important for the peace and security of the Far East that the United States should be in a position to carry out fully its defense treaty obligations in the area and that reversion should not hinder the effective discharge of these obligations.

As a result of my talks with the Prime Minister, I am convinced that the arrangements we will make for reversion will not impair our ability to meet our security commitments in Asia. This belief is shared by my senior military advisers. I also feel strongly that resolution of the Okinawa

question is essential to healthy relations over the long term with a most important Asian ally, the Government and people of Japan.

I appreciate your writing to me about this important matter.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

QUORUM CALL

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. COOK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Cook) is recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes.

(The remarks of Mr. Cook when he introduced Senate Joint Resolution 89 and the ensuing debate are printed in the Record under Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the bill (S. 575) entitled "An act to authorize funds to carry out the purposes of the Appalachian Region Development Act of 1965, as amended," with amendments in the nature of a substitute.

The message also announced that the House insists upon its amendments, requests a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. BLATNIK, Mr. JONES of Alabama, Mr. GRAY, Mr. EDMONDSTON, Mr. HARSHA, Mr. SCHWENGL, and Mr. CLEVELAND was appointed managers of the conference on the part of the House.

The message further announced that, pursuant to the provisions of section 1, Public Law 86-42, the Speaker had appointed Mr. Morse of Massachusetts as a member of the U.S. Delegation of the Canada-U.S. Interparliamentary Group to fill the existing vacancy thereon.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. In accordance with the previous order, there will be a period for the transaction of routine morning business of not to exceed 30 minutes, with a limitation of 3 minutes on statements therein.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

秘密表示(朱印)

部 数 指 示	発 信 用	執 務 用	備 考
主 信	1	1	2
付 属	2071		
	付属添付		

発送日 昭和46年5月20日
 処理日
 発信タイプ 校表

文書課長 (分項) 公 信 案

公 信 番 号 米比1 第 85 号 公 信 日 付 昭和46年5月19日

大 臣 政 務 次 官 事 務 次 官 外 務 審 議 官 外 務 審 議 官 官 房 長	主 管 アメリカ局長 参 事 官 北米才一課長	起 案 昭 和 46 年 5 月 18 日 起 案 者 安藤 電 話 番 号 2498
協 議 先		
受 信 者 在 沖 繩 高 瀬 大 使	発 信 者 愛 知 大 臣	
写 送 付 先	(希 望 発 送 日)	
件 名 公 信 転 報 (沖 繩 返 還 内 題 に 関 す る パ ー ト 上 院) 議 員 の 演 説 テ キ ス ト		

GA-2 19 外務省 198 回覧番号

米比1 第 85 号
 昭和46年5月19日

沖縄復帰準備委員会
 日本国政府代表 巖

外 務 大 臣

公 信 転 報 (沖 繩 返 還 内 題 に 関 す る パ ー ト)
 上 院 議 員 の 演 説 テ キ ス ト

本 件 に 関 す る 下 記 公 信 (1) 通 を 転 報 す る。

記

71年⁴月30日米回 発 本 大 臣 あ て 第 3328 号

付 属 添 付

GA-4

外 務 省

(部の内 号)

大政事外外儀官
務務典房
次次典房
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会営給
調査長領移長
参企析調
参領旅査移

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

71年7月29日 19時59分
71年7月30日 09時46分

米 国 発 着
本 省

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワに関する米上院議員の演説

第2149号 平 至急

28日ピアソン(共) 29日バード(民)の両上院議員は本会議でオキナワに関連し要旨下記の通りの演説を行なった。(テキスト空送)

1. ピアソン議員

(1) 日米関係は両国の政治家が力りようを發きして両国の対立を避くべき極めてデリケートな時期差しかかっている。差し当つては上院のオキナワ返かん協定の審議が問題であり、一部にこれを貿易問題と結びつける暇が必るが、このため批准ができない事態になれば日本のナショナリズムをよびおこすこととなろう。よろしく日米関係の全体としての重要性の中で問題を位置づけるべきであろう。

(2) 日本は予見し得る将来ビルマから朝鮮までのアジア全域で中国に対抗し得る唯一国であり、アジアにおけるクソン・ドクトリン成功のカギである。今後の米中接近日本との密接な連けいをないがしろにしていとは考

外務省

ア 地中東
長 北東西
参北北保
中南
参一
参西東洋
西東

近ア長 参書近ア
経次総経国資源
長 参質統三万
経協長 参政技二
参国一理
参参政規
長 参政経科
軍社專
情参道内外
長 文長 一

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

れない。

(3) 日米間の経済問題については、日本の輸出により困難に立たされている一部産業の声にみみを傾けるだけでなく日本が米国農産物のナンバーワン輸入国であることをわすれてはならないであろう。

2. バード議員

(1) 米国はアジアで広はんな防衛義務を引きえている。この義務は厳然と存在するものであり、義務を引きうけているからにはその遂行能力を米国は保持せねばならない。しかるに日本はGNPの/%の防衛費を費しているのみで西太平洋における防衛パートナーの役割を引受ける能力を持つに至っていない。

(2) オキナワ返かん協定は現在の米国がオキナワ基地に対してもっている無制限な権限を制限し日本は米国の行動に拒否権をも持つこととなろう。

私はオキナワが究極的には日本に返されることに反対しないが米国が西太平洋に防衛義務をもちかつ日本の防衛努力が足りない現在は返かんに適当な時期とは思われない。もし協定を上院が承認するのならばすべからくアジアの防衛義務をけい減すべきである。

(了)

外務省

秘密表示(朱印)

部数指示	発信用	執務用	備考
主信	1	0	1
付	付属添付		
属			

発送日	昭和46年5月11日
処理日	
発信	校

文書課長 (印) 公 信 案 (分)

公信番号	米北1 第 73 号	公信日付	昭和46年5月10日
大 臣	主 管	起案	昭和46年5月8日
政務次官		起案者	小田野 2998
事務次官	アメリカ局長	電話番号	
外務審議官	参事官		
外務審議官	北米才一課長		
官房長			
協議先			
受信者	吉田公使代	発信者	参知外務 大臣
在 沖 繩	高瀬夫使		
写送付先		(希望発送日)	
件 名	公 信 転 報 (沖 繩 返 還 問 題 に 関 す る バ ー ド 上 院 議 員 の 演 説 テ キ ス ト)		

GA-2 10 129 外務省 回覧番号

米北1第 73 号
昭和46年5月10日

沖縄復帰準備委員会
日本国政府代表 殿

外 務 大 臣

公 信 転 報 (沖 繩 返 還 問 題 に 関 す る バ ー ド 上 院 議 員 の 演 説 テ キ ス ト)

本件に関する下記公信(1)通を転報する。

記

46年4月30日 在米大 発本大臣 あて 政 第 3328 号

付 属 添 付

GA-4 外務省

2/27
2/28
2/29
2/30
2/31
米俣 北米一課長
アメリカ局長
参事官
北米一課長

政 第 6918 号	昭和46年 7 月 30 日
外 務 省 殿	在 米 牛 場 大 使
引用(来)(往)公信・電信番号 往電ナ 2149号	

送付資料

沖縄に関する米上院議員の
演説(7月28日のシエムズ・B・
ロアソン上院議員, 7月29日の
ハリ・R・バード上院議員)


事務官
参事官
渉外調査
漁業
航空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査
カナダ
局庶務

米俣 北米一課長
2/27
2/28
2/29
2/30
2/31

(希望配布先)

付属添付 付属空便(行) 付属空便(DE) 付属船便(貨)
(郵)

本信写送付先 (別添とも)



SPEECH ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE, THURSDAY, JULY 29, 1971

History is a great teacher, but it teaches nothing to those who will not heed it.

I think that if we will take the time to study the history of the foreign relations of the United States since World War II, it will be possible for this Nation to arrive at a balanced and rational policy toward the rest of the world.

From shortly after the end of World War II to the 1960's, this Nation engaged in a far-flung enterprise of defending freedom everywhere in the world. We built a globe-circling chain of alliances.

As a result, we came to have mutual defense agreements with 44 different nations. And of course, the word "mutual" was merely a diplomatic way of saying that the United States had undertaken the defense of another country.

In fact, if not in name, America became the policeman of the world.

Recently, because of the frustrations of the war in Vietnam, there has been a sharp reaction against the responsibilities of global defense. Some advocate a new brand of isolationism, or drastic reductions on U.S. defense, or both.

In my view, we must maintain a strong defense - but strike a balance between isolationism and over-extension.

What have the last 25 years taught us?

I think we should have learned at least three major lessons from our experiences during the quarter-century since World War II.

First, we cannot afford to put our trust in the good intentions of the Russians. From the Berlin Blockade of 1948 to the Czechoslovakian invasion 20 years later, Moscow's record has been one of hostility and bad faith.

Second, we must maintain a strong defense. Communist leaders respect strength and despise weakness. If we permit ourselves to become weak, we shall invite Communist aggression and domination. It is primarily the threat of Russian aggression which forces the United States to spend billions on defense.

Third, we must set realistic limits on American involvement in the affairs of distant lands. It does not strengthen us, but rather weakens us, if this Nation stretches its forces too thin in an effort to influence the destinies of countries all around the world.

Our foreign and military policy should be governed strictly by the real national interests of the United States, and not by a misguided effort to shape the world in our own image.

But we must recognize that the task of defending our real interests requires an expenditure of resources.

We dare not blindly slash away at the defense budget of this Nation. We must cut the fat, but not the muscle.

I do not for a moment deny that there has been waste and mismanagement in some military programs. And I believe that the Congress must continue -- and indeed, increase -- its vigilance over the military budget, to be sure that the huge cost overruns of the past are ended.

But the fact that there has been inefficiency in military management does not mean that we can afford to weaken our defense posture. We must correct the inefficiency - but maintain our strength.

The SALT talks, the President Nixon's projected visit to Peking, both are being hailed as promising a more peaceful era.

I join in the hope for world peace. It is a cherished dream of mankind. But I also would sound a note of caution: We shall be heading into serious trouble, if we permit our hopes, rather than our realistic assessment of the world situation, to dictate our defense policies.

None of us knows just what are Communist Russia's intentions; we do have evidence, however, as to her capabilities. It is on her capabilities that we must judge our defense needs.

The Senate soon will be facing two decisions that will bear importantly on our defense position.

In one case, we must decide whether or not we can allow ourselves to remain dependent on the Soviet Union for the bulk of our supply of chrome ore, a material vital to defense.

In the second case, we are going to have to approve or disapprove an agreement which would turn over control of the island of Okinawa to Japan.

The chrome issue is of great importance. Soon the Congress will vote billions of dollars for defense -- primarily because of the threat of Russian aggression -- yet this country is dependent upon Russia for most of its supply of chrome ore.

This situation came about because of an embargo put into effect unilaterally by the United Nations Security Council and former President Johnson. The embargo was imposed on trade with the African country of Rhodesia, after that country declared its independence from Great Britain in 1966.

Rhodesia is the world's richest source of chrome ore. The United States has no chrome, and, cut off from the Rhodesian source, we have had to turn to Russia, the next largest supplier.

To show the importance of chrome, it is essential in the manufacture of jet aircraft, missiles and nuclear submarines. Furthermore, it is vital to many elements in the transportation and communications networks which are essential to defense.

I have introduced legislation designed to end the dependence of the United States upon the Soviet Union for chrome ore. This legislation is cosponsored by Senators Ervin, Fannin, Goldwater and Gurney.

My legislation is simple in structure. It would amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to provide that the President could not prohibit imports of a strategic material from a free world country if the importation of the same material is permitted from a Communist-dominated country.

I do not believe that it is logical for the United States to continue to be dependent upon Communist Russia for a material vital to our national defense.

I believe it is imperative that this question come to a vote in the Senate. I shall try to insure that the Senate is given a chance to register its will on this vital question.

The second decision to which I referred -- concerning the reversion of the island of Okinawa -- is also of great consequence.

An agreement has been signed providing for the reversion of the island of Okinawa to Japanese control.

Okinawa is our most strategic base in the Western Pacific.

We now have vast commitments in East Asia and the Far Pacific. We are the principal partner in the SEATO alliance, and we are committed to the defense of South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.

I am not convinced that we ought to have such extensive commitments. As I said earlier, the role of world policeman is not an appropriate one for this Nation.

However, as of July, 1971, these commitments do exist.

And since they do exist, it seems to me only logical that the United States should retain the capability of carrying them out.

The issue of the reversion of Okinawa is an emotional political question in Japan. That is the reason for the haste with which the United States and Japan have proceeded to draw up the pending agreement.

But the Japanese, who are determined to resume control of Okinawa, are spending only about 1 percent of their gross national product on defense. There has been talk of increasing this amount, but not to the extent that Japan could assume the role of a partner in the defense of the Western Pacific.

The United States should retain control of its strategic military base on Okinawa -- especially since Japan is not a real partner in the defense of the area. After all, it is Japan's area and not ours.

The Senate will be called upon to vote on this question in the near future.

The agreement for the reversion of Okinawa modifies the Treaty of Peace with Japan approved after World War II. Under the Treaty of Peace, the United States has the unrestricted right to Okinawa.

Under the agreement recently worked out between President Nixon and Premier Sato of Japan, the United States would relinquish this unrestricted right. Japan would have a veto over our actions.

I am not opposed to the eventual return of Okinawa to Japanese control. But I doubt that the present time -- with vast American commitments in the Western Pacific, and no significant defense effort by Japan -- is the appropriate time for reversion.

If the Senate should approve the treaty, then I think careful consideration should be given to prompt action toward reducing our Asian commitments.

In the long run, these commitments should be reduced anyway. But without Okinawa, I believe the United States would have to move more quickly toward reducing its Asian responsibilities.

The issues which this Nation faces in the field of foreign and military policy are exceedingly complex.

If we are to solve these difficult problems, we must use commonsense.

All of us must work and hope for world peace, but we dare not pin our national security on the belief that we have reached that great goal.

We must maintain a strong national defense - or we shall run great risk of losing our freedom.

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Statement by:
Senator James B. Pearson (R. N. H. G.)
July 28, 1971

US-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Mr. President, relations between the United States and Japan may be entering their most delicate period since the end of the American occupation. The delicacy arises over the juxtaposition of economic and political controversies at a time when long-term relations between the two great democracies are in at a cross roads. Only the greatest sensitivity and statesmanship on both sides of the Pacific will prevent a disastrous confrontation damaging to fundamental interests of both nations.

The United States and Japan have a golden opportunity to firmly establish a mutually beneficial relationship in Asia and the Pacific based upon a concert of political and economic interests, but this relationship could founder in the next few months if politicians and statesmen on both sides of the Pacific do not act with the upmost restraint and responsibility.

The immediate issue which could provoke a dramatic confrontation is Senate consideration of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty signed by the President in June of this year. In this country, some may attempt to link the return of Okinawa and eventual withdrawal of American forces to changes in Japanese export practices and import restrictions. In Japan, for understandable reasons, the return of Okinawa has become a highly nationalistic issue. A failure to ratify the treaty, or to ratify with conditions relating to trade matters, could provoke potent forces of nationalism in Japan -- forces which could shape US-Japanese relations for years to come.

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Confrontation now would be doubly tragic as signs of changes in Japanese policies hold out some promise for settlement of the most difficult trade problems.

At this juncture of US-Japanese relations, it would be wise to place some of the relatively minor disagreements we have with Japan in the perspective of the overall importance of US-Japanese relations. This is not to dismiss the serious individual problems caused by any economic dislocations resulting from Japanese imports, rather, it is to measure those problems against the consequences of disruption of cordial relations with the Japanese.

It is not possible, in a short statement, to adequately examine the strategic importance of US-Japanese relations. In brief, the Japanese will be leaders in Asia for the foreseeable future. Japan is the only Asian nation which can balance the power of the Peoples Republic of China on the small nations of Asia from Korea to Burma.

It is not difficult to imagine the leaders of the small nations of the area balancing Chinese influence and pressure against Japanese economic and political power. The independence of these small nations, for which so much American blood and treasure has been expended, is undeniably important to American security.

The Japanese will, however, need American assistance to carry out this important strategic function; and provided cordial relations are maintained, will seek and receive assistance as needed. In short, the Japanese are a key to the successful operation of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia.

Although they may be somewhat concerned about the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking, it is difficult to believe

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that any future rapprochement with the Peoples Republic will supercede the necessity of maintaining close ties with the other Asian power, Japan.

Political and economic relations between Asian policies of the US and Japan could be found in coordinated foreign assistance programs. A large proportion of American foreign assistance has been spent assisting Asian nations maintain political integrity and promote economic development. The continuation of these efforts is important to both the United States and Japan. While the political interests of the two Allies are not identical, they are certainly in enough accord to permit the coordination of aid efforts.

This would have economic and political advantages for both nations.

Economically, an increase in Japanese development loans and grants, as opposed to the export-oriented assistance now rendered, could relieve some of the balance of payments strains American aid now places on our economy. Relief of American balance of payments difficulties has definite benefits for the Japanese.

In addition to the desirability of increased grants and loans from Japan, the Japanese may well be able to operate technical assistance programs more easily than Americans. They should have a better grasp of cultural requirements of technical aid -- problems which all too often limit the effectiveness of American programs -- and should, as Asians, be less conspicuous and objectionable in war-ravaged Southeast Asia than Americans.

Increased Japanese efforts in the development assistance field could offset some of the American criticisms of low levels of Japanese efforts in defense spending. At this time Japan spends about .8 percent of her GNP on defense while the US spends many times that amount on American forces

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A good case can be made for the Japanese assuming a larger portion of development assistance efforts on both political and economic grounds. For reasons stated earlier, they may well be able to operate more effectively in the Asian cultures than Americans, while Americans -- the only power really capable of strategic defense of the Pacific -- are able to supply men and material for defense.

For domestic political reasons in both the US and Japan, this division of labors may well be advantageous. We can all understand the reluctance on the part of many Japanese to develop military forces capable of supporting their Asian allies -- forces which would be considered offensive forces. A number of small Asian nations would also be uncomfortable with such a development.

On the other hand, foreign assistance has not been unpopular in Japan. Although it has been, exclusive of war reparations, mostly on hard terms and tied to export expansion, the Japanese have indicated that they will triple their development assistance efforts in the next years. By contrast, foreign aid funds are extremely hard to come by in the United States. Congress grudgingly votes money each year, and in decreasing amounts at that. Defense funds are, however, somewhat easier to secure, especially when the administration can actually demonstrate a need.

By dividing and coordinating our efforts in aid and defense, the US and Japan could reinforce mutually advantageous policies throughout Asia and the Pacific.

For individual Americans and Japanese, somewhat esoteric international policies do not have the direct personal impact of economic relations between nations. Two hundred million Americans and one hundred and

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four million Japanese carry on a trade valued at \$10.5 billion 1970. Furthermore, this trade has been increasing at a fantastic rate for the last five years and the prospects for continued increases are excellent.

A great deal of verbage has been expended on trade between the United States and Japan. No one denies the fact that the US has run a sizeable deficit in bilateral trade with Japan in the last few years. It is, however, imperative to consider the implications of the return to mercantilism advocated by some as a cure for the increase of Japanese imports.

It is, perhaps, necessary to make the simple 'economists' point that foreign nations have to sell goods in the United States to earn the dollars to buy American goods. In more specific terms, Japanese must sell radios, cameras, and even textiles, if they are going to be able to continue to buy wheat, corn, grain sorghum, and other commodities from Americans.

Japanese as much as Americans, have a stake in seeking to restore a balance to the trade between the two nations. Japanese mercantilism is as futile as American mercantilism, it does the Japanese little good to continue to hold large foreign currency reserves especially while the dollar continues decrease in value due to inflation. The Japanese, for their part, are evidently beginning to understand the urgent need for changes in their import regulations, export practices, investment regulations and the value of the yen -- perhaps the most important element of all.

Japan is the United States' second largest single market for all export products and it is the largest market of American agricultural exports. The United States is Japan's largest foreign market. The value of US exports of agricultural commodities to Japan rose to a record \$1.2 billion in calendar year

1970, a 30 percent increase over 1969. This trade represented a 110 percent increase over the average value of US agricultural exports to Japan during the 1965-1969 period.

These statistics are cited to indicate the dangers faced by American exporters, especially American farmers, if Japanese-American trade is disrupted because of political or economic disputes. This is not to imply that Japanese import restrictions, export practices and yen value are entirely acceptable; certainly both sides need to negotiate changes in trading practices. I do want to point out the magnitude and delicacy of the problem -- especially for those whose incomes depend on exports to Japan at a time when we hear almost exclusively about those whose incomes may be jeopardized by Japanese imports.

At this time, the interests of a relatively small number of persons adversely affected by imports from Japan cannot be allowed to override the national security and economic well-being of the majority of the American people -- and that is precisely the danger which could arise from attempts to use the Okinawa Reversion treaty as a bargaining device to secure trade concessions from Japan.

We cannot, of course, ignore the serious difficulties encountered by those whose jobs and investments are threatened by foreign competition. Greater utilization of adjustment assistance benefits for workers and businesses affected by increased imports is the most sensible short-term remedy available to the United States. Adjustment assistance enables the entire society to bear the costs of retraining and reinvestment of resources displaced by imports. This is only fair, as the entire society benefits from the lower costs

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of the imported goods. In this way we adjust to competition from abroad internally, and avoid the trade wars and other international dangers of escalating protective tariffs.

I have tried to examine, however briefly, the importance of the maintenance of cordial relations between the United States and Japan and to point out that the next few months may be an extremely critical period for the formation of long-term relations between the two nations. Both nations have too much at stake to allow relatively minor, but soluable, controversies to disrupt political and economic relations in their formative months. Now is a time when statesmen must become politicians and politicians become statesmen if we are to avoid tragic disruption of our close ties with Japan.

注意

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- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

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電信写

大政事外外儀官
 務務 典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 儀総入電厚計
 書大会営給

総番号(TA) 58118 主管
 71年11月8日17時25分 米 国 発
 71年11月9日07時36分 本 省 着 米北1

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

調査長
 参企析調
 領移長
 参領旅査移

オキナワ返かん協定(バード議員の演説)

第3632号 平 大至急

往電第3628号に関し

ハリー・バード上院議員が8日の上院本会議において、オキナワ返かん協定に反対する演説を行なつたところ、右テヤスト別電の通り。

(丁)

(千葉米北1課長に連絡 9月08:40)

ア 参地中東
 長 北東西
 米北(保)
 中南番
 参一三
 欧 参西東洋
 長 西東

近ア 参書近ア
 長 経 次総経国資
 経 源

長 参貿統
 経 参政技一理
 協 国
 長 条 参条協規
 国 参政経科

軍社專
 情参道内外
 文書 一二

外務省

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電信写

大政事外外儀官
 務務 典房
 次次
 臣官官審審長長
 儀総入電厚計
 書大会営給

総番号(TA) 58129 主管
 71年11月08日17時25分 米 国 発
 71年11月09日08時40分 本 省 着 米北1

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

調査長
 参企析調
 領移長
 参領旅査移

沖繩返還協定(バード議員の演説)

才3633号 平 大至急

往電才3632号 別電

(以下別紙/英文)



(千葉米北1課長に連絡 9月08:40)

ア 参地中東
 長 北東西
 米北(保)
 中南番
 参一三
 欧 参西東洋
 長 西東

近ア 参書近ア
 長 経 次総経国資
 経 源

長 参貿統
 経 参政技一理
 協 国
 長 条 参条協規
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軍社專
 情参道内外
 文書 一二

外務省

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電信写

MR. PRESIDENT, ON TUESDAY THE SENATE WILL BE CALLED UPON TO RATIFY OR REJECT THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT FOR THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF JAPAN.

THIS PROPOSED AGREEMENT WOULD BE A CHANGE IN THE TERMS OF THE TREATY OF PEACE OF 1951 BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES.

UNDER TERMS OF THE PEACE TREATY THE UNITED STATES HAS UNRESTRICTED USE OF MILITARY BASES ON OKINAWA.

TWO YEARS AGO, WHEN OFFICIAL DISCUSSION BEGAN CONCERNING THE PROPOSED REVERSION OF OKINAWA, I SPONSORED LEGISLATION THAT CALLED UPON THE PRESIDENT TO SUBMIT ANY AGREEMENT CHANGING THE STATUS OF OKINAWA TO THE SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT. THIS LEGISLATION WAS APPROVED BY THE SENATE, AND NOW THE QUESTION OF RATIFICATION BY THE SENATE MUST BE DECIDED.

AFTER LONG CONSIDERATION, I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT I CANNOT SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT FOR REVERSION OF OKINAWA, WHICH PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE JAPAN A VETO OVER THE USE BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS FACILITIES ON OKINAWA.

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電信写

IT IS NOT MY INTENTION TO ORGANIZE OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENT. I WISH, HOWEVER, TO MAKE MY OWN VIEWS KNOWN.

I SHALL VOTE AGAINST THE PROPOSAL, EVEN IF I BE THE ONLY SENATOR TO CAST SUCH A VOTE.

I AM AMONG THOSE WHO BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BECOME OVERCOMMITTED AROUND THE WORLD. WE HAVE MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS WITH 44 DIFFERENT NATIONS.

MORE THAN 25 YEARS AFTER THE END OF WORLD WAR II, THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINS 310,000 MEN IN EUROPE, INCLUDING THE 2ND FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEMI-COLON AND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC, THE UNITED STATES HAS 370,000 TROOPS ON DUTY.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES CAN CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO CARRY SO HEAVY A MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT OTHER NATIONS MAKE A GREATER CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR OWN SECURITY.

BUT, AT THE PRESENT TIME, OUR MILITARY COMMITMENTS ARE A FACT.

AMONG THE AREAS IN WHICH WE ARE MOST HEAVILY COMMITTED IS ASIA. NOT ONLY IS THE UNITED STATES ENGAGED IN A SHOOTING WAR IN VIETNAM, BUT THE NATION

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電信写

IS ALSO COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF SOUTH KOREA, TAIWAN, JAPAN, THE PHILIPPINES, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, PAKISTAN AND THAILAND,.

WE MUST VIEW THE OKINAWA PROPOSAL WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF EXISTING TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

FIRST, IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT IS THE 1951 TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN WHICH CONFERS UPON THE UNITED STATES THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF MILITARY BASES ON THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA.

THE TREATY OF PEACE IS ENTIRELY SEPARATE FROM THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY OF 1960 BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. THE TWO AGREEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED.

AGREEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES TO TURN OVER ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

OF OKINAWA TO THE JAPANESE IS A CHANGE IN THE TREATY OF PEACE. IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY.

THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO THE CONTROL OF JAPAN WOULD INVOLVE SURRENDER BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE OKINAWA BASES. NO ONE DISPUTES THAT STATEMENT.

I THINK THAT IN CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT THE REVERSION AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED, MEMBERS OF

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電信写

THE SENATE SHOULD GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE EXTENSIVE DEFENSE COMMITMENTS WHICH WE HAVE IN ASIA.

WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT ALL OF OUR ASIAN COMMITMENTS WERE UNDERTAKEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT UNRESTRICTED USE OF OKINAWA WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO THE UNITED STATES.

CAN WE AFFORD TO GO ON GUARANTEEING THE DEFENSE OF SO MANY ASIAN NATIONS, IF WE ARE TO SURRENDER AN IMPORTANT PART OF OUR MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE FAR EAST?

OUR MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY WITH JAPAN, FOR EXAMPLE, IS SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL ON 1 YEAR'S NOTICE. SHOULD IT BE CONTINUED INDEFINITELY?

THE STATE DEPARTMENT FEELS IT SHOULD. I QUESTION THAT.

WE HAVE COMMITMENTS TO 10 ASIAN NATIONS UNDER THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION AGREEMENT OF 1954. THIS TREATY ALSO IS SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL BY ANY PARTY ON 1 YEAR'S NOTICE. CAN WE CONTINUE THESE COMMITMENTS INDEFINITELY?

THE SATO GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN HAS ASSURED THE UNITED STATE THAT IT WILL COOPERATE IN PERMITTING

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電信写

THIS NATION TO USE OKINAWA IN ORDER TO FULFILL OUR OBLIGATIONS. THOSE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO FAVOR HAVING OKINAWA REVERT TO JAPAN PUT GREAT STRESS ON THIS.

BUT ONCE REVERSION IS ACCOMPLISHED, THE FINAL DECISION ON THE USE OF OKINAWA IN EACH CONTINGENCY WILL REST NOT WITH THE UNITED STATES, BUT WITH JAPAN - WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT BE UNDER THE RULE OF THE SATO GOVERNMENT AT THE TIME. IN FACT, SATO VERY LIKELY WILL BE OUT OF OFFICE IN A MATTER OF MONTHS.

THESE, I FEEL, ARE SERIOUS CONSIDERATIONS.

I WANT TO SEE OUR COMMITMENTS IN ASIA REDUCED.

BUT NO PROPOSAL HAS BEEN MADE TO REDUCE OUR COMMITMENTS.

THE ONLY PROPOSAL IS THAT WE VOLUNTARILY GIVE UP THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT TO USE OUR GREATEST MILITARY BASE COMPLEX IN THE FAR PACIFIC.

JAPAN IS SEEKING, AND WOULD BE GETTING, CONTROL OVER OUR MILITARY BASE. AT THE SAME TIME, JAPAN WOULD HAVE A PLEDGE FROM THE UNITED STATES TO GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF JAPAN.

TO STATE IT ANOTHER WAY, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

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電信写

WANTS THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF JAPAN SEMICOLON TO CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE SAFETY OF OKINAWA SEMICOLON TO CONTINUE TO SPEND HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS ON OKINAWA - DORUJIRUSI 260 MILLION LAST YEAR. BUT IT SEEKS TO PUT RESTRICTIONS ON WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DO.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTE 42 PERCENT OF THE ECONOMY OF THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA.

JAPAN WANTS A VETO OVER ANY U.S. ACTION AFFECTING OKINAWA. IT SPECIFICALLY WANTS THE RIGHT TO DENY TO THE UNITED STATES THE AUTHORITY TO STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA AND WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR CONSULTATION BEFORE OUR MILITARY FORCES BASED THERE COULD BE USED.

IN OTHER WORDS, THE UNITED STATES NO LONGER WOULD HAVE UNRESTRICTED USE OF OKINAWA.

OUR ROLE AS THE DEFENDER OF THE FAR EAST HAS ENABLED JAPAN TO AVOID THE BURDEN OF REARMAMENT - ONLY ABOUT 1 PERCENT OF HER GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT IS SPENT ON DEFENSE - AND THUS CONCENTRATE ON EXPANDING AND MODERNIZING ITS DOMESTIC ECONOMY.

IN DEFENSE MATTERS, THE JAPANESE HAVE GOTTEN A FREE RIDE. AS A DIRECT RESULT, JAPAN'S PRESENT

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電信写

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT RANKS THIRD IN THE WORLD, BEHIND ONLY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

WHILE THE PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN GIVES THE UNITED STATES UNRESTRICTED RIGHTS ON OKINAWA, THE 1960 MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY PROVIDES THAT OUR MILITARY FORCES BASED IN JAPAN CANNOT BE USED WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

UNDER THE AGREEMENT WHICH THE SENATE MUST SOON VOTE ON, JAPAN WOULD HAVE A SIMILAR RIGHT OF CONSULTATION WHICH REGARD TO AMERICAN FORCES ON OKINAWA.

WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN AND THE VAST AREAS OF THE WEST PACIFIC AND SOUTHEAST ASIA IS OPEN TO QUESTION.

BUT AT THE MOMENT, THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF THESE REGIONS. AND IT IS ONLY COMMONSENSE, IN MY VIEW, THAT SO LONG AS THESE COMMITMENTS CONTINUE IN FORCE, THEN IT IS ONLY LOGICAL AND RESPONSIBLE THAT THIS COUNTRY RETAIN THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF ITS GREATEST BASE IN THE WEST PACIFIC, NAMELY OKINAWA.

I AGREE THAT EVENTUALLY OKINAWA AND THE RYUKYU

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電信写

ISLANDS WILL REVERT TO CONTROL OF JAPAN. BUT I THINK IT UNWISE TO TURN OVER SUCH CONTROL AT A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED SO DEEPLY TO THE DEFENSE OF ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC.

IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY, IN MY OPINION, FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE ITS COMMITMENTS TO THE DEFENSE OF ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC WHILE AT THE SAME TIME GIVING UP THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE MILITARY COMPLEX ON OKINAWA.

IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT PUBLIC ATTENTION BE FOCUSED ON THIS ISSUE OF UNRESTRICTED USE OF OUR BASES ON OKINAWA.

I SPEAK AS ONE WHO IS NOT SYMPATHETIC TO OUR DEEP INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, ONE WHO FROM THE BEGINNING REGARDED IT AS AN ERROR OF JUDGMENT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A GROUND WAR THERE.

I SPEAK AS ONE WHO QUESTIONS THE WISDOM OF OUR COUNTRY'S COMMITTING ITSELF TO MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS WITH 44 DIFFERENT NATIONS.

I SPEAK AS ONE WHO FEELS THAT WE CANNOT LOGICALLY BE THE WORLD'S POLICEMAN.

IF BY THE ACT OF GRANTING JAPAN ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER OKINAWA, THE UNITED STATES COULD INSURE

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電信写

A MULTINATIONAL DEFENSE STRUCTURE IN THE FAR EAST, WITH INCREASED PARTICIPATION BY JAPAN - IF THIS ACTION WOULD RELIEVE OUR COUNTRY OF A MEASURE OF ITS HEAVY INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES - THEN, I WOULD SUPPORT A REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPANESE CONTROL.

BUT THIS IS NOT THE CASE.

QUITE THE CONTRARY. SURRENDER OF CONTROL OVER OKINAWA WOULD ONLY MAKE MORE DIFFICULT OUR ROLE IN THE PACIFIC.

IN FACT, SHOULD THE TREATY FOR REVERSION OF OKINAWA BE APPROVED, THEN I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE ITS COMMITMENTS IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC AREAS.

IF THE UNITED STATES CHOOSES TO GIVE UP THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT OF USE OF ITS BASES ON OKINAWA, THEN I BELIEVE THIS ACTION WILL BE AN APPROPRIATE SIGNAL FOR THE REDUCTION OF COMMITMENTS IN THIS REGION.

SURELY WE CANNOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO CARRY THE CHIEF BURDEN FOR DEFENSE OF ASIA AND THE WEST PACIFIC WHILE GIVING UP THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF OUR MOST STRATEGIC BASE.

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電信写

IN THE LONG RUN, I BELIEVE WE MUST REDUCE OUR ASIAN COMMITMENTS.

WHEN THIS HAS BEEN DONE, THEN IT WOULD BE PROPER TO TURN OVER OKINAWA TO THE CONTROL OF JAPAN.

BUT IN THE SHORT RUN, THE COMMITMENTS OF THIS NATION IN THE ASIAN AND PACIFIC AREAS REMAIN IN FORCE.

AND SO LONG AS THIS IS THE CASE, I CANNOT SUPPORT AN AGREEMENT WHICH SACRIFICES THE UNRESTRICTED RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES TO USE ITS BASES ON THE ISLAND OF OKINAWA.

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外務省