

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 米国関係  
（議員等発言(2)（講演、記者会見等）

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コピアツン上院議員演説(昭四六・七・三八)

沖縄にかつる米上院議員の演説  
 (7月28日のジェムズ・B・ピアソン上院議員、  
 7月29日のハリ・F・バード上院議員)の来公  
 信は、バード上院議員の項目に、ファイルしてあり  
 す。

( 部の内 号)

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

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大政事外外儀官  
 務務典房  
 次次典房  
 臣官官審審長長  
 儀総人電厚計  
 (書)文会営給  
 調査長  
 領移長  
 参企析調  
 参領旅査移

電信写

71年7月29日19時59分 米 国 発  
 71年7月30日09時46分 本 省 着

外務大臣殿 牛場(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

参地中東  
 長北東西  
 (参北北保)  
 参一ニ  
 参西東洋  
 長西東

参書近ア  
 次総経国資  
 長参貿統国万  
 参政技二  
 参国一理  
 参務協規  
 参政経科  
 長軍社專  
 参道内外  
 長文長

オキナワに関する米上院議員の演説

第2149号 平 至急

28日ピアソン(共)、29日バード(民)の両上院議員は  
 本会議でオキナワに関連し要旨下記の通りの演説を行なつ  
 た。(テキスト空送)

1. ピアソン議員

(/)日米関係は両国の政治家が力りようを殆きして両国  
 の対立を避くべき極めてデリケートな時期差しかかっている。  
 差し当つては上院のオキナワ返かん協定の審議が問題  
 であり、一部にこれを貿易問題と結びつける現象があるが  
 。このため批准ができない事態になれば日本の経済・ナショ  
 ナリズムをよびおこすこととなろう。よろしく日米関係の  
 全体としての重要性の中で問題を位置づけるべきであろう  
 。

(2)日本は予見し得る将来ビルマから朝鮮までのアジア  
 全域で中国に対抗し得る唯一国であり、アジアにおける  
 クソン・ドクトリン成功のカギである。今後の米中接近  
 日本との密接な連けいをないがしろにしていとは考



WILLIAM W. WALKER, JR., JR.

VIRGINIA

SPEECH ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE, THURSDAY, JULY 29, 1971

History is a great teacher, but it teaches nothing to those who will not heed it.

I think that if we will take the time to study the history of the foreign relations of the United States since World War II, it will be possible for this Nation to arrive at a balanced and rational policy toward the rest of the world.

From shortly after the end of World War II to the 1960's, this Nation engaged in a far-flung enterprise of defending freedom everywhere in the world. We built a globe-circling chain of alliances.

As a result, we came to have mutual defense agreements with 44 different nations. And of course, the word "mutual" was merely a diplomatic way of saying that the United States had undertaken the defense of another country.

In fact, if not in name, America became the policeman of the world.

Recently, because of the frustrations of the war in Vietnam, there has been a sharp reaction against the responsibilities of global defense. Some advocate a new brand of isolationism, or drastic reductions on U.S. defense, or both.

In my view, we must maintain a strong defense - but strike a balance between isolationism and over-extension.

What have the last 25 years taught us?

I think we should have learned at least three major lessons from our experiences during the quarter-century since World War II.

First, we cannot afford to put our trust in the good intentions of the Russians. From the Berlin Blockade of 1948 to the Czechoslovakian invasion 20 years later, Moscow's record has been one of hostility and bad faith.

Second, we must maintain a strong defense. Communist leaders respect strength and despise weakness. If we permit ourselves to become weak, we shall invite Communist aggression and domination. It is primarily the threat of Russian aggression which forces the United States to spend billions on defense.

Third, we must set realistic limits on American involvement in the affairs of distant lands. It does not strengthen us, but rather weakens us, if this Nation stretches its forces too thin in an effort to influence the destinies of countries all around the world.

Our foreign and military policy should be governed strictly by the real national interests of the United States, and not by a misguided effort to shape the world in our own image.

But we must recognize that the task of defending our real interests requires an expenditure of resources.

We dare not blindly slash away at the defense budget of this Nation. We must cut the fat, but not the muscle.

I do not for a moment deny that there has been waste and mismanagement in some military programs. And I believe that the Congress must continue -- and indeed, increase -- its vigilance over the military budget, to be sure that the huge cost overruns of the past are ended.

But the fact that there has been inefficiency in military management does not mean that we can afford to weaken our defense posture. We must correct the inefficiency - but maintain our strength.

The SALT talks, the President Nixon's projected visit to Peking, both are being hailed as promising a more peaceful era.

I join in the hope for world peace. It is a cherished dream of mankind. But I also would sound a note of caution: We shall be heading into serious trouble, if we permit our hopes, rather than our realistic assessment of the world situation, to dictate our defense policies.

None of us knows just what are Communist Russia's intentions; we do have evidence, however, as to her capabilities. It is on her capabilities that we must judge our defense needs.

The Senate soon will be facing two decisions that will bear importantly on our defense position.

In one case, we must decide whether or not we can allow ourselves to remain dependent on the Soviet Union for the bulk of our supply of chrome ore, a material vital to defense.

In the second case, we are going to have to approve or disapprove an agreement which would turn over control of the island of Okinawa to Japan.

The chrome issue is of great importance.

Soon the Congress will vote billions of dollars for defense -- primarily because of the threat of Russian aggression -- yet this country is dependent upon Russia for most of its supply of chrome ore.

This situation came about because of an embargo put into effect unilaterally by the United Nations Security Council and former President Johnson. The embargo was imposed on trade with the African country of Rhodesia, after that country declared its independence from Great Britain in 1966.

Rhodesia is the world's richest source of chrome ore. The United States has no chrome, and, cut off from the Rhodesian source, we have had to turn to Russia, the next largest supplier.

To show the importance of chrome, it is essential in the manufacture of jet aircraft, missiles and nuclear submarines. Furthermore, it is vital to many elements in the transportation and communications networks which are essential to defense.

I have introduced legislation designed to end the dependence of the United States upon the Soviet Union for chrome ore. This legislation is cosponsored by Senators Ervin, Fannin, Goldwater and Gurney.

My legislation is simple in structure. It would amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to provide that the President could not prohibit imports of a strategic material from a free world country if the importation of the same material is permitted from a Communist-dominated country.

I do not believe that it is logical for the United States to continue to be dependent upon Communist Russia for a material vital to our national defense.

I believe it is imperative that this question come to a vote in the Senate. I shall try to insure that the Senate is given a chance to register its will on this vital question.

The second decision to which I referred -- concerning the reversion of the island of Okinawa -- is also of great consequence.

An agreement has been signed providing for the reversion of the island of Okinawa to Japanese control.

Okinawa is our most strategic base in the Western Pacific.

We now have vast commitments in East Asia and the Far Pacific: We are the principal partner in the SEATO alliance, and we are committed to the defense of South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.

I am not convinced that we ought to have such extensive commitments. As I said earlier, the role of world policeman is not an appropriate one for this Nation.

However, as of July, 1971, these commitments do exist.

And since they do exist, it seems to me only logical that the United States should retain the capability of carrying them out.

The issue of the reversion of Okinawa is an emotional political question in Japan. That is the reason for the haste with which the United States and Japan have proceeded to draw up the pending agreement.

But the Japanese, who are determined to resume control of Okinawa, are spending only about 1 percent of their gross national product on defense. There has been talk of increasing this amount, but not to the extent that Japan could assume the role of a partner in the defense of the Western Pacific.

The United States should retain control of its strategic military base on Okinawa -- especially since Japan is not a real partner in the defense of the area. After all, it is Japan's area and not ours.

The Senate will be called upon to vote on this question in the near future.

The agreement for the reversion of Okinawa modifies the Treaty of Peace with Japan approved after World War II. Under the Treaty of Peace, the United States has the unrestricted right to Okinawa.

Under the agreement recently worked out between President Nixon and Premier Sato of Japan, the United States would relinquish this unrestricted right. Japan would have a veto over our actions.

I am not opposed to the eventual return of Okinawa to Japanese control... But I doubt that the present time -- with vast American commitments in the Western Pacific, and no significant defense effort by Japan -- is the appropriate time for reversion.

If the Senate should approve the treaty, then I think careful consideration should be given to prompt action toward reducing our Asian commitments.

In the long run, these commitments should be reduced anyway. But without Okinawa, I believe the United States would have to move more quickly toward reducing its Asian responsibilities.

The issues which this Nation faces in the field of foreign and military policy are exceedingly complex.

If we are to solve these difficult problems, we must use common sense.

All of us must work and hope for world peace, but we dare not pin our national security on the belief that we have reached that great goal.

We must maintain a strong national defense - or we shall run great risk of losing our freedom.

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Statement by:  
Senator James B. Pearson (R, Ill.)  
July 28, 1971

#### US-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Mr. President, relations between the United States and Japan may be entering their most delicate period since the end of the American occupation. The delicacy arises over the juxtaposition of economic and political controversies at a time when long-term relations between the two great democracies are in at a cross roads. Only the greatest sensitivity and statesmanship on both sides of the Pacific will prevent a disastrous confrontation damaging to fundamental interests of both nations.

The United States and Japan have a golden opportunity to firmly establish a mutually beneficial relationship in Asia and the Pacific based upon a concert of political and economic interests, but this relationship could founder in the next few months if politicians and statesmen on both sides of the Pacific do not act with the utmost restraint and responsibility.

The immediate issue which could provoke a dramatic confrontation is Senate consideration of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty signed by the President in June of this year. In this country, some may attempt to link the return of Okinawa and eventual withdrawal of American forces to changes in Japanese export practices and import restrictions. In Japan, for understandable reasons, the return of Okinawa has become a highly nationalistic issue. A failure to ratify the treaty, or to ratify with conditions relating to trade matters, could provoke potent forces of nationalism in Japan -- forces which could shape US-Japanese relations for years to come.

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Confrontation now would be doubly tragic as signs of changes in Japanese policies hold out some promise for settlement of the most difficult trade problems.

At this juncture of US-Japanese relations, it would be wise to place some of the relatively minor disagreements we have with Japan in the perspective of the overall importance of US-Japanese relations. This is not to dismiss the serious individual problems caused by any economic dislocations resulting from Japanese imports, rather, it is to measure those problems against the consequences of disruption of cordial relations with the Japanese.

It is not possible, in a short statement, to adequately examine the strategic importance of US-Japanese relations. In brief, the Japanese will be leaders in Asia for the foreseeable future. Japan is the only Asian nation which can balance the power of the Peoples Republic of China on the small nations of Asia from Korea to Burma.

It is not difficult to imagine the leaders of the small nations of the area balancing Chinese influence and pressure against Japanese economic and political power. The independence of these small nations, for which so much American blood and treasure has been expended, is undeniably important to American security.

The Japanese will, however, need American assistance to carry out this important strategic function; and provided cordial relations are maintained, will seek and receive assistance as needed. In short, the Japanese are a key to the successful operation of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia.

Although they may be somewhat concerned about the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Peking, it is difficult to believe

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that any future rapprochement with the Peoples Republic will supercede the necessity of maintaining close ties with the other Asian power, Japan.

Political and economic relations between Asian policies of the US and Japan could be found in coordinated foreign assistance programs. A large proportion of American foreign assistance has been spent assisting Asian nations maintain political integrity and promote economic development. The continuation of these efforts is important to both the United States and Japan. While the political interests of the two Allies are not identical, they are certainly in enough accord to permit the coordination of aid efforts.

This would have economic and political advantages for both nations. Economically, an increase in Japanese development loans and grants, as opposed to the export-oriented assistance now rendered, could relieve some of the balance of payments strains American aid now places on our economy. Relief of American balance of payments difficulties has definite benefits for the Japanese.

In addition to the desirability of increased grants and loans from Japan, the Japanese may well be able to operate technical assistance programs more easily than Americans. They should have a better grasp of cultural requirements of technical aid -- problems which all too often limit the effectiveness of American programs -- and should, as Asians, be less conspicuous and objectionable in war-ravaged Southeast Asia than Americans.

Increased Japanese efforts in the development assistance field could offset some of the American criticisms of low levels of Japanese efforts in defense spending. At this time Japan spends about .8 percent of her GNP on defense while the US spends many times that amount on American forces

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A good case can be made for the Japanese assuming a larger portion of development assistance efforts on both political and economic grounds. For reasons stated earlier, they may well be able to operate more effectively in the Asian cultures than Americans, while Americans -- the only power really capable of strategic defense of the Pacific -- are able to supply men and material for defense.

For domestic political reasons in both the US and Japan, this division of labors may well be advantageous. We can all understand the reluctance on the part of many Japanese to develop military forces capable of supporting their Asian allies -- forces which would be considered offensive forces. A number of small Asian nations would also be uncomfortable with such a development.

On the other hand, foreign assistance has not been unpopular in Japan. Although it has been, exclusive of war reparations, mostly on hard terms and tied to export expansion, the Japanese have indicated that they will triple their development assistance efforts in the next years. By contrast, foreign aid funds are extremely hard to come by in the United States. Congress grudgingly votes money each year, and in decreasing amounts at that. Defense funds are, however, somewhat easier to secure, especially when the administration can actually demonstrate a need.

By dividing and coordinating our efforts in aid and defense, the US and Japan could reinforce mutually advantageous policies throughout Asia and the Pacific.

For individual Americans and Japanese, somewhat esoteric international policies do not have the direct personal impact of economic relations between nations. Two hundred million Americans and one hundred and

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four million Japanese carry on a trade valued at \$10.5 billion 1970. Furthermore, this trade has been increasing at a fantastic rate for the last five years and the prospects for continued increases are excellent.

A great deal of verbage has been expended on trade between the United States and Japan. No one denies the fact that the US has run a sizeable deficit in bilateral trade with Japan in the last few years. It is, however, imperative to consider the implications of the return to mercantilism advocated by some as a cure for the increase of Japanese imports.

It is, perhaps, necessary to make the simple economists' point that foreign nations have to sell goods in the United States to earn the dollars to buy American goods. In more specific terms, Japanese must sell radios, cameras, and even textiles, if they are going to be able to continue to buy wheat, corn, grain sorghum, and other commodities from Americans.

Japanese as much as Americans, have a stake in seeking to restore a balance to the trade between the two nations. Japanese mercantilism is as futile as American mercantilism; it does the Japanese little good to continue to hold large foreign currency reserves especially while the dollar continues decrease in value due to inflation. The Japanese, for their part, are evidently beginning to understand the urgent need for changes in their import regulations, export practices, investment regulations and the value of the yen -- perhaps the most important element of all.

Japan is the United States' second largest single market for all export products and it is the largest market of American agricultural exports. The United States is Japan's largest foreign market. The value of US exports of agricultural commodities to Japan rose to a record \$1.2 billion in calendar year

1970, a 30 percent increase over 1969. This trade represented a 110 percent increase over the average value of US agricultural exports to Japan during the 1965-1969 period.

These statistics are cited to indicate the dangers faced by American exporters, especially American farmers, if Japanese-American trade is disrupted because of political or economic disputes. This is not to imply that Japanese import restrictions, export practices and yen value are entirely acceptable; certainly both sides need to negotiate changes in trading practices. I do want to point out the magnitude and delicacy of the problem -- especially for those whose incomes depend on exports to Japan at a time when we hear almost exclusively about those whose incomes may be jeopardized by Japanese imports.

At this time, the interests of a relatively small number of persons adversely affected by imports from Japan cannot be allowed to override the national security and economic well-being of the majority of the American people -- and that is precisely the danger which could arise from attempts to use the Okinawa Reversion treaty as a bargaining device to secure trade concessions from Japan.

We cannot, of course, ignore the serious difficulties encountered by those whose jobs and investments are threatened by foreign competition. Greater utilization of adjustment assistance benefits for workers and businesses affected by increased imports is the most sensible short-term remedy available to the United States. Adjustment assistance enables the entire society to bear the costs of retraining and reinvestment of resources displaced by imports. This is only fair, as the entire society benefits from the lower costs

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of the imported goods. In this way we adjust to competition from abroad internally, and avoid the trade wars and other international dangers of escalating protective tariffs.

I have tried to examine, however briefly, the importance of the maintenance of cordial relations between the United States and Japan and to point out that the next few months may be an extremely critical period for the formation of long-term relations between the two nations. Both nations have too much at stake to allow relatively minor, but solvable, controversies to disrupt political and economic relations in their formative months. Now is a time when statesmen must become politicians and politicians become statesmen if we are to avoid tragic disruption of our close ties with Japan.