

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 米国関係  
（議員等発言(2)（講演、記者会見等）

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マツギー上院議員記者会見(昭四四・七・十八)

浪屋野呂

秘

アメリカ局長

参事官

北米才一課長

送付公信

政 第 5977 号	昭和 44 年 7 月 22 日
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送付資料

ヴァン・スライクのマクギー上院議員との会見報告。

同議員の考えるところ要旨次のとおりである。

1. 議会進歩派は軍事に削減と象徴的勝利としてのABM打倒を組んでいる。
2. 進歩派はABMおよびMIRVを内題とすべきである。
3. ニクソン政権はABMに内題対決に勝つ自信を持っている。ニクソンの軍事政策立案に内題はキンシントン、レアト、ロジャースの順に影響力を持っている。
4. 沖縄内題に内題同議員は部分的にしか知らず、同島における米軍の行動力の自由は残っているが、沖縄、日本の世論を考慮し、早い機会に(11月までに)返還の時期(3~5年後)を約束して世論を静めるべきである。

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本信写送付先:

(別添省略)

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秘  
July 18, 1969

Mr. Akitane Kiuchi  
First Secretary  
Embassy of Japan  
2520 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20008

"CONFIDENTIAL"

Dear Mr. Kiuchi:

As you know, I spent nearly an hour yesterday afternoon with Senator Gale McGee of Wyoming, obtaining his analysis of the current defense debate, from his vantage point as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (He is also a member of the powerful Appropriations Committee, and chairman of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee.) Senator McGee, whom I have known since 1957, when he was a professor of history at the University of Wyoming, was elected to the Senate in 1958, reelected in 1964. As you are aware, he has been an articulate and sophisticated "hawk" on defense policy, and at the same time a liberal on foreign economic and on domestic economic and social policies. He was a strong ally of President Kennedy, but is not politically close to Senator Edward Kennedy.

Incidentally, Sen. McGee left the floor of the Senate, which was in secret session, to keep his appointment with me.

Following is a summary of his views, as he expressed them to me.

1. The current ABM-defense debate is being pressed by the liberals with the intention of producing a basic change in national priorities, and major changes in strategic foreign policies, through a process of (a) mobilizing public opinion against the "military-industrial complex" and the high defense budget; (b) forcing substantive cuts in the defense budget, in addition to administrative cuts on grounds of efficiency, etc., which both

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sides are prepared to make; and (c) effecting an important symbolic defeat of the Administration -- i.e., Safeguard ABM.

2. The liberals probably chose the wrong issue, since a better case could be made for deferring MIRV. Indeed, the Administration is probably prepared to make a "deal" on MIRV -- e.g., accepting the Brooke proposal for a bilateral ban on further MIRV testing.

3. The Administration is confident it will win on the ABM showdown, although he feels it may accept the McIntyre or some other compromise in order to expand quantitatively its support in the Senate. The President is under some pressure from political advisers to make a bold shift to a new defense policy for political reasons, but key substantive advisers and the President's own instincts, support a strong stand on a "policy of continuity" in defense budget and strategic posture. Key adviser on this is Henry Kissinger, with Laird next, and Rogers third in influence. The President, according to Mr. McGee, is quite firm on his objectives.

4. Current strategy of the Administration and its supporters is to stretch out the ABM debate a while longer, to try to dissipate the liberals' momentum, and to count on popular support of the President as Commander-in-Chief for the extra margin of political pressure needed to insure passage of the Administration's minimum defense program in the 91st Congress. Continuing progress on Vietnam deescalation is expected to strengthen the President's public position as well as weaken the effect of the "neoisolationist" movement.

(On each of the above four points the Senator's analyses confirms our own analysis, submitted to you on July 11.)

5. On Okinawa, Sen. McGee is obviously only casually informed, so his views must be taken as personal rather than representative of any group of Senators. He sees the problem, naturally, in terms of long-range U.S. strategic interests, and is thus reluctant to lose U.S. freedom of action in Okinawa as long as the strategic threat remains uncertain, and especially in the face of the current domestic liberal onslaught on the defense budget and posture. At the same time, he recognizes the direct

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domestic political pressures on the Japanese Government (which constitute indirect pressures on the U.S. Government). He therefore favors an early (certainly by November) firm commitment on a reversion date -- three to five years from now -- with the hope that such an agreement would "defuse" Okinawan and Japanese public pressures on Tokyo. The nuclear-storage and base-use questions he would like to see deferred till the reversion date.

I had made it clear to Sen. McGee (both when I asked for the appointment and at the beginning of the interview) that I was there to ask questions and to gain the benefit of his insights, in order that I might be better informed and thus be able to provide more authentic political analysis to my client, the Gaimusho. Thus I made no attempt, during the interview, to influence the Senator's thinking. Only on this basis, I think, would it have been possible to have such a candid exposition. He has, moreover, invited me to keep in touch, and will be glad to talk with me again should it seem useful to do so.

Very sincerely,

*Piet van Sijck*

PVS:gh