

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 米国関係
（議員等発言(2)（講演、記者会見等）

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第ニ回沖縄内題に關する日米議員懇談会出席者記者会見

マスクー上院議員記者会見 (44.2.19)

スコット上院議員記者会見 (44.2.20)

(回覧番号) 外務省電信案 (分送)

秘密表示 (極秘・秘の朱印)	符号表示 暗 略 平	総第 7417 号
第 298 号	昭和 20 年 2 月 21 日 3 時 分	
大至急 (至急) 普通 LTF	発電係	

大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 官房長	主管 アメリカ局長 参事官 北米才一課長	主管局部課 (室) 名 米北1 起案 昭和 年 月 日 44 2 20 起案者 鳩 電話番号 446
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臨時代理大使
在米 下田 (大使) 総領事
あて 登天 大臣 発
代理

大使 臨時代理大使
総領事 代理 あて

件名 沖縄に関する資料送付結果

1. 当地報道によれば、18日、米下院外交委員会委員会が沖縄視察団の報告書を発表したと報じられた。右要旨回電あり。また、同報告書が送付された。(右が去来が米側関係者の右に報告材料あり)

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2. 牙利、当地代付、マキ上院議員が、19日、当地に於ける記者会見で、「沖縄の返還時期は今年中」（沖縄返還内閣内閣で発言）と自報（203と3）詳細は存じず。右も、右発言内容につき、同会の上、回電あり。（12月21日現地同様に取付あり）

44.2.21 十八西京報

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万博

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
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電信写

大政通外電
務務房
次次房
臣官審審長
研書文会當給
送人電厚計
参調折
参領旅移

総番号(TA) 6765 主管
69年2月20日23時00分 ワシントン 発信
69年2月21日13時40分 本省 到着

外務大臣殿 下田 (大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

オキナワ問題 (マスキー及びスコット上院議員会見)

第495号 平 至急

貴電米北一第298号2。に関し

1。(1) / 9日行なわれたマスキー上院議員の記者会見要旨次のとおり。(記録送付した。)

(イ) (日米議員交流の経緯を述べた後) 会議中の主要な問題はオキナワと安保条約問題の2つであつた。日米通商関係についても話し合つた。中共、国府、東南アジアの問題についても広いかく度からとり上げると共に、オキナワ安保問題のかく度からも討議した。

(ロ) 会議はそつ直な意見交かんをはかるため非公開であつたので、オキナワ問題等についての日本側の立場を明らかにすることはちゆうちよしたいが、自分の得た印象を述べることとしたい。

オキナワ問題は感情的 (EMOTIONAL) なものであり、米國人が理解し得ない程強れつなものである。それは、1970年日米安保条約の一応の期限が来る以前に行なわれる公算の大きい総選挙においてKEY ISSUEと

参北東経
中西
参北北保
参一
参西東洋
西東
参近ア
次総経国万
参賢統
参政技二
国一理
参条協規
参政経科
参社専
参通外
文長

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なるであらう。オキナワ問題は安保条約継続如何の問題と関連している。オキナワ問題が日本国民の大多数が支持するような形で解決されないならば、安保条約継続そのものに相当困難な情勢を作り出すこととなる。日米関係のみとおしを暗いものとするであらう。オキナワ問題には人権問題が含まれている。米軍の施政下に100万人の住民が服しており、彼等は日本国民としての人権をうばわれていると考えているのであり、かかる感情は非常に強くなっている。

(ハ) そこで問題は、施政権の日本への返かであるが、その具体的期日は合意されていない。自分は本年末のワシントン・サトウ会談において少なくとも返かん期日の合意位については検討されることになると考えている。基地の態様については (i) 核の展開の態様を如何に扱うか、(ii) 本土なみとするか否か、(iii) 核ゆき自由使用とするか否かの3つが考えられるが、日本政府はこの問題についてはコミットしていない。

日本の各政党の主張はそれぞれ異なっているが各党とも米軍基地ないしは施設の削減を希望している。日本における米軍の存在は減少してゆくものと思うが、そのペースはヴェトナム戦争の帰すう如何によるであらう。

(2) 以上の要領ちん述の後記者より質問がなされたが主

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要点次のとおり。

(イ) 返かん期日について、日本のノ部筋は7/年、72年等の期限を述べているが、自分はそれはUNREASONABLEな線だとは思わない。本年中にその合意に達すべきであり、また遅しなればならない。基地の態様については日米両国政府がFULL CONSULTATIONを行ない、かつFULL UNDERSTANDINGに到達することがかん要と思う。

(ロ) 米側としてはオキナワの軍事的価値については、オキナワの基地を移すことの可能性も含めてHEARD LOOKをやる必要がある。自分は今般の訪日で得た印象を軍当局にもはかつて、代替基地の問題等についても意見を聞いてみたいと思っている。

(ハ) 施政権の返かんと基地の態様についての合意はパッケージでなされるべきものとする。

(ニ) オキナワに現に核が存在するか否かについては軍事上の機密事項であるから自分は言う立場にない。

(ホ) 日本国民は中共の核のきょういについてほとんど関心がない。日本政府が中共との政治的外交的関係の改善に努力せんとしているが、自分はそれが可能だと思うし、そういう努力は米側の考えていることとも一致する。ただし、中共のアグレッシブな対外し勢には問題がある。

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(ハ) 社会党は日本の安全保障について何も考えていないが、日本の長期防衛政策についてもHEARD LOOKが必要であろう。

(3) 本件会見(内外記者、テレビ等をあわせ30-40名の出席者があつた由。)をちよう取した当地邦人記者団の印象をそう合すると、マスキー上院議員は今次訪日においてかなり問題の核心をはあくしてきたものとみられ、日本のすがたを客観的にとらえ、政府をこう束するが如き発言はさげつつも特にオキナワ問題を人道問題としてとらえている点については米人記者の共感をよびおこしたものとみられている。

(4) 右会見においては、72年大統領選出ばの意向如何等の内政問題(この点について同上院議員は要請があれば受けて立つ用意ありとしてかなりの関心を示した由)にも言及したが、当地20日付各紙はこれら内政問題について報道したのみでオキナワ問題についての発言は報道されていない。

2. スコット上院議員は20日小人数の記者とINFORMALに会見したが、同議員報道官等よりちよう取したところ要旨次のとおり。

(1) オキナワの施政権返かんは日米間の緊急な課題である。返かんの期日についてサトウ総理訪米の際に合意すべ

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きてある。日米関係上も日本国内における緊張を緩和する意味でも、返かん期日について交渉することは有益と思う。

(2) 基地の態様については施政権返かんの時期までにはつきり合意しておくべきである。(返かんの期日については特定の時期をメンションせず。基地の態様についての合意のタイミングと返かん期日の合意のタイミングとは必ずしもリンクさせないでも良いということを示さし。米国政府は日本政府を信頼しなくては行けないと述べていた由。

(3) ヴイエトナム戦争が終了するまでは、オキナワ基地の使用を停止することはアジアの安全保障上不可能であり、B-52の撤去もむづかしい。

(4) 日本政府は安保条約の継続、オキナワ基地の維持を支持しており、米軍はオキナワを離れるべきではないという事につき日本国民の理解を求めるべく努力している。

3. 以上要するにマスキー、スコット両議員が日本より帰国後直ちに前述の如き見解を表明したことは今次訪日においてオキナワ問題に関する日本のすがたに深い印象をうけたことをもの語るものと思われ。その意味で今次議員交流は京都会議、サンタペーペラ会議等に加え貴重な成果をあげたものと認められる。

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海外広報課長 北米第一課長
 参事官
 送信公信

政 第 1465 号	昭和44年 2 月 20 日
外 務 大 臣 殿	在 米 下 田 大 使

引用公信・電信番号 往電才 495-子

送 付 資 料 マスナー・マスケット上院議員の記者
 会見

- 1 Evening Star Feb. 20, 1969
 "Muskie 'Interested' in '72 race, he says"
- 2 ESM Press Conference --2/19/69--4 p.m.-- Trip to Japan
- 3 New York Times Feb. 20, 1969
 "Muskie says his interest in the Presidency is rising"
- 4 Washinngton Post Feb. 20, 1969
 "Muskie 'Interested' in '72 nomination"

- 要理
- 首席事務官
- 南(方)
- 渉外課
- 漁業
- 航空
- 科学協力
- 連絡調整
- 調査
- 力夕夕
- 局業務



付属添付 付属空便(行) 付属空便(D. P.)

本信写送付先: (別添省略)



—Associated Press

SEN. EDMUND MUSKIE

PEOPLE IN THE NEWS

Muskie 'Interested' In '72 Race, He Says

By the Associated Press

Sen. Edmund Muskie said yesterday, "I'm getting increasingly interested" in the Democratic presidential nomination in 1972.

But he added, "Whatever enthusiasm I am able to generate may cool off."

The Maine senator, Democratic candidate for vice president last year, told a news conference his campaign experience has shown him the immense financial and organizational support necessary for a national race.

"It's quite an undertaking for a man without means," he said. "It becomes more awesome the more I contemplate it."

He said he is not surprised at recent polls showing Sen. Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts as considered leading prospect for the 1972 nomination.

Asked about Hubert Humphrey's claim to leadership of the party as its presidential candidate last year, Muskie commented: "I recognize him as the titular leader, whatever that is."

ESM Press Conference--2/19/69--4 p.m.--Trip to Japan

Perhaps I might begin by saying that describing what the trip was and what we did and something about the issues that were discussed and then if you would like to ask some questions I would be happy to try to answer them.

The trip was in response to a long-standing Japanese interest in Japanese-American Interparliamentary Conference comparable to those that we have with Canada and Mexico. Legislative leaders here in America have always taken the position that it is difficult enough now to find the time to attend the conferences we have, and so there has been a reluctance to establish another formal official conference with the Japanese.

However, the American Assembly of Cornell University and the Ford Foundation after exploring this request, determined to sponsor such conferences itself and the first one was held in Shimoda Bay, in Japan in the autumn of 1967. The second one was held last April. I did not have an opportunity to attend that one.

Then there was this one. Seven American Senators and six members of the American Congress attended and it was an excellent week of conferences.

It was very unusual in the sense that we did not meet with a broad representative delegation of the Japanese diet but rather met with representatives of each of the four parties separately, going over the whole range of issues with representatives of which each of the four parties in closed door meetings which made it very long and in the sense of repetition somewhat tedious at times.

But, nevertheless, I thought it was a very interesting format because it gave us insights into the interplay of Japanese politics as between the political parties. We got some idea of what they felt about each other, which

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is always useful. And, of course, we were able to concentrate a little more effectively upon the precise position which each party took on the issues.

The two issues that were most in evidence in the course of the week or six days of dawn to dusk meetings that we held were the Okinawa issue and the security treaty issue.

In addition, we did get into discussion of Japanese-American^{trade} relations and economic intercourse generally.

The nature of the Far Eastern situation at the present time/especially Communist China, Taiwan, Southeast Asia--and we discussed that in the context of the Okinawan security treaty issues as well as more broadly.

We met not only with the ~~Japan~~ Japanese parliamentarians which took most of the week, but also with--on the last day, Saturday morning--representatives of the editorial ~~boards~~ boards of the leading Japanese newspapers. That, in many ways, was the most interesting of all the ~~sessions~~ sessions because after an initial awkwardness we found them most responsive to a very frank and full exchange of views on all these issues.

I am under some reluctance ~~to~~ about discussing Japanese positions on these issues because each of these meetings was closed door in order to promote as much candor and frankness as we could in the exchange BETWEEN individuals.

I think I am in a position to discuss general Japanese attitudes in ~~so~~ so far as we have developed any impression of them in the course of the ~~Japan~~ conference. The Okinawa issue is a very emotional one and carries an intensity which I think we in America don't appreciate. It could will be a key issue of the next Japanese election campaign whenever that may come and it could conceivably come before the security treaty runs out in 1970.

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And the Okinawa issue, of course, is related to the question of whether the security treaty will be continued. And so, it is very important-- if the Okinawa issue is not resolved in a way that can be supported by a majority of the Japanese people, it could create considerable ferment and difficulty with respect to a continuation of the security treaty itself. It could, I think, color our relations with Japan generally in the next term at least. There is in the Okinawa issue a very strong human rights question involved. There are a million people ~~is~~ living under military rule--American military rule--considering themselves deprived of their human rights and of their rights as Japanese citizens under the Japanese constitution. And they are beginning to feel very strongly about it.

We met with the delegation of Okinawan citizens in order to get direct expression to exposure to their feeling about it. So that the question of Okinawa involves first of all the reversion of the administrative control of the island to the Japanese. We have already conceded since World War II that reversionary rights to Okinawa belong to the Japanese and we have promised-- several presidents have promised or have committed themselves to the objective at least--of reversion to Japan at some point. No date for such reversion, even of administrative control, has yet been agreed upon and at least that much of the question would be considered by the President and Prime Minister Sato later this year, I assume.

But also involved is the question of our military bases on Okinawa and the extent to which, if at all, their use should be limited--more limited than it is now. With respect to military bases on the mainland of Japan, there use or any substantial change in their use can be accomplished only after prior consultation with the Japanese government. And so the questions with respect

to Okinawa bases are these:

1. To what extent the Okinawan bases can be used in connection with ~~the~~ our nuclear capacity.
2. Whether or not the prior consultation formula of the mainland bases should be now applied to the Okinawan bases--it is not now ~~applied~~ applied.
3. Whether or not the Okinawa bases should be freely used by America, without prior consultation, that is, for weapons or military purposes other than nuclear weapons.

Those are the three military questions involved in the Okinawa question.

The Japanese government has not committed itself to a position on the military bases. It will seek to gather a definite date on reversion of administrative rights. The four political parties ~~desire~~ differ with each other on this range from the government position which I have just described to the position of the Japanese socialist party which asks for immediate ~~the~~ reversion of Okinawa and immediate segregation of the security treaty. With respect to the security treaty the position of the government I think will be or will tend to be to support its continuation but all parties would like to see a reduction of the number of bases and facilities ~~that~~ maintained between United States on Japanese soil. I think there are now some 149.

We began in December of last year the process of returning 50 of these and I think that that process of diminishing the United States presence on Japanese soil will continue. Its pace will depend in my judgment upon the outcome of the Vietnam ^{war,} years.

NEW YORK TIMES
FEB 20 1969

**Muskie Says His Interest
In the Presidency Is Rising**

WASHINGTON, Feb. 19 (AP) — Senator Edmund S. Muskie said today "I'm getting increasingly interested" in the Democratic Presidential nomination in 1972.

But, he said, "whatever enthusiasm I am able to generate may cool off."

Senator from Maine, the Democratic candidate for Vice President last year, told a news conference that his campaign experiences has shown him the immense financial and organizational support necessary for a national race. "It's quite an undertaking for a man without means," he said. "It becomes more awesome the more I contemplate it."

WASHINGTON POST
FEB 20 1969

**Muskie 'Interested'
In '72 Nomination**

Associated Press

Sen. Edmund Muskie said today that "I'm getting increasingly interested" in the Democratic Presidential nomination in 1972.

But the Maine senator told reporters the problem of building financial and organizational support "becomes more awesome the more I contemplate it."

Asked about Hubert Humphrey's claim to leadership of the party as its presidential candidate last year, Muskie commented: "I recognize him as the titular leader, whatever that is."

北米第一課長

Senator Muskie's Speech
at the Press Club on Feb. 11, 1969.
(.....introductory remarks.....)

Well, this may not be a time of wrong policies or wrong directions but certainly it's a time when Japanese and Americans have a great deal of doubt about the rightness of our policies and the directions which our respective countries are taking not only in this part of the world but around the globe general. It's a time of ferment, as a consequence, in Japan and in America, because of the failures or shortcomings of past policies, domestic and foreign.

Young people in both our countries are skeptical and cynical, they go beyond that, and on many, many instances protest the consequences of bad policies, as they see it, the failure to correct injustice and wrong here in year 1968.

And [..... in] the field of foreign policy, this is a time of ferment in America and in Japan. And discussions that have taken place in the few days since our arrival in Japan make amply clear that Japan is giving much thought to the role it should play in Asia in the decade of the 70's. In this process the Japanese are obviously looking for a way to mesh their policies with future realities in so far as they can anticipate them and see them; in the context of their remarkable economic progress and the resurgence of national pride. We, Americans, like the Japanese, are trying to make sense out of our Post-Vietnam era to which we are, perhaps

overly

録音テープから聴取したものの

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overly, hopefully looking forward, we are beginning to re-examine our political, economic and military role in Asia. And the mood of the American people, as we press for an end to the tragic war in Vietnam, is a mood of sharp questioning. It is time we have a new Administration, and it is only natural that there would be a full scale reassessment of our policies and our commitments. The questioning to which I refer is more than that. This reassessment takes its roots in a national consensus which says quite clear that while we may cooperate with others in the future as we had in the past we will not attempt to undertake the role of policeman in the world.

Mood which is so important to understanding Japan is also important particularly at this time to understanding the United States. Given the present mood of the American people, all options involving a reduction of American are open, and when I say all options, I mean that to include even withdraw from the Western Pacific, even though I personally do not agree that that would be wise nor do I think would many Japanese. What I am getting at is just as Americans have a deep interest in the outcome of the Japanese reassessment of its relationship with the nations bordering the Pacific. So in like measure Japanese have a deep interest in and they are specially sensitive to ^{the} outcome of the American reassessment. What the Japanese decide will surely have a profound effect on the

role

role America plays in the Pacific in the coming decade. And what Americans decide will have a profound effect on Japan's role in Asia. I don't forget the enigma of China, Communist China, but nevertheless, I think it is clear that Japan and the U.S. are the two leading Pacific Powers. By the end of this century we may well be the world's two leading economic Powers.

Everything we do affects each other for better or for worse. I hope I have said enough to show that equality between our two nations must be the first principle of our relationship. Political and economic reality dictates this sort of recognition as does a decent respect for the opinions of each other.

The post-war era in so far as Japan is concerned has ended, and no intelligent American would think any lasting relationship could be constructed other than on the basis of equality, having said this, it follows; that the Japanese people will decide for themselves what they want by way of a relationship with the rest of the world in the decade to come. If the Japanese do not want us here, ^{we will withdraw,} even though this action might be against the best interests of both our nations, and so in defining our new relationships in Asia, we'll have to keep in mind first of all the relations between our two countries.

At this point, I am going to depart from the hollowed
tradition

tradition that has public officials present all the answering. And I am going to try to raise questions that we might ponder together in working out our new relationship, because there will be a new relationship.

The right place to start with is the most fundamental question of all. Will ^ain alliance between America and Japan be necessary in the Post-Vietnam era in Asia, and if so what kind of an alliance?

There are some on both sides of the Pacific who argue that "No" is the answer, that such an alliance is neither necessary nor desirable. There are Japanese contend for illogical or nationalistic reasons that the Yankee should go home. Japan, they say, should retreat into neutrality or take an entirely independent course such as France has in Europe. There are Americans who maintain that we must retire or withdraw from the world in a new form of isolation, or at least to pull out of Asia, and put our reliance for security on our allies in Western Europe. The Japanese as a free people will make their own judgements on these questions. I personally can't agree that retreating into isolationism could benefit either Japan or the United States.

The time has passed when the United States could rationally ignore as it did in the isolationist 19th century almost everything that happened on the other side of the Pacific, and
the

the time has also passed when Japan could withdraw into its own shell as it did in the reign of Tokugawa's.

For more than a century America and Japan have been tied together. Once unhappily locked in a terrible war but more often fortunately enmeshed into peaceful pursuits that become civilized nations.

We are bound together by geography, for the shores of Japan and America are washed by the Pacific Ocean. Our well-being is even more closely intertwined by the need, the mutual need for the vast trade that flows between us and we are caught up together in a ceaseless search for the peace, security, and prosperity.

America must remain a Pacific Power for its own well-being and security. The well-being of Japan, the most important power on the other side of the Pacific, requires on-going growth and stability in the region. So it is evident to me that an alliance, a strong and continuing working relationship between America and Japan, is vitally necessary for our mutual prosperity and the maintenance of peace in Asia.

Well, that's not a difficult conclusion to reach, but now let us begin raising questions about how we should conduct our fundamental relationship.

Do Japanese and Americans, all of them, recognize that without our great two-way-trade both nations would be poorer, and

that

that our consumer citizens would be denied many of products that all of us prize?

Have we done what we could to work out trade adjustment problems and to eliminate unnecessary restrictions? Do Japanese and Americans recognize, that despite their distinct cultural history, both nations, in their consumer-oriented society, in their fidelity to their democratic process, in their growing urbanization, in their mass-higher-education, and in their emphasis on rapid technological discoveries, have much, much in common?

Do they realize that we profit, or can profit, everyday each other's successes and that we can if we wish ^{learn} ~~learn~~ from each other's failure? We might even exchange experiences on unrest in our university campuses.

Another question increasing importance has to do with Japan's role vis-à-vis the developing nations in Asia. The Japanese, of course, will have to decide for themselves, for the poverty in other nations in Asia affects Japan, her well-being and her security. Upon the answer the answer to this question depends, I would think, the Japanese political and economic role in Asia in the decade of the 70's.

America is not likely to engage indefinitely in ⁿ lovely efforts to assist economic development. If Japan participates and exercises leadership in regional development, we will

continue

continue to cooperate in this endeavor. If Japan will undertake economic assistance, I mean economic assistance beyond the simple promotion of her own commercial interests, to other nations in proportion to her economic ability, America would continue her economic contributions to Asia. To do so will not be an easy decision for us or for the Japanese who like ourselves have domestic needs to cope with. But if the leading Pacific Powers, and they are the two of us, do not work together, cannot find the way to work together, in a common effort to help their fellowmen help themselves, the result will be predictable, increasing chaos, instability and [.....] warfare in the regions. We cannot allow our respective increases in affluence to blind us to this immutable fact.

So far as Communist China is concerned I sense that we both agree we have to find the way to bring Communist China into the family of nations. Success in this effort will require a positive response from ~~the~~ China and the process would be gradual rather than sudden. Any honest solution must not ignore Taiwan, its people and government. They have, in terms of offering a better life for their people, come much further down the road than the mainland has today and it would be unjust and unwise to abandon, in our efforts, them to promote a dialogue with Peking. The United States and Japan should seek to act in concert, continue close consultation, on this issue which has characterized our efforts thus far and perhaps propose comments and issues. Our stakes in this matter are

equally

equally great, as is the stake of the world, in the impact which mainland China has on the problem of world peace. So cooperation here is just as vital as assisting the developing nations of Asia.

Let me move then to the question of security. It is quite clear from our talks that the Japanese are reassessing, sharply reassessing, the security relationship with the United States. And we on our side will be doing the same and the answers we come up with will inevitably affect our future. Do we have a need for a security relationship? The easiest thing to do, given the present mood in the United States, would be for us to make things easy for those Japanese who suggest that there is no need for a security relationship. This would not be difficult to sell to the American electorate and it is obvious it would not be difficult to sell to the Japanese people. But if we do get out of Japan, from that action may follow consequences that both sides might have cause to regret. Japan and the United States have an inescapable responsibility, each has an inescapable responsibility, to take a good hard look at what is in the best interests of each in security terms. In so doing, we can not think only of what is necessary for the defense of Japan, but in terms of the security structure that affects other parts of the Far East including, for example, Korea. In assessing our security relationship we must keep in mind the need to anticipate situations that we cannot fully

predict

predict at this moment in history. I think our present mutual security treaty, the principal channel of our security relationship, is flexible enough to provide wide latitude in coming to any new assessments that we may believe to be in the best interests of our respective countries. The Japanese should understand, if it were necessary to seek revision of the Security Treaty, any proposed revision might come in for extremely close scrutiny in the Senate of the United States.

Assuming for the moment that we each decide in our own interest to continue our security relationship in some form, there is still another question to consider; how much responsibility, for the defense of Japan, will the United States bear in the new relationship. The Self-Defense Forces of Japan have, of course, come to take more and more responsibility for the conventional defense of Japan proper. In the 1970's, will both conventional and nuclear protection continue to be necessary? And who can be sure of that? Or, will the American role be limited to the nuclear umbrella and the protective screen of the 7th Fleet? Will an American commitment to defend Japan be feasible without the presence of American forces? We know that in the future the process of slimming down U.S. military installation will continue. How far should it go?

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Let us consider for a moment the vital question of Okinawa, which is very much on Japanese minds now. Not many Americans, it must be admitted, are as yet aware of the full intensity of Japanese feelings on the Okinawa issue. Our attention has been taken with Vietnam and domestic crisis, but Americans have in greater number begun to listen to the Japanese Government and to the Japanese and Okinawan people as they tell us the depth of their desire for reversion. The urgency of Okinawa has come to my attention, to that of my colleagues in this conference and we will take that message back home.

If I may remind you I am not a part of the new Administration but despite November, and because there are many Novembers, we will as Americans preserve the principle of bipartisan approach to foreign policy. In respect for this principle I am not going to prejudge the new Administration's intensive review of foreign policy questions that includes Okinawa, and frankly I do not have all the answers to the complex question of how to go about reversion. But I know I can speak for responsible Americans of both parties, when I say that we have no intention of maintaining a colonial possession in the Ryukyus. And speaking very personally I am convinced the United States and Japan must agree this year on a date for beginning the reversion process.

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In my judgement there will undoubtedly be a change of status of Okinawa in the direction desired by the Japanese and, if not, in my judgement, emotion is likely to out-race reason to the lasting regret of our two nations. Having said this I recognize that many complex problems attend the reversion process making it impossible to return Okinawa to Japan with a simple stroke of the pen. The most difficult of these is of course the question of how to treat American bases once the islands have returned to full Japanese sovereignty. I reject the thought that there is not enough good will and intelligence on both sides to come up with a rational answer. I'd like to say a word of caution to my Japanese friends. Emotions and panic do not make the sensible solution. There is no need to approach Americans on Okinawa in a mood of confrontation and in the mistaken belief that Japan has to force America to listen about Okinawa. Americans will listen to Japanese as friends on this issue but if their receptiveness on this point is mistaken, Americans may tend to compound the mistake by interpreting it as evidence of hostility which in return could trigger even greater American tendencies toward withdrawal that are now evident.

I can see three consequences of creating an emotional or panic-ridden atmosphere on this issue. In terms of the new American mood of which I spoke earlier, the first might well

be

be to convince the American people that they are not wanted in Japan and create pressures for us to pull back despite the evident fact that our destinies are bound up together. The second, given the atmosphere of suspicion, might be to accentuate economic differences that are now soluble through rational efforts, thus damaging the commercial ties which are so important to our two countries. And thirdly a cooling of Japan-U.S. relations would affect in ways we cannot fully predict the actions of other nations in this region some of which who hold attitudes hostile or potentially hostile to our common purposes.

So I urge the rational, calm approach to what I think is inevitable process of reversion. The atmosphere which I think is possible between our two countries. In this approach each nation should hesitate to run in the face of public emotion, each nation should analyse from the standpoint of its own interests the question of the conditions for reversion. As good friends we should then try to reconcile these interests with each side's views and with the state of public opinion which we as citizens of democratic societies respect.

In my judgement the following elements represent reasonable basis for negotiations and agreement on Okinawa. First, a mood of rationality that permits us to avoid the consequences of panic and emotion. Secondly, recognition that in our common interests we must reach agreement by the end of this year on specific date in the future by which the process of reversion of administrative rights to Japan will have been completed. Thirdly, acceptance by the Japanese of responsibility for local defense of the Ryukyus. And fourthly, American respect for Japan's feelings about the stationing of nuclear weapons on the Japanese soil. Now these four points can't cover all of the points which need to be resolved and do not eliminate all of the ambiguities. It is my intention simply to indicate a receptiveness to the points of view which have been urged upon us in Japan this week and the sympathetic understanding for the public opinion which underlies those points of view. And I think in addition that these points are based on what are in my judgement two realistic assumptions. First, the security interests of both Japan and the United States involve more than just the defense of home islands of Japan. Second, and related to the first, the constitutional limitations in Japan's use of Self Defense Forces, limitations which we respect, provide reasons for the presence of the U.S. bases here in order to make viable the concept of regional security.

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I recognize of course that the new arrangements we come to with regard to Okinawa and our security relationship will not last for all time; neither did the arrangements of 1951 and probably the arrangements of 1960. Just as our security relationships have changed in the past they will change in the future.

Let me say one final thing about the Okinawa base question as I think this needs to be pointed out in addition. We, and I mean the United States, do not want an outmoded "Model T" base structure that might needlessly serve to trigger emotions on, say, the nuclear question. I think Americans in general would agree that our bases on Okinawa have relevance and must have relevance to not only Japan's security but that of neighboring countries. Beyond that, pending the hard look which I have already referred to, I see no consensus in the United States on exactly what kind of bases we should have on Okinawa after reversion. Just as we are studying this question, I hope the Japanese after making their own analysis, will not hold back from expressing their views in the belief that we are not interested. Because the American use of Okinawan bases in my judgement after reversion must be consistent with the Japanese views of their own national interest. Any other bases simply will not be viable, nor realistic, nor possible, but I would hope that public opinion in both countries on this issue would be an enlightened, realistic public opinion.

opinion, made so by the frank discussion of this issue on the part of the leaders of both countries with their people.

Now having posed many questions and given few views of my own I'd like to end with one observation. I think we've reached the point, indeed passed the point, when either Japanese or Americans ever have to look upon any reassessment of our common policies as an exercise in confrontation. We have much in common, and nothing will serve our two nations better than the assumption that we can workout questions like this in a spirit of friendship. Over the past quarter of a century, we have moved forward together in a remarkable evolutionary process, from war^{time} confrontation as adversaries, to an adjustment ^{period} of occupation, to our present mutually beneficial relationship. Our relationship from now on must be that of two sovereign powers sharing common interests and prospering from our contacts with each other, and hopefully contributing out of growing wisdom and strength to improvement in the affairs of all mankind. That I think is the ultimate bond that binds us and that can continue to bind us in partnership across the Pacific Ocean into the distant future. As I consider the points of friction which could separate us as the result of our relationships with each other over a quarter of a century, I think it is remarkable that for differences of opinion should center on the relatively few which I discussed today.

We

Well may I thank you again for inviting an unknown Senator from the far distant state of Maine to address you here this afternoon. I still find it difficult to understand why so much of what I believe is listened to today when it wasn't three or four months ago but it's a good solid feeling at least until the press conferences and questions open up. Thank you very much.