

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 米国関係
（議員等発言(2)（講演、記者会見等）

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情報 (昭四八八五十二)

7020字

条約局長
参事官
北米第一課長
アメリカ局長
参事官
極秘

政第6538号

昭和44年8月8日

外務大臣殿

在 米 閣下 田中大使

要処理
首席事務官
調査
空
連絡調整
調査
力ナタ
局庶務

沖縄問題に関する上下両院外交、軍事
両委員会所属主要議員の態度(報告)
田中大使よりおたより
に付、上下両院外交、軍事両委員会所属主
要議員の沖縄問題に関する態度につき調査
方依頼をいたすと、今般同氏より別添
報告書の送付があった。

同氏は本報告書の冒頭において、概要下記のと
おり述べておると、個々の議員の考え方はついで

44.8.11

GA-4

184 外務省

は、田中大使の得てくる印象とは異なるもの
あると、大筋においては同大使の観察と同様の
趣である。かつ、これによ、米政府が今後本件交
渉方針を固め、これを下に議会にアポロチ
せる場合に及ぶ、具体的反響が生ずるものと
見られる。

記

1. 沖縄問題に直接関係にある上下両院の
各議員は、これら本件成行に漸次関心を
持ちはじめているが、態度表明に及ぶまでは従
来に比し、益々慎重かつ注意深くなっている。
この議員の最大関心事は、この政権が今
後決定する方針であり、又これに関連して提
起される安全保障上の問題である。この
問題について、彼等は「討議」するといふより

GA-4

外務省

11月

11月

「國を以て」に對する態度がどうかは別である。

2. 纖維問題に關する限り、このソソ政権が今後固める決定は殆んどこの議案の受入れるところとなる。蓋し、同問題は APM 問題の如く感情的かつ國家的なものではないからである。

3. 上下兩院の關係委員會に對する見れば、軍事委員會では國防省の勸告に従ふとする傾向があるのに對し、外交委員會では國務省の方針に同調しようとする傾向がある。之に加之、特筆をせらるゝのは上記各委員會所屬議員には纖維工業を擁護の選出議員が多数含まれてゐることである。

村属添付

別紙添付



August 4, 1969

The Honorable Hiroto Tanaka
Roving Ambassador to the United States
Embassy of Japan
2520 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Some time ago, when you and Minister Yoshino were able to have dinner with us, you expressed an interest in having us check the current attitude of individual Senators and Representatives who are members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee and of the House Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee concerning the reversion of Okinawa to Japan at an early date.

We have conducted such a preliminary inquiry through other friendly sources than ourselves, with three exceptions, because we felt that such an inquiry would be more impartial and accurate.


In any event, we are enclosing an original and a copy of a confidential memorandum prepared for you on this subject matter. A copy is being sent to Minister Yoshino for his information.

Should you have any questions concerning the information being sent you, we will be pleased to discuss them with you at your convenience.

Inasmuch as I am scheduled to leave Washington for New York this coming Friday, August 8, afternoon, we trust that this information is satisfactory and acceptable. And, may we add that we trust that your return to Tokyo later this month will be a pleasant one. Incidentally, we shall not be back in Washington until August 18.

With kindest personal regards.

Sincerely,



MMM:mt
Enclosure

cc: Minister Bunroku Yoshino

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Views on Reversion of Okinawa to Japan

...-00-...
...the Japan Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee...

For preliminary information regarding the probable thinking of certain members of the Senate and the House of Representatives concerning the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, we checked with friendly staff members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee and of the House Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee, since these four committees have specific jurisdiction over such matters.

We also checked with the staffs of the Senators and Representatives who are members of the four key committees, and with friendly Senators and Congressmen who are not members of these committees but are usually knowledgeable about their attitudes. This includes the leadership of both chambers.

We checked too with newspapermen and radio and television commentators who are interested in military problems and United States-Japan relations.

We did not, however, speak directly with any member of the four committees most involved, with three exceptions, since we may at some future time contact them with specific information or requests and we did not want at this time to prejudice future relationships.

To begin with, it can now be reported that practically all of the Senators and Representatives concerned directly with the problem of reversion are much more careful and cautious than ever in expressing their viewpoints, since they know that the issue of reversion is currently the subject of "delicate and sensitive" negotiations between the United States and Japan. Moreover, all of them are most interested in learning what the final American position will be, and why, since on questions of national security they must be careful not to alienate their own constituencies and to provoke charges on being against "national defense", etc. By the United States position, we mean the Nixon Administration's official position.

While most are also interested in learning Japan's final position too, they also recognize that on issues of this character they should generally vote in terms of the national security and interests of the United States. In other words, at the moment, most members of Congress on these key committees are willing to "listen" more than to "talk" about Okinawa.

It can be summarized, however, that there is the basic feeling that on this particular issue whatever the Nixon Administration decides as its final offer will be pretty much acceptable to most members of Congress, for Okinawa is not the emotional, national question that the safeguard AEM, for instance, is and was. This, of course, is more true for Republicans than Democrats.

Also, the Armed Services Committees of both the Senate and the House tend to follow pretty much the recommendations of the Defense Department, while the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee tend to follow the positions of the State Department.

Complicating and prejudicing the situation is that so many members of all four key committees are from textile producing states and districts and most are very much in favor of import restrictions on Japanese textiles, and many other items.

Still, we believe that it can safely assume that none are unalterably opposed to the principle of reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan. To them, it is a matter of timing, and of the conditions of return.

For what it may be worth, we are indicating what the consensus opinion is thought to be--at this moment, based on the information available to them--on the matters of returning Okinawa to Japan.

Congressional Leadership

Democrats:

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield is probably the best informed of the congressional leadership on this Okinawa problem. He is also the most sympathetic to Japan's general position as known at this time. He can be persuasive and influential with both the Nixon Administration and his fellow Senators if he decides to take a personal leadership position. Usually, however, he allows both the Administration and his fellow Senators to make up their own minds and does not attempt to influence them as to his own thinking. Even more seldom does he use the influence of his office as Majority Leader to persuade the President and his fellow Senators to follow a certain course. On this subject of Okinawa, he is expected to express his own opinion only as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Far East Subcommittee, but not to go beyond this--at least as of the present.

Senate Majority Whip (Assistant Leader) Edward Kennedy will probably follow the lead of Mansfield on this particular subject, since he does not feel any special competence or feeling on the matter. Moreover, since his recent troubles in Massachusetts that resulted in the death of a woman companion, he is not likely to take any strong position on any controversial topic.

House Speaker John McCormack and his leadership team of Majority Leader Carl Albert and Majority Whip Hale Boggs will play a secondary role in this matter, not only because reversion may be undertaken as an Executive Order or Agreement but also because on both military and foreign relations subjects the Senate is the more important chamber. Only if appropriations are required to take care of certain necessary actions or commitments, when the House initiates appropriations bills, will the House leadership become an important factor.

McCormack is inclined to leave military and national security matters pretty much in the hands of the House Armed Services Committee. Generally a conservative and a hawk on security and defense legislation, he will probably follow what course the Armed Services Committee recommends. He does not give much weight to the influence of the Foreign Affairs Committee when military matters are involved.

Albert, having served for a short time in Japan as a member of the Occupation and being an Oxford graduate, is more understanding of the Japanese position, but is likely to defer to the judgment of the Nixon Administration as to what should be done with Okinawa. He too is hawkish and conservative on military topics.

Boggs, though he has visited Japan more than any other member of the leadership team in the House, is also inclined to follow the Administration lead on this particular subject. He also is hawkish and conservative on military subjects.

Senate Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen is going to represent whatever the Nixon Administration decides concerning Okinawa. As the nominal spokesman for the Republican Administration in the Senate, on military subjects he has the tendency to accept the Pentagon's views but will probably accept the White House position without question on Okinawa, even if it differs somewhat from that of the Defense Department.

Senate Minority Whip Hugh Scott on principle believes that Okinawa should be returned to Japan as soon as possible. But, he will probably accept whatever position the Nixon Administration establishes as his own. Of all the Senate and House leadership, he feels most strongly that Japan should assume a greater share of its defense burdens and that it should be more liberal in its import and investment opportunities.

House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, like Dirksen, will be the Administration spokesman on Okinawa policy. Also like Dirksen, he puts great stock in the recommendations of the Armed Services Committee and of the Pentagon.

House Minority Whip Leslie Arends has become the ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee, with the recent death of Massachusetts Congressman William Bates. His views are very similar to those of the Committee Chairman, Rivers, and quite pro-Pentagon. He probably will try to influence both the Administration and Minority Leader Ford to adopt a strong American security position on Okinawa.

Senate Armed Services Committee

Democrats:

John C. Stennis, Chairman, Mississippi. Relies on the advice of former Chairman Richard Russell, who gave up the chairmanship of this committee to be the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee which authorizes funding for every government operation, program, and project. Believes that there is no hurry in returning Okinawa to Japan, especially with the Vietnam War going on, with Red China's increased nuclear capabilities, and with general unrest and tension throughout the Far East area. Has personal motto "Better safe than sorry", which may underlie his attitude on Okinawa too. Has great faith in military judgment generally. If Okinawa has to be returned, believes that the hardest possible bargain for Japan be made, including payment for American-built installations, free use of bases and without "prior consultation", written conditions of return, etc.

Richard E. Russell, Georgia. As the uncrowned leader of the Southern lawmakers in the Senate, as the President pro tempore of the Senate, and as the acknowledged head of the Senate establishment, not to mention that for many years prior to this one he was the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, he is probably the most powerful and influential men on the Armed Services Committee at this time. He and Stennis see eye-to-eye on most issues, especially military matters. He is an advocate of Japan assuming a far greater share of its own defense costs and of "charging" Japan for the cost of certain United States-built installations. Of all members of Congress, on this Okinawa question he probably can influence the Nixon Administration more, that is if he decides he wants to.

Stuart Symington, Missouri. As a former Air Force Secretary, he has reasons to question military judgment. At the same time, he also understands the need for Okinawa as an American base overseas. Not quite as hawkish as Stennis or Russell, nevertheless he generally goes along with their recommendations on national security matters, the ABM being an exception.

Henry M. Jackson, Washington. President Nixon's first choice to be Secretary of Defense last January, he is probably the most popular national figure on defense and security subjects. Generally a Pentagon man who trusts the military judgment, he will depend upon the Defense Department's recommendations as the beginning of his thinking on Okinawa problems. He may be tougher than his general reputation puts him on this specific issue.

Sam J. Ervin, South Carolina. A Southerner who follows Russell and Stennis on military subjects.

Howard W. Cannon, Nevada. Tends to follow Jackson on military matters.

Stephen M. Young, Ohio. Probably the most liberal of the Committee members on most matters, but an unknown on Okinawa. He will probably be more favorable than most if convinced that the Pentagon is wrong in its analysis and conclusions. He is also suspicious of the State Department.

Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii. Being of Japanese ancestry and being from Hawaii, he has a greater sensitivity on this problem than the others. At the same time, he almost always follows Russell on military judgments, except for the ABM. Because Japan is involved and because he does not want to be accused of favoring Japan over the United States, tends to lean over backwards to avoid being charged with favoritism or racism.

Thomas J. McIntyre, New Hampshire. Wants to study situation more, and wants Pentagon briefing. Tends to follow Jackson.

Harry F. Byrd, Virginia. Has been most outspoken opponent recently of early reversion. Follows Pentagon line. Often considered Russell's mouth-piece on this Committee, used to float "trial balloons" on many military subjects. Feels Okinawa needed for American defense in the Pacific, and calls for hardest possible bargaining with Japan if reversion becomes reality. He has expressed view that reversion should be the subject of a bilateral treaty, which will provide the Senate the opportunity to "advise and consent".

Republicans:

Margaret Chase Smith, Maine. Generally, pro-Pentagon. Wants to hear Defense Department views before making up mind. Also, generally in agreement with Stennis and Russell. Has great admiration for latter.

Strom Thurmond, South Carolina. Probably the most hawkish member of the Committee. A Major General (Reserve) in the Army, he is a consistent supporter of the Pentagon, often going beyond its recommendations for a bigger defense, etc. Also, as a Senate champion of the American textile industry, he has a long record of opposing Japanese imports. And, as a Southern white supremacist, he is generally anti-Japanese in all legislative matters.

John G. Tower, Texas. Generally follows the Thurmond line on military matters. Together with Thurmond, he is credited with winning the South for Nixon in last November's election. Probably anti-reversion.

Peter H. Dominick, Colorado. More hawkish than dovish, but not the consistent Pentagon man that Thurmond and Tower are. Will probably accept whatever Nixon Administration proposes.

George Murphy, California. Quite hawkish. An American Legion follower. Strong Pentagon backer. Will follow Stennis and Russell position most of the time.

Edward W. Brooke, Massachusetts. Probably most sympathetic personally to reversion among Committee Republicans, but usually follows Smith leadership on military subjects. Nixon Administration position will have strong influence.

Barry Goldwater, Arizona. An acknowledged hawk on military topics. Also a Major General (Reserve) in the Air Corps, has little patience for civilian interference in military matters. Will probably follow Nixon Administration recommendations.

Richard S. Schweiker, Pennsylvania. While he may be influenced by his colleague, Hugh Scott, also of Pennsylvania and the Minority Whip, who has indicated an inclination to favor the reversion of Okinawa, he usually follows the leadership of Smith. A freshman Senator, he is regarded as a liberal in most matters and might be persuaded.

Summary:

The conservative, military-oriented makeup of this Committee indicates that its majority probably does not favor reversion at this time, and that if reversion is necessary that the hardest possible bargain be made with Japan as the price of reversion.

The permanent Subcommittees of the Armed Services Committee are on Preparedness Investigating (Stennis), Central Intelligence (Stennis), National Stockpile and Naval Petroleum Reserves (Symington), Status of Forces (Ervin), and Military Construction (Jackson). The Okinawa issue has not yet been assigned to any Subcommittee, but it could be assigned to the full Committee, to a special Subcommittee designated for this purpose, or to the permanent Status of Forces Subcommittee. Its members are Ervin, Chairman, McIntyre, and Byrd of Virginia (Democrats), and Murphy and Schweiker (Republicans).

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Democrats:

J. W. Fulbright, Chairman, Arkansas. Quite dovish and among leaders in Senate of those who believe that the United States should reduce its overseas commitments and expenses. While he has some influence with the President and with the Secretary of State, he will probably go along with their recommendation unless it is "obviously" improper and unreasonable. He has expressed sentiment for return in principle, but has not spelled out conditions for such reversion. Will probably accept whatever is proposed by the Administration, though he may ask that it be considered as a treaty and subject to ratification by the Senate on the grounds that reversion may result in a commitment of American troops to Asia, etc.

John Sparkman, Alabama. More cautious and more hawkish than Fulbright, with considerable admiration for Russell and Stennis. Having been Chairman of Far East Subcommittee for many years, he knows the Okinawa problem quite well.

He too seems to favor return in principle, though his price would be relatively high, compared to Fulbright and Mansfield, for instance.

Mike Mansfield, Montana. Majority Leader of the Senate and Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee, this former professor of Far Eastern history also favors reversion in principle. Like the Chairman, an intellectual, but more liberal generally, he may be the one to best express Japan's position, though it is likely that he will back almost any Administration formula for return.

Albert Gore, Tennessee. Now a rather frustrated Senator who once had vice presidential ambitions, he has become a critic of general Administration policies, including in foreign relations. But on Okinawa, he may follow the Stennis-Russell leadership because he admires them both generally. He is not impressed by the Pentagon as a rule.

Frank Church, Idaho. An acknowledged western liberal, he is inconsistent in his positions on many foreign relations matters. Probably for reversion in principle, but probably also for conditions that may be put down by the Administration.

Stuart Symington, Missouri. The only Senator on both the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, an estimate of his views was given in the earlier section on the Armed Services Committee.

Thomas J. Dodd, Connecticut. Probably the most hawkish of all the Democratic Senators on the Committee.

Claiborne Pell, Rhode Island. Also considered an eastern liberal on most matters. Has been in Japan and admires particularly the new railroad lines between Tokyo and Osaka. Has, however, criticisms against Japanese textile and trade policies. His views on Okinawa are unknown.

Gale W. McGee, Wyoming. A western liberal, he is one of the leading doves on Vietnam. His views on Okinawa are unclear, though understand that he is generally sympathetic in principle.

Republicans:

George D. Aiken, Vermont. This dean of Republicans in the Senate is considered a moderate liberal. His views on Okinawa will probably be what the Nixon Administration sets forth, though in principle he favors reversion. He is considered to be rather dovish.

Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota. A midwestern conservative, he generally follows the Pentagon hawkish line. He usually accepts the Nixon Administration views, though he often follows the Thurmond leadership on military matters.

Clifford P. Case, New Jersey. A gentle liberal who is known as a "loner" in the Senate. Usually independent, it is thought that he favors reversion in principle at least.

John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky. Also generally considered a Republican liberal, and a dove on Vietnam. He probably favors reversion in principle, but probably will go along with the Nixon Administration formula.

John J. Williams, Delaware. A conservative eastern Republican, he is planning to retire after next year. He follows Russell-Stennis line on most military issues.

Jacob J. Javits, New York. Probably the most vocal and aggressive of all liberals on the Committee. A dove in most military matters, he favors the return of Okinawa in principle. He feels that Japan should bear a greater share of its defense burden, though, which is an attitude that he shares with an increasing number of Senators and Representatives.

Summary:

Contrasted to the Armed Services Committee, the Foreign Relations Committee is studded with liberals. As a matter of basic principle, we think there is little question that a majority of the Committee would favor reversion of Okinawa. On the other hand, little is known as to what conditions the Committee would like to impose on any return program. Unfortunately, this Committee has relatively little influence and prestige at this time, especially compared to the Armed Services Committee.

Since the Foreign Relations Committee has a permanent Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, the Okinawan issue will be assigned to it if and when the subject matter is submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for consideration. In any event, this Subcommittee will consider the problem as a part of its regular activities. Its members are Mansfield, Chairman, Sparkman, Gore, and Dodd (Democrats), and Aiken, Mundt, and Cooper (Republicans).

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Because House members are not expected to have much influence on the Administration's Okinawa policy, and because there are so many members of the Armed Services Committee (30) and of the Foreign Affairs Committee (38), except for the Chairman and the ranking Republican (Minority) member we shall note the probable position of the Representatives involved as follows:

PRO--Probably for return in principle, and will go along with Administration policy.

CON--Probably does not favor return at this time, but probably will go along with reversion if Administration so suggests.

UNKNOWN--Position unknown at this time, though probably will accept Administration's program.

House Armed Services Committee

Democrats:

L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman, South Carolina. Runs Committee almost as dictator. Because of his personality and ambitions, and because his Committee must authorize Pentagon projects before appropriations can be considered, he is often considered the single most influential man on defense and security matters. All the armed forces defer to him, for fear of risking his anger. His Committee members also tend to rubber stamp his wishes because he uses his "patronage" with the Pentagon to determine which districts receive forts, installations, defense contracts, etc. He seldom confers with his Senate counterpart (Stennis) and often "bullies" Stennis to defer to his ambitions. He is pro-Pentagon minded and is among the most nationalistic and militaristic members of the entire Congress. He often collaborates with Thurmond on military projects and matters. As far as Okinawa is concerned, he feels that it should not be returned now because North Vietnam, North Korea, and Red China. If it must be returned, he believes in exacting the highest possible price from Japan. From a major textile state, he also resents Japanese textile imports, as well as other imports.

Philip J. Rivers, Massachusetts. PRO.

E. Edward Hebert, Louisiana. CON.

Melvin Price, Illinois. PRO. Probably the most knowledgeable and sympathetic member of the Committee. However, he has some strong feelings that Okinawa should be a "free base" for the United States and that special provisions should be undertaken by Japan to assure that the Okinawan people are "well taken care of" after reversion. He is somewhat fearful that once Okinawa becomes "just another prefecture" of Japan, it will not enjoy the special economic, political, and social status that it currently enjoys. He is aware of pre-World War II Okinawa and fears that it may again become a "stepchild" prefecture of Japan proper.

O. C. Fisher, Texas. CON.

Charles E. Bennett, Florida. UNKNOWN.

James A. Byrne, Pennsylvania. PRO.

Samuel S. Stratton, New York. PRO.

Otis G. Pike, New York. PRO.

Richard H. Ichord, Missouri. UNKNOWN.

Lucien N. Nedzi, Michigan. PRO.

Alton Lennon, North Carolina. CON.

William J. Randall, Missouri. UNKNOWN.

G. Elliott Hagen, Georgia. CON.

Charles H. Wilson, California. PRO.

Robert L. Leggett, California. PRO.

Floyd V. Hicks, Washington. PRO.

Speedy O. Long, Louisiana. UNKNOWN.

Richard White, Texas. UNKNOWN.

Bill Nichols, Alabama. CON.

Jack Brinkley, Georgia. UNKNOWN.

Robert H. Mollohan, West Virginia. UNKNOWN.

W. C. (Dan) Daniel, Virginia. UNKNOWN.

Republicans:

Leslie C. Arends, Illinois. UNKNOWN (specifically).

Alvin E. O'Konski, Wisconsin. CON.

William G. Bray, Indiana. CON.

Bob Wilson, California. UNKNOWN.

Charles S. Gubser, California. PRO.

Charles E. Chamberlain, Michigan. UNKNOWN.

Alexander Pirnie, New York. UNKNOWN.

Durward G. Hall, Missouri. PRO.

Donald D. Clancy, Ohio. UNKNOWN.

Robert T. Stafford, Vermont. UNKNOWN.

Carleton J. King, New York. PRO.

William L. Dickinson, Alabama. UNKNOWN.

Charles W. Whalen, Jr., Ohio. UNKNOWN.

Ed Foreman, New Mexico. UNKNOWN.

John E. Hunt, New Jersey. UNKNOWN.

G. William Whitehurst, Virginia. UNKNOWN.

Jorge L. Cordova, Puerto Rico. UNKNOWN. (non-voting)

Summary:

The House Armed Services Committee has four permanent numbered Subcommittees (Subcommittee #1--Philbin, Subcommittee #2--Hebert, Subcommittee #3--Price, and Subcommittee #4--Fisher) to which the Chairman may assign any bills, provided that they do not come within the jurisdiction of the following special permanent Subcommittees or of a specially created Subcommittee for the purpose: Armed Services Investigating (Rivers), Antisubmarine Warfare (Stratton), Central Intelligence Agency (Rivers), Exchanges and Commissaries (Philbin), Military Airlift (Price), U.S.S. Pueblo (Pike), Real Estate (Bennett), Retirement (Hebert), Seapower (Bennett), Service Academies (Hebert), and Supplemental Service Benefits (Byrne).

Because Subcommittee #3, the Price Subcommittee, handled the authorization of appropriations for the Civil Government of Okinawa, it is anticipated that this issue will be referred to it. Members are Price (Chairman), Pike, Ichord, Leggett, and Hicks (Democrats), and O'Konski, Hall, Stafford, and Whalen (Republicans).

House Foreign Affairs Committee

Democrats:

Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman, Pennsylvania. Amiable, friendly, medical doctor. Quite friendly to Japan generally. PRO.

Clement J. Zablocki, Wisconsin. For many years, and until this year, was Chairman of Far East Subcommittee. Considered by many to be the real power of this Committee. PRO.

Wayne L. Hays, Ohio. PRO.

L. H. Fountain, North Carolina. CON.

Dante B. Fascell, Florida. CON.

Leonard Farbstein, New York. PRO.

Charles C. Diggs, Michigan. PRO.

William R. Murphy, Illinois. Chairman, Far East Subcommittee. PRO.

Cornelius E. Gallagher, New Jersey. PRO.

Robert N. C. Nix, Pennsylvania. UNKNOWN.

John S. Monogan, Connecticut. UNKNOWN.

Donald M. Fraser, Minnesota. PRO.

Benjamin S. Rosenthal, New York. UNKNOWN.

Edward C. Roybal, California. PRO.

John C. Culver, Iowa. UNKNOWN.

Lee H. Hamilton, Indiana. UNKNOWN.

John V. Tunney, California. PRO.

Abraham Kazen, Jr., Texas. UNKNOWN.

Lester L. Wolff, New York. PRO.

Jonathan B. Bingham, New York. UNKNOWN.

Gus Yatron, Pennsylvania. UNKNOWN.

Republicans:

E. Ross Adair, Indiana. Combat officer, World War II in Europe. Strong follower of American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars. Expected to follow Administration position, however, as ranking Republican on Committee.

William S. Mailliard, California. PRO.

Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, New Jersey. UNKNOWN.

William S. Broomfield, Michigan. PRO.

J. Irving Whalley, Pennsylvania. PRO.

H. R. Gross, Iowa. CON.

E. Y. Berry, South Dakota. CON.

Edward J. Derwinski, Illinois. UNKNOWN.

F. Bradford Morse, Massachusetts. PRO.

Vernon W. Thomson, Wisconsin. UNKNOWN.

James G. Fulton, Pennsylvania. PRO.

Paul Findley, Illinois. UNKNOWN.

John Buchanan, Alabama. CON.

Robert Taft, Jr., Ohio. UNKNOWN.

Sherman P. Lloyd, Utah. UNKNOWN.

J. Herbert Burke, Florida. UNKNOWN.

William V. Roth, Jr., Delaware. UNKNOWN.

Summary:

Like its Senate counterpart Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee has a permanent Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Its members are Murphy (Chairman), Gallagher, Hamilton, Diggs, Tunney, Wolff, and Bingham (Democrats), and Broomfield, Whalley, Mailliard, Thomson, Buchanan, and Berry.

August 4, 1969

To this date, it is a very preliminary will of the...
The House Foreign Affairs Committee has a permanent Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Its members are Murphy (Chairman), Gallagher, Hamilton, Diggs, Tunney, Wolff, and Bingham (Democrats), and Broomfield, Whalley, Mailliard, Thomson, Buchanan, and Berry.

アメリカ局長
参事官
北米課長


極秘
極秘

政第 8913 号

昭和44年10月29日

外務大臣殿

在 米 下田大使



沖縄返還交渉に付する米議会との動向

印中大使より。

往電才556号(子)を(毛)報告申進め左本件

に關し、[REDACTED]より手交越した情勢分

析書を一節別添送付申上付。

付屬添付

要処理
首席事務官
南 方
渉外調査
海 洋
航 空
学術協力
連絡調整
調 査
力 夕 夕
局 庶 務



GA-4

3610

外務省

添付あり

Confidential, for Ambassador Tanaka

OKINAWA REVERSION SITUATION

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Congressional Attitudes

Lately, there seems to be a disposition on the part of key Congressmen and Senators, including those who in the past have expressed reservations to the early reversion of Okinawa, to permit State Department negotiators and high officials of the State, Defense, Treasury, and the White House to work out an arrangement for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.

The feeling now seems to be that officials in charge are aware not only of the security problems involved but also of United States interests in the Far East. They seem to be more content than ever to simply let those in State and Defense "run the show", although they have told, and will continue to tell, those in charge that their arrangements must be "reasonable and satisfactory to American concerns".

This is the impression given us by the staffs of the House Foreign Relations Committee and of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee and some of their senior members. To a lesser extent but considerably more than previously, this also seems to be the latest attitude of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee.

Even those like Illinois Congressman William Murphy, chairman of the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, and South Carolina's Mendell Rivers, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who have been insisting that steel and textile

- 2 -

import problems with Japan had to be resolved before any "easy settlement" of Okinawa could be considered, now say that they "have to trust the officials in charge" with working out the best possible terms for the United States in the reversion formula.

Part of this new attitude comes from the fact that Congress is very busy now with Vietnam, inflation, draft, tax reforms, etc. Part also comes from a realization that the reversion problem is not an easy one.

The feeling seems to be that, at most, President Nixon and Premier Sato can only agree to reversion of Okinawa by the end of 1972, and that the specific conditions will continue to have to be worked on during the period when the actual agreements on the terms for reversion are being negotiated. This was what took place on the return of the Bonins, except that the final agreements on Okinawa will take considerably longer, since the problems are bigger and more complex.

There is more and more sentiment among members of Congress that the financial arrangements for the payment of nonmilitary facilities built by Americans will be a major headache. But, they seem to feel quite strongly that the Japanese should pay for such establishments.

There is also more and more sentiment that Okinawa will be a part of a package deal involving some trade and investment concessions. Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, for instance, in speaking in Cincinnati to governors of both the United States and Japan this past Wednesday (October 22) evening declared that more than Okinawa

reversion would be discussed when the two chief executives meet in Washington in mid-November.

Finally, there seems to be an increasing awareness that American forces in the Ryukyus must be under the same status of forces conditions, including prior consultations, as United States forces in what is now considered Japan proper. Any other more restrictive arrangement would subject the United States to world opinion that it is still considering Okinawa as conquered territory and different from the rest of Japan.

Some Senators especially, such as Chairman William Fulbright of the Foreign Relations Committee, have expressed the belief that whatever agreement is finally negotiated should be subject to ratification by the Senate, since the 1951 Treaty of Peace is being revised. It so happens that these same Senators are among the most enthusiastic supporters of early reversion to Japan. At the moment, there is a consensus that even these Senators are more interested in early reversion than in the principle of treaty ratification.

Like almost any other issue, attitudes could change overnight. But, Okinawa is still not a very "pressing or demanding" matter with the individual members personally or with their constituents.

It may remain in this category, which would make the negotiations easier, especially for the State Department. Or, it may become a "burning issue" two weeks or a week before the Prime Minister visits Washington.

Riots and demonstrations in Japan earlier this week did not receive the attention that some thought they might as indications of anti-American feelings. Perhaps it is because of the riots and demonstrations that are currently taking place in this country that members of Congress and the American people at large are more or less conditioned to accept such violence and activity.

Thoma Visit to Washington

Only to those most concerned because of their official responsibilities, such as members of the foreign relations and armed services committees, in both the House and the Senate, are aware of the recent organization of the Association to Build Okinawa for Okinawans and that former Chief Executive (Governor) Jugo Thoma is its leader.

The letters which this new Association are supposed to send, or have sent already, have not yet arrived in the offices of the 435 Congressmen and 100 Senators. Neither has it been confirmed that Thoma and his associates will be coming to Washington two weeks to ten days before the Prime Minister is scheduled to arrive in Washington. Thoma proposes to call on key Senators and Congressmen, plus the President and the Secretaries of State, Defense, etc.

When the letter arrives, and particularly if they are followed by Thoma and his delegation, it may spark not only general congressional interest but also specific opposition. The Association, as it has been explained to us, feels that a plebiscite should be taken in Okinawa to determine whether its people really want to return to Japan. It also feels that among the reasons Japan wants Okinawa back is for military

and prestige purposes, while exploiting Okinawa as it did prior to World War II.

Thoma is a respected elder citizen, though he was appointed Chief Executive. The State Department is explaining that he speaks for a prominent and affluent group of businessmen who have enjoyed their special status during the period of American occupation. It is pointed out, however, that the election of Chief Executive Chobyō Yara only last November on a "platform" of immediate reversion and his success over runner-up Gunji Nishime of the Okinawa Liberal Party is clear evidence of prevailing Okinawa sentiment.

It is acknowledged that there are some Okinawans who are opposed to reversion. Some of these are opposed for nationalistic reasons, and some because they are making money now and would not like to see their favored position eroded by competition from the main Japanese islands. Thoma fits both categories.

There are also American businessmen on Okinawa who oppose reversion because of their fears over their new status under Japanese administration.

The estimate of the United States Government, however, is that anti-reversion sentiment on Okinawa is confined to a very small percentage of the population.

It is also its estimate that at this late date the Thoma movement would not likely change the scenario of events, although it is conceded that it may have some vocalizing effects in Congress where

textile-state Congressmen and Senators may make use of this divisive factor. Undoubtedly it would have some effect on others who wonder why the United States and Japan should object to a plebiscite among those on Okinawa on the "self-determination of people" principle.

Anti-Sato Demonstrations

As we have reported, the weekend before the Prime Minister is slated to visit Washington (November 14-15-16), another anti-Vietnam War demonstration has been scheduled. This will include a mass march on Washington, with perhaps some 200,000 or more people involved. Like the October 15 demonstration, it is supposed to be non-violent.

Taking part in this anti-Vietnam War demonstration will be what is called Asian Americans for Action, whose listed address is 225 Lafayette Street, Room 713, New York City. A C. Iijima apparently is in charge. This organization is supposedly made up mostly of students of so-called intellectual left. The leadership is in students from Japan attending the New York colleges and universities, Sansei Japanese American students, Red Guard Chinese from New York's Chinatown who are probably Maoists, Korean and Philippine students, and others. They plan to march on Washington this same weekend, but also to conduct demonstrations and teach-ins for the reversion of Okinawa without any strings attached and against continuance next year of the 1970 Mutual cooperation and Security Treaty.

We have no idea of how many are involved in this Asian Americans for Action group, now how many intend to come to Washington. But we have been told that they have asked to conduct "teach-ins" (education)

此は山口県省に調査依頼した。

at Washington churches especially, including those which are predominantly Negro, to explain the dangers of United States-Japan military alliance, etc. They do not seem to regard either President Nixon or Prime Minister Sato with any favor at all.

Our understanding is that of this time no decision has been made as to whether this Asian Americans for Action group will try to stay over and to demonstrate against the Prime Minister when he arrives in Washington and during his stay here. Much may depend on the success of the anti-Vietnam War demonstrations and the support they may secure for their general objectives--reversion of Okinawa and opposition to the Treaty extension.

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October 24, 1969

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注意

- 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
- 2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

を日本から通商上の譲歩を得るためのてこに使うことを要求する意味をもつものであるが。この点においてもSENSITIVE-INDUSTRY-STATES出身の多数議員をようする軍事委員会よりも外交委員会で審議される方が日本に有利であると思われる。また。はい後で返かんの引延しまたは厳格な条件を付する策動をしている国防部の動きからも外交委員会で審議は影響を受けることが少ないといえる。

オキナワのトウマよりの手紙の件については少なくとも外交委員会に関する限り。一般的に圧倒的多数のオキナワ人が即時返かんの望んでいると考えている。また。オキナワ在住米人実業家の働きかけは外交委員会では余り共感をよばなかつた。ただし。軍事委員会はQUITE RESPONSIVEであつた。

4. 下院の動向

外交委員会はベトナム戦争。対外援助に注意を向け。オキナワ問題を未だ十分に検討していないが。大勢は返かんに賛成といわれる。また。多くの議員がトウマ書簡に関連し。PLEBISCITEが必要であるとは考えていない。下院の重要議員(LEADERSHIP)は人民投票を要求する動きはほとんどないといっている。万一かかる動きが始まるとすれば。RIVERS。LANDRUMの

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如きPROTECTIONIST-MILITARISTか自決の原則実施を要求するULTRA-LIBERALであろう。これを要求するにかかる決議が提出される可能性はまずないし。かりに出されても上下両院とも外交委員はこれをFIGURE ON HOLDすると思われる。オキナワ在住米人実業家の働きかけは日本統治下において特権的地位は許さるべきでないとして同情をひいていない。

外交。軍事両委員会の多数議員が軍事基地の重要性を知りつつも。日本は重要な盟邦であり。この問題が日本にとり極めて重要であるならば。オキナワを返かんしなければ日本を他の方向へおしやることとなろうと考えている。パード決議に対する下院の大勢はGO ALONG WITH ITであるが。SENATORIAL PREROGATIVEのため戦うとの気持はない。

5 国務省議員連絡官の見解

上院にはオキナワ返かんに批准を要するとの強い感情がある。国務省はオキナワ返かんと日米経済問題は別であるとの立場をとっているが。多数の議員は国際関係に対する顧慮がなくBLUNTLYに動く傾向がある。また下院軍事委員会にはベトナム戦争が終るまでオキナワを返かんすべきでないとの意見もある。オキナワ返かんのためには上院の批准を求める必要あり。これを避けようとする情勢は

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OKINAWA REVERSION SITUATION

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General Situation with Congress

The congressional situation is very fluid and complicated concerning general sentiment for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan at this moment, less than a week before Prime Minister Sato is scheduled to arrive in Washington for his personal talks with President Nixon on the subject. Much of this has been caused by (1) adoption of the Byrd Amendment in the Senate, (2) letters from former Ryukyu Governor Thoma, and (3) demands from American businessmen in Okinawa that their special interests be protected, which are now being personally presented to influential members of the Congress by a delegation from the American Chamber of Commerce of Okinawa.

At the same time, in spite of all the latest developments, there appears to be general acceptance by congressional members that the Nixon-Sato talks will result in at least the setting of a "date certain" for the reversion of Okinawa. What else is decided upon in the way of conditions for reversion will determine whether such a reversion program will be popular with the Congress or not. But, it seems quite clear that there is a general feeling that--at this juncture in history and in the relations between Japan and the United States--the United States cannot afford to retain complete control over Okinawa as if it were still under military occupation.

On the other hand, we get the impression that most Senators and Congressmen who have an interest in this reversion problem do not have an understanding of the "deep feeling" that the Japanese as a people have about the early return of Okinawa without unreasonable conditions. Accordingly, they look upon this reversion issue as an opportunity to try to bargain for benefits in return for reversion. We have tried to explain how the Japanese feel by suggesting that the United States would resent very much a 25-year military occupation of Puerto Rico, or Hawaii, or even California or Florida, by alien troops.

We also have the definite impression that many members of Congress who are concerned with this issue feel very strongly that the White House and the State Department have not briefed them sufficiently and often enough on what is involved in reversion and what the official United States position on the conditions of return are. Perhaps when State Department officials, including Ambassador to Japan Meyer and Special Envoy on Okinawa Reversion Sneider, meet later this week and next with influential and concerned Senators and Congressmen much of this misunderstanding and confusion will be cleared away.

Overall, however, we must confess that our impression remains that most members of Congress are not very interested in the Okinawa problem, even now. Most members have had little mail on the subject from their constituents and they are so busy with other legislative problems that directly concern their home districts and states that they have little time to devote to this special topic. Most give the impression that if the

- 2 -

President and the Prime Minister agree to some "reasonable" arrangement and if the Administration makes it clear that the arrangement is in the national security interests of the United States, they are willing "to go along".

Congressional Understanding of State Department Position

As we called on various Senators and Congressmen, as well as staff members to these members of Congress and of the Senate and House Committee on Foreign Relations and on Armed Services, we received several general impressions of what they know and feel about State Department policy on this subject.

There is acceptance of the State Department attitude for reversion. There is also a feeling that following the Nixon-Sato discussions, a joint communique will be issued which will be rather ambiguous and "fuzzy", in order that both sides can explain to their respective peoples the conditions of return in the most favorable possible light. They understand that most of that communique has already been accepted by the United States and Japan, with only a few real obstacles left that the President and the Prime Minister will personally have to agree upon by and between themselves. Several who asked not to be identified expressed fears that there might be a number of "secret and confidential" understandings between not only the two governments but also the two chief executives.

Their understanding is that neither President Nixon nor Secretary of State Rogers have yet been asked to make the decision as to whether the reversion of Okinawa should be handled by treaty or by Executive Agreement. They have kept this option open so far and the matter is said to be under study. But most State Department legal advisers seem inclined now to the view that the final decision will probably be by treaty, particularly since the Senate acted so overwhelmingly on the Byrd Amendment.

They feel that such treatment would also assure that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and not the Senate and House Armed Services Committees would have jurisdiction over the reversion treaty. This would mean not only more sympathetic consideration but also formal debate only in the Senate, and not in both chambers of the Congress.

They are aware that one possibility now being considered by the State Department is that there will be a brief treaty submitted to the Senate for its "advice and consent", which would be coupled with a long and detailed Executive Agreement which would embody the negotiated arrangements for the transfer of administrative control. This technique was used in the past in reference to Japanese relations, more specifically the U.S.-Japan "Security" Pact and the Status of Forces agreement that accompanied it. For understandable reasons, there seems to be a reluctance on the part of the State Department to submit a long and technical agreement.

Members of Congress called to our attention the "muddled" language of State Department spokesman McCloskey when asked whether the reversion of Okinawa constituted a revision of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. "The reversion of Okinawa to the administrative authority and jurisdiction of Japan would obviously effect a change in the present status of Okinawa as provided for under the Treaty. However, the fact of Japan's residual sovereignty was made clear by Mr. John Foster Dulles at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference, and the Treaty does recognize that U.S. administration was not intended to be permanent. The question of whether, in view of these facts, reversion would most appropriately be described as a revision of the Peace Treaty and the question of the form in which Congress participates in any decision about Okinawa are obviously related. The whole matter is under study."

After the Nixon-Sato talks next week, it is anticipated that a new U.S.-Japan Committee will be formed to work out the specific details of the reversion of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese administrative control. It will not be a military group as such and its functions will range from defense to health, education, roads, water, legal problems, banking, financial and economic problems, etc. The idea seems to be, not to wait until the day of actual reversion before ironing out the details, so that there may be a smooth transition. This joint committee is expected to take the place of the current Joint Committee.

The military content of any Committee responsibility will have to be prominent. It is said that the basic agreement on this aspect was reached by Assistant Secretary of Defense Nutter during his recent visit to Japan. The details will include the specifics of Japanese ground, sea, and air defense units in the defense of Okinawa.

While such an arrangement will put Japanese forces deeper into Far Eastern waters than at any time since World War II, such officials as Nutter are not trying to persuade Japan to take over completely its own defense responsibilities. Nutter is among those who seems to fear a revival of Japanese nationalism and militarism. For example, he is opposed to permitting the Japanese into the Trust Territories of the Pacific area "for future security reasons".

Senate Views

Some of the more legal minds on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee feel that, technically and legally, reversion can probably take place without any revision of the 1951 Peace Treaty. But, almost all of the Senators now, including those who voted against the Byrd Amendment last week, feel that as a practical matter whatever the final form technically, the Senate will have to "ratify" it. They feel that the President cannot afford to risk senatorial anger, particularly since such anger could well "spill over" into other areas of congressional concern than simply the reversion of Okinawa.

Actually, Senate leaders are now saying that the handwriting was on the wall long before the Byrd Amendment was even proposed. They recall that last April, when the so-called national commitments resolution was adopted unanimously, the Senate served notice on the Executive that it did not want to be ignored on foreign policy decisions which the Senate has a constitutional right to exercise.

In other words, they see the overwhelming 63 to 14 vote for the Byrd Amendment not as one for or against the reversion of Okinawa, but rather as "another notice" to the White House that the Senate continues to insist upon its constitutional prerogatives.

Many members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are also saying, in responding to some hints that the State Department may challenge the legality of being required to submit the reversion arrangement to the Senate for its "advice and consent", that, without particularly meaning to, the Senate action is most beneficial to the Nixon Administration. They say that by forcing the Administration to take the treaty route, they can now explain to Japan why an Executive Agreement on all the terms and conditions is no longer possible. It also makes certain, as we have reported earlier, that the Okinawa question will be considered by the Foreign Relations Committee, where the majority favor reversion. If handled strictly as a matter of overseas military bases, it would have to be referred to both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, where, though a majority may favor reversion, the restrictions on Japanese control would be far more numerous and limited.

These Senators also say that U.S.-Japan relations will be less strained if formal hearings are held, rather than if they are avoided.

While the Byrd Amendment does also serve notice on the Nixon Administration that certain protectionist elements in the Congress, such as textiles, footwear, steel, electronics, glassware, want the President to "bargain for trade concessions in return for Okinawa", knowledgeable Senators say that this was to be expected.

They add that this is another reason that the Foreign Relations Committee is a better forum for Japan than the Armed Services Committees, most of whose members come from textile-manufacturing or other import-sensitive-industry-states. Since members of the Foreign Relations Committee gave us their personal opinion that, in the long run, the demands of the protectionists and others may not upset the kind of agreement the Nixon Administration is likely to reach.

And this assessment includes the military, who are active in behind-the-scenes efforts to delay reversion, or to place such conditions on reversion that its operations could continue pretty much as they are at present when they control Okinawa "completely".

The so-called Thoma letter has been received by quite a number of Senators. While a few, such as Byrd of Virginia, Thurmond of South Carolina, and Smith of Maine are reported to be considering introducing a resolution calling for a plebiscite of the Okinawa people, the general feeling in the Senate, at least in the Foreign Relations Committee, is that there is no question that the overwhelming majority of the Okinawans desire "immediate reversion".

The public opinion poll from the Mainichi Shimbun of November 4 that 86% of the Okinawa people want reversion, which you so kindly sent me, has been most useful too in reinforcing this impression.

The so-called American-businessman-in-Okinawa problem is also not being very sympathetically received by the Foreign Relations Committee, though members of the Armed Services Committee have been quite responsive to their suggestions.

While there is a question of timing within the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, there seems to be absolutely no doubt in the minds of the members that the United States has made a firm commitment to return all of the Ryukyus to Japan and does not intend to retain them as U.S. territory.

A senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee said that Secretary Rogers told the Committee in a closed session that it would be kept fully informed on Okinawa developments. Whether he meant consultations or something more formal was not made clear. But, we received the common complaint that no member of the State Department has talked to the members of the Committee recently, that nobody from State has approached the Committee to set up a subcommittee to receive periodic reports--in closed sessions if necessary--of what the Administration has in mind. There has been no volunteering of information, or request for understanding. The only thing the Department volunteered, we were told, is that it did not want the Byrd Amendment passed. As a member complained, "They could come down and talk to us about the things they have in mind."

Another member told us that "The trouble is that the State Department wants it both ways. When I talked with a Japanese official off-the-record, he told me that the State Department had informed him that the constitutional role of the Senate was "fuzzy" in this area. At the same time, another State Department official told this same Japanese official that unless the Japanese agreed to certain things, the reversion instrument would be brought before the Senate for their approval." While the Senate's action on the Byrd Amendment cut the ground out from under the State Department's gambit, nevertheless it seems that some State Department negotiators were using the reversion issue as a means of procuring certain concessions from the Japanese.

Frankly, this particular member did not think that the State Department's motivation in this cited instance was a result of some other Senators wanting to link reversion with trade.

Summed up, it seems to us that the Senate's concern is two-fold.

1. The constitutional issue. Fulbright and others who favor reversion believe that whatever is negotiated must have Senate support. This attitude is typical of perhaps the majority of Senators.

2. Behind the scenes, there are some who support not only the constitutional question, but also believe that the United States is giving up valuable military installations and rights. Byrd of Virginia is an example of this kind of sentiment. They want something in return. As Chairman Stennis of the Senate Armed Services Committee put it, "If we give up Okinawa, we still have to defend Japan, so we will have to build up another base, at tremendous cost, to do that. What's the sense in giving away an expensive military installation only to have to build an equally expensive one somewhere else?"

Members of both the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees gave us the impression that, under present circumstances, the United States is now responsible for the defense of Okinawa as it is for any American state or territory. Once reversion takes place, they feel that the United States would be committed to defend Okinawa under the U.S.-Japan "Mutual Defense" Treaty. So, as they view it, in a real way, this reversion is increasing the United States commitment to Japan.

Personally, we cannot understand this line of argument, since the U.S. must defend Okinawa in both instances. But, to some Senators, there is a difference in the American commitment to defend Okinawa itself, and to defend Okinawa as a part of Japan.

As far as the actual vote is concerned, we have no idea of what it will be. Much of it will depend upon what the Nixon-Sato agreements are, and how they are presented to the Senate and the public. Moreover, much will depend upon how high a priority and how much work the Nixon Administration puts into the effort to secure "ratification".

If there is only the return of administrative control and the United States is able to keep its bases and weapons on Okinawa, this is one circumstance that the majority of the Senate would vote for "rather easily". But, serious questions could be raised if Okinawa were put on the same basis as the rest of the American military installations in Japan.

And, any evaluation cannot escape some consideration of whether Japan agrees to voluntary textile restraints, and possibly other trade

concessions, although it is hard to try to estimate just how much "power and pressure" the protectionists actually have, especially if the Nixon Administration insists that trade and reversion are different problems and each must be solved in its own separate way.

We know that this past Monday evening, the Japanese gave a formal reply to the American textile proposal of some weeks ago. But we have been given to understand that the United States is not very happy with the Japanese reply. And, unless there can be some arrangement that is satisfactory to the American officials prior to the arrival of the Prime Minister early next week, the President may ask the Prime Minister some "tough" questions that may not help the cause of "quick and generous reversion" of Okinawa to Japan.

House View

According to what we have been able to learn about the House Foreign Affairs Committee, it does not think that there is any militant sentiment against reversion as such in the House. The Committee has been concentrating on foreign aid and on the resolution of the Vietnam War, and so it has not yet begun any definitive work on the Okinawa issue. But, of the 38 members on the Committee, there was said to be little doubt that the majority favored reversion.

Also, most of the Committee members, though receiving the Thoma letter, do not believe that the Okinawans will be mistreated and deprived of their sovereignty if reversion takes place. They do not think that any plebiscite is necessary, or warranted.

A check with the House leadership indicates that there is little movement now for a resolution calling for a plebiscite in Okinawa. There seems to be two groups that may introduce such a resolution, though, and for different reasons, if any introduction is made at all. One is the protectionist-militarists, such as Chairman Rivers of the Armed Services Committee, who is from South Carolina, or Congressman Landrum of Georgia, a member of the House Ways and Means Committee and the chairman of the Ad Hoc House Textile Committee. They would use the resolution as a bargaining weapon to assure that Japan is required to agree to voluntary textile restraints, for instance, in return for Okinawa control. The other is the ultra-liberal Congressmen, such as New York's Wolff, or California's Don Edwards, or Illinois' Mikva, who want to check to see that the self-determination principle is carried through.

To repeat, at the moment, there appears little likelihood in either the Senate or the House that any resolution calling for a vote of the Okinawans on their own future will be introduced. And, if it is introduced, either the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House Foreign Affairs Committee is expected to "pigeonhole" it by taking no action on it. But, if it is to be introduced, the chances are better that it will be in the House, rather than the Senate.

So far too, the request of the American-businessmen-in-Okinawa that their privileged status be preserved by the Japanese in the event of reversion is not being received with too much sympathy. The general attitude seems to be that these privileged few enjoyed special benefits under the current system long enough, but that these special benefits should not be continued over under Japan in discrimination against its own nationals, etc.

While most members of both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Armed Services Committee in the House understand the importance of the military installations, especially among Foreign Affairs members there is the sense that Japan is an important friend and ally. If this is so important to the Japanese, it might turn Japan in other directions if Okinawa were not allowed to be returned to Japan, they argue.

The consensus of the members of both Committees seem to be that the Nixon Administration will turn over the administrative control of the Ryukyus to Japan but retain base rights there.

The House reaction may depend a lot on how the Congress is approached on the problem. If they are asked to give up Okinawa bluntly in so many words, the probable reaction would be to say "Hell, No. We need our bases over there." But properly worded and placed in the right context, it is believed that the House will not cause any undue difficulty to the White House on this issue.

No one in the House is particularly worried about the prestige of the Senate and the Byrd Amendment. The majority feeling seems to be that the House conferees on the State Department appropriations bill, to which the Byrd Amendment has been added, will "go along with it" and that the House will not fight hard for either reversion or for the preservation of senatorial prerogatives.

If the textile import problem is not on its way to settlement, however, it could be a factor in both House and congressional reaction to the Nixon-Sato discussions, according to the estimates of the House leadership on both the Democratic and Republican sides.

Most House members consider reversion to be either a revision of the 1951 Peace Treaty or something very much like a treaty change. Accordingly, while they would like to be "consulted" on developments, in the traditional way they seem to defer to the Senate on this Okinawa issue.

State Department's Liaison View

Reported herewith are some views of the liaison officers of the State Department as to what the Congress thinks of the Okinawa case.

The House is not too concerned with the constitutional issue. It is more concerned with the economic and military phases of the Okinawa problem.

On the Senate side, the constitutional issue is the emotional one. In the opinion of one who has worked on the "Hill" for more than a dozen years, the record on the Okinawa debate over the years shows that there is a strong feeling against anything but a treaty being worked out for reversion. Fulbright is talking more and more like the late Senator Robert Taft did in terms of power and the Executive Branch. Like Taft, Fulbright feels that Congress must act to protect the separation of powers and that the Executive should not be allowed to usurp the constitutional authority of the Senate through default or lack of action on the part of the Senate.

The Department's congressional liaison seems to feel that Senator Byrd has "more on his mind than just the treaty". They seem to think that he wants to use the treaty angle to extract some concessions from Japan, with the President acting as the agent for the Senate in its dealings with the Japanese.

Some suspect that Senator Byrd is "fronting" for such better known protectionists like Thurmond, Pastore, Cotton, etc., and that his Byrd Amendment is in actuality a ploy to "intimidate" the Japanese into agreeing to some trade or other concessions.

Most Senators and Congressmen recognize that the U.S. has a heavy military burden, and that this burden is not lessened appreciably by reversion. They want the Japanese to bear a bigger share of Japan's own defense. And, in addition, they feel the United States ought to get something in return--for example, concessions on textiles, a general lowering of trade barriers, greater ease of investment in Japan, etc. People like Byrd feel strongly that the United States should not give up Okinawa without some quid pro quo for the U.S.

No nose count, preliminary or even informal, has been taken in either the House or the Senate by the State Department's liaison officers. They feel that it is too premature for such activity as of this time. They sense, however, that in all probability the Congress will go along with the President "on any reasonable basis for reversion", provided that "the Japanese do not cause members of Congress to become angry and frustrated on trade and other issues". A few of them have indicated that perhaps the Japanese reaction to American requests for cooperation in the economic field may have more to do with the reversion issue than reversion itself. Frankly, we do not share this opinion.

The State Department people know that obtaining the return of Okinawa is now a matter of honor for the Japanese Government. They understand why

the Japanese don't want to pay for something they used to own and are now getting back. But, they have not been able to communicate this feeling to members of Congress, who see no reason why the Japanese should not pay something for Okinawa. Furthermore, members of Congress do not mind linking Okinawa reversion and trade problems. Members of Congress tend to deal more directly and bluntly, and they do not care so much about "hurting" international feelings.

Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Tresize has said that the two issues are not unrelated--that Okinawa and trade do have some relevance to each other in the context of United States-Japan relations.

On the House Armed Services Committee, as in its Senate counterpart, many of the members are not convinced that it is wise to give up Okinawa. They prefer to keep it, at least for now, on the grounds that the U.S. can always give it back but the U.S. can't get it back from Japan if it wanted to, once reversion takes place. They suggest waiting until the Vietnam War is over and Mainland China "settles down" to peaceful co-existence. The military people are the ones who are asking, "What do we get in return?" And, they are not satisfied with the answers that the State Department has provided them.

These departmental liaison officers feel that it will be harder to secure approval for Okinawa reversion if the treaty route is not now used, especially since the Senate by its vote on the Byrd Amendment has served notice of its intentions to the White House.

In philosophical discussions, it was pointed out that the Amani Islands and the Bonin Islands were returned to Japan by Executive Agreements, and not by treaty. And, it was pointed out that transfer of sovereignty are accomplished by treaty. But, in the case of Okinawa, the U.S. never had sovereignty. No other territory has ever been quite like Okinawa. No one but a Dulles could have concocted a legal situation like this one where the defeated power retained "residual sovereignty" and, therefore, did not lose sovereignty over militarily occupied territory.

At the time of the Bonin settlement, no one raised the question of whether an Executive Agreement or a treaty was required to give the United States legal authority to relinquish administrative rights to Ogasawara. So, the former was used. While this may have established a technical precedent, in the light of the Senate action on the Byrd Amendment, what should the White House and the State Department do? Insist upon the precedent established, regardless of what that may do to good relations with Japan? In other words, what is involved is more than a legal issue, and the State Department is suffering through quite an experience in trying to work out a solution that will be satisfactory to all parties involved.

As an inside, it was mentioned to us that Soviet diplomats are not unmindful of their own situation and are frowning upon the United States intention to return Okinawa. They say that it is extremely dangerous business when the super-powers begin to change the frontiers caused by war. It encourages small powers to do likewise and it can lead to instabilities, the Russians say, on every continent. They point to the Arab-Israeli conflict as an evidence of this instabilities.

In closing, may we add some personal comments of our own.

We are optimistic that the President and the Prime Minister will be able to work out a relatively satisfactory agreement, particularly now that the Japanese have at least given a formal reply of willingness to participate in a multilateral meeting on textiles.

Noting that the second day of meetings will be devoted to trade and economic matters, though, we would caution that the Prime Minister keep this second day in mind when discussing Okinawa reversion on the first day of meetings. He should avoid if at all possible making such commitments the first day in the context of Okinawa reversion that on the second day he will find himself having inadvertently and indirectly made commitments concerning trade and investment opportunities.

And, while it is important that a beginning be made and that a date be settled for the effective reversion of Okinawa, it is equally important to remember that unless great care is taken the United States may have many opportunities in the next year or two, while reversion negotiations on specific conditions are being carried on, to request, and even demand, other concessions on trade and economic matters. In other words, we are suggesting that what happens in the Nixon-Sato talks should be considered as only the beginning, and that care be taken that safeguards against future requests for concessions by the United States in terms of reversion are carefully and specifically set forth.

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