琉球大学学術リポジトリ

日米関係（沖縄返還）44

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71 年 10 月 27 日 13 時 24 分　米国　発
71 年 10 月 28 日 03 時 19 分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

区域協定　委員会　冒頭説明

沖縄上院外交聴聞会（1ナロジャーズ長官発言）

46. 10. 27

~~第3422号 平 大至急~~

（以下英文）

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STATEMENT BY THE HONORAIBLE WILLIAM P. ROGERS SECRETARY OF STATE BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1971

MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE,

I AM HAER TODAY TO EXPLAIN WHY THIS ADMINISTRATION CONSIDERS IT VERY IMPRTANT THAT THE SENATE SHOULD ADVISE AND CONSENT OR THE RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN.

THE AGREEMENT, SIGNED ON JUNE 17 , 1971, PROVIDES FOR THE RETURN OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF JAPAN.

THIS AGREEMENT CAN, I BELIEVE, TRULY BE CALLED AN HISTORIC DOCUMENT ~~SEMICOLON~~ IT WOULD RESOLVE THE LAST MAJOR U.S.-JAPANESE ISSUE ARISING FROM WORLD WAR II.

THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR THE RETURN TO JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION OF AN AREA WHICH HAS BEEN HISTORICALLY ASSOCIATED

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WITH JAPAN AND WHOSE POPULATION STRONGLY DESIRES TO BE UNITED ONCE AGAIN WITH ITS NATIVE LAND. THE RYUKYUS ARE ALSO AN AREA OF SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES. THE AGREEMENT TAKES FULL ACCOUNT OF THIS ~~SEMICOLON~~ INDEED, ONE OF MY PURPOSES TODAY IS TO EXPLAIN WHY WE BELIEVE THAT THIS AGREEMENT AND ITS RELATED ARRANGEMENTS WOULD WOULD PROTECT AND PROMOTE UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE FAR EAST. DUPUTY SECRETARY PACKARD WILL DISCUSS ITS SECURITY ASPECTS IN GREATER DETAIL IN HIS TESTIMONY.

THE AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY REAFFIRMS THAT THE REVERSION OF THE ISLANDS TO JAPAN SHALL BE CARRIED OUT ON THE BASIS OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND PRIME MINISTER SATO ON NOVEMBER 21, 1969. IN THAT COMMUNIQUE JAPAN RECOGNIZED THAT THE PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE FAR EAST CONSTITUTED A MAINSTAY FOR

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THE STABILITY OF THE AREA。THE COMMUNIQUE ALSO REFLECTED JAPAN'S SERIOUS CONCERN FOR THE SECURITY OF COUNTREIS IN THE FAR EAST。PRIME MINISTER SATO SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT ''THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA WAS ESSENTIAL TO JAPAN'S OWN SECURITY''AND THAT '' THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE TAIWAN AREA WAS ... A MOST IMPRTANT FACTOR FOR THE SECURITY OF JAPAN.''

THE PRIME MINISTER FURTHER RECOGNIZED IN THE COMMUNIQUE THAT UNITED STATES FORCES IN OKINAWA PLAYED A VITAL ROLE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST。HE AGREED THAT THE RETURN OF ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS OVER OKINAWA SHOULD NOT HINDER THE EFFECTIVE DISCHARGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE UNITED STATES FOR DEFENSE OF COUNTRIES IN THE FAR EAST INCLUDING JAPAN, AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD RETAIN SUCH MILITARY

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FACILITIES AND AREAS IN OKINAWA AS REQUIRED IN THE MUTUAL SECURITY OF BOTH COUNTRIES。THE USE OF SUCH BASES WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE TERMS OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY OF 1960 AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, WHICH NOW GOVERN THE USE OF OUR BASES IN JAPAN PROPER。

I HAVE DESCRIBED THE CONTENTS OF THE REVERSION AGREEMENT IN GENERAL TERMS IN MY LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF SEPTEMBER 5, 1971, A COPY OF WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TO YOU BY THE PRESIDENT。

THIS LETTER SUMMARIZES, INTER ALIA, THE SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS REACHED。IT NOTES, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE JAPANESE WILL PAY US ~~DORUJIRUSI~~ $320 MILLION AS COMPENSATION FOR CIVIL ASSETS TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND FOR CERTAIN REVERSION-RELATED COSTS。IT ALSO DESCIRIBES THE ARRANGEMENTS REACHED WITH THE JAPANESE TO PROTECT AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS IN OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION。THE

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PROVISONS OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS WERE
WORKED OUT AFTER CLOSE CONSULATATIONS WITH
THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY ON OKINAWA. I BELIEVE
THEY SHOULD PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY
BASIS FOR THE POST-REVERSION PERIOD.
UNDER SECRETARY JOHNSON IS HERE TO
DISCUSS THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVERSION
AGREEMENT IN MORE DETAIL, SHOULD YOU
DESIRE HIM TO DO SO. I WOULD LIKE
TO COMMENT HOWEVER ON ONE MAJOR
PROVSION OF THE AGREEMENT - - THAT DEALING
WITH OUR USE OF BASES ON OKINAWA FOLLOWING
REVERSION.
THERE IS ONE PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN OUR PRESENT TENURE OF BASES
ON OKINAWA AND OUR TENURE OF BASES IN JAPAN
PROPER. IN JAPAN PROPER WE ARE
REQUIRED BY THE MUTUAL SECURITY
TREATY TO CONSULT WITH THE JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT IN THE CASE OF USE OF BASES
FOR MILITARY COMBAT OPERATIONS TO BE
UNDERTAKEN FROM JAPAN, MAJOR CHANGES IN
DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES FORCES INTO

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JAPAN, AND MAJOR CHANGES IN THEIR
EQUIPMENT. IN 1960 PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, IN A
JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED DURING THE
VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER KISHI TO WASHINGTON,
SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD
NO INTENTION OF ACTING IN A MANNER CONTRARY
TO THE WISHES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN WITH
RESPECT TO MATTERS INVOLVING PRIOR CONSULTA-
TION UNDER THE TREATY. SUCH CONSULTATION IS
NOT PRESENTLY REQUIRED WITH RESPECT TO THE USE
OF OUR BASES IN OKINAWA. AFTER REVERSION IT
WILL BE.
ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE
WITH THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WHICH SHOULD EXIST
BETWEEN TWO GREAT ALLIED POWERS LIKE THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN. THE PROVISIONS OF OUR MUTUAL
SECURITY TREATY HAVE WORKED WELL IN JAPAN PROPER.
I AM CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL WORK WELL IN
OKINAWA ALSO. WE AND THE JAPANESE HAVE A
COMMON INTEREST IN THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF
THE FAR EAST -- AN INTEREST WHICH THE GOVERN-
MENT OF JAPAN HAS CONFIRMED ON NUMEROUS
OCCASIONS, MOST SPECIFICALLY, IN THE JOINT

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COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 1969。

IT WAS CLEAR IN 1969, AND IT REMAINS CLEAR TODAY, THAT CONTINUANCE OF A SITUATION IN WHICH A MILLION JAPANESE ARE STILL LIVING UNDER UNITED STATES MILITARY ADMINISTRATION MORE THAN 25 YEARS AFTER THE END OF WORLD WAR II HAS SUBJECTED OUR POSITION IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN TO INCREASING STRAIN。

SUCH A SITUATION IS NO LONGER TENABLE。 IT IS NOT IN KEEPING WITH OUR NATIONAL CHARACTER OR OUR NATIONAL INTEREST。 NOR IS IT CONSISTENT WITH HISTORY。

OKINAWA WAS ONE OF THE 47 PREFECTURES OF JAPAN BEFORE WORLD WAR II。 IT WAS SEPARATED FROM JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION IN JANUARY 1946 BY ORDER OF GENERAL MACARTHUR, SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED POWERS IN JAPAN, AND IT HAS BEEN UNDER UNITED STATES CONTROL EVER SINCE。 UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY OVER OKINAWA WAS CONFIRMED IN ARTICLE III OF THE JAPAN PEACE TREATY OF SEPTEMBER 8, 1951, WHICH GAVE THE UNITED STATES THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE ''ALL AND

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ANY POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION, LEGISLATION AND JURISDICTION OVER THE TERRITORY AND INHABITANTS OF THESE ISLANDS。''

HOWEVER, A MOVEMENT FOR REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN STARTED EVEN BEFORE THE PEACE TREATY WAS SIGNED。 IN MARCH 1951, WHEN NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE TREATY WERE JUST BEGINNING IN SAN FRANCISCO, THE OKINAWA ASSEMBLY ADOPTED A RESOLTUION REQUESTING REVERSION TO JAPAN。 THE VOTE WAS 17 TO 3。 THE THREE OPPOSING VOTES WERE IN FAVOR OF INDEPENDENCE FOR THE RYUKYUS。 TWO MONTHS LATER, IN MAY 1951, KOBYO YARA, THE ISLANDS' PRESENT CHIEF EXECUTIVE, WAS ELECTED THE FIRST CHAIRMAN OF THE ''ASSOCIATION FOR THE PROMOTION OF REVERSION TO JAPAN。'' HE HAS BEEN AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE REVERSION MOVEMENT EVER SINCE, AND WAS ELECTED TO HIS PRESENT POST IN 1968 ON A PLATFORM STRONGLY ADVOCATING IMMEDIATE REVERSION TO JAPAN。

ON SPETEMBER 5, 1951, IN PRESENTING THE DRAFT OF THE PEACE TREATY TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE, AMBASSADOR JOHN FOSTER DULLES NOTED THAT SOME

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OF THE ALLIED POWERS HAD URGED THAT THE TREATY REQUIRE JAPAN TO RENOUNCE ITS SOVEREIGNTY. OTHERS HAD PROPOSED THAT THE ISLANDS BE RESTORED COMPLETELY TO JAPAN. "IN THE FACE OF THIS DIVISION OF ALLIED OPINION," AMBASSADOR DULLES SAID, "THE UNITED STATES FELT THAT THE BEST FORMULA WOULD BE TO PERMIT JAPAN TO RETAIN RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY, WHILE MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR THESE ISLANDS TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM, WITH THE UNITED STATES AS ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY."

IT WAS DECIDED AT THAT TIME THAT, ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES HAD LONG-TERM SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE RYUKYUS, THE "PEACE OF RECONCILIATION" WHICH WE AND MOST OF OUR ALLIES SOUGHT WITH JAPAN WOULD BE VITIATED BY THE ISLANDS' ENFORCED, PERMANENT DETACHMENT FROM JAPAN. THE "RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY" FORMULA WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED TO CONVEY THE THOUGHT TO JAPAN AND THE WORLD THAT -- ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES WAS OBLIGED TO RETAIN CONTROL

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OF THE RYUKYUS TEMPRARILY FOR SECURITY REASONS -- WHAT HAD BEEN JAPANESE TERRITORY WAS NOT BEING PERMANENTLY DETACHED FROM JAPAN AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NO UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL ACQUISITIONS AS A RESULT OF WAR WAS BEING OBSERVED.

IN DECEMBER 1953 THE UNITED STATES RETURNED THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE OKINAWA ISLAND CHAIN, THE AMAMI ISLANDS, TO JAPANESE JURISDICTION.

IN JUNE 1957 PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND PRIME MINISTER KISHI REAFFIRMED "JAPANESE RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY" OVER THE RYUKYUS.

IN JUNE 1961 PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PRIME MINISTER IKEDA DID LIKEWISE.

IN MARCH 1962, IN CONNECTION WITH AN EXECUTIVE ORDER CONCERNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ISLANDS ISSUED ON THE BASIS OF A UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TASK FORCE STUDY OF OUR RYUKYUS POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, PRESIDEN KENNEDY RECOGNIZED THE RYUKYUS "TO BE A PART OF THE JAPANESE HOMELAND." HE ADDED THAT HE "LOOKED FORWARD TO THE DAY WHEN THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD WILL PERMIT THEIR

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RESTORATION TO FULL JAPANESE SOVEREIGNTY."

IN NOVEMBER 1967 PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRIME MINISTER SATO MET IN WASHINGTON AND AGREED ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE HIGH COMMISSIONER "TO PROMOTE THE INTEGRATION OF THE RYUKYUS WITH JAPAN AND THUS HELP TO MINIMIZE THE STRESSES THAT WOULD ACCOMPANY REVERSION." PRESIDENT JOHNSON ALSO STATED AT THAT TIME THAT HE "FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE DESIRE OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE FOR THE REVERSION OF THE ISLANDS." THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED TO CONDUCT JOINT AND CONTINUOUS REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, "GUIDED BY THE AIM OF RETURNING ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS OVER THESE ISLANDS TO JAPAN." THEY ALSO AGREED ON REVERSION OF THE BONIN ISLANDS TO JAPAN. THIS LEFT OKINAWA, THE DAITO ISLANDS AND THE MORE SOUTHERLY ISLANDS IN THE RYUKYU ARCHIPELAGO AS THE ONLY TERRITORIES LISTED UNDER ARTICLE III OF THE PEACE TREATY WHICH WERE STILL UNDER UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION.

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FINALLY, PRESIDENT NIXON AND PRIME MINISTER SATO IN THEIR COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 1969 ANNOUNCED THAT "THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WOULD IMMEDIATELY ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS REGARDING SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR ACCOMPLISHING THE EARLY REVERSION OF THESE ISLANDS WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO THE SECURITY OF THE FAR EAST INCLUDING JAPAN. THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER (THE COMMUNIQUE CONTINUED) AGREED TO EXPEDITE THE CONSULTATIONS WITH A VIEW OF ACCOMPLISHING THE REVERSION DURING 1972, SUBJECT TO THE CONCLUSION OF THESE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE NECESSARY LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT."

THUS JAPAN'S "RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY" OVER OKINAWA HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY EVERY AMERICAN PRESIDENT AND EVERY UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION SINCE THE END OF THE OCCUPATION. THE AGREEMENT BEFORE YOU AND ITS RELATED ARRANGEMENTS ARE THE LOGICAL AND TIMELY CULMINATION OF A HISTORIC PROGRESSION SET IN MOTION OVER TWENTY YEARS AGO.

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BY 1969 THE TIME HAD CLEARLY COME FOR THE "RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY," SO LONG RECOGNIZED, TO BECOME A REALITY.

THE TEN-YEAR FIRST TERM OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY WOULD END IN 1970 AND THE TREATY WOULD THEN BECOME SUBJECT TO TERMINATION BY EITHER PARTY ON ONE YEAR'S NOTICE. STRENUOUS DEBATES IN THE DIET AND POSSIBLY VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST OUR BASES ON THIS ANNIVERSARY WERE ANTICIPATED. THAT THEY DID NOT OCCUR MAY WELL BE DUE LARGELY TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN THE NIXON/SATO COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 1969 THAT ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN IN 1972 WERE ABOUT TO BEGIN.

THERE WAS ALSO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT, THE LONGER REVERSION WAS DELAYED, THE GREATER THE CHANCE WOULD BE OF AN OPEN CLASH BETWEEN DEMONSTRATORS DEMANDING REVERSION AND AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES PROTECTING OUR BASES.

THE 1968 ELECTION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE YARA ON A PLATFORM OF IMMEDIATE REVERSION AND THE GROWING MILITANCY OF STUDENT AND LEFTIST RADICALISM ON

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OKINAWA HAD MADE IT APPARENT THAT TO FURTHER DELAY A REVERSION AGREEMENT WOULD BE TO ERODE RAPIDLY THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE LOCAL POPULATION NECESSARY TO THE CONTINUED EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF OUR BASE STRUCTURE IN THE ISLANDS.

THE LOCAL POPULATION FURNISHES A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE LABOR FORCE FOR BASE OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY ON THE DENSELY POPULATED ISLAND OF OKINAWA ITSELF. THE MILITARY COMMUNITIES ARE NOT ISOLATED ENCLAVES. ON THE CONTRARY, MILITARY AND OKINAWAN COMMUNITIES ARE INTERSPERSED CLOSELY WITH ONE ANOTHER. ACCORDINGLY, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, AND PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE, TO OPERATE A BASE STRUCTURE ON OKINAWA EFFECTIVELY IF THE LOCAL POPULACE WERE ACTIVELY OPPOSED TO OUR CONTINUED PRESENCE. AT LAST, A CONTINUED UNITED STATES PRESENCE UNDER THESE CONDITIONS COULD BE MAINTAINED ONLY BY VIGOROUS POLICE CONTROL THAT WOULD BE BOTH HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE AND EXTREMELY COSTLY. GENERAL DAMPERT, THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE RYUKYUS SINCE 1969, WILL HAVE MORE TO SAY ON THIS POINT,

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BASED UPON HIS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IN ADMINISTERING THE ISLANDS。

IT WAS AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THEN, THAT THE UNITED STATES JOINED THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IN ISSUING THE 1969 JOINT COMMUNUQUE。

IN JAPAN PROPER, THE JAPANESE PEOPLE ARE SOLIDLY CONVINCED OF THE JUSTICE OF THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA NO LATER THAN 1972。FOR US TO DISAPPOINT THIS EXPCTATION AND TO FAIL TO CARRY OUT THIS AGREEMENT, WHICH --BOTH OT THEM AND TO US-- IS SO FAIR AND SO NECESSARY, WOULD HAVE EXTREMELY UNFORTUNATE EFFECTS ON OUR WHOLE RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN。IT WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, GIVE A STRONG WEAPON TO THOSE POLITICAL FORCES IN JAPAN WHO DO NOT FAVOR THE KIND OF CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES WHICH NOW EXISTS, AND WHO SEEK TO REPLACE THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTRY WITH OTHERS LESS FAVORABLE TO SUCH A RELATIONSHIP。

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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON TRADE AND MONETARY ISSUES HAVE SUBJECTED OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS TO STRAIN IN RECENT MONTHS。BUT OUR BASIC POLITICAL AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIP CONTINUES TO BE STABLE AND COOPERATIVE。OUR NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES THAT WE DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THAT COOPERATION, WHICH PRESIDENT NIXON HAS CALLED THE LINCHPIN FOR PEACE IN THE PACIFIC。

IN THE LARGER FRAMEWORK OF OUR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, REVERSION WOULD BE A FURTHER STEP IN CARRYING OUT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE, WHICH RECOGNIZES AND ENCOURAGES THE GREATER CAPACITY OF OUR ALLIES TO ASSUME THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR DEFENSE。IN THIS AGREEMENT, JAPAN AGREES AFTER REVERSION TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA AGAINST OUTSIDE ATTACK。

FOR OUR PART, AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER THE NIXON DOCTRINE, WE WILL CONTINUE TO HONOR OUR COMMIT-

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MENTS TO JAPAN UNDER THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE PROTECTION OF THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR SHIELD TO JAPAN IN CASE THERE IS A NUCLEAR THREAT TO JAPAN'S FREEDOM. THE EMPHASIS WE PLACE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF REMAINING A PACIFIC POWER IS REFLECTED IN THE CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF OUR BASE STRUCTURE IN JAPAN AND IN THE RYUKYUS.

MR. CHAIRMAN; THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT WILL NOT BECOME EFFECTIVE UNTIL THE PRESIDENT HAS DEPOSITED THE INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION. HE WILL NOT TAKE SUCH ACTION UNTIL AFTER THE JAPANESE DIET HAS ENACTED THE NECESSARY IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION.
THE STEP CURRENTLY REQUIRED ON THE PART OF UNITED STATES IS ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE TO RATIFICATION.

I URGE EARLY AND FAVORABLE SENETE ACTION ON THE AGREEMENT BEFORE YOU. IT PROTECTS --AND ADVANCES -- UNITED STATES INTERESTS. AND IT IS ESSENTIAL

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TO THE CONTINUATION OF A VIABLE AND HARMONIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH ONE OF OUR MAJOR ALLIES IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

(3)

(米北1、千葉課長、佐藤事務官に連絡、16:30)

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1800

総番号(TA) 56031
71年 10月27日 15時40分 米国 発 主管
71年 月28日 05時23分 本省 着 米北1

外務大臣殿 牛場 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄上院外交委聴聞会(2)

第3423号 平 大至急

SECRETARY ROGERS DELAYED AT WHITE HOUSE BY 8:30 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT AND MR. KISSINGER, WHO RETURNED LAST NIGHT FROM PEKING ~~SEMICOLON~~ (ヤミコロン) HEARING BEGAN 17 MINUTES LATE. ROGERS ACCOMPANIED BY ALEXIS JOHONSON.

FULBRIGHT OPENED HEARING WITH STATEMENT TREATY REPRESENTS END OF AN ERA. REMOVES LAST VESTIGE OF OCCUPYING POWER STATUS. PRESIDENT NIXON IN TRANSMITTAL LETTER SAYS APPROVAL IS ESSENTIAL. U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS ARE STRAINED BECAUSE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPTMENTS, UNANNOUNCED OVERTURES TO CHINA AND FAILURES TO CONSULT WITH JAPAN. SPEAKING PERSONALLY,

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次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
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領移長 参領旅査移
ア長 参地中東 北一西
米長 参北北保
中南審 参一二
欧長 参西東洋 西東
近ア長 参書近ア
経長 次総経国資 参貿統一源 国三
経協長 参政技一理 国企二
条長 参条協規
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2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

I WISH TO REFER TO RECENT ACTION IN ~~UN~~ U.N.

REGRET DECISION BUT OVER LONG PERIOD MAY BE BENEFICIAL (ダ) AND SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD NOT BE DISCOURAGED IN FUTURE EFFORTS.

ROGERS THEN READ PREPARED STATEMENT WITHOUT INTERRUPTION. READING OF STATEMENT BEGAN AT 10:20 AND CONCLUDED AT 10:38 WITH REQUEST FOR EARLY FAVORABLE SENATE ACTION PARTICULARLY ESSENTIAL AT THIS TIME.

IN THE INTERROGATION OF SECRETARY ROGERS BY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE MADE:

SENATOR FULBRIGHT. COMPLIMENTED ROGERS ON

DECISION TO SUBMIT TREATY FOR APPROVAL OF SENATE. ASKED ABOUT JAPAN'S RESPONSIBILITY TO DEFEND OKINAWA UNDER THE TREATY. ROGERS ADVISED JAPAN ASSUMES THAT OBLIGATION, WITH PROVIDE SELF DEFENSE FUNCTION, ''HAS PRIMARY INITIALRESPONSIBILITY''. U.S.

外務省

注　意

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電信写

PRESENT THERE UNDER (M)UTUAL (S)ECURITY (T)REATY。
(J)APAN WILL DEVELOP MILITARY CAPABILITY
THAT DOES NOT NOW EXIST。(F)ULBRIGHT ASKED
WHETHER BASES RETAINED BY (U.S.) ARE SET
OUT IN (T)REATY。(R)OGERS REFERRED TO LIST ON PP。
10-12 OF PRINTED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE。
(F)ULBRIGHT OBSERVED (U.S.) IN (O)KINAWA
BECAUSE OF EMERGENCY OF LARGER WAR。
(F)ULBRIGHT QUESTIONED (R)OGERS EXTENSIVELY
IN REGARD TO NEED FOR PRESENCE
OF (V)OICE OF (A)MERICA IN (O)KINAWA。
(R)EFERRED TO IT AS A PRODUCT OF THE (C)OLD
(W)AR LIKE (R)ADIO (F)REE (E)UROPE。(S)AID
RETENTION OF (VOA) IS AMBIVALENT POLICY
AND IRRITATING。(VOA) A COSTLY PROPAGANDA
AGENCY AND ITS MISSION COULD BE
FILLED BY PRIVATE COMMUNICATION
FACILITIES。
(R)OGERS REPLIED (VOA) IMPORTANT TO
PRESENT OBJECTIVE FACTS AND NEED FOR

(VOA) STATION IN (O)KINWA NOT CHANGED BY NEW
RELATIONS WITH (C)HINA。(I)NDICATES (VOA)

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電信写

PROGRAMS FROM (O)KINAWA WILL CONTINUE
BUT UNDER TREATY (U.S.)。 CAN TERMINATE
WHEN IT WISHES。(F)ULBRIGHT COMMENTED
(VOA) DOESN'T EVEN AGREE WITH (S)ECRETARY OF
(S)TATE。
(F)ULBRIGHT ASKED WHETHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ALL OUT OF (O)KINAWA。
(R)OGERS REPLIED AFFIRMATIVE AND SAID HE WROTE
A LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THIS SUBJECT YESTERDAY AND WILL GO INTO
IT IN EXECUTIVE SESSION。(F)ULBRIGHT MADE POINT
THAT KEEPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRESENCE AND
WHEREABOUTS SECRET DESTROYS DETERRENT
VALUE OF THE WEAPON AND INCONSISTENT WITH
OUR OBJECTIVES。(F)ULBRIGHT REFERRD TO
(U.S.) BUSINESS INTERESTS IN (O)KINAWA,
AND (R)OGERS SAID ADEQUATELY PROTECTED AS
RESULT OF LONG NEGOTIATION。(R)OGERS
SAID LEGAL STATUS OF (I)SLAND OF (S)ENKAKU NOT
AFFECTED BY TREATY。
(S)ENATOR (S)PARKMAN。(E)XPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR (R)OGERS'
STATEMENT。(A)SKED WHETHER ALL RETAINED BASE RIGHTS
ARE REFLECTED IN PRINTED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE,

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電信写

AND ROGERS SAID THEY WERE AT PP。10-13。FACILITIES LISTED IN SCHEDULE C ON PP。13-14 WILL BE PHASED OUT OVER A PERIOD OF TIME。ROGERS SAID JAPAN MILITARY FORCES FOR DEFENSE OF OKINAWA WILL BE INCREASED WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE IX。ROGERS AWARE OF NO MOVEMENT IN JAPAN NOW TO VIOLATE ARTICLE IX。ROGERS INDICATED CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN, ABOUT WHICH HE IS HESITANT TO COMMENT, WOULD NOT AFFECT MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY。THIS TREATY FOR RETURN OF OKINAWA WOULD SOLIDIFY OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND IMPROVE THEM。(solidify) ROGERS SAID UNDER THIS TREATY, U.S。HAS NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OKINAWA。

SENATOR AIKEN。INDICATED CHAIRMAN FULBRIGHT HAD ASKED MOST OF HIS QUESTIONS。DEVELOPED THE POINT THAT CHINA HAS PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS INTO THE AREA COVERED BY VOA IN OKINAWA。ROGERS SAID JAPAN UNDER THE TREATY AGREES TO PROTECT U.S。BUSINESS INTERESTS IN OKINAWA INDEFINITELY。ROGERS INDICATED HIS VIEW THAT OKINAWA TREATY WOULD BE BINDING ON ANY FUTURE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT。

SENATOR CHURCH。IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, ROGERS STATED

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電信写

U.S。IS ENCOURAGING JAPAN TO EXPAND ITS FORCES AND MILITARY BUDGET。ROGERS INDICATED U.S。HAS PROVIDED MONEY AND MANPOWER IN PAST YEARS IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD。JAPAN NOW THIRD STRONGEST ECONOMIC POWER。JAPAN SHOLD CARRY LARGER SHARE OF BURDEN AND WE HAVE ENCOURAGED JAPAN TO INCREASE ITS BUDGET。THIS ACTION CONFORMS TO THE NIXON DOCTRINE。

THE ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON REPEAL OF THE FORMOSAN RESOLUTION IS UNCHANGED AS A RESULT OF UN VOTE MONDAY。

AT THIS POINT SENATOR CHURCH SAID A WORD OF ENCOURAGEMENT。

DUE ROGERS AFTER HARD WEEK IN UN, STATED HIS VIEW ADVISABILITY OF TWO-CHINA CONCEPT QUESTIONABLE AND IN LONG RUN U.S。MAY BE BETTER SERVED BY THE VOTE。SENATOR CHURCH SAID:

"ADMINISTRATION DESERVES CREDIT FOR CHANGES IN ASIA POLICY LONG OVERDUE。THIS TREATY IS AN EXAMPLE。IT HEALS A WOUND。NO COUNTRY IN ASIA MORE IMPORTANT TO US THAN JAPAN。I COMMEND YOU FOR THE TREATY。YOU ALSO DESERVE CREDIT FOR REDUCTION OF FORCES IN VIETNAM。I HOPE CONGRESS CAN FIND A WAY TO JOIN WITH THE PRESIDENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS。DEDUCTION

外務省

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電信写

OF FORCES IN ASIA HAS ALSO OCCURRED IN PHILIPPINES, KOREA, THAILAND AND JAPAN ITSELF, AND I COMMEND THIS. THOSE GOVERNMENTS ARE ON NOTICE TO LOOK TO THEIR OWN RATHER THAN US FORCES. THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO PEKING IS A VERY IMPORTANT GESTURE. IT MAY BE THE GREAT TURNING POINT IN US POLICY IN ASIA. I COMMEND HIM FOR IT. WE HAVE LIVED WITH OUR MYTHS TOO LONG. I COMMEND MAJOR CHANGES IN DIRECTION YOU HAVE MADE THAT SERVE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.''

ROGERS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS STATEMENT AND SAID IT WOULD MAKE HIS JOB EASIER AND THAT WORKING TOGETHER A '' GENERATION OF PEACE'' MIGHT BE ACHIEVED.

SENATOR CASE. COMMEND CHURCH STATEMENT ARE ADMINISTRATION POLICY AND ROGERS' HANDLING OF IT. DID NOT REGARD UN VOTE AS A MAJOR DEFEAT. COMMEND PRESIDENT'S PLANS TO VISIT PEKING. ROGERS EXPLAINED WE DO NOT PLAN TO BRING JAPAN BACK TO PRE-WORLD WAR II MILITARY STATUS. OURS IS A PROGRAM OF REDUCTION OF FORCES, NOT WITHDRAWAL. ROGERS SAYS NO REVIVAL OF MILITARISM IN JAPAN NOW OR IN THE FUTURE. WE ARE ENCOURAGING

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電信写

THEM TO SPEND MORE MONEY FOR DEFENSE, BUT NOT AN OVERSEAS CAPABILITY. ROGERS SAID HE WANTED TREATY RATIFIED TO SHOW WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT US-JAPAN RELATIONS. ROGERS SAID THERE ARE NO SECRET AGREEMENTS OR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE THE TREATY ITSELF ~~SEMICOLON~~ ONLY SOME INTERPRETIVE UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH ARE AVAILABLE TO THE COMMITTEE ON REQUEST. ROGERS DEFERRED A QUESTION ON EXPANSION OF OUR BASES IN MICRONESIA TO UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE PACKARD WHO WILL TESTIFY LATER.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. CRITICIZED ROGERS' NON-WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS PUBLICLY ALL ARRANGEMENTS WITH REFERENCE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SAID US PEOPLE SHOULD KNOW WHAT OUR AGREEMENT IS WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. ROGERS SAID THERE WILL BE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION. SYMINGTON THEN READ A PREPARED STATEMENT ON THE POLICY OF NUCLEAR SECRECY RESULTING IN UNECONOMIC PURCHASES OF UNNECESSARY EQUIPMENT. WASTE WILL CONTINUE IF SECRECY CONTINUES. SECRECY INHIBITS PROGRESS IN DEALING WITH PROBLEMS IN THE FIELDS OF POWER, POLLUTION, FRESH WATER, ETC. WE SHOULD CONSIDER THE IMPOR-

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TANCE OF THESE MATTERS。MANY LEADING NUCLEAR AUTHORITIES AGREE WITH THIS POSITION INCLUDING DR。SEABORG。SYMINGTON ALSO ASKED ROGERS TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO REVIEW OF OUR POLICY TOWARD CUBA IN VIEW OF OUR OVERTURES TOWARD JAPAN。

SENATOR COOPER。COMMENDED ROGERS' STATEMENT。SAID TREATY A CREDIT TO U.S。AND JAPAN。DEVELOPED THE POINT THAT UNDER THE TREATY, U.S。AND JAPAN WILL CONSULT AND ACTION WILL BE TAKEN PURSUANT TO '' CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES'' COOPER COMMENTED HE HOPES THIS MEANS WE DON'T ENTER ANOTHER WAR WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS。ROGERS SAID NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND SOVIET UNION REGARDING NORTHERN ISLANDS。

SENATOR JAVITS。AGREED WITH SENATOR CHURCH'S COMMENTS。URGED NO PUNITIVE CUTOFF OF JUNDS TO THE UN。ROGERS RESTATED THE POSITION IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY WITH REFERENCE TO U.S。ATTITUDES TOWARD UN FUNDING。JAVEITS ASKED IF RETURN OF OKINAWA WOULD NOT ACTIVATE

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ARGUMENT FOR RETURN OF TAIWAN TO MAINLAND CHINA。THIS WOULD BE UNTHINKABLE。ROGERS SAID OUR RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN UNAFFECTED BY UN VOTE ~~SEMICOLON~~, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS CONTINUE AS BEFORE ~~SEMICOLON~~, OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS UNAFFECTED AND TAIWAN APPRECIATES OUR EFFORTS IN ITS BEHALF。JAVITS ALSO DEVELOPED POSITION WE REAFFIRM TRUMAN'S DECLARATION THAT WE WILL NOT ABET TAIWAN CLAIMS TO MAINLAND CHINA。JAVITS SAID HE WOULD VOTE GLADLY FOR RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY。ROGERS DEVELOPED HIS EXPECTATION THAT JAPAN WOULD PLAN AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNDEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF ASIA。WE ~~DE~~ STATED OUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH JAPAN ARE RESULT OF COMPETITION ~~SEMICOLON~~; THERE HAS BEEN NO RETROGRESSION IN OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, WE CONSIDER IT OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE。

SENATOR SCOTT。WANTS EXPEDITIOUS APPROVAL OF THE TREATY。REFERRED TO HIS MANY VISITS TO JAPAN AND DISCUSSIONS THERE AND IMPORTANCE OF OKINAWA REVERSION TO JAPAN。STATED THIS TREATY GOES LONG WAY TO DEMONSTRATE OUR FRIENDLINESS AND

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電信写

RRIDE IN JAPAN'S ACHIEVEMENTS, HELPS OUR OVER-
LL RELATIONS AND THAT HE WILL DO ALL HE CAN
O GET AN EARLY SENATE RETIFICATION AS SOON AS
T IS REPORTED TO THE FLOOR。SENATOR SCOTT
HEN MADE A LONG STATEMENT SUGGESTING THAT THE
U.S。SHOULD RECONSIDER THE WHOLE QUESTION OF ITS
INANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE UN IN VIEW OF MONDAY'S
VOTE。HIS STATEMENT WAS CONTRARY TO THE VIEWS
XPRESSED BY JAVITS。

SCOTT ASKED WHY THE ARREARAGE EXPULSION RULE
AS NOT ENFORCED AT THE UN。SCOTT STATED THAT
THERE WAS A POPULAR FEELING THAT THE U.S.
IS PAYING TOO MUCH TO THE UN。HE FELT THAT ANY
MOTION TO CUT FUNDS OF THE UN WOULD PASS AT THIS
TIME AND THE COUNTRIES WHO VOTED FOR THE EX-
PULSION OF TAIWAN MUST NOT HAVE REALIZED THAT THE
EXPULSION WAS A GREAT AFFRONT TO THE UNITED
STATES。

ROGERS REPLIED THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED MANY
OF THESE SAME SENTIMENTS TO UN AMBASSADORS BUT
THAT THEY DIDN'T REALIZE THE REALITY OF AN

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電信写

UNFAVORABLE PUBLIC ATTITUDE IN THE U.S。SCOTT
SAID HE PLANS TO VOTE AGAINST THE UN APPROPRI-
ATION。

SENATORS COOPER AND PEARSON DISSOCIATED
THEMSALVES FROM SCOTT'S REMARKS SAYING THAT A
CUT IN FINANCIAL SUPPORT WOULD BE MISUNDERSTOOD
AT THIS TIME。ROGERS HAD AN ADDITIONAL LENGTHY
REPLY TO SCOTT SATUBG THAT HE FELT THAT IT WOULD
BE GOOD TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE UNITED NATIONS'
FINANCIAL SITUATION AT THIS TIME。

SENATOR PEARSON。SENATOR PEARSON CHARACTERIZED
THE OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY AS ANOTHER ''
BRIGHT CHAPTER '' IN THE PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY
OF NIXON。THE LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS FOR THE
OKINAWA TREATY IS THE 1951 PEACE TREATY AND THE
REPRESENTATIONS OF ALL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS
SINCE THAT TIME。

SENATOR FULBRIGHT (CLOSING STATEMENT)。FUL-
BRIGHT POINTED OUT THAT UN ARREARAGES WERE MOSTLY

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電信写

FROM NON-PAYMENT BY LARGE COUNTRIES OF THEIR ASSESSMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. IT WOULD BE A DISASTER TO CUT UN FUNDS AT THIS TIME. PRESENT DIFFICULTIES ARE A RESULT OF A POLICY BEGUN IN THE 1940'S OF INSISTING THAT THERE WAS ONE CHINA AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA WAS THAT OF CHAING KAI SHEK. IF THE SENATE WANTED TO RETALIATE FOR THE EXPULSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, IT SHOULD CUT FUNDS FROM COUNTRIES DIRECTLY RATHER THAN FROM THE UNITED NATIONS.

IN CLOSING, FULBRIGHT TOLD ROGERS THAT HE NEED NOT BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE COMMITTEE'S FAVORABLE ATTITUDE TOWARD APPROVAL OF THE OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY.

(3)

(米北1. 千葉課長、佐藤事務官に連絡、06:30)

外務省

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電信写

総番号(TA) 56060　　主管
71年10月27日18時40分　米国　発
71年10月28日07時48分　本省　着 米北1

外務大臣殿　　牛場大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

オキナワ上院外交委ちょう聞会(3)

第3424号　平　大至急
往電第3423号に関し
上院外交委のオキナワちょう聞会は27日午前10時過ぎより開始されたところ、右概要次の通り(ちょう聞会における応答要旨別電=報告電(2)参照)。
1．27日はロジャース国務長官の証言のみが行われた。ジョンソン国務次官がばい席したほか、スナイダー公使、エリクソン日本部長、ドウーリン国防次官補代理、エオード陸軍次官代理、カーテイス中将等が同席した。
外交委会側は、フルブライト委員長以下スパークマン、チャーチ、サイミントン、スポン(以上民主党)、エイケン、ケース、クーパー、ジャヴイッツ、スコット、ピアソン(以上共和党)の各議員が出席し、スポンを除く各議員が5分ないし10分程度の質疑を行なつた。
2．審議の模様は、(イ)フルブライト委員長がかわ切りの質問において、(i)日本の防衛責任及び米軍基地、(ii)VOA、(iii)核撤去、(iv)在チユウ米企業、(v)センカク諸島の取扱い等の問題につき総ざらい的に質問したほかは、スパークマン、エイケン、ケース、クーパー等の議員が核兵器撤去、在チユウ米軍基地、VOA、在チユウ米企業、秘密協定の有無等につきさん発的に質問した程度であり、また質問のし方もかなり言及するという程度で深追いすることもなく、むしろ上院が本協定を早急に承認することが必要であると強調したスコット議員をはじめ、ジャヴイッツ、ピアソン、チャーチ等が協定賛成を明言したほか、全般的にオキナワ返かん支持のムードがかん取された。このことはちょう聞会の閉会にあたりフルブライト委員長がロジャース長官に対し外交委員会の協定に対する態度について心配する必要がない旨発言したことに要約されている。なおかかる委員会のふん囲気も手伝つて、本日の議論のしよう点は国府の国連からの追放という事態を前にして、米国の国連に対する財政支出や後進国援助を再検討すべきや否かという点に向けられた感があつた。
3．オキナワ協定に関する上記の各種質問に対し、ロジャーズ長官は(イ)施政権返かんに伴ないオキナワの核兵器は撤去される。(ロ)VOAについては米政府の外交政策上必要であり返かん後も放送を継続するが、将来のそむときに活動を停止することができる。(ハ)日米間の交渉

大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 長官 総人 電厚 計 書 文会 営 給
調査長 参企 析 調
領事移住長 参領 旅 査 移
アジア局長 参 調 中東一 東北二 西
米州局長 参 北 北保 一三
中南米審議官 参一二
欧亜局長 参 西東洋 西東 三
近東アフリカ局長 参 書 近ア
経済局長 次 総 経 国資源 一
経済協力局長 参 貿 統 国 三
条約局長 参 政 技 一 理 国企 二
国際連合局長 参 条 協 規
情報文化局長 参 経 科
参 軍 社 専
参 道 内 外
一二

外務省

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業、(v)センカク諸島の取扱い等の問題につき総ざらい的に質問したほかは、スパークマン、エイケン、ケース、クーパー等の議員が核兵器撤去、在チユウ米軍基地、VOA、在チユウ米企業、秘密協定の有無等につきさん発的に質問した程度であり、また質問のし方もかなり言及するという程度で深追いすることもなく、むしろ上院が本協定を早急に承認することが必要であると強調したスコット議員をはじめ、ジャヴイッツ、ピアソン、チャーチ等が協定賛成を明言したほか、全般的にオキナワ返かん支持のムードがかん取された。このことはちょう聞会の閉会にあたりフルブライト委員長がロジャース長官に対し外交委員会の協定に対する態度について心配する必要がない旨発言したことに要約されている。なおかかる委員会のふん囲気も手伝つて、本日の議論のしよう点は国府の国連からの追放という事態を前にして、米国の国連に対する財政支出や後進国援助を再検討すべきや否かという点に向けられた感があつた。
3．オキナワ協定に関する上記の各種質問に対し、ロジャーズ長官は(イ)施政権返かんに伴ないオキナワの核兵器は撤去される。(ロ)VOAについては米政府の外交政策上必要であり返かん後も放送を継続するが、将来のそむときに活動を停止することができる。(ハ)日米間の交渉

外務省

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の結果在ちゆう米企業の権益は十分守られている。（ニ）センカク諸島の法的置位は今回の協定により影響されない。（ホ）日米間に何等の秘密協定は存在しない。（ヘ）日本は今後自主防衛力を拡じゆうすることになろう。（ト）日本における軍国主義のたい頭はみられず。また憲法第9条改訂の動きもみられない等の点を答弁した。

4．なお核兵器の問題についてはロジャーズ長官は上記通りオキナワからの核撤去を明言するとともにフルブライト、サイミントン両議員の質問に対し、26日付でフルブライト委員長あての書簡を送り、核兵器の問題についての詳細については秘密ちょう聞会の場で話す用意がある旨伝えた旨述べたが、フルブライト、サイミントンのいずれよりも秘密ちょう聞会の開催の要望は出なかつた。

（了）

外務省

極秘

（　部の内　号）注　意
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電信写

総番号（TA）56052　　主管
71年10月27日18時05分　米国　発
71年10月28日07時14分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場（大使）　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

オキナワ上院外交委ちょう問会（4）

第3425号　極秘　大至急
往電第3424号に関し
27日の外交委ちょう問会の質疑応答においてフルブライト委員長が核は撤去されるのかと質問したのに対し、ロジャース国務長官は「THAT IS CORRECT.本件については昨日「フ」委員長に書簡を発送ずみであり、要すれば秘密会に応ずる用意がある。」と答弁している。
右書簡につき木内よりエリクソン日本部長にただしたところ、同部長は本件書簡はオキナワ返かん協定につきフルブライト委員長のかねてからの多数の質問事項のうち、核に関して答えている書簡であつて、核がどのくらいあるのか、どこへはん出するのか、そこではどう取扱うのか等種々問合せ越しているのに対し、可能な範囲で回答しているものである旨述べた。本件は機密に属するので、外部に対しその内容を明らかにするわけにはゆかない。しかしながら「ロ」長官が核撤去を「こう定」したことに注目ありたく、事務当局で考えていたよりも明確にすぎる答弁振りであることを述べた次第である。（了）

大臣官房　総人審議官　厚生審議官　次官　政務次官　書文会営給
調査長　参企析調
領事移住長　参領旅査移
ア長　参地中東二　北東西
米長　参北保
中南米局長　参一二
欧亜局長　参西東洋　西東二
近ア長　参書近ア
経協長　次総経国資源
長　参賀統国
参政技一理
国企二
条約局長　参条協規
国際法局長　参政経科
軍社専
情報文化局長　参道内外
一二

外務省

ステンシル、至急

注 意
1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

850

電信写

総番号(TA)56092
71 年10月27日20時30分 発 米国 主管 北1
71 年10月28日10時02分 着 本省

外務大臣殿 牛場 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

迅速扱 至急
沖縄正院外交委聴問会(7-VOA)

本3444号 平大至急 46.10.27

往電本3425号together

THE CHAIRMAN; ABOUT THE RETENTION OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA WHAT PURPOSE IS THERE IN OUR RETAINING THE VOICE OF AMERCIA AND WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA OPERATING FROM OKINAWA?

THE REASON I ASK IT, I HAD ASSUMED THIS HAD BEEN DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT CHINA. NOW, IF WE ARE -- AND I HOPE WE ARE, AND I BELIEVE WE ARE CHANGING OUR ATTITUDE AND OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA, WHAT JUSTIFICATION IS THERE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA ON OKINAWA?

SECRETARY ROGERS; WELL, WE THINK OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA AS PERFORMING A VERY USEFUL FUNCTION IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY IN PRESENTING FACTS, HOPEFULLY

大臣 政務次官 官房長 審議官 儀典長 総人事厚生課 書文会営給

調査長	参企析調	
領移長	参領旅査移	
ア長	参地中東二 北東西	
水長	参北北保	
中南審欧長	参一二	
	参西東洋 西東	
近ア長	参書近ア	
経長	次総経国資 一源	
	参貿統国	
経協長	参政技一理 国企二	
条長	参条調	
国長	参政経科	
情長	軍社専	
文長	参道内外	
	一二	

外務省

注 意
1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

OBJECTIVE FACTS, AND WE THINK IT IS VERY USEFUL.

WE DO HOPE, OF COURSE, THAT WE WILL IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA; ~~SEMICOLON~~ BUT THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT IS TAKING A TRIP TO PEKING, AS HE SAID ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT WE ARE BEGINNING TO HAVE TOO RAPID AN IMPROVEMENT. IT WILL DEPEND ON EVENTS. HE DOESN'T WANT US TO BE TOO EUPHORIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS MERELY BECAUSE OF THE TRIP THAT IS TAKING PLACE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IN HIS RECENT SPEACH -- I THINK IT WAS ON LAST SUNDAY, I BELIEVE; ~~SEMICOLON~~ SO WE WANT TO CONTINUE OUR VOICE OF AMERICA PROGRAMS.

WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO PRESENT THE NEWS.

THE CHAIRMAN; THE VOICE OF AMERICA, JUST LIKE RADIO FREE EUROPE, WAS A PRODUCT OF THE COLD WAR. THEY WERE ORIGINATED AT THAT TIME AND THAT WAS THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE.

THE SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY HAS RAISED THIS QUESTION, I THINK, IN A MOST APPROPRIATE MANNER

外務省

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検関班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

ABOUT THE CONTINUATION OF (R)ADIO (F)REE (E)UROPE.
IT COSTS A LOT OF MONEY AND WHAT DOES IT ACHIEVE?
IT REALLY WAS A TOOL OF THE COLD WAR.

(N)OW, (I) REALIZE -- (I) AM NOT SAYING THAT WE HAVE SUDDENLY REACHED A MILLENNIUM AND THAT EVERYTHING IS FINE : BUT TO MAINTAIN -- IT STRIKES ME IT IS A BIT AMBIGUOUS, AMBIVALENT -- OUR ATTITUDE. WE SAY WE WISH TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS AND YET WE CONTINUE CERTAIN ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE DESIGNED NOT TO IMPROVE THEM, TO IRRITATE THEM OR TO PROLONG, (I) MAY SAY, THE COLD WAR.

(I) WOULD JUST AS SOON IT WOULD BE -- (I) ASSUME THIS IS A VERY COSTLY OPERATION AND WHAT USE DOES IT SERVE. (I) DON'T QUITE SEE WHY IT SHOULD BE RETAINED AS THE SAME WAY (I) DON'T SEE THE UTILITY OF RETAINING (R)ADIO (F)REE (E)UROPE. (T)O ME, THEY ARE MUCH IN THE SAME (V)EIN; ~~SEMICOLON~~ THEY ARE PROPAGANDA AGENCIES, AND THERE IS NO DEARTH OF ACCESS TO NEWS WITH MODERN SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS. (C)ERTAINLY THEY ARE NOT DOING ANYTHING THAT THE PRIVATE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検関班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

ARE NOT DOING ALSO. (T)HAT WAS NOT SO TRUE WHEN THEY STARTED. (I) ONLY RAISE THE QUESTION AS TO -- IN THIS TREATY YOU DON'T HAVE TO RETAIN THEM; ~~SEMICOLON~~ YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO RETAIN THEM?

(S)ECRETARY (R)OGERS; (T)HAT'S RIGHT.

(T)HE (C)HAIRMAN; (I)F YOU WITH TO DISCONTINUE THEM YOU MAY?

(S)ECRETARY (R)OGERS. (O)H, SURE.

The Chairman;

(T)HE (S)ECRETARY. (T)HEN (I) READ RECENTLY, TO ME, CERTAIN DISCREPANCIES ON THE (V)OICE OF (A)MERICA ABOUT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND YOUR OWN. (T)HERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOME LANGUAGE OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE (V)OICE OF (A)MERICA AND THE (S)ECRETARY OF (S)TATE-- NOT RECENTLY; ~~SEMICOLON~~ THIS OCCURRED --

(S)ECRETARY (R)OGERS; (I) DON'T BELIEVE THAT IS CORRECT RECENTLY, (M)R. (C)HAIRMAN.

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

(T)HE (C)HAIRMAN; (W)ELL, HE TAKES A MUCH HARDER LINE THAN YOU TAKE, (I) WOULD SAY, AND HIS STATEMENT HAS BEEN MUCH HARDER; ~~SEMICOLON~~ AND IT IS COMMENTED UPON BY EVERYBODY. (H)E SEEMS TO BE MUCH MORE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN THE COLD WAR THAN YOU ARE; ~~SEMICOLON~~ AND (I) ASSUME YOU CERTAINLY SPEAK MORE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION.

(I) WOULD THINK IT IS ONE OF THOSE SMALL IRRITANTS.

(O)NE OTHER THING ABOUT -- I DON'T WANT TO PURSUE IT. (Y)OU HAVE THE RIGHT TO DO IT BUT YOU DON'T HAVE TO MAINTAIN IT.

(Secretary Rodgers;)

(I) THINK WE ALSO, (M)R. (C)HAIRMAN, SHOULD POINT OUT THAT -- (I) SUPPOSE THE GREAT LISTENING AUDIENCE IS NOT IN THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. (I) MEAN, THE LISTENING AUDIENCE FROM THIS PARTICULAR STATION IS ALL AROUND IN THAT AREA IN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES AS WELL AS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

(T)HE (C)HAIRMAN; (I)T IS A VERY BIG STATION; ~~SEMICOLON~~

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

IT IS CAPABLE OF REACHING MOST OF (C)HINA OR A GREAT PART OF IT, AND (I) THOUGHT THAT IS WHAT IT WAS THERE FOR. (I)T IS PART OF THE SAME COLD WAR.

(O)F COURSE, (I) SUPPOSE THE VOICE IS NOT AN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AGENCY?

(S)ECRETARY (R)OGERS; (N)O.

(3)

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

850

総番号（TA）56092
71年10月27日20時30分　米国　発　主管
71年10月28日10時02分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

沖縄上院外交委聴問会（7-VOA）
第3443号　平　大至急
往電第3425号に関し

THE CHAIRMAN. ABOUT THE RETENTION OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA WHAT PURPOSE IS THERE IN OUR RETAINING THE VOICE OF AMERCIA AND WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA OPERATING FROM OKINAWA? THE REASON I ASK IT, I HAD ASSUMED THIS HAD BEEN DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT CHINA. NOW, IF WE ARE -- AND I HOPE WE ARE, AND I BELIEVE WE ARE CHANGING OUR ATTITUDE AND OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA, WHAT JUSTIFICATION IS THERE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA ON OKINAWA?

SECRETARY ROGERS. WELL, WE THINK OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA AS PERFORMING A VERY USEFUL FUNCTION IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY IN PRESENTING FACTS, HOPEFULLY

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

OBJECTIVE FACTS, AND WE THINK IT IS VERY USEFUL.

WE DO HOPE, OF COURSE, THAT WE WILL IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA SEMICOLON BUT THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT IS TAKING A TRIP TO PEKING, AS HE SAID ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT WE ARE BEGINNING TO HAVE TOO RAPID AN IMPROVEMENT. IT WILL DEPEND ON EVENTS. HE DOESN'T WANT US TO BE TOO EUPHORIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS MERELY BECAUSE OF THE TRIP THAT IS TAKING PLACE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IN HIS RECENT SPEACH -- I THINK IT WAS ON LAST SUNDAY, I BELIEVE SEMICOLON SO WE WANT TO CONTINUE OUR VOICE OF AMERICA PROGRAMS.

WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO PRESENT THE NEWS.

THE CHAIRMAN. THE VOICE OF AMERICA, JUST LIKE RADIO FREE EUROPE, WAS A PRODUCT OF THE COLD WAR. THEY WERE ORIGINATED AT THAT TIME AND THAT WAS THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE.

THE SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY HAS RAISED THIS QUESTION, I THINK, IN A MOST APPROPRIATE MANNER

外務省

注 意
1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検関班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

ABOUT THE CONTINUATION OF RADIO FREE EUROPE.
IT COSTS A LOT OF MONEY AND WHAT DOES IT ACHIEVE?
IT REALLY WAS A TOOL OF THE COLD WAR.

NOW, I REALIZE -- I AM NOT SAYING THAT WE HAVE SUDDENLY REACHED A MILLENNIUM AND THAT EVERYTHING IS FINE : BUT TO MAINTAIN -- IT STRIKES ME IT IS A BIT AMBIGUOUS, AMBIVALENT -- OUR ATTITUDE. WE SAY WE WISH TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS AND YET WE CONTINUE CERTAIN ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE DESIGNED NOT TO IMPROVE THEM, TO IRRITATE THEM OR TO PROLONG, I MAY SAY, THE COLD WAR.

I WOULD JUST AS SOON IT WOULD BE -- I ASSUME THIS IS A VERY COSTLY OPERATION AND WHAT USE DOES IT SERVE. I DON'T QUITE SEE WHY IT SHOULD BE RETAINED AS THE SAME WAY I DON'T SEE THE UTILITY OF RETAINING RADIO FREE EUROPE. TO ME, THEY ARE MUCH IN THE SAME FALSS SEMICOLON THEY ARE PROPAGANDA AGENCIES, AND THERE IS NO DEARTH OF ACCESS TO NEWS WITH MODERN SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS. CERTAINLY THEY ARE NOT DOING ANYTHING THAT THE PRIVATE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

-7-

外務省

注 意
1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検関班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

ARE NOT DOING ALSO. THAT WAS NOT SO TRUE WHEN THEY STARTED. I ONLY RAISE THE QUESTION AS TO -- IN THIS TREATY YOU DON'T HAVE TO RETAIN THEM SEMICOLON YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO RETAIN THEM?

SECRETARY ROGERS. THAT'S RIGHT.

THE CHAIRMAN. IF YOU WITH TO DISCONTINUE THEM YOU MAY?

SECRETARY ROGERS. OH, SURE.

THE SECRETARY. THEN I READ RECENTLY, TO ME, CERTAIN DISCREPANCIES ON THE VOICE OF AMERICA ABOUT CERTAIN ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND YOUR OWN. THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SOME LANGUAGE OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE HEAD OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE-- NOT RECENTLY SEMICOLON THIS OCCURRED --

SECRETARY ROGERS. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT IS CORRECT RECENTLY, MR. CHAIRMAN.

-8-

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に
　連絡ありたい。

電信写

THE CHAIRMAN。WELL, HE TAKES A MUCH HARDER LINE THAN YOU TAKE, I WOULD SAY, AND HIS STATEMENT HAS BEEN MUCH HARDER SEMICOLON AND IT IS COMMENTED UPON BY EVERYBODY。HE SEEMS TO BE MUCH MORE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN THE COLD WAR THAN YOU ARE SEMICOLON AND I ASSUME YOU CERTAINLY SPEAK MORE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION。

I WOULD THINK IT IS ONE OF THOSE SMALL IRRITANTS。

ONE OTHER THING ABOUT -- I DON'T WANT TO PURSUE IT。YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO DO IT BUT YOU DON'T HAVE TO MAINTAIN IT。

I THINK WE ALSO, MR。CHAIRMAN, SHOULD POINT OUT THAT -- I SUPPOSE THE GREAT LISTENING AUDIENCE IS NOT IN THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES。I MEAN, THE LISTENING AUDIENCE FROM THIS PARTICULAR STATION IS ALL AROUND IN THAT AREA IN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES AS WELL AS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES。

THE CHAIRMAN。IT IS A VERY BIG STATION SEMICOLON

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に
　連絡ありたい。

電信写

IT IS CAPABLE OF REACHING MOST OF CHINA OR A GREAT PART OF IT, AND I THOUGHT THAT IS WHAT IT WAS THERE FOR。IT IS PART OF THE SAME COLD WAR。

OF COURSE, I SUPPOSE THE VOICE IS NOT AN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AGENCY?

SECRETARY ROGERS。NO。

(3)

外務省

注　意
1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

150

総番号（TA）56095　　主管
71年10月27日21時00分　米国　発
71年10月28日10時25分　本省　着　北1

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

沖縄上院外交委聴問会（8-尖閣）

~~第3444号 平大至急~~

~~往電第3425号に関し~~

THE CHAIRMAN; THERE IS THIS TROUBLESOME QUESTION THAT I HAVE SEEN IN THE PAPER AND I WONDERED IF YOU WANTED TO COMMENT ON IT, ON THE ISLAND OF SENKAKU, I BELIEVE IT IS.

IS THAT LEFT AS IS WITHOUT AN ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE ITS SOVEREIGNTY? THERE WAS A PIECE IN THE PAPER THE OTHER DAY WHICH SEEMED TO BE -- INDICATING THERE MAY BE SOME DIFFICULTY OVER THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THAT ISLAND.

SECRETARY ROGERS; MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM GLAD YOU ASKED

外務省

注　意
1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

THAT QUESTION BECAUSE WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THIS TREATY DOES NOT AFFECT THE LEGAL STATUS OF THOSE ISLANDS AT ALL. WHATEVER THE LEGAL SITUATION WAS PRIOR TO THE TREATY IS GOING TO BE THE LEGAL SITUATION AFTER THE TREATY COMES INTO EFFECT.

THE CHAIRMAN; SO, IN ANY CASE, THAT IS NOT A REASON TO OBJECT THIS TREATY, WHATEVER ONE MAY THINK ABOUT IT; ~~SEMICOLON~~ IS THAT CORRECT?

SECRETARY ROGERS; THAT IS RIGHT. THAT IS CORRECT.

THE CHAIRMAN; IT DOES NOT AFFECT IT.

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

360

総番号（TA）56097　　主管
71年10月27日21時05分　米国　発
71年10月28日10時34分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

沖縄上院外交委聴問会（9月一合意書）

~~米3445号 平大至急~~　46.10.27

~~往電米3425号に関し~~

SENATOR CASE; I JUST HAVE A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT A COLLATERAL MATTER, MR. SECRETARY, IF I MAY, IN THE TIME REMAINING. ARE THERE ANY PARTS OF THIS TREATY WITH JAPAN THAT ARE SECRET?

SECRETARY ROGERS; NO, THERE ARE NOT. NOW THERE OBVIOUSLY, AS IN ANY TREATY -- WELL, FIRST, LET ME SAY SO THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING. MY ANSWER IS NO, THERE ARE NO SECRET AGREEMENTS.

TWO, AS IN ANY LONG NEGOTIATION OF THIS KIND, THERE ARE MANY CONVERSATIONS AND SO FORTH THAT RELATE TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

JUST AS THERE IS IN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ON STATUTES, BUT THERE IS NO SECRET AGREEMENT AND WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING IN CONNECTION WITH THIS TREATY THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO HAVE US DISCUSS.

SENATOR CASE; I APPRECIATE THAT. I JUST WANTED TO HAVE YOUR ASSURANCE THAT NOT ONLY THIS COMMITTEE, WHICH PRESUMABLY CAN GET IT, THAT EXISTS AND WILL, FROM YOU, IN SECRET OR PRIVATE SESSION, BUT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL NOT HAVE THE FEELING THAT WE ARE NOT GOING INTO ANYTHING THAT IS NOT ON THE SURFACE.

SECRETARY ROGERS; THAT IS CORRECT.

SENATOR CASE; ARE THERE ANY OTHER AGREEMENTS RELATED TO THE TREATY, NOT SECRET, BUT EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, WHICH THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERS TO BE BINDING THAT ARE NOT INCLUDED IN WHAT YOU HAVE PRESENTED TO US?

SECRETARY ROGERS; NO, CERTAINLY NO EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS. AS I SAY, I WOULD NOT WANT TO -- WE

外務省

注　意

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　連絡ありたい。

電信写

CAN DISCUSS THIS IN DETAIL, IF YOU WANT. THERE ARE NO SECRET AGREEMENTS, NO EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS. THERE MAY BE ONE OR TWO MINOR THINGS WHERE THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY ARE INTERPRETED BY THE DISCUSSIONS THAT WE HAD ABOUT THOSE PROVISIONS, IF YOU FOLLOW ME, AND THAT, ALL OF THAT INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE TO THE COMMITTEE SO THAT YOU CAN HAVE IT IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO READ IT OVER, AND THOSE WHO WORKED ON IT WILL BE GLAD TO POINT OUT THE AREAS WHERE THAT EXISTS.

SENATOR CASE; I APPRECIATE THAT. MY CONCERN WAS WHETHER THERE WAS ANY MATTER OF SUBSTANCE THAT IS NOT EMBRACED WITHIN THIS OR THE DOCUMENTS THAT YOU HAVE SENT UP TO US.

SECRETARY ROGERS; NO, NO.

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

221

大政事外外儀官
務務
次次　典房
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会営給

調査長	参企析調
領移長	参領旅査移
ア長	参地中東二 北東一西
米長	参北北保
中南審	参一二
欧長	参西東洋 西東
近ア長	参書近ア
経長	次総経国資 一源 参貿統国
経協長	参政技一理 国企二
条長	参条協規
国長	参政経科 軍社専
情長	参道内外
文長	一二

総番号（TA）56103　　主管
71年10月27日21時35分　米国　発
71年10月28日10時58分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

オキナワ上院外交委ちよう聞会（10）

第3448号　平　大至急

往電第3425号に関し

本件ちよう聞会の取材に当つている内外人記者の27日午前のちよう聞会に対する反応はおおよそ次のとおりと思われる。

一般的に、上院外交委の態度が予想以上に本件協定の通過承認に好意的なのに注目しており、上院本会議においても、このままの調子ならば数名の特定議員を除き3分の2以上が賛成にまわることは略疑いないと見ている趣である。米人記者は、むしろ東京の情勢を気にしており、ロジャース長官のちん述末段にある如く、本邦の国会において協定ならびに関係法案の成立が危なまれるならば、批准書の交換がおくれることがありうるとの見地から、わが国内政局の動向に関心を示しているものが多いように見受けられる。他方邦人記者は、フルブライト、スパークマンの核が撤去されるのかとの質問に答え、ロジャース長官が「その通り」と答え、これが一早くロイターによつて報道されたこ

外務省

注　意

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2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

とに最大の関心を示している状況である。

（了）

外務省

注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

5400

電信写

大政事外外儀官	
務務	典房
次次	
臣官官審審長長	
儀参人電厚計	
書文会営給	
調査長	参企析調
領移長	参領旅査移
ア長	参地中東二 北一西
米長	参北北保
中南審	参一二
欧長	参西東洋 一一 西東 二二
近ア長	参書近ア
経長	次総経国資 一源 参貿統国 二
経協長	参政技一理 国企二
条長	参条協規
国長	参政経科 軍社専
情長	参道内外
文長	一二

総番号（TA） 56229

71年10月27日23時00分 米国 発 主管

71年10月28日14時50分 本省 着 米北1

外務大臣殿 牛場 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

(返還協定) 3中継 二院外交委員会 聴聞会

(パッカード国防次官及びランパート高等弁務官の冒頭説明)

第3448号 (秘扱い)

後電第3448号に同じ。

28日国防省関係聴聞会でのパッカード国防次官及び在沖ランパート高等弁務官の陳述次の通り。

外務省

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電信写

1．パッカード国防次官

I AM PLEASED AND HONORED TO APPEAR BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE TODAY TO TESTIFY IN SUPPORT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE RYUKYU ISLANDS AND THE DAITO ISLANDS。

THIS AGREEMENT, AS SECRETARY ROGERS HAS DESCRIBED TO YOU, IS THE CULMINATION OF LONG AND DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS, AS CALLED FOR BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND PRIME MINISTER SATO IN THEIR JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 21, 1969。 THAT HISTORIC UNDERSTAINDING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER, THAT IT WAS TIME TO RETURN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE RYUKYU AND DAITO ISLANDS TO JAPAN, IN TURN REPRESENTED THE FULFILLMENT OF A LONG-STANDING US POLICY。

AS YOU KNOW, OKINAWA REPRESENTS A MAJOR ELEMENT OF THE US DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC。 WE HAVE NEARLY 50,000 MILITARY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED ON OKINAWA, AND THIS INCLUDES IMPORTANT UNITS OF ALL THE BRANCHES OF THE ARMED FORCES。 THE COMBAT AND SUPPORT FORCES ON OKINAWA ARE A MAJOR PART OF OUR FORWARD BASED MILITARY UNITS IN EAST ASIA。

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電信写

WITH THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN, THESE FORCES WILL REMIN ON OKINAWA AND CONTINUE TO BE READY TO PERFORM THEIR MISSIONS。 HOWEVER, INSTEAD OF BEING ABLE TO USE THESE FORCES WITH THE FREEDOM EQUAL TO THAT AVAILABLE FROM US TERRITORY, OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS WE HAVE WITH JAPAN, THE HOST COUNTRY。 WHILE IT IS MUCH EASIER AND IDEALLY PREFERABLE NOT TO BE CONCERNED WITH THE WISHES OR VIEWS OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT IN THE CONDUCT OF OUR ARMED FORCES, WHEN THESE FORCES ARE DEPLOYED IN THE TERRITORY OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY, IT IS ONLY REALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT CERTAIN CONDITIONS MUST BE AGREED TO。 TO DATE, OKINAWA HAS BEEN AN EXCEPTION TO THIS GENERAL RULE BECAUSE OF ITS UNIQUE HISTORY, FIRST AS WAR-CONQUERED TERRITORY, THEN AS AN AREA ADMINISTERED BY US UNDER THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN。 BUT THE TIME HAS COME TO NORMALIZE THIS ASPECT OF OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND WITH THE PEOPLE OF OKINAWA, AND TO RESPOND TO THE DESIRES OF THE JAPANESE AND OKINAWANS FOR REVERSION。

SIMPLY STATED, AFTER REVERSION OUR MILITARY

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FORCES ON OKINAWA WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME CONDITIONS AS GOVERN THE MILITARY FORCES WE HAVE DEPLOYED IN JAPAN PROPER。 THESE CONDITIONS ARE SET FORTH IN THE US-JAPAN TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY AND ITS RELATED ARRANGEMENTS。 IT IS AN EXCELLENT TREATY WHICH SERVES WELL THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN。 WE CURRENTLY HAVE OVER 30,000 MILITARY PERSONNEL STATIONED IN JAPAN WHO, LIKE THEIR COMRADES IN OKINAWA, SERVE AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN OUR WESTERN PACIFIC DEFENSE POSTURE。

(大文字)

UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND RELATED EXCHANGES OF NOTES, WE CAN USE OUR ARMED FORCES FOR THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN AND FOR OTHER MILITARY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE MINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE FAR EAST, EXCEPT THAT UNDER THE PRIOR CONSULTATION FORMULA WE NEED THE AFFIRMATIVE APPROVAL OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO MAKING MAJOR CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF US MILITARY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED TO JAPAN, MAJOR CHANGES IN THEIR EQUIPMENT, OR USING OUR BASES IN JAPAN

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電信写

FOR DIRECT MILITARY COMBAT OPERATIONS, EXCEPT FOR THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN。

IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THESE THREE LIMITATIONS MEAN THAT, FIRST, THE US CANNOT INITIATE A SUBSTANTIAL BUILD-UP OF US FORCES IN JAPAN WITHOUT THAT GOVERNMENT'S PERMISSION。 HOWEVER, SMALL UNITS CAN BE DEPLOYED INTO JAPAN, AND THIS HAPPENS ON A FAIRLY REGULAR BASIS, WITH ONLY NOTIFICATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN。 IN TERMS OF MOVING OUR UNITS OUT OF JAPAN, THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT。

THE SECOND CATEGORY OF PRIOR CONSULTATION CONCERNS MAJOR CHANGES IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT。 THE JAPANESE INSISTED ON THIS PRIVISION AS ASSURANCE THAT THE US WOULD NOT ACT CONTRARY TO THE WISHES OF THE PEOPLE OF JAPAN。 THIS, OF COURSE, APPLIES TO THE STORING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN JAPAN。 THAT IS, THE US CANNOT STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN JAPAN WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT。 FOLLOWING REVERSION, THIS SAME CONDITION WILL APPLY TO THE RYUKYUS。

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電信写

THE THIRD CATEGORY OF THE PRIOR CONSULATION FORMULA REQUIRES THE APPROVAL OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO UNDERTAKING MILITARY COMBAT OPERATIONS FROM OUR BASES IN JAPAN, AND ON OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, LAUNCHING OF AIR STRIKES DIRECTLY AGAINST AN ENEMY TARGET FROM BASES IN JAPAN WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR CONSULTATION. THE DEPLOYMENT OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT FROM JAPAN TO OPERATE IN A ZONE OF HOSTILITIES HOWEVER, WOULD NOT. SIMILARLY, THE MYRIAD OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS PROVIDED TO OUR COMBAT FORCES FROM FACILITIES IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA WOULD NOT AND DO NOT REQUIRE PRIOR CONSULTATION.

EVEN THOUGH SUBJECT TO THE CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES OUTLINED ABOVE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT REVERSION WILL SIGNIFICANTLY IMPAIR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR MILITARY FORCES ON OKINAWA AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN OUR WESTERN PACIFIC DEFENSE POSTURE. THIS STATEMENT IS PREMISED ON SHARED US-JAPANESE SECURITY INTERESTS AND IN TURN A GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE PURPOSES FOR THESE FORCES, AS EMBODIED IN THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY. AT THE TIME OF PRIME

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(注) 第3454号 訂正報により修正

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MINISTER SATO'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN NOVEMBER OF 1969 HE DECLARED THAT THE SECURITY OF SOUTH KOREA WAS ESSENTIAL TO THE SECURITY OF JAPAN. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE SECURITY OF TAIWAN WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO JAPAN. THUS, IN THE EVENT OF A CONTINGENCY WE BELIEVE WE WOULD, IF NECESSARY, BE ABLE TO OPERATE OUR BASES IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA EFFECTIVELY.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE BEEN CONSULTED FULLY DURING THE OKINAWA REVERSION NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN EVERY STAGE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. ADMIRAL MOORER, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT AND URGE YOUR FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION OF IT.

LET ME TURN NOW TO THE FUNCSIONS NOW PERFORMED BY OUR MILITARY FORCES ON OKINAWA WHICH WILL BE TURNED OVER TO THE JAPANESE AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE US-JAPAN STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT WHICH WILL APPLY TO OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION: SPECIFICALLY (1) THE MISSION OF PROVIDING FOR THE IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA, (2) THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF OKINAWA, AND (3) THE APPLICATION OF THE US-JAPAN AGREEMENT REGARDING FACILITIES AND AREAS AND THE

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電信写

STATUS OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN JAPAN。

IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA

AS PART OF THE NOVEMBER 1969 JOINT COMMUNIQUE, PRIME MINISTER SATO AGREED THAT JAPAN WOULD GRADUALLY ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA。ONE ASPECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN LEADING TO THE AGREEMENT BEFORE YOU HAS CENTERED ON THE MODALITIES FOR TRANSFERRING THAT RESPONSIBILITY TO JAPAN。AN ASSOCIATED ARRANGEMENT WAS NEGOTIATED BY VICE ADMIRAL WALTER L。CURTIS, JR。, THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE TO THE OKINAWA NEGOTIATING TEAM, AND REPRESENTATIVES OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE AGENCY。
THIS DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT DESCRIBES THE GROUND, MARITIME AND AIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCES THAT JAPAN WILL DEPLOY TO OKINAWA FOLLOWING REVERSION。

THE OBJECTIVE IS FOR THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES TO ASSUME PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA BY JULY 1973。
WE BELIEVE THE DEFENSE AGENCY'S PLANS FOR THE FORCES

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TO BE DEPLOYED TO OKINAWA ARE ADEQUATE TO FULFILL THE DEFENSE MISSION TO BE ASSUMED。

THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY A SPIRIT OF CLOSE COOPERATION WHICH TYPIFIES THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND JAPANESE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS。

WHEN THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES ASSUME THE DEFENSE MISSION OF OKINAWA, THIS WILL MAKE AVAILABLE ABOUT 35 MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR FOR OTHER DOD MISSIONS。

CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

AS YOU KNOW, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, THROUGH THE EXECUTIVE AGENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ADMINISTERS THE RYUKYU AND DAITO ISLANDS FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT。THE CURRENT HIGH COMMISSIONER, LT。GEN。JAMES B。LAMPERT, USA, A VERY ABLE OFFICER, IS HERE TODAY AS A WITNESS FOR THIS COMMITTEE。
HE IS PREPARED TO EXPLAIN IN DETAIL THE SPECIFIC

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PLANS FOR RELINQUISHING TO JAPAN OUR ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OKINAWA, AND WHAT EFFECT REVERSION, OR A DENIAL OF REVERSION WOULD HAVE ON THE DAILY OPERATIONS OF OUR BASES ON OKINAWA. I WOULD SIMPLY LIKE TO STATE HERE THAT UPON REVERSION THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, AND SPECIFICALLY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WILL CEASE TO HAVE ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CIVILIAN AFFAIRS OF OKINAWA. THE GOVERNING OF OKINAWA WILL BECOME THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE NEW OKINAWA PREFECTURAL GOVERNMENT.

TRANSFER OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY WILL MEAN A SAVINGS TO THE UNITED STATES OF ABOUT 20 MILLION DOLLARS/YEAR. THIS WAS THE COST OF RUNNING THE U.S. CIVIL ADMINISTRATION INCLUDING ITS AID APPROPRIATIONS PRIOR TO THE DECISION TO BEGIN REVERSION NEGOTIATIONS. THE FIGURE HAS BEEN SHARPLY REDUCED ALREADY IN ANTICIPATION OF REVERSION.

APPLICATION OF SOFA

UPON THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN, THE US-

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JAPAN AGREEMENT REGARDING FACILITIES AND AREAS AND THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN JAPAN WILL APPLY TO OKINAWA AS WELL AS TO JAPAN PROPER. THIS AGREEMENT IS COMMONLY REFERRED TO AS THE US-JAPAN SOFA. LET ME BRIEFLY OUTLINE SOME OF THE CHANGES THAT WILL RESULT FROM THE APPLICATION OF THIS AGREEMENT AND THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY.

1. PROVISION OF AREAS AND FACILITIES

WE ARE CURRENTLY LEASING THE PRIVATE LAND WHICH WE USE FOR OUR BASES ON OKINAWA. UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND THE RELATED SOFA, JAPAN PROVIDES TO US FREE OF CHARGE OUR REQUIRED FACILITIES AND AREAS. THUS THE LAND RENTALS ON OKINAWA WHICH CURRENTLY COST US OVER 10 MILLION DOLLARS A YEAR WILL BE ASSUMED BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT UPON REVERSION.

2. EMPLOYMENT OF LOCAL NATIONALS

THE CURRENT PRACTICE ON OKINAWA IS FOR THE MILITARY SERVICES TO HIRE DIRECTLY THE REQUIRED LOCAL NATIONAL

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電信写

EMPLOYEES。 ON JAPAN, HOWEVER, WE HAVE A MASTER LABOR CONTRACT WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF THE REQUIRED LOCAL NATIONAL EMPLOYEES。 THUS OUR LOCAL NATIONAL EMPLOYEES IN JAPAN ARE HIRED INDIRECTLY THROUGH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT。 THIS SYSTEM HAS THE GREAT ADVANTAGE OF REDUCING TREMENDOUSLY LABOR DISPUTES WITH OUR LOCAL NATIONAL EMPLOYEES

IN JAPAN。 THE ANNUAL WAGE NEGOTIATIONS WE HAVE ON OKINAWA WILL BE TERMINATED, AS THE WAGES AND BENEFITS WE PAY UNDER THE MASTER LABOR CONTRACT WILL BE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THOSE PAID BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO ITS OWN EMPLOYEES。 IT ALSO MEANS, HOWEVER, THAT AT REVERSION OUR EMPLOYEES ON OKINAWA WILL RECEIVE AN INCREASE IN WAGES AND BENEFITS, AS THE WAGE SCALE IN JAPAN PROPER IS HIGHER THAN IT HAS BEEN IN OKINAWA。 THIS WILL CREATE SOME ADDITIONAL COSTS TO THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT, ALTHOUGH EVENTUALLY WE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE HAD TO PAY THE HIGHER WAGES SINCE THE GAP IN WAGES BETWEEN JAPAN AND OKINAWA HAS BEEN STEADILY CLOSING。

3。 TRAINING OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS

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WE CURRENTLY HAVE ON OKINAWA VARIOUS PROGRAMS TO PROVIDE TRAINING TO THE MILITARY PERSONNEL OF OTHER ASIAN ALLIES。 UNDER THE TERMS OF THE SOFA, THESE PROGRAMS FOR THE TRAINING OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS WILL HAVE TO BE TERMINATED。 THE MAJOR UNIT AFFECTED BY THIS REQUIREMENT IS THE US ARMY PACIFIC INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL。 THIS SCHOOL WILL BE RELOCATED TO GUAM, OR ANOTHER LOCATION IN THE PACIFIC, BEFORE REVERSION TAKES PLACE。

FACILITIES

THE FINAL SUBJECT I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU IS THE MILITARY FACILITIES WE WILL MAINTAIN ON OKINAWA AND THOSE THAT WILL BE RELEASED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN。

FIRST, WE WILL MAINTAIN ALL THOSE FACILITIES ESSENTIAL TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MISSIONS OF OUR MILITARY UNITS DEPLOYED ON OKINAWA。 THOSE FACILITIES THAT WILL BE RELASED ARE EITHER NO LONGER REQUIRED BY OUR FORCES, OR WILL NO LONGER BE REQUIRED ONCE, AND AS, THE MISSIONS FOR THE IMMEDIATE DEFENSE

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電信写

OF OKINAWA ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES.

小文字

THE LARGEST FACILITY BEING RETURNED TO JAPAN IS NAHA AIRPORT. AS THE AIRPORT IS THE CIVILIAN AIR TERMINAL FOR OKINAWA AS WELL AS A US MILITARY BASE, AND AS THE US MILITARY ACTIVITIES THERE HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO A US NAVY ASW PATROL AND UTILITY SQUADRONS, IT WAS JUDGED APPROPRIATE TO AGREE TO THE JAPANESE REQUEST TO RELEASE THE FACILITY COMPLETELY. THE FINANCIL ARRANGEMENT WORKED OUT WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IS COVERING THE COSTS OF RELOCATING THESE NAVAL FLYING ACTIVITIES. THE RELOCATION OF THESE NAVY UNITS WILL NOT IMPACT ON THEIR MISSION PERFORMANCE.

IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD NOTE THAT OKINAWA IS A SMALL ISLAND ROUGHLY 70 MILES LONG AND 5 MILES WIDE, WITH A POPULATION OF ABOUT ONE MILLION - 100,000 AMERICANS AND 900,000 OKINAWANS. THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF OUR BASES THERE DEPENDS UPON THE CONTINUED GOODWILL

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OF THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE, FOR IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TOTALLY ISOLATE THE BASES FROM THE REST OF THE ISLAND.

THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE STRONGLY DESIRE TO BE REUNITED WITH JAPAN AFTER A SEPARATION OF OVER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. IT IS A DESIRE THAT WE, AS AMERICANS, CAN COMPLETELY UNDERSTAND. RESPONDING TO THE DESIRES OF THE OKINAWANS TO REJOIN JAPAN, AND OF THE JAPANESE WHO WISH TO WELCOME BACK THE OKINAWANS, IS AN HISTORICALLY UNPRECEDENTED ACT BUT ONE WHICH IS IN KEEPING WITH THE BEST IN OUR POLITICAL HERITAGE. I URGE YOU TO CONSIDER FAVORABLY AND QUICKLY THIS AGREEMENT FOR THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA.

ランパート高等弁務官

2. ~~RANPAATO KOOTOO BENMUKAN~~

~~(High Commissioner)~~

10/29

IT IS A PRIVILEGE TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO TESTIFY IN SUPPORT OF THE OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT.

I SERVE IN THREE POSITIONS ON OKINAWA, WHICH I HAVE HELD SINCE JANUARY 1969. AS HIGH COMMISSIONER

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OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS UNDER THE AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND, BY DELEGATION, TO THE HIGH COMMISSION BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 10712. I EXERCISE THESE RESPONSIBILITIES THROUGH THE UNITED STATES CIVIL ADMINISTRATION, OR USCAR AS IT IS COMMONLY KNOWN. MY PRIMARY MISSIONS AS HIGH COMMISSIONER ARE TO PROMOTE THE WELFARE AND WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE OF THE RYUKYUS AND TO MAINTAIN A FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF OUR MILITARY BASES, WHICH ARE LOCATED FOR THE MOST PART ON THE MAIN ISLAND OF OKINAWA.

AS THE LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, PACIFIC, I HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING LOCAL ACTIVITIES OF THE MILITARY SERVICES, REPORTING DIRECTLY TO ADMIRAL MCCAIN IN HAWAII.

MY OTHER POSITION IS COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, RYUKYU ISLANDS, IN COMMAND OF THE ARMY FORCES IN THE RYUKYUS, UNDER THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES ARMY, PACIFIC, IN HAWAII.

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THE UNITED STATES HAS ADMINISTERED THE RYUKYU ISLANDS SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II IN 1945. THE RECORD OF OUR ADMINISTRATION IS ONE IN WHICH I BELIEVE OUR COUNTRY CAN TAKE CONSIDERABLE PRIDE. THE RYUKYUAN PEOPLE HAVE AN EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT OF THEIR OWN, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS, WHICH IS BASED ON DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND WHICH FOR THE MOST PART RUNS ITS OWN AFFAIRS. THEY HAVE A FREELY-ELECTED CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND A LEGISLATURE AS WELL AS A COURT SYSTEM OF THEIR OWN. ECONOMICALLY, THE RYUKYU ISLANDS HAVE ACHIEVED ONE OF THE HIGHEST STANDARDS OF LIVING IN ASIA ~~SEMICOLO~~ AND THE ECONOMY HAS CONTINUED TO GROW EACH YEAR AT AN IMPRESSIVE RATE. A FULL-SCALE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, TOGETHER WITH EXTENSIVE SOCIAL AND WELFARE FACILITIES HAVE ALSO BEEN DEVELOPED UNDER THE US ADMINISTRATION.

THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE RYUKYUS, WHO CALL THEMSELVES OKINAWANS BUT CONSIDER THEMSELVES JAPANESE NATIONALS, STRONGLY WITH TO RETURN TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR MOTHERLAND, JAPAN. THE RYUKYU

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ISLANDS WERE AN INTEGRAL PART OF JAPAN UNTIL 1945。
REVERSION TO JAPAN AT THE EARLIESE POSSIBLE TIME
HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY REQUESTED BY THEIR ELECTED
CHIEF EXECUTIVE AND BY UNANIMOUS RESOLUTIONS OF
THEIR LEGISLATURE, AND THERE HAVE BEEN FEW EXPRESSIONS
OF DESIRE TO REMAIN UNDER US ADMINISTRATION。THE
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND PRIME MINISTER SATO
IN NOVEMBER 1969 THAT THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
WOULD ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH A VIEW TO
ACCOMPLISHING REVERSION SOME TIME IN 1972 WAS
WELCOMED BY THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE AS A RESPONSE TO
THEIR STRONG DESIRE FOR REUNION WITH JAPAN。

WE ARE NOW IN A COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT PERIOD,
MARKED BY OKINAWAN UNCERTAINTIES AND ANXIETIES
OVER HOW REVERSION WILL AFFECT THEM PERSONALLY。
MANY OKINAWANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE GREATER REDUCTIONS
IN OUR BASES, BUT AT THE SAME TIME THEY FEAR THAT
THERE WILL BE LARGE-SCALE REDUCTIONS IN THE JOBS 小文字
PROVIDED BY OUR BASES WITHOUT OTHER JOBS BEING
AVAILABLE。OUR OKINAWAN BASE LABOR FORCE HAS REACTED
STRONGLY TO SUBSTANTIAL CURTAILMENTS IN OUR WORK
FORCE REQUIRED BY REDUCTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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DEFENSE BUDGET。THE OKINAWAN こもじ ECONOMY AND こもじ STANDARD OF
LIVING HAVE BEEN HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON OUR BASES
AS WELL AS ON UNITED STATES ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE。
OUR ECONOMIC AID HAS BEEN SHRAPLY REDUCED AND WILL,
OF COURSE,TERMINATE ON REVERSION。OKINAWANS ARE
CONCERNED THAT JAPAN MAY NOT CONTINUE TO PRIVIDE
THE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN AND
EVENTUALLY RAISE THE ECONOMY TO LEVELS COMPARABLE
WITH THE REST OF JAPAN。IN RECENT MONTHS THEY HAVE
BEEN APPREHENSIVE THAT THEY MIGHT SUFFER SERIOUS
ECONOMIC LOSSES AS A RESULT OF RECENT US MEASURES
TO PROTECT THE DOLLAR AND JAPAN'S DECISION TO
FLOAT THE YEN。

SERIOUS PROBLEMS AND TENSIONS HAVE ALSO RESULTED
FROM OCCASIONAL UNLAWFUL ACTS OF US SERVICEMEN AND
FROM ACCIDENTS INVOLVING OKINAWANS AND AMERICANS。
STRONG RESENTMENT AGAINST OUR EXCLUSIVE US CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION OVER MILITARY PERSONNEL HAS INCREASINGLY
FOUND EXPRESSION。THIS IS BECAUSE OKINAWANS BELIEVE
THE TIME IS APPROACHING WHEN THE UNITED STATES
SHOULD NO LONGER POSSESS POLICE AND OTHER POWERS OF

外務省

注　意

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2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

GOVERNMENT。

THE PRESENCE OF MILITARY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS ON OKINAWA, WHICH HAVE JUST RECENTLY BEEN COMPLETELY REMOVED, WAS ANOTHER MAJOR FACTOR CONTRIBUTING TO OKINAWAN FEELINGS OF ANXIETY AND TENSIONS。

THERE IS A VOCAL MINORITY WHICH VIGOROUSLY OPPOSES THE PRESENCE OF OUR MILITARY BASES AND WHICH TAKES EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT THESE EXISTING TENSIONS AND THE VARIOUS ACTIVITIES OF OUR BASES WHICH UNAVOIDABLY CAUSE INCONVENIENCE AND IRRITATION, SUCH AS JET AIRCRAFT NOISES AND MILITARY USE OF FARMLANDS。

THE RETURN OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION TO JAPAN AND THE APPLICATION TO OKINAWA OF THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA) BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ARE EXPECTED TO REDUCE SOURCES OF FRICTION AND TENSION AND TO PRIVIDE A MORE STABLE AND FAVORABLE BASIS FOR THE FUTURE。 OUR MILITARY BASES AND US FORCES PERSONNEL WILL BE PLACED IN THE SAME

外務省

注　意

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電信写

SITUATION, WITH THE SAME STATUS AND PRIVILEGES, AS IN MAINLAND JAPAN, INCLUDING THE APPLICATION OF THE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION PROVISIONS OF THE SOFA。 THIS IS EXPECTED TO REMOVE A MAJOR SOURCE OF OKINAWAN FEELINGS OF UNEQUAL TREATMENT。 IN ADDITION, AS HAS BEEN STATED BY SECRETARY PACKARD, (Deputy) RELATIONS SHOULD IMPROVE WHEN BASE WORKERS, WHOM THE US FORCES HAVE BEEN HIRING AND DEALING WITH DIRECTLY, ARE EMPLOYED BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT UNDER AN INDIRECT HIRE SYSTEM AS IN JAPAN。 THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT WILL BECOME RESPONSIBLE FOR PUBLIC SAFETY OUTSIDE OUR BASES, INCLUDING POLICE, FIRE PROTECTION AND TRAFFIC CONTROL。 UNDER THE SOFA, THE UNITED STATES WILL BE RELIEVED OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LEASING OF PRIVATELY OWNED LAND, WHICH HAS LONG BEEN A SENSITIVE ISSUE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE。

THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH US IN THE HANDLING OF VARIOUS DIFFICULT PROBLEMS THAT HAVE ARISEN AND IN THE WORKING OUT OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR A SMOOTH AND ORDERLY TRANSFER OF ADMINISTRATION。

外務省

注 意

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電信写

FOLLOWING PRESIDENT NIXON'S AND PRIME MINISTER SATO'S NOVEMBER 1969 COMMUNIQUE, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPANESE GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISHED SPECIAL GOVERNMENTAL MACHINERY TO NEGOTICATE DETAILED REVERSION ARRANGEMENTS AND TO INITIATE REVERSION PREPARATORY MEASURES. THE UNITED STATES/JAPAN CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE IN TOKYO WAS CHARGED WITH OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION IN OKINAWA WAS ESTABLISHED "FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONSULTING AND COORDINATING LOCALLY ON MEASURES RELATING TO PREPARATION FOR THE TRANSFER OF ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHT..."

AS THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY IN OKINAWA, THE UNITED STATES TOOK THE LEAD IN PRESENTING TO THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION IN JULY 1970 A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO FACILITATE THE TRANSFER OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY TO JAPAN. THE ESSENCE OF THAT PLAN WAS THAT THE TRANSFER SHOULD, TO THE LARGEST PRACTICABLE EXTENT, BE GRADUAL AND PROGRESSIVE, AVOIDING AN ABRUPT AND PAINFUL SHIFT AT REVERSION.

外務省

注 意

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電信写

AS A FRAMEWORK FOR A PROGRESSIVE RELINQUISHMENT OF UNITED STATES CIVIL ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS TO JAPAN, UNDER CONTINUED UNITED STATES OVERALL AUTHORITY, THE PERIOD UNTIL REVERSION WAS DIVIDED IN THE PLAN INTO THREE PHASES. THE FIRST WAS FROM THE DATE OF THE PLAN'S ADOPTION UNTIL A UNITED STATES-JAPAN REVERSION AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SIGNED ~~SEMICOLON~~ ; THE SECOND WAS FROM THEN UNTIL NECESSARY LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT WAS OBTAINED ~~SEMICOLON~~ ; AND THE THIRD WAS FROM THEN UNTIL REVERSION DAY.

PURSUANT TO THIS PLAN, THE UNITED STATES PRESENTED IN THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR THE FULL OR PARTIAL RELINQUISHMENT TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT OF A NUMBER OF FUNCTIONS IN PHASE ONE. MOST OF THESE FUNCTIONS WERE UCCAR FUNCTIONS OF ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE TO THE RYUKYUAN GOVERNMENT.

WE ARE CURRENTLY IN PHASE II OF THE TRANSFER PLAN, WHEN WE HAVE PROPOSED THE RELINQUISHMENT TO THE RYUKYUAN GOVERNMENT OF SEVERAL OPERATIONAL CIVIL ADMINISTRATION FUNCTIONS. DURING PHASE III

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電信写

VE PLAN TO RELINQUISH TO THE RYUKYUAN GOVERNMENT ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL CIVIL ADMINISTRATION FUNCTIONS, SUCH AS ADMINISTRATION OF QUARANTINE, CUSTOMS AND OTHER RELATED CONTROLS. DURING THAT FINAL PHASE MANY ACTIONS WILL BE TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE TURNOVER OF U.S. PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, THE SALE OF OUR CONTROLLING INTEREST IN THE BANK OF THE RYUKYUS, AND OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR CIVIL CONTROL PREPARATORY TO THE COMPLETE RELINQUISHMENT OF THAT CONTROL TO JAPAN ON REVERSION DAY.

ALTHOUGH THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE SEEM AWARE THAT REVERSION WILL NOT TAKE PLACE WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND THE JAPANESE DIET, THEY NONETHELESS GENERALLY EXPECT THAT REVERSION WILL OCCUR BY 1 JULY 1972 IF NOT EARLIER. CHIEF EXECUTIVE YARA AND THE GRC LEGISLATURE HAVE EXPRESSED THE DESIRE THAT REVERSION TAKE PLACE ON 1 APRIL 1972. THERE CAN BE NO DECISION ON THE DATE OF REVERSION, HOWEVER, UNTIL AFTER THE TREATY IS APPROVED BY THE SENATE AND THE DIET. WE FORESEE A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN PREPARING FOR A SMOOTH REVERSION AND FOR PLANNING PURPOSES WE

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注　意

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電信写

ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF 1 JULY 1972.

SHOULD REVERSION BE DELAYED MUCH BEYOND 1 JULY 1972, I BELIEVE WE WOULD SEE A STRONG ADVERSE REACTION FROM THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE. I WOULD EXPECT RAPID INTENSIFICATION OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT AND ACTIVITY WHICH COULD MAKE IT VERY DEFFECULT TO EXERCISE U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY AND TO MAINTAIN A FAVORABLE ENVIRONMENT FOR OUR BASES AND AMERICAN PERSONNEL. THE LONGER THE DELAY THE GREATER THE ADVERSE REACTION WHICH IS TO BE ANTICIPATED SINCE IT IS EVIDENT THAT U.S. BASES IN OKINAWA REQUIRE AT LEAST THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE.

WHILE A MINORITY OF OKINAWANS CONTINUE TO DEMAND IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE REMOVAL OF THE AMERICAN BASES, THE MAJORITY APPEAR TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY BASE STRUCTURE ON OKINAWA. IRRITATIONS AND PROBLEMS WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO ARISE FROM THE PRESENCE OF OUR BASES AND FROM TWO PEOPLE OF SUCH DEFFERENT LANGUAGE AND CULTURE LIVING SO

外務省

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電信写

CLOSE TO EACH OTHER IN A SMALL, DENSELY POPULATED GEOGRAPHIC AREA. THE OKINAWANS, NEVERTHELESS, ARE BASICALLY WARM, FRIENDLY PEOPLE. I CONTINUE TO FIND IN MY FREQUENT TRAVELS THROUGHOUT THE RYUKYUS AND IN MY PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH OKINAWANS SUBSTANTIAL GOODWILL TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AND AN APPRECIATION FOR WHAT THE UNITED STATES HAS DONE SINCE WORLD WAR II TO PROMOTE THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE OF OKINAWA. INDIVIDUAL OKINAWANS FREQUENTLY GO OUT OF THEIR WAY VOLUNTARILY TO EXPRESS THESE SENTIMENTS TO ME. I THINK THAT WITH INTELLIGENT MANAGEMENT OF OUR BASES WE CAN PRESERVE THESE FRIENDLY SENTIMENTS.

I BELIEVE THAT WITH THE CONTINUING SUPPORT OF OUR JAPANESE ALLY, AND WITH A SMOOTH REVERSION, OUR MILITARY BASES ON OKINAWA WILL CONTINUE AFTER REVERSION TO BE OF MAJOR VALUE TO THE UNITED STATES. BECAUSE OF THE STRATEGIC LOCATION OF OKINAWA, OUR EXTENSIVE AND HIGHLY DEVELOPED COMPLEX OF MILITARY BASES THERE ARE EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN U.S. DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS. THEY CONTRIBUTE IN

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電信写

A MAJOR WAY TO OUR ABILITY TO FULFULL U.S. COMMITMENTS TO THE SECURITY OF JAPAN AND OUR OTHER ALLIES IN THE PACIFIC.

(3)

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ステンシル タイプ

注　意

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電信写

1022

総番号（TA）56337　　主管
71年10月28日 13時30分　米国　発
71年10月29日 02時41分　本省　着 東北1

外務大臣殿　牛場（大使）臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

（区分限定）（至急）
沖縄上院外交聴問会（12一企業）

第3443号 平大至急　46.10.27
往電第3425号に関し

（以下別紙英文）

公文書館

官房	長官	公文書館	
総務	次長	典務	
官房	審議官	長官	
官房	総務	人事	電厚	計画	
官房	総務	会計	営繕	給与	
調査企画	分析	調整			
領事移住	領事	旅券	査証		
中南米局	参事官	中米	南米	東南アジア	北東アジア	西欧	東欧	北米	中近東	参事官	保障
中南米局	長	参事官	一	二							
欧亜局	長	参事官	西欧	東欧	東洋	西洋					
欧亜局	長										
経済協力局	長	参事官	資源	国際経済	一	二					
経済協力局	長	参事官	国際経済	統一	理						
経済協力局	長	参事官	技術	政策	一						
経済協力局	長	参事官	企画	調整	二						
国際連合局	長	参事官	協力	規制							
国際連合局	長	参事官	経済	科学							
国際連合局	長		専門	社会	軍縮						
条約局	長	参事官	国内	国際	法律						
条約局	長		一	二							
近東アフリカ局	長	参事官	近東	アフリカ							
経済協力局	長	次長	経済	経済	国際	資源	一				
経済協力局	長	参事官	国際	経済	統一	国際	二				
経済協力局	長	参事官	技術	政策	一	理					
経済協力局	長	参事官	企画	調整	二	国					
国際連合局	長	参事官	協力	規制							
国際連合局	長	参事官	経済	科学							
国際連合局	長		専門	社会	軍縮						
条約局	長	参事官	国内	国際	法律						
条約局	長		一	二							

外務省

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電信写

SENATOR AIKEN; AND AS I UNDERSTAND IT, JAPAN AGREES TO PROTECT AMERICAN BUSINESS INTERESTS AND PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS, INCLUDING LAWYERS, WHO MIGHT BE PRESENTLY ON OKINAWA?

SENATOR CASE; AND VETERINARIANS。

SENATOR AIKEN; AND VETERINARIANS。

BUT FOR HOW LONG A PERIOD OF TIME IS THIS AGREEMENT -- DOES THIS AGREEMENT CARRY?

SECRETARY ROGERS; IT IS INDEFINITE。

SENATOR AIKEN; INDEFINITE?

SECRETARY ROGERS; YES。

SENATOR AIKEN; AND THEN SECOND DEGREE, SEOND GENERATION, THIRS GENERATION AMERICANS ALSO MIGHT BE PROTECTED IF THEY INHERITED --

SECRETARY ROGERS; IT CERTAINLY WOULDN'T APPLY TO LAWYERS。

SENATOR AIKEN; I SEE。

(字支ずみ. 29/10 03:35)

(3)

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
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電信写　100

総番号（TA）56341　主管

71年10月28日14時00分　米国　発
71年10月29日03時03分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　米場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

沖縄上院外交委聴問会（13）

第3454号 平 大至急
往電第3449号に関し
パッカード次官の冒頭証言テキストの
"IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA" から前に数えて2番目のパラグラフ（ADMIRAL MOOERE,...で始まるパラグラフ）が全文次の通り変更された。

（以下英文別紙）

外務省

注　意

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電信写

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE BEEN CONSULTED FULLY DURING THE OKINAWA REVERSION NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVE ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN EVERY STAGE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. ADMIRAL MOORER, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT AND URGE YOUR FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION OF IT.

(了)

-- 2 --

(写手交ずみ。29/10 03:35)

外務省

注　意

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電信写

4500??

大政事外外儀官
務務　典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会営給

調査長	参企析調
領移長	参領旅査移
ア長	参地中東二 北東一西
米長	参北北保
中南審	参一二
欧長	参西東洋 西東二
近ア長	参書近ア
経長	次総経国資源 参賀統国一
経協長	参政技一理 国企二
条長	参条協規
国長	参政経科 軍社専
情長	参道内外
文長	一二

総番号（TA）56400　　主管
71年10月28日16時40分　米国　発
71年10月29日06時35分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

上院外交委聴問会（14-2明概要）

第3457号　平　大至急
往電第3449号に関し

PRESENT DURING ALL OR PART OF THE HEARING WERE SENATORS FULBRIGHT, SPARKMAN, SYMINGTON, SPOMG, COOPER, JAVITS AND PEARSON.

THE SECOND DAY OF THE HEARING WAS CONVENED BY CHAIRMAN FULBRIGHT AT 10:00 A.M. HE WAS THE ONLY COMMITTEE MEMBER PRESENT AT THAT TIME. SENATORS PEARSON , COOPER AND SPARKMAN ENTERED THE HEARING DURING THE PRESENTATIOM OF SECRETARY PACKARD'S FORMAL WRITTEN STATEMENT .

SENATOR FULBRIGHT OPENED THE HEARING WITH A BRIEF STATEMENT THAT CONCERN HAD BEEN EXPRESSED

外務省

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電信写

ABOUT RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF OUR BASES AND POSSIBLE ADVERSE DFFECTS ON OUR U.S. NATIONAL SECRITY INTERESTS.

DEPUTY SECRETARY PACKARD, AS THE FIRST WITNESS, STATED THAT OKINAWA REPRESENTS A MAJOR DLEMENT OF THE U. S. DEFENSE POSTURE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC WITH NEARLY 50,000 MILITARY PERSONNEL DEPLOYED THERE.
WITH THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA THESE FORCES WILL REMAIN AND CONTINUE TO BE READY TO PERFORM THEIR MISSIONS. OUR MILITARY ACTIVITIES WILL, HOWEVER, BE SUBJECT TO THE UNDERSTANDING WE HAVE WITH JAPAN.
THE TIME HAS COME TO RESPOND TO THE DESIRES OF THE JAPANESE AND OKINAWANS FOR REVERSION. PACKARD STATED THAT AFTER REVERSION OUR MILITARY FORCES ON OKINAWA WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME CONDITIONS AS GOVERN THE MILITARY FORCES WE HAVE DEPLYED IN JAPAN PROPER. WE CURRENTLY HAVE OVER 30,000 MILITARY PERSONNEL IN JAPAN.

PACKARD STATED THAT UNDER THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY WE CAN USE OUR ARMED FORCES FOR THE DEFENSE

外務省

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電信写

OF JAPAN AND FOR OTHER MILITARY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE FAR EAST, EXCEPT THAT WE NEED THE THE AFFIRMATIVE APPROVAL OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO MAKING MAJOR CHANGES:

(1) IN THE NUMBER OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL DEPLYED TO JAPAN,

(2) IN THEIR EQUIPMENT,

(3) OR USING OUR BASES IN JAPAN FOR DIRECT MILITARY COMBAT OPERATION EXCEPT FOR THE DIRECT MILITARY COMBAT OPERATIONS EXCEPT FOR THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN.

WE CANNOT INITIATE A SUBSTANTIAL BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN WITHOUT THAT GOVERNMENT 'S PERMISSION . FOLLOWING REVERSION WE WILLNOT BE ABLE TO STORE MUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OKINAWA WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. PRIOR CONSULTATION REQUIRES APPROVAL OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO UNDRTAKING MILITARY

外務省

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電信写

COMBAT OPERATIONS FROM OUR BASES IN JAPAN AND ON OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION.

ON THE OCCASION OF PRIME MINISTER SATO'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN NOVEMBER 1969, HE DECLARED THE SECURITY OF SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN WAS IMPORTANT TO THE SECURITY OF JAPAN. " IN THE EVENT OF A CONTINGENCY WE BELIEVE WE WOULD, IF NECESSARY, BE ABLE TO OPERATE OUR BASES IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA EFFECTIVELY. "

PACKARD SAID THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SUPPORT THE AGREEMENT AND URGE THE COMMITTEE'S FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION OF IT.

WITH REFERENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA, PACKARD SAID THE OBJECTIVE IS FOR THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES TO ASSUME PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA BY JULY 1973. HE STATED THAT UPON REVERSION THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL CEASE TO HAVE ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CIVILIAN AFFAIRS OF OKINAWA AND THAT U.S. -JAPAN SOFA WILL APPLY.

外務省

注 意

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電信写

TO OKINAWA AS WELL AS TO JAPAN PROPER。
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY
AND SOFA, JAPAN WILL PROPVIDE OUR REQUIRED
FACILITIES AND AREAS FREE OF CHARGE。 PROGRAMS
FOR THE TRAINING OF THIRD -COUNTRY NATIONALS
WILL HAVE TO BE TERMINATED ' AND THE U.S。
ARMY PACIFIC INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL WILL BE
RELOCATED TO GUAM OR ELSEWHERE IN THE PACIFIC。

PACKARD STATED THE U。S。 WILL MAINTAIN
ALL THOSE FACILITES ESSENTIAL TO THE PERFORMANCE
OF THE MISSIONS OF OUR MILITARY UNITS DEPLOYED
ON OKINAWA。 NAHA AIRPORT IS BEING RETUNED TO
JAPAN AND THE NAVY UNITS THERE BEING RELOCATE。
HE STATED THAT THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING GOOD
WILL OF THE PEOPLE THERE AND URGED FAVORABLE
AND QUICK CONSIDERATION OF THE REVERSION
AGREEMENT。

AT MR。 PACKARD'S SUGGESTION , GENERAL
JAMES P。 LAMPERT READ HIS PREPARED STATEMENT
BEFORE QUESTIONING BEGAN。

GENERAL LAMPERT, HIGH COMMISSIONER OF THE

注 意

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電信写

RYUKYU ISLANDS, DESCRIBED HIS POSITION
AND DEVELOPED THE DESIRE OF THE GREAT MAJORITY
OF THE PEOPLE OF THE RYUKYU TO RETURN TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THIER MOTHER LAND, JAPAN。
HE REFERRED TO THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT ON THE
ISLAND THAT PRODUCED TENSIONS AND INDICATED
THAT OUR ECONOMIC AID TO OKINAWA WILL TERMINATE
ON REVERSION 。HE STATED THAT THE PRESENCE OF MILITARY
CHEMICAL MUNITIONS ON OKINAWA WHICH HAVE BEEN
COMPLETELY REMOVED, WAS A MAJOR FACTOR CONTRI-
BUTING TO OKINAWAN TENSION。
WITH REVERSION OUR MILITARY BASES AND U。S。
FORCES PERSONNEL WILL HAVE THE SAME STATUS
AND PRIVILEGES AS IN MAINLAND JAPAN。
HE STATED THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS COOPERATED
CLOSELY IN THE HANDLING OF DIFFICULT OROBLEMS
THAT HAVE ARISEN。 HE DESCRIBED NEGOTIATIONS FOR
REVERSION AS A THREE-STAGE ACTIVITY:

THE FIRST WAS FROM THE DATE OF THE PLAN'S ADOPTION
UNTIL THE SIGNING OF THE REVERSION AGREEMENT
SEMICOLON THE SECOND WAS FROM THEN UNTIL LEGIS-
LATIVE APPROVAL SEMICOLON AND THE THIRD FROM THEN

注　意

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電信写

UNTIL REVERSION DAY. WE ARE CURRENTLY IN THE SECOND STAGE OF THAT PLAN AND HE IS WORKING TOWARD JULY 1, 1972 AS THE EFFECTIVE REVERSION DATE. HE STATED THAT THE LONGER THE DELAY THE GREATER THE ADVERSE REACTION AND THAT ''WITH INTELLIGENT MANGEMENT OF OUR BASES, WE CAN PRESERVE THE FRIENDLY SENTIMENTS'' THAT EXIST BETWEEN THE OKINAWANS AND THE U.S.

AT 10:33 A.M. THE QUESTIONING OF BOTH WITNESSES WAS BEGUN BY SENATOR FULBRIGHT. HE FIRST ASKED GENERAL LAMPERT TO DEFINE THE MISSION OF OUR RETAINED BASES IN OKINAWA AND THE NUTURE OF THE '' THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY.'' GANERAL LAMPERT STATED THAT ON OKINWA OUR U.S. ARMY BASES ARE PRIMARILY LOGISTICAL AND STAFFED BY U.S. MILITARY AND RYUKYU CIVILIANS. THERE ARE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE MISSILE FORCES AND TWO LARGE AIR BASES RELATED TO AIR DEFENSE OF OKINAWA. THE MARINES HAVE THE LARGEST COMPLEMENT ON THE ISLAND AND THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION HAS BEEN RETURNED THERE FROM VIETNAM. THE NAVY HAS THE SMALLEST REPRESENTATION. TOTAL U.S. CITIZEN PERSONNEL ON THE ISLAND, INCLU-

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電信写

DING DERVICEMENT IN UNIFORM, GOVERNMENT CIVILIANS AND FAMILIES, TOTAL 85,000.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT THEN QUESTIONED THE FINANCIAL SAVINGS TO BE EFFECTED ON REVERSION. SECRETARY PACKARD STATED DORUJIRUSI 35 MILLION A YEAR WOULD BE SAVED BY JAPAN ASSUMING THE SELF-DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES AND DORUJIRUSI 20 MILLION A YEAR ON CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION COSTS. THERE WOULD BE ABOUT A DORUJIRUSI 10 MILLION PER YEAR INCREASE IN LABOR COSTS WHICH WOULD HAVE RESULTED ANYWAY. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AS TO HOW MUCH MONEY WE HAVE INVESTED IN OKINAWA, GENRAL LAMPERT REPLIED ''OVER DORUJIRUSI 600 MILLION EXPENDED ''. SENATOR FULBRIGHT AGAIN ASKED SECRETARY PACKARD WHAT THREAT WE ARE PROTECTING AGAINST AND WHY ARE THE BASES THERE. PACKARD REPLIED THAT THE BASES RELATE TO THE SECURITY OF THE WEST PACIFIC AREA AND MUST BE LOOKED AT IN TERMS OF OUR LARGER ROLE. HE STATED OKINAWA WAS IMPORTANT TO US IN KOREA AND THAT A UNIT HAS BEEN MOVED THERE FROM VIETNAM. FULBRIGHT ASKED, ''IF VIETNAM IS COMING TO AN END, AS I HOPE IT IS , WHY DO WE

外務省

注　意
1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

NEED THESE BASES?'' ''IT THERE A PROVISION OF THE TERMINATION OF THOSE BASES?'' PACKARD REPLIED THAT WE ARE GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND WITH T THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVES TO CHINA。 HE CANNOT ASSESS HOW LONG WE MUST REMAIN THERE BUT IT IS IMPORTANT WE BE THERE NOW。 HE STATED WE ARE GOING THROUGH IMPORTANT CHANGES IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY AND WE DO NOT WANT TO GIVE THE SINGAL WE ARE ABANDONING OUR RESPONSIBILITIES IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD。 HE STATED WE ARE AT HTEBEGINNING OF A NEW ERA AND MUST BE CAREFUL AS WE MOVE FORWARD。 FULBRIGHT STATED HE UNDERSTANDS WE ARE IN A '' TRANSITIONAL PERIOD'' AND THAT PACKARD CAN'T SAY WHETHER WE NEED THESE BASES FOR TWENTY, TEN OR FIVE YEARS。 PACKARD REPLINED THAT WAS CORRECT SEMICOLON WE ARE MOVING FROM AN ERA OF CONFRONTATION TO AN ERA OF NEGOTIATION AND WE MUST MOVE FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH TAND BE VERY CAREFUL。

FULBRIGHT QUESTIONED LAMPERT ON HIS REFERENCES TO SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING IN THE RYUKYUS。 LAMPERT REPLIED THAT IN THE LAST

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電信写

TEN YEARS, AVERAGE PER CAPITA INCOM IS UP FROM DORUJIRUSI 264 TO DORUJIRUSI 925 PER ANNUM AND GNP OF THE RYUKYUS FROM DORUJIRUSI 265 MILLION IN 1962 TO DORUJIRUSI 1 BILLION IN THE CURRENT YEAR。 PACKARD REPEATED THAT THE RYUKYUS HAVE 1 MILLION PEOPLE AND A DORUJIRUSI 1 BILLION GNP。 FULBRIGHT ASKED IF THIS WAS DUE TO U。S。 EXPENDITURES。 LAMPERT REPLIED THEY HAVE PLAYED A PART BUT THAT BUSINESS HAS INCREASED, FOREIGN INVESTMENT HAS INCREASED AND JAPANESE AID HAS INCREASED。 U。S。 CONTRIBUTION TO GNP IS BETWEEN 25 PERSENT AND 30 PERSENT。 IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM SENATOR FULBRIGHT, LAMPERT STATED THAT U。S。 DIRECT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO OKINAWA UNDER THE PRICE ACT WAS DORUJIRUSI 17。5 MILLION IN 1970 AND HAS BEEN DECREASING SINCE THEN。

SENATOR SPARKMAN BEGAN HIS QUESTIONING OF THE WITNESSES AT 10:45 A。M。。 SENATOR SPARKMEN INQUIRED ABOUT THE FUTURE ATATUS OF AMERICAN BUSINESSES IN OKINAWA。 GENERAL LAMPERT SAID THAT THE REVERSION TREATY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A LETTER TO THE U。S。 AMBASSADOR FROM THE JAPANESE

外務省

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電信写

FOREIGN MINISTER WHICH, WITH ACCOMPANYING ASSURANCES, PROVIDED A SOLID BASIS FOR THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF U.S. BUSINESS IN OKINAWA. THERE WOULD BE SOME ADDED RESTRAINT ON U.S. BUSINESSES DUE TO THE OPERATION OF JAPANESE LAW AND SOME MATTERS WERE STILL UNDER DISCUSSION. SPARKMAN ASKED HOW MUCH OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS THERE DEPENDED ON THE PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES FORCES. LAMPERT ANSWERED THAT MANY OF THE U.S. BUSINESSES WERE SMALL CONCERNS SPECIALIZING IN PROVIDING SERVICES AND PRODUCTS FOR PERSONAL CONSUMPTION. HOWEVER, A LARGER PORTION WAS BEING ORIENTED TOWARD LOCAL AND OUTSIDE MARKETS AS, FOR EXAMPLE, THREE U.S. OIL REFINERIES WHICH WERE BEING CONSTRUCTED TO PROCESS MIDDLE EAST OIL FOR SHIPMENT THROUGHOUT THE EAST ASIA AREA.

SPARKMAN ASKED HOW MANY MAINLAND JAPANESE THERE WERE AMONG THE POPULATION OF OKINAWA. LAMPERT TOLD HIM HHAT ONLY A SMALL SEGMENT OF THE JAPANESE POPULATION WAS OF MAINLAND ORIGIN ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MAINLAND JAPANESE BUSINESSMAN AND OTHERS ON OKINAWA. SPARKMAN CONTINUED THIS LINE OF QUESTION-

外務省

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電信写

NG BY ASKING WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA FTER REVERSION WOULD BE COMPOSED OF OKINAWANS R MAINLAND JAPANESE. LAMPERT RESPONDED THAT OKINAWA AS TO BECOME A PREFECTURE OF JAPAN AGAIN. THE RESENT OKINAWA ELECTED OFFICIALS WOULD BE CONTIUED IN OFFICE TEMPORARILY UNTIL NEW ELECTIONS WOULD E HELD. SOME GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FROM MAINLAND APAN WOULD BE POSTED IN OKINAWA BUT LAMPERT ID NOT KNOW HOW MANY. SPARKMAN ADN LAMPERT AGREED HAT THE PREFECTURE GOVERNMENT WOULD GENERALLY BE GOVERNMENT COMPOSED OF OKINAWANS. SPARKMAN NQUIRED AS TO WHAT PORTION OF AMERICAN TROOPS RESENTLY IN OKINAWA WOULD BE WITHDRAWN. SECREARY PACKARD RESPONDED THAT ONLY A SMALL PORTION F THE 50,000 U.S. TROOPS AND PERSONNEL WOULD E WITHDRAWN. THOSE WITHDRAWN WOULD BE APPROXIATELY 3,500 REPLACED BY JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE ORCES. IN ADDITION, SOME WOULD BE WITHDRAWN BECAUSE F THE CANCELLATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE THRAINING PERATION, AND WITHDRAWAL OF THE NAVAL SUPPORT ASE AT NAHA AIRPORT, ALTHOUGH THE PLACE OF ELOCATION OF THE NAVAL SUPPORT BASE AT NAHA IRPORT HAD NO BEEN DETERMINED. OVER HALF OF THE

外務省

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電信写

U.S. FOCRES BELONG TO THE MARINE UNIT STATEIONED THERE AND IT WOULD REMAIN. PACKARD DID NOT KNOW THAT THE FUTURE WOULD HOLD AS TO THE SIZE OF AMERICAN FORCES THERE.

SPARKMAN INQUIRED AS TO WHETHER A PROVISION OF THE PEACE TREATY SAID THAT U.S. FORCES WOULD REMAIN IN OKINAWA SO LONG AS THERE WAS A THREAT TO PEACE IN THE AREA. PACKARD RESPONDED THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW THE EXACT WORDS OF THE REATY BUT THAT THE CONCEPT WAS THAT JAPAN WAS TO RETAIN RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER OKINAWA. SPARKMAN INDICATED THAT THE PURPOSE OF HIS QUESTION WAS TO INDICATE THAT THERE WERE CONTINUING CONDITIONS JUSTIFYING THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN FORCES ON OKINAWA. SPARKMAN ASKED IF THE STATUS OF FORCES IN OKINAWA WOULD BE THE SAME AS THROUGHOUT JAPAN. LEMPERT ASSURRED HIM THAT IT WOULD BE EXACTLY THE SAME. SPARKMAN FINISHED HIS QUESTIONING AT 10:58. SENATOR COOPER THANKED PACKARD AND LAMPERT FOR THEIR STATEMENTS AND SAID THAT IT WAS A GREAT CREDIT TO THE UNITED

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STATES THAT IT HAD NOT REQUIRED JAPAN TO CEDE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE RYUKYUS AFTER THE WAR. THIS SITUATION WAS TO BE CONTRASTED WITH WHAT RUSSIA REQUIRED IN REGARD TO THE KURILE ISLANDS.

COOPER INQUIRED AS TO THE NUMBER OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN OKINAWA. PACKARD RESPONDED A LITTLE UNDER 50,000. COOPER ASKED THE NUMBER IN JAPAN SEMICOLON PACKARD SAID ABOUT 30,000. COOPER ASKED THE NUMBER IN TAIWAN SEMICOLON PACKARD SAID ''9,000, I BELIEVE.'' COOPER ASKED THE NUMBER FOR KOREA SEMICOLON PACKARD SAID ''40,000, RDUCED FROM 60,000.'' COOPER THEN ASKED WHETHER OKINAWA WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT AREA IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD. PACKARD RESPONDED THAT OKINAWA WAS INDEED VERY KEY WITH A STRATEGIC LOCATION IN PROXIMITY TO SOUTH KOREA, JAPAN AND OTHER PARTS OF THE AREA. COOPER

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電信写

ASKED WHETHER INCREASSED FORCES IN
OKINAWA MIGHT BE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF
CONDITIONS BETWEEN TAIWAN AND
MAINLAND CHINA。 PACKARD RESPONDED
THAT THIS SITUATION WAS SUBJECT
TO FURTHER ASSESSMENT AND WAS BUT
ONE ELEMENT IN THE CHANGING
SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES
IN THE AREA。

COOPER INDICATED THAT LAMPERT HAD
TALKED ABOUT ANTI-AMERICANISM CREATED BY
BASES IN OKINAWA AND ASKED WHETHER
SUCH ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT WAS
PRESENT IN JPAN BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED
PRESENCE OF U。S。 FORCES IN OKINAWA。
LAMPERT RESPONDED THAT AMERICAN BASES
IN JPAN ARE MORE DISPERSED THAN IN
OKINAWA CREATING FEWER FRICTIONS AND
THAT THERE WAS GREAT INTERST IN JPAN
ABOUT EVERYTHING OCCURRING IN OKINAWA。
COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN OKINAWA RECEIVE
EQUALLY PROMINENT TREATMENT WITH
THOSE EVENTS WHICH OCCURR IN MAINLAND

外務省

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電信写

JAPAN。 LAMPERT POINTED OUT THAT LAST
YEAR THE OKINAWAS WERE ALLOWED TO
ELECT MEMBERS OF THE DIET AND THAT THESE
MEMBERS OF THE DIET HAD BEEN VERY
EFFECTIVE IN BRINGIN OKINAWAN PROBLEMS
TO THAT BODY。

COOPER INQUIRED ABOUT THE TRANSFER
OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER U。S。
FORCES FOR OFF-BASE CRIMES。 LAMPERT
RESPONDED THAT SUCH JURISDICTION WOULD BE
TRANSFERRED FOR OFF-BASE, OFF-DUTY
OFFENSES。 COOPER ASKED ABOUT THE
HANDLING OF JAPANESE OFFENSES ON U。S。
BASES。 LEMPERT RESPONDED THAT HE DID NOT
KNOW WHAT THE STATUS OF SUCH OFFENSES
WOULD BE。 COOPER AND PACKARD AGREED THAT THE
STATUS WOULD BE THE SAME AS IN MAINLAND
JAPAN。 COOPER CALLED ATTENTION TO
PAGE 3 OF PACKARD'S STATEMENT
CONCERNING LIMITATIONS ON THE U。S。 BASES
IN OKINAWA。 PACKARD RESPONDED THAT THE
U。S。 HAD A RIGHT TO WITHDRAW TROOPS,
ALTHOUGH THE USE OF THE BASES TO FLY

外務省

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電信写

COMBAT SORTIES WOULD ONLY BE
UNDERTAKEN IN CONSULTATION AND AFTER
THE CONSENT OF JAPAN. SENATOR COOPER STRESSED
HIS CONCERN WITH THE MECESSITY FOR
FOLLOWING CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES IN THE
DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES FOR HOSTILE
PURPOSES. COOPER INQUIRED AS TO THE
PRINCIPAL NAVAL SUPPORT BASE. LAMPERT
THOUGHT THAT THE PRINCIPAL BASE IN THE
AREA WAS SHOUTH OF TOKYO.
SENATOR COOPER CONCLUDED QUESTIONING
AT 11;00 A.M. AND SENATOR JAVITS BEGAN
WITH A STATEMENT THAT THE KEYPORTION
OF MR. PACKARD'S TESTIMONY WAS THE
SENTENCE WHICH STATED THAT '' THE SMOOTH
FUNCTIONING OF OUR BASES THERE (OKINAWA)
DEPENDS UPON THE CONTINUED GOOD
WILL OF THE OKINAWAN PEOPLE ''...
SENATOR JAVITS INDICATED HE WAS PROUD
TO BE A SENATOR FROM A COUNTRY WHICH
WOULD RELINQUISH CONTROL
OF TERRITORY.
SENATOR JAVITS ASKED A VERY BROAD

外務省

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電信写

QUESTION CONCERNING HOW REVERSION
WOULD AFFECT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES PERSONNEL ON OKINAWA AND
AND THE OKINAWAN POPULATION. HE ASKED IF
PACKARD HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO
WHAT STEPS THE U.S. MIGHT TAKE TO
PROMOTE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. PERSONNEL
AND THE OKINAWAN POPULATION. PAKARD REPLIED
THAT THE REVERSION AGREEMENT WOULD
ITSELF REMOVE SOME OF THE
IRRITANTS IN THE SHORT RUN, BUT
IN THE LONG TERM, SMOOTH RELATIONS
BETWEEN AMERICANS AND THE
OKINAWANS WOULD DEPEND ON THE
DEGREE TO WHICH THE INTERESTS OF THE
UNITED STATES COINCIDE WITH THOSE
OF JAPAN AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH BOTH
THE PEPOLE OF JAPAN AND OKINAWA SEE THIS
COINCIDENCE OF UNITED STATES AND
JAPANESE INTERESTS. LAMPERT POINTED OUT
THAT THERE WERE CONTINUING EFFORTS TO PROMOTE
GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. PERSONNEL AND
THE OKINAWAN POPULATION. LAMPERT FELT

外務省

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THAT GIVING UP ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
OVER THE ISLAND WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO
THESE RELATIONS, THAT THE TRANSFER OF
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION, THE TRANSFER OF
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIRING OKINAWAN NATIONALS,
AND THE RELINQUISHMENT OF LANDS WOULD
ALL BE BENEFICIAL TO IMPROVING
THESE RELATIONS。HE RECOGNIZED THAT
HOW TO MAKE U。S。PERSONNEL BEHAVE
PROPERLY WAS THE ESSENCE OF THE
MILITARY COMMANDER'S JOB。HE REVIEWED
PROGRAMS FOR INTRODUCING YOUNG SOLDIERS,
AIRMEN AND MARINES
TO THE CUSTOMS OF OKINAWA。JAVITS STATED
THAT IT WAS HIS EXPERIENCE THAT MAKING
PEOPLE USEFUL WAS THE BEST WAY TO
PROMOTE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE
AMERICANS AND THE OKINAWANS。LAMPERT RESPONDED
THAT THERE WAS AN EXTENSIVE COMMUNITY
RELATIONS PROGRAM WITH AMERICANS
PROVIDING FUNDS FOR HIGH SCHOOL BAND
INSTRUMENTS AND REPAIRING TYPHOON DAMAGE。
JAVITS ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD BE ACTIVE

外務省

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電信写

OR PASSIVE IN OUR AID TO THE OKINAWANS。
LAMPERT AND PACKARD BOTH SAID WE WOULD
BE ACTIVISTS AND THAT THERE WERE MORE MILITARY
PERSONNEL ANXIOUS TO BE INVOLVED
IN THIS SORT OF PROGRAM THAN HAS BEEN
THE CASE IN THE PAST。JAVITSCONCLUDED WITH
A STATEMENT THAT THE LESS UNITED
STATES FORCES LIVE IN LOCKED
COMPOUNDS AND THE MORE AMERICANS
LIVE WITH THE
PEOPLE OF OKINAWA AND ARE COMMUNITY- MINDED AND
AVID BOOSTERS OF OKINAWA, THE MORE LIKELY GOOD
RELATIONS WOULD BE。JAVITS CONCLUDED QUESTIONING
AT 11:21。

SENATOR SYMINGTON ASKED ''WHETHER WE HAVE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA OR NOT, IS OUR POSITION
KNOWN TO THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA?'' PACKARD
REPLIED THAT OUR STANDARD RESPONSE TO THIS QUESTION
IS THAT ''WE DO NOT CONFIRM OR DENY OR DISCUSS
THAT SUBJECT。'' HE INDICATED THIS RESPONSE APPLIED
TO THE HIGHEST OFFICIALS IN THE OKINAWAN GOVERNMENT。
SYMINGTON ASKED IF THE PEOPLE OF OKINAWA WERE

外務省

注　意

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電信写

GNORANT OF THE DETAILS ON THE NUCLEAR PRESENCE SSUE AND PACKARD REPLIED AFFAIRMATIVELY。SYMINGTON HEN STATED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS POLICY F SECRECY。HE STATED THE CONGRESS IS ASKED FOR UBSTANTIAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDS FOR EAPONRY BUT LITTLE REQUEST FOR FUNDS TO SUPPORT UCLEAR USES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PURPOSES AND CREATION F FOOD。HE STATED THE SUBJECT IS SATURATED WITH ECRECY AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE DO NOT KNOW HOW HIS AREA OF ACTIVITIES HAS BEEN SLIGHTED。HE ASKED AGAIN ''WHY ALL THE SECRECY?'' PCAKARD REPLIED HAT ''ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA WILL BE EMOVED BY REVERSION DAY。IF THERE ARE ANY THERE NOW, HEY WILL NOT BE THERE ON THE DAY OF REVERSION。''

SYMINGTON SUGGESTED THAT IF WE TKAE NUCLEAR EAPONS OFF OKINAWA AND PUT THEM SOMEWHERE ELSE, E ARE NOT SOLVING THE PROBLEM。HE AGAIN QUESTIONED HE SECRECY POLICY SINCE EVERYONE KNOWS WHAT YOU AN DO WITH THEM。HE SAID SECRECY MAY HELP THE UNITIONS MAKERS BUT DOES NOT HELP NON- MILITARY SES OF THE ATOM。HE COMMENTED THAT NORWAY IS UING GERMANY AND GREAT BRITAIN FOR POLLUTION OF

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FISHING WATERS AND WE SHOULD BE LOOKING AT THOSE PROBLEMS。IN RESPONSE, PACKARD SAID HE AGREED IT WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE BUT THAT WHAT WE DO WITH REFERENCE TO OKINAWA REVERSION DOES NOT AFFECT WHAT THE SENATOR IS TALKING ABOUT。SYMINGTON REPLIED THAT ''THIS IS A FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND WE ARE INTERESTED。'' HE STATED WE MUST HAVE CREDIBILITY TO HAVE CONSENT, AND CONSENT TO HAVE DEMOCRACY。

SENATOR PERARSON BEGAN HIS QUESTIONING AT 11:28 AM。HE STATED THE TREATY WAS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF JAPAN AND THE US AND PUTS OUR FORCES IN OKINAWA UNDER THE CONSULATATION AGREEMENT。HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD CONSULTATION POSED NO PROBLEM TO DOD AS IT AFFECTS OKINAWA, AND WAS THE SAME THING TRUE AS TO INDOCHINA AND THE PHILLIPPINES? PACKARD REPLIED THIS QUESTION MUST BE ASSESSED IN THE LONGER TERM AND DEPENDS UPON THE ''MUTUALITY OF INTEREST AT THE PARTICULAR TIME。'' HE STATED THE CONSULTATION PROVISION INVOLVED SOME CONSTRAINTS BUT THAT THERE WAS A MUTUALITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE US AND THAT BOTH COUNTRIES COULD WORK UNDER THE

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AGREEMENT. PEARSON DISCUSSED THE FINANCIAL SAVINGS TO RESULT FROM THE TREATY AND ESTIMATED THEM AS ABOUT 60 MILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR IN CURRENT OPERATIONS. PACKARD STATED THIS WAS CORRECT AND THAT WE SHOULD ALSO KEEP IN MIND A 320 MILLION DOLLARS CASH PAYMENT BY JAPAN TO THE UNITED STATES. HE STATED THIS WAS A FAIR ARRANGEMENT FOR BOTH THE US AND JAPAN. PEARSON ASKED IF US COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN OKINAWA HAD BEEN WORKED OUT AND PACKARD REPLIED THAT THEY HAD BEEN SATISFACTORILY WORKED OUT WITH SOME MINOR IRRITATIONS.

SENATOR SPONG BEGAN HIS QUESTIONING AT 11:33 AM. HE ASKED PACKARD IF WE WERE REQUESTING JAPAN TO EXPAND ITS ARMED FORCES. PACKARD REPLIED THAT AN EXPANSION OF FORCES IS INVOLVED IN JAPAN'S DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES IN OKINAWA BUT THAT IT CAN BE DONE WITHIN THE SONSTRAINTS OF THE CONSTITUTION.

THE QUESTIONING RETURNED TO SENATOR SPARKMAN WHO, AT THIS TIME, HAD REPLACED SENATOR FULBRIGHT AS ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE. HE STATED THAT WHILE THERE WAS ORIGINALLY OPPOSITION TO SOFA IN

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THIS COUNTRY, HE LEARNED ON A VISIT TO JAPAN IN 1957 THAT IMPRISONED US SERVICE PERSONNEL, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, WERE SATISIFIED WITH THE TREATMENT THEY HAD RECEIVED UNDER THAT AGREEMENT AND THAT THERE WAS NOW NO OPPOSITION TO SOFA AND HE WAS CONFIDENT IT WOULD WORK IN OKINAWA.

SENATOR SPARKMAN THEN STATED HE HAD SOME QUESTIONS TO ASK FOR SENATOR CASE WHO COULD NOT BE PRESENT THIS MORNING. HE COMMENTED THAT THE NOVEMBER 1969 JOINT COMMUNIQUE MADE REFERENCE TO THE IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF JAPAN AND ASKED IF THAT WAS STILL TRUE. PACKARD INDICATED HE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER THAT POLICY HAD BEEN RECENTLY REASSESSED BUT THAT JAPAN AND OTHER ALLIES WILL BE REASSESSING THESE POSITION S BECAUSE ''WE ARE IN A PERIOD OF CHANGE.'' SPARKMAN (FOR CASE) ASKED WHETHER THE US HAD CHANGED ITS POSITION WITH REFERENCE TO THE IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN. PACKARD REPLIED ''WE ARE SORRY ABOUT THE UN VOTE BUT THAT DOES NOT CHANGE OUR IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN SEMICOLON WE WANT TO MAINTAIN IT AND WE HOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN

外務省

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　連絡ありたい。

電信写

LL COUNTRIES。'' HE STATED THAT ''FOR THE TIME
EING, WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN OUR FRIENDSHIP WITH
AIWAN。'' SPARKMAN THEN REFERRED TO THE
ACT THAT WE HAVE A SECURITY AGREEMENT WITH TAIWAN
ND NO THOUGHT OF CHANGING IT。 PACKARD AGREED。
PARKMAN COMMENTED THAT TAIWAN MAY NOW BE MORE
MPORTANT TO THE US WITH THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA。
ACKARD AGREED THAT MIGHT BE SO AND SAID THE SAME
PPLIED TO KOREA。 HE INDICATED'' WE CANNOT MEASURE
HAT THESE CHANGES MAY BE。''

AT THIS POINT, SENATOR SPARKMAN INDICATED SENATOR
ASE MAY HAVE SOME WRITTEN QUESTIONS TO SUBMIT
O SECRETARY PACKARD, AS MAY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
TAFF。 PACKARD REPLIED THEY WOULD BE HAPPY TO
NSWER THE WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF SENATOR CASE,
NY OTHER SENATOR OR THE STAFF。

CONTINUING WITH WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO
IM BY SENATOR CASE, SPARKMAN ASKED IF THE RELEASE
F BASES IN OKINAWA WOULD RESULT IN NEW OR EXPANDED
ASES IN MICRONESIA。 PACKARD REPLIED THAT NO
PECIFIC DECISION HAD BEEN MADE ON REPLACEMENT

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電信写

OF THOSE BASES OR THEIR GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION。
SPARKMAN AND PACKARD HAD A DIALOGUE ABOUT OUR RIGHTS
TO MAINTAIN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN MICRONESIA
UNDER THE US TRUSTEESHIP。 PACKARD REFERRED TO THE
FACT THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH MICRONESIA ON A NUMBER
OF SUBJECTS ARE UNDERWAY, THAT HE COULD NOT ANSWER
PRECISELY THE EFFECT OF TRUST STATUS ON OUR PLANS
BUT THAT PERMISSION FROM THE UN WAS NOT NEEDED
TO PUT US FORCES IN MICRONESIA。 IN RESPONSE TO A
QUESTION WHETHER THE US HAS PLEDGED TO THE UNITED
NATIONS THAT MICRONESIANS CAN CHOOSE THEIR OWN
FUTURE STATUS , PACKARD, AFTER
CONSULTATION WITH AN AIDE, REPLIED THAT THESE
MATTERS WERE UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR。

THE SENATORS WERE CALLED TO VOTE AT11:47 AM
SENATOR SPARKMAN ADJOURNED THE HEARING TO RECONVENE
OCTOBER 29 AT 1000 AM TO HEAR PUBLIC WITNESSES。

(3)

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電信写

総番号（TA）5845
71年10月28日22時30分　米国　発
71年10月29日11時38分　本省　着　主管

外務大臣殿　在米大使／臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

オキナワ返かん協定上院審議（新聞報道及び論調）」

第3484号　平
10.28日付ニューヨーク・タイムズ、ワシントン・ポスト両紙は"ROGERS BIDS SENATE VOTE OKINAWA PACT"（タイムズ）」、"ROGERS ASKS SPEED ON OKINAWA PACT"（ポスト）」と題し、オキナワ返かん協定に関する上院外交委員会における審議の模様を報じているところ、その要旨次のとおり。
（1）」ニューヨーク・タイムズ
ロジャース国務長官は本日の上院外交委において調和ある日米関係維持のために、上院がオキナワ返かん協定を承認するよう求め、オキナワ返かんが行われない場合には反米的政府が成立するかも知れぬ旨警告した。
同協定は、日米関係緊張化の動きの中で、上院に提出されたわけであるが、主として日米せん維協定の成立により、協定に対する反対派（主に南部議員）は大いに減少したようである。

大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 外務省 経済局長 北米局長 中南米局長 欧亜局長 アジア局長 経済協力局長 条約局長 国際連合局長 国際協力局長 情報文化局長 調査企画課長 領事移住課長 旅券課長 参事官 参事官 参事官

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

ナワ返かんは日米両国の安全保障上の利益と合致する形で実施されており、米国は両国の相互安全保障に必要なオキナワの軍事施設及び地域を保持（ＲＥＴＡＩＮ）すると述べた。

更に『ロ』長官は日本国民は本協定を支持しており、本協定が実施をし得ぬ場合には、日米関係全般に極めて不こうな結果をもたらし、また協定を批准せぬ場合には米国との緊密な関係を望まぬ連中に格好の武器を与えることになろうと述べた。

日本側の情報によると、日本の野党はオキナワ協定をサトウ政権打倒へのテコとして利用しているが、国会議員の過半数はこれに賛成しているので、／2月中ごろまでには国会の承認を得るものと期待される。しかしながらサトウ総理は中国代表権と経済問題をめぐる日米関係緊張の結果退じんを強いられると予想される。

2．なお28日付ワシントン・ポストは"ＪＡＰＡＮ　ＡＮＤ　ＴＨＥ　Ｕ．Ｎ．　ＤＥＦＥＡＴ"と題する社説において、今般の中国代表権問題につき論じた後、米側としてはサトウ総理の助力に答えるべきであるとし、オキナワ協定の早期批准は日米友好が日本にとり必ずしも与えることのみを意味するものではないということをサトウ総理及び、その後断者にはっきりと示す記左となろうと論じている。

(3)

外務省

送付公信　参事官
北米第一課長

政第 9196 号	昭和46年10月29日
外務大臣殿	在米牛場大使
引用（来）（往）公信・電信番号	往電第3484号

送付資料

○

○ 沖縄返還協定上院審議
（新聞報道及び論調）

○

○

（希望配布先　　）

付属添付 ☑　付属空便（行）☐　付属空便（DP）☐　付属船便（貨）☐
（郵）☐

本信写送付先　　（別添とも）

事務官	
総務	
沖縄	
外調査	
漁業	
航空	
科学協力	
連絡調整	
調査	
カナダ	
局庶務	

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WASHINGTON POST

OCT 2 8 1971

Rogers Asks Speed On Okinawa Pact

Secretary of State William P. Rogers yesterday asked the Senate for speedy ratification of the treaty returning Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands to Japan after 27 years of American administration.

As Rogers appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, no Senator objected to the treaty, although there were some reservations about the retention of a Voice of America transmitting station in Okinawa.

Rogers also made the first public confirmation that nuclear weapons have been stored at American bases in the Ryukyu Islands. Asked by committee chairman J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) whether these weapons would be removed, Rogers replied: "Yes." He said he had sent a letter to the committee containing details which he would be "happy" to discuss in executive session.

Fulbright took exception to the secrecy. If the nuclear weapons are to serve principally as a deterrent, he said, keeping their existence secret would diminish the effect. "I don't know why you're sensitive about discussing them openly, because that enhances their role as a deterrent," he said.

Fulbright also questioned retention of the Voice of America on Okinawa while the United States was seeking to improve relations with China. VOA, he said, is "a tool of the cold war . . . I don't see why it should be retained."

Rogers said reversion of the Ryukyus was being carried out in a manner consistent with U.S. and Japanese security interests. He said, the United States "would retain such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries."

Rogers said that the Japanese people support the treaty and that failure to carry out the agreement "would have extremely unfortunate effects on our whole relationship with Japan."

Failure to ratify, he said, would "give a strong weapon to those political forces in Japan who do not favor the kind of close relationship with the United States which now exists, and who seek to replace the present leadership of the country with others less favorable to such a relationship."

Rogers noted that differences between the United States and Japan on monetary and trade issues had strained relationships in recent months.

For a while, it appeared that disagreement over textile quotas might hinder ratification of the Okinawa treaty; but this is no longer considered an obstacle since Tokyo has agreed to quotas.

Japanese sources said that the opposition in the Japanese Diet was using the Okinawa treaty as a lever against the Sato government but that they expected approval in the Diet by mid-December because the majority favor it.

Premier Eisaku Sato, however, is still expected to be forced out in the aftermath of strains with the United States over Chinese representation at the United Nations and the economic issues.

WASHINGTON POST

OCT 2 8 1971

Japan and the U.N. Defeat

The Japanese government is paying a much higher price than the United States for the defeat of the Two Chinas resolution in the United Nations. Measured in loss of prestige, erosion of domestic support, and public anxiety for the future, the defeat has had far more impact in Japan than in this country.

Premier Sato stands for the principle, in Japanese domestic politics, that the interests of his country's security and prosperity are best served by the closest possible alliance with the United States. It has been a bad four months for both the premier and the principle.

The United States asked for Japanese support in the U:N. at a time when it had opened negotiations with China (without warning Mr. Sato, let alone offering the much-promised consultation) and had embarked on its new economic policy (again without warning, although much of it was aimed explicitly at Japan). It was also the period in which the United States was publicly threatening the Japanese in the textile bargaining.

China policy is a much more immediate matter to the Japanese than to Americans. They are a great deal closer, after all, and exports have a much more direct effect on Japan's economy. (Japan's exports to China have recently been running at a level of more than $500 million a year, which is in the same range as their sales to Britain, for example, or West Germany.) Mr. Sato has been under severe attack, not only from the left but within his own party, for holding fast to the traditional American position after Mr. Nixon himself has abandoned it.

But when the United States asked Mr. Sato for help on the Two Chinas resolution, he responded with very active support. He invested his personal reputation in the campaign to a degree that Mr. Nixon never did.

It is now necessary that the United States demonstrate at least that it recognizes Mr. Sato's assistance. The Okinawa agreement is before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, put the matter in the mildest possible terms yesterday when he told the Committee that an American refusal to ratify the agreement "would have extremely unfortunate effects on our whole relationship with Japan. It would, for example, give a strong weapon to those political forces in Japan who do not favor the kind of close relationship with the United States which now exists . . ."

The United States' relationship with Japan has changed sharply and irretrievably in these past four months. American policy is no longer so protective of Japanese interests, nor so supportive of its development as it had been for 25 years. Where American policy once looked on Japan primarily as an ally, it now looks on Japan as a competitor and, in Pacific politics, perhaps a rival. This summer was the point at which the United States ceased to think of Japan as a client, and began to regard her in terms of genuine equality. It now lies chiefly with the United States to set the terms of a new friendship, no doubt cooler than in the past but durable nonetheless and crucially important to both sides. The prompt ratification of the Okinawa treaty would be solid evidence for Mr. Sato, and his successors, that friendship with the United States need not be all give and nothing in return.

NEW YORK TIMES

OCT 2 8 1971

ROGERS BIDS SENATE VOTE OKINAWA PACT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 27 — Secretary of State William P. Rogers urged the Senate today to approve a treaty relinquishing American control over Okinawa as a necessary step toward maintaining "a viable and harmonious relationship" with Japan.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Rogers warned that failure to ratify the treaty returning Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands to Japanese control could lead to an anti-American government in Tokyo.

The treaty, signed last June, comes before the Senate amid what Mr. Rogers acknowledged were strained relations, caused largely by differences over trade and monetary policies.

Much of the opposition to the treaty, mostly among Southern senators, appears to have diminished, largely because of a recent agreement limiting Japanese textiles exports.

Mr. Rogers emphasized that even if the Senate gave its approval, President Nixon could not ratify the treaty "until after the Japanese Diet has enacted the necessary implementing legislation."

In Mr. Rogers's first appearance before the often-critical committee since May, he found himself embraced in compliments, led by Senators J. W. Fulbright, and Frank Church, both Democrats, among the more persistent critics of Administration foreign policy.

EVENING STAR

OCT 2 8 1971

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THE EVENING STAR
Washington, D. C., Thursday, October 28, 1971

Asia Policy Is Praised By Fulbright Group

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star Staff Writer

Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have joined in giving unusually strong praise to Secretary of State William P. Rogers for the Nixon administration's policy in Asia.

"I think the administration deserves more credit than it is getting for major changes in policy in Asia, changes long overdue," Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, said yesterday at a Senate hearing.

Church, a strong anti-war critic and co-author of an amendment in the $3.2 billion foreign aid bill to stop all funds for Vietnam except for the withdrawal of American forces there, praised the administration for its "substantial reduction of forces" already in Vietnam.

Cooper Seconds

Sen. John Sherman Cooper, R-Ky., the other sponsor of the anti-war amendment, seconded Church and commended Rogers for the "remarkable changes" produced in American policy toward China, the Pacific generally, and toward Southeast Asia.

The meeting blossomed into one of the most harmonious sessions in years between a Secretary of State and the Foreign Relations Committee.

One by one, committee members known for their liberal persuasion commended Rogers for his efforts to preserve Nationalist China in the United Nations while opening up a long overdue dialogue with the Communist mainland.

The words of praise were slightly overshadowed by continuing discussion over whether the United States should cut funds to the United Nations in the wake of the China vote Monday night.

Rogers was testifying on the treaty signed in June to return Okinawa to Japan. Committee members voiced overwhelming support for the swift Senate ratification, which the administration wants in order to bolster sagging Japanese-American relations.

Church, who led off the praise of the Asia policy, used the treaty about Okinawa as example and cited three other facets of the Nixon policy which "deserve credit":

- The removal of 300,000 men from South Vietnam, with "complete disengagement" as the over-all aim.
- Reduction of American forces in Thailand, Korea, the Philippines, Japan and elsewhere in Asia.
- The President's forthcoming trip to Peking, which Church called "a significant gesture toward peace" and a "turning point in American policy toward Asia."

The committee members overwhelmingly supported the treaty. Committee chairman J. William Fulbright, D-Ark., called it the "last issue" from World War II to be settled between Japan and the United States.

Rogers, for the first time, confirmed publicly that under the treaty, the United States will remove all nuclear weapons from the island. But he said that the United States will continue to use the strategic bases there under the neutral security treaty with Japan, and that the new arrangement strengthens the allied security system in the Pacific.

注　意
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秘

電信写

総番号(TA)56470
71年10月28日23時48分　米国　発
71年10月29日12時58分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場(大使)　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

オキナワ外交委ちよう聞会（15証言者）

第3486号　略　大至急

29日以降の一般証言予定者（12名）及び予想される証言内容次のとおり。なお外交委員会スタッフ（トリンブル）がサトウに述べたところによれば。

（イ）下記12名の内何人までが実際に証言するか不明であり（実際に証言することなくステートメントのみ送付する者もありうる由）、また（ロ）明29日中にちよう聞会を終了しうるか否かは目下上院本会議で審議されている援助法案の審議が同日午後に行われるか否かにかかつており、もし援助法案の審議がなければ29日午後も使つて29日中にちよう聞会を終える予定なるも、この点は29日朝まで判明しない由。

1．タニー上院議員（カリフオルニア、民主党）
日米関係重視の立場から協定の早期承認の必要性を説く由。

2．CHEN NING YANG（ニューヨーク州立大

大臣官房　総務審議官　外務審議官　次官　事務次官
総合計画局長　人事課長　厚生課長　会計課長　書文課長　給与課長
調査企画課長　領事移住部長　旅券課長　査証課長
アジア局長　参事官　中近東第一課長　中近東第二課長　北東アジア課長　北米局長　参事官　北米第一課長　北米第二課長　保障課長
中南米局長　参事官　中南米第一課長　中南米第二課長
欧亜局長　参事官　西欧第一課長　東欧第一課長　西欧第二課長　東欧第二課長
条約局長　参事官　条約課長　国際協定課長
国際連合局長　参事官　国連政策課長　国連経済課長　国連社会課長　国連専門機関室長
情報文化局長　参事官　対外広報課長　報道課長
経済局長　参事官　経済総務課長　国際経済第一課長　国際経済第二課長　国際資源室長　国際貿易課長　国際金融課長　経済協力課長　技術協力課長

外務省

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電信写

センカク諸島の日本への返かんに反対する模様。本人はノーベルしよう受しようの物理学者で、最近訪中した経緯がある。

3．DR．MORTON HALPERIN（アルブキングス・インステイテューションオキナワ担当前陸軍次官代理）
日本政府の国民の支持なくして米国基地の機能の維持を図れず、また日本の協力なくしては米国の極東戦略はくずれるとの観点から協定の早期承認の必要性をとく由。

4．ROBERT MORRIS（弁護し）
センカク諸島についての私的所有権を有すると主張していると言われるMRS．GRACE HSUなる女性の代理としてセンカク諸島の日本への返かんに反対する由。

5．SHIEN-BIAN WOO（デュウニア大学教授）
センカク諸島の日本への返かんに反対する模様。

6．JOHN FINCHER（ASIAN-AMERICANS FOR ACTION、ジョン・ホプキンズ大学教授）
在米中国人との関係の深さからみてセンカク諸島の日本への返かんに反対すると考えられる。

7．JOSEPH L．VICIES．（NATION

外務省

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電信写

AL COMMAUDER-IN-CHIEF OF VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS)。
オキナワは多数の米国人将兵のちを流して勝ちとつたものであり、またオキナワ返かんは、米国のアジアにおける戦力の弱体化につながるとして返かんに反対する由。
8. MAJ. GEN. DALE O. SMITH (退役軍人、元オキナワ第3/3航空ヒ団司令官)。
基地の自由使用の必要性の観点からオキナワ返かんに反対する模様。
9. E. RAYMOND WILSON (EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION)。
クウエーカー教と、在チユウ米軍基地は撤去すべしとの見地から協定内容に反対する由。
10. THOMAS C. DUNN. (デュポン社)。

化合せんの問題をとりあげて対日批判をする由。
11. MARK SELDON (セントルイスのワシントン大学歴史学助教授)
オキナワに在住した経験があり、日本、オキナワ問題を専攻。ニクソン、キッシンジャー外交批判をするともらして

外務省

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電信写

る由。
12. JACK C. STOLLE (U. S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN OKINAWA

チユウ米企業問題をとらえて、取り決め内容に反対する模様。
最近一部の上院議員に対し、日本政府の官僚はアイチ書簡を守る意思がないとの趣旨の書簡を送付している。
(了)。

外務省

ステンシル タイプ

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9001

電信写

大政事外外儀官	務務 次次 典房
臣官官審審長長	
儀総人電厚計	
書文会営給	
調査長	参企析調
領移長	参領旅査移
ア長	参地中東二 北東一西
米長	参北北保
中南審	参一二
欧長	参西東洋 一西一東 二西二東
近ア長	参書近ア
経長	次総経国資源 参貿統国一
経協長	参政技一理 国企二
条長	参条協規
国長	参政経科 軍社専
情長	参道内外
文長	一二

総番号（TA）56465　　主管

71年10月28日22時15分　米国　発　米北1

71年　月29日12時25分　本省　着

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

返還協定　豆会

沖縄上院外交委聴問会（16-~~2日目~~核）

~~第3487号　平　大至急~~　46.10.28

~~往電第3457号に関し~~

~~（以下別紙英文）~~

外務省

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電信写

SENATOR SYMINGTON; GENERAL, NICE TO SEE YOU. I HAVE JUST ONE LINE OF QUESTIONING.

REGARDLESS OF WHETHER WE DO OR DO NOT HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA, IS OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THOSE WEAPONS KNOWN TO ANYBODY IN THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA OUTSIDE OF--

GENERAL LAMPERT; OUR STANDARD RESPONSE IN ALL DISCUSSIONS IN ANSWER TO ALL QUESTIONS WITH ALL FOREIGNERS, AND THIS INCLUDES OF COURSE ALL OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA, IS THAT WE NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOR DO WE DISCUSS THE SUBJECT WITH THEM.

SENATOR SYMINGTON; DOES THAT INCLUDE THE HIGHEST PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA?

GENERAL LAMPERT; THAT IS INCLUDING THE HIGHEST PEOPLE.

SENATOR SYMINGTON; HAS THE SAME THING BEEN TRUE OF OUR POSITION IN JAPAN?

外務省

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電信写

GENERAL LAMPERT; SIR, I AM NOT QUALIFIED TO COMMENT ON THAT SINCE I DO NOT SERVE IN JAPAN.

SENATOR SYMINGTON; SO WHATEVER THE POSITION IS WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IF ANY, IN OKINAWA, ALL THE PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA ARE IGNORANT OF THAT POSITION. IS THAT A FAIR STATEMENT?

GENERAL LAMPERT; THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN NO INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO ANY QUESTION, YES, SIR.

SENATOR SYMINGTON; I AM BEGNINNING TO WORRY ABOUT ALL OF THIS SECRECY BECAUSE WE ARE ASKING, AS DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY PACKARD KNOWS, WE ARE ASKING FOR 7.9 BILLION DOLLARS FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR WEAPONS. WE ARE ASKING FOR LESS THAN TEN PERCENT OF THAT FOR THE PEACETIME APPLICATION OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY. IF THE PEOPLE IN THE ADMINISTRATION ARE RIGHT IN WHAT THEY ARE TELLING US, SUCCESS FOR RESEARCH IN THIS FIELD COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF ENERGY WHICH PERHAPS IS THE GREATEST PROBLEM WE HAVE TODAY.

OUR REQUIREMENT FOR ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER,

外務省

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電信写

DOUBLED EVERY DECADE FOR FOUR DECADES。THIS COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF POLLUTION, IT COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF CLEAN FRESH WATER, COULD NOT ONLY HANDLE WASTE BUT COULD RECYCLE IT AND COULD CREATE FOOD。SO YOU MIGHT SAY THAT IN THE POWER WHICH LIES IN THE ATOM COULD WELL BE THE HOPE OF A PEACETIME WORLD, AND YET WE HAVE SATURATED UNDER WHAT I CONSIDER WRONG, IF NOT IMPROPER, INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 202 OF THE JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY ACT。 WE HAVE SATURATED THIS WHOLE FIELD WITH SO MUCH

SECRECY THAT REALLY THE PEOPLE DO NOT KNOW HOW MUCH WE HAVE SLIGHTED THESE PROBLEMS AS AGAINST THE PROBLEMS OF WEAPONRY, AND WHEN YOU FIND GREAT UNIVERSITIES WITH BUDGETS RUNNING ALMOST TO A BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR AND HALF OF THAT MONEY CAN GO FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, NOT FROM THE CITIES OR THE STATES -- HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS PER YEAR RUNNING THOSE UNIVERSITIES, THEN WHEN YOU SEE PEOPLE FROM THOSE UNIVERSITIES CAN GO BACK AND DEFEND IN OPEN SESSION WEAPONRY WHICH I PERSONALLY DO NOT THINK IS NEEDED FOR OUR SECRURITY, YOU WOULD WONDER WHY WE DO HAVE ALL OF THE SECRECY, WHY WE

外務省

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電信写

CANNOT BREAK THIS OUT, SO THE PEOPLE WILL UNDERSTAND WHAT WE COULD DO IN THESE FIELDS。THAT IS WHY I ASKED YOU THE QUESTION。

SECRETARY PACKARD; LET ME JUST SAY THIS: I BELIEVE SECRETARY ROGERS SAID IN RESPONSE, WILL NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW ON OKINAWA BE REMOVED ON REVERSION DAY, YES。I WAS GOING TO PUT IT IN THESE TERMS, IF YOU WISH, AGREE WITH WHAT THE GENERAL SAID IS OUR POLICY, BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IF THERE ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA THEY WILL NOT BE THERE ON REVERSION DAY。

SENATOR SYMINGTON; WELL, I APPRECIATE THAT, MR。SECRETARY, BUT WE HAVE ALSO DEVELOPED A SUDDEN AND I THINK COMMENDABLE INTEREST IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BEING BETTER FRIENDS WITH US。 IF WE ARE GOING TO TAKE THOSE WEAPONS OFF OF OKINAWA, FOR EXAMPLE, AND THIS IS STRICTLY HYPOTHETICAL, AND PUT THEM IN COUNTRIES THAT HAVE CAUSED ALL OF THIS TROUBLE, ACCORDING TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND APPARENTLY TO OTHER PEOPLE IN OTHER

外務省

注 意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

COUNTRIES, BASED ON RECENT EVENTS IN NEW YORK, THEN (I) THINK WE HAVE SORT OF CONTINUED, WHETHER YOU SAY ROB PETER TO PAY PAUL, BUT WE ARE CERTAINLY NOT SOLVING THE PROBLEMS。(M)Y ONLY POINT IS, (I) CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE HAVE SO MUCH SECRECY ABOUT THESE WEAPONS WHEN EVERYBODY KNOWS REALLY WHAT YOU CAN DO WITH THEM IN ALL OF THE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE THEM。

(S)INCE THIS SMYTHE REPORT CAME OUT IN THE MIDDLE FORTIES, THERE HAS BEEN NO REASON FOR ALL OF THE SECRECY AND (I) THINK WHAT IT HAS DONE, IT MAY HAVE HELPED THE MUNITIONS MAKERS AND IT MAY HAVE HELPED THOSE WHO, IN MY OPINION, COULD OVEREMPHASIZE VARIOUS TYPES OF WEAPONS INSTEAD OF MAKING DECISIONS AS TO WHICH ONE IS THE BEST AND SO FORTH, BUT IT IS CERTAINLY NO QUESTION ABOUT THE FACT, (I) SAY THIS AS A MEMBER OF THE JOINT ATOMIC ENERGY COMMITTEE, THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE FACT IT SERIOUSLY RETARDED WHAT WE COULD DO TO SOLVE PROBLEMS THAT ARE NOT PROBLEMS OF WAR OR PREPARATIONS OF WAR AND COULD BE -- AFTER ALL, (N)ORWAY, (I) UNDERSTAND, IS SUING (G)REAT (B)RITAIN AND (G)ERMANY FOR

注 意

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電信写

POLLUTING THEIR FISHING WATERS。

(I)F WE CAN HANDLE SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS AND TURN AWAY FROM WHAT HAS , RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, BEEN CALLED THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL, AND THE (C)HIRMAN OF THIS (C)OMMITTEE ADDED UNIVERSITY COMPLEX, BEING THE FORMER PRESIDENT OF A GREAT UNIVERSITY HE HAS A RIGHT TO HIS OWN THINKING, AS ALL (A)MERICANS DO, AND (I) THINK WE HAVE MADE PROGRESS TO WHAT TO ME LOOKED LIKE EVEN GREATER PROBLEMS THAN THE ONES WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING。

(Y)OU, (I) THINK, ARE WELL-VERSED IN BOTH ASPECTS OF THIS FIELD BECAUSE YOU ARE INTERESTED IN YOUR OWN COMMUNITY, AND HAVE YOU ANY OTHER COMMENTS OR ANY THINKING ON THAT?

(S)ECRETARY (P)ACKARD; (I) WOULD AGREE, (S)ENATOR, THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE AND (I) ASSURE YOU WE GIVE CONSIDERATION TO ALL OF THE THINGS YOU HAVE ALLUDED TO。

(I) THINK IN TERMS OF THE SUBJECT WE ARE DISCUSSING

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電信写

TODAY, HOWEVER, THAT IS A SEPARATE ISSUE. WE HAVE ESSENTIALLY AGREED TO DO WHAT I THINK IS NECESSARY AND PROPER IN TERMS OF THE REVERSION AGREEMENT AND I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WHAT WE HAVE DONE HERE IN ANY WAY LIMITS OR COMMITS US TO WHATEVER WE MAY WANT TO DO IN TERMS OF THE THINGS YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT.

SENATOR SYMINGTON; WELL, I WOULD ONLY MAKE ONE CLOSING OBSERVATION. THIS IS THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND WHAT WE ARE INTERESTED IN IS OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL AS THE ONES WE TALK ABOUT.

SOMEBODY WROTE NOT TOO LONG AGO THAT WE MUST HAVE CREDIBILITY TO HAVE CONSENT AND YOU MUST HAVE CONSENT TO HAVE DEMOCRACY, AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE LONGER WE PUT WHAT I THINK, IN THE INTEREST OF MY OWN COUNTRY AS WELL AS THE REST OF THE WORLD, IS TOTALLY UNNCECESSARY SECRECY TO THE EXTENT THAT WE HAVE IT IN THIS FIELD, THE MORE WE ARE GOING TO REMEMBER, PERHAPS WE CAN REMEMBER AT ALL WHAT IS THE WISEST ASPECT OF THAT OBSERVATION.

注　意

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電信写

SECRETARY PACKARD; I AM SURE YOU KNOW, SENATOR, WE ARE TAKING SOME STEPS IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF TRYING TO REDUCE THE SECRECY. WE HAVE NOT GONE FAR ENOUGH TO KNOW THE PROBLEMS, BUT I THINK WE RECOGNIZE THERE IS SOMETHING WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION IN THIS AREA.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. THANK YOU, MR. SECRETARY.

(3)

ステンシル タイプ

注 意
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電信写

150

総番号（TA）56462
71 年 10 月 28 日 22 時 45 分 主管 米口 発
71 年 10 月 29 日 12 時 2 分 本省 着 米北1

外務大臣殿 牛場 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄上院外交委聴聞会
（（17-208 防衛）

~~大3488号 平大至急~~ 46、10、28

~~依頼スラメトク等に送付~~

SENATOR SPONG; DO YOU EXPECT AN EXPANSION OF JAPAN'S MILITARY FORCES?

SECRETARY PACKARD; WE WOULD EXPECT AN EXPANSION OF JAPAN'S MILITARY FORCES.

I THINK THE RESPONSIBILITY THAT THEY HAVE, THEY ARE TAKING OVER FOR THE DEFENSE OF OKINAWA, IS IN A SENSE AN EXPANSION OF THAT NATURE. THEY ARE CONSTRAINED BY THEIR CONSTITUTION THAT THEY CANNOT DEVELOP OR DEPLOY MILITARY FORCES FOR THE OUTSIDE OF DEFENSE OF JAPAN, FOR USE OVERSEAS, AND IN PART OVER THE YEARS OUR PRESENCE IN JAPAN AND THE

大臣官房 政務次官 審議官 審議官 長 人事課 厚生課 計 書文会営給
調査長 参企析調
領事移住長 参領旅査移
ア長 参地中東二 北東二西
米長 参北北保
中南米長 参一二
欧亜長 参西東洋 西東二
近ア長 参書近ア
経済局 次総経国資源
長 参貿統国二
経協長 参政技一理 国企二
条約長 参条協規
国際情報長 参政経科
文化交流長 軍社専
参道内外
一二

外務省

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2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

PRESENCE OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES HAS HAD AS ONE OF ITS ROLES AID, ASSISTANCE TO THE DEFENSE OF JAPAN. AS THEY CAN PICK UP A LARGER SHARE OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY, A LARGER CAPABILITY, I THINK IT IS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE AND WE WOULD HOPE THIS CAN BE BEGUN WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE CONSTITUTION, THEIR CONSTITUTION

(3)

外務省

スチュアル 分析

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電信写

大臣	政務次官	事務次官	外務審議官	官房長	総合計画局長	人事課長	電厚課長	給与課長	書文課長

調査課長	参事官	企画調整室
領事移住部長	参事官	領事移住部旅券課
アジア局長	参事官	地域政策課
	参事官	中近東第一課
	参事官	東北アジア課
	参事官	中近東第二課
中南米局長	参事官	中南米第一課
欧亜局長	参事官	西欧課
	参事官	東欧課
	参事官	旧ソ連邦課
	参事官	西欧第二課
近東アフリカ局長	参事官	近東アフリカ課
経済局長	次長	総括
	参事官	国際経済第一課
	参事官	国際経済第二課
経済協力部長	参事官	技術協力課
	参事官	開発協力課
条約局長	参事官	条約課
国際連合局長	参事官	政治課
	参事官	経済科学課
	軍縮専門官	
情報文化局長	参事官	対外広報課
	参事官	国内広報課

総番号（TA） 50467
71 年 10 月 28 日 22 時 50 分 発 主管
71 年 10 月 29 日 12 時 30 分 着 本省

外務大臣殿 平 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

(極秘) 部外 日米外交委員会（10月末協議）

平3489号 平 大至急

44.10.28

往電平3457号に関し

(1) SENATOR COOPER; ..... IN YOUR STATEMENT, MR. SECRETARY--PARHAPS THE GENERAL COULD ALSO RESPOND TO THIS -- ON PAGE 3 YOU TALK ABOUT THE THIRD CATEGORY OF THE PRIOR CONSULTATION FORMULA REQUIRES THE APPROVAL OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PRIOR TO UNDERTAKING MILITARY COMBAT OPERATIONS FROM OUR BASES IN JAPAN AND ON OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, LAUNCHING OF AIR STRIKES DIRECTLY AGAINST AN ENEMY TARGET FROM BASES IN JAPAN WOULD REQUIRE PRIOR CONSULTATION.

THIS IS THE SENTENCE I WANT TO ASK YOU ABOUT;

"THE DEPLOYMENT OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT FROM JAPAN TO OPERATE IN A ZONE OF HOSTILITIES, DOES THAT MEAN THAT WHILE AN AIRCRAFT COULT NOT

外務省

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電信写

LAUNCH A STRIKE FROM OKINAWA, AN AIRCRAFT COULD BE SENT FROM THERE, DEPLOYED IN ANOTHER COUNTRY, ANOTHER AREA."

SECRETARY PACKARD; YES, WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FORCES WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION, SO WE COULD TAKE AN AIR UNIT WHICH WAS STATIONED IN OKINAWA OR STATIONED IN JAPAN AND MOVE THAT UNIT TO KOREA, TO TAIWAN, TO ANY OTHER PLACE THAT WE MIGHT CHOOSE WITHOUT HAVING TO GET PERMISSION FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

AT THAT TIME, THAT UNIT COULD THEN ENGAGE IN WHATEVER ACTIVITIES WERE APPROPRIATE. IT IS SIMPLY THE USE OF THE BASES IN OKINAWA AS IN JAPAN TO FLY COMBAT SORTIES WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED WITHOUT AGREEMENT WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

SENATOR COOPER; IN ESSENCE THEN, IT IS A LOGISTICAL BASE.

SECRETARY PACKARD; WELL, THE LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES, THAT IS, TO SUPPLY MATERIALS, WE ARE SUPPLYING MATERIALS TO SOUTH-EAST ASIA FROM OKINAWA. WE WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO DO THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

外務省

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電信写

WE ARE REPAIRING EQUIPMENT IN JAPAN NOW AND I GUESS ALSO REPAIRING EQUIPMENT IN OKINAWA。

GENERAL LAMPART; YES, AND THAT WILL BE ALLOWED UNDER THE REVERSION AGREEMENT。

(2) SENATOR PEARSON; ..... LET ME SEE IF I UNDERSTAND THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF YOUR TESTIMONY。 THE REVERSION TREATY WILL PLACE OUR MILITARY PRESENCE IN OKINAWA UNDER THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WHICH INVOLVES PRIOR CONSULTATION ON THE NUMBER OF TROOPS, TYPES OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, TO SOME EXTENT。 AND I THINK YOUR TESTIMONY, YOU MADE REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, SOME COMMUNIQUE OR SOME NOTE HAD INDICATED THAT THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT WOULD HAVE NO QUESTION ABOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION, WHICH IS AN AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT, AS YOU SAY, AS TO TAIWAN OR KOREA。

DOES THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAVE ANY QUESTION ABOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION AS TO INDO-CHINA OR AS TO THE PHILIPPINES?

外務省

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電信写

SECRETARY PACKARD; WELL, SENATOR PEARSON, I THINK WHILE THERE HAS BEEN SOME INDICATION THAT CONSENT WOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN RELATION TO KOREA OR TAIWAN, INDICATING THAT THERE IS SOME COMMON INTEREST THERE, I THINK WE HAVE TO ASSESS THIS QUESTION IN THE LONGER TERMS THAT I HAVE ALLUDED TO。 IT IS GOING TO DEPEND NETIRELY UPON WHAT THE MUTUALITY OF INTEREST IS AT THE TIME。

I THINK THE PRIME MINISTER WAS ADDRESSING THE QUESTION AS HE VIEWED IT THEN AND I THINK WE MUST RECOGNIZE THOSE CONDITIONS MIGHT CHANGE AND I THINK WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THERE MAY BE SOME CONSTRAINTS AFTER THE AGREEMENT THAT WERE NOT PRESENT BEFORE THE AGREEMENT, BUT I AM CONFIDENT THAT MUTUALITY OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ARE SUCH THAT WE CAN WORK WELL UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT JUST AS WE HAVE WORKED WELL UNDER THE ARRANGEMENT WHICH GOVERNS OUR TROOPS WHICH ARE NOW STATIONED IN JAPAN。

SENATOR PEARSON; PARTICULARLY SO SINCE WE HAVE A LEGAL AND MORAL OBLIGATION TO GO FORWARD WITH THIS TREATY, I SUPPOSE。

外務省

ステンシル、タイプ

注　意

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電信写

1500

大政事外外儀官	
務務	典房
次次	
臣官官審審長長	
儀総人電厚計	
書文会営給	
調査長	参企析調
領移長	参領旅査移
ア長	参地中東二 北東一西
米長	参北北保
中南審	参一二
欧長	参西東洋 一二 西東 二二
近ア長	参書近ア
経長	次総経国資 一源 参貿統国 二
経協長	参政技一理 国企二
条長	参条協規
国長	参政経科 軍社専
情長	参道内外
文長	一二

総番号（TA）56471　　主管

71年　月28日23時30分　半国　発

71年10月29日13時04分　本省　着　半北1

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

区委協定　五会

沖縄上院外交委聴聞会（19-~~20日~~企業）

46.10.28

~~第3490号 平 大至急~~

~~往電第3457号に関し、~~

~~以下英文別紙のとおり。~~

外務省

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電信写

(1) SENATOR SPARKMAN; THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
YOU MENTIONED A FEW MINUTES AGO ONE OF THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THEIR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT I BELIEVE IS THE AMERICAN BUSINESS OR AMERICAN INVESTMENT IN OKINAWA. HOW WILL THAT BE AFFECTED AS WE PULL OUT, THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE DO?

GENERAL LAMPERT; MR. CHAIRMAN, SENATOR SPARKMAN, THE REVERSION AGREEMENT SINGED IN JUNE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A LETTER TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR SIGNED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER, MR. AICHI, PROVIDING DETAILED ASSURANCES WITH RESPECT TO THE FUTURE STATUS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THE RYUKYUS. THIS LETTER WAS DEVELOPED FOLLOWING VERY, VERY DETAILED AND INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS OVER NEARLY TWO YEARS, AND I BELIEVE IT IS CORRECT TO SAY THAT IN OUR VIEW THIS LETTER AND THE ACCOMPANYING ASSURANCES PROVIDES A SOLID BASIS FOR CONTINUED OPERATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS.

I SHOULD SAY, SIR, THAT THERE WILL, OF COURSE, BE ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS PLACED ON AMERICAN

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電信写

BUSINESS DUE TO THE OPERATION OF THE BODY OF JAPANESE LAW, SINCE THE RYUKYUS WILL BECOME A PERFECTURE OF JAPAN AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC BUSINESS CONSIDERATIONS WHICH ARE IMPORTANT TO THE BUSINESS COMMUNITIES THAT HAVE NOT YET BEEN SETTLED AND ARE STILL UNDER DISCUSSION. WE BELIEVE THAT THE OUTLOOK IS FAVORABLE FOR THE CONTINUED SATISFACTORY OPERATION.

SENATOR SPARKMAN; I WONDER HOW MUCH OF THAT BUSINESS DEPENDS IN A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE TO THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN ACTIVITIES THERE?

GENERAL LAMPERT; SIR, A GOOD DEAL. A LARGE PART ONE AMERICAN BUSINESS IN OKINAWA IS MADE UP OF SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS, SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS, SOFT DRINK ESTABLISHMENTS, ELECTRONIC DEALERS, ELECTRONIC REPAIRMEN, DRY CLEANERS, BUSINESSES OF THAT TYPE, AND THEY DO DEPEND TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT ON THE PRESENCE OF THE AMERICAN BASES AND THE FAMILIES OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY MEN. HOWEVER, A VERY LARGE PORTION OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS ACTIVITY THERE IS ORIENTED TOWARD THE LOCAL POPULATION AND TOWARD MARKETS AND BUSINESS CONTACTS OUTSIDE OF

外務省

注　意

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2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に
　連絡ありたい。

電信写

OKINAWA。

FOR EXAMPLE, THERE HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE INVESTMENT IN THE LAST THREE YEARS BY THREE AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES WHICH ARE NOW CONSTRUCTING REFINERIES ON OKINAWA AND THEY IN GENERAL WILL RECEIVE OIL FROM ELSEWHERE, GENERALLY FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, AND REFINE OKINAWA AND THEN SHIP FROM THERE TO MARKETS IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD。

SENATOR SPARKMAN; USE THAT AS A REFINERY BASE?

GENERAL LAMPERT。 YES, SIR。

(2) SENATOR PEARSON; THE ONLY OTHER ISSUE THAT I RECALL THAT IS GOING TO BE RAISED HAS TO DO WITH THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS。 I UNDERSTAND THAT HAS BEEN WORKED OUT AS FAR AS YOU KNOW。 PERHAPS WE SHOULD HAVE ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE THIS YESTERDAY。

SECRETARY PACKARD; THAT HAS BEEN WORKED OUT IN WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE AN ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY WAY。 I CANNOT ASSUREYOU THERE WILL NOT BE SOME MINOR IRRITATIONS, BUT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN PEOPLE WHO ARE NOW THERE ASSURANCE THAT THEY CAN

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電信写

ONTINUE TO OPERATE IN ABOUT THE WAY THEY HAVE EEN AND I THINK THIS IS AN ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY RRANGEMENT AND, AS FAR AS I KNOW, THE PEOPLE NVOLVED ARE SATISFIED WITH THE ARRANGEMENT。

AGAIN, THERE MAY BE SOME MINOR IRRITATIONS HERE AND THERE BUT I THINK ALL IN ALL IT IS A GOOD RRANGEMENT。

SENATOR PEARSON; I THANK YOU。

(3)

ステンシル、タイプ

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電信写

総番号（TA）5667
71 年 10 月 29 日 00 時 20 分　主管 米・国
71 年 10 月 29 日 13 時 35 分　本省 発着 米41

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

日米協定
沖縄上院外交委聴聞会（20-21日 暮地）

米3491号 至急 46.10.28
往電米3457号に関し。

(1)　THE CHAIRMAN ; I UNDERSTAND ITS UTILITY IN VIETNAM, IN THE CASE OF HOSTILITIES SUCH AS WE HAVE BEEN GOING THROUGH, BUT I WAS ASSUMING THAT THIS PARTICULAR ACTIVITY IS COMING TO AN END。 I WAS JUST WONDERING ABOUT HOW YOU FORESEE THE NEED FOR THE MAINTAINENCE OF THESE BASES INDEFINITELY, WHICH ,OF COURSE , THIS REVERSION PROVIDES FOR 。THERE IS NO RERMINATION NOW PROVIDED FOR ON THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF THE BASES, IS THERE?

SECRETARY PACKARD; I THINK , MR。 CHAIRMAN , THE BEST WAY TO LOOK AT THIS QUESTION AS OF

大臣 官房 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 儀典長 総務課長 人事課長 会計課長 厚生課長 調査企画課長 調査室長 領事移住部長 領事旅券課長 アジア局長 参事官 中近東アフリカ局長 参事官 北米局長 参事官 中南米局長 参事官 欧亜局長 参事官 経済局長 参事官 経済協力局長 参事官 条約局長 参事官 国際連合局長 参事官 情報文化局長 参事官 書文課 会計課 営繕課 給与課 調査企画課 参事官 企画調整室 参事官 領事移住部 参事官 旅券課 参事官 アジア局 参事官 中近東アフリカ局 参事官 北米局 参事官 中南米局 参事官 欧亜局 参事官 経済局 参事官 経済協力局 参事官 条約局 参事官 国際連合局 参事官 情報文化局 参事官

外務省

注　意
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2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

NOW--

THE CHAIRMAN ; THAT IS WHAT I AM TRYING TO GET YOU TO EXPLAIN。

SECRETARY PACKARD; WE ARE GOING THROUGH A PARIOD OF SUBSTATAL CHANGE。

THE CHAIRMAN; I HOPE SO。

SECRETARY PACKARD; AND THAT IVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN RELATION TO OUR FRIENDLY COUNTRY JAPAN。 OUR PRESIDENT OPENING THE DOOR TO THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS A NEW STEP。 I DON'T THINK WE CAN ASESS AT THIS TIME THE LEVEL OR THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT OUR MILITARY PRESENCE WILL BE REQUIRAD THERE BUT I DO THINK IT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR US TO MAINTAIN OUR MILITARY PRESENCE AT THIS TIME UNTIL WE ARE ABLE TO WORK OUT AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH MAY BE DICTATED 。

I THINK WE ARE GOING THROUGH A VERY IMPORTANT CHANGE IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY, ONE THAT I THOROUGHLY SUPPORT , AND I THINK PARTICULARLY AT THIS TIME IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US NOT TOGIVE ANY SIGNALS THAT WE ARE RENEGING OUR RESPONSIBILITY

外務省

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2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD。 WHAT THAT RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE IN THE LONG RUN DEPENDS UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS, IT DEPENDS UPON THE ROLE THAT JAPAN MAY TAKE, IT DEPENDS UPON WHAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO IN WORKING OUT BETTER ARRANGEMENTS, DIFFERENT KINDS OF A POLCICY WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA。 WE ARE AT THE END OF TWO DECADES, AS I SEE IT, AS BEING A PERIOD THAT REFLECTS THE POST-WORLD WAR II PERIOD IN OUR FREIGN RELATIONS AND I THINK WE ARE BEGINNING A NEW ERA AND I THINK WE HAVE TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN MOVING AT THIS POINT BECAUSE WE DON'T KNOW YET WHAT PROBLEMS WE ARE GOING TO FACE。

THE CHAIRMAN ; SO IT IS FAIR TO SAY WE ARE IN A TRANSITIONAL PEIROD。 WHILE THIS IS INDEFINITE YOU CAN'T SAY IT IS TEN YEARS OR TWENTY YEARS OR FIVE YEARS, IT IS A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND YOU FEEL IT IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THESE BASES?

SECRETARY PACKARD; I THINK THIS IS PRECISELY THE CASE, MR。 CHAIRMAN, AND I THINK THIS IS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S DOCTRINE。 I THINK WE

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
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電信写

ARE INDEED MOVING FROM AN AERA OF CONFRONTATION INTO AN ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS AND I TNINK WE MUST DO THIS FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH。 I THINK WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THESE CHANGES ARE REALLY MOMENTOUS CHANGES NOT ONLY FOR US BUT FOR OTHER PEOPLE AND WE MUST BE VERY CAREFUL IN THE RATE AT WHICH AND THE DEGREE AT WHICH WE GIVE ANY SIGNALS THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO TAKE OUR SHARE OF RESPONSIBILITY ON A WORLD-WIDE BSIS IN THE FUTURE。

(2) SENATOR SPARKMAN; IN WHAT PROPORTION ARE OUR FORCES BEING WITHDRAWN FROM OKINAWA? I UNDERSTAND, OF COURSE, WE CONTINUE TO OPERATION BASES BUT I SUPPOSE SOME PART OF THE STRENGTH WILL BE TAKEN OUT IS THAT RIGHT?

SECRETARY PACKARD; WELL, OF THE 50,000 TROOPS WE HAVE THERE, THERE WILL BE A RATHAR SMALL PART TAKEN OUT BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR REVERSION REQUIREMANTS 。 IT HAS TO DO WITH THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES TAKING OVER THE DEFENSE REPONSIBILITY FOR OKINAWA AND, AS I HAVE INDICATED, THAT IS IN THE ORDER OF 3500 PEOPLE。 WE WILL MOVE THE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL SOMEWHERE ELSE, WHICH

注　意

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電信写

WILL BE ANOTHER SMALL AMOUNT。 (I) GUESS IN ROUND FIGURES ABOUT HALF OF THE FORCES THERE RELATETO THE MARINE UNIT THAT IS STATIONED ON THERE。 (T)HAT WILL STAY。

(S)ENATOR (S)PARKMAN; (T)HERE IS A MARINE DIVISION THERE?

(S)ECRETARY (P)ACKARD ; (Y)ES, (S)IR, A MARINE DIVISION。 (T)HAT DIVISION WILL STAY 。(T)HE OTHER ACTIVITIES, THE LOGISTIC ACTIVITIES , HOSPITALS, TRANSPORTATION, ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT, WILL BE MOVED FROM (N)AHA-- WE DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHERE THE MOVE WILL BE-- BUT THERE WILL BE NOT A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE SOME 45,000 AS A REULT OF THE REVERSION DECISION AND CONCURRENCE。

(W)E ARE CONFINUALLY ADDRESSING THE PRESENCE OF THE (U)NITED (S)TATES (M)ILITARY (F)ORCES ALL OVER THE WORLD IN RELATION TO THE LARGER CONSIDERATIONS AND WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN REDECTION BEYOND THESE MINOR ONCE THAT (I) HAVE INDICATED IN RELATION TO THE RVERSIONS, (I) THINK, ARE A QUESTION WE HAVE NOT REALLY ADRESSED YET。

(了)

外務省

スチンセルタイプ

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

大臣	政務次官	事務次官	外務審議官	儀典長	官房総務課長	人事課長	電信課長	厚生課長	計理課長	給与課長	書類審査官	文書課長	会計課長

調査課長	参事官	企画調整室長	領事移住部長	参事官	領事移住部旅券課長	査証課長							

アジア局長	参事官	地域政策室長	中近東第一課長	中近東第二課長	北米局長	参事官	北米第一課長	北米第二課長	中南米局長	参事官	中南米第一課長	中南米第二課長	

欧亜局長	参事官	欧亜第一課長	欧亜第二課長	東欧第一課長	東欧第二課長								

近アジア局長	参事官	書記官室	経済局長	次長	総合経済課長	国際資源課長	国際機関第一課長	国際機関第二課長	経済協力局長	参事官	技術協力課長	有償資金協力課長	無償資金協力課長

条約局長	参事官	多国間条約課長	二国間条約第一課長	二国間条約第二課長	国際協定課長	国際法規課長							

国際情報局長	参事官	分析課長	調査企画課長	報道課長	対外広報課長	文化事業部長	文化交流課長	海外広報課長	日本語教育課長				

領事移住部長	参事官	海外邦人安全課長	外国人登録室長	移住課長									

在外公館													

在外公館													

在外公館													

総番号（TA）5646A
71 年 10 月 29 日 22 時 20 分　発　米国　主管
71 年 10 月 29 日 12 時 41 分　着　本省　北1

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

至急指定

衆議院外交委聴聞会（21-22日 財政）

沖3492号 至大至急　46、10、28

往電沖3417号に関し、

別紙のとおり。

外務省

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

SENATOR FEARSON: I JUST SORT OF MENTALLY ADDED UP SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS, 35 MILLION IN MILITARY COST AND, LIKE YOU SAID , 20 MILLION IN ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS AND AN ADDITIONAL TEN ON LAND RENT, AS I RECALL.

SUBTRACTING HIGHER WAGES, WE REALLY GOT A SUBSTANTIAL SAVINGS OF PERHAPS DORUJIRUSI 60 MILLION?

SECREARY PACKARD. YES, SIR.

SENATOR FEARSON: OR SOMETHING IN THAT RANGE, IS THAT CORRECT?

SECRETARY PACKARD. YES, SIR. THAT IS CORRECT.

OBVIOUSLY THERE HAS TO BE SOME CONSIDERATION AS TO WHAT IS A FAIR ARRANGEMENT ON REVERSION AND WE HAVE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION TWO THINGS:

ONE, COMPARABLE PAYMENT, WHICH IS DORUJIRUSI 320 MILLION, AND THEN THESE SAVINGS WHICH ACCRUE AS YOU HAVE LISTED OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, AND THINK IN TERMS OF THE FACT WE HAVE HAD THESE BASES FOR A

注 意

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電信写

LONG TIME, THEIR USE, THE FACT WE HAVE SOME MUTUALITY OF INTEREST IN BEING THERE, THAT THIS IS IN EVERY WAY A FAIR ARRANGEMENT BOTH FOR THE UNITED STATES AND FOR JAPAN. I AM QUITE SATISFIED WITH THAT MATTER.

(7)

外務省

ステンレス/タイコ

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
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電信写

大臣	政務次官	事務次官	外務審議官	官房長					
儀典長	総務課長	人事課長	電信課長	厚生課長	計理課長	給与課長	会計課長	営繕課長	

調査室長	参企画調整室		
領事移住部長	参領事移住部	旅券課長	査証課長

ア大使	参事官	地域政策課長	中近東第一課長	中近東第二課長	北米第一課長	北米第二課長	保障課長
中南米局長	参事官	中南米第一課長	中南米第二課長				
欧亜局長	参事官	西欧第一課長	東欧第一課長	西欧第二課長	東欧第二課長	東欧第三課長	

近東アフリカ局長	参事官	中近東アフリカ第一課長	中近東アフリカ第二課長				
経済局長	次長	総務課長	経済協力課長	国際経済第一課長	国際経済第二課長	資源課長	
	参事官	貿易振興課長	貿易管理課長	国際経済第三課長			
経済協力局長	参事官	政策課長	技術協力課長	有償資金協力課長	無償資金協力課長	開発金融課長	開発調査課長
条約局長	参事官	多国間条約課長	二国間条約第一課長	二国間条約第二課長			
国際連合局長	参事官	政治課長	経済課長	社会課長	専門機関室長		
情報文化局長	参事官	報道課長	対外広報課長	国際文化課長	文化交流室長		

総番号（TA）5649

71 年 10 月 28 日 22 時 05 分　発　米国
71 年 10 月 29 日 12 時 49 分　着　本省　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

（返還協定上院）

沖縄返還聴聞会（22-~~23日~~ 台湾）

~~米749号 至急~~　46.10.28

~~往電米749号に関し、~~

以下英文別紙のとおり。

外務省

（11/1日/日）

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

(Senator Sparkman;)

電信写

NOW, I WANT TO ASK A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS, SENATOR CASE HAS NOT COME IN, AND THEN I WANT TO ASK THREE OR FOUR THAT HE WANTED TO PUT TO YOU.

THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL QUESTIONS ASKED ABOUT OUR SITUATION WITH TAIWAN.

IN THE NIXON-SATO COMMUNICATION OF 1969 JAPAN STATED THAT TAIWAN WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR TO THE SECURITY OF JAPAN. DO YOU THINK THERE HAS BEEN ANY REASSESSMENT OF THAT POSITION BY JAPAN IN VIEW OF THE CHANGE OF THE UNITED STATES-CHINA POLICY AND EVEN MORE RECENTLY THE VOTE IN THE UN?

SECRETARY PACKARD; MR. CHAIRMAN, I CANNOT SAY WHETHER THERE HAS OR HAS NOT BEEN A REASSESSMENT OF THAT POLICY, BUT I THINK WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WILL BE A REASSESSMENT OF POLICIES OF THIS NATURE BY JAPAN AND OUR OTHER ALLIES, AND SO I THINK WE DO NOT KNOW THE EXTENT TO WHICH THERE HAS BEEN ANY CHANGE THERE, BUT WE ARE IN A PERIOD OF CHANGE IN OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS AND WE HAVE TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WILL BE CHANGES IN TERMS OF ASSESSMENTS

注 意

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電信写

THAT WERE MADE SEVERAL YEARS AGO AND IN A GREAT MANY SITUATIONS.

SENATOR SPARKMAN; GENERAL, DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT

GENERAL LAMPERT; NO.

SENATOR SPARKMAN; I WONDER IF EITHER ONE OF YOU COULD EXPRESS YOUR OPINION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THAT SAME SITUATION PREVAILS.

SEVERETARY PACKARD; YOU MEAN THE SITUATION--

SENATOR SPARKMAN; OUR OPPINION ASIDE FROM JAPAN.

SECRETARY PACKARD; AS FAR AS I ASSESS THE SITUATION, WE ARE VERY SORRY ABOUT THE UN VOTE. WE DO NOT SEE THIS AS CHANGING OUR RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. WE THINK THIS HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP OVER THE YEARS AND I THINK WE WILL WANT TO MAINTAIN THAT RELATIONSHIP.

NOW, HERE AGAIN I DO NOT THINK ANYONE WANTS

注　意

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電信写

TO PROJECT INTO THE FUTURE TOO GREAT A DISTANCE。
WE HOPE THAT THERE CAN BE IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELATION SHIPS AMONG ALL COUNTRIES OVER WHAT HAS PREVAILED DURING THE PAST TWO AND A HALF DECADES。

I THINK FOR THE TIME BEING OUR POSITION HAS TO BE THAT TAIWAN HAS BEEN A VERY GOOD STRONG FRIEND OF OURS AND I WOULD HOPE, AND AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED INTEND, THAT WE WOULD MAINTAIN THAT FRIENDSHIP。

SENATOR SPARKMAN; OF COURSE, WE HAVE A SECURITY AGREEMENT WITH TAIWAN。

SECRETARY PACKARD; YES , SIR。

SENATOR SPARKMAN; AND I ASSUME THERE WOULD BE NO THOUGHT OF DISCONTINUING OR CHANGING THAT。 WOULD YOU AGREE?

SECRETARY PACKARD; I WOULD AGREE WITH THAT。

SENATOR SPARKMAN。 IN FACT, THE THOUGHT OCCURS

注　意

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電信写

TO ME THAT WITH THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA, TAIWAN MIGHT BECOME EVEN MORE IMPORTANT AS A SECURITY BASE IN THAT AREA OF THE WORLD。

SECRETARY PACKARD; I THINK WE CAN SAY IN GENERAL TERMS THAT WITH THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA, TAIWAN MAY BECOME MORE IMPORTANT, SOUTH KOREA MAY BECOME MORE IMPORTANT, OTHER AREAS IN WHICH WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEPEND ON FOR ALLIES OR FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OF OUR OWN WILL TEND TO HAVE SOME INCREASED IMPORTANCE, AND I WOULD NOT WANT TO ASSESS, PUT ANY MEASURE OF WHAT THESE CHANGES ARE LIKELY TO BE。

SENATOR SPARKMAN; WE ARE PROBABLY REACHING A VOTE IN THE SENATE。 THIS QUORUM CALL MAY BE FOR THAT PURPOSE。 IF IT IS, I UNDERSTAND IT IS ON AN AMENDMENT PROPOSING TO STRIKE FROM THE FOREIGN AID BILL A PROVISION REPEALING THE FORMOSA RESOLUTION。 I DO NOT SUPPOSE YOU HAVE ANY THOUGHT TO EXPRESS ON THAT。

SECRETARY PACKARD; I WOULD HOPE IT WILL NOT PASS。

注　意

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電信写

SENATOR SPARKMAN; YOU ARE HOPEFUL IT WILL PASS?

SECRETARY PACKARD; IF THE VOTE IS REPEALING, I WOULD HOPE --

SENATOR SPAKMAN; THE AMENDMENT IS TO STRIKE OUT THAT PROVISION, WHICH WOULD REPEAL.

SECRETARY PACKARD; I WOULD BE IN FAVOR OF THE AMENDMENT IN THAT CASE.

SENATOR SPARKMAN; WELL, I AM INCLINED TO AGREE WITH YOU.

(了)

外務省

大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 典務長 官房総務長 人事課長 電信課長 厚生課長 計画課長 会計課長 給与課長

調査長	参	企画調整
領事移住長	参	旅券課
アジア局長	参	地域政策中東課 東北アジア課 東南アジア第二課 北西アジア課
米国局長	参	北米一課 北米二課 北米局安保課
中南米局長	参	中南米一課 中南米二課
欧亜局長	参	西欧課 東欧課 西欧東欧課
近東アフリカ局長	参	書記官室
経済局長	次	総務課 経済協力課 国際経済第一課 国際経済第二課
	参	貿易課 国際経済第三課
経済協力局長	参	政策課 技術協力課
条約局長	参	条約課 法規課
国際連合局長	参	政治課 経済課 社会課 専門機関課
情報文化局長	参	報道課 対外広報課
		文化交流課

スタンプ　タテ

注　意

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2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

総番号（TA）56466　主管
71年1月24日23時00分　発　米国
71年1月25日12時31分　着　本省

外務大臣殿　ヤルタ　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

(委員協定上院)
沖縄外交懇談会（23-日米基地移転等）
(於)
沖縄本土(平)大臣室

沖縄米軍基地問題　46.10.28

THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES PLANS TO REPLACE LOSS OF CERTAIN MILITARY FACILITIES IN OKINAWA WITH NEW OR EXPANDED BASES IN MICRONESIA. IS THIS TRUE? YOU MAY HAVE SEEN THAT.

SECRETARY PACKARD; YES, SIR, I HAVE SEEN THAT.

SENATOR SPARKMAN; THAT ARTICLE IN THE PAPER REPORTING THAT?

SECRETARY PACKARD; WE HAVE NOT MADE ANY SPECIFIC DECISIONS AS TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH ANY FACILITIES IN OKINAWA WILL HAVE TO BE REPLACED

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

ELSEWHERE NOR WHERE
THOSE MIGHT BE。WE ARE LOOKING
AT VARIOUS AREAS, BUT NO DECISION
HAS BEEN MADE ON THIS MATTER。
SENATOR SPARKMAN; WE WOULD HAVE
IT RIGHT TOO, WOULD WE
NOT? WHAT IS OUR POSITION? IS IT A
TRUSTEESHIP?
SECRETARY PACKARD; IT IS A TRUSTEESHIP
AND WE WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO DO
THAT, BUT HERE AGAIN I THINK WE
MUST RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE
IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH
VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS IN MICRONESIA AND I
THINK AS A PRACTICAL MATTER IT IS VERY
IMPORTANT THAT WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNTNOT
JUST OUR LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, BUT THE
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS ON THIS MATTER。
SENATOR SPARKMAN; DOES THE FACT THAT
MICRONESIA IS A TRUST TERRITORY UNDER THE
UN HAVE ANY EFFECT ON OUR FUTURE PLANS
THERE?

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
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電信写

I DID NOT REALIZE THAT WAS IN
THERE, BUT --
SECRETARY PACKARD; WELL, HERE AGAIN I
CANNOT GIVE YOU A PRECISE ANSWER TO THAT
QUESTION。I THINK WE HAVE TO TAKE
INTO ACCOUNT THAT FACT AND ALL
OTHER CONSIDERATIONSIN DETERMINING
WHAT WE MIGHT DO, WHETHER WE MIGHT
DO ANY THING IN TERMS OF REPLACING
FACILITIES IN VARIOUS MICRONESIAN
LOCATIONS THAT WOULD BE RELATED TO
THIS ISSUE AT HAND。
SENATOR SPARKMAN; WELL, I THINK
THE MATTER AS TO WHAT WE CAN DO AND CANNOT DO
DEPENDS ON THE TERMS OF THE
TRUSTEESHIP AND I DO NOT
KNOW OFFHAND WHAT THESE ARE。
HAS THE UNITED STATES MADE A
PLEDGE TO THE UN THAT WE WOULD PERMIT
THE ISLANDERS OF MICRONESIA TO CHOOSE
THEIR FUTURE STATUS, INCLUDING INDEPENDENCE?
SECRETARY PACKARD; THIS SITUATION
WITH MICRONESIA UNDER THE UN, THIS IS A

注　意

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2．本電の主管変更その他については検関班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

TRUST WHICH IS IRREVERSHIBLE AND WE DO NOT NEED TO GET PERMISSION FROM THE UNITED NATIONS TO PUT FORCES THERE。

SENATOR SPARKMAN; WILL THE U.S. HONOR THIS? I DO NOT THINK YOU ANSWERED THAT LAST QUESTION。

HAS THE UNITED STATES MADE A PLEDGETO THE UN THAT WE WILL PERMIT THE ISLANDERS OF MICRENESIA TO CHOOSE THEIR FUTURE STATUS IN CHOOSING INDEPENDENCE?

IT MAY BE THAT QUESTION SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT。

SECRETARY PACKARD; THIS NEGOTIATION WITH MICRONESIA IS UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND I WILL HAVE TO PROVIDE AN ANSWER TO --

SENATOR SPARKMAN; IT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THIS DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR THEN。 FINE。

外務省

注　意

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2．本電の主管変更その他については検関班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

THE NEXT QUESTION, WILL THE U.S. HONOR THIS PLEDGE AND, IF SO, WHEN?

I SUPPOSE THAT OUGHTTO GO TO THE INTERIOR, TOO。

(3)

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

4000

電信写

大臣	政務次官
事務次官	外務官
外審	外務官
儀審	儀典長
官長	官房長
儀給	給人
電厚	電計
書	文会
営給	給
調査長	参企析調
領移長	参領旅査移
ア長	参地中東二 北東一西
米長	参北北保
中南審	参一二
欧長	参西東洋 西東
近ア長	参書近ア
経長	次総経国資 一源 参貿統国
経協長	参政技一理 国企二
条長	参条協規
国長	参政経科 軍社専
情長	参道内外
文長	一二

総番号（TA）　5 6 6 2 5　　主管

71 年 10 月 29 日 15 時 30 分　米国　発

71 年　月 30 日 05 時 31 分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

沖縄上院外交委（24－3日目概要）

第3495号　平　大至急

往電第3486号に関し、

（以下別紙英文）

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

THE HEARING OPENED AT 10:15 A.M. WHTH
SENATOR SPARKMAN SERVING AS ACTING
CHIRMAN AND THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE
PRESENT。 HE EXPLAINED THAT
CONVENING OF THE HEARING HAD BEEN
DELAYED BY A ROLL CALL IN THE SENATE
AND THAT THE HEARING TODAY WOULD
CONTINUE TO HEAR PUBLIC WITNESSES
WHO WOULD BE LIMITED IN THIER
PRESENTATIONS TOTEN MINUTES OR LESS。
HE INDICATED THAT ADDITIONAL WRITTEN
STATEMENTS MAY BE SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD AND THE ENTIRE STATEMENTS PREPARED
BY WITNESSES WOULD BE PRINTED IN THE
RECORD。 HE INDICATED THAT IF THE
COMMITTEE IS CALLED TO THE SENATE
THE HEARING WILL ADJOURN UNTIL THIS
AFTERNOON OR IF THAT IS NOT FEASIBLE,
TO MONDAYAT 10:00 A.M。
　　THE FIRST WITNESS WAS SENATOR
JOHN V。 TUNNEY (D。 CAL。)。 SENATOR
TUNNEY READ A PREPARED STATEMENT
IN WHICH HE STATED THAT THE DECISION
OF THE SENATE ON THIS TREATY ''WILL

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

BE A TURNING POINT IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN
RELATIONS。'' HE INDICATED THERE WAS NO
MORE IMPORTANT TASK AT THIS MOMENT FOR
US INTHE FAR EAST THANTO TREAT OUR
RELATIONS WITH JAPAN WITH THE GREATEST
CARE。 HE INDICATED ''WE CAN MUST
MAINTAIN A FIRM ALLIANCE WITH JAPAN。''
HE THEN POINTED OUT SOME OFTHE CENTRAL
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
QUESTIONS IN OUR JAPANESE POLICY
RAISED BY THE TREATY。 HE STATED THAT
''OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN ARE MORE
IMPORTANT THAN OUR RELATIONS
WITH ANY OTHER ASIAN NATION,
INCLUDING CHINA。'' HE STATED THAT THE
BENEFITS OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH
JAPAN ARE SUBSTANTIAL AND TOUCH ON
VITAL ELEMENTS OF AMERICAN POLICY。''
AMERICAN BASES IN JPAN NOT ONLY ''
STRENGTHEN THE AMERICAN DETERRENT
AGAINST CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION BUT
ALLOW JAPAN TO MAINTAIN ACREDIBLE DEFENSE
POSTURE WIHOUT DEVELOPING AN
INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR CAPABILITY。

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電信写

HE INDICATED THAT PREVENTING A DETERIORATION
IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS WILL
REQUIRE CAREFUL AMERICAN ATTENTION
AND A JAMOR CHANGE IN THEMANNER
WITH WHICH WE DEAL WITH THE JAPANESE。
HE WAS CRITICAL OF RECENT ACTIONS
OF THE ADMINISTRATION SEMICOLON THE
HANDLING OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE
AUGUST ECONOMIC PROPOSALSAND THE
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO
PEKING WERE CHARACTERIZED AS ''AND
INSENSITIVE STYLE OF DEPLOMACY' THAT
IN INAPPROPRIATE AND UNPRODUCTIVE。'' HE STATED
THAT A NEW DEPLOMACY IS NECESSARY IN
THE FAR EAST AND THAT STABILITY IN ASIA
REQUIRES COOPERATIONOF FOUR NATIONS --
UNITED STATES, JAPAN, SOVIET UNION AND
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA。 HE STATED
THAT ''TO IGNORE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH OUR
JAPANESE ALLY IS TO IGNORE THE
SECURITY, STABILITY AND PEACE OF THE
FAR EAST。'' HE STATED THE U。S。 SHOULD
TAKE NO ACTION WHICH AFFECTS THE

外務省

注　意

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電信写

SECURITY OF THE FAR EAST WITHOUT CLOSE
CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN SEMICOLON
SHOULD CONSULT FULLY WITH JAPAN ON ALL
MATTERS OF VITAL INTEREST TO HERSEMICOLON
AND IF POSSIBLE SHOULD MOVE IN THOSE
AREAS ONLY IN FULL AGREEMENTWITH JAPAN''
HEPOINTEDOUT THAT THE U。S。 HAS ''
ALWAYS ACKNOWLEDGED JAPAN'S RESIDUAL
SOVEREIGNTY OVER OKINAWA AND THAT THE
REVERSIONAGREEMENT ''IS THE CAREFUL PRODUCT
OF LONG NEGOTIATIONS'' INVOLVING
COMPROMISE BY BOTH SIDES。 HE REMINDED
THE COMMITTEE THAT ''THE SUPPORT OF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR
RATIFICATION SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT PROOF
THAT THE REVERSION AGREEMENT IS IN
AMERICA'S SECURITY INTEREST AND DOES
NOT THREATEN OUR ABILITY TO MEET OUR
COMMITMENTS。''
HEINDICATED THE US HAS NOTHING TO
GAIN -- AND MUCH TO LOOSE -- IN THE
WAY OF NATIONAL SECURITY BY RETAINING
TITLE TO OKINAWA。 HE DEVELOPED THE
IDEA ORIGINALLY STATED BY PRIME

外務省

注　意

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電信写

MINISTER SATO THAT THE REVERSION OF
OKINAWA WILLMARK THE END OF THE POST-WAR
ERA IN JAPAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS。
HE STATED °°PROMPT RATIFICATION OF
THIS TREATY SIGNALS THE INCEPTION OF THAT
POST-WAR RELATIONSHIP。°° HE INDICATED
JAPAN SHOULD NOW BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE HER
CONTRIBUTION TOTHE ECONOMIES OF THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND HER ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF LESS DEVELOPED ASIAN NATIONS。 HE
URGED PROMPT REPORTING AND RATIFICATION OF THE
TREATY。

FOLLOWING HIS DELIVERY, SENATOR TUNNEY
WAS COMPLIMENTED BY ACTINGCHAIRMAN SPARKMAN ON
A °°VERY FINE STATEMENT。°°

THE FIRST PUBLIC WITNESS TO APPEAR WAS
MR。 C。 N。 YANG OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF
NEW YORK AT STONYBROOK。 HE WAS TESTIFYING
°°AS AN INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN°° AND READ A
PREPARED STATEMENT ADDRESSED PRIMARILY TO THE
PROBLEM OF THE TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS。 HE ADVANCED THE
ARGUMENT THAT THESE ISLANDS ARE
°°GEOGRAPHICALLY, HISTORICALLY AND

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電信写

OLITICALLY PART OF THE TERRITORY OFTAIWAN,
HICH IS A PROVINCE OF CHINA。 HE STATED THE
。S。 STATE DEPARTMENT HAS TAKEN A POSITION
F NEUTRALITY WITH REFERENCE TO THE ISLANDS BUT THAT
APAN °°EVIDENTLY DOES NOT REGARD THE U。S。 AS
AKING A NEUTRAL POSITION IN THE (OWNERSHIP)
ISPUTE。°° HE REFERRED TO A MONTH-LONG
ISIT HE MADE TO THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA THREE
ONTHS AGO WHICH INDICATED TO HIM THAT THE
HINESE PEOPLE AND LEADERS °°ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED
BOUT THE POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE
ILITARISM°°。 HE REFERRED TO TWO JAPANESE
OVIES WITH AN AGGRESSIVE MILITARY THEME WHICH HE
AW IN CHINA。 HE INDICATED IT WAS NOT IN U。S。
NTEREST °°TO ANTAGONIZE THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF
HINA AND THE TAIWAN GOVERNMENT ALIKE BY
GNORING THEIR CLAIM°° TO THE ISLANDS。 HE
ONCLUDED THAT °°THE LEAST THE SENATE COULD
OIS TO TOTALLY DISASSOCIATE ITSELF 。 。 。 BY
AKING EXPLICIT THE NEUTRALITY POSITION OF
HIS COUNTRY RELATIVE TO THE DISPUTE, AND
TOPPING WHAT AMOUNTS TO AU。S。 NAVY-JAPAN
LLIANCE TO ESTABLISH DE FACTO RECOGNITION
Y THE U。S。 OF JAPANESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE
TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS。

注　意

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電信写

MR。YANG ENDED HIS PREPARED STATEMENT AT 1Ø:41。 SENATOR SPARKMAN THANKED YANG FOR HIS STATEMENT AND ASKED HOW LONG YANG HAD BEEN IN CHINA ON HIS RECENT TRIP。 YANG REPLIED FOUR WEEKS。 SENATOR SPARKMAN ASKED WHETHER CHOU EN LAI INDICATED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MAINTAIN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN IN ORDER TO RESTRAIN RESURRGENT JAPANESE MILITARISM。 YANG REPLIED THAT CHOU WAS COMPLETELY CONCERNED BY THE JAPANESE ROLE WITH THE U。S。 CHOU IS IMPRESSED WITH JAPANESE ACHIEVEMENTS, BUT THE PAST HISTORY OF JAPAN CAUSES WORRIES ABOUT JAPANESE MILITARISM。 SENATOR SPARKMAN INQUIRED WHAT SHOULD BE OUR FUTURE POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN IN VIEW OF DEVELOPING RELATIONS WITH PEKING。 YANG ANSWERED THAT HE DID NOT KNOWHOW THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN TAIWAN WOULD DEVELOP BUT WAS AFRAID OF INSTABILITY IN TAIWANAS A RESULT OF PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE MAINLAND CHINESE IN TAIWAN AND THE TAIWANESE。 SPARKMAN ASKED IF IT WERE POSSIBLE THAT TAIWAN AND MAINLAND CHINA MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE ABLE TO WORK OUT A RESOLUTION OF THEIR PROBLEMS, PERHAPS EVEN A MERGER OFTHE TWO AREAS。 YANG REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A POSSIBILITY。

外務省

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電信写

E SAID THAT CHOU EN LAI, AT APARTY GIVEN IN YANG'S ONOR, HAD EXPRESSED A BELIEF THAT TAIWAN IS OMINATED BY JAPANESE ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND UNLESS N ACCOMMODATION CAN BE REACHED BETWEEN TAIWAN ND CHINA, TAIWAN WOULD BECOME AN OUTPOST OF JAPAN。 PARKMAN INQUIRED WHETHERYANWAS BORN IN CHINA。 ANG REPLIED YES, AND THAT HE HAD LEFT THERE S YEARS AGO。 SENATOR SPARKMAN THANKED MR。 YANG ND INDICATED THAT MR。 YANG WAS A NOBEL PRIZE INNER IN PHYSICS。 SENATOR SPARKMAN'S UESTIONING OF MR。 YANG ENDED AT 1Ø:47 A。M。

RETIRED AIR FORCE MAJOR GENERAL DALE O。 SMITH AS THE NEXT WITNESS AND BEGAN DELIVERY OF A PREPARED TATEMENT AT 1Ø:47。 SMITH SERVED ON OKINAWA AS OMMANDER OF THE 313TH AIR DIVISION FROM 1957 O 1960。 SMITH SAID THAT ''OKINAWA TRULY ASTHE 'KEYSTONE OF THE PACIFIC' 。。。。'' E STATED ''IN 1958 WE DISCOURAGED A RED'' HINESE INVASION OF QUEMOY, MATSU AND THE ESCADORES BYSENDING THE 15ST FIGHTER WING TO AIWAN'' BUT ''WERE UNABLE TO GO TO THE ESCUE OF THE PUEBLO BECAUSE OF JAPAN'S ELUCTANCE TO LET US USEOUR FORCES IN THIS ANNER。'' SMITH SAID THAT WHILE HE WAS

外務省

注　意

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電信写

HERE U。S。 FORCES WERE FREE TO BE DEPLOYED ANYWHERE, ANYTIME IMMEDIATELY UPON ORDERS FROM WASHINGTON AND THAT BECAUSE OKINAWA WAS AMERICAN-ADMINISTERED TERRITORY THE U。S。 ''COULD KEEP ANY KINDS OF WEAPONS ON THE ISLAND IN ANY NUMBERS。'' ''WITH REVERSION, U。S。 FORCES ON OKINAWA WILL BE AS DRASTICALLY CURTAILED AND RESTRICTED AS ARE OUR BASES NOW ON THE HOME ISLANDS OF JAPAN。'' SMITTSAID THAT THE U。S。 WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PROTECT OKINAWA FROM AIR ATTACKOR UTILIZE IT AS A LOGISTICS OR STAGING BASE AS IN THE PAST。 SMITH SAID THAT THE JAPANESE SELF- DEFENSE FORCES COULD NOT DEFEND OKINAWA BECAUSE THEDEFENSE OF SUCH A SMALL REA REQUIRED THE USE OF NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR ROCKETS AND GROUD-TO-AIR MISSILES。 JAPANWILLHVE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS。

AFTER REVERSION THE NUCLEAR TALENT AND UMBRELLA FOR JAPAN WILL BE ''SHOT WITH HOLES'' WE WILL BE PUSHING JAPAN INTO A NUCLEAR POSTURE TO PROTECT HERSELF AGAINST RED CHINA ANDSOVIET RUSSIA。

JAPAN COULD REARM IN TWO ORTHREEYEARS。
SMITH NOTES THAT THEUS HAD TO FIGHT GERMANY FIRST。

外務省

注　意

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電信写

WITHIN ONE GENERATION。

SMITH HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT THECHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND THEXECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAD STATED THAT OUR MILITARY COMMITMENTS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC WOULD BE ADEQUATELY MET AFTER REVERSION。 SMITH IS AWARE OF THE PRESSURES PUT UPON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO SUPPORT PROGRAMS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT。 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE CHAIRMAN ARE NOT ALWAYS CORRECT INTHEIR JUDGEMENTS。

REVERSION OF OKINAWA WOULD OPEN A '' PANDORA'S BOX EVEN MORE TRAGIC THAN THE VIETNAM MISTAKE。'' THE RESULT WOULD BE AN EXPANDING RED CHINA AND A REARMED NUCLEAR JAPAN。

THEREHAS HARDLY BEEN A TIME SINCE 1945 WHEN THE U。S。 NEEDED OKINAWA MORE。 REVERSION SHOULD BE POSTPONED FOR A YEAROR TWO AT LEAST。

THE OKINAWANS ARE JAPANESE ONLY BECAUSEJAPAN SEIZED THE ISLANDS IN 1874。

外務省

注　意

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電信写

ALTHOUGH THE OKINAWANS SPEAK JAPANESE。THEIR ETHNIC BACKGROUND IS UNIQU。

THE US HAS INVESTED FROM 2 TO 5 BILLION DOLLARS IN OKINAWA。WHEN SMITH WAS THERE THEY FIGURED THE INVESTMENT AT 4 BILLION DOLLARS。JAPAN WILL PAY JUST 320 MILLION DOLLARS, OR FROM 6 TO 16 CENTS ON THE DOLLAR。

SMITH SAIDREVERSION WILL FURTHERADVERTISE AMERICAN WEAKNESS AND LACK OFRESOLUTION SEMICOLON IT WILL ENCOURAGE COMMUNIST EXPANSION AND THE ARMAMENT OF JAPAN。IT WILLLEAD TO PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS。JAPAN HAS NOT SIGNED THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY。

IN CONCLUSION, SMITH STATED THAT ITIS NOT SO IMPORTANT THAT WE KEEP FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH JAPAN BUTTHAT WE KEEP PEACEFUL RELATIONS。'' A DISARMED JAPANHAS NO CHOICE BUTTO REMAIN PEACEFUL。''

SMITH ENDED HIS PREPARED STATEMENT AT 1056。

12

注　意

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電信写

SENATOR SPARKMAN ASKED SMITH WHETHER HE KNEW OF ANY OPPOSITION TO RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY BY ANY MEMBER OF THE JCS。SMITH REPLIED HE HAD NO DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH ANY MEMBER OF JCS AND SPOKE AS AN INDIVIDUAL。SPARKMAN ASKED WHETHER THE CONCEPT OF THE PEACE TREATY HAD BEEN ONE OF ''RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY'' SEMICOLON SMITH REPLIED THAT ''RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY'' WAS NOT IN ARTICLE III OF THE TREATY ITSELF BUT IN A STATEMENT OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES。SPARKMAN ASKED WHETHER ''RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY'' HAD BEEN OUR POLICY FOR MANY YEARS。 SMITH REPLIED THAT IT HAD BEEN。IN CONCLUSION, SPARKMAN ASKED WHAT THE ETHNIC BACKGROUND OF THE OKINAWANS WAS。SMITH REPLIEDTHAT THE OKINAWANS WERE POLYNESIAN, CHINESE AND JAPANESE IN ETHNIC BACKGROUND。QUESTIONING OF SMITH BY SENATOR SPARKMAN ENDED AT 1100 AM。

THE NEXT WITNESS WAS MR。EDWARD REEVES, REPRESENTING THE US CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF OKINAWA AND APPEARING FOR MR JACK C。STOLLE, WHO WAS THE SCHEDULED WITNESS。 MR。REEVES SPOKE FOR THE US CHAMBER ON OKINAWA A AND EXPRESSED THE CONCERN OF ITS MEMBERS ABOUT THEIR TREATMENT AFTER REVERSION。HE STATED THEY HAD [illegible]

13

注　意

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電信写

N THE PROBLEM FOR TWO YEARS AND THAT THE US BUSINESS
NTERESTS IN OKINAWA WERE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE
GREEMENT KNOWN AS THE AICHI LETTER WHICH WAS A
ETTER OF ASSURANCES EXPLAINING JAPANESE POLICY。
IS MEMBERS ACCEPT THAT LETTER AS SATISFACTORY IN
GENERAL WAY IN THE MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS。HE EXPRESSED
PPREHENSION ""WHETHER THE SPIRIT AND INTENT OF
HE LETTER ARE FULLY UNDERSTOOD BY THE
OVERNMENT OF JAPAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION""。 HE
TATED THAT CERTAIN CHANGES IN
LAW WERE NECESSARY
EMICOLON THEY ARE TOLD THESE ARE NOW BEFORE THE
IET FOR ACTION BUT THEYHAVE NOT SEEN A TRANSLATION
F THOSE LAWS。 HE DESCRIBED THE MEMBERSHIP OF
HE US CHAMBER INOKINAWA AND SAID THAT ""THESE
USINESSMENEXPECT FREEDOM TO CONDUCTTHEIR BUSINESS
ND TO COMPETE AFTER REVERSION。"" HE STATED A
COMMITTEE OF HIS GROUP HAD PREPARED A POSITION
APER ON THEIR RIGHTS AFTER REVERSION AND THAT THIS
APER WAS USEDIN THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO
GREEMENT。HESTATED THE AICHI LETTER WAS ""GOOD
S FARAS IT WENT"" BUT THAT IT DEPENDS ON""SUB-
EQUENT INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTING BUREAUCRATIC

注　意

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電信写

ECISIONS。"" HE STATED THEY DO NOT NOW, IN CURRENT
ISCUSSION, "ALWAYSAGREE ON INTERPRETATION。HE
EVIEWED VARIOUSSECTIONSOF THEAICHILETTER AND
NDICATED THATTHEPROVISIONSWITH REFERENCE TO
ROADCASTING WERE SATISFACTORYSEMICOLON WITH
EFERENCE TO CURRENCY, GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE
EMICOLON

THAT PROVISIONS FOR TAXATION ""CAN BE WORKED OUT""
BUT THAT THE FOLLOWING IS NECESSARY:

(1) WITH REFERENCE TO BUSINESS ACTIVITIES,
THERE MUSTBE CONTINUITY AFTER REVERSION AND HE IS
CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF JAPANESE POLICY
AGAINST DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT。

(2) WITH REFERENCE TO PROFESSIONALS, THERE MUST
BE NO LAPSE IN LICENSING AND THEY ARE TOLD THIS
MATTER IS NOW BEFORE THE DIET AND HE ASKS THE COMMITTEE
TO SATISFY ITSELF ADEQUATE PROTECTIONS ARE PROVIDED。

注　意

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　連絡ありたい。

電信写

(3) WITH REFERENCE TO IMPORT QUOTAS, HE INDICATES FEW CHANGES IN JAPANESE LAW ARE REQUIRED BUT THAT HIS MEMBERS HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION ON HOW THIS QUESTION WILL BE HANDLED ADMINISTRATIVELY AND THAT IMPORT POLICY NEEDS FURTHER CLARIFY。

MR。 REEVES CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION WITH A STATEMENT THAT US CCMEMBERS IN OKINAWA HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO ITS GROWTH ANDDO NOT OPPOSE ITS REVERSION TO JAPAN。 THEYWANT ONLY ""FAIR AND REASONABLE TREATMENT"" AND ARE TOLD JAPAN SHARES THIS VIEW。 HE HOPES THAT WHAT IS REFERRRED TO AS THE SPITIT OF ""COMMON CAUSE""WILL PREVAIL。 ACTING CHAIRMAN SPARKMAN INDICATED HIS PRESENTATION WAS HELPFUL。

THE NEXT WITNESS WAS ATTORNEY ROBERT MORRIS, OF DALLAS, TEXAS, APPEARING AS COUNSEL FOR MISS。 GRACE HSU。 HE STATED THAT HIS CLIENT NOW LIVES IN NEW YORK CITY AND HAS A CLAIM TO THE ISLANDS TIAO-YU TAI, HUANG WEI YU AND CHIH YU AND TWO SMALL SURROUNDING ISLETS。HE DESCRIBED THE ISLANDS AND INDICATED THAT HIS CLIENT'S CLAIM DERIVES FROM A GRANT IN 1893 BY THE EMPRESS OF CHINA TO MISS

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電信写

HSU'S GRANDFATHER。 HE INTRODUCED INTO THE RECORD FOUR DOCUMENTS ALLEGEDLY SUPPORTING HER LEGAL CLAIM。 HE ASKED THECOMMITTEE TO ""AFFIRM THAT THE TREATY CAUSES NO CHANGES IN HER(MISS HSU'S) RIGHT THERETO,"" AND THAT RETURN OF THE ISLANDS TO JAPAN WOULD NOT PREJUDICE ANY UNDERLYING CLAIMS。 SENATOR SPARKMAN REFERRED TO HIS TESTIMONY AS ""INTERESTING""。

THE NEXT WITNESS WAS MR。 SHEN-BIAU WOO。 MR。 WOO IS ON THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE。 HE ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO THE DISPUTE OVER THE TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS。 HE STATED THAT TIAO-YU TAI WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IN THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT WHICH GAVE THE US ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS OVER OKINAWA ALTHOUGH IT IS SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO IN THE PRESENT REVERSION TREATY。 HE INDICATED THE US STATE DEPARTMENT IS TAKING A ""VERY AMBIGUOUS"" POSITION ON THE STATUS OF TIAO-YU TAI AND THAT THIS POSITION IS DAMAGING TO THE US INTEREST。 HE SAID "" THE DISPUTE OF TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS IS THE FIRST CONCRETE CASE INVOLVING CHINA'S INTEREST AND US, SINCE PRESIDENT NIXON'S IMAGINATIVE INITIATIVE TO CHINA。

注　意

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電信写

HUS FAR, THE US HAS HANDLED IT WITH APPARENT
UPLICITY°° HE STATED THAT IF THE US MODIFIES
HE TREATY TO HONOR THE ORIGINAL LINE OFDEMARCATION
WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE TIAO-YU TAI) °° A LARGE
RACTION OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, IN
ARTICULAR, PREMIER SATO, MIGHT BE UNHAPPY。 BUT
HE INTEREST OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE WILL, IN MY VIEW,
EFINITELY BE SERVED。°° HE STATED THAT THE TREATY
HAS IN IT A BUILT-IN INSTABILITY AGAINST WORLD
EACE°° AND ASKED THAT THE COMMITTEE PLACE THE
EACE AND TRANQUILITY OF EAST ASIA BEFORE THIS
MMEDIATE PROBLEM OF TIAO-YU TAI。 HE ASKED THAT
HE COMMITTEE TAKE A °°TRULY NEUTRAL POSITION
ND ELMINATE THE BUILT-IN INSTABILITY IN THE OKINWA
EVERSION TREATY。°° ACTING CHAIRMAN SPARKMAN
NDICATED HE APPRECIATED THE STATEMENT。

THE NEXT WITNESS WAS MR。 MARK SELDEN, ASSISTANT
ROFESSOR OF HISTORY, THE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,
S。 LOUIS。 HE READ A PREPARED STATEMENT IN WHICH
H STATED HIS SUPPORT FOR THE IMMEDIATE REVERSION
O OKINAWATO JAPANESE SOVEREIGNTY BUT INDICATED
HAT °°PROVISIONS FOR CONTINUED USE OF OKINAWA

注　意

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電信写

A A US BASE BLATANTLY VIOLATE THE INTERESTS AND
EXPRESSED DESIRES OF THE PEOPLE OF OKINAWA AND JAPAN。°°
H STATED THAT OKINAWA REVERSION SHOULD BE PREMISED °°
ON THE ELMINATION OF AMERICAN MILITARY INSTALLA-
TIONS SEMICOLON THAT AMERICAN MILITARY POWER ON
OKINAWA IS NO LONGER NECESSARY FOR THE DEFENSEOF
JAPAN AND THAT THE ENTIRE STRUCTUREOF THE US-JAPAN
MILITARY ALLIANCE IS OFFENSIVE RATHER THAN DEFENSIVE。
H WAS CRITICAL IN GENERAL OF US POLICY IN ASIA
AND STATED °°THE TIME HAS COME FOR ABANDONING
A DIPLOMACY OF WAR PREDICATED ON A FORWARD AMERICAN
MILITARY POSTURE IN ASIA IN FAVOR OF GENUINE ATTEMPTS
TO REACH ACCOMMODATION WITH CHINA。°° HE STATED
APPROVAL OF THE TREATY °°SABOTAGES HOPES FOR A
GENUINE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS IN EAST ASIA 。。。°°
H SUGGESTED THE US SHOULD ABANDON THE DREAM OF °°
STABILIZING ASIA THROUGH US-JAPAN MILITARY POWER
AND THE US SHOULD °°CEASE TO AID AND ENCOURAGE
JAPAN°S REPID MILITARIZATION。°° HE STATED OKINAWA
SHOULD BE RETURNED TO JAPAN FREE OF US MILITARY
BASES。

AT 1138, SENATOR SPARKMAN INTRODUCED E。 RAYMOND

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電信写

WILSON, A SPOKESMAN OF THE FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION。 WILSON SAID THAT HE WOULD FILE HIS STATEMENT AND NOT READ FROM IT。 HE SAID THAT THOSE FORM WHOM HE SPOKE SUPPORTED ARTICLE I OF THETREATY BUT DEFINITELY OPPOSED ARTICLES II AND III。 HE ASKED THAT RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY BE POSTPONED UNTIL DEMILITARIZATION OF OKINAWA。 HE SAID AT THE VERY LEAST THE COMMITTEEE SHOULD EXPRESS ITS DESIRE FOR RAPID DEMILITARIZATION OF OKINAWA。 HE POINTED WITH APPROVALTO THE REMOVAL OF 13,000 TONS OF MUSTARD AND NERVE GAS FROM OKINAWA BUT ASKED WHY IT WAS MERELY TRANSFERRED RATHER THAN DETOXIFIED。

WILSON SAID THETREATY WAS NOT A TREATY OF REVERSION BUT RETENTION。 HE ADDED THAT THE TREATY LOOKED LIKE ANOTHER TONKIN RESOLUTION, A COMPLETE ""BLANK CHECK""。 HE NOTED THE DISCUSSION IN THE COMMITTEE ON WEDNESDAY CONCERNING UN APPROPRIATIONS AND COMPARED THE SIZE OF THE INVESTMENT WHICH SMITH HAD SAID WAS IN OKINAWA, 2 TO 5 BILLION DOLLARS, TO OUR UNITED NATIONS CONTRIBUTIONS, 270 MILLION DOLLARS。

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

HE CALLED THE TREATY A FORMULA FOR CONTINUED TROUBLE AND NOT A FORMULA FOR SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEMS。 HE SAID THE REAL INTEREST OF JAPAN LAY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITHMAINLAND CHINA, RUSSIA AND KOREA。 HE SAID THAT THE SECRETARYOF STATE'S STATEMENT THAT WE WERE ENCOURAGING GREATER MILITARYEXPENDITURES ON THE PART OF JAPAN WAS A MISTAKE。 WILSON SAID WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE JAPAN TO BECOME THE SWITZERLAND OF ASIA RATHEN THAN THE ""COCK PIT"" OF ASIA。

THE KEEPING OF TROOPS IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY OVER A PERIOD OF TIME WOULD CAUSE IRRITATION。 WILSON SAID THAT JAPANESEAND OKINAWANS HAVE DEMONSTRATED AGAINST STATIONING B-52S AND THE STOCKPILING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS ON THE ISLAND。 HE WAS INFORMED THAT THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN OKINAWA AND JAPAN ON THESE SUBJECTS WERE ALMOST CONTINUOUS。 HE HOPED THAT THE COMMITTEE WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE TREATY IN NO WAY PRE-JUDGES OR PREJUDICES THE CLAIMS OF CHINA TO THE SENKAKU ISLANDS。 IN CLOSING, MR。 WILSON STATED THAT US SHOULD SPEND MONEY ON PROBLEMS OF DECAYING CITIES AND POLLUTION RATHER THAN ARMS。

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

THE TREATY IS ANOPPORTUNITY TO DEMILITARIZE AND NEUTRALIZE OKINAWA AND HELP JAPAN BECOME A LEADER FOR PEACE IN THE FAR EAST。 MR。 WILSON ENDED HIS STATEMEENT AT 11:52 AM。

SENATOR SPARKMAN CALLED THE NEXT WITNESS, THOMAS C DUNN, A NATURALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN OF CHINESE EXTRACTION。 MR。 DUNN SAID THAT HE WAS HERE TO (1) EXPLAIN WHY THE TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS BELONG TO THE CHINESE, (2) EXPRESS HIS ALARM OVER THE POSSIBLE REVIVAL OF JAPANESE MILITARISM AND (3) URGE THE ADOPTION OF A TRULY NERUTRAL STAND BY EXCLUDING THESE ISLANDS FROM THE OKINAWA REVERSION TREATY。 HE REVIEWED THE GEOGRAPHY, USAGE, HISTORY, AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS。 HE SAID THE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS BELONGS TO CHINA AND THAT BOTH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA AGREE ON THIS POINT。 HE EXPRESSED FEARS OF A RESURRGENCEOF JAPANESE MILITARISM。 IN CONCLUDING HE CALLED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE A TRULY NEUTRAL POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF THE TIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS BY EXLCUDING THEM FROM THE OKINAWA REVERSION

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

AGREEMENT。 HE CONCLUDED HIS STATEMENT AT 12:03 PM。

THE CONCLUDING WITNESSWAS JOHN H。 FINCHER, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF ASIAN STUDIES AT JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY。 HE READ A RATHER LENGTHY STATEMENT OMITTING PARTS WHICH WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE RECORD。 HIS STATEMENT WAS ADDRESSED PRIMARILY TO THETIAO-YU TAI ISLANDS PROBLEM ALTHOUGH HE DISCUSSED A BROAD RANGE OF SUJBECTS, INCLUDING THE EVOLUTION OF STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY BASED UPON HIS SERVICE AS A STATE DEPARTMENT FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER FROM 1963 TO 1970。 HE SUGGESTED THAT IN 1951 SECRETARY DULLES MAY HAVE DELIBERATELY IGNORED THESE ISLANDS TO GIVE THE JAPANESE A CHANCE TO BULD UP SOME CLAIMS WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE US MILITARY。 HE SUGGESTED THAT US ALLIES ON TAIWAN, IN KOREA AND IN HONG KONG SEE ""THE TEXTILE AGREEMENT AS COLLUSION BETWEEN AMERICAN AND JAPANESE TEXTILE MAKERS AGAINST RIVALS IN OTHER PARTS OF ASIA。"" HE SUGGESTED ""THE CHINESE FEAR THE COMBINATION OF THE US AND THE JAPANESE MILITARY MORE THAN THEY FEAR EITHER SEPARATELY。"" HE STATED THE CHINESE FEAR THE TIAO-YU TAI ISSUE ISA ""PARTICULARALY DANGEROUS

外務省

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

EXAMPLE OF WHAT THEY CONSIDER COLLUSION BETWEEN US AND JAPANESE MILITARISTS。'' HE CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS WITH A REQUEST THAT THE SENATE DEVELOP IT OWN INDEPENDENT VIEW OF THE ISLAND DISPUTE。 HE WAS THANKED BY ACTING CHAIRMAN SPARKMAN WHO MADE NO OTHER COMMENT ABOUT HIS TESTIMONY。

DR。 MORTON H。 HALPERIN OF BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, AND JOSEPH L。 VICITES, NATIONAL COMMANDER, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS, WERE ON THE OFFICIAL WITNESS LIST BUT DID NOT APPEAR IN PERSON OR BY REPRESENTATIVE。 SENATOR SPARKMAN COMMENDTED THAT THE COMMITTEE HAD RECEIVED OTHER STATEMENTS WHICH WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE RECORD AND THAT ''THE RECORD WILL BE KEPT OPEN FOR ONE WEEK TO RECEIVE ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS FROM ANYONE WHO WISHES TO SUBMIT THEM。''

THE HEARING WAS THEN CONCLUDED AND ADJOURNED AT 12 15 P。M。

(了)

(千葉北米1課長に連絡済 30/10 06:10)

外務省

注　意
1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

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秘

電信写

総番号(TA) 56639　　主管
71年 10月29日17時10分　米国　発　米北1
71年 10月30日06時30分　本省　着

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

オキナワ上院外交委ちょう聞会（25－今後の見通し）

第3496号　略　大至急
往電第3495号に関し、

1．上院外交委は29日、3日に及ぶちょう聞会を了した。今後はかん例にしたがい一般人に本件協定に対する意見開ちん（書面による）の機会を与える期間（一週間）をおいた上でその後採決に付し（右審議は非公開）協定は上院本会議に回付される。したがつて委員会の採決は、11月8日にはじまる週に行なわれるべく、その上で何時本会議の討議が行なわれるかはマンスフィールド院内総務の裁量に委だねられることとなる。

2．上院本会議の審議は通常午後行なわれることとなつており、一応2日間位にわたるものと見込まれる。その具体的日取りについては更にマンスフィールド院内総務に当る必要があるが、早ければ、11月25日感謝さいの休会に入る前か、あるいは感謝さい明けの適当な時期になるものと予想される。

採決、通過の上は直ちに大統領府に送達される。

大臣 次官 事務 外務 官房 次次 審議官 審議官 長官 長官 人事 電厚 計 総 書文会営給

調査長 参企析調
領事移住長 参領旅査移

ア長 参地中東二 北東二西
米長 参北北保
中南米欧長 参一二
参西東洋 西東二

近ア長 参書ア
経長 次総経国資源
参貿統国三
経協長 参政技一理
国企二
条長 参条協局
国長 参政経科
軍社専
情報文長 参道内外
一二

外務省

注　意
1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

3．フルブライト外交委員長以下、ほとんど全部の外交委メンバーは、もともと本件協定に好意的とみられていたが、わずか3日間で審議を了し、しかも秘密会を開催することなく、これまでは少くとも順調に審議が取り運ばれたのは、次の理由があげられる。

（1）行政府が協定を上院に提出したことに外交委が好感を示していること

（2）行政府（軍部を含む）が協定を支持していること、

（3）ニクソン大統領の新経済政策（課徴金、円切り上げ圧力）にともないわが国に可成りの圧力が加えられ、かたがたせん維をめぐる政府間協定が事実上妥結し、わが国をきゆう弾する材料が大きく後退したこと、

（4）ニクソン大統領の対中共政策が大きく転換し、オキナワ基地の軍事目的価値を言及して返かんに反対することが困難なふん囲気が現出されたこと、

（5）かような情況下、上院議員の対日理解も増進され外交委としても他の上院議員の反対圧力を感じなくなつてきたこと

（6）タニー上院議員の如く好意的な議員が積極的に返かんのかん要なることを説き、またヘリー・パードン上

2

外務省

注　意

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電信写

院議員の如く返かんに反対投票するが、最早反対運動などはしないと言つていることは今年前半に較べて事態が大きく変化したことを示しているといえよう。

（了）

（千葉北米1課長に連絡済 30/10 06:45）

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外務省

注　意

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2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

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総番号（TA）56336　　主管
71年10月28日13時25分　米国　　発
71年10月29日02時31分　本省　　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場（大使）　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

核撤去声明に関するロジャース長官発言

第3452号　平　大至急

ロジャース長官が記者会見において返かん時に核撤去に関する声明を発出することを検討中と述べたとのNHK報道について、エリクソン日本部長に確認したところ、ロジャース長官がかかる発言をした事実はない由。

（了）

（米北1、佐藤首席事務官へ連絡ずみ。29/10 03:00）

外務省

大政事外外儀官	
務務	典房
次次	
臣官官審審長長	
儀総人電厚計	
書文会営給	
調査長	参企析調
領移長	参領旅査移
ア長	参地中東二 北東一西
米長	参北北保
中南審	参一二
欧長	参西東洋 西東
近ア長	参書近ア
経長	次総経国資源 参貿統国
経協長	参政技一理 国企二
条長	参条協規
国長	参政経科 軍社専
	内外

(回覧番号 844) 外務省電信案 (分類 OK)

電信課長

機密表示(極秘・秘の朱印): 秘 無期限

符号表示: 暗 略 平

※総第 28 029 号

※第 2420 号

※昭和 年 月 日 時 分発 46.10.28 14/30

大至急・至急・普通・LTF

※発電係

(※印欄内は電信課記入)

~~大臣~~ 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 外務審議官 ~~官房長~~	主管 アメリカ局長 参事官 北米オー課長	主管局部課(室)名 米北1 起案 昭和46年10月28日 起案者 佐藤 電話番号 2464

協議先

条約課長 安全保障課長

在 米牛場 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理 あて 福田 大臣発

電転報 在 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理 あて

件名 上院外交委聴聞会(核)

貴電第3425号に関し、

冒頭貴電の冒頭のフルブライト委員長の発言に「you mentioned nuclear weapons.」とあるが、ロジャーズ長官の冒頭説明は核の点については言及していないところ、~~フルブライト~~ 同長官の発言として引用されて

(昭和四二・七・一 改正)

GB-1

写済

核に関する

いる発言とはいかなるものか折かえし回電ありたい。

(3)

GB-3

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

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電信写

大政事外外儀官
務務　典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会営給

調査長	参企析調
領移長	参領旅査移
ア長	参地中東二 北東一西
米長	参北北保
中南審	参一二
欧長	参西東洋 西東
近ア長	参書近ア
経長	次総経国資一源 参貿統国二
経協長	参政技一理 国企二
条長	参条協規
国長	参政経科 軍社専
情長	参道内外
文長	一二

総番号（TA）56414　　主管
71年10月28日18時15分　米国　発
71年10月29日07時41分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場（大使）臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

上院外交委ちよう聞会（核。ロジャース）

第3459号　平　大至急

貴電米北1第2420号に関し。

本件ロジャース発言（往電第3441号（1）参照）に先立つロジャース長官の核に関する発言は、往電第3422号の同長官の冒頭発言の末びより3番目のパラグラフにある核のカサに対する言及のみであり、フルブライト委員長が言及しているのもこの点であると考えられる。

（了）

外務省

（　部の内　号）注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

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極秘

電信写

大政事外外儀官
務務　典房
次次
臣官官審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会営給

調査長	参企析調
領移長	参領旅査移
ア長	参地中東二 北東一西
米長	参北北保
中南審	参一二
欧長	参西東洋 西東
近ア長	参書近ア
経長	次総経国資一源 参貿統国二
経協長	参政技一理 国企二
条長	参条協規
国長	参政経科 軍社専
情長	参道内外
文長	一二

総番号（TA）56418　　主管
71年10月28日19時00分　米国　発
71年10月29日08時09分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場（大使）臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

オキナワ協定米側応答要領（秘密協定）

第3466号　極秘　大至急

往電第3445号に関し

冒頭往電のロジャース長官の発言につき国務省エリクソン日本部長と協議したところ、「エ」部長も、ロジャース長官の答弁に若干の行きすぎがあつたことを認めつつも、米政府としては右発言自体についてはどうすることもできないこと、米政府としても秘密協定は一切ないというラインで別電の通り応答要領を準備していたこと等を説明し、今後は秘密協定は一切ないというラインでおし通すのが一番よいと思う旨述べていた。（注：当地ではこの点が問題になる可能性は殆んどないと思われる。）

（了）

外務省

（　部の内　号）

注　意

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2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

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極秘

大政事外外廣官	
務務	典房
次次	
臣官官審審長長	
儀総人電厚計	
書文会営給	
調査長	参企析調
領移長	参領旅査移
ア長	参地中東二 北東一西
米長	参北北保
中南審	参一二
欧長	参西東洋 西東二
近ア長	参書近ア
経長	次総経国資一源 参貿統国二
経協長	参政技一理 国企二
条長	参条協規
国長	参政経科 軍社専
情長	参道内外
文長	一二

総番号（TA）56421　　主管

71年10月28日19時15分　米国　発　米北1

71年10月29日08時23分　本省　着

外務大臣殿　牛場　大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

沖縄協定米側応答要領（秘密協定）

第3467号　極秘　大至急

往電第3466号別電

QUESTION:

ARE THERE ANY SECRET ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVED IN THE REVERSION AGREEMENT?

ANSWER:

AS STATED IN THE NIXON/SATO COMMUNIQUE OF NOVEMBER 21, 1969, THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND ITS RELATED ARRANGEMENTS WILL APPLY TO OKINAWA WITHOUT CHANGE AFTER REVERSION. THERE ARE NO SECRET ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVED IN THE OKINAWA REVERSION AGREEMENT WHICH MODIFY IN ANY WAY THE FULL APPLICATION OF THE MST AND MITS RELATED ARRANGEMENTS TO OKINAWA.

外務省

注　意

1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

AS IS USUAL IN CASES OF NEGOTIATIONS, HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL PREPARATORY, EXPLANATORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE PAPER WORK WHICH HAS GONE INTO THE PREPARATIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT. THE PAPERS, WHICH HAVE GUIDED OUR NEGOTIATORS AND ASSIST IN DETAILED INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENTS, GENERALLY ARE NOT PUBLISHED. THE IN NO WAY, HOWEVER, MODIFY THE FULL APPLICATION OF THE MST TO OKINAWA AFTER REVERSION.

(了)

—2—

外務省

注　意
1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

大政事外外儀官	
務務	典房
次次	
臣官官審審長長	
儀総人電厚計	
書文会営給	
調査長	参企析調
領移長	参領旅査移
ア長	参地中東二 北東一西
米長	参北北保二
中南審	参一二
欧長	参西東洋一一 西東二二
近ア長	参書近ア
経長	次総経国資一源 参賀統国三
経協長	参政技一理 国企二
条長	参条協規
国長	参政経科 軍社専
情長	参道内外
文長	一二

総番号（TA）56457　　主管
71年10月28日22時30分　米国　発
71年10月29日11時38分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　体明1大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

オキナワ返かん協定上院審議（新聞報道及び論調）」

第3484号　平

1．28日付ニューヨーク・タイムズ、ワシントン・ポスト両紙は〝ROGERS BIDS SENATE VOTE OKINAWA PACT〟（タイムズ）」、〝ROGERS ASKS SPEED ON OKINAWA PACT〟（ポスト）」と題し、オキナワ返かん協定に関する上院外交委員会における審議の模様を報じているところ、その要旨次のとおり。

（1）」ニューヨーク・タイムズ

ロジャース国務長官は本日の上院外交委において調和ある日米関係維持のために、上院がオキナワ返かん協定を承認するよう求め、オキナワ返かんが行われ場合には反米的政府が成立するかも知れぬ旨警告した。

同協定は、日米関係緊張化の動きの中で、上院に提出されたわけであるが、主として日米せん維協定の成立により、協定に対する反対派（主に南部議員）」は大いに減少したようである。

注　意
1．本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

またロジャース長官は、日本の国会が必要な施行法令を制定しなければ米側としては協定を批准し得ぬ旨強調した。ロジャース長官は5月以来はじめてこの批判的な上院外交委に出席したわけであるが、今回は従来より行政府の外交委政策に常に最も批判的なフルブライト及びフランク、チャーチ両民主党上院議員等より賛辞の言ば（COMPLIMENTS）」を投げかけられた。

（2）」ワシントン・ポスト

27日ロジャース長官は上院に対しオキナワ協定の早期批准を要請したところ、上院外交委においてはVOAにつき若干の留保があつたのみで、協定に反対する上院議員はいなかつた。「ロ」長官はリユウキユウ諸島の核基地には核兵器がある旨はじめて公に確認したが、フルブライト上院外交委員長よりオキナワから核兵器は撤去されるや否や問うたに対し、「そうだ、外交委へ詳細は書簡をもつて送付済であり、右については秘密会において討議するのであればよろこんで応ずる。」と答えた。右に対し「フ」委員長は核については公開で討論した方が核のよく止力を高めると思われ、何故公開討論にしんけい質になるのかわからぬと述べ、更にまた米国が中共との関係改善を求めている現在、れい戦の道具として使われてきたVOAをオキナワに保持する理由がわからぬと述べたところ、「ろ」長官はオキ

注　意

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2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

ナワ返かんは日米両国の安全保障上の利益と合致する形で実施されており、米国は両国の相互安全保障に必要なオキナワの軍事施設及び地域を保持（RETAIN）すると述べた。

更に「ロ」長官は日本国民は本協定を支持しており、本協定が実施をし得ぬ場合には、日米関係全般に極めて不こうな結果をもたらし、また協定を批准せぬ場合には米国との緊密な関係を望まぬ連中に格好の武器を与えることになろうと述べた。

日本側の情報によると、日本の野党はオキナワ協定をサトウ政権打倒へのテコとして利用しているが、国会議員の過半数はこれに賛成しているので、12月中ごろまでには国会の承認を得るものと期待される。しかしながらサトウ総理は中国代表権と経済問題をめぐる日米関係緊張の結果退じんを強いられると予想される。

2．なお28日付ワシントン・ポストは"JAPAN AND THE U.N. DEFEAT"と題する社説において、今般の中国代表権問題につき論じた後、米側としてはサトウ総理の助力に答えるべきであるとし、オキナワ協定の早期批准は日米友好が日本にとり必ずしも与えることのみを意味するものではないということをサトウ総理及び、その後断者にはっきりと示す記左となろうと論じている。

(3)

外務省

(回覧番号 402845)　外務省電信案　(分類 ok)

電信課長

機密表示（極秘・秘の朱印）：秘 無期限	符号表示：暗 略 平	※総第 28 146 号
	※第 2428 号	※昭和 46 年 10 月 28 日 時 19 分発 49
大至急	大至急・至急・普通・LTF	※発電係 K

（※印欄内は電信課記入）

大至急

大臣 ~~政務次官~~ 科務 事務次官 ~~外務審議官~~ 外務審議官 官房長	主管：アメリカ局長 参事官 北米オー課長	主管局部課（室）名：米北1 起案 昭和 46 年 10 月 28 日 起案者 佐藤 電話番号 2464
協議先：官房総務参事官 官房書記官	条約局長 条約課長	安全保障課長

在 米牛場 大使 総領事 臨時代理大使 代理 あて 福田 大臣発

電報転 在 大使 総領事 臨時代理大使 代理 あて

件名：上陸外交委の聴聞会（核）

貴電才3441号(2)に関し、

昌頭貴電のサイミントン議員とロジャーズ長官との間の質疑応答において、同議員より核の問題については27日朝は討議したくないと了解するがそのとおりかと問うたのに対し、同長官より、核につ

写済

（昭和四二・七・一改正）

GB-1

いては秘密会議で話し合いたいと答えた後
we will not have nuclear weapons in Okinawa と答え、更に「サ」議員より追求したのに対し、「ロ」長官は「So far as Japan is concerned, well, we do not have any nuclear weapons on Okinawa」と答えているところ、当地各紙は後者の証言をとらえて沖縄には既に核はないと報道し、国会においても右をとらえて政府の見解を(核撤去費用にも言及しつ)質問越している。

当方としては、27日の「ロ」長官の証言の趣旨は返還時においては沖縄には核は存在しないこととなる旨を述べたものであり、本件証言の全体のコンテクストから云って、前述の do not have との表現は will not have

と云わんとしたものであり、既に核が撤去されていることを云わんとしたものではないと了解している。このことは「サ」議員の更に追求した質問に対し、「we are not going to have nuclear weapons on Okinawa」と証言していることからも明らかであるとの趣旨で応酬している。

ついとは、明29日の衆議院予算委員会においてもこの点を更に追求するものと予想されるところ、前述の我方説明振りにつき米側の確認を求め結果大至急(当地時間29日午前5時までに着電するよう)回電ありたい。

(3)

注　意

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2．本電の主管変更その他については極秘班に連絡ありたい。

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電信写

総番号（TA）8640
71 年 10 月 28 日 21 時 00 分　主管 米国
71 年 10 月 29 日 10 時 21 分　本省 着 米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

上院外交委ちょう聞会（核）」

第3485号　略　大至急
貴電米北1第2428号に関し
国務省エリクソン日本部長は核の存否については言及しえないとの立場をとりつつ、27日のロジャーズ発言については、冒頭貴電のわが方説明振りにて結構であり、何れにせよ28日パッカード国防次官が"I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IF THERE ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA, THEY WILL NOT BE THERE ON REVERSION DAY"と答えたので、右をもその論拠としうるものと思う旨述べた。
（了）

大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 儀官長 総合外交政策局長 人事課長 電信課 文書課 会計課

調査室 参企画調整室 領事移住部長 参領事移住部旅券課

ア長 参地域中東二課 北東一課 西一課
米局長 参北米一課 北米二課 保障課
中南米局長 参中南米一課 二課
欧亜局長 参西欧一課 東欧一課 洋一課 西欧二課 東欧二課

近ア局長 参書記官室 近東アフリカ一課
経済局長 次官 総務参事官 経済協力課 国際経済第一課 資源課
参事官 貿易振興課 国際経済第二課 統計室
経済協力局長 参事官 政策課 技術協力課 国際経済第一課 国際経済第二課
条約局長 参事官 条約課 国際協定課
国際連合局長 参事官 国連政治課 国連経済社会課 軍縮課 専門機関室
情報文化局長 参事官 報道課 対外広報課 国際文化交流課 文化事業部
文化交流部長 参事官 文化交流課 日本語教育課 学術課 海外広報課

注　意

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2．本電の主管変更その他については極秘班に連絡ありたい。

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電信写

総番号（TA）5713 4
71 年 11 月 02 日 12 時 50 分　主管 米国
71 年 11 月 03 日 02 時 57 分　本省 着 米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場大使　臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

オキナワ上院外交委審議

第3521号　平　大至急
往電第3496号に関し。
上院外交委は2日朝の会合（非公開）でオキナワ返かん協定を全会一致で承認し、上院本会議へ送付（REPORT OUT）することに決定した趣。詳細確認の上追電するもとりあえず。
（了）

（沖縄代表に転電済、電信課）

（米北1、千葉課長に連絡済、3日03:05）

大臣 政務次官 事務次官 外務審議官 儀官長 総合外交政策局長 人事課長 電信課 文書課 会計課

調査室 参企画調整室 領事移住部長 参領事移住部旅券課

ア長 参地域中東二課 北東一課 西一課
米局長 参北米一課 北米二課 保障課
中南米局長 参中南米一課 二課
欧亜局長 参西欧一課 東欧一課 洋一課 西欧二課 東欧二課

近ア局長 参書記官室 近東アフリカ一課
経済局長 次官 総務参事官 経済協力課 国際経済第一課 資源課
参事官 貿易振興課 国際経済第二課 統計室
経済協力局長 参事官 政策課 技術協力課 国際経済第一課 国際経済第二課
条約局長 参事官 条約課 国際協定課
国際連合局長 参事官 国連政治課 国連経済社会課 軍縮課 専門機関室
情報文化局長 参事官 報道課 対外広報課 国際文化交流課 文化事業部
文化交流部長 参事官 文化交流課 日本語教育課 学術課 海外広報課

注　意
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2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写　560

総番号（TA）57191　主管
71年11月02日18時30分　米国　発
71年　月03日08時43分　本省　着　米北1

外務大臣殿　牛場（大使）臨時代理大使　総領事　代理

オキナワ上院外交委審議（外交委決定）

第3523号　略　大至急
往電第3521号に関し
外交委員会スタッフ（トリンブル）が2日サトウに述べたところ次のとおり。
1．外交委員会は2日朝の会合でオキナワ返かん協定を賛成16、反対なし（欠席議員も代理者を通じて意思表示した由）の全会一致で承認し、同協定を上院本会議に送付することに決定した。
2．今後の外交委員会としての手続きとしては外交委員会の上院本会議に対する報告書を起草することが残つているが、2日午後、マンスフイールド上院民主党院内総務より外交委員会に対し、2日よるまでに報告書を作成し、印さつに付すよう指示が来た。従つて明3日にも協定が上院本会議に送付される可能性が出て来た。（実際にとりあげられる日については他の議案との関連もあり、不明）当初の外交委員会の予定としては5日までにちよう聞会の記録をオープンにしておいて、一般からの文書によるステートメ

外務省

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電信写

ントをうけつけることになつていたことでもあり、今週一ぱいに報告を作成のうえ、来週にでも協定を本会議に送付するということであつたが、マンスフイールドの指示により急に作業を急ぐこととなつた次第である。従つて今後5日までの間に予定されていた一般からのステートメント受けつけは事実上立ち消えとなる見込みである。（貴電米北1第2470号と関連）
（マンスフイールドのスタッフによれば同議員が外交委の報告書の提出を急がせたのは何とか休会前にオキナワ協定の上院本会議における審議をあげてしまいたいとの同議員の考えによるものの由。）なお、外交委の報告書はメンバーに回らんして了承をとるのみであり、議決は行なわれない。
3．外交委員会の報告書にはオキナワ協定に対する支持の表明のほかに、（イ）批准書交換は日本側が協定実施に必要な国内法の立法を完了するのを待つて行なうべしとの行政府に対する指示（協定実施に必要と判断される日本側国内法がいかなるものかについては具体的に列挙することはしないので、所要の立法措置がとられたか否かの判断は事実上行政府にまかせられることになる由）、（ロ）オキナワを含む在日米軍基地、人員の削減の方針に対する支持表明及び（ハ）せん閣諸島の領有権をめぐる問題について米

2

外務省

注　意

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電信写

国が中立的立場をとるべしとの外交委員会の立場の表明（せん閣諸島に対する施政権を日本に返かんすることに対しては異論をとなえない。）の3点を含めるが、協定内容についての留保は一切付さないことに決定した。

4、外交委員会が本日、オキナワ協定の上院本会議への送付を決定した結果、外交委員会として、核兵器の問題等につき秘密ちょう聞会を行なう可能性は事実上なくなつた。また、軍事委員会が別途、オキナワ協定を取り上げる可能性もほとんどないと考えられる。

（了）

（沖縄代表に報電済、電信課）

（米北1. 千葉課長に連絡済 3日 09:15）

3

外務省

11 （部内参考用）

米北1

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会

昭和46、11、1

アメリカ局北米オー課

10月27日及び28日の両日米国上院外交委員会は沖縄返還協定に関する聴聞会を開催したところ、27日のロジャーズ国務長官の冒頭説明及び右に関する質疑応答のうち当方に関心ある部分、並びに28日のパッカード国防次官及びランパート高等弁務官の冒頭説明及び右に関する質疑応答のうち当方に関心ある部分を取急ぎ英文のまま（在米大使館報告書）執務参考用として回覧する。

おとどけ

GA 6

外務省

部内参考用

和訳は ファイル(2)
に収録

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会
聴聞会

昭和46.11.1
アメリカ局北米第一課

10月27日及び28日の両日米国上院外交委員会は、沖縄返還協定に関する聴聞会を開催したところ、27日のロジャーズ国務長官の冒頭説明及び右に関する質疑応答のうち当方に関心ある部分、並びに28日のパッカード国防次官及びラシバート高等弁務官の冒頭説明及び右に関する質疑応答のうち当方に関心ある部分を取急ぎ英文のまま(在米大使館報告)執務参考用としてお届けする。

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
（ ロジャーズ長官冒頭説明）
昭和46.10.27
アメリカ局北米第一課

Statement By The Honorable William
P. Rogers Secretary of State Before The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Wednesday, October 27, 1971

Mr. Chairman; Member of the Committee,

I am haer today to explain why this administration considers it very important that the Senate should advise and consent on the ratification of the Agreement between the United States and Japan. The Agreement, signed on June 17, 1971, provides for the return of the Ryukyu Islands to the administrative control of Japan.

This Agreement can, I believe, truly be called an historic document; it would resolve the last major U.S.-Japanese issue arising from World War II. The Agreement provides for the return to Japanese administration of an area which has been historically associated with Japan and whose population strongly desires to be united once

once again with its native land. The Ryukyus are also an area of significant strategic importance to the United States. The Agreement takes full account of this: indeed, one of my purposes today is to explain why we believe that this Agreement and its related arrangements would protect and promote United States security interests in the Far East. Deputy Secretary Packard will discuss its security aspects in greater detail in his testimony.

The Agreement specifically reaffirms that the reversion of the islands to Japan shall be carried out on the basis of the Joint Communique issued by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato on November 21, 1969. In that Communique Japan recognized that the presence of United States forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area. The Communique also reflected Japan's serious concern for the security of countries in the Far East. Prime Minister Sato specifically stated that "The security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security" and that "The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was ... a most important factor for the security of Japan."

The

The Prime Minister further recognized in the Communique that United States forces in Okinawa played a vital role in the present situation in the Far East. He agreed that the return of administrative rights over Okinawa should not hinder the effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for defense of countries in the Far East including Japan, and that the United States would retain such military facilities and areas in Okinawa as required in the mutual security of both countries. The use of such bases will be governed by the terms of the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 and related documents, which now govern the use of our bases in Japan proper.

I have described the contents of the Reversion Agreement in general terms in my letter to the President of September 5, 1971, a copy of which has been sent to you by the President.

This letter summarizes, inter alia, the specific agreements reached. It notes, for example, that the Japanese will pay us $320 million as compensation for civil assets to be transferred to the Japanese Government and for certain reversion-related costs. It also desciribes the arrangements reached with the Japanese

to

to protect American business and professional interests in Okinawa after reversion. The provisons of these arrangements were worked out after close consulations with the business community on Okinawa. I believe they shluld provide a satisfactory basis for the post-reversion period.

Under Secretary Johnson is here to discuss the provisions of the Reversion Agreement in more detail, should you desire him to do so. I would like to comment however on one major provision of the Agreement -- that dealing with our use of bases on Okinawa following reversion.

There is one principal difference between our present tenure of bases on Okinawa and our tenure of bases in Japan proper. In Japan proper we are required by the Mutual Security Treaty to consult with the Japanese Government in the case of use of bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan, major changes in deployment of United States forces into Japan, and major changes in their equipment. In 1960 President Eisenhower, in a Joint Communique issued during the visit of Prime Minister Kishi to Washington, said that the United States Government had no intention

of

of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Government of Japan with respect to matters involving prior consultation under the treaty. Such consultation is not presently required with respect to the use of our bases in Okinawa. After reversion it will be.

Any other arrangement would be incompatible with the close relationship which should exist between two great allied powers like the United States and Japan. The provisions of our Mutual Security Treaty have worked well in Japan proper. I am confident that they will work well in Okinawa also. We and the Japanese have a common interest in the peace and security of the Far East -- an interest which the Government of Japan has confirmed on numerous occasions, most specifically, in the Joint Communique of November 1969.

It was clear in 1969, and it remains clear today, that continuance of a situation in which a million Japanese are still living under United States military administration more than 25 years after the end of World War II has subjected our position in the Ryukyu Islands and our relationship with Japan to increasing strain.

Such a situation is no longer tenable. It is not in keeping with our national character or our national interest.

interest. Nor is it consistent with history.

Okinawa was one of the 47 prefectures of Japan before World War II. It was separated from Japanese administration in January 1946 by order of General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, and it has been under United States control ever since. United States administrative authority over Okinawa was confirmed in Article III of the Japan Peace Treaty of September 8, 1951, which gave the United States the right to exercise "All and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands."

However, a movement for reversion of Okinawa to Japan started even before the Peace Treaty was signed. In March 1951, when negotiations for the Treaty were just beginning in San Francisco, the Okinawa Assembly adopted a resolution requesting reversion to Japan. The vote was 17 to 3. The three opposing votes were in favor of independence for the Ryukyus. Two months later, in May 1951, Chobyo Yara, the Islands' present Chief Executive, was elected the First Chairman of the "Association for the Promotion of Reversion to Japan." He has been at the forefront of the reversion movement ever

ever since, and was elected to his present post in 1968 on a platform strongly advocating immediate reversion to Japan.

On September 5, 1951, in presenting the draft of the Peace Treaty to the Peace Conference, Ambassador John Foster Dulles noted that some of the allied powers has urged that the treaty require Japan to renounce its sovereignty. Others had proposed that the islands be restored completely to Japan. "In the face of this division of allied opinion," Ambassador Dulles said, "the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the United Nations Trusteeship System, with the United States as administering authority."

It was decided at that time that, although the United States had long-term security interests in the Ryukyus, the "Peace of Reconciliation" which we and most of our allies sought with Japan would be vitiated by the islands' enforced, permanent detachment from Japan. The "residual sovereignty" formula was clearly designed to convey the thought to Japan and the world that -- although the United States was obliged to retain

control

control of the Ryukyus temporarily for security reasons -- what had been Japanese territory was not being permanently detached from Japan and the principle of no United States territorial acquisitions as a result of war was being observed.

In December 1953 the United States returned the northern portion of the Okinawa Island chain, the Amami Islands, to Japanese jurisdiction.

In June 1957 President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi reaffirmed "Japanese Residual Sovereignty" over the Ryukyus.

In June 1961 President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ikeda did likewise.

In March 1962, in connection with an Executive Order concerning the administration of the islands issued on the basis of a United States Government task force study of our Ryukyus policies and programs, President Kennedy recognized the Ryukyus "to be a part of the Japanese Homeland." He added that he "looked forward to the day when the security interests of the free world will permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty."

In

In November 1967 President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato met in Washington and agreed on the establishment of Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner "to promote the integration of the Ryukyus with Japan and thus help to minimize the stresses that would accompany reversion." President Johnson also stated at that time that he "fully understood the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of the islands." The President and the Prime Minister agreed to conduct joint and continuous review of the status of the Ryukyu Islands, "guided by the aim of returning administrative rights over these islands to Japan." They also agreed on reversion of the Bonin Islands to Japan. This left Okinawa, the Daito Islands and the more southernly islands in the Ryukyu Archipelago as the only territories listed under Article III of the Peace Treaty which were still under United States administration.

Finally, President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato in their Communique of November 1969 announced that "The two governments would immediately enter into consultations regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early reversion of these islands without

without detriment to the security of the Far East including Japan. The President and the Prime Minister (the Communique continued) agreed to expedite the consultations with a view of accomplishing the reversion during 1972, subject to the conclusion of these specific arrangements with the necessary legislative support."

Thus Japan's "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa has been recognized by every American President and every United States administration since the end of the occupation. The Agreement before you and its related arrangements are the logical and timely culmination of a historic progression set in motion over twenty years ago.

By 1969 the time had clearly come for the "residual sovereignty," so long recognized, to become a reality.

The ten-year first term of the Mutual Security Treaty would end in 1970 and the treaty would then become subject to termination by either party on one year's notice. Strenuous debates in the Diet and possibly violent demonstrations against our bases on this anniversary were anticipated. That they did not occur may well be due largely to the announcement in the Nixon-Sato Communique of November 1969 that active negotiations

negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 were about to begin.

There was also reason to believe that, the longer reversion was delayed, the greater the chance would be of an open clash between demonstrators demanding reversion and American military forces protecting our bases.

The 1968 election of Chief Executive Yara on a platform of immediate reversion and the growing militancy of student and leftist radicalism on Okinawa had made it apparent that to further delay a reversion agreement would be to erode rapidly the acquiescence of the local population necessary to the continued effective operation of our base structure in the islands.

The local population furnishes a large proportion of the labor force for base operation, particularly on the densely populated island of Okinawa itself. The military communities are not isolated enclaves. On the contrary, military and Okinawan communities are interspersed closely with one another. Accordingly, it would be extremely difficult, and probably impossible, to operate a base structure on Okinawa effectively if the local populace were actively opposed to our continued presence. At last, a continued United States

presence under these conditions could be maintained only by vigorous police control that would be both highly undersirable and extremely costly. General Lampert, the United States High Commissioner of the Ryukyus since 1969, will have more to say on this point, based upon his personal experience in administering the islands.

It was against this background, then, that the United States joined the Japanese Government in issuing the 1969 Joint Communique.

In Japan proper, the Japanese people are solidly convinced of the justice of the reversion of Okinawa no later than 1972. For us to disappoint this expectation and to fail to carry out this Agreement, which -- both on them and to us -- is so fair and so necessary, would have extremely unfortunate effects on our whole relationship with Japan. It would, for example, give a strong weapon to those political forces in Japan who do not favor the kind of close relationship with the United States which now exists, and who seek to replace the present leadership of the country with others less favorable to such a relationship.

Differences between our two countries on trade and monetary issues have subjected our economic relations to strain in recent months. But our basic political and security relationship continues to be stable and cooperative. Our national interest requires that we do everything possible to maintain that cooperation, which President Nixon has called the linchpin for peace in the Pacific.

In the larger framework of our international relations, reversion would be a further step in carrying out the principles of the Nixon Doctrine, which recognizes and encourages the greater capacity of our allies to assume the primary responsibility for their defense. In this Agreement, Japan agrees after reversion to assume responsibility for the defense of Okinawa against outside attack.

For our part, as contemplated under the Nixon Doctrine, we will continue to honor our commitments to Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty and we will continue to provide the protection of the United States nuclear shield to Japan in case there is a nuclear threat to Japan's freedom. The emphasis we place on the importance of remaining a pacific power is reflected in the

the continued maintenance of our base structure in Japan and in the Ryukyus.

Mr. Chairman, the provisions of the Agreement will not become effective until the President has deposited the instrument of ratification. He will not take such action until after the Japanese Diet has enacted the necessary implementing legislation. The step currently required on the part of United States is advice and consent of the Senate to ratification.

I urge early and favorable Senete action on the Agreement before you. It protects -- and advances -- United States interests. And it is essential to the continuation of a viable and harmonious relationship with one of our major allies in the years ahead.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会

（核 －1）

昭和46.10.27
アメリカ局北米第一課

(1) The Chairman; You mentioned nuclear weapons. I think this treaty contemplates the removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa, does it not?

Secretary Rogers; That is correct, Mr. Chairman. I did send you a letter yesterday on this subject.

The Chairman; Yes.

Secretary Rogers; And we will be glad to go into it in detail in security session with you. I think the decisions that we have made in connection with it are decisions which will meet with approval by members of this committee.

(2) Senator Sparkman; I believe under the treaty the United States would agree not to keep nuclear weapons on Okinawa, except with the agreement of Japan; is that right?

Secretary Rogers; That is correct.

Senator Sparkman; I presume that is open to the future and that is not a part of the treaty — I mean, there

there is no agreement to that effect carried in the treaty, is there, that the United States may keep nuclear weapons there?

Secretary Rogers; No, no, not at all. Senator Sparkman; It is an open question?

Secretary Rogers; Well, there is nothing dealing with the matter except what appears in the treaty.

Senator Sparkman; That is all right. Very well. I believe that is all. I can think of many questions but I think if we do get around I will give up at this time.

(3) Senator Symington; Mr. Secretary, as I understand it, you are not prepared to discuss this morning what has been agreed on with respect to Japan and Okinawa regarding nuclear weapons, is that correct?

Secretary Rogers; Well, we prefer to do it in executive session. We have, of course, I have answered the questions that we are going to, that the chairman asked, that we will not have nuclear weapons in Okinawa.

Senator Symington; Do you think the Senate should approve a treaty with Japan about its relationship with Japan and Okinawa which we give unilateral military

military protection to Japan, without the people knowing what was agreed on in this nuclear field, the people in his country?

Secretary Rogers; So far as Japan is concerned, well, no, we do not have any nuclear weapons on Okinawa.

Senator Symington; Well, I do not want to get into semantics about it and I say that with great respect but it would not help our trade and other relationships with the Japanese people if there was an understanding about the nuclear weapons situation. We seem to have trouble trade-wise with the Japanese at this time. In other words, I would sort of like to follow up with the chairman's question, would it not be a constructive thing to get some of this information out in the open?

Secretary Rogers; Well, so far as the Japanese are concerned, Senator, they know and they are entirely satisfied we are not going to have nuclear weapons on Okinawa.

Senator Symington; No one is more anxious to have an adequate military posture than I am, but especially after becoming a member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, after the death of Senator Russell, a

a committee which by law must be given nuclear information that is withheld from this foreign relations committee by this administration, I am also convinced that the principal result of all this nuclear secrecy has been the purchase of many billions of dollars of unnecessary military equipment, and if the secrecy is continued, based on some dollar billion military budget that has just been recommended, which the Senate has just authorized, I am also convinced that waste is going to continue at the taxpayers' expense. I have to leave shortly to make a little talk about the problems of the taxpayer, and its relationship to some of these problems this morning, on the floor, but for what it is worth, I also belive this secrecy has been a major factor in preventing this country from having made proper progress in the handling of such problems as lack of adequate energy, electric power, pollution, danger in our diminishing and decreasing fresh water and so forth and it seems to me the world should look at this country from the standpoint of solving these problems, which are now international as well as national leadership just as much as it looks to it for military leadership. An illustration

illustration of this is that this year the administration is asking for seven billion 900 million dollars for weaponry, and all those problems, in my opinion, that I just mentioned, do not have to do with war, could very possibly be solved by further success in the nuclear field with the use of the force in the atom, and it does not really make much difference what I think about that but great authorities on it are convinced of like, for example, Glen Seaborg and many others, and whereas we are asking for seven billion 900 million dollars for weaponry this year, we are asking for less than ten percent of that, around 780 million dollars for peacetime research in the atom field. So, I would hope inasmuch as your department not only embraces military problems but also the broad problems of our relationship with foreign countries, that you would give consideration to this relative importance as expressed in the money that the taxpayers are putting up.

Secretary Rogers; Thank you, Senator.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
（防衛－1）

昭和46.10.27
アメリカ局北米第一課

(1) The Chairman (Fulbright) ... that Japan agrees after reversion to assume responsibility for the defense of Okinawa against outside attack. Just what does that mean -- because, as I understand it, we retain quite a large acreage and quite a number of bases on Okinawa?

How does that fit in this statement you made about Japan having the responsibility for the defense of Okinawa?

Secretary Rogers; Well, under the terms of the treaty, Japan has assumed this responsibility and it will provide defense forces, self-defense forces to carry out this function.

We can go into detail on the numbers and location of those forces but they will depend primarily on the defense of Okinawa against outside attack. We will have no responsibility for this as such. Of course, as you have indicated by your question, because we do have a mutual security treaty with Japan, I suppose

that

that if that, if the provisions of that treaty were implemented then our Far East forces might be called upon to play a role. But the primary and initial responsibility would be on Japan; and they have agreed to assume that. And they will increase — well, they will develop a military capability on Okinawa which does not now exist.

(2) Senator Sparkman; Now, with reference to the responsibility of Japan to defend Okinawa, will Japan have to increase her military forces in order to meet that capability?

Secretary Rogers; Yes, Senator Sparkman, there will have to be an increase and they are prepared to do that.

Senator Sparkman; Well, it still will stay within the prohibition contained in Article 9, is it?

Secretary Rogers; Yes, it will not violate that at all, now that reversion has taken place.

Senator Sparkman; Is there any move on the part of Japan or some of the people of Japan to modify Article 9 or will it be retained, in your opinion, just as is?

Secretary Rogers;

Secretary Rogers; Not that we are aware of, certainly no major move in this direction. I think Article 9 will be continued for the foreseeable future so far as we know.

Senator Sparkman; There has been comment, I believe, in various announcements that have been made in the press and so forth about increasing the responsibility of Japan in that area of the world. Will that not necessitate changing their military posture?

Secretary Rogers; No, I don't think so. I think they can increase their defence capabilities under Article 9 to a considerable extent by increasing their budgetary amounts available for military equipment and manpower and so forth without in any way violating Article 9; and certainly they can do it so far as Okinawa is concerned because it does not create a problem at all.

(3) Senator Church; Mr. Secretary, is it the policy of the administration to urge Japan to modernize its armed forces or to expand its military budget?

Secretary Rogers; Yes.

Senator Church; That is a snappy answer.

Secretary Rogers;

Secretary Rogers; Well, it is a snappy question.

Senator Church; Why?

Secretary Rogers; Well, because we have in past years provided a great deal of money and manpower for the security of that area of the world and we did it for obvious reasons, principally because we were the nation that was in position to do it. Since that time, Japan has made a remarkable recovery, as you know. It is now the third strongest economic power in the world.

It has tremendous abilities in terms of technology and industry and so forth, and particularly in view of that development and in view of the problem we have in the balance of payments we think it is important for Japan to carry a larger share of the burden of the security of that area; and we do encourage them to increase their military budgets. They have given us assurances that they would do that; and we think that can be done without in any way violating Article 9 of the Constitution.

Senator Church; You think this policy conforms with the overall thrust of the Nixon Doctrine?

Secretary Rogers; Yes, I do, Senator.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
（ＶＯＡ）

昭和46.10.27
アメリカ局北米第一課

The Chairman; About the retention of the Voice of America what purpose is there in our retaining the Voice of America and what is the function of the Voice of America operating from Okinawa? The reason I ask it, I had assumed this had been directed primarily at China. Now, if we are -- and I hope we are, and I believe we are changing our attitude and our relations with China, what justification is there for the continuation of the Voice of America on Okinawa?

Secretary Rogers; Well, we think of the Voice of America as performing a very useful function in our foreign policy in presenting facts, hopefully objective facts, and we think it is very useful.

We do hope, of course, that we will improve our relations with the People's Republic of China; but the fact that the President is taking a trip to Peking, as he said on several occasions, does not necessarily mean that we are beginning to have too rapid an improvement.

It

It will depend on events. He doesn't want us to be too euphoric about the prospects merely becuase of the trip that is taking place. He emphasized that in his recent speach -- I think it was on last Sunday, I believe; so we want to continue our Voice of America programs.

We are going to continue to present the news.

The Chairman; The Voice of America, just like Radio Free Europe, was a product of the cold war. They were originated at that time and that was their original purpose.

The Senator from New Jersey has raised this question, I think, in a most appropriate manner about the continuation of Radio Free Europe. It costs a lot of money and what does it achieve? It really was a tool of the cold war.

Now, I realize -- I am not saying that we have suddenly reached a millennium and that everything is fine: but to maintain -- it strikes me it is a bit ambiguous, ambivalent -- our attitude. We say we wish to improve our relations and yet we continue certain activities which are designed not to improve them, to irritate them or to prolong, I may say, the cold war.

I

I would just as soon it would be -- I assume this is a very costly operation and what use does it serve. I don't quite see why it should be retained as the same way I don't see the utility of retaining Radio Free Europe. To me, they are much in the same class; they are propaganda agencies, and there is no dearth of access to news with modern satellite communications. Certainly they are not doing anything that the private communication systems are not doing also. That was not so true when they started. I only raise the question as to -- in this treaty you don't have to retain them; you have the right to retain them?

Secretary Rogers; That's right.

The Chairman; If you wish to discontinue them you may?

Secretary Rogers; Oh, sure.

The Chairman; The Secretary. Then I read recently, to me, certain discrepancies on the Voice of America about certain aspects of international relations and your own. There seems to have been some language of communication between the head of the Voice of America and the Secretary of State -- not recently; this occurred --

Secretary

Secretary Rogers; I don't believe that is correct recently, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman; Well, he takes a much harder line than you take, I would say, and his statement has been much harder; and it is commented upon by everybody. He seems to be much more determined to maintain the cold war than you are; and I assume you certainly speak more for the administration.

I would think it is one of those small irritants.

One other thing about -- I don't want to pursue it. You have the right to do it but you don't have to maintain it.

Secretary Rodgers; I think we also, Mr. Chairman, should point out that -- I suppose the great listening audience is not in the communist countries. I mean, the listening audience from this particular station is all around in that area in friendly countries as well as in communist countries.

The Chairman; It is a very big station; it is capable of reaching most of China or a great part of it, and I thought that is what it was there for. It is part of the same cold war.

Of course, I suppose the voice is not an intelligence gathering agency?

Secretary Rogers; No.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会

（尖閣諸島）

昭和46.10.27
アメリカ局北米第一課

The Chairman; There is this troublesome question that I have seen in the paper and I wondered if you wanted to comment on it, on the Island of Senkaku, I believe it is.

Is that left as is without an attempt to determine its sovereignty? There was a piece in the paper the other day which seemed to be — indicating there may be some difficulty over the sovereignty of that island.

Secretary Rogers; Mr. Chairman, I am glad you asked that question because we have made it clear that this treaty does not affect the legal status of those islands at all. Whatever the legal situation was prior to the treaty is going to be the legal situation after the treaty comes into effect.

The Chairman; So, in any case, that is not a reason to object this treaty, whatever one may think about it; Is that correct?

Secretary Rogers; That is right. That is correct.

The Chairman; It does not affect it.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
（合意文書）

昭和46.10.27
アメリカ局北米第一課

Senator Case; I just have a few questions about a collateral matter, Mr. Secretary, if I may, in the time remaining. Are there any parts of this treaty with Japan that are secret?

Secretary Rogers; No, there are not. Now there obviously, as in any treaty — well, first, let me say so there is no misunderstanding. My answer is no, there are no secret agreements.

Two, as in any long negotiation of this kind, there are many conversations and so forth that relate to the interpretation of the treaty just as there is in legislative history on statutes, but there is no secret agreement and we would be prepared to discuss anything in connection with this treaty that you would like to have us discuss.

Senator Case; I appreciate that. I just wanted to have your assurance that not only this committee, which presumably can get it, that exists and will, from you, in secret or private session, but the American people

people will not have the feeling that we are not going into anything that is not on the surface.

Secretary Rogers; That is correct.

Senator Case; Are there any other agreements related to the treaty, not secret, but executive agreements, which the United States considers to be binding that are not included in what you have presented to us?

Secretary Rogers; No, certainly no executive agreements. As I say, I would not want to — we can discuss this in detail, if you want. There are no secret agreements, no executive agreements. There may be one or two minor things where the provisions of the treaty are interpreted by the discussions that we had about those provisions, if you follow me and that, all of that information is available to the committee so that you can have it if you would like to read it over, and those who worked on it will be glad to point out the areas where that exists.

Senator Case; I appreciate that. My concern was whether there was any matter of substance that is not embraced within this or the documents that you have sent up to us.

Secretary Rogers; No, no.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
（パッカード国防次官及びランパート
高等弁務官の冒頭説明）

昭和46.10.28
アメリカ局北米第一課

1. パッカード国防次官

I am pleased and honored to appear before this Committee today to testify in support of the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands.

This Agreement, as Secretary Rogers has described to you, is the culmination of long and detailed negotiations between our two governments, as called for by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato in their Joint Communique of November 21, 1969. That historic understanding between the President and the Prime Minister, that it was time to return the administrative control of the Ryukyu and Daito Islands to Japan, in turn represented the fulfillment of a long-standing U.S. policy.

As you know, Okinawa represents a major element of the U.S. defense posture in the Western Pacific. We have nearly 50,000 military personnel deployed on Okinawa, and this includes important units of all the branches of the armed forces. The combat and support

forces

forces on Okinawa are a major part of our forward based military units in East Asia. With the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, these forces will remain on Okinawa and continue to be ready to perform their missions. However, instead of being able to use these forces with the freedom equal to that available from U.S. territory, our military activities will be subject to the understandings we have with Japan, the host country. While it is much easier and ideally preferable not to be concerned with the wishes or views of a foreign government in the conduct of our armed forces, when these forces are deployed in the territory of a foreign country, it is only realistic to expect that certain conditions must be agreed to. To date, Okinawa has been an exception to this general rule because of its unique history, first as war-conquered territory, then as an area administered by U.S. under the Treaty of Peace with Japan. But the time has come to normalize this aspect of our relations with Japan and with the people of Okinawa, and to respond to the desires of the Japanese and Okinawans for reversion.

Simply stated, after reversion our military forces on Okinawa will be subject to the same conditions as

govern

govern the military forces we have deployed in Japan proper. These conditions are set forth in the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements. It is an excellent treaty which serves well the security interests of both the United States and Japan. We currently have over 30,000 military personnel stationed in Japan who, like their comrades in Okinawa, serve as an important element in our Western Pacific defense posture.

Under the terms of the Mutual Security Treaty and Related Exchanges of Notes, we can use our armed forces for the defense of Japan and for other military activities related to the maintenance of international peace and stability in the Far East, except that under the prior consultation formula we need the affirmative approval of the Japanese Government prior to making major changes in the number of U.S. military personnel deployed to Japan, major changes in their equipment, or using our bases in Japan for direct military combat operations, except for the defense of Japan.

In practical terms, these three limitations mean that, first, the U.S. cannot initiate a substantial build-up of U.S. Forces in Japan without that government's permission. However, small units can be deployed into

Japan,

Japan, and this happens on a fairly regular basis, with only notification to the Government of Japan. In terms of moving our units out of Japan, there is no requirement for prior consultations with the Japanese Government.

The second category of the prior consultation concerns major changes in military equipment. The Japanese insisted on this provision as assurance that the U.S. would not act contrary to the wishes of the people of Japan. This, of course, applies to the storing of nuclear weapons in Japan. That is, the U.S. cannot store nuclear weapons in Japan without the permission of the Japanese Government. Following reversion, this same condition will apply to the Ryukyus.

The third category of the prior consultation formula requires the approval of the Japanese Government prior to undertaking military combat operations from our bases in Japan, and on Okinawa after reversion. Thus, for example, launching of air strikes directly against an enemy target from bases in Japan would require prior consultation. The deployment of combat aircraft from Japan to operate in a zone of hostilities however, would not. Similarly, the myriad of logistic support operations provided to our combat forces from facilities in Japan and Okinawa would not and do not require prior consultation.

Even

Even though subject to the consultative procedures outlined above, we do not believe that reversion will significantly impair the effectiveness of our military forces on Okinawa as an important element in our Western Pacific defense posture. This statement is premised on shared U.S.-Japanese security interests and in turn a general Agreement on the purposes for these forces, as embodied in the Mutual Security Treaty. At the time of Prime Minister Sato's visit to Washington in November of 1969 he declared that the security of South Korea was essential to the security of Japan. He also stated that the security of Taiwan was most important to Japan. Thus, in the event of a contingency we believe we would, if necessary, be able to operate our bases in Japan and Okinawa effectively.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been consulted fully during the Okinawa reversion negotiations and have actively participated in every stage of these negotiations. Admiral Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has asked me to assure you that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the Agreement and urge your favorable consideration of it.

Let me turn now to the functions now performed by our military forces on Okinawa which will be turned over to the Japanese and the provisions of the U.S.-Japan

Status

Status of Forces Agreement which will apply to Okinawa after reversion: specifically (1) the mission of providing for the immediate defense of Okinawa, (2) the civil administration of Okinawa, and (3) the application of the U.S.-Japan Agreement regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

Immediate Defense of Okinawa

As part of the November 1969 Joint Communique, Prime Minister Sato agreed that Japan would gradually assume responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa. One aspect of the negotiations with Japan leading to the Agreement before you has centered on the modalities for transferring that responsibility to Japan. An associated arrangement was negotiated by Vice Admiral Walter L. Curtis, Jr., the military representative to the Okinawa negotiating team, and representatives of Japan's Defense Agency. This Defense Arrangement describes the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces that Japan will deploy to Okinawa following reversion.

The objective is for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to assume primary responsibility for the immediate defense of Okinawa by July 1973. We believe the Defense Agency's plans for the forces to be deployed to Okinawa

are

are adequate to fulfill the defense mission to be assumed.

These negotiations have been characterized by a spirit of close cooperation which typifies the relationship between the U.S. and Japanese defense establishments.

When the Japanese Self-Defense Forces assume the defense mission of Okinawa, this will make available about 35 million dollars a year for other DOD missions.

Civil Administration

As you know, the Defense Department, through the executive agent of the Department of the Army, administers the Ryukyu and Daito Islands for the United States Government. The current High Commissioner, Lt. Gen. James B. Lampert, U.S.A., a very able officer, is here today as a witness for this committee. He is prepared to explain in detail the specific plans for reliquishing to Japan our administrative functions and responsibilities for Okinawa, and what effect reversion, or a denial of reversion would have on the daily operations of our bases on Okinawa. I would simply like to state here that upon reversion the United States Government, and specifically the Department of Defense, will cease to have any responsibility for the civilian affairs of Okinawa. The governing of Okinawa will become the responsibility

of

of the Japanese Government and the New Okinawa Prefectural Government.

Transfer of administrative responsibility will mean a savings to the United States of about 20 million dollars/year. This was the cost of running the U.S. Civil Administration including its aid appropriations prior to the decision to begin reversion negotiations. The figure has been sharply reduced already in anticipation of reversion.

Application of SOFA

Upon the reversion of Okinawa to Japan, the U.S.-Japan Agreement regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan will apply to Okinawa as well as to Japan proper. This Agreement is commonly referred to as the U.S.-Japan SOFA. Let me briefly outline some of the changes that will result from the application of this Agreement and the Mutual Security Treaty.

1. Provision of Areas and Facilities

We are currently leasing the private land which we use for our bases on Okinawa. Under the terms of the Mutual Security Treaty and the Related SOFA, Japan

provides

provides to U.S. free of charge our required facilities and areas. Thus the land rentals on Okinawa which currently cost U.S. over 10 million dollars a year will be assumed by the Japanese Government upon reversion.

2. Employment of Local Nationals

The current practice on Okinawa is for the military services to hire directly the required local national employees. In Japan, however, we have a Master Labor Contract with the Japanese Government for the provision of the required local national employees. Thus our local national employees in Japan are hired indirectly through the Japanese Government. This system has the great advantage of reducing tremendously labor disputes with our local national employees in Japan. The annual wage negotiations we have on Okinawa will be terminated, as the wages and benefits we pay under the Master Labor Contract will be essentially the same as those paid by the Japanese Government to its own employees. It also means, however, that at reversion our employees on Okinawa will receive an increase in wages and benefits, as the wage scale in Japan proper is higher than it has been in Okinawa. This will create some additional costs to the Defense Department, although eventually we would

probably

probably have had to pay the higher wages since the gap in wages between Japan and Okinawa has been steadily closing.

3. Training of Third County Nationals

We currently have on Okinawa various programs to provide training to the military personnel of other Asian allies. Under the terms of the SOFA, these programs for the training of third country nationals will have to be terminated. The major unit affected by this requirement is the U.S. Army Pacific Intelligence School. This chool will be relocated to Guam, or another location in the Pacific, before reversion takes place.

Facilties

Facilities

The final subject I would like to discuss with you is the military facilities we will maintain on Okinawa and those that will be released to the Government of Japan.

First, we will maintain all those facilities essential to the performance of the missions of our military units deployed on Okinawa. Those facilities that will be relased are either no longer required by our forces, or will no longer be required once, and as, the missions for the immediate defense of Okinawa are transferred to the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.

The largest facility being returned to Japan is Naha Airport. As the airport is the civilian air terminal for Okinawa as well as a U.S. military base, and as the U.S. military activities there have been reduced to a U.S. Navy ASW patrol and utility squadrons, it was judged appropriate to agree to the Japanese request to release the facility completely. The financial arrangement

worked

worked out with the Japanese Government is covering the costs of relocating these naval flying activities. The relocation of these Navy units will not impact on their mission performance.

In conclusion, I would note that Okinawa is a small island roughly 70 miles long and 5 miles wide, with a population of about one million - 100,000 Americans and 900,000 Okinawans. The smooth functioning of our bases there depends upon the continued goodwill of the Okinawan people, for it is impossible to totally isolate the bases from the rest of the island.

The Okinawan people strongly desire to be re-united with Japan after a separation of over twenty-five years. It is a desire that we, as Americans, can completely understand. Responding to the desires of the Okinawans to rejoin Japan, and of the Japanese who wish to welcome back the Okinawans, is an historically unprecedented act but one which is in keeping with the best in our political heritage. I urge you to consider favorably and quickly this Agreement for the reversion of Okinawa.

2.

2. ランパート高等弁務官

[redacted]

It is a privilege to appear before you today to testify in support of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement.

I serve in three positions on Okinawa, which I have held since January 1969. As High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, I am responsible for the administration of the Ryukyu Islands under the authority granted to the Secretary of Defense and, by delegation, to the High Commission by Executive Order 10712. I exercise these responsibilities through the United States Civil Administration, or USCAR as it is commonly known. My primary missions as High Commissioner are to promote the welfare and well-being of the people of the Ryukyus and to maintain a favorable environment for the effective operation of our military bases, which are located for the most part on the main island of Okinawa.

As the local representative of the Commander-In-Chief, Pacific, I have the responsibility for coordinating local activities of the military

services,

services, reporting directly to Admiral McCain in Hawaii.

My other position is commanding general, United States Army, Ryukyu Islands, in command of the Army Forces in the Ryukyus, under the Commander-In-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, in Hawaii.

The United States has administered the Ryukyu Islands since the end of World War II in 1945. The record of our administration is one in which I believe our country can take considerable pride. The Ryukyuan people have an effective and responsible government of their own, the Government of the Ryukyu Islands, which is based on democratic principles and which for the most part runs its own affairs. They have a freely-elected Chief Executive and a Legislature as well as a court system of their own. Economically, the Ryukyu Islands have achieved one of the highest standards of living in Asia; and the economy has continued to grow each year at an impressive rate. A full-scale educational system, together with extensive social and welfare

facilities

facilities have also been developed under the U.S. administration.

There is little doubt, however, that the great majority of the people of the Ryukyus, who call themselves Okinawans but consider themselves Japanese nationals, strongly wish to return to the administration of their motherland, Japan. The Ryukyu Islands were an integral part of Japan until 1945. Reversion to Japan at the earliest possible time has been repeatedly requested by their elected Chief Executive and by unanimous resolutions of their ligislature, and there have been few expressions of desire to remain under U.S. adminiseration. The statement by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato in November 1969 that the United States and Japan would enter into negotiations with a view to accomplishing reversion some time in 1972 was welcomed by the Okinawan people as a response to their strong desire for reunion with Japan.

We are now in a complex and difficult period, marked by Okinawan uncertainties and anxieties

over

over how reversion will affect them personally. Many Okinawans would like to see greater reductions in our bases, but at the same time they fear that there will be large-scale reductions in the jobs provided by our bases without other jobs being available. Our Okinawan base labor force has reacted strongly to substantial curtailments in our work force required by reductions in the United States defense budget. The Okinawan economy and standard of living have been heavily dependent on our bases as well as on United States economic assistance. Our economic aid has been sharply reduced and will, of course, terminate on reversion. Okinawans are concerned that Japan may not continue to provide the economic assistance required to maintain and eventually raise the economy to levels comparable with the rest of Japan. In recent months they have been apprehensive that they might suffer serious economic losses as a result of recent U.S. measures to protect the dollar and Japan's decision to float the yen.

Serious

Serious problems and tensions have also resulted from occasional unlawful acts of U.S. servicemen and from accidents involving Okinawans and Americans. Strong resentment against our exclusive U.S. criminal jurisdiction over military personnel has increasingly found expression. This is because Okinawans believe the time is approaching when the United States should no longer possess police and other powers of government.

The presence of military chemical munitions on Okinawa, which have just recently been completely removed, was another major factor contributing to Okinawan feelings of anxiety and tensions.

There is a vocal minority which vigorously opposes the presence of our military bases and which taken every opportunity to exploit these existing tensions and the various activities of our bases which unavoidably cause inconvenience and irritation, such as jet aircraft noises and military use of farmlands.

The return of the civil administration to Japan and the application to Okinawa of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and Japan are expected to reduce sources of friction and tension and to privide a more stable and favorable basis for the future. Our

Our military bases and U.S. Forces personnel will be placed in the same situation, with the same status and privileges, as in mainland Japan, including the application of the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the SOFA. This is expected to remove a major source of Okinawan feelings of unequal treatment. In addition, as has been stated by Secretary Packard, relations should improve when base workers, whom the U.S. Forces have been hiring and dealing with directly, are employed by the Japanese Government under an indirect hire system as in Japan. The Japanese Government will become responsible for public safety outside our bases, including police, fire protection and traffic control. Under the SOFA, the United States will be relieved of responsibility for the leasing of privately owned land, which has long been a sensitive issue in our relations with the Okinawan people.

The Japanese Government has cooperated closely with U.S. in the handling of various difficult problems that have arisen and in the working out of arrangements for a smooth and orderly transer of administration.

Following President Nixon's and Prime Minister Sato's November 1969 Communique, the United States and Japanese Governments established special governmental machinery to negotiate

negotiate detailed reversion arrangements and to initiate reversion preparatory measures. The United States-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo was charged with overall responsibility for conduct of the negotiations. The Preparatory Commission in Okinawa was established "for the purpose of consulting and coordinating locally on measures relating to preparation for the transfer of administrative right ..."

As the administrative authority in Okinawa, the United States took the lead in presenting to the Preparatory Commission in July 1970 a comprehensive plan to facilitate the transfer of administrative responsibility to Japan. The essence of that plan was that the transfer should, to the largest practicable extent, be gradual and progressive, avoiding an abrupt and painful shift at reversion. As a framework for a progressive relinquishment of United States civil administrative functions to Japan, under continued United States overall authority, the period until reversion was divided in the plan into three phases. The first was from the date of the plan's adoption until a United States-Japan Reversion Agreement had been signed; the second was from then until necessary legislative support was obtained; and the third was from then until reversion day.

Pursuant to this plan, the United States presented in the Preparatory Commission specific proposals for the full or partial relinquishment to the Japanese Government of a number of functions in phase one. Most of these functions were USCAR functions of advice and assistance to the Ryukyuan Government.

We

We are currently in phase II of the transfer plan, when we have proposed the relinquishment to the Ryukyuan Government of several operational civil administration functions. During phase III we plan to relinquish to the Ryukyuan Government additional operational civil administration functions, such as administration of quarantine, customs and other related controls. During that final phase many actions will be taken in connection with the turnover of U.S. public corporations, the sale of our controlling interest in the Bank of the Ryukyus, and other aspects of our civil control preparatory to the complete relinquishment of that control to Japan on reversion day.

Although the Okinawan people seem aware that reversion will not take place without the approval of the United States Senate and the Japanese Diet, they nonetheless generally expect that reversion will occur by 1 July 1972 if not earlier. Chief Executive Yara and the GRI Legislature have expressed the desire that reversion take place on 1 April 1972. There can be no decision on the date of reversion, however, until after the treaty is approved by the

Senate

Senate and the Diet. We foresee a number of practical problems in preparing for a smooth reversion and for planning purposes we are thinking in terms of 1 July 1972.

Should reversion be delayed much beyond 1 July 1972, I believe we would see a strong adverse reaction from the Okinawan people. I would expect rapid intensification of anti-American sentiment and activity which could make it very difficult to exercise U.S. administrative authority and to maintain a favorable environment for our bases and American personnel. The longer the delay the greater the adverse reaction which is to be anticipated since it is evident that U.S. bases in Okinawa require at least the acquiescence of the Okinawan people.

While a minority of Okinawans continue to demand immediate and complete removal of the American bases, the majority appear to accept the fact that the United States will continue to maintain a military base structure on Okinawa. Irritations and problems will, of course, continue to arise from the presence of our bases and from two people of such different language and culture living so close to each other in

in a small, densely populated geographic area. The Okinawans, nevertheless, are basically warm, friendly people. I continue to find in my frequent travels throughout the Ryukyus and in my personal contacts with Okinawans substantial goodwill toward the United States and an appreciation for what the United States has done since World War II to promote the welfare of the people of Okinawa. Individual Okinawans frequently go out of their way voluntarily to express these sentiments to me. I think that with intelligent management of our bases we can preserve these friendly sentiments.

I believe that with the continuing support of our Japanese ally, and with a smooth reversion, our military bases on Okinawa will continue after reversion to be of major value to the United States. Because of the strategic location of Okinawa, our extensive and highly developed complex of military bases there are extremely important in U.S. defense arrangements. They contribute in a major way to our ability to fulfill U.S. commitments to the security of Japan and our other allies in the Pacific.

Senator Aiken: And as I understand it, Japan agrees to protect American business interests and professional interests, including lawyers, who might be presently on Okinawa?

Senator Case: And veterinarians.

Senator Aiken: And veterinarians. But for how long a period of time is this agreement — does this agreement carry?

Secretary Rogers: It is indefinite.

Senator Aiken: Indefinite?

Secretary Rogers: Yes.

Senator Aiken: And then second degree, second generation, third generation Americans also might be protected if they inherited —

Secretary Rogers: It certainly wouldn't apply to lawyers.

Senator Aiken: I see.

Senator Symington: General, nice to see you. I have just one line of questioning.

Regardless of whether we do or do not have nuclear weapons on Okinawa, is our position with respect to those weapons known to anybody in the Government of Okinawa outside of —

General Lampert: Our standard response in all discussions in answer to all questions with all foreigners, and this includes of course all officials of the Government of Okinawa, is that we neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons nor do we discuss the subject with them.

Senator Symington: Does that include the highest people in the Government of Okinawa?

General Lampert: That is including the highest people.

Senator Symington: Has the same thing been true of our position in Japan?

General Lampert:

General Lampert: Sir, I am not qualified to comment on that since I do not serve in Japan.

Senator Symington: So whatever the position is with respect to nuclear weapons, if any, in Okinawa, all the people in the Government of Okinawa are ignorant of that position. Is that a fair statement?

General Lampert: They have been given no information in response to any question, yes, Sir.

Senator Symington: I am beginning to worry about all of this secrecy because we are asking, as Deputy Defense Secretary Packard knows, we are asking for 7.9 billion dollars for research and development for weapons. We are asking for less than ten percent of that for the peacetime application of the atomic energy. If the people in the administration are right in what they are telling us, success for research in this field could solve the problems of energy which perhaps is the greatest problem we have today.

Our requirement for energy, electric power, doubled every decade for four decades. This could solve the problems of pollution, it could solve the problems of clean fresh water, could not only handle waste but could recycle it and could create food. So you might say

say that in the power which lies in the atom could well be the hope of a peacetime world, and yet we have saturated under what I consider wrong, if not improper, interpretation of section 202 of the Joint Atomic Energy Act. We have saturated this whole field with so much secrecy that really the people do not know how much we have slighted these problems as against the problems of weaponry, and when you find great universities with budgets running almost to a billion dollars a year and half of that money can go from the federal government, not from the cities or the states — hundreds of millions of dollars per year running those universities, then when you see people from those universities can go back and defend in open session weaponry which I personally do not think is needed for our security, you would wonder why we do have all of the secrecy, why we cannot break this out, so the people will understand what we could do in these fields. That is why I asked you the question.

Secretary Packard: Let me just say this:
I believe Secretary Rogers said in response, will nuclear weapons now on Okinawa be removed on reversion day, yes. I was going to put it in these terms, if you wish, agree with

with what the general said is our policy, but I can assure you that if there are nuclear weapons on Okinawa they will not be there on reversion day.

Senator Symington: Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary, but we have also developed a sudden and I think commendable interest in the People's Republic of China being better friends with us. If we are going to take those weapons off of Okinawa, for example, and this is strictly hypothetical, and put them in countries that have caused all of this trouble, according to the People's Republic of China, and apparently to other people in other countries, based on recent events in New York, then I think we have sort of continued, whether you say Rob Peter to pay Paul, but we are certainly not solving the problems. My only point is, I cannot understand why we have so much secrecy about these weapons when everybody knows really what you can do with them in all of the countries that have them.

Since this Smythe report came out in the middle forties, there has been no reason for all of the secrecy and I think what it has done, it may have helped the munitions makers and it may have helped those who, in my opinion, could overemphasize various types of

weapons

weapons instead of making decisions as to which one is the best and so forth, but it is certainly no question about the fact, I say this as a member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, there is no question about the fact it seriously retarded what we could do to solve problems that are not problems of war or preparations of war and could be — after all, Norway, I understand, is suing Great Britain and Germany for pollution their fishing waters.

If we can handle some of these problems and turn away from what has, rightly or wrongly, been called the military industrial, and the Chairman of this Committee added university complex, being the former president of a great university he has a right to his own thinking, as all Americans do, and I think we have made progress to what to me looked like even greater problems than the ones we have been discussing.

You, I think, are well-versed in both aspects of this field because you are interested in your own community, and have you any other comments or any thinking on that?

Secretary Packard: I would agree, Senator, this is an important issue and I assure you we give consideration to all of the things you have alluded to.

I

I think in terms of the subject we are discussing today, however, that is a separate issue. We have essentially agreed to do what I think is necessary and proper in terms of the reversion agreement and I do not believe that what we have done here in any way limits or commits us to whatever we may want to do in terms of the things you are talking about.

Senator Symington: Well, I would only make one closing observation. This is the Foreign Relations Committee and what we are interested in is our relationship with all other countries as well as the ones we talk about.

Somebody wrote not too long ago that we must have credibility to have consent and you must have consent to have democracy, and it seems to me that the longer we put what I think, in the interest of my own country as well as the rest of the world, is totally unnecessary secrecy to the extent that we have it in this field, the more we are going to remember, perhaps we can remember at all what is the wisest aspect of that observation.

Secretary Packard:

Secretary Packard: I am sure you know, Senator, we are taking some steps in the general direction of trying to reduce the secrecy. We have not gone far enough to know the problems, but I think we recognize there is something worthy of consideration in this area.

Senator Symington: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
（防衛－２）

昭和46.10.28
アメリカ局北米第一課

Senator Cpong: Do you expect an expansion of Japan's military forces?

Secretary Packard: We would expect an expansion of Japan's military forces.

I think the responsibility that they have, they are taking over for the defense of Ckinawa, is in a sense an expansion of that nature. They are constrained by their consitution that they cannot develop or deploy military forces for the outside of defense of Japan, for use overseas, and in part over the years our presence in Japan and the presence of United States military forces has had as one of its roles aid, assistance to the defenre of Japan. As they can pick up a larger share of this responsibility, a larger capability, I think it is entirely appropriate and we would hope this can be begun within the constraints of the constitution, their constitution.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
（事前協議）

昭和46.10.28
アメリカ局北米第一課

(1) Senator Cooper: In your statement, Mr. Secretary--perhaps the general could also respond to this--on page 3 you talk about the third category of the prior consultation formula requires the approval of the Japanese Government prior to undertaking military combat operations from our bases in Japan and on Okinawa after reversion. Thus, for example, launching of air strikes directly against an enemy target from bases in Japan would require prior consultation.

This is the sentence I want to ask you about: "The deployment of combat aircraft from Japan to operate in a zone of hostilities, does that mean that while an aircraft could not launch a strike from Ckinawa, an aircraft could be sent from there, deployed in another country, another area."

Secretary Packard: Yes, we have the right to withdraw forces without prior consultation, so we could take an air unit which was stationed in Okinawa or stationed in Japan and move that unit to Korea, to Taiwan, to any other place that we might choose without having

having to get permission from the Japanese Government.

At that time, that unit could then engage in whatever activities were appropriate. It is simply the use of the bases in Okinawa as in Japan to fly combat sorties would not be permitted without agreement with the Japanese Government.

Senator Cooper: In essence then, it is a logistical base.

Secretary Packard: Well, the logistics activities, that is, to supply materials, we are supplying materials to South-East Asia from Okinawa. We will be able to continue to do that under the terms of the Agreement.

We are repairing equipment in Japan now and I guess also repairing equipment in Okinawa.

General Lampart: Yes, and that will be allowed under the Reversion Agreement.

(2) Senator Pearson: Let me see if I understand the essential element of your testimony. The Reversion Treaty will place our military presence in Okinawa under the Mutual Defense Treaty which involves prior consulation on the number of troops, types of weapons and military operations, to some extent. And I think your testimony, you made reference to the fact that the heads

of

of government, some communique or some note had indicated that the Defense Department would have no question about prior consultation, which is an affirmative consent, as you say, as to Taiwan or Korea.

Does the Department of Defense have any question about prior consultation as to Indo-China or as to the Philippines?

Secretary Packard: Well, Senator Pearson, I think while there has been some indication that consent would be forthcoming in relation to Korea or Taiwan, indicating that there is some common interest there, I think we have to assess this question in the longer terms that I have alluded to. It is going to depend entirely upon what the mutuality of interest is at the time.

I think the Prime Minister was addressing the question as he viewed it then and I think we must recognize those conditions might change and I think we should recognize there may be some constraints after the Agreement that were not present before the Agreement, but I am confident that mutuality of interest between the United States and Japan are such that we can work well under this arrangement just as we have worked well under the arrangement which governs our troops which are now stationed in Japan.

Senator

Senator Pearson: Particularly so since we have a legal and moral obligation to go forward with this treaty, I suppose.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
(企業-2)
昭和46.10.28
アメリカ局北米第一課

(1) Senator Sparkman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You mentioned a few minutes ago one of the contributing factors to their gross national product I believe is the American business or American investment in Okinawa. How will that be affected as we pull out, the extent to which we do?

General Lampert: Mr. Chairman, Senator Sparkamn, The Reversion Agreement signed in June was accompanied by a letter to the American Ambassador signed by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Aichi, providing detailed assurances with respect to the future status of American business in the Ryukyus. This letter was developed following very, very detailed and intense negotiations and discussions over nearly two years, and I believe it is correct to say that in our view this letter and the accompanying assurances provides a solid basis for continued operation of American business in the Ryukyu Islands.

I should say, Sir, that there will, of course, be additional constraints places on American business

due

due to the operation of the body of Japanese law, since the Ryukyus will become a perfecture of Japan and there are a number of specific business considerations which are important to the business communities that have not yet been settled and are still under discussion. We believe that the outlook is favorable for the continued satisfactory operation.

Senator Sparkamn: I wonder how much of that business depends in a substantial degree to the presence of American activities there?

General Lampert: Sir, a good deal. A Large part one American business in Okinawa is made up of small business concerns, service establishments, soft drink establishments, electronic dealers, electronic repairment, dry cleaners, businesses of that type, and they do depend to a considerable extent on the presence of the American bases and the families of the American military men. However, a very large portion of the American business activity there is oriented toward the local population and toward markets and business contacts outside of Okinawa.

For example, there has been extensive investment in the last three years by three American oil companies which

which are now constructing refineries on Okinawa and they in general will receive oil from elsewhere, generally from the middle east, and refine Okinawa and then ship from there to markets in that part of the world.

Senator Sparkman: Use that as a refinery base?

General Lampert: Yes, Sir.

(2) Senator Pearson: The only other issue that I recall that is going to be raised has to do with the protection of American commercial interests. I understand that has been worked out as far as you know. Perhaps we should have asked the Secretary of State this yesterday.

Secretary Packard: That has been worked out in what I believe to be an entirely satisfactory way. I cannot assure you there will not be some minor irritations, but the Japanese Government has given people who are now there assurance that they can continue to operate in about the way they have been and I think this is an entirely satisfactory arrangement and, as far as I know, the people involved are satisfied with the arrangement.

again,

Again, there may be some minor irritations here and there but I think all in all it is a good arrangement.

Senator Pearson: I thank you.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
（基地）

昭和46/10.28
アメリカ局北米第一課

(1) The Chairman: I understand its utility in Vietnam, in the case of hostilities such as we have been going through, but I was assuming that this particular activity is coming to an end. I was just wondering about how you foresee the need for the maintainence of these bases indefinitely, which of course, this reversion provides for. There is no termination now provided for on the continued occupation of the bases, is there?

Secretary Packard: I think, Mr. Chairman, the best way to look at this question as of now--

The Chairman; That is what I am trying to get you to explain.

Secretary Packard: We are going through a pariod of substantial change.

The Chairman: I hope so.

Secretary Packard; And that ivolves substantial change in relation to our friendly country Japan. Our President opening the door to the People's Republic

of

of China is a new step. I don't think we can asess at this time the level or the length of time that our military presence will be required there but I do think it is very important for us to maintain our military presence at this time until we are able to work out an arrangement which may be dictated.

I think we are going through a very important change in our foreign policy, one that I thoroughly support, and I think particularly at this time it is important for us not to give any signals that we are reneging our responsibility in that part of the world. What that responsibility will be in the long run depends upon the development of events, it depends upon the role thaat Japan may take, it depends upon what we may be able to do in working out better arrangements, different kinds of a policy with the Republic of China. We are at the end of two decades, as I see it, as being a period that reflects the post-World War II period in our foreign relations and I think we are beginning a new era and I think we have to be very careful in moving at this point because we don't know yet what problems we are going to face.

The

The Chairman: So it is fair to say we are in a transitional peirod. While this is indefinite you can't say it is ten years or twenty years or five years, it is a transitional period and you feel it is necessary to maintain these bases?

Secretary Packard: I think this is precisely the case, Mr. Chairman, and I think this is an important step in the implementation of President Nixon's Doctrine. I think we are indeed moving from an era of confrontation into an era of negotiations and I think we must do this from a position of strength. I think we must recognize that these changes are really momentous changes not only for us but for other people and we must be very careful in the rate at which and the degree at which we give any signals that we are not going to take our share of responsibility on a world-wide basis in the future.

(2) Senator Sparkman: In what proportion are our forces being withdrawn from Okinawa? I understand, of course, we continue to operation bases but I suppose some part of the strength will be taken out is that right?

Secretary

Secretary Packard: Well, of the 50,000 troops we have there, there will be a rathar small part taken out because of the particular reversion requirements. It has to do with the Japanese Self Defense Forces taking over the defense reponsibility for Okinawa and, as I have indicated, that is in the order of 3,500 people. We will move the army intelligence school somewhere else, which will be another small amount. I guess in round figures about half of the forces there relate to the marine unit that is stationed on there. That will stay.

Senator Sparkman: There is a marine division there?

Secretary Packard: Yes, Sir, a marine division. That division will stay. The other activities, the logistic activities, hospitals, transportation, anti-submarine warfare unit, will be moved from Naha -- we don't know exactly where the move will be -- but there will be not a substantial reduction in the some 45,000 as a reult of the reversion decision and concurrence.

We

We are continually addressing the presence of the United States Military Forces all over the world in relation to the larger considerations and what will happen in reduction beyond these minor one that I have indicated in relation to the reversions, I think, are a question we have not really adressed yet.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
（財政）

昭和46.10.28
アメリカ局北米第一課

Senator Pearson: I just sort of mentally added up substantial savings, 35 million in military cost and, like you said, 20 million in administrative costs and an additional ten on land rent, as I recall.

Subtracting higher wages, we really got a substantial savings of perhaps $60 million?

Secretary Packard: Yes, Sir.

Senator Pearson: Or something in that range, is that correct?

Secretary Packard: Yes, Sir. That is correct.

Obviously there has to be some consideration as to what is a fair arrangement on reversion and we have taken into consideration two things:

One, comparable payment, which is $320 million, and then these savings which accrue as you have listed over a period of time, and think in terms of the fact we have had these bases for a long time, their use, the fact we have some mutuality of interest in being there, that this is in every way a fair arrangement both for the United States and for Japan. I am quite satisfied with that matter.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
（台湾）

昭和46.10.28
アメリカ局北米第一課

Senator Sparkman: Now, I want to ask a couple of questions, Senator Case has not come in, and then I want to ask three or four that he wanted to put to you.

There have been several questions asked about our situation with Taiwan.

In the Nixon-Sato Communique of 1969 Japan stated that Taiwan was the most important factor to the security of Japan. Do you think there has been any reassessment of that position by Japan in view of the change of the United States-China policy and even more recently the vote in the U.N.?

Secretary Packard: Mr. Chairman, I cannot say whether there has or has not been a reassessment of that policy, but I think we must recognize that there will be a reassessment of policies of this nature by Japan and our other allies, and so I think we do not know the extent to which there has been any change there, but we are in a period of change in our foreign relations and we have to recognize that there will be

changes

changes in terms of assessments that were made several years ago and in a great many situations.

Senator Sparkman: General, do you have any comment?

General Lampert: No.

Senator Sparkman: I wonder if either one of you could express your opinion as to whether or not that same situation prevails.

Secretary Packard: You mean the situation--

Senator Sparkman: Our oppinion aside from Japan.

Secretary Packard: As far as I assess the situation, we are very sorry about the U.N. vote. We do not see this as changing our relations with Taiwan. We think this has been an important relationship over the years and I think we will want to maintain that relationship.

Now, here again I do not think anyone wants to project into the future too great a distance. We hope that there can be improvement in the relationships among all countries over what has prevailed during the past two and a half decades.

I think for the time being our position has to be that Taiwan has been a very good strong friend of our and I would hope, and as far as I am concerned intend, that we would maintain that friendship.

Senator

Senator Sparkman: Of course, we have a Security Agreement with Taiwan.

Secretary Packard: Yes, Sir.

Senator Sparkman: And I assume there would be no thought of discontinuing or changing that. Would you agree?

Secretary Packard: I would agree with that.

Senator Sparkman: In fact, the thought occurs to me that with the reversion of Okinawa, Taiwan might become even more important as a security base in that area of the world.

Secretary Packard: I think we can say in general terms that with the reversion of Okinawa, Taiwan may become more important, South Korea may become more important, other areas in which we have an opportunity to depend on for allies or for military operations of our own will tend to have some increased importance, and I would not want to assess, put any measure of what these changes are likely to be.

Senator Sparkman: We are probably reaching a vote in the Senate. This quorum call may be for that purpose. If it is, I understand it is on an amendment proposing to strike from the Foreign Aid

Bill

Bill a provision repealing the Formosa resolution. I do not suppose you have any thought to express on that.

Secretary Packard: I would hope it will not pass.

Senator Sparkman: You are hopeful it will pass?

Secretary Packard: If the vote is repealing, I would hope --

Senator Sparkman: The amendment is to strike out that provision, which would repeal.

Secretary Packard: I would be in favor of the amendment in that case.

Senator Sparkman: Well, I am inclined to agree with you.

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
（基地移転先）

昭和46.10.28
アメリカ局北米第一課

Senator Sparkman:

There have been reports that the United States plans to replace loss of certain military facilities in Okinawa with new or expanded bases in Micronesia. Is this tue? You may have seen that.

Secretary Packard: Yes, Sir, I have seen that.

Senator Sparkman: That article in the paper reporting that?

Secretary Packard: We have not made any specific decisions as to the extent to which any facilities in Okinawa will have to be replaced elsewhere nor where those might be. We are looking at various areas, but no decision has been made on this matter.

Senator Sparkman: We would have it right too, would be not? What is our position? Is it a trusteeship?

Secretary Packard: It is a trusteeship and we would have the right to do that, but here again I think we must recognize that we are in the process of negotiations with various Governments in Micronesia and I think

as a practical matter it is very important that we take into account not just our legal requirements, but the other considerations on this matter.

Senator Sparkman: Does the fact that Micronesia is a trust territory under the UN have any effect on our future plans there?

I did not realize that was in there, but --

Secretary Packard: Well, here again ' cannot give you a precise answer to that question. I think we have to take into account that fact and all other considerations in determining what we might do, whether we might do anything in terms of replacing facilities in various Micronesian locations that would be related to this issue at hand.

Senator Sparkman: Well, I think the matter as to what we can do and cannot do depends on the terms of the trusteeship and I do not know off hand what these are.

Has the United States made a pledge to the UN that we would permit the islanders of Micronesia to choose their future status, including independence?

Secretary Packard: This situation with Micronesia under the UN, this is a trust which is irrevershible

and

and we do not need to get permission from the United Nations to put forces there.

Senator Sparkman: Will the U.S. honor this? I do not think you answered that last question.

Has the United States made a pledge to the UN that we will permit the islanders of Micronesia to choose their future status in choosing independence?

It may be that question should be addressed to the State Department.

Secretary Packard: This negotiation with Micronesia is under the Department of Interior and I will have to provide an answer to --

Senator Sparkman: It should be addressed to this Department of Interior then. Fine.

The next question, will the U.S. honor this pledge and, if so, when?

I suppose that ought to go to the Interior, too.

注意
1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

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大政事外外儀官
務務 典房
次次
臣官宣審審長長
儀総人電厚計
書文会営給

調査長	参企析調
領移長	参領旅査移
ア長	参地中東二 北東二西
米長	参北北保
中南審	参一二
欧長	参西東洋 西東二
近ア長	参書近ア
経長	次総経国資源 参貿統国二
経協長	参政技一理 国企二
条長	参条協規
国長	参政経科 軍社専
情長	参道内外
文長	一二

総番号(TA) 57630 主管
71年 11月4日22時57分 米国 発
71年 11月5日16時36分 本省 着 米北1

外務大臣殿 大河原 大使 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

沖縄上院外交委聴聞会速記録

第3591号 平 至急(優先処理)
往電第3590号 別電

1. 往電第3441号 (3)について
(1) ロジャース長官発言中"We do not have any nuclear weapons on Okinawa"を"We will not have"に訂正
(2) サイミントン議員の発言中"I do not want to get into semantics ---- about the nuclear weapons situation"を"I do not want to get into semantics about it but say with respect that it would not help our trade and other relationships with the Japanese people if these was not true understanding

外務省

注意
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2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

--situation in their part of the world."
と訂正する。
2. 往電第3491号(2)のパワカード国防次官発言中
"order of 3500 people"を"order of 2700 people"に同"in the some 45,000"を"in the some 50,000 military personel"に訂正する。
3. 往電第3487号のサイミントン議員とパワカード次官及びランパート弁護官の質疑は字句の修正が著しく多いので該当部分確定版テキスト全文次の通りさしかえ願いたい。

Senator Symington. General, it is pleasant to see you. I have one line of questioning.
Ignorance of U.S. position concerning nuclear

外務省

注　意

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2．本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

電信写

WEAPONS ON OKINAWA

REGARDLESS OF WHETHER WE DO OR DO NOT HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA, IS OUR POSITION KNOWN TO ANYBODY IN THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA OUTSIDE OF----

GENERAL LAMPERT。 OUR STANDARD RESPONSE IN ALL DISCUSSIONS IN ANSWER TO ALL QUESTIONS WITH ALL FOREIGNERS, AND THIS INCLUDES OF COURSE ALL OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA, IS THAT WE NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY THE PRESENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOR DO WE DISCUSS THE SUBJECT WITH THEM。

SENATOR SYMINGTON。 DOES THAT INCLUDE THE HIGHEST PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA?

GENERAL LAMPERT。 THAT IS INCLUDING THE HIGHEST PEOPLE。

SENATOR SYMINGTON。 IS THIS ALSO TRUE OF OUR POSITION IN JAPAN?

GENERAL LAMPERT。 SIR, I AM NOT QUALIFIED TO COMMENT ON THAT SINCE I DO NOT SERVE IN JAPAN。

SENATOR SYMINGTON。 SO WHATEVER THE POSITION IS WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IF ANY, IN OKINAWA,

注　意

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電信写

THE PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF OKINAWA ARE IGNORANT OF THAT POSITION。 CORRECT?

GENERAL LAMPERT。 THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN NO INFORMATION IN RESPONSE TO ANY QUESTION SEMICOLON YES, SIR。

EFFECT OF SECRECY ON PEACETIME APPLICATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY

SENATOR SYMINGTON。 I WORRY ABOUT ALL THIS SECRECY BECAUSE AS DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY PACKARD KNOWS, WE ARE ASKING FOR DORUJIRUSI 7。9 BILLION FOR DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND LESS THAN 10 PERCENT OF THAT AMOUNT IS BEING REQUESTED FOR THE PEACETIME APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY。 IF EXPERTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION ARE RIGHT IN WHAT THEY ARE TELLING US, RE THIS LATTER FIELD, IT MIGHT SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE ENERGY, PERHAPS THE GREATEST PROBLEM WE HAVE TODAY。

OUR REQUIREMENT FOR ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER HAS DOUBLED EVERY DECADE FOR FOUR DECADES。 THIS MIGHT ALSO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF POLLUTION, OF CLEAN FRESH WATER, AND NOT ONLY HANDLE WASTE BUT RECYCLE

注 意

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電信写

IT。 SO ONE MIGHT SAY THAT IN THE POWER WHICH LIES IN THE ATOM COULD WELL BE THE HOPE OF A PEACETIME WORLD。 BUT WE HAVE SURRENDERED THIS WHOLE SUBJECT WITH SO MUCH SECRECY THAT THE PEOPLE DO NOT KNOW JUST HOW MUCH WE HAVE SLIGHTED THESE PROBLEMS AS AGAINST THE PROBLEMS OF WEAPONRY。 WHEN YOU FIND GREAT UNIVERSITIES, WITH BUDGETS RUNNING ALMOST TO A BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR, HALF OF WHICH COMES FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO RUN ONE UNIVERSITY SEMICOLON THEN WHEN YOU SEE PEOPLE FROM THOSE UNIVERSITIES COME BACK HERE AND DEFEND IN OPEN SESSION WEAPONRY AND GADGETS WHICH MANY OF US DO NOT THINK IS NEEDED FOR OUR SECURITY, YOU WONDER WHY WE DO HAVE ALL OF THIS SECRECY, WHY WE CANNOT BREAK IT OUT, SO THE PEOPLE WILL UNDERSTAND WHAT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO IN THESE PEACETIME FIELDS。 THAT IS WHY I ASKED THE QUESTION。

REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM OKINAWA

SECRETARY PACKARD。 LET ME JUST SAY THIS: I BELIEVE SECRETARY ROGERS SAID ''YES'' IN RESPONSE

注 意

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電信写

TO THE QUESTION, ''WILL NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOW ON OKINAWA BE REMOVED ON REVERSION DAY?'' I AM GOING TO PUT IT IN THESE TERMS, IF YOU WISH。 WHILE AGREEING WITH WHAT THE GENERAL SAID IS OUR POLICY, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IF THERE ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON OKINAWA, THEY WILL NOT BE THERE ON REVERSION DAY。

SECRECY CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS QUESTIONED

SENATOR SYMINGTON。 I APPRECIATE THAT, MR。 SECRETARY, BUT WE HAVE ALSO DEVELOPED A SUDDEN AND COMMENDABLE INTEREST IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA BEING BETTER FRIENDS WITH US。 IF WE ARE GOING TO TAKE THOSE WEAPONS OFF OF OKINAWA, FOR EXAMPLE, AND THIS IS STRICTLY HYPOTHETICAL, AND PUT THEM IN OTHER COUNTRIES BASED ON RECENT EVENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN NEW YORK, WE ARE NOT SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF MORE AND BETTER FRIENDS。 I CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE HAVE SO MUCH SECRECY ABOUT THESE WEAPONS WHEN JUST ABOUT EVERYBODY NOW KNOWS ABOUT THE NUCLEAR ART。

SINCE THE SMYTHE REPORT CAME OUT IN THE MID

注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
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電信写

FORTIES, THERE HAS BEEN NO REASON FOR ALL THIS SECRECY。 IT MAY HAVE HELPED SOME MUNITIONS MAKERS, ALSO THOSE WHO COULD BE OVEREMPHASIZING VARIOUS TYPES OF WEAPONS INSTEAD OF MAKING DECISIONS AS TO WHICH ONE IS THE BEST AND SO FORTH SEMICOLON BUT THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE FACT IT HAS SERIOUSLY RETARDED PEACETIME NUCLEAR EFFORT。 HAVE YOU ANY COMMENTS?

SECRETARY PACKARD。 I WOULD AGREE, SENATOR, THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE AND I ASSURE YOU WE GIVE CONSIDERATION TO ALL OF THE THINGS YOU HAVE ALLUDED TO。

I THINK IN TERMS OF THE SUBJECT WE ARE DISCUSSING TODAY, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS A SEPARATE ISSUE。 WE HAVE ESSENTIALLY AGREED TO DO WHAT I THINK IS NECESSARY AND PROPER IN TERMS OF THE REVERSION AGREEMENT, AND I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WHAT WE HAVE DONE HERE IN ANY WAY LIMITS OR COMMITS US TO WHATEVER WE MAY WANT TO DO IN TERMS OF THE THINGS YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT。

SENATOR SYMINGTON。 WELL, THIS IS THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE AND WE ARE INTERESTED IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL COUNTRIES。

注 意

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電信写

SOMEBODY WROTE NOT TOO LONG AGO THAT WE MUST HAVE CREDIBILITY TO OBTAIN CONSENT, AND MUST HAVE CONSENT TO ACHIEVE DEMOCRACY。 THE LONGER WE PUT UP WITH UNNECESSARY SECRECY TO THE EXTENT WE HAVE IN THIS FIELD, THE MORE WE ARE GOING TO REGRET IT。

SECRETARY PACKARD。 I AM SURE YOU KNOW, SENATOR, WE ARE TAKING SOME STPS IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF TRYING TO REDUCE THE SECRECY。 WE HAVE NOT GONE FAR ENOUGH TO KNOW ALL THE PROBLEMS, BUT I THINK WE RECOGNIZE THERE IS SOMETHING WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION IN THIS AREA。

SENATOR SYMINGTON。 THANK YOU, MR。 SECRETARY。

(3)

[redacted] 72

部内参考用

沖縄返還協定に関する米国上院外交委員会
聴聞会の訂正

46.11.5
米北一

11月1日付をもつて回覧した本件聴聞会の議事録（関係部分）に関し、在米大使館より訂正方報告がありましたので、関係部分を別紙のとおり、訂正ないし差しかえ方願います。

〔別紙〕

1. （核－1）に関し、

(1) 3頁5行目ロジャーズ長官の発言中

"We do not have any nuclear weapons on Okinawa"

とあるを"We will not have" と訂正する。

(2) 3頁7行目サイミントン議員の発言中

"I do not want to get into semantics ---- about the nuclear weapons situation."とあるを

"I do not want to get into semantics about it but say with respect that it would not help our trade and other relationships with the Japanese people if there was not true understanding about the nuclear weapons situation in their part of the world."

と訂正する。

2. （基地）に関し、

4頁パッカード国防次官の発言中

6行目"order of 3,500 people" とあるを、"order of 2,700 people"と、又同末段"in the some 45,000" とあるを"in the some 50,000 military personel"と訂正する。

3. （核－2）に関し、

本稿を別添の訂正稿と差しかえ方願います。

沖縄返還協定上院外交委員会聴聞会
（核　－2）　　昭和46/10/28
アメリカ局北米第一課

Senator Symington: General, it is pleasant to see you. I have one line of questioning.

Ignorance of U.S. position concerning nuclear weapons of Okinawa

Regardless of whether we do or do not have nuclear weapons on Okinawa, is our position known to anybody in the Government of Okinawa outside of —

General Lampert: Our standard response in all discussions in answer to all questions with all foreigners, and this includes of course all officials of the Government of Okinawa, is that we neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons nor do we discuss the subject with them.

Senator Symington: Does that include the highest people in the Government of Okinawa?

General Lampert: That is including the highest people.

Senator Symington:

Senator Symington: Is this also true of our position in Japan?

General Lampert: Sir, I am not qualified to comment on that since I do not serve in Japan.

Senator Symington: So whatever the position is with respect to nuclear weapons, if any, in Okinawa, the people in the Government of Okinawa are ignorant of that position. Correct?

General Lampert: They have been given no information in response to any question; yes, Sir.

Effect of secrecy on peacetime application of atomic energy

Senator Symington: I worry about all this secrecy because as Deputy Defense Secretary Packard knows, we are asking for 7.9 billion dollars for defense research and development, and less than ten percent of that amount is being questioned for the peacetime applications of nuclear energy. If experts in the administration are right in what they are telling us, in this latter field, it might solve the problem of adequate energy,

perhaps

perhaps the greatest problem we have today.

Our requirement for energy, electric power has doubled every decade for four decades. This might also solve the problems of pollution, of clean fresh water, and not only handle waste but recycle it. So one might say that in the power which lies in the atom could well be the hope of a peacetime world. But we have surrendered this whole subject with so much secrecy that the people do not know just how much we have slighted these problems as against the problems of weaponry. When you find great universities, with budgets running almost to a billion dollars a year, half of which comes from the federal government, hundreds of millions of dollars to run one university; then when you see people from those universities come back here and defend in open session weaponry and gadgets which many of us do not think is needed for our security, you wonder why we do have all of this secrecy, why we cannot break it out, so the people will understand what we might be able to do in these peacetime fields. That is why I asked the question.

Removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa

Secretary Packard: Let me just say this: I believe Secretary Rogers said "yes" in response to the question, "Will nuclear weapons now on Okinawa be removed on reversion day?" I was going to put it in these terms, if you wish, while agreeing with what the general said is our policy, I can assure you that if there are nuclear weapons on Okinawa, they will not be there on reversion day.

Secrecy concerning nuclear weapons questioned

Senator Symington: I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary, but we have also developed a sudden and commendable interest in the People's Republic of China being better friends with us. If we are going to take those weapons off of Okinawa, for example, and this is strictly hypothetical, and put them in other countries based on recent events at the United Nations in New York, we are not solving the problem of more and better friends. I cannot understand why we have so much secrecy about these weapons when just about everybody now knows about the nuclear art.

Since this Smythe report came out in the mid forties, there has been no reason for all this secrecy. It may have helped some munitions makers, also those who could be overemphasizing various types of weapons instead of making decisions as to which one is the best and so forth; but there is no question about the fact it has seriously retarded peacetime nuclear effort. Have you any comments?

Secretary Packard: I would agree, Senator, this is an important issue and I assure you we give consideration to all of the things you have alluded to.

I think in terms of the subject we are discussing today, however, that this is a separate issue. We have essentially agreed to do what I think is necessary and proper in terms of the reversion agreement, and I do not believe that what we have done here in any way limits or commits us to whatever we may want to do in terms of the things you are talking about.

Senator Symington: Well, this is the Foreign Relations Committee and we are interested in our relationship with all countries.

Somebody wrote not too long ago that we must have

credibility

credibility to obtain consent, and must have consent to achieve democracy. The longer we put up with unnecessary secrecy to the extent we have in this field, the more we are going to regret it.

Secretary Packard: I am sure you know, Senator, we are taking some steps in the general direction of trying to reduce the secrecy. We have not gone far enough to know all the problems, but I think we recognize there is something worthy of consideration in this area.

Senator Symington: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.