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上院軍事委員會

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送付資料

計十通内起の四通は上院軍務委員会
 1972年度軍務関連法案についての
 授権
 上院軍務委員会に於ける討論についての討議記録
 (本年3月16日)

- 要
- 首席事務官
- 総務
- 渉外調査
- 漁業
- 航空
- 科学協力
- 連絡調整
- 調査
- 力
- 局庶務



(希望配布先)

付属添付 付属空便(行) 付属空便(D.P.) 付属船便(貨)
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本信写送付先 (別添とも)

手沖
7/24

I have been going all over the State of Virginia commending President Nixon and Secretary Laird and Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger for the progress I feel you have made in disengaging American troops from Vietnam.

Secretary LAIRD. I think we have made good progress. Instead of continuing increases in American troops in that area, we are decreasing the number. The troop ceiling was 549,500 when we took over this responsibility and we will have brought it down by May 1 to 284,000, which is a substantial reduction.

As for my reference to the negotiations route, however, I believe that the President's October 7 proposal does offer the fastest route as far as termination of our involvement is concerned. But the other side does not seem to be interested in peace in that area, and some of the indications are that they will not be interested in serious negotiations at least until the October elections are over in South Vietnam.

I am not sure that there will be progress after that, but it looks as though they are standing very firm and are not willing to negotiate on any substantive issues—it looks as though they are delaying for the elections.

OKINAWA

March 16, 1977

Senator BYRD. May I ask Admiral Moorer or Secretary Laird, either one for that matter, what changes does this budget envision insofar as Okinawa is concerned?

Admiral MOORER. As you know, we are currently having discussions with the Japanese as to the details of the reversion of Okinawa.

[Deleted.]

Senator BYRD. What is the status of the negotiations?
(Colloquy deleted.)

Senator BYRD. Do you know the timetable insofar as reversion is concerned?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes; the timetable has been established, and it is planned that reversion will take place next year.

Senator BYRD. Okinawa is continued by the treaty of peace with Japan?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. So I assume any change in the treaty of peace with Japan, which treaty was ratified by the Senate, any change will be sent back to the Senate for approval or disapproval?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, the President has decided that the Okinawa Reversion Agreement will be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent.

As far as the bases are concerned, we will retain those which we will continue to require under the terms of the United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.

Senator BYRD. I understand that we will keep the bases we need. The Japanese want us to guarantee their security and in obtaining the reversion of Okinawa they want the bases to stay there.

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct. That is the essence of the mutual security treaty.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned allies in Southeast Asia are increasing their forces. Could you supply for the record which

allies are involved and to what extent the forces have been increased?
Secretary LAIRD. Yes, sir; I will.
(The information follows:)

EAST ASIA MILITARY MANPOWER

The number and quality of the forces of other friendly countries in East Asia are important factors in our force posture in that area of the world. For example, we are modernizing the Korean forces while reducing our authorized force level by 20,000; we have provided military assistance to the Cambodian government as it has increased its forces from some 40,000 to over 200,000 in order to defend its freedom; and there are now over one million men in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces which include Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, as well as Regional and Popular Forces. In general, President Nixon said in his foreign policy report: "A decade ago our East Asian allies had about one million men under arms. Today, that figure has more than doubled, and the quality of equipment and training has significantly improved."

CVAN CONSTRUCTION

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

You mentioned I believe in your comments this morning that you think CVAN-70 should be constructed.

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, sir; it should be constructed.

Senator BYRD. But there is no recommendation for that in the current budget?

Secretary LAIRD. There is a statement that an additional carrier will be needed for the 1980's and beyond. The only problem that we are confronted with is whether or not we should fund the leadtime items in fiscal 1972.

Senator BYRD. There are no leadtimes.

Secretary LAIRD. The funds are not included now because we have included funds for support ships. We felt at the time this budget was put together that they have a higher priority as far as shipbuilding is concerned than any other ship.

Now should it turn out that funds are required so that the production line on the nuclear propulsion components can be maintained—and I refer to this in my statement—we will come to this committee with a budget amendment or a reprogramming, depending upon when such a decision might be arrived at.

As you know, Senator, the problem we have is that work on CVAN-68 and CVAN-69 has slipped, and there is about a 12 month' delay in their construction. Now we must study this from a standpoint of whether or not it is necessary to put some money into the program during fiscal year 1972 in order to keep that production line open on the nuclear propulsion components. This must be studied on the basis of the slippage that we have had in the other two carriers, and we are going forward with that at the present time.

Senator BYRD. The point I am attempting to get clear in my mind, there are no long leadtime items in the present budget as submitted?

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct. As I testified earlier this morning, we included the oiler and the other support ships in the budget as higher priority items. I made clear in my statement that at the time this budget was put together we were not sure that we would be faced with that production line decision.

IMPROVEMENT IN CAMBODIAN SITUATION

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, with all of the attention on Laos it seems the situation in Cambodia called the threat to that country is less today than it was 2 months ago, and if so, to what extent?

Secretary LAIRD. I think the threat is about the same as it was about 2 months ago. The only difference is that the North Vietnamese are having a more difficult time in getting their supplies and infiltrating their troops into Cambodia because of the operations that have been going on in the Ho Chi Minh Trail area. But as far as the threat is concerned, the threat is about the same except that the North Vietnamese forces are probably in a worse logistic position.

I would like the Chairman to comment on that.

Admiral MOORER. You know, Senator Thurmond, we have a situation where the South Vietnamese are conducting a rather large scale operation, about 17,000 troops involved, around what is called the Chup Plantation which is between the Mekong River and the base areas that were occupied last May and June by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces.

In this area there are three North Vietnamese divisions and they have suffered some significant casualties during the last 3 or 4 weeks. Nevertheless, there have been some North Vietnamese deployed in other areas in Cambodia; for instance, over on the western side on the road that leads from Phnom Penh to Thailand, and down in the southern part which is along Highway 4 which leads from Phnom Penh down to old Sihanoukville which is now called Kompong Som and it is the road where the Cambodians bring up their fuel from the port up to the city of Phnom Penh. There have been various and sundry types of harassments and ambushes and things of that kind, so the Secretary is quite right in saying numberwise, with the exception of the attrition suffered by these three divisions, which is in excess of 3,000, the total number in the area is about the same.

However we feel they are having supply difficulties and have not succeeded so far in obtaining the replenishment that they normally get through the Ho Chi Minh Trail at this time of year and their difficulties have been increased by the fact that they do not have access to the port from Cambodia.

Secretary LAIRD. I think the Cambodian military assistance program has moved along very well, Senator Thurmond. It was approved in December and we have now had 3 months for the total program to be in operation and the force structure of the Cambodian armed forces has moved forward quite adequately.

I think it is important to bear in mind that they have gone from some 40,000 to over 200,000 in a period of less than a year. This is probably the fastest growing military force that I can recall.

We understand that they have another 200,000 volunteers that were willing to join up with their military forces [deleted].

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF OKINAWA

Admiral MOORER, for 2 years now the Nixon doctrine of partnership has been a part of the U.S. policy.

Now, I want to ask you a question. If you feel that involves a political answer you had better let the Secretary answer because we

do not want to embarrass you. But maybe you could answer from a purely military standpoint.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel the United States can effectively supply and support our allies in Southeast Asia in the next 5 years if we surrender control of Okinawa?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir, as long as we have access to the bases.

As I said this morning we intend to base the Marines [deleted] in Okinawa as well as the Air Force units in Kadena. And under the terms of the reversion I think I would answer your question "yes."

Senator THURMOND. Has the Defense Department made any contingency plans to establish another supply base in that part of the world if we lose Okinawa as an operating station?

Admiral MOORER. I do not think the studies we have made could be classified as contingency plans, Senator, but of course we have looked at alternatives [deleted].

Senator THURMOND. Maybe this would be more suitable for Secretary Laird.

COST OF HELICOPTER LOSSES IN LAOS

A great deal is being said about the helicopter losses in Laos.

What is the cost of the helicopters being lost there and could the Cheyenne or any airborne craft survive in this type of environment?

Secretary LAIRD. I think I would let the chairman answer.

Admiral MOORER. I will be happy to get you the exact costs. I am talking in terms of the numbers, Senator, because I have watched this very closely.

As you know, this operation commenced on the 8th of February and since that time we have had about 53 helos lost in Laos.

Now, when I say 53 lost, I mean those that were totally lost. I am not counting the ones that have been recovered and restored to use. For instance, if they get fired upon and they get a "red light" on the instrument panel they land right then and there. Sometimes they fly out and on occasion they have to be lifted out by these so-called big crane helos.

Now, the percentage in general in that area of helos that go down from combat causes or otherwise that are lifted out and put back into operation I think is somewhere around 62 percent. In other words, of the helos that crash, 62 percent of them are recovered, taken back to the depot and repaired and used again.

Senator THURMOND. Almost two-thirds?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. And so in order to put this in perspective I had my staff break out the losses in Indochina in previous times; for instance, during the Cambodian operation last May and June, during the Tet operation in 1968, and during a corresponding time in South Vietnam last year, namely, from the 8th of February to the current time, and the overall helo losses during those comparative periods are in some cases higher than the ones that have been lost during this particular period. In other words, although we deplore the loss of a single helo, I do not think that these losses are out of line in view of the opposition and environment in which they have been operating.

Secretary LAIRD. I can give you the cost figures, Senator Thurmond. The Cobra helicopter costs about \$465,000. That is the AH-1.

秘密表示(捺印)

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沖繩復帰準備委員会
 日本国政府代表 殿

外 務 大 臣

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