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(Unofficial translation)

Excerpts of interpellation by Prime Minister Sato with Mr. Sone, member of the House of Representative, at the Special Committee on Okinawa Reversion Agreement on November 11, 1971.

Mr. Sone: (abridged)

The paragraph 4 of the Joint Communiqué states that "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security" and that "the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also an important factor for the security of Japan."

Since that time, I have a concern on this statement, particularly the case for Taiwan, as an excessive statement on the part of Japan. The Prime Minister's speech at the National Press Club on this subject clarified more than a vague expression "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security." It reads that if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the policy of the Government of Japan towards prior consultation concerning military combat operation from Japan would be to decide its position positively and promptly. The word "maemuki-ni" was translated into English as "positively"; "positively"

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means that Japan's answer is not negative but affirmative and active. It is a sort of trick that you used the word "maemuki-ni" for the word "positively". In short, in spite of the prior consultation system, you committed yourself to something like an automatic consent in the case of an armed attack against the Republic of Korea. As for "Taiwan area", Japan is deeply concerned with the peace and security of this area; we cannot put up with war breaking out in this area by any chance. But your speech at the National Press Club represents a little bit different connotation. Should an armed attack take place against the Republic of China, situation would require the U.S. to carry out its defense obligations. In such a case, Japan will deal with the situation, recognizing it being a threat to the peace and security of the Far East including Japan.

Your speech concerning Taiwan area is not so clear-out as in the case of Korea. However, Mr. Prime Minister, you made a very unfortunate overstatement when you implied in your speech that not only in the case of Taiwan Strait but in the occurrence of an armed attack against the Republic of China, Japan would say "OK" for U.S. forces fulfilling its defense commitments with the Republic of China.

China.

It is under these circumstances that we are discussing the Reversion Agreement. Ever since, active debate has been made through meetings of various committees as well as through main session of the House of Representatives. At the National Press Club, you made a statement which may well be interpreted as your saying "yes", and, on the other hand, your official explanation or your answers at the Diet have always been that there can be both "yes" or "no". I believe that this point has to be made clear. I'd like to ask for your definite answer on this point.

Prime Minister Sato:

As far as some problems are concerned, Democratic Socialist Party shares our view. Particularly, in presenting to U.S. our proposal of early reversion of Okinawa without nuclear weapons and in "hondonami" fashion, late Chairman Nishimura's views were given due consideration.

Okinawa reversion is by no means an easy task, but, viewing the relationship between Japan and U.S., I thought U.S. would not flatly refuse the return of this former Japanese territory to Japan in the face of strong desire expressed by peoples of mainland Japan and Okinawa Prefecture. At the same time, though, I sensed that it is necessary that I should see to it that U.S. confidence

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in Japan be retained; these are the basic attitude with which I embarked upon negotiation with U.S.. What, then, is a problem? Needless to say, it is the Security Treaty, under which Japan's security is assured. In this context, I noted the fact that Japan will faithfully observe the Security Treaty, and that the security of Japan is secured under that Treaty.

Mr. Sone indicated the inadequacy of wording in my speech at the National Press Club after the issuance of the Joint Communique between President Nixon and myself.

In the case of prior consultation, Japan's answer will be either "yes" or "no". This principle has not been changed a bit. Your point is that if that is the case, I should have said so frankly, and that the words "Japan would deal with the problem "positively" may be construed as my implying automatic consent.

I think the word "maemuki-ni" may be inappropriate, as you pointed out. Let me explain the background further, though. I think in the case of prior consultation the Government of Japan has to make a decision without delay; the Government of Japan has to reply promptly, and has to make its intention clear without delay. This is what I meant.

May I take this opportunity to clarify my intention,

since

since I had the impression that my speech at the National Press Club was misleading. We earnestly hope for the peace of Japan and the prosperity of the entire Asia. Therefore, it is our sincere hope that war will never occur. Let's take the case of prior consultation. Situation may force Japan to be involved in war. We have to run that risk. This is the point which must be taken into consideration when we judge whether it suits our national interest or not. Since it is our sincere hope that we will not be involved in a war, in the case of U.S. forces engaging in military combat operations from its bases in Japan. From this standpoint, we will never allow U.S. forces to freely engage in combat operations from Japan; we wish to decide on our own judgement in the case of prior consultation. This is what I intended to say.

I feel very sorry, if my speech at the National Press Club has been misunderstood. In this ~~quiet~~ debate, I wish to make this point clear.

Mr. Sons: Your statement is a very important one, and I think it is a very favourable statement. It is a progress. At least, at the Security Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June last year, Under Secretary Johnson said that Japan had not been interested at all in international peace and security but that in exchange for the return of Okinawa, for its being placed under the Security Treaty, Japan would answer positively "yes" or "no" with respect to problems of Korea and Taiwan. However, Senator Symington, Chairman of the Subcommittee, went further to add that, having once been Secretary of Defense, he wonders, if contingency might arise in Korea or Taiwan, whether or not U.S. forces would be allowed to engage in military combat operations from Japanese bases including Okinawa, whether or not Under Secretary would reserve the answer. To this Under Secretary Johnson replied that the whole context is that Japan's answer tends to be "yes," in other words, it is almost "yes", or essentially the same as "yes".

You may argue that this is a line of argument employed to convince the Senate. I don't think this is a case, though. Let's take the armed attack against Republic of

Korea

Korea for example. Japanese public opinion would not allow that Japan immediately and positively gives consent to U.S. forces to engage in military combat operations from U.S. bases in Japan including Okinawa in the event armed conflict or boundary dispute might arise as seen in EC 121 and <sup>Public</sup> ~~Public~~ cases. In the case of Korea, U.N. forces are stationed there. Therefore, in the event a large scale armed conflict occurs there, circumstances may not allow the Japan's answer to be always "no". This is theoretically so. It is very much dangerous to be "positive" in the case of Korea. This is all the more the case with Taiwan strait. Not allowing any armed attack or armed conflict in both these areas should be the basic attitude to be taken by Japan and U.S. As far as the paragraph 4 of the Joint Communique is concerned, there still remains a lee way or it does not represent Japan's automatic consent. However, your speech at the National Press Club is quite different and it implies "yes". Paragraph 4 of the Joint Communique is so construed as you explained it in your capacity as Prime Minister of Japan at the National Press Club and is agreed upon as such by the U.S. side. This fact cannot be denied.

However,

However, situation has been changed as you are well aware. The preamble of the Reversion Agreement provides that reversion is carried out on the basis of the Joint Communique including paragraph 4. Mr. Prime Minister, you just explained that your speech at the National Press Club does not imply the automatic consent on the part of Japan, and that "yes" or "no" in each case will be decided in accordance with Japan's national interest. I assume then that "no" will be relatively large in number after all. Any way, Mr. Prime Minister, would you please confirm once again those foregoing points?

Prime Minister Sato: Since I've just answered your question, you can confirm my statement by reading transcripts carefully.

Let me make it clear; we have agreed to the presence of U.S. forces in Japan from the viewpoint of securing our national interests; This is exactly what the Security Treaty aims to obtain. There should not be such a case as Japan's being dragged into the state of disaster due to the U.S. military combat operations. This is precisely why the prior consultation system is invented; matters which go beyond the scope of the purposes of the Security Treaty will be a subject of prior consultation. Further, as I've stated before, the United States Government has assured that it will not take action contrary to the view of the Japanese Government. Therefore, this is what we should decide upon our own judgment. I wish you to understand in this context.

Mr. Sone: According to the record of the hearings of the U.S. Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, the statement made by Prime Minister in 1969 at the National Press Club, which would indicate such a change of situations, is clearly explained by Deputy Secretary of Defense himself.

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Here let me quote Senator Sparkman's questions addressed to Secretary Parkard.

"In the Nixon-Sato communication of 1969, Japan stated that Taiwan was the most important factor to the security of Japan. Do you think there has been any reassessment of that position by Japan in view of the change of the United States-China policy and even more recently the vote in the U.N.?" To this Deputy Secretary Parkard responded as follows:

"I cannot say whether there has or has not been a reassessment of that policy, but I think we must recognize that there will be a reassessment of policies of this nature by Japan and our other allies."

I want you recognize that the America Side has already realized such situations. He further continued: "We are in a period of change in our foreign relations and we have to recognize that there will be changes in terms of reassessments that were made several years ago and in a great many situations."

I appreciate your clarification of "positively" which must be the view of the Japanese Prime Minister. I have been wondering who is the Japanese Member of Parliament or who is the Secretary of the United States.

That



That I have really through of Senator Pearson confirms that the Department of Defense expects affirmative with respect to prior consultation on Taiwan and Korean situation. Deputy Secretary of Defense stated in his opening remarks that U.S. bases in Japan can be effectively used for such situations. Being further closely questioned, Deputy Secretary became rather negatively and stated, "I think that while there has been some indication that consent would be forthcoming in relation to Korea and Taiwan, indicating that there is some common interest there." Apparently he lost his confidence in his first statement. He further said "We have to assess this question in the longer terms that I have alluded to. It is going to depend entirely upon what the mutuality of interest is at the time."

Having these in mind. I must say that what you stated is a very important change of course. It is a necessary change of course. Reapprochment between U.S. and Communist China, such a major change is now under way. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan can be realized and withdrawal from Vietnam is of course in sight. Further, Communist China has now been

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admitted into U.N. blessed by its members. Being in such a new era of world situations, you should renounce or make some adjustments on your speech at the National Press Club.

I am sure you will meet President Nixon in a near future, and taking such occasion, you should change your recognition in the joint Communicate in November 1969. How would you comment on such a belief of mine.



Prime Minister Sato: Joint Communique has already been issued as you know, but your point is that my speech at the National Press Club is misleading.

As for as that point is concerned, I have corrected myself. Please so understand.

I've thus far explained that if your neighborhood is set on fire, you cannot sit with folded arms but that you must take such measures as preventing the fire spread out on your house, hoping that this explanation will make it easier for the public to understand my intention. This is exactly the case with Korea. After Okinawa is returned to its matter country Japan, situation in Taiwan Strait may turn out to be a fire in your neighborhood. I am convinced that we don't have to be concerned about Taiwan problem, since it represents only a domestic, internal problem under the One China principle. However, should contingency might arise in Taiwan Strait in spite of my conviction just I mentioned, it is quite natural that we should take necessary measures so that we could avoid sparks.

My point is that Japan, against this background, Japan decides "yes" to the prior consultation on its own judgment, from the standpoint that our national interests will not be hindered.

は、基地なき沖縄の返還でなければ絶対につけな... 安保政策、こういうような全面的な条件返還... 沖縄の返還をやらなければいかぬというのを言... いた。私は、事前に言つて、これがわが国民... のコンセンサスをつくるに大きな役割をし... たいと思ふ。...

に思ひますので、国会におきましてその点を明ら... かにしておきたいと思ひます。... ○曾根委員、たいへん重要な発言であったと思... うのです。私は、それはたいへん前向きな発言... だと思います。...

ういふ状態になるだろうと思はれます。しかし、私は、台湾の場合においては、これは中国は一つだ、こういうことで、内政的な問題で、われわれがとやかく心配しなくても、問題は起こりつけない、かように確信はいたしてあります。が、もしも万一、そういうことがあれば、これは近火に對してわれわれが火の粉を受けなければならない。これは当然だろう、かように思います。さういふことを含みながら、事前協議といふものをどうも自主的に、しかも日本と中国に反しない、その立場でのイニス、これをきめる、こういうことでございます。

○留務委員 重ねてお尋ねしますが、近々ニクソン大統領とお会いになるであろうし、私はお会いになるべきだと思はれます。中国訪問するニクソン大統領が、もし日本側の事情が許すならば、むしろその前に日本へ参りまして中国問題を論議するのが私は筋合いだと思ふ。その前後は別といたしまして、近くお会いになるだろうし、お会いになる必要もある。そういう場合に、いま申されたような点で軌道修正をすべきだ。それはニクソン大統領でも異存がないと思ふ。中国本土と台湾とが平和的にうまく一体化して行くというところ、これは望みでしようけれども、ですから、われわれは、どうも冷戦構造で台湾を守る場合に、日本及び沖縄から出撃するのはあたりまえだと言わなければならない。これは軌道修正するには、むしろアメリカの政策にわれわれが、何と云いまむらうアメリカの政策にわれわれが、何と云いまむらうの軌道修正は当然ありまうと思ふのです。もう一べんその点を確認して次の問題に進みたいと思はれます。

○佐藤内閣総理大臣 私、ただいままだニクソン大統領と最近に会うというふうな予定をとおしてありませんし、また、ニクソン大統領と公談を持つ、そういうこともございません。しかし、ただいま行われるようなこと、アメリカをいたしたとしても、日本の国会において論議がかわされること、こういうものに無関心であらうはずはございません。

形で、その中に核兵器撤去費も入っているからこれで十分じゃないか、こういう主張であつたわけですね。私は正直に言つてそれは不十分だ。この共同声明の中で、日本側から見れば日本商品ともしうべき第八項が、なぜ全文その協定に入らなぬのか。そのくらいのこと、できなければ、全くこれはもう交渉当局としてはなつてないと思はれる。それができてない。