

琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 米国議会
会審議（議会証言、議事録）

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下院外交委アジア太平洋小委

ライレヤワ教授証言

다 흥우

1. 本電の取扱いに慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

連絡あり~~ない~~

68 年 2 月 29 日 22 時 20 分
68 年 3 月 1 日 12 時 40 分

ワレントン
本省

死着

北米

外務大臣殿

下田 大使

臨時代理大使 總領事 代理

下院外交委員会におけるアジア問題に関する公ちよう会

第627号 平

29 日本委員会アジア太平洋小委員会はアジア問題に関する
公ちよう会を開催したところ、ライシャワー教授は第1番目
の証言者として同証言においてベトナム問題を中心に、中共
の現状及び日本の重要な役割等に言及しつつ、最近のアジア
情勢をレビューし、アジア太平洋地域の今後の発展が米国
にとって重要である等の見を明らかにした。同教授は更に
右冒頭発言の後の質疑応答及びその後の記者会見においてオ
キナワ問題について（イ）戦略核体制についてはボラリス及
びグアムを基地とする戦略空軍で対処出来ると思われ、オキ
ナワについては本土基地なみの返かんは可能と思う、（ロ）
これにせよ、1969年中には決着をつけ、70年1月に返
かんを実現することが望ましく、これが不可能な場合も6
9年中に少なくとも返かん時期は決定すべきである、（ハ）
オキナワ問題とベトナム問題が安保改定に関する最大の問
題であり、これをこのまま放置する場合は危険にして望まし
からざる事態を招くおそれがある等々の旨を述べた。なお次
回公ちよう会は3月7日の予定。議事録空送する。（2）

(3)

會	領	密	旅	營	厚
計	參	文	電	參	文
人	參	參	參	參	參
員	參	參	參	參	參
參	參	參	參	參	參
長	參	參	參	參	參
北	參	參	參	參	參
中	參	參	參	參	參
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西	參	參	參	參	參
南	參	參	參	參	參
駐	參	參	參	參	參
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國	參	參	參	參	參
米	參	參	參	參	參
歐	參	參	參	參	參
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通	參	參	參	參	參
入	參	參	參	參	參
經	參	參	參	參	參
協	參	參	參	參	參
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規	參	參	參	參	參
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三	參	參	參	參	參
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文	參	參	參	參	參
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文	參	參	參		

2月29日米国下院外交委員会極東小委員会公
聴会におけるライシャワー教授証言テキスト
(沖縄に関する部分)

Mr. Zablocki. We can come back to the real thrust of the purpose of these meetings, what the United States future role will be. I think you touched on one particular issue; that is, the emotional and political one. There is no doubt in my mind, certainly, as to your views on Okinawa. My question would be because I believe there is a timetable involved and before 1970 when the Mutual Security Pact must conclude something must be done about Okinawa.

I think it is going to be directly involved with a future security treaty. What are your views as to what arrangements for the return of the Island to Japan should be made prior to 1970, and realizing the domestic political problem, the acceptance of the public announcement at this time or any time in the future.

Mr. Reischauer. You are talking about this country?

Mr. Zablocki. This country.

What guidance, what advice will you give this particular period in question?

Mr. Reischauer. Well, the Japanese-American relationship is the most important thing to us in that whole part of the world. Everything else in a sense depends upon that. There are two things that make that relationship different. One is the great Japanese worry about our situation in Vietnam, we paid a high price for it. The other is the fact that we still have almost a million Japanese under our semi-colonial control, which is not sound.

You have the specific problem of 1970 being a time that opposition groups in Japan have always aimed at as a year to break the relationship between America and Japan. For this reason I think it is essential that in calendar 1969, after the Presidential election is passed, it would be easier to do, we should solve the Okinawa problem.

The

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The solution I would like to see is the return of Okinawa to Japan. At the very least we can get a clear date for its return; it is tied down but I don't see why it can not be returned in 1969. The problem is American bases on Okinawa. At the present time they do not have the restrictions in Japan proper with regard to the utilization of nuclear weapons or movement directly into combat elsewhere.

Actually, we are not in a position where we could carry out a major military commitment in an area near Japan without Japanese cooperation and support. Hence, I see no danger in putting the bases in Okinawa under the same restrictions, meaning that we need Japan's support before we could really utilize it that we have for the bases in Japan itself.

Either we have a close relationship with Japan, including Okinawa, or we run the risk of having no relationship with Japan.

Mr. Zablocki. But the Japanese also have a political problem. The base agreements between the United States and Japan on the Mainland of Japan are entirely different.

Mr. Reischauer. They are different in only two respects. That is, we have agreed you have prior consultation with the Japanese before we utilize those bases for direct action militarily anywhere,

Actually, two and a half years ago when some B-52s did come out of the Okinawa bases and bombed Vietnam there was such strong political reaction we realized we lost the possibility of using those bases as we saw fit for actions of that sort. This one is already eroded, the remaining one is the nucleus. I think this is something that should be examined very carefully. While I am not an expert in this field and therefore should not really give you hard testimony on it, I suspect very strongly that the American nuclear position, including defense of Okinawa, Japan and all the rest can perhaps be done as well without nuclear bombs. This is true, the problem can be solved very easily and it would be a great plus in our relationship with Japan, which is a most important thing to all of us in that part of the world.

Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. Zablocki. But you are saying your security would not be endangered if we moved the nuclear arm from Okinawa to Guam?

Mr. Reischauer. Yes. After all you have the Polaris submarine and the long-distance ones that are in real nuclear striking power for that part of the world, or anywhere else. You have lots of other possibilities for storage such as Guam and other places, so you don't have to have it in Okinawa, I believe.

As I say, I am not an expert on this but I believe we could probably get along without it. Since this is such a crucial matter in our relationship with Japan, which is already in a tenuous position because of the pressures Vietnam brings, this is something maybe we ought to concede.

Mr. Zablocki. But you are an expert on political sciences, Mr. Reischauer. Do you think that certain factions in the United States will accept this policy? I am speaking of at the present time there are several veterans' organizations decisively opposed. What can be done to change their views?

Mr. Reischauer. I doubt if there is that much feeling about this. After all, we lost men in Normandy and we don't claim Normandy, and a lot of other places. This is obviously an invalid kind of argument.

Mr. Culver. Retrospect.

Mr. Reischauer. Maybe I should not have mentioned that.

Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. Buchanan. I hate to dwell on the subject, but I want to make sure I understand what you are saying about Thailand. You say on page 4 that while we ought to seek to withdraw from this kind of commitment, it would be impossible to say how this can best be done until the outcome in Vietnam is clear, but in any case, it would not be easy or wise for the United States to back out of commitments until satisfactory substitutes are made available for the guarantees we have given.

Then.

Then you suggest maybe a regional organization or an international.

Now given the fact that we do have those commitments, that they do now exist and that there are not at present substitutes, you do advocate that we honor those commitments?

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