

# 琉球大学学術リポジトリ

米国管理下の南西諸島状況雑件 沖縄関係 米国議会審議（議会証言、議事録）

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24

下院軍事委員會會議事錄

(※印欄内は電信課記入)

(昭和四二・七一改正)

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外務省

共015外/13

②完①

◎日米の軍事関係にミソ

米下院安保分科委報告

「ワシントン十六日A P 共同」  
ワシントンで十六日明らかにされた米下院外交委の国家安全保障政策分科委報告は、日本、韓国、  
沖繩、フィリピン、タイ、台湾およびインドネシアにおける米国の軍事訓練援助計画について論評し、特に日本関係では次のように指摘している。

一、米國はいま日本が西太平洋の安全保障により大きな役割りを果たすより望んでいるが、皮肉なことにまさにこの時期に両國の軍隊の関係はますますかけ離れたものになりつつある。

一、事情に通じた観測筋は日本に軍国主義が復活したとはみていない。しかし日本はだんだん自前の軍事計画に依拠するようになり、米國の軍学校に留学生を派遣することに消極的になっている。

一、また日本は自國領内の米軍基地における第三國の軍事要員の訓練を禁じている。

一、米軍当局者は、沖繩でアジア各國軍要員に対する訓練、とくに兵たん、補給の分野での訓練を拡大できると考えている。しかし、来年沖繩の施政權が日本に返還されることから、同地に大規模な訓練センターを設置する見通しは明るくない。

(丁)

防衛努力足りぬ

# 沖縄討議で日本に不満

米下院軍事委

があり、新聞や何でもそこについて、「日本は自動的生涯で西独を抜いて世界第三位だ」「われわれが日本につき込んだ国防支出は、日本が不況の時に二三回も日本経済の安定に役立つ」といって激しい発言がなされる。

最後はレアード長官が「日本の国防支出の詳細は表さない方がよい」と思つて「素直にそのを、リパード参謀長は拒否し、結局レアード長官も「まあ、よく言ひな

情である。英米は、六四年から五五年間の日本前年の民間支出額、その間経路総生産（GNP）に対する比率を提示した。それに対する表は六八年に約百九十九億六千、GNPの二・三であるのに、日本は約十二億七千万（○九兆九千万）にすぎない。

一方、ヘルツォグ（我知）は「血を流して征服した神聖ローマの二の二の儀の状態にするには反対だ」と述べ、國務院は「返還権をまかせるべきではない」との間際猶ほ警告する言を吐いた。

[illegible]

要性を強調している。

沖縄返還問題は、七年度国防予算に計上されている沖縄の施設整備費「二百五十万」の四割で取上げられている。レオ・トウ国防長官が、沖縄返還問題は、左派首相の動き前に「日本側でもっとも重大な問題である」との認識のもとに、國務省を中心総合的に検討が進められている」と説明し、

次いで沖縄基地使用、日本への主權とこの國が取り合っているが、肝心部分はほとんど開示されている。その開示は、リバーズ委員は「日本は最近、われわれを助けている」とこれを認めているが、いよいよ近へ、日本の防衛努力に対する協賛助している。「日本に借の大きな借

いる。「日本には声の大きな群衆

AP141

MILITARY AID-ASIA

BY SPENCER DAVIS

WASHINGTON, FEB. 16 (AP)--A CONGRESSIONAL STAFF REPORT SAID TUESDAY UNITED STATES MILITARY ADVISERS AND SOME DIPLOMATS IN ASIA ARE COMPLAINING THAT THE MEANING OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE HAS NOT BEEN CLEARLY COMMUNICATED TO THEM BY SPECIFIC COMMAND HEADQUARTERS AT PEARL HARBOR.

THE REPORT PREPARED FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY SAID A GREATER AMOUNT OF INFORMATION ON POLICY MATTERS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE U.S. MILITARY ADVISERS "AS A MEANS OF ENHANCING THEIR CONFIDENCE IN CURRENT POLICIES ... AND CONVEY THAT CONFIDENCE TO THOSE AMONG WHOM THEY WORK."

THE REPORT TURNED A CRITICAL EYE ON THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING PROGRAM IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, OKINAWA, THE PHILIPPINES, THAILAND, TAIWAN AND INDONESIA.

IT SAID THAT SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN TRAINING IN JAPAN HAS RESULTED IN "LESS RAPPORT AND CONTACT WITH THE UNITED STATES AT A TIME WHEN U. S. INTERESTS SEEM TO REQUIRE EVEN CLOSER LIAISON AND WHEN JAPAN HAD LITTLE OR NO MILITARY FORCE."

(MORE)

AP142

WASHINGTON--MILITARY AID-ASIA 2 (AP141)

THE U.S. HAS SPENT MORE THAN 440 MILLION DOLLARS IN THE PHILIPPINES ON EQUIPMENT, SUPPORT AND TRAINING FOR FILIPINO FORCES BUT THE RESULT OF THIS INVESTMENT HAS NOT BEEN HARTENING, THE REPORT SAID.

"THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WHICH INCLUDES ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY CONSTABULARY FORCES HAS FAILED TO MEASURE UP TO EXPECTATIONS, " IT SAID AND ADDED:

APPARENTLY PHILIPPINE LEADERS HAVE EXPECTED THE U.S. TO PROVIDE FOR 90 PER CENT OF THEIR DEFENSE NEEDS--EXPECTATIONS WHICH THE U.S. LARGELY HAS FULFILLED IN THE PAST. THE U.S. AT PRESENT BUYS OUT OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE FUNDS FOR THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY SUCH ITEMS AS GASOLINE, OIL VEHICLE BATTERIES AND TIRES.

THIS PROGRAM WILL END NEXT YEAR BUT EFFORTS BY THE U.S. TO ENCOURAGE GREATER PHILIPPINE DEFENSE SPENDING--NOW ABOUT 65 MILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY--HAVE HAD LITTLE EFFECT TO DATE.

THE REPORT SAID IT IS IRONIC THAT AT A TIME WHEN THE U.S. IS ENCOURAGING JAPAN TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN THE SECURITY OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC THAT THE TWO MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS WERE GROWING FARTHER APART.

IT SAID INFORMED OBSERVERS DO NOT FEAR THE SEPTRE OF RESURGENT MILITARISM IN JAPAN. BUT INCREASINGLY JAPAN IS DEPENDING UPON ITS OWN MILITARY PROGRAMS AND ARE INCREASINGLY UNWILLING TO SEND JAPANESE STUDENTS TO U.S. MILITARY SCHOOLS.

HIGHLIGHTS OF OTHER FINDINGS:

JAPAN HAS FORBIDDEN THE TRAINING OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AT U.S. MILITARY BASES ON JAPANESE SOIL.

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OKINAWA--U.S. MILITARY AUTHORITIES BELIEVE AN OPPORTUNITY EXISTS ON OKINAWA FOR EXPANDED TRAINING OF ASIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY IN LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENT. THE REPORT POINTED OUT THAT THE PROSPECTS ARE NOT BRIGHT FOR CREATING A MAJOR TRAINING CENTER THERE BECAUSE OF REVERSION OF THE ISLAND TO JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION IN 1972.

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JAPAN HAS FORBIDDEN THE TRAINING OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS AT U.S. MILITARY BASES ON JAPANESE SOIL.

KOREA--BEGINNING NEXT JULY 1, THE U.S. WILL ELIMINATE TRAINING IN INTELLIGENCE, COMBAT, AND COMBAT SERVICE COURSES. KOREANS ARE BEING ENCOURAGED TO EXPAND THEIR OWN SERVICE SCHOOLS AND TO USE CIVILIAN EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES.

IT RECOMMENDED THAT THE PRESENT MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP BE ABOLISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND BE REPLACED BY A JOINT U.S.-KOREAN GROUP OF ADVISERS TO REFLECT CURRENT U.S. OBJECTIVES.

TAIWAN--THE U.S. SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE SHIFTING OF AS MUCH TRAINING IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AS POSSIBLE FROM MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN MILITARY SALES FOR NATIONALIST CHINA. IT SAID TAIWAN HAS DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR ESSENTIAL TRAINING NEEDED FOR SUCH SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS SYSTEMS AS SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES. FOR THESE WEAPONS IT IS NEITHER PRACTICAL NOR DESIRABLE FOR NATIONALIST CHINA TO DEVELOP ITS OWN TRAINING BASE.

THAILAND--CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ESTABLISHING WITH U.S. SUPPORT A COMMON FACILITY FOR TRAINING MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM ALLIED AND FRIENDLY NATIONS IN ASIA. SUCH A FACILITY COULD BE LOCATED ON ONE OF THE BASES LIKELY TO BE HANDED BACK BY THE U.S. TO THE THAI GOVERNMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

INDONESIA--THE U.S. HAS INCREASED ITS MILITARY ASSISTANCE BY MORE THAN 300 PER CENT IN ONE YEAR--FROM \$5 MILLION TO \$18 MILLION DOLLARS. THIS IS REVERSING THE SUCCESSFUL U.S. POLICY OF KEEPING A LOW PROFILE IN INDONESIA. TRAINING SHOULD BE GIVEN INCREASED EMPHASIS INSTEAD OF SHIFMENTS OF ARMS AND COMBAT RELATED ITEMS.

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注意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

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大政事外外儀官 電信写

事務次官  
臣官官審長  
秘書文会官  
総人電厚計  
国資長  
領移長  
参領旅移

総番号(TA) 44286  
69年10月2日20時28分 米 国 発  
69年10月3日09時39分 本 省 着

主管  
米北

外務大臣殿 下田(大使) 臨時代理大使 総領事 代理

米下院軍事委ちよう開会(オキナワ問題)

第3112号 平

貴電米北/第1950号に関し

9月26日下院軍事委員会が公表した同委秘密ちよう開会  
議事録のうちオキナワ問題に関する部分の要旨次の通り(

テキスト2部空送) → 8/14/69 政オ8/16/69

4月/5日のちよう開会におけるレアド国防長官の証  
言

(1) (リバーズ委員長のオキナワ返かん交渉が行なわれ  
る可能性があるならば、1400万ドルにものぼる公共施  
設をつくるのはむだであるとの発言に対し) 米国はしかし  
引続きオキナワに基地を維持しようとしている

(2) (ブランドフォード委員会主席参与の高校建設等は  
金のむだであるとの発言に対し) オキナワには軍属もいる  
ことであり、高校建設はむだとは思えない。自分は米国が  
引続きオキナワに基地を保持すると予想するので、学校建  
設を支持する

(3) (委員長のオキナワ返かんについて上院の承認を得

外務省

注意

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電信写

るつもりかとの質問に対し) 上院指導層は交渉の過程でし  
問を受けるだろうが(WILL CERTAINLY C  
ONSULTED). 合意の内容が未確定であるので、それ  
が正式な上院の承認を必要とするかどうかは答えかねる

(4) (委員長のオキナワが施設とともに返かんされるな  
ら、こうきゆう的施設のオキナワに建設するのは差しひか  
えるべきではないかとの質問に対し) 米国はオキナワに引  
続き基地を維持することを期待しており、オキナワ返かん  
が必然的にオキナワからの米軍基地撤去を意味するような  
印象を与えるのは好ましくないと思う。

(5) (ブレイ議員のオキナワにおける施設掘じゆうは土  
地接収のために住民の不満を高めているとの発言に対する  
応答は削除された)

(6) (ガブサー議員の日本に完全にオキナワの主権を返  
かんし、かつ基地を維持することはできるかとの質問に対  
し) それは国務省が答えるべきものと思う。私は最近日本  
人と会ったが、日本政府の側にはその点で問題があるよう  
である(あと削除)。

(7) (委員長の日本は最近あまり米国の助けとなってい  
ないとの発言に対して) 日本の防衛費は国民所得の約1%  
であるが、支出額の詳細は議事録から削除すべきものであ  
ると思う(議長はこれに反ばくして日米両国の1964-

外務省



注 意

1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の主管変更その他については検閲班に連絡ありたい。

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67年の防衛費絶対額及び国民総所得比を公開)

2. 同日のちよう開会におこるホール議員の発言

私は血によつて獲得したリュウキュウ諸島、特にオキナワの放棄に反対する闘いをひきいてきたが、国務省のみをしてオキナワ問題を討議交渉せしめ、あるいはオキナワを放棄せしめることは米国民に害を及ぼすことであり、国防省はオキナワに関し断固たる態度をとるべきであると思う。

3. 7月28日のオキナワどくガス事件に関する陸軍CBR及核関係ストーンじゆん将の証言

(1) 7月8日(化学)兵器よりふるいペイントを落すルーティンの更新作業を行なつていたところ、プラグふ近から小規模のろうえいが起つた。いずれも米国民である24名がこの更新作業を行なつていた建物内にいたが、数名がGBをあび、全員ガスマスクを着用して建物から退去した。救急班が建物に入り、兵器を完全な状態にし、重しよう者は出なかつたが、24名全員が検しんを受け、うち4名は短期間病院に収容された。事件後6時間以内に全員退院して平常の勤務に復した。7月12日には専門家がオキナワに到着して兵器(複数)を非どく性化した。この事件は7月18日のウォールストリートジャーナルに報道された。外交経路を通しての日本政府への通報後7月22日日本には化学物質(LETHAL CHEMICAL)はちよ

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外務省

注 意

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電 信 写

蔵されておらず、オキナワにおけるものも撤去される旨発表された。

(2) (委員長の日本の選挙に影響するとしてオキナワからどくガスを撤去したが、このように国外のどくガスをすべて撤去したらいつたいどうやって海外の米兵を守るのかとの質問に対し) オキナワ情勢が悪化することを予想して陸軍は2年前からオキナワの化学兵器撤去を考えていた。

4. プエプロ号事件報告書公表(往電第2374号参照)に関するプエプロ号調査分科会パイク委員長の発言

報告書中日米安保条約に関する部分はすべて削除されたが、航空機が日本からプエプロ号救援に赴けなかつたこと、そして現在進行中のオキナワ交渉との関連で前記削除は注目されるべきである。もし在日基地と同様の制約が返かん後のオキナワ基地に適用されるとすれば、あまり役にたたない基地になってしまうので、オキナワに基地を保持し得るか否かは問題にならなくなる。

(了)

-4-

外務省

別添 /

アメリカ局長

参事官

北米一課長

送付公信

政 第 8168 号

昭和44年10月3日

外務大臣殿

在米下田大使

引用公信・電信番号

往電才3112号に附し

送付資料  
米下院軍事委院内会  
議事録抜萃2部

[記] 御申入の議事録全体は入手次第  
御送付申上げらる。

要処理
庶務
秘書官
方
渉外調査
漁業
航空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査
力十ダ
局業務

付属添付 ☒

付属空便 (行) ☐

付属空便 (D.P.) ☐

本信写送付先:

(別添省略)



別添 /

送付公信

北米一課長

政 第 8396 号

昭和44年10月11日

外務大臣殿

在米下田大使

引用公信・電信番号

貴電米北1才1950号 往電才3112号

送付資料

沖縄問題 (米下院軍事委院内会議事録2部)

要処理
庶務
秘書官
方
渉外調査
漁業
航空
科学協力
連絡調整
調査
力十ダ
局業務

付属添付 ☐

付属空便 (行) ☐

付属空便 (D.P.) ☒

本信写送付先:

(別添省略)



HEARINGS  
ON  
MILITARY POSTURE  
AND

LEGISLATION TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS DURING THE FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, NAVAL VESSELS, AND TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND TO PRESCRIBE THE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF THE RESERVE FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

[PART 1 OF 2 PARTS]

HEARINGS HELD MARCH 27, APRIL 1, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 30,  
MAY 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, AND 15, 1969



[Pages of all documents printed in behalf of the activities of the House Committee on Armed Services are numbered cumulatively to permit a comprehensive index at the end of the Congress. Page numbers lower than those in this document refer to other subjects.]

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

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MELVIN PRICE, Illinois  
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GEORGE NOARIS, *Counsel*  
JAMES F. SHUMATE, Jr., *Counsel*  
MARY JO SOTTILE, *Counsel*  
ONETA L. STOCKSTILL, *Executive Secretary*

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WASHINGTON : 1969

37-066

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The CHAIRMAN. Give it for the record.  
(The study referred to is classified and has been furnished separately to the committee.)

Mr. PACKARD. Unless you have some further questions I don't think I will take any more time on this.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a pleasure to have a man who has made a living, and a businessman who has been successful, handling these things, rather than somebody who has demonstrated their obvious incapacities to be entrusted with the responsibility. It sure is a pleasure.

Let's get to the next question, which has to do with Okinawa.

Mr. Secretary, is any action or negotiation taking place within the executive branch at the present time having to do with the possible relinquishment of control of Okinawa to the Japanese?

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, while reversion of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan has been the subject of continuing exploratory conversations in both Tokyo and Washington, no negotiations have as yet taken place between the United States and Japanese Governments, nor have any decisions with regard to this matter yet been made within the U.S. Government. The United States has recognized Japanese residual sovereignty in the Ryukyu Islands ever since we signed the peace treaty in 1951. In recent years sentiment has been mounted in both Okinawa and Japan to have this translated into the return of administrative control of the area to Japan. When Prime Minister Sato visited Washington in November 1967, the joint communique between him and President Johnson recorded Sato's wish to have a date set for reversion [deleted] and the decision of the President and Prime Minister to keep the question under "joint and continuous review" was also a part of that communique of 1967.

The Prime Minister of Japan plans to come to Washington late this year, and has indicated his intention to seek a decision on a date for reversion during his visit here. [Deleted.]

In preparation for Prime Minister Sato's visit and in recognition that Okinawa is the most critical problem in United States-Japanese relations, we are participating with the State Department and other Government agencies in a full study of the Okinawa reversion question. This study is going on at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, if there is a possibility—and it is quite a political question—if there is a possibility that we are going to deal on this, I think it is premature to give you 14 millions of public works. We can save that for you pretty fast.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add one bit of caution.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute now.

Secretary LAIRD. We are still going to have a military base in Okinawa.

The CHAIRMAN. I know all about it. You are going to have a military base on Iwo Jima, too. This is so much to the entire Marine morale of the United States, and you are going to have an emergency fund, and if you have to have all of this, if it works out the other way, we will take care of you.

Mr. BLANDFORD. To put a high school in there. Mr. Chairman, and a few other things which will revert eventually to Okinawa, seems

to be a waste of money if we are going to eventually turn it over to the Japanese Government.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is any nation on earth that has a currency balance, it is that crowd in Japan.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, there has been some criticism of the high school. I happen to have looked at that high school, and looked at the school facilities generally. I was one of those who supported funding of those school facilities on Okinawa, because I felt that with the large number of dependents we had there, this was a justifiable expense.

Quite recently I looked at the new schools there, and I don't think that it was really a waste of our taxpayers' money.

I would anticipate that we would continue to have military installations there, and I would still support my vote in the Congress to fund that school building program.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: Irrespective of the civilian control of the islands, would these installations be put in an area where we would have control as a result of an amended treaty?

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I believe that you will find that the construction projects requested in the 1970 bill are in the area where we would maintain our military installations, and would not be outside—

The CHAIRMAN. Should we make a transfer—

Secretary LAIRD (continuing). Of the area.

The CHAIRMAN. We will go into that further.

Mr. BLANDFORD. So there will be no question as to what is developed in the military construction bill, if we are going to deal with the Japanese Government on reversion of administrative control of Okinawa to the Japanese, why should we be giving consideration to the withdrawal of dependents from Okinawa?

The Marine Corps has done very well over there since 1945 without any dependents. Why do we have to build schools and other permanent fixtures which will revert? Why not just start saving money and pull the dependents out?

Secretary LAIRD. That is something I will be very glad to look into. I thought the chairman was directing his attention to the schools that were built last year when some of us got into a discussion of that problem.

I happen to have supported those schools last year. I didn't do it as Secretary of Defense, however. This question that the chief counsel of the committee mentioned—

The CHAIRMAN. You have to change your position on a lot of things since you have become Secretary of Defense.

Secretary LAIRD. I will probably change them on a lot of other things, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course you will, Mr. Secretary. We will not disagree with you. You are doing well, let the record show that. Of course the week is not out, though, Mr. Secretary. [Laughter.]

Go ahead, Mr. Secretary. Is it planned to seek Senate approval of this program?

Secretary LAIRD. The answer, Mr. Chairman, is that the Senate leadership will certainly be consulted as any negotiations proceed in regard to Okinawa, but without knowing the nature of agreements

that might be reached, it is impossible to say whether any agreements reached would require formal Senate approval, or will require formal Senate action.

It is impossible to give you a direct answer to that question, because there conceivably could be an agreement that would not require any approval as far as the U.S. Senate is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure if you want to give it back, and pay them money—go ahead, I won't say that. You have to go through the Senate. And then they have split jurisdiction over there, don't they, on the other body?

Secretary LAIRD. I am finding that out.

The CHAIRMAN. They do. It is not unusual for the Armed Services Committee, with the fine relations on foreign affairs, to meet together.

Mr. Secretary, if this action is imminent, don't you think it is unwise to proceed with the construction of permanent facilities in Okinawa? Shouldn't we wait until it is firmly established what our position will be in relation to this territory?

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I want to make it very clear, pending the establishment of a U.S. policy and the completion of negotiations with the Japanese Government on the matter of reversion, it is impossible to anticipate what specific agreements will be reached. It is, of course, expected that U.S. forces will continue to be stationed on Okinawa, and I don't believe we should give the impression this reversion discussion means that the U.S. forces would not be present on Okinawa.

The CHAIRMAN. This is not a trust territory?

Secretary LAIRD. No; this is not trust territory.

The CHAIRMAN. The Marshall Islands?

General WHEELER. That is about it. They lump them all into what they call Micronesia.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, there certainly will be a continuing requirement to meet the military needs in this area. As you know, the fiscal year 1970 budget request for military construction, which will be taken up later as I understand it by this committee, includes \$12.7 million for Okinawa.

Our military construction program in Okinawa is subject, however, to frequent review in terms of both our present and long-term requirements. But I do not think it is proper for us to give the impression that this reversion problem necessarily means there will not be a military presence of the United States in Okinawa.

This has been very significant as far as the South Vietnam war effort is concerned, and it is one of the important bases. We have a large U.S. investment in this base.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, we had a large investment in France, a pretty good-sized investment in France. We saved that country, hook, line, and sinker.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bray.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Secretary, regarding Okinawa, I have been objecting to the expenditures in Okinawa for some years because of the unsettled condition as to our right there and what is going to happen. Each time, as I recall, the committee has made the Department of State come over here, and again reiterate they meant to stay here,

and then in about 72 hours they would say they had their fingers crossed or didn't mean it, or words to that effect. I think we are spending too much in Okinawa. [Deleted.]

I merely suggest that before you ask us to put too enormous buildings there, I think we should consider a little of the experience in the past.

Secretary LAIRD. I will be glad to review the question that was brought up here. As far as dependents are concerned, I will look into that. I have not looked into the dependents problem since I have been Secretary of Defense, but I will at the request of this committee.

Mr. BRAY. There are two studies that this committee has made on that, and each time there was sentiment expressed we were moving too fast in Okinawa, building it up too large. It brings resentment from people there. The people lose their lands, but at least we are still there.

Secretary LAIRD. I think my friend, the gentleman from Indiana, knows full well we have now invested—I believe last year it was approaching [deleted] dollars.

Mr. BRAY. [Deleted.]

Secretary LAIRD. It is a very large figure, as far as the total investment in Okinawa. Let me put that in the record.

(The information is classified and has been furnished separately to the committee.)

Mr. BRAY. Let's go a little slow for once.

Secretary LAIRD. In this budget we have a request for some military construction. It is in the amount of \$12.7 million. I will certainly review the questions that have been raised here regarding dependents, but I would like to remind this committee that we do have a very large investment of U.S. tax dollars that has been made in Okinawa. That is no reason to continue it, but at the same time I do think we should understand that we've got a very substantial program going there.

Mr. BRAY. I don't want to proceed with this matter too far, but I do recall I was on one of the subcommittees that went to France, seeing what we might be able to save out of the mess over there. It made me sick to see what we had built there.

Much of it was built after some members of this committee were trying to stop this construction, or slow it down. But it had no effect at all. I hope we will have better luck this time.

Mr. PACKARD. Mr. Chairman, could I just make a comment here? I am very interested in what Mr. Bray had to say [deleted]. I'm very interested in what you had to say.

Mr. BRAY. There was a religious group that mentioned it several times, that we are building hatred and bitterness over there, I talked to civilians over there and found out that was true, a lot of the ill will we built in ourselves by something less than stupidity.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor.

Mr. GUBSER. Perhaps, Mr. Secretary, this question should be asked of the State Department. If so, please tell me so.

But is it possible to return complete sovereignty to Japan for the Ryukyus and retain a base [deleted].

If that is a question that should go to the State Department—

Secretary LAIRD. I think that is a question that should go to the State Department. I have had some discussions with the Japanese

about this quite recently, and I think there is a problem involved here as far as the Japanese Government is concerned [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. You must remember the Japanese have not been helping us too much these days.

Mr. GUBSER. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know, but I wouldn't be surprised.

Mr. GUBSER. Don't they?

Secretary LAIRD. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. They have a powerful vocal crowd, they have the newspapers and everything.

Secretary LAIRD. [Deleted.]

Their contribution to defense is about 1 percent of their gross national product [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. They are No. 2 in the world in automobile production. They replaced West Germany.

Secretary LAIRD. We better keep the details of Japan's defense expenditures out of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. No, put it in the record.

Secretary LAIRD. We could put in the record the difference between our contribution to national security and the Japanese contribution measured by gross national product. It is quite a startling situation. (The following information was received for the record.)

COMPARISON OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES<sup>1</sup> OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

[Dollar amounts in millions]

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Defense expenditure, United States <sup>2</sup>	\$51,213	\$51,827	\$63,572	\$75,451	\$79,601
Defense expenditure, Japan <sup>3</sup>	\$778	\$849	\$960	\$1,095	\$1,172
Defense expenditure (percent of GNP) United States	8.1	7.6	8.5	9.6	9.3
Defense expenditure (percent of GNP) Japan	1.0	1.0	1.0	.9	.9

<sup>1</sup> Current market prices, NATO definitions of defense expenditures.

<sup>2</sup> Calendar years.

<sup>3</sup> Fiscal years, beginning April 1 of each year; amounts converted at rate of 3.50 yen per dollar.

Mr. GUBSER. In addition, our defense spending in Japan has actually on two or three occasions stabilized their economy, when a recession was imminent. Isn't that the truth?

The CHAIRMAN. We helped them a lot.

We have three remaining questions. I think the staff is to be congratulated on the composition of these questions. I think the Secretary is to be thanked for his full responses to all of them.

We have three of them. I would like to finish this afternoon. One is military construction, one is ROTC, and the other is on industrial funded activities. All of these are important.

I think we should go to the military construction now, Mr. Secretary. You say on page 9 of your unclassified statement that the Defense Department has accumulated a substantial backlog of needed military construction projects. What is the magnitude of this backlog?

Secretary LAIRD. This past fall, in connection with the review of the fiscal year 1970 program, the military departments were requested to present the total magnitude of their known construction requirements, without regard to phasing. The total amounted to \$19.6 billion, of

and however the war in Vietnam ends, that major national requirements for military preparedness will continue. While the reduction of US military commitments in Vietnam will permit adjustments in our defensive posture, we cannot allow these adjustments to degrade our military capabilities unacceptably. I know that this Committee and the Congress will be alert to this danger and will support the actions necessary to safeguard our security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I want to make two observations. Just as I helped to lead the fight against giving away the Panama Canal, for years I have led the fight against the giving away, or letting the Ryukyus, or Okinawa in particular, won by bloody conquest, revert to the prefectural status in Japan.

I just hope when Mr. Packard goes out there, one of the first places he stops is Buckner Museum. I wish that you could take some of the past High Commissioners that we have known through the years with you out there, like General Carraway, who was High Commissioner for two or more different terms, and talk to some of these people about whether or not this crossroads of the Pacific should revert under any circumstances, and I submit to you we do damage and a disservice to the Nation to even let the State Department discuss this, let alone negotiate it, or knuckle under to them. I hope the Department of Defense will rear up on its hind legs and stand very firm, albeit I am willing to leave that to your judgment.

Secretaries come and go. As long as we are going to be the defenders of freedom around the world, we better well have a place to get our feet on the ground and defend from, before we shorten our lines. That is all of that.

Secondly, just in the event that we wouldn't get to see the Secretary again, in view of all the happenings that are going on in the world today, the Secretary mentioned in his opening statement, I believe, Mr. Chairman, the question of the eternal problem we have like training personnel, or death and taxes that is always with us, in getting the product of all research and development to its maximum perfection, and yet getting it into the hands of the troops.

Thirdly, he mentioned on an occasion or two, the problem of defense vis-a-vis the Bureau of the Budget, and indeed I know his thesis that if we don't save our economy and the backbone of our Nation, there will be little use to defend it otherwise.

I go along with a lot of that. But earlier this year, Mr. Chairman, there was a lot of publicity on both of these problems. I believe actually it occurred in a thesis written by an employee of the Bureau of the Budget, a Mr. Stubbing, on the subject of military weapons developed.

I wonder if the Secretary has had a chance to look into that document, and if he would have any comment to make about those observations out at DOD as they affect the defense of our country.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to address myself to the subject raised by the gentleman from Missouri, Dr. Hall.

I have had the opportunity of going over the paper which was written by a "key Government official," as it was described in the article about Mr. Richard A. Stubbing, who is a military budget analyst in the Bureau of the Budget. It is true, at the time he authored this paper he was on academic leave at Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs.

Many of the points that are raised in this paper are points that we



nually. I would like to emphasize that no open-air testing of infectious materials is conducted at Fort Detrick.

The risks involved in open-air testing of lethal agents are minimized by continuous review of safety procedures and the adoption of new technology for test site monitoring. Further, the data gained from past tests are continually being used to reduce to the minimum the requirement for further open-air testing of lethal agents. No serious accidents have occurred in over 15 years of such open-air testing at Edgewood and only one serious incident occurred in over 17 years of open-air testing at Dugway. As a result of the incident at Dugway, in which sheep died, additional safeguards have been adopted to reduce the possibility of an accident in the future. Permanent advisory committees of eminent scientists have been established to review periodically and in detail the testing safety at Dugway. Recently an advisory committee has been established to review the open-air test procedures at Edgewood Arsenal. We should note that the CB activity at Fort McClellan, Ala., involves training on decontamination procedures and not testing, however, the advisory committee will also review this training activity as well as the testing at Edgewood.

(e) *Nonmilitary byproducts of research.*—The House Committee on Science and Astronautics in its 1959 report listed about 70 contributions to public health, welfare, and safety. Discoveries at Edgewood Arsenal, Md., for example, led to the later use of nitrogen mustard for treatment of cancer and to the development of an improved catheter for use in treatment of "blue babies." Another example of Edgewood Arsenal research is the development of a method, useful to medical institutions, physicians, and medical examiners, which detects extremely small quantities of LSD in the blood stream. Toxicological findings observed in the research of approximately 100,000 chemical compounds have been turned over to the industrial sources of these compounds, thus contributing to the safety, health, and benefit of the public, as well as our knowledge of many potentially toxic compounds.

Since the end of World War II, the scientists and engineers at the biological center, Fort Detrick, Md., alone have published more than 1,400 individual papers in the open scientific literature, many of these papers have made contributions to public welfare, and to scientific knowledge, particularly in agriculture, medicine, and public health. Significant contributions have been in the development of several new vaccines and toxoids. Another contribution is work on sterilization and isolation techniques which have contributed to support of the NASA space program (for example, the Apollo II operation). Other examples include an evaluation of hospital or surgical masks, and investigations into gaseous disinfection techniques, resulting in capabilities for sterilization of heat, or moisture sensitive articles which previously could not be satisfactorily sterilized. Although much of the work is necessarily classified these publications and contributions have resulted from a program generally believed to be highly secretive.

#### OKINAWA INCIDENT

Currently in the news is the Okinawa incident. I would like to describe for you what actually occurred there and what the status is today. On July 8, while performing a routine renovating operation

to remove old paint from a weapon, a small leak developed adjacent to the filling plug. Twenty-four personnel, all U.S. citizens, were in the renovation building; several were exposed briefly to chemical agent GB; they all put on their protective masks and evacuated the building. Emergency teams entered and rendered the item safe. No personnel were severely affected. All 24 were examined; four were admitted to the hospital for brief periods. Within 6 hours after exposure all of those hospitalized were released to full duty.


On July 12 a team of experts arrived in Okinawa to demilitarize and detoxify the contents of the weapon. The weapon has been demilitarized and the contents detoxified.

This incident was reported by the Wall Street Journal on July 18. After notification to the Japanese Government through diplomatic channels, it was publicly announced on July 22 that there were no lethal chemical stocks in Japan and those in Okinawa would be removed.

#### PRODUCTION FACILITIES

On this Vu-Graph are depicted our manufacturing plants. Edgewood Arsenal has a limited production capability which supports its laboratories and provides production engineering.

#### MANUFACTURING PLANTS



Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denver has the capability to produce the nerve agent, GB. Its production plant has been in a layaway status since 1956. As part of the complex at this arsenal, facilities are available for loading the agent into a variety of munitions. The demilitarization of the M-34 Air Force cluster bombs will be accomplished here and are to be disposed of as part of Project CHASE.

The Newport Chemical Plant is located in the Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Newport, Ind. The plant first produced VX in April.

whether we were guilty or not. I told them that we were certainly looking at it, and pointed out that we certainly were suspect. Gradually, over the next several months, the data accumulated and showed that the Army was actually at fault.

The claims were submitted, and the Army recommended that they be paid.

The CHAIRMAN. It turned out you were guilty, and while you don't form the policy, somebody should have admitted it.

General STONE. The basic mistake was right at the time of the incident making the flat statement that we were not involved, and that we couldn't be involved.

The CHAIRMAN. But you had an idea, you knew that that plane was in the area.

How long have you been in this business?

General STONE. About 25 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody can kid an oldtimer like you.

Mr. RANDALL. General, you said there were some bad circumstances, and I want the record to show that I happened to read their account of this. Have you read this thing?

General STONE. I believe I did, sir.

Mr. RANDALL. There were some good circumstances in that if the wind had changed it could have gone to Salt Lake City, couldn't it sir?

General STONE. It could have, sir, but without affecting people as there were people living in this area where the agent rained out and where these sheep died. There was no effect whatsoever on the people living in that valley, or on their pets or on the rodents native to the area.

Mr. RANDALL. Did you take steps to stop traffic on Highway 40? Here were these innocent people going along on Highway 40.

General STONE. Sir, the wind was not in the direction of Highway 40.

Mr. RANDALL. If the wind did change, did you have anybody there to stop them?

General STONE. Sir, we have had an arrangement for many years with the Tooele County sheriff to stop this traffic if we ever had to.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I have to recognize Mr. Pike on the *Pueblo*.

Now, Mr. Pike, you are recognized.

Mr. PIKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The report is in front of all the members. It is for release to the papers. There are a few things I would like to bring to their attention.

First, the procedural matters, the fact that the report was a unanimous report, and I think this is due in large measure to Mr. Slatinshek's work—the fact that it is not full of demagoguery or loaded language.

It is factual, precise, and it is in my opinion an excellent job by Mr. Slatinshek.

Second, there are elements in it which have been deleted, obviously. There are things which have been censored. One of the reasons that it took so long to get it out was that we were in some combat with the Department of Defense and the Navy as to what should be included in the report, and what should be left out. And what we have here is a

compromise between what they first wanted to take out, and what they finally insisted had to be taken out.

As to the substantive matters of the report, I would say the most important thing in the report you will find at the bottom of page 1619, and the top of page 1620, this language:

The reluctant but inescapable conclusion finally reached by the Subcommittee is that because of the vastness of the military structure, with its complex division into multiple layers of command, and the failure of responsible authorities at the seat of government to either delegate responsibility or in the alternative provide clear and unequivocal guidelines governing policy in emergency situations—our military command structure is now simply unable to meet the emergency criterion outlined and suggested by the President himself.

That, and the following paragraph are in my opinion the most important conclusions as to the national security implications.

Two other items deserve some comment. The entire section on the effect of our status of forces treaty with Japan was removed from the report, and I think that the members of this committee should be particularly aware of the significance of this, not only in connection with why aircraft did not go from Japan to the aid of the *Pueblo*, but also because of the implications involved in our current negotiations regarding the island of Okinawa.

If the same restrictions are to apply to the island of Okinawa which do apply to Japan, it is my personal feeling that we shouldn't worry too much about whether we have a base left there or not, because the base wouldn't be much use to us if we had one. Whether or not the Navy or CINCPAC could have sent aircraft from Japan to the aid of the *Pueblo* is in much doubt. Everybody will argue about this.

The State Department says yes, they could have done it. But the responsible military commanders themselves felt that they could not do it, and accordingly no request was made for aircraft from Japan to go to the aid of the *Pueblo*, and this is very significant as far as Okinawa and our negotiations on Okinawa are concerned.

The final item I would like to mention briefly is as to the code of conduct which was also a part of our jurisdiction. We do conclude that it is necessary to do some revision of the code of conduct, at least insofar as it affects those situations where we are not at war, and where, therefore, prisoners of other countries are not protected in any manner by the Geneva Convention which governs prisoners of war.

In our opinion it wouldn't have made much difference with the North Koreans whether we had a declared war or not, but it is our conclusion that the code itself is in conflict with the Geneva Convention, and we say the matter should be studied, and studied now.

Mr. Bray might like to say something from the other side.

The CHAIRMAN. I want you all to remember this. They grew up under the McNamara regime where everybody in uniform was afraid to make a decision, and you could find nobody that would assume any responsibility.

I certainly hope that concept has been dispelled. It was just a question of nobody wanting to assume the responsibility, Mr. Pike.

Mr. PIKE. Well, there are two elements to it, Mr. Chairman. I think what you say is correct, there is a confusion as to who has got the right to make the decision in the first place. What decisions can CINCPAC make? CINCPAC I don't think knew what decisions he could make,



and Commander Naval Forces for Japan didn't know what decisions he could make.

The other part of it is that even if they had known, the messages did not get through to them in time to make the decisions fast enough, if they had had the authority. It doesn't matter whether you are talking about an ABM or the jawbone of an ass, somebody has got to make a decision to use it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pike is absolutely right. One reason I set up this committee, consisting of Mr. Pike, Mr. Nedzi, Mr. Lennon, Mr. Nichols, Mr. Brinkley, Mr. Bray, Mr. Hall, Mr. Stafford and Mr. Whitehurst, was the question of command control and communications. You remember the problem of the *Liberty* ship which was attacked by the Israelis. The *Pueblo* was a continuation of that problem. This committee did a fine job. The DOD asked me to go slow on it. I say, "Nothing doing," I said, "You have made these mistakes, now live with them." And it indicates too that this committee is not and will not be rubberstamped. It is our responsibility to do it, let's do it.

Now, Mr. Bray.

Mr. BRAY. I do want to reiterate what Mr. Pike said, and also what the Chairman said. I don't know what kinds of words they used for it, "Everything will work out," and you couldn't get to the top man at the Pentagon, and we did nothing.

Only one addition here, that we give in detail the communications from the *Pueblo* and to the *Pueblo*, and there is one paragraph:

The foregoing communication traffic from the *Pueblo*, among other things, clearly reflects the intention of the commanding office to react passively and comply with the boarding orders of the North Korean forces. Therefore the failure of Commander Naval Forces Japan and higher naval authority to officially respond to these communications and direct the *Pueblo* to take more aggressive and positive action constitutes, in the view of the subcommittee, a tacit endorsement and approval by Commander Naval Forces Japan of the actions taken by the *Pueblo*.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bray.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to stress one thing, and get it straight in my mind.

Mr. Pike's committee has done a magnificent job. Mr. Pike, in the paragraph that was deleted by the State Department, I did not quite get exactly what the import of that deletion was?

Mr. PIKE. Well, Mr. Hébert, what the State Department did, they did not take out a paragraph, they took out five pages involving all of our correspondence with the executive branch regarding the effect of our status of forces treaty with Japan on our right to use aircraft based in Japan in an emergency, or in a combat situation.

Now, there are different ground rules, if you interpret what the *Pueblo* was involved in as an emergency situation or if you interpret it as a combat situation.

According to the best way I can piece it together, if they had all agreed that it was simply an emergency situation, aircraft were to be launched from Japan for a rescue operation; this could have been done.

On the other hand, if you anticipate that an aircraft launched from Japan would be going into combat with North Korean aircraft, or with

North Korean naval forces, this could not have been done without prior consultation with the Japanese.

Mr. HEBERT. I wanted the committee to understand what you just said, Mr. Pike. Here is what it amounts to.

We have bases in Japan, and all they are is a National Guard for Japan. We maintain them, we provide protection for them. Here is a country we conquered, here is a country we put back on their feet, and when it comes to our own defense, we cannot use our planes to defend ourselves except with their permission.

The CHAIRMAN. Okinawa is our main base in that region, but the minute you have an accident and our enemies get hold of it and publicize it, the armed services announce that all agents are going to be removed from Okinawa because it will affect some election in Japan.

I can't speak for the committee, but I can speak for myself. If we remove those gas storages we have outside of the United States and bring them all home, how are we going to protect our soldiers?

General STONE. Sir, for the record, I should say that the Army has been trying to remove these stocks from Okinawa [deleted] for the past 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.]

General STONE. We can anticipate from the Army's point of view that we are going to have increasing difficulties in Okinawa. [Deleted] and this is why we initiated a couple of years ago in the Army Staff a proposal to move these stocks from Okinawa.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Chairman, that statement is the first statement that we have had that the armed services have planned for 2 years to withdraw from Okinawa, and I am glad you have made that statement, General, because this committee has eliminated all construction items in Okinawa, but it is the opinion of the Army that eventually you are going to be off Okinawa, is that correct?

General STONE. Sir, as far as we were concerned, we wanted our chemicals off of Okinawa.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Well, whatever it is from your viewpoint, the United States has capitulated to Japan concerning Okinawa?

General STONE. Sir, I am not competent to answer that question. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. What members of the committee want to question these witnesses?

I can put these questions in the record. I have tried to get the staff to anticipate everything, but if you have anything, I will not cut you off.

Mr. ICHORD. General, you made the statement that your CBW was made for defensive use. Does CBW have any deterrent at all against nuclear attack?

The CHAIRMAN. Before we answer that, without objection, a quorum being present, the report is approved, the report by Mr. Pike is approved. We have a quorum here and this represents an awful lot of work.

Now, if you don't believe it, just look what they are bringing for you. The report is approved. Mr. Pike will have his own press conference.

Mr. PIKE. I want you to know that you will be very welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. I want the committee to get the credit for it.

Mr. ICHORD. Did you understand my question, General?

HEARINGS  
ON  
MILITARY POSTURE  
AND

LEGISLATION TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS DURING THE FISCAL YEAR 1970 FOR PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, NAVAL VESSELS, AND TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND TO PRESCRIBE THE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF THE RESERVE FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

[PART 1 OF 2 PARTS]

HEARINGS HELD MARCH 27, APRIL 1, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 30,  
MAY 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, AND 15, 1969



[Pages of all documents printed in behalf of the activities of the House Committee on Armed Services are numbered cumulatively to permit a comprehensive index at the end of the Congress. Page numbers lower than those in this document refer to other subjects.]

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

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The CHAIRMAN. Give it for the record.  
(The study referred to is classified and has been furnished separately to the committee.)

Mr. PACKARD. Unless you have some further questions I don't think I will take any more time on this.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a pleasure to have a man who has made a living, and a businessman who has been successful, handling these things, rather than somebody who has demonstrated their obvious incapacities to be entrusted with the responsibility. It sure is a pleasure.

Let's get to the next question, which has to do with Okinawa.

Mr. Secretary, is any action or negotiation taking place within the executive branch at the present time having to do with the possible relinquishment of control of Okinawa to the Japanese?

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, while reversion of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan has been the subject of continuing exploratory conversations in both Tokyo and Washington, no negotiations have as yet taken place between the United States and Japanese Governments, nor have any decisions with regard to this matter yet been made within the U.S. Government. The United States has recognized Japanese residual sovereignty in the Ryukyu Islands ever since we signed the peace treaty in 1951. In recent years sentiment has mounted in both Okinawa and Japan to have this translated into the return of administrative control of the area to Japan. When Prime Minister Sato visited Washington in November 1967, the joint communique between him and President Johnson recorded Sato's wish to have a date set for reversion [deleted] and the decision of the President and Prime Minister to keep the question under "joint and continuous review" was also a part of that communique of 1967.

The Prime Minister of Japan plans to come to Washington late this year, and has indicated his intention to seek a decision on a date for reversion during his visit here. [Deleted.]

In preparation for Prime Minister Sato's visit and in recognition that Okinawa is the most critical problem in United States-Japanese relations, we are participating with the State Department and other Government agencies in a full study of the Okinawa reversion question. This study is going on at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, if there is a possibility—and it is quite a political question—if there is a possibility that we are going to deal on this, I think it is premature to give you 14 millions of public works. We can save that for you pretty fast.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add one bit of caution.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute now.

Secretary LAIRD. We are still going to have a military base in Okinawa.

The CHAIRMAN. I know all about it. You are going to have a military base on Iwo Jima, too. This is so much to the entire Marine morale of the United States, and you are going to have an emergency fund, and if you have to have all of this, if it works out the other way, we will take care of you.

Mr. BLANDFORD. To put a high school in there. Mr. Chairman, and a few other things which will revert eventually to Okinawa, seems

to be a waste of money if we are going to eventually turn it over to the Japanese Government.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is any nation on earth that has a currency balance, it is that crowd in Japan.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, there has been some criticism of the high school. I happen to have looked at that high school, and looked at the school facilities generally. I was one of those who supported funding of those school facilities on Okinawa, because I felt that with the large number of dependents we had there, this was a justifiable expense.

Quite recently I looked at the new schools there, and I don't think that it was really a waste of our taxpayers' money.

I would anticipate that we would continue to have military installations there, and I would still support my vote in the Congress to fund that school building program.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: Irrespective of the civilian control of the islands, would these installations be put in an area where we would have control as a result of an amended treaty?

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I believe that you will find that the construction projects requested in the 1970 bill are in the area where we would maintain our military installations, and would not be outside—

The CHAIRMAN. Should we make a transfer—

Secretary LAIRD (continuing). Of the area.

The CHAIRMAN. We will go into that further.

Mr. BLANDFORD. So there will be no question as to what is developed in the military construction bill, if we are going to deal with the Japanese Government on reversion of administrative control of Okinawa to the Japanese, why should we be giving consideration to the withdrawal of dependents from Okinawa?

The Marine Corps has done very well over there since 1945 without any dependents. Why do we have to build schools and other permanent fixtures which will revert? Why not just start saving money and pull the dependents out?

Secretary LAIRD. That is something I will be very glad to look into. I thought the chairman was directing his attention to the schools that were built last year when some of us got into a discussion of that problem.

I happen to have supported those schools last year. I didn't do it as Secretary of Defense, however. This question that the chief counsel of the committee mentioned—

The CHAIRMAN. You have to change your position on a lot of things since you have become Secretary of Defense.

Secretary LAIRD. I will probably change them on a lot of other things, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course you will, Mr. Secretary. We will not disagree with you. You are doing well, let the record show that. Of course the week is not out, though, Mr. Secretary. [Laughter.]

Go ahead, Mr. Secretary. Is it planned to seek Senate approval of this program?

Secretary LAIRD. The answer, Mr. Chairman, is that the Senate leadership will certainly be consulted as any negotiations proceed in regard to Okinawa, but without knowing the nature of agreements

that might be reached, it is impossible to say whether any agreements reached would require formal Senate approval, or will require formal Senate action.

It is impossible to give you a direct answer to that question, because there conceivably could be an agreement that would not require any approval as far as the U.S. Senate is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure if you want to give it back, and pay them money—go ahead, I won't say that. You have to go through the Senate. And then they have split jurisdiction over there, don't they, on the other body?

Secretary LAIRD. I am finding that out.

The CHAIRMAN. They do. It is not unusual for the Armed Services Committee, with the fine relations on foreign affairs, to meet together.

Mr. Secretary, if this action is imminent, don't you think it is unwise to proceed with the construction of permanent facilities in Okinawa? Shouldn't we wait until it is firmly established what our position will be in relation to this territory?

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I want to make it very clear, pending the establishment of a U.S. policy and the completion of negotiations with the Japanese Government on the matter of reversion, it is impossible to anticipate what specific agreements will be reached. It is, of course, expected that U.S. forces will continue to be stationed on Okinawa, and I don't believe we should give the impression this reversion discussion means that the U.S. forces would not be present on Okinawa.

The CHAIRMAN. This is not a trust territory?

Secretary LAIRD. No; this is not trust territory.

The CHAIRMAN. The Marshall Islands?

General WHEELER. That is about it. They lump them all into what they call Micronesia.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, there certainly will be a continuing requirement to meet the military needs in this area. As you know, the fiscal year 1970 budget request for military construction, which will be taken up later as I understand it by this committee, includes \$12.7 million for Okinawa.

Our military construction program in Okinawa is subject, however, to frequent review in terms of both our present and long-term requirements. But I do not think it is proper for us to give the impression that this reversion problem necessarily means there will not be a military presence of the United States in Okinawa.

This has been very significant as far as the South Vietnam war effort is concerned, and it is one of the important bases. We have a large U.S. investment in this base.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, we had a large investment in France, a pretty good-sized investment in France. We saved that country, hook, line, and sinker.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bray.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Secretary, regarding Okinawa, I have been objecting to the expenditures in Okinawa for some years because of the unsettled condition as to our right there and what is going to happen. Each time, as I recall, the committee has made the Department of State come over here, and again reiterate they meant to stay here,

and then in about 72 hours they would say they had their fingers crossed or didn't mean it, or words to that effect. I think we are spending too much in Okinawa. [Deleted.]

I merely suggest that before you ask us to put too enormous buildings there, I think we should consider a little of the experience in the past.

Secretary LAIRD. I will be glad to review the question that was brought up here. As far as dependents are concerned, I will look into that. I have not looked into the dependents problem since I have been Secretary of Defense, but I will at the request of this committee.

Mr. BRAY. There are two studies that this committee has made on that, and each time there was sentiment expressed we were moving too fast in Okinawa, building it up too large. It brings resentment from people there. The people lose their lands, but at least we are still there.

Secretary LAIRD. I think my friend, the gentleman from Indiana, knows full well we have now invested—I believe last year it was approaching [deleted] dollars.

Mr. BRAY. [Deleted.]

Secretary LAIRD. It is a very large figure, as far as the total investment in Okinawa. Let me put that in the record.

(The information is classified and has been furnished separately to the committee.)

Mr. BRAY. Let's go a little slow for once.

Secretary LAIRD. In this budget we have a request for some military construction. It is in the amount of \$12.7 million. I will certainly review the questions that have been raised here regarding dependents, but I would like to remind this committee that we do have a very large investment of U.S. tax dollars that has been made in Okinawa. That is no reason to continue it, but at the same time I do think we should understand that we've got a very substantial program going there.

Mr. BRAY. I don't want to proceed with this matter too far, but I do recall I was on one of the subcommittees that went to France, seeing what we might be able to save out of the mess over there. It made me sick to see what we had built there.

Much of it was built after some members of this committee were trying to stop this construction, or slow it down. But it had no effect at all. I hope we will have better luck this time.

Mr. PACKARD. Mr. Chairman, could I just make a comment here? I am very interested in what Mr. Bray had to say [deleted]. I'm very interested in what you had to say.

Mr. BRAY. There was a religious group that mentioned it several times, that we are building hatred and bitterness over there. I talked to civilians over there and found out that was true, a lot of the ill will we built in ourselves by something less than stupidity.

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor.

Mr. GUBSER. Perhaps, Mr. Secretary, this question should be asked of the State Department. If so, please tell me so.

But is it possible to return complete sovereignty to Japan for the Ryukyus and retain a base [deleted].

If that is a question that should go to the State Department—

Secretary LAIRD. I think that is a question that should go to the State Department. I have had some discussions with the Japanese

about this quite recently, and I think there is a problem involved here as far as the Japanese Government is concerned [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. You must remember the Japanese have not been helping us too much these days.

Mr. GUBSER. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know, but I wouldn't be surprised.

Mr. GUBSER. Don't they?

Secretary LAIRD. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. They have a powerful vocal crowd, they have the newspapers and everything.

Secretary LAIRD. [Deleted.]

Their contribution to defense is about 1 percent of their gross national product [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. They are No. 2 in the world in automobile production. They replaced West Germany.

Secretary LAIRD. We better keep the details of Japan's defense expenditures out of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. No, put it in the record.

Secretary LAIRD. We could put in the record the difference between our contribution to national security and the Japanese contribution measured by gross national product. It is quite a startling situation. (The following information was received for the record.)

COMPARISON OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES<sup>1</sup> OF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

[Dollar amounts in millions]

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Defense expenditure, United States <sup>2</sup> .....	\$51,213	\$51,827	\$53,572	\$75,451	\$79,501
Defense expenditure, Japan <sup>3</sup> .....	\$778	\$849	\$960	\$1,095	\$1,172
Defense expenditure (percent of GNP) United States.....	8.1	7.6	8.5	9.8	9.3
Defense expenditure (percent of GNP) Japan.....	1.0	1.0	1.0	.9	.9

<sup>1</sup> Current market prices, NATO definitions of defense expenditures.

<sup>2</sup> Calendar years.

<sup>3</sup> Fiscal years, beginning April 1 of each year; amounts converted at rate of 3.60 yen per dollar.

Mr. GUBSER. In addition, our defense spending in Japan has actually on two or three occasions stabilized their economy, when a recession was imminent. Isn't that the truth?

The CHAIRMAN. We helped them a lot.

We have three remaining questions. I think the staff is to be congratulated on the composition of these questions. I think the Secretary is to be thanked for his full responses to all of them.

We have three of them. I would like to finish this afternoon. One is military construction, one is ROTC, and the other is on industrial funded activities. All of these are important.

I think we should go to the military construction now, Mr. Secretary. You say on page 9 of your unclassified statement that the Defense Department has accumulated a substantial backlog of needed military construction projects. What is the magnitude of this backlog?

Secretary LAIRD. This past fall, in connection with the review of the fiscal year 1970 program, the military departments were requested to present the total magnitude of their known construction requirements, without regard to phasing. The total amounted to \$19.6 billion, of

and however the war in Vietnam ends, that major national requirements for military preparedness will continue. While the reduction of US military commitments in Vietnam will permit adjustments in our defensive posture, we cannot allow these adjustments to degrade our military capabilities unacceptably. I know that this Committee and the Congress will be alert to this danger and will support the actions necessary to safeguard our security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hall.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, I want to make two observations. Just as I helped to lead the fight against giving away the Panama Canal, for years I have led the fight against the giving away, or letting the Ryukyus, or Okinawa in particular, won by bloody conquest, revert to the prefectural status in Japan.

I just hope when Mr. Packard goes out there, one of the first places he stops is Buckner Museum. I wish that you could take some of the past High Commissioners that we have known through the years with you out there, like General Carraway, who was High Commissioner for two or more different terms, and talk to some of these people about whether or not this crossroads of the Pacific should revert under any circumstances, and I submit to you we do damage and a disservice to the Nation to even let the State Department discuss this, let alone negotiate it, or knuckle under to them. I hope the Department of Defense will rear up on its hind legs and stand very firm, albeit I am willing to leave that to your judgment.

Secretaries come and go. As long as we are going to be the defenders of freedom around the world, we better well have a place to get our feet on the ground and defend from, before we shorten our lines. That is all of that.

Secondly, just in the event that we wouldn't get to see the Secretary again, in view of all the happenings that are going on in the world today, the Secretary mentioned in his opening statement, I believe, Mr. Chairman, the question of the eternal problem we have like training personnel, or death and taxes that is always with us, in getting the product of all research and development to its maximum perfection, and yet getting it into the hands of the troops.

Thirdly, he mentioned on an occasion or two, the problem of defense vis-a-vis the Bureau of the Budget, and indeed I know his thesis that if we don't save our economy and the backbone of our Nation, there will be little use to defend it otherwise.

I go along with a lot of that. But earlier this year, Mr. Chairman, there was a lot of publicity on both of these problems. I believe actually it occurred in a thesis written by an employee of the Bureau of the Budget, a Mr. Stubbing, on the subject of military weapons developed.

I wonder if the Secretary has had a chance to look into that document, and if he would have any comment to make about those observations out at DOD as they affect the defense of our country.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to address myself to the subject raised by the gentleman from Missouri, Dr. Hall.

I have had the opportunity of going over the paper which was written by a "key Government official," as it was described in the article about Mr. Richard A. Stubbing, who is a military budget analyst in the Bureau of the Budget. It is true, at the time he authored this paper he was on academic leave at Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs.

Many of the points that are raised in this paper are points that we

nually. I would like to emphasize that no open-air testing of infectious materials is conducted at Fort Detrick.

The risks involved in open-air testing of lethal agents are minimized by continuous review of safety procedures and the adoption of new technology for test site monitoring. Further, the data gained from past tests are continually being used to reduce to the minimum the requirement for further open-air testing of lethal agents. No serious accidents have occurred in over 15 years of such open-air testing at Edgewood and only one serious incident occurred in over 17 years of open-air testing at Dugway. As a result of the incident at Dugway, in which sheep died, additional safeguards have been adopted to reduce the possibility of an accident in the future. Permanent advisory committees of eminent scientists have been established to review periodically and in detail the testing safety at Dugway. Recently an advisory committee has been established to review the open-air test procedures at Edgewood Arsenal. We should note that the CB activity at Fort McClellan, Ala., involves training on decontamination procedures and not testing, however, the advisory committee will also review this training activity as well as the testing at Edgewood.

(c) *Nonmilitary byproducts of research.*—The House Committee on Science and Astronautics in its 1959 report listed about 70 contributions to public health, welfare, and safety. Discoveries at Edgewood Arsenal, Md., for example, led to the later use of nitrogen mustard for treatment of cancer and to the development of an improved catheter for use in treatment of "blue babies." Another example of Edgewood Arsenal research is the development of a method, useful to medical institutions, physicians, and medical examiners, which detects extremely small quantities of LSD in the blood stream. Toxicological findings observed in the research of approximately 100,000 chemical compounds have been turned over to the industrial sources of these compounds, thus contributing to the safety, health, and benefit of the public, as well as our knowledge of many potentially toxic compounds.

Since the end of World War II, the scientists and engineers at the biological center, Fort Detrick, Md., alone have published more than 1,400 individual papers in the open scientific literature, many of these papers have made contributions to public welfare, and to scientific knowledge, particularly in agriculture, medicine, and public health. Significant contributions have been in the development of several new vaccines and toxoids. Another contribution is work on sterilization and isolation techniques which have contributed to support of the NASA space program (for example, the Apollo II operation). Other examples include an evaluation of hospital or surgical masks, and investigations into gaseous disinfection techniques, resulting in capabilities for sterilization of heat, or moisture sensitive articles which previously could not be satisfactorily sterilized. Although much of the work is necessarily classified these publications and contributions have resulted from a program generally believed to be highly secretive.

#### OKINAWA INCIDENT

Currently in the news is the Okinawa incident. I would like to describe for you what actually occurred there and what the status is today. On July 8, while performing a routine renovating operation

to remove old paint from a weapon, a small leak developed adjacent to the filling plug. Twenty-four personnel, all U.S. citizens, were in the renovation building; several were exposed briefly to chemical agent GB; they all put on their protective masks and evacuated the building. Emergency teams entered and rendered the item safe. No personnel were severely affected. All 24 were examined; four were admitted to the hospital for brief periods. Within 6 hours after exposure all of those hospitalized were released to full duty.


On July 12 a team of experts arrived in Okinawa to demilitarize and detoxify the contents of the weapon. The weapon has been demilitarized and the contents detoxified.

This incident was reported by the Wall Street Journal on July 18. After notification to the Japanese Government through diplomatic channels, it was publicly announced on July 22 that there were no lethal chemical stocks in Japan and those in Okinawa would be removed.

#### PRODUCTION FACILITIES

On this Vu-Graph are depicted our manufacturing plants. Edgewood Arsenal has a limited production capability which supports its laboratories and provides production engineering.

#### MANUFACTURING PLANTS



Rocky Mountain Arsenal near Denver has the capability to produce the nerve agent, GB. Its production plant has been in a layaway status since 1956. As part of the complex at this arsenal, facilities are available for loading the agent into a variety of munitions. The demilitarization of the M-34 Air Force cluster bombs will be accomplished here and are to be disposed of as part of Project CHASE.

The Newport Chemical Plant is located in the Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Newport, Ind. The plant first produced VX in April



whether we were guilty or not. I told them that we were certainly looking at it, and pointed out that we certainly were suspect. Gradually, over the next several months, the data accumulated and showed that the Army was actually at fault.

The claims were submitted, and the Army recommended that they be paid.

The CHAIRMAN. It turned out you were guilty, and while you don't form the policy, somebody should have admitted it.

General STONE. The basic mistake was right at the time of the incident making the flat statement that we were not involved, and that we couldn't be involved.

The CHAIRMAN. But you had an idea, you knew that that plane was in the area.

How long have you been in this business? General STONE. About 25 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody can kid an oldtimer like you.

Mr. RANDALL. General, you said there were some bad circumstances, and I want the record to show that I happened to read their account of this. Have you read this thing?

General STONE. I believe I did, sir.

Mr. RANDALL. There were some good circumstances in that if the wind had changed it could have gone to Salt Lake City, couldn't it sir?

General STONE. It could have, sir, but without affecting people as there were people living in this area where the agent rained out and where these sheep died. There was no effect whatsoever on the people living in that valley, or on their pets or on the rodents native to the area.

Mr. RANDALL. Did you take steps to stop traffic on Highway 40? Here were these innocent people going along on Highway 40.

General STONE. Sir, the wind was not in the direction of Highway 40.

Mr. RANDALL. If the wind did change, did you have anybody there to stop them?

General STONE. Sir, we have had an arrangement for many years with the Tooele County sheriff to stop this traffic if we ever had to.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I have to recognize Mr. Pike on the *Pueblo*.

Now, Mr. Pike, you are recognized.

Mr. PIKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The report is in front of all the members. It is for release to the papers. There are a few things I would like to bring to their attention.

First, the procedural matters, the fact that the report was a unanimous report, and I think this is due in large measure to Mr. Slatinshek's work—the fact that it is not full of demagoguery or loaded language.

It is factual, precise, and it is in my opinion an excellent job by Mr. Slatinshek.

Second, there are elements in it which have been deleted, obviously. There are things which have been censored. One of the reasons that it took so long to get it out was that we were in some combat with the Department of Defense and the Navy as to what should be included in the report, and what should be left out. And what we have here is a

compromise between what they first wanted to take out, and what they finally insisted had to be taken out.

As to the substantive matters of the report, I would say the most important thing in the report you will find at the bottom of page 1619, and the top of page 1620, this language:

The reluctant but inescapable conclusion finally reached by the Subcommittee is that because of the vastness of the military structure, with its complex division into multiple layers of command, and the failure of responsible authorities at the seat of government to either delegate responsibility or in the alternative provide clear and unequivocal guidelines governing policy in emergency situations—our military command structure is now simply unable to meet the emergency criterion outlined and suggested by the President himself.

That, and the following paragraph are in my opinion the most important conclusions as to the national security implications.

Two other items deserve some comment. The entire section on the effect of our status of forces treaty with Japan was removed from the report, and I think that the members of this committee should be particularly aware of the significance of this, not only in connection with why aircraft did not go from Japan to the aid of the *Pueblo*, but also because of the implications involved in our current negotiations regarding the island of Okinawa.

If the same restrictions are to apply to the island of Okinawa which do apply to Japan, it is my personal feeling that we shouldn't worry too much about whether we have a base left there or not, because the base wouldn't be much use to us if we had one. Whether or not the Navy or CINCPAC could have sent aircraft from Japan to the aid of the *Pueblo* is in much doubt. Everybody will argue about this.

The State Department says yes, they could have done it. But the responsible military commanders themselves felt that they could not do it, and accordingly no request was made for aircraft from Japan to go to the aid of the *Pueblo*, and this is very significant as far as Okinawa and our negotiations on Okinawa are concerned.

The final item I would like to mention briefly is as to the code of conduct which was also a part of our jurisdiction. We do conclude that it is necessary to do some revision of the code of conduct, at least insofar as it affects those situations where we are not at war, and where, therefore, prisoners of other countries are not protected in any manner by the Geneva Convention which governs prisoners of war.

In our opinion it wouldn't have made much difference with the North Koreans whether we had a declared war or not, but it is our conclusion that the code itself is in conflict with the Geneva Convention, and we say the matter should be studied, and studied now.

Mr. Bray might like to say something from the other side.

The CHAIRMAN. I want you all to remember this. They grew up under the McNamara regime where everybody in uniform was afraid to make a decision, and you could find nobody that would assume any responsibility.

I certainly hope that concept has been dispelled. It was just a question of nobody wanting to assume the responsibility, Mr. Pike.

Mr. PIKE. Well, there are two elements to it, Mr. Chairman. I think what you say is correct, there is a confusion as to who has got the right to make the decision in the first place. What decisions can CINCPAC make? CINCPAC I don't think knew what decisions he could make,

and Commander Naval Forces for Japan didn't know what decisions he could make.

The other part of it is that even if they had known, the messages did not get through to them in time to make the decisions fast enough, if they had had the authority. It doesn't matter whether you are talking about an ABM or the jawbone of an ass, somebody has got to make a decision to use it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Pike is absolutely right. One reason I set up this committee, consisting of Mr. Pike, Mr. Nedzi, Mr. Lennon, Mr. Nichols, Mr. Brinkley, Mr. Bray, Mr. Hall, Mr. Stafford and Mr. Whitehurst, was the question of command control and communications. You remember the problem of the *Liberty* ship which was attacked by the Israelis. The *Pueblo* was a continuation of that problem. This committee did a fine job. The DOD asked me to go slow on it. I say, "Nothing doing," I said, "You have made these mistakes, now live with them." And it indicates too that this committee is not and will not be rubberstamped. It is our responsibility to do it, let's do it.

Now, Mr. Bray.

Mr. BRAY. I do want to reiterate what Mr. Pike said, and also what the Chairman said. I don't know what kinds of words they used for it, "Everything will work out," and you couldn't get to the top man at the Pentagon, and we did nothing.

Only one addition here, that we give in detail the communications from the *Pueblo* and to the *Pueblo*, and there is one paragraph:

The foregoing communication traffic from the *Pueblo*, among other things, clearly reflects the intention of the commanding office to react passively and comply with the boarding orders of the North Korean forces. Therefore the failure of Commander Naval Forces Japan and higher naval authority to officially respond to these communications and direct the *Pueblo* to take more aggressive and positive action constitutes, in the view of the subcommittee, a tacit endorsement and approval by Commander Naval Forces Japan of the actions taken by the *Pueblo*.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bray.

Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to stress one thing, and get it straight in my mind.

Mr. Pike's committee has done a magnificent job. Mr. Pike, in the paragraph that was deleted by the State Department, I did not quite get exactly what the import of that deletion was?

Mr. PIKE. Well, Mr. Hébert, what the State Department did, they did not take out a paragraph, they took out five pages involving all of our correspondence with the executive branch regarding the effect of our status of forces treaty with Japan on our right to use aircraft based in Japan in an emergency, or in a combat situation.

Now, there are different ground rules, if you interpret what the *Pueblo* was involved in as an emergency situation or if you interpret it as a combat situation.

According to the best way I can piece it together, if they had all agreed that it was simply an emergency situation, aircraft were to be launched from Japan for a rescue operation; this could have been done.

On the other hand, if you anticipate that an aircraft launched from Japan would be going into combat with North Korean aircraft, or with

North Korean naval forces, this could not have been done without prior consultation with the Japanese.

Mr. HEBERT. I wanted the committee to understand what you just said, Mr. Pike. Here is what it amounts to.

We have bases in Japan, and all they are is a National Guard for Japan. We maintain them, we provide protection for them. Here is a country we conquered, here is a country we put back on their feet, and when it comes to our own defense, we cannot use our planes to defend ourselves except with their permission.

The CHAIRMAN. Okinawa is our main base in that region, but the minute you have an accident and our enemies get hold of it and publicize it, the armed services announce that all agents are going to be removed from Okinawa because it will affect some election in Japan.

I can't speak for the committee, but I can speak for myself. If we remove those gas storages we have outside of the United States and bring them all home, how are we going to protect our soldiers?

General STONE. Sir, for the record, I should say that the Army has been trying to remove these stocks from Okinawa [deleted] for the past 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.]

General STONE. We can anticipate from the Army's point of view that we are going to have increasing difficulties in Okinawa. [Deleted] and this is why we initiated a couple of years ago in the Army Staff a proposal to move these stocks from Okinawa.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Mr. Chairman, that statement is the first statement that we have had that the armed services have planned for 2 years to withdraw from Okinawa, and I am glad you have made that statement, General, because this committee has eliminated all construction items in Okinawa, but it is the opinion of the Army that eventually you are going to be off Okinawa, is that correct?

General STONE. Sir, as far as we were concerned, we wanted our chemicals off of Okinawa.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Well, whatever it is from your viewpoint, the United States has capitulated to Japan concerning Okinawa?

General STONE. Sir, I am not competent to answer that question. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. What members of the committee want to question these witnesses?

I can put these questions in the record. I have tried to get the staff to anticipate everything, but if you have anything, I will not cut you off.

Mr. ICHORD. General, you made the statement that your CBW was made for defensive use. Does CBW have any deterrent at all against nuclear attack?

The CHAIRMAN. Before we answer that, without objection, a quorum being present, the report is approved, the report by Mr. Pike is approved. We have a quorum here and this represents an awful lot of work.

Now, if you don't believe it, just look what they are bringing for you. The report is approved. Mr. Pike will have his own press conference.

Mr. PIKE. I want you to know that you will be very welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. I want the committee to get the credit for it.

Mr. ICHORD. Did you understand my question, General?